Is Civil Society

heard in Brussels?

Interest representation and the role

of civil society in EU decision-making

Adrian Beresford Taylor

European Essay No.4

THE FEDERAL TRUSTEnlightening the Debate on Good Governance

A Definition of Federalism

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Lord BriggsSir Bernard Burrows

Rt Hon Lord CockfieldSir Brian Corby

Lord EzraLord Forte

Sir Michael FranklinSir Arthur Knight

Lord Mackenzie-StuartSir Donald Maitland

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Lord Roll of IpsdenRt Hon Lord Scarman

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Carole TongueSir Brian UrquhartSir Peter Ustinov

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Dr Michael BurgessAlison CottrellHarry Cowie

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Baroness Sally GreengrossProfessor Stanley Henig

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Peter LuffNicolas MacleanDavid Martin MEPDr Richard Mayne

Professor Jörg MonarJohn Pinder OBE

John StevensLord Taverne QC

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The views expressed in this European Essay are the views of the author only. Theyare not necessarily shared by the Federal Trust. As a registered educationalcharity the Federal Trust holds no political views of its own.

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1

THE FEDERAL TRUST

Is Civil Society heard in

Brussels?

Interest representation and the role of civil

society in EU decision-making

Adrian Beresford Taylor

European Essay No.4©Federal Trust for Education and Research 2000

ISSN 1468-9049

ISBN 0-901573-06-X

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Introduction

‘Power corrupts’, wrote Lord Acton. Even those lesspessimistic about human nature might still concede thatpower is tempting and that power attracts. Theexercise of power in Brussels has attracted over thelast few decades a very large number of individuals andorganisations who wish to be or who need to be closeto power.

They range from the growing army of journalists - thepress corps in Brussels is now more numerous than inWashington - through myriad trade associations to ahost of non-government organisations both pressingtheir points of view on the EU Institutions andreporting back to their members the length and breadthof Europe.

These representatives of civil society are muchneglected in both academic and popular descriptionsof how the European Union works. Important thoughthe Parliament, the Council and the Commission maybe in the decision-taking process, the role ofrepresentatives of European civil society in thepreparation and the making of decisions is all too oftenunderestimated and overlooked.

Some Treaty articles and subsequent legislation requireformal consultation of interested parties. Both theEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee ofthe Regions find their raison d’être in consultation ofthis sort. But informal consultation with potentiallyinterested parties goes much wider and deeper than

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this. The Commission in particular is active in seekinginformation and opinions well before draftinglegislation. And from whom better can the Commissioncanvass opinions than from those who have made theirpresence known to its servants professionally andsocially in the capital of the new Europe?Representations made by those potentially affected bylegislation or by the operation of the EU budget aremade more easily and more frequently by those wholive and work cheek by jowl with the parliamentarians,diplomats and officials in the same city.

All this raises serious questions about access, privilege,legitimacy, openness, transparency and standards ofethical behaviour in European public life. This essaytouches on them all, arguing that there are bothstrengths and weaknesses in the present situation wherebusiness interests, citizens’ concerns and mediacoverage seem often out of sync. How far positivedevelopments can be encouraged or orchestrated bythe Institutions themselves, how far the corporatesector takes the lead, how far grass-roots activists callthe tune remains an open question, but there can beno doubt on reading this essay that the Brussels scenein respect of the representation of civil society is in astate of creative upheaval.

Martyn Bond

Director, The Federal Trust

January 2000

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About the Author

Adrian Taylor is ‘scholar in residence’ at the EU Centerof Georgia Tech, in Atlanta, USA. He previously livedand worked in Brussels for 11 years, spendingconsiderable time in helping to build civil societynetworks, as well as lobbying for various causes. Hesubsequently worked for the European Commission.The author can be contacted by e-mail:adrianberesfordtaylor@yahoo.com.Other papers by the author can be seen onwww.eurogoal.org.

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Is Civil Society heard in Brussels?

by Adrian Beresford Taylor

The Issue

The gradual emergence of the European institutions asimportant forces for political, social and economicchange has been one of the most marked features ofpolitical life in all European Union1 countries since themid-1980s. But whose interests are actually beingpromoted in the European integration process? Who isactually able to have their voice heard, and so to helpset the agenda?

These questions are particularly relevant, given theoft-repeated fact that there is a ‘democratic deficit’in the EU institutions. It is indeed true that the samemechanisms of democratic control do not exist on theEU level as do on the national level. On the one handthis pans out in a debate about the role of the Councilof Ministers (is it an Upper House of a bicameral systemor is it an intergovernmental Executive organ?) andindeed of all the institutions (e.g. is the Commission aGovernment in waiting or the secretariat for theCouncil of Ministers?). This institutional debate is wellknown, and the opposing solutions well rehearsed.

