Enrile Rebellion cases

7/28/2019 Enrile Rebellion cases

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G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCEENRILE, petitionervs.

JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTORFERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIOMANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDOLIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern PoliceDistrict) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODYOVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,

vs.PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R.ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR.,in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs.

Hernandez1

once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law thatwould re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To besure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with theruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season andcircumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and exciteimpassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite thekind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate MinorityFloor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led byDirector Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant

issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, inCriminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed andearlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor

Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant CityProsecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco andErlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder andmultiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coupattempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held


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overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none havingbeen recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. Thefollowing morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal inQuezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of theNorthern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed thepetition forhabeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filedon March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, orhaving been:

(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initiallyfiled or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge whoissued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea forhearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidatedreturn 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had beencontemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, thespouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urgedthat the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandezruling because-and this isputting it very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other common

crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas theinformation against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committedon the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the SolicitorGeneral would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising froman offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in thesecond clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandezruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single actconstituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of thesame paragraph, with which Hernandezwas not concerned and to which, therefore, itshould not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after whichthe Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and thePanlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours fromnotice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (forthe Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice toa more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners andstressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four


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Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 againstgranting bail to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated inSenator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandezand adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent ofJustice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, andthat under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexedwith common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General inoral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;

(b) hold Hernandezapplicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as anecessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in thecourse of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less gravecharacter;

(c) maintain Hernandezas applying to make rebellion absorb all other offensescommitted in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherancethereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoningHernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In theview of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases havewithstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasiveenough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not toolong ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom

Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the formerregime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandezby enacting a newprovision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason,or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3,which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penaltiesare imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in itsmaximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President ineffect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandezas binding doctrine with the effect of law.The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficientlypowerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandezis, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary meansfor the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted asprohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on theoccasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that theproponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that theywere not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust ofHernandezto ruleout the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under


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either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerptfrom the majority opinion in that case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our PenalCode cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion,and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the

following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime ofrebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 andprision mayor, in the corresponding period,depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of

prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporalin its maximum periodto death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in theabsence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposeduponhim. However, under Article 48 saidpenalty would have to be meted outto him, even inthe absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed inconformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose offavoringthe culprit,not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if theseveral acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez

Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hacereferencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basadofrancamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del TribunalSupremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the SpanishPenal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932,reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso deque un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellossea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito masgrave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de lasque pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran losdelitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del TribunalSupremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to

the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the actscharged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Codedoes not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one actconstitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graverthan that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that thepenalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lowerthan the aggregate ofthe penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spiritof article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act,the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate


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and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other,he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumptionthat it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,which is that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing

of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as ameans necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity thatconstitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not hereinquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. TheCourt's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questionsrelevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the proprietyof the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the

petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing thatwould complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is tobe read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information againstdefendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies describedtherein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by saiddefendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion;that the crime chargedin the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simplerebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies;that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) yearsofprision mayorand a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this

court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendantmay be allowed bail. 13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist inthe statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellionmay not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, musttherefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez,the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished bythe Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/orpreliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaintagainst petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau ofInvestigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation wasconducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questionedinformation. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against arespondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatorycomplaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.


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It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrestwithout firstpersonallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining underoath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, ofthe Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidableduty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows

established procedure bypersonallyevaluating the report and the supportingdocuments submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrestissued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to therespondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over thevoluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondenthad what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply withthat duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied;nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that officialduty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's

reaffirmation ofHernandezas applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical andnecessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as chargingonly the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now beaccepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from whichthis case arose, was a petition forhabeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehiclefor asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking thepetitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original

jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was forpetitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a

right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only afterthat remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Courthave been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals ifappropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandezruling, theinformation charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basisthat it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice ofremedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion toquash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner hasfounded the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is chargedin the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or ofthe respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciablein the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there insteadof directly to this Court.


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There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions wasbeyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumptionwould be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them tobe of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, exceptthis Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established

judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of ourcourts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Courtagainst the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus beprecipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in thatmatter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that therespondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practicesanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though itmay be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearingwhere a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as towhom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing andthereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court ofother parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful orcontemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined.The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner mayhave hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the presentpetition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds wouldonly compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides thesame on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that

said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that shouldhave started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for wasdenied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but willgive short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial processand burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of thelower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of thepetition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that ofpetitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principlesalready set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrestissued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1,1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of saidwarrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost thatquitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regardedand punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than


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by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, noteven the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothingso underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as oftenperpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large

attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even thecrowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that isdisruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery.There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penaltytherefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbedthereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegalactivity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it canonly interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyondinterpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the

initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile andthe spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebelliononly, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter ofright. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional incharacter, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondentJudge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by saidrespondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Courtshall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,vs.

HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court ofMakati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior StateProsecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS andAsst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.


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GUTIERREZ,JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having

committed rebellion complexed with murder1

with the Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation ofPresidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The secondinformation reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias Village, Makati, MetroManila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasanhas committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowinglyobstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio"Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance theissuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probablecause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge ofrespondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis ofa finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liablefor violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and toQuash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legalbasis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murderagainst Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of theiralleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator forharboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion forreconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court inrefusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:


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I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposedmeeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator ofCol. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for allthe component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation ofPresidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential DecreeNo. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patentirregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents

from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwisedirected by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separatelycharged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filedagainst him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that theformer involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or ageneral law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case ofPeople v. Hernandez(99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition forhabeas corpus ofJuan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the longstanding proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion andsubjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandezcase. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,which that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing ofrebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to

its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion.(Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with thecomplex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he becharged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive orcomponent element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.


