Enemecio vs Sandiganbayan - Ouano vs CA

7/27/2019 Enemecio vs Sandiganbayan - Ouano vs CA

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CRIMES AGAINST PUBLICINTEREST

G.R. No. 146731 January 13, 2004

AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and SERVANDO

BERNANTE

CARPIO, J.:

Facts: Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman acriminal complaint against Bernante for falsificationof public document. Enemecio asserted thatBernante made it appear in his leave applicationthat he was on forced leave from 15 May 1996 to21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante wasserving a 20-day prison term, from 14 May 1996 to2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the crime

of slight physical injuries. Bernante was able toreceive his salary during his incarceration sincethen CSCST-CFT Superintendent Andres T.Melencion approved Bernantes application forleave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was notentitled to receive salary for that period because of his "falsified leave applications."

Issue: whether Bernante should be held liable forfalsification

Held:No. Enemecios contentions do not deserveserious consideration.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RevisedPenal Code, the elements of falsification of publicdocuments through an untruthful narration of factsare: (a) the offender makes in a documentuntruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b)the offender has a legal obligation to disclose thetruth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated bythe offender are absolutely false; and (d) theperversion of truth in the narration of facts wasmade with the wrongful intent to injure a thirdperson.24

As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out,Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing uponBernante the legal obligation to disclose where hewas going to spend his leave of absence. "Legalobligation" means that there is a law requiring thedisclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making falsestatements in a narration of facts absent any legalobligation to disclose where he would spend hisvacation leave and forced leave.

LEONILA BATULANON vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated(PCCI) employed LeonilaBatulanon as itsCashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving depositsfrom and releasing loans to the membesa of thecooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982,certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanonfalsified four commercial documents, allchecks/cash vouchers representing granted loansto different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion,Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appearthat said names were granted a loan and receivedthe amount of the checks/cash vouchers when intruth and in fact the said persons never received agrant, never received the checks, and never signedthe check vouchers issued in their names. Infurtherance, Batulanon released to herself thechecks and received the loans and thereaftermisappropriated and converted it to her own useand benefit.

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa throughFalsification of Commercial Documents were filedagainst Batulanon. The prosecution presentedMedallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses.Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assistBatulanon in the preparation of cash voucherstestified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated thatOracion is Batulanon sister-in-law and DennisBatulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in1982. He averred that membership in thecooperative is not open to minors.

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered aDecision convicting Batulanon of Estafa throughFalsification of Commercial Documents.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of thetrial court, hence this petition.

Batulanon avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element prejudiceto a third person. She insists that PCCI has notbeen prejudiced by these loan transactionsbecause these loans are accounts receivable bythe cooperative.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanonwas Falsification of Private Documents.


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HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in theInformation is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could beconvicted of Falsification of Private Documentsunder the well-settled rule that it is the allegationin the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given inthe preamble of the information.

The elements of falsification of private documentunder Article 172, par.2 of the RPC are: (1) that theoffender committed any of the acts of falsification,except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) thatthe falsification was committed in any privatedocument; and (3) that the falsification causeddamage to a third party or at least the falsificationwas committed with intent to cause such damage.

There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCIhas not been prejudiced because the loantransactions are reflected in its books as accountsreceivable. It has been established that PCCI onlygrants loans to its bona fide members with nosubsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are notmembers of PCCI and neither are they eligible for aloan.

The CA correctly ruled that the subject vouchersare private documents and not commercialdocuments because they are not documents usedby merchants or businessmen to promote orfacilitate trade or credit transactionsnor are theydefined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or

other commercial law.Rather, they are privatedocuments, which have been defined as deeds orinstruments executed by a private person withoutthe intervention of a public notary or of otherperson legally authorized, by which somedisposition or agreement is proved, evidenced orset forth.

As there is no complex crime of Estafa throughFalsification of Private Documents, it is importantto ascertain whether the offender is to be chargedwith Falsification of a Private Document or withEstafa. If the falsification of a private document is

committed as a means to commit estafa, theproper crime to be charged is falsification. If theEstafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa.We find that the Court of Appeals correctly heldBatulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show thatBatulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis.What she did was to sign: by: Ibatulanon to

indicate that she received the proceeds of the loanin behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under anyof the modes of Falsification under Article 171because there is nothing untruthful about the factthat she used the name of Dennis and that asrepresentative of the latter, obtained the proceedsof the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsificationis the act of making untruthful or false statements,which is not attendant in this case. As to whether,

such representation involves fraud which causeddamage to PCCI is a different matter which willmake her liable for estafa, but not for falsification.Hence, it was an error for the courts below to holdthat Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the caseinvolving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994