However, there is another angle to the ‘democraticdeficit’: to what extent is democracy in the fuller sensepossible at all on the EU level without the existence ofa corresponding European civil society?

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After all, in democratic societies, any major policyinitiative is thoroughly discussed in the media, andgenerally stimulates a debate in political parties, tradeunions, business associations and other non-governmental fora. It is through this debate – and theconsequent capacity for groups to voice their supportor opposition, that each democratic society can ensureparticipation of all elements of civil society in thedecision-making process. To what extent can such adebate emerge on a European level, given that so manyof the major political, economic and social changes arenow initiated on the EU level? To what extent does theperceived lack of a European media, or of a broaderEuropean civil society mean that the agenda can behijacked by particular interest groups which are closeto power, or even by the EU institutions themselves?

These are crucial questions as some critics suggest that:• multi-national corporations control the EU’sagenda, as business is the only element of society whichhas been able to organise efficiently at the EU level,and hence that Europe has been hijacked by theinterests of big business;• the lack of a European civil society is a structuralfeature dictated by different languages and cultures,and cannot be achieved without (undesirable) culturalharmonisation, and hence that transnationaldemocracy can only ever be a façade.

This essay suggests that, while there may have beensome historical validity in this line of thinking, aEuropean civil society is emerging, and making its voiceheard. However, unlike in traditional nation building,this European civil society is not articulated through

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centralised media or established civil societyinstitutions, but rather it is emerging through networkedcontacts and issue-based activism. Indeed, civilsociety is increasingly organising itself in member states,and at the wider international level in this way also.This has important implications for the decisionmaking process and for the broader European politicalproject.

Civil Society in the Member States

There is no single definition of what ‘civil society’ is,or of how it plays a role in influencing policy debate.Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the outer limits,and to suggest why elements of civil society areconsidered necessary in the effective functioning ofdemocratic forces in the member states.

At its very broadest, civil society can embrace anythingwhich is not a governmental institution. Mostdefinitions of civil society would include trade unions,churches, and non-governmental organisations (whichmay be anything from neighbourhood watchcommittees, through educational charities to AmnestyInternational). The inclusion of business or employers’organisations and of political parties (as distinct fromthe members of a party in parliament or government)is more controversial, but often accepted. Anybodycapable of having something to say on government policycould, therefore, be conceivably part of civil society.

When the government of a member state presents animportant policy proposal, it is likely that it will affect

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one or other segment of society. Some EU memberstates (e.g. Benelux) have more ‘corporatist’ models,where important social actors have an importantinstitutionalised role in policy making, and are given aformal platform from which to speak to thegovernment. This consensual method of policy makingtends to privilege traditional social actors - tradeunions, and employers’ organisations, or establishedchurches. Similarly, where political parties are stronglyanchored in social organisations at every level, theytheoretically act to articulate the concerns of thesesegments of society, aggregating interests as they go,in order to find a balanced approach. In more‘pluralist’ member states (e.g. UK), each and everyactor has the opportunity to intervene, but theGovernment is unlikely to give them a formal platformfrom which to do so2 . Political parties are treated morelike groups to be lobbied, rather than to be worked onfrom within.

Such traditional models are, however, already undersubstantial attack. In all member states theappropriately named ‘media’ increasingly standsbetween government and civil society. The mediaprovide the transmission belt by which the message ofa new policy is transmitted not just to the various civilsociety actors, but also to the citizen directly, thus‘disintermediating’ the traditional actors. This has evenled to a further phenomenon in our democracies, thatof government by opinion poll. The capacity oforganised elements of civil society to have an impactupon the policy maker increasingly depends upon theircapacity to draw media attention to themselves andhence to have an impact on the opinion polls. As a

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result, governments of all hues and from all culturalbackgrounds are now making policy communication(media spin) a top priority - a tendency most pronouncedin those countries which have a pluralist rather thancorporatist culture.

On the positive side, one could argue that in this‘mediatised’ model of society, the ‘disorganisedcitizen’ (i.e. one who is not an active member of anyform of civil society association) is increasingly in thedriving seat, as it is their views that are sought in theopinion polls. On the negative side, the question ofindependence of the media becomes a criticalproblem, and increasingly criticism can be heard thatpoliticians, desperate to ensure re-election, havebecome opinion followers rather than leaders. Indeed,‘control freakery’ to prevent any dissonant (andpossibly creative) opinions from being heard, could alsobe seen as a by-product of this evolution.

An analysis of what is missing on the EU

level

On the EU level, an immediate feature that strikes everyobserver is the total lack of a ‘European’ media. Thelack of a common language is a barrier - indeed,increasingly so, even in countries such as Belgium wherethe Flemish/French speaking divide seems to grow3 -let alone in an EU where there are eleven officiallanguages and many more vernaculars.