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The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularlySection 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine rangingfrom 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly orwilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the

investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or hasreasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penallaws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained andaccommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in

his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedlydid not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of suchfailure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation ofSection 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on theaffidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who statedthat the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attendedthe mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening ofDecember 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldierswearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasanin his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, canbe inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo,p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constituteor include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation underPresidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A,Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiplefrustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions forharboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829.The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged actof harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of


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rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent orresolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well assuch common crimes as may be committed to achieve apolitical purpose. The decisivefactor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of menand a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932).Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimesin themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v.Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, theact of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredientof rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be madethe basis of a separate charge. The case ofPeople v. Prieto2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) isinstructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by somekind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to amental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and oftenis, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when thedeed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime andcan not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason toincrease the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug,and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecutionfor robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent insmoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murderas a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is

averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitiveis punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the RevisedPenal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under theother. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandezdoctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationaleremains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as

separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part andparcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished eitherseparately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ...(People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandezand other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in thecrime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder,


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arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendantcircumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory ofabsorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also tooffenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile withColonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealingHonasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion andviolation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on hisacts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance ofrebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with thecrime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor theproposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are

divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion ofthe main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot bepunished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify theimposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleadedguilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution forillegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accusedis charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm andammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of

rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate caseand wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in thepresent case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further nowwould be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case ofMisolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990)where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, thepetitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged

with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion underSection 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based hisarguments on the Hernandezand Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption ofcommon in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense ofillegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEINGCHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL


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POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FORSUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings ofthe Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguezfind no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearmsunder PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been

filed. 3The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrilewith rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder andmultiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex therebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him forrebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted thatthere is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 cannot prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator PonceEnrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan

simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act iscompletely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is infurtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellioninstead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 inaddition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no needfor the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their

successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holdingthe arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedingstherein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

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Case Digest on Rebellion

ENRILE V. AMIN

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,vs.HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of RTCof Makati, Branch 135, HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of RTCof Makati, Branch 134, PairingJudge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO


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TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City ProsecutorEULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charaged with rebellion complexed with murder 1withthe RTCof Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging himfor violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the RTC of Makati.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance theissuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probablecause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge ofrespondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis ofa finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liablefor violation of PD No. 1829."

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Informationon the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legalbasis; and(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murderagainst Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of theiralleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator forharboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

The trial court issued an order denying the MFR for alleged lack of merit and settingSenator Enrile's arraignment.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court inrefusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presentlycharged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meetingon 1 December 1989;III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the componentacts of rebellion;IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No.1829;V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The

preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial ofdue process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued aTRO enjoining the respondents from conducting furtherproceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No.1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against Sneator Juan Ponce Enrile.


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Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that theformer involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or ageneral law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez(99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition forhabeas corpus ofJuan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the longstanding proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion andsubjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandezcase. This Court recently declared:The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which thatHernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any otheroffense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintendedeffect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the above doctrine is applicable in the case at bar?HELD: If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greaterpenalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) differentoffenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtheranceof rebellion.The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularlySection 1 (c) which states:SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes,frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal casesby committing any of the following acts:xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable groundto believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,prosecution and conviction.xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained andaccommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 inhis house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedlydid not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of suchfailure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation ofSection 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on theaffidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated

that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attendedthe mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening ofDecember 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accusedSenator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldierswearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:


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In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house inthe presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constituteor include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation underPresidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A,

Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiplefrustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions forharboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829.The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged actof harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime ofrebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent orresolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such commoncrimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p.

536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of menand a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932).Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimesin themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v.Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, theact of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredientof rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be madethe basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is

instructive:In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Itsvery nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S.,ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penalstatute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identifiedwith the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination withtreason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not bepunished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot beheld guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession ofopium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not adefendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, asin this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive

is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the RevisedPenal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under theother. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.In the light of the Hernandezdoctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationaleremains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged asseparate crimes in themselves. Thus:


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This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by theapplication of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in thecrime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder,

arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendantcircumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory ofabsorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also tooffenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile withColonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealingHonasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion andviolation of PD No. 1829.Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on hisacts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance ofrebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the

crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition thatcommon crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as"common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mereingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexedwith the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleadedguilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution forillegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in thepresent case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as anecessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged withother persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)xxx xxx xxx[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case isalready absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double

jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case ofMisolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990)where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, thepetitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was chargedwith illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion underSection 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based hisarguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption ofcommon in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegalpossession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THECOMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HEBEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OFFIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguezfind no application inthis case.

In the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3The


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prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile withrebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiplefrustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion withmurder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion inQuezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a

separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the RTCof Quezon City.

HELD: In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.The intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged withrebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is afriend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the actis committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then itshould be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punishedseparately.In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there isno need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

The petition was granted . The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED.The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors inCriminal Case No. 90-777, RTCof Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. JuanPonce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

Enrile Rebellion cases

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