FELIX NIZURTADO, petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

That on or about August 25, 1983, and forsometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Cityof Caloocan, Philippines and within the jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,a public officer, being then the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, did then andthere, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsifyand attest Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 bymaking it appear that on August 25, 1983 theBarangay council of Panghulo met and identified T-shirt manufacturing as its livelihood project, whenin truth and in fact, as the accused fully well knew,no such meeting was held, where T-shirtmanufacturing was identified and approved by theBarangay Council as its livelihood project, andthereafter, accused submitted the falsifiedresolution to the MHS-MMC-KKK Secretariat whichendorsed the same to the Land Bank of thePhilippines, which on the basis of said endorsement

and the falsified resolution, encashed LBP checkNo. 184792 in the amount of TEN THOUSANDPESOS (P10,000.00), which check was earlierreceived by him as Barangay Captain of Panghuloin trust for the Barangay for its livelihood projectand for which fund accused became accountable,and upon receipt thereof herein accused, withdeliberate intent and grave abuse of confidencedid then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously misappropriate, misapply and convertto his own personal use and benefit the amount of

TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) out of the


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funds for which he was accountable, to the damageand prejudice of the government in the saidamount.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is liable of falsification

HELD:

YES. Accused-appellant was charged with havingcommitted the crime of malversation through thefalsification of a public document punishable underparagraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised PenalCode.

The pertinent provisions read:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee ornotary or ecclesiastic minister. The penaltyofprision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his

official position, shall falsify a document bycommitting any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Causing it to appear that persons haveparticipated in any act or proceeding when theydid not in fact so participate;

In falsification under the above-quoted paragraph,the document need not be an authentic officialpaper since its simulation, in fact, is the essence of falsification. So, also, the signatures appearing

thereon need not necessarily be forged. 11

In concluding that the Barangay Council resolution,Exhibit "D," 12 was a falsified document for whichpetitioner should be held responsible, theSandiganbayan gave credence to the testimoniesof Barangay Councilman Santos A. Gomez andBarangay Treasurer Manuel P. Romero. The twotestified that no meeting had actually taken placeon 25 August 1983, the date when

"T-shirt manufacturing" was allegedly decided tobe the barangay livelihood project. The

Sandiganbayan concluded that Nizurtado hadinduced Romero and Gomez to sign the blankresolution, Exhibit "J" 13 on the representation thatRomero's proposal to build a barangay servicecenter would so later be indicated in that resolutionas the barangay livelihood project.

Galeos vs People

GR No. 174730-37 February 9, 2011

Villarama, Jr., J.

Facts:

Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayorof the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986.He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in1988 and served as such until 1998.

Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeosand Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I,respectively, in the Office of the MunicipalEngineer.

In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilitiesand Net Worth (SALN), Galeos answered "No" tothe question: "To the best of your knowledge, areyou related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working inthe government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" onthe space for the list of the names of relativesreferred to in the said query.

Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degreeof consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos mother, and to Rivera within the fourthdegree of affinity as his mother is the sister of themother of Riveras wife.

Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved therecommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman forthe Visayas that criminal charges be filed againstOng, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of publicdocuments under Article 171 of the Revised PenalCode.

The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailedDecision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera.

Issue:

Whether the accused herein are guilty of the crimeof falsification?

Ruling:

Yes. Art. 171.of the RPC provides: Falsification bypublic officer, employee or notary or ecclesiasticminister. any public officer, employee, or notarywho, taking advantage of his official position, shall

falsify a document by committing any of thefollowing acts: 1. Counterfeiting or imitating anyhandwriting, signature or rubric; 2. Causing it toappear that persons have participated in any act orproceeding when they did not in fact so participate;3. Attributing to persons who have participated inan act or proceeding statements other than thosein fact made by them; 4. Making untruthfulstatements in a narration of facts;

The elements of falsification in the above provisionare as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public


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document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose thetruth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the factsnarrated by him are absolutely false.

All the elements of falsification of publicdocuments by making untruthful statements havebeen established by the prosecution.

A narration of facts is merely an account ordescription of the particulars of an event oroccurrence.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to thequestion in his SALN if he has relatives in thegovernment service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statementtherein as in fact he was related to Ong, who wasthen the municipal mayor, within the fourth degreeof consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins(their mothers are sisters). When a governmentemployee is required to disclose his relatives in thegovernment service, such information elicitedtherefore qualifies as a narration of factscontemplated under Article 171 (4) of the RevisedPenal Code, as amended.

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS

MICHAEL T. DAVA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURTG.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:The information specifically charges thepetitioner with having made it appear in hisdriver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of thePampanga LTC agency participated" in in-preparation and with having used the said driver'slicense knowing that it was falsified. The chargestherefore are found on the provisions of Article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any

private individual who shall commit any thefalsification enumerated in Article 171 specificallyparagraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials)have participated in any act proceeding when theydid not in fact so participate. The information alsocharges Dava with having knowingly used a falsedocument under the last paragraph of Article 172.