Without a common political culture, and a commonmeans of articulating policies to the people,

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understanding the importance of any particular policyinitiative is bound to be confused at best. Eachnational media inevitably picks up on those Europeanpolicies which are perceived as having most impact ontheir member state, especially if the incidence isnegative. Furthermore, the sources interviewed andquoted are often those that come from the memberstate concerned - they are, after all, the best known athome, and speak the language. And yet, as onepolyglot friend once stated after a meeting of theEuropean Council ‘having seen the TV reports sent outin four different languages, I had the impression thatthey were talking about four totally differentmeetings’. The confusion over what the variousinstitutions actually do just reinforces public opinionin the view that ‘Brussels’ is out of reach and beyondcontrol.

Hence, without this common intermediary vector, it israpidly affirmed that no European civil society exists.Indeed, unless everybody learns a commonlanguage, there is no hope of such a society emerging.

Some critics would even go further and suggest thatthis absence of a civil society feedback or controlmechanism has let the EU run away. Ironically, thesame critics often quote two totally opposedtendencies to justify their affirmations.

On the one hand, they suggest that because of the ab-sence of control, the Brussels ‘eurocracy’ has careeredout of control. Precisely because Brussels (all institu-tions thrown in pell-mell together) is not subject to

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elections, the bureaucrats do not have to care aboutpublic opinion, with all the abuses that can follow fromthis. Certainly it is the case that Commission officialsused to pride themselves on their ability to think oflong-term interests, and not to have to take decisionswith only short-term (electoral) paybacks.Unfortunately this may have been perceived byoutsiders as arrogance.

On the other hand, critics often also claim thatbusiness has hijacked the European project. Aselective look at history can endorse this view. Themajor success stories of the recent past - the SingleMarket followed by Economic and Monetary Union - areundeniably projects which are business friendly, andindeed which were able to be pushed throughsometimes reluctant national governments because ofbusiness backing. The downside of this is precisely thatif business in general, and more specificallymultinational corporations, are the only organisationscapable of having their voice heard in Brussels, there isa serious risk of other parts of civil society having theirinterests squeezed out. Such concerns are loudly voicedin the debate on the Commission’s initiatives toliberalise public services by bringing in cross-bordercompetition (for instance in telecommunications andnow in the energy and transport sectors). Given thetendency of certain member states to ‘put the blameon Brussels’ for these initiatives, there is notsurprisingly a sense in some milieu that Brussels hasbeen ‘bought’, and acts regardless of the citizens’interest.

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The attempt to build a civil society

When first founded, the European Union’s predecessororganisations did not have to worry too much aboutcivil society. In fact, they managed to build it into thesystem in a way which was remarkably similar to theway that civil society acted in the founding six memberstates. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome even created aninstitution for trade union and employerrepresentation, the Economic and Social Committee(ECOSOC). Given that these - along with the churchesand political parties - were, at that time, the onlymajor ‘corps constitués’ in the six member states, civilsociety was in a sense ‘covered’, especially as at leastfour of the member states handled their own relationswith civil society in a very structured, almostinstitutionalised, manner. Even the advent of othergroups in society was provided for with the growth of athird group in the ECOSOC which came to representany organisation from local authorities through toconsumer groups.

Indeed, even outside of these formal structures, othergroups started to emerge. Right from the beginning,the agricultural communities had a strong voiceestablished in part through the Comité desOrganisations Professionnelles Agricoles/Comité Généralde la Coopération Agricole dans la CommunautéEuropéene (COPA). More interestingly still, in 1962,the emergence of consumer rights led to the setting upof the Bureau Européen des Union de Consommateurs(BEUC), which the Commission rapidly integrated intoa number of consultative committees and which it even

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designated as the consumers representative on theComité européeen pour la Normalisation (CEN) and itselectro-technical brother CENELEC.

Then the other institutional expression of society -elected representatives in a parliament - came on thescene. A directly elected parliament was seen as themain means of handling the democratic legitimacyissue, a means to give the citizen a say on policy, as theother institutional form of civil society representationwas no longer enough, given the breadth of issues nowcovered by the EU. It was even hoped that the adventof European elections would be precisely the type ofevent that would start to generate a European civilsociety, by providing a focal point for discussions in allmember states on EU policies. Likewise Parliament hasspurred the birth of European parties, which aresupposed to be means to evolve a politicalconsciousness4 .

Ever since then, as other new actors gained inimportance, there has been a constant effort to co-optthem into the institutional fold, be it by:• financially sponsoring the establishment of aEuropean Environment Bureau to represent theenvironmental concerns (and to act thus as acounter-force to business lobbies);• establishing liaison committees, which adviseNGOs how to interact with the institutions, such as fordevelopment NGOs;• sponsoring social dialogue (industry-trade unions)at a European level;• member states agreeing to create a new

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institution, the Committee of the Regions (COR) as ameans to keep their own lower levels of government‘in the information loop’5 .

Simultaneously, as Brussels increasingly becameperceived as the locus where key policy decisions werebeing taken, more and more interest groups have setup shop. Everything from starch producers to birdlovers, chemical industries to the Red Cross, and carmakers to cycling associations are represented.According to the European Institute for Public Affairs &Lobbying, there were 4,000 interest groups employing10,000 people active in Brussels in 1996, and at thattime they projected that this figure would reach 9,000interest groups employing 25,000 people by the turn ofthe century6 . Indeed, these interest groups are alsobound into the institutions through a myriad of semi-institutionalised consultative committees, proceduresand hearings, which give them numerous formal chancesto present their opinions.

Furthermore, an even more recent step has been tosupport the emergence of a European media. Be it bygranting limited funds to the ‘Euronews’ channel, orby establishing ‘Europe by Satellite’ (which providesimages of EU events to TV companies) the EUinstitutions have sought to foster the beginnings of anEU audiovisual media, through which common debatecan be generated.

So how is it that some people can still claim that civilsociety’s voice is not heard? With all this machinery inplace, surely it has an impact?

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For those who favour integration, there is evidence thatthe EU has reached a certain political maturity. Forthis group, even the recent crisis which led to theresignation of the Santer Commission was positive proofthat the ‘institutionalisation’ of civil society wasworking well. For it was the summum of thisincarnation, the European Parliament, which played thekey role in bringing down the Commission.

Unfortunately however, for those who dislike the EU,there is evidence to the contrary. After all, whoactually drives the European Parliament? Is it reallythe citizens, given the abysmally low turnout in theelections? In addition, what influence do the ECOSOCand Committee of the Regions actually have? Since whenhave they really been able to change anything ofsubstance?

Furthermore, the legitimacy of the various Europeanrepresentative groups is doubtful. For instance, takethe largest of all: the European Trades Union Congress(ETUC). According to its web site7 ‘As of October 1998,the ETUC had in membership, 65 National Trade UnionConfederations from 28 countries and 14 IndustryFederations with a total of 59 million members.’ Onewould think from these figures that EU policy makerswould be quaking in their boots when they meet ETUCrepresentatives. But strangely, they do not seem tobe. Why? Because of the nature of the ETUC: as afederation of national union groupings, it can only takedecisions following extensive internal consultations. Inother words, on any given policy initiative, the nationaltrade union congresses (which are already themselves

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federations of trade unions) have to decide on aposition, which then has to be agreed upon by all atthe European level. A slow, plodding process, in whichthe 59 million members on the shop floor are neverinvolved and which generally leads to a lowestcommon denominator declaration: somewhat like thecaricature of the EU itself at its worst.

And it is certainly not just the fault of the ETUC -indeed, in many ways, the ETUC is among the best ofthe bunch. Employers represented in the UNICE or anyother sector group, be it industry, workers, or even NGOinterests suffer the same fate when working towardsconsensus through some form of federation.

The problem is that at a time of major social changeand ever-faster communications with electronic mediathere are still limits on the European civil society as ithas emerged in its institutionalised form. Institutionsmean slow procedures, and that guarantees a bigdistance or ‘power gap’ between even the activecitizen on the ground and those representing themthrough federations of federations in the EU. Even theattempts at European media seem insufficient in thisrespect, given the resistance of language barriers andrelative lack of success of Euronews.

So can Parliament be seen as a ray of hope? That begsthe question as to how much is it really in contact withcivil society and citizens - and how much MEPs arebeholden to the national parties who guarantee theirplace on the list at election time.

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Maastricht: Civil Society hammers down the

door

For many, the first time that ‘public opinion’ irruptedinto the mindset of Brussels was with the ‘No’ vote ofDenmark on the Maastricht Treaty. Previously, theentire European integration process was driven by elites.To start with, it was the baby of a few visionarypolitical leaders. Then it became the favourite childof economic leaders. But as of Maastricht, with all thedirectness and irreverence of a teenager, civil societyhammered down the door of European decision-making, and leaders were forced to recognise that civilsociety could no longer simply be channelled off intoinstitutionalised mechanisms.