The evidence at hand proves that petitioner,misrepresenting that he had no driver's license,asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him.

Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who usedto get his own driver's license in San Fernando,Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver'slicense No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land

Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in saidlocality. 46 On January 24, 1978, petitionerrenewed his license at the said office by paying theamount of P10.00 for which he was issued officialreceipt No. 0605870. 47

In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice thenwas simply to present an official receipt showingthat at the previous year the licensee had paid forhis driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and topay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction didnot involve the issuance of "another form," a driverdid not have to fill up an application form for therenewal of a license. The said agency would thenissue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but the driver's license itself would notbe changed. 48

Thus.on January 24,1978, when driver's license No.2706887 together with official receipt No. 86432149 were presented to the San Fernando LTCagency, the personnel therein issued official-receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner.Although the receipt was not personally signed byoffice registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant,the receipt 50 was genuine and the amountindicated therein was actually paid to and collectedby the San Fernando agency. 51 The driver'slicense itself may not have been issued by saidagency 52 but its form was likewise genuine.However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK'

because it "did not emanate" from his office and "afacsimile was not printed over" his name therein.53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land

Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 in thename of Michael DavaTolosa "is not registered" intheir index card. 54

ISSUE: Is there a violation of Art. 172?

HELD:Yes.Hence, while there is no doubt thatdriver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one,the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as theactual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there arepieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonabledoubt at he caused the falsification and made useof the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.

The elements of the crime of using a falsifieddocument in transaction (other than as evidence ina judicial proceed penalized under the last


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paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) theoffender knew that a document was falsified byanother person; (b) the false document isembraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisionsNos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used suchdocument (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) theuse of the false document caused damage toanother or at last it was used with intent to causesuch damage. 55 Except for last, all of these

elements have been proven beyond reason doubtin this case.

It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself whorequested Manalili to get him a license. Hemisrepresented to Manalili that he has not at anytime been issued a driver's license. 56 Through thismisrepresentation and capitalizing on Manaliliawareness of the dire necessity of obtaining adriver's license the shortest time possible to enablepetitioner to perform duties as detailman,petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner,to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing

the subject driver's license. For indeed, there wasno way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in soshort a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus,as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared tohave been motivated by a sincere desire to help afriend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixerswhom he knew were not employees of the LTC towhom he paid P70.00 for the license even if thelegal fee then was only P15.00. 57 As it was intruth petitioner who induced and left Manalili withno choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact thatit was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directlywith said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner fromthe charge of falsification. He is, beyondreasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in thecommission of said crime.

Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spuriouscharacter of his second driver's license No.2706887. Having already obtained a driver'slicense, he knew that it was not legally possible forhim to secure another one. Otherwise, there wouldhave been no need for him to misrepresent to hisfriend Manalili that he was not then a holder of adriver's license. But even with thismisrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin tobelieve that Manalili would be able to secure adriver's license through legal means in about anhour's time. 58 The patent irregularity in obtainingdriver's license No. 2706887 was more thansufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinarycautious and prudent man as to its genuinenessand authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that hehimself was surprised when the fixer handed tohim the plastic jacket of the driver's license of Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hoursafter he had sought the fixer's assistance. 59 Inthose days, all plastic jackets emanated from the

LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delayin the release of the license applied for. Underthese circumstances, no "reasonable andfairminded man" would say that petitioner did notknow that his license was a fake. 60

A driver's license is a public document within thepurview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document themoment it is accomplished. 61 Thus, when driver'slicense No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner'spersonal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein,even if the same was simulated, the driver'slicense became a public document.

The third element of use of the falsified documentis proven by the fact that when petitioner wasapprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was inhis possession and it was what he presented Lisingto show that he had a license. Because he was adetailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is

probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner useddriver's license No. 2706887.

The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to anotherperson or at least an intent to cause such damagehas become immaterial. In falsification of public orofficial documents, the principal thing beingpunished is the violation of the public faith and thedestruction of the truth proclaimed therein.

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts

that the following ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego,63 should be applied in his favor:The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified documentand he made use of it (uttered it), takingadvantage of it and profiting thereby, thepresumption is that he is the material author of thefalsification. This is especially true if the use oruttering of the forged documents was so closelyconnected in time with the forgery that the user orpossessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have closeconnection with the forgers, and therefore, hadcomplicity in the forgery. In the absence of a

satisfactory explanation, one who is found inpossession of a forged document and who used oruttered it is presumed to be the forger.