Beyond the simple fact of voting ‘No’, what happenedin Denmark was surprising for two reasons. Firstly, itwas totally against the recommendations of the vastmajority of the Danish political elite. The Folketinghad already overwhelmingly approved the MaastrichtTreaty, and all the major political parties werecampaigning for a ‘Yes’. The opponents in the ‘JuneMovement’ were a ragbag of figures, lacking theinstitutional power of the pro-Europeans. And yet,despite all of that, the nay-sayers had won. A firstrealisation of the power of ‘a bunch of citizens’.

But secondly, and even more interestingly, the powdertrail did not stop with Denmark. Naturally the debatethat was provoked was stronger in those parts of theEU that were more sceptical, but many observers weresurprised at the depth of anti-European sentiment that

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was revealed in France, and the extreme narrownessof the ‘Yes’ vote there for Maastricht. Although pro-Europeans rarely recognise it as such, the ‘No’ vote inDenmark was, perhaps, ironically the birth of the firsttruly pan-European debate! Of course, this debate wasarticulated differently in each national press,depending also on the degree of overt hostility toEurope, but it was clearly a wave that spread acrossdifferent member states.

It is perhaps not to be wondered that a change of Treatywas the first point of crystallisation of something new.After all, Treaty changes are not just like a policyinitiative in one particular area. They are afundamental choice of what type of society you wish tolive in. And that choice is not just limited to ‘moreEurope’ or ‘less Europe’. For instance to include orexclude public services from the purview ofcompetition policy, to determine that price stabilitywill be more important than employment in currencymanagement, to decide that justice and home affairsmatters can be drawn up ‘in camera’ without eitherparliamentary oversight or Court of Justice control; allsuch matters are fundamental social choices, notminor tinkering.

And Maastricht left its traces. Not only did theEuropean political elite make a series of declarationsabout being ever closer to the citizens and moretransparent, but civil society actors also starteddrawing the lessons. Hence with the approach of afurther Treaty change, a number of initiatives saw thelight of day. The European Movement for instancefounded the ‘Permanent Forum of Civil Society’8 , a

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platform of NGOs that presented a common list ofdemands. Initially this focused on the Amsterdam Treatyprocess, and subsequently has moved on to look at manyother issues, most recently the EU’s stance on the WorldTrade Organisation’s New (Seattle) Round.

But the Permanent Forum was not the only initiative.The EP, in an effort to bolster its own importance in theotherwise purely inter-governmental process of Treatyreform, decided to hold two major public hearingswhere civil society representatives were invited tospeak. Over 400 organisations took part, withinterests varying from those struggling for children’sprotection in Ireland and Sweden to young federalistsfrom Italy and France, through the Evangelical Churchof Germany, and the lift manufacturers association!Parliament clearly realised that it could gain in statureand importance if it could be seen to harness the powerof civil society, if it could go to governments sayingthat it - unlike the governments themselves - hadlistened to what civil society actors had to say.

Towards networked action

In many cases for the first time, organisations withsimilar goals discovered face to face through thesehearings that they had similar interests with otherorganisations from other member states. One result ofthis was the birth of the ‘European Inter-CitizensConferences’9 (ICC). The ICC, unlike the PermanentForum, did not have the objective of presenting acommon front. Rather it was conceived as a networkof organisations which would encourage Europeans fromall parts of the continent to meet and exchange views,

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and thus to build up the transnational perspectives ofwhat is happening in a way that is not possible whenviewing things purely through national media. In otherwords, to get people who are interested in similarsubjects to talk across borders.

Other interesting phenomena can also be identified.For instance, in late 1995, Royal Dutch/Shell announcedits intention to tow the Brent Spar oil rig from itsdrilling location, and then to dump it in deep sea.Greenpeace took up the cause and occupied the oil rig,pulling a maximum of publicity on television screensaround the globe. For a while, the struggle lookedhopeless. And then suddenly Shell buckled and yielded.Why? Because on one given day, motorists in theGerman state of Bavaria decided that they were goingto boycott Shell filling stations in protest at the BrentSpar plans; the result was one of the fastest majorcollapses in market share ever. So citizens in one partof Europe, a part that is not even adjacent to the NorthSea, were able to cause a multinational to yield in theface of one highly organised NGO.

Then again, just as negotiators were fighting out thedetails of the Amsterdam Treaty, and arguing if thereshould - or should not - be an employment chapter inthe Treaty, Renault decided to shut its factory inVilvoorde, Belgium. Whatever the rights or wrongs ofthe case, it was perceived that one reason Renault haddone this was to take advantage of fiscal incentivesoffered to build up another plant in Spain. The outcrywas widespread, and gave birth to a new phenomenon- a pan-European strike by workers of the samecompany. The issue hit the headlines, and not just in

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Belgium, but across the EU. Subsequently, ChancellorKohl stated that it was the ‘Vilvoorde issue’ thatconvinced him that there should be an employmentchapter in the Amsterdam Treaty, leading Germany - afierce critic of the proposal - to do a complete U-turn.The employment chapter is now firmly in the Treaty.

And again, in the run-up to the last European elections,environmental and consumer groups stirred-upincredible amounts of publicity in the national press ineach member state as to the risks and dangers ofgenetically modified organisms. Without the benefitof a centralised campaign, each piled on the pressurefor a rejection of the draft legislation before theEuropean Parliament. And lo and behold, thelegislation was rejected.

With all these cases we can see the emergence of non-institutionalised networked action. Precisely becauseof the slowness of the institutional structures, thosefrustrated by their lack of voice have started finding away to go around them. In each case, some form ofemergent network, either the same organisation spreadacross different countries (Greenpeace), or ‘sister’organisations already in contact through the Europeaninstitutionalised process (Renault trades unions), orsimply temporary coalitions of different groups, somebig and some small (environmental and consumergroups), came together to exert pressure. Theircombined impact was substantial, and drew enoughmedia attention in all parts of Europe (and beyond) tocarry the day, at least symbolically in terms of publicopinion, if not always in substance. Vilvoorde remainedshut.

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But what does this mean? Possibly that power isshifting from the big ‘representative’ bodies to thesmaller, niftier bodies that are able to bring anexplosive amount of energy to bear on a very focusedissue at a given moment; the kind of energy that causesit to figure on media radar screens, and to have acatalytic effect on public opinion across Europe andbeyond.

Civil society - promoted by business?

The irony, may perhaps now be that business is wakingup to this new picture and may even see an interest insupporting civil society networking. Be they driven byenlightened self-interest or by the desire to find whatCold War ideology described as ‘useful idiots’, there isa clear paradigm shift taking place in lobbying inBrussels today.

Of course issue based lobbying, where professionals aresent in to try to get the text of a directive changed, orpassed or rejected, still exists. But increasinglyprofessional public affairs companies are coming torecognise that the moment the pen has hit the paperand that a directive (or any form of policy initiative) isbeing drafted, it is already too late to change much.

Hence a substantial shift ‘up-stream’. The aim is toframe the state of mind of the policy deciders, toexpose them to industry’s understanding of an issue,and also to win over the other stake-holders who arelikely to be involved in lobbying on a question, beforeany policy decision is taken. The move is increasinglyblurring the boundaries between public relations and

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extreme form of a wider communications policy. Andin that communications policy, the important civilsociety actors have to be brought in as partners ratherthan treated as enemies - otherwise, the likelihood thatthe regulator will listen is substantially decreased.

Indeed, in this respect industry and regulators werereally quite taken aback by the degree of mobilisationand hostility to the Multilateral Agreement onInvestment (MAI), which was under negotiation in theOECD a couple of years ago, and which in the end hadto be dropped as a result of countries who feared thefall-out from negative publicity.

The MAI phenomenon also highlights two otherinteresting features. The first is that the frame ofreference for this new, emergent civil society does notin any way correspond directly to any internationalorganisation: networks happen at every level, be itone day on the EU level for GMOs or the OECD the nextday, in the same way as the Brent Spar operation wasnot just aimed at EU citizens. Just as Europe’s bordersare becoming fuzzy with the limits of enlargementunknown, a similar phenomenon covering a much widerspace across mainly developed countries is taking place.

Secondly, the MAI phenomenon was significant alsobecause it underlined the emergence of a new medium- e-mail. The author was certainly not alone in beingbombarded with e-mails inciting petitions anddemonstrations against the MAI. And the petitions werealways accompanied by short editorials, explaining (justas a good newspaper used to) the issues at stake and

public communication, making lobbying only the most

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what the proposals could mean in practice. Industry’sviews were totally absent in these tracts, whereas theywere very much present in the ‘centralised andofficial’ media. And unlike the official media, thesee-mails generally came from people that were knownand trusted by the receiver. Suddenly, through e-mail,a massive self-organising system was possible. Certainlynot one that covered the whole citizenry, rather onlythe better off citizenry with money for a computer10 .But then, civil society activism (as against passivesupport or occasional participation) was never reallyan affair of the masses, even in an earlier age and inthe member states.

Even more recently, the pictures of rioting in Seattlecomplete with the ‘world-wide citizens movementagainst globalisation’ (sic) have again brought home tomany in Europe that if constantly ignored, someelements of civil society will react strongly to what theyperceive as exclusion. The greater the degree ofexclusion of civil society, the more violent thereaction, and the less the involvement of moderateelements of society. This is likely again to spur bothcompanies and institutions to come to grips with thesenew emergent forms, precisely to remove the monopolyof the radicals who otherwise set the agenda.

Other equivalent manifestations are emerging likemushrooms after a rainstorm. Commissioners (EmmaBonino and Marcelino Oreja to name just two) went on-line to answer citizens’ questions well before Tony Blairand Bill Clinton got in on the act. Numerous web-basedservices are now increasingly designed with civilsociety actors in mind, such as Euractiv11 , and Grande

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Place Europe12 , and the Commission itself has becomeone of the largest information sites in the world withits Europa server13 . Similarly there are entiremovements built upon the predicate of networkeddemocracy, such as Prometheus14 .

What is to be done?

So what does this mean for the policy maker?

Firstly, what is happening on the European level is justan exaggeration of what will increasingly happen onthe member state level. On the EU level it is clear justhow slow-moving our institutionalised civil society is -but in reality on the national level things are barelymuch better. Increasingly NGO campaigns, even ifdriven by relatively few people without any greatdegree of representativeness, can set the agenda if theycan focus enough energy to draw media attention. It ishence no coincidence that the ‘marche blanche’ tookplace in Belgium: it was a spontaneous outpouring ofnational grief stimulated by intense media attentionon institutional failure to stop a paedophile ring.Indeed, the formal civil society outlets were totallyoverwhelmed by this; these institutionalised forms,notably the political parties, were seen as part of theproblem, not the solution. Likewise theunemployed and ‘sans-papiers’ movements were ableto generate spontaneous support by taking overstrategic spots in France.

But secondly, media fragmentation may now be asecular trend. Already gone are the days when all newscame from one or two public broadcasters, and hence

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any nation was guaranteed the same version of events.The emergence of commercial channels, and then alsonarrowcasters (those focusing on only one type ofprogramme such as CNN on news), and increasingly oflocal TV stations and of website newscasting areoffering more and more potential perspectives onissues. The EU also has contributed to this, both bypromoting liberalisation, and by financing pan-Europeanmedia.

However, if the internet revolution is completed, thisis likely to bring the internet into each person’stelevision set, and allow individuals to see programmeson demand. In other words, no longer to wait and seewhat the TV company has to offer, but actively to goand search for one’s favourite football match, soapopera or theatre piece. Whilst this will not mean theelimination of broadcast (any more than TV meant thedeath of radio), it will fragment further the worldviewof public opinion: the media will no longer be the only

feedback mechanism between policy maker and civil

society, even on the national level.

And so how should the European institutions act? Viewedfrom this perspective, the EU institutions are suddenlynot at the disadvantage, but rather at the cutting edge.They are suffering first what all others will ultimatelyhave to face. If the EU institutions are able to seizethe opportunity, then they will have a competitiveadvantage, not the traditional national administrations,parliaments and governments.

They should encourage the networks, at every level.They should bring together every element of civil

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society across Europe, simply let people who sharecommon interests get to know their opposite numbersin other countries. And at the same time, they shouldactively go out and seek the opinion of these networkson concrete issues which are of concern. TheParliament could usefully hold more hearings and notjust in Brussels.

Indeed, ultimately the information flow should beinverted: the needs of the citizen are not determinedby Brussels and then ‘communicated’ to the broadercommunity, but rather the outside networkscommunicate in to the decision-taking centre. And thisshould be pursued, even if the messages are often verycritical and completely opposed to existing officialpolicy15 , given the longer-term benefits of dynamisingEuropean civil society. In this way, the Commission andParliament may be able to generate the popular drivethey need to overcome member state resistance16 .

Furthermore, the institutions should encourage thisnetworking to go further still, to cover other countrieswhich do not even have a vocation to join: alreadythere are initiatives in this direction, such as the TransAtlantic Information Exchange Service17 . After all,European civil society will only realise how much it hasin common when it is confronted with the values ofothers in the world, who think and act differently.

The risks? There are indeed many. As pointed out, thenetworked activists do not have to be numerous to havean impact. There is indeed a risk of a lurch away frombroader democracy in this case; but to counter that,there is a need for representative democracy to be even

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more deeply anchored - and that means that the on-going institutional democratisation of the EU should beaccelerated rather than slowed, making the EP agenuine co-decider and the Commission responsible tothe electorate.

Likewise there is no reason to throw over-board thealready established and institutionalised representationof civil society. The advent of the new does not meanthe rubbishing of the old. ECOSOC has starteddeliberately adapting to the new reality and even thefront of its brochures advertise it as ‘A Bridge betweenEurope and Civil Society’. Likewise it was the motorfor organising a meeting of European and LatinAmerican civil societies to accompany the EU-Mercosursummit in June 1999. From such official platforms, anumber of private initiatives are bound to emerge, andhence should be encouraged.

Conclusion

The EU’s ‘top-down’ attempts to create the fora forcivil society to interact has stimulated a wide range ofactivity. Parliamentary elections, the Economic andSocial Committee, Committee of the Regions andvarious consultative fora have all acted to start publicdebates on Europe, have forced political parties to takestances and have focused the attention of some single-issue pressure groups. However, the key relay that actsto stir up a broader public debate - a common media -is still lacking.

It is nevertheless wrong to assume that there is noEuropean civil society, and still less that none can

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emerge from the bottom-up. All in all, the EU is goingthrough a paradigm shift that is being felt by theEuropean institutions first, but which is exactly the samephenomenon everywhere. The shift is a slow one, wherethe traditionally institutionalised civil society actors areslowly being outflanked by faster, networked actors.Legitimacy is emerging not from the number ofmembers, but from the ability to produce pertinentideas and a clever means to attract media attention -or increasingly to use alternative media to spread themessage.

Some people mistakenly identify the cause of this shiftin one particular technical means: the internet. This isfalse. The change is fundamentally the way thatinformation is transmitted and processed. Forinformation processing is the heart of decision-mak-ing. The Commission will only take action if its an-tenna start warning that one of its priorities (e.g. theunity of the single market) is threatened. Informationsupply, both direct to the Commission and indirectlythrough all other actors is essential here. Likewise theEU institutions are increasingly realising that it is notjust the adoption of legislation that is important, butthe way in which it is implemented. That being thecase, the feedback of information on application ofpolicy is ever more important and again increasinglycomes from civil society actors on the ground18 .

Bearing this in mind, industry is more and more awarethat it may be to its advantage to encourage theemergence of civil society actors, and to make themallies, rather than to ignore them. Indeed it is probablyto their benefit to encourage the emergence of those

30

forces even if they are critical, lest their most radicalopponents make use of the vacuum they would createby neglect.

The whole issue of legitimacy is nevertheless posed ina new light. On the one hand, policy makers andcorporations are increasingly realising that theemergence of this networked, often issue-based, civilsociety is something that does not respect frontiers,not even those of the European Union. Hencedecisions such as ratification of treaties like Maastricht,or the launching of a WTO New Round, which used tobe conducted behind closed doors and out of thepublic eye, are now matters of public interest. On theother hand, it risks opening the door to the dictat of aminority, if small groups without wider legitimacymanage to hijack the political agenda. Hence, morethan ever before, democratic legitimacy becomes acentral point for European institutions: in order tomaintain their role and to prosper they must bedemonstrably more democratic than the forces that arelobbying them.

Interestingly, however, what could be seen as Europe’snegative could be its biggest plus. The fact that civilsociety is not highly channelled in the EU, and not fedfrom a central media source, opens the door to newforms of civil society articulation. This gives the EUthe chance to lead the way - if it accepts that thosewho it will be encouraging may very often be critical ofits policies and attitudes. At a time of paradigm shift,the risks are high, but so are the rewards. And in thiscase it is the EU which is leading the way and not themember states.

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1 Out of deliberate choice for simplicity, no distinction is madebetween the European Union and European Community (or evenprevious manifestations, notably the European Economic Community) inthis text. The EU is hence used to cover all pillars of activity of theinstitutions, past and present.2 See for instance the inability of various governments from the mid-70s to turn the National Economic Development Committee into ameaningful forum for dialogue on economic policy.3 Not forgetting 60,000 mother tongue German speakers.4 Since the Treaty of Maastricht, this is even recognised as important inthe Treaties themselves.5 Regions and towns were previously only represented as part of the‘others’ group in the Economic and Social Committee.6 Valérie Kanza-Druart, ‘Lobbying: technique d’influence ou stratégiede communication?’, mémoire de fin de cycle, november 1996, MMA,Ecole de Commerce Solvay, Université Libre de Bruxelles.7 www.ETUC.org8 www.eurplace.org/orga/forumsoc9 The name was a deliberate ‘clin d’oeil’ at the official‘InterGovernmental Conference’ which is the official title of the forumused to negotiate changes of the EU Treaties.10 The author knows of no scientific study of the use and role of e-mailin this context, but would be interested to hear of any.11 www.euractiv.com12 www.eurplace.org13 www.europa.eu.int14 www.prom.org15 As was already clear when the Commission held a meeting with CivilSociety in preparation of the Seattle WTO meeting.16 For instance, the establishment of the first ERASMUS programmesback in the mid-80’s owed a lot to extensive lobbying carried out by thestudents movement AEGEE, with these students even going to seeheads of government and of state such as Mitterrand.17 www.tiesweb.org18 Anecdotally, UK groups have taken the lead in writing to the Commis-sion to complain about breaches in application of environmentaldecisions.

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