We agree with the petitioner that the presumptionenunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absoluteas it is subject to the exception that the accusedshould have a satisfactory explanation why he is inpossession of a false document. 64 Hisexplanation, however, is unsatisfactory as itconsists mainly in passing the buck to his friend,Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not


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have acted on his own accord without the proddingof petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner'sallegations on the role of fixers in governmentagencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" whocould do things fast for the right amount. He is "notnecessarily involved in the commission of forgeryor falsification of official documents" and he shareshis fees with "insiders." 65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures ingovernment licensing agencies. Why theyproliferate is a sad commentary not only on ourbureaucracy but also on our own people. While notall fixers are engaged in illegal activities for somesimple serve as "facilitators," they nonethelessprovide sources for exploitation of the unknowingcommon people who transact business with thegovernment and for corruption of the gulliblegovernment employees. Their unwanted presencemust be dealt with accordingly and the soonest

this is undertaken by our government agencies thebetter for all of us.

The decision of the respondent appellate court ishereby affirmed.

ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OFFLASE BANK NOTES

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. An informant in the person of inmate Francisdela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. andMichael Passilan. The informant narrated that hereceived a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellantwith orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from theManila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee,however, recognized the bill as a fake and refusedto accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David andPassilan, along with the informant, proceeded toappellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuantto their agreement, the informant entered thecubicle first and found appellant therein, lying inbed. The informant returned to appellant thelatter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then enteredthe cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1

Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a blackwallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet weretwenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of whichwere suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscatedthe same and marked them sequentially with IIB-2 to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00bill that was returned by informant to appellantwith IIB-1. Appellant was consequently arrestedand brought out of his cell into the office of the

Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of theManila City jail for interrogation.

Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 billsconfiscated from appellant were turned over to theBangkoSentralngPilipinas for analysis. Pursuant toa Certification dated August 7, 2007, ActingAssistant Manager LoidaMarcega Cruz of theBangkoSentralngPilipinas examined and found thefollowing bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9)P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five

(5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388;one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062;and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial NumberWW164152.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possessionand use of false bank notes under Article 168[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

ISSUE: Whether the accused is criminally liable for

the crime charged.

HELD:NO.The elements of the crime charged forviolation of said law are: (1) that any treasury orbank note or certificate or other obligation andsecurity payable to bearer, or any instrumentpayable to order or other document of credit notpayable to bearer is forged or falsified by anotherperson; (2) that the offender knows that any of thesaid instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) thathe either used or possessed with intent to use any

of such forged or falsified instruments. As held inPeople v. Digoro, possession of false treasury orbank notes alone, without anything more, is not acriminal offense. For it to constitute an offenseunder Article 168 of the RPC, the possession mustbe with intent to use said false treasury or banknotes.In this case, the prosecution failed to showthat petitioner used the counterfeit money or thathe intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francisdela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave thefake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was notpresented in court. According to the jail officers,


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they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz thatpetitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at theManila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. Inshort, the jail officers did not have personalknowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruzuse the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, ishearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.

USURPATION

PEOPLE vs CORTEZ

G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988

MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, respondents.

YAP, C.J.:

On May 14, 1981, as an employee of BlackMountain Mining Company, Gigantoni went to theoffice of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly toconduct verification of some travels made by BlackMountain's officials. Upon reaching the said PALoffice, he falsely represented himself to the PALlegal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating akidnapping case, and requested that he be shownthe PAL records particularly the passengermanifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights coveringthe period February 1 to 3 1981. To furtherconvince the PAL officials of his supposed mission,Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card

purporting to show that he was a PC-CISagent.Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of therequested manifest and the used PAL tickets of oneCesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of BlackMountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL premises.

PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr. subsequentlylearned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoniwas no longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 ashe had been dismissed from the service for grossmisconduct. Atty. Puno immediately alerted theNBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL

office the following day.

When Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office,in the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security,Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno as to hisreal Identity. He later admitted that he was nolonger with the CIS; that he was working for theBlack Mountain Mining Corporation; and that hewas just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had travelled. Upon thearrival of NBI agents, Attys. Puno and Boro turnedover the person of Gigantoni to the NBI.

ISSUE: Whether Gigantoni was guilty of usurpationof authority

HELD: No.Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code onusurpation of authority or official functions, underwhich the petitioner was charged, punishes anyperson: (a) who knowingly and falsely representshimself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the PhilippineGovernment or of any foreign government; or (b)who, under pretense of official position, performsany act pertaining to any person in authority orpublic officer of the Philippine Government or anyforeign government or any agency thereof, withoutbeing lawfully entitled to do so. The formerconstitutes the crime of usurpation of authorityunder which the petitioner stands charged, whilethe latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.

The failure of the prosecution to prove thatpetitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from

the service negatives the charge that he"knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be aCIS agent. In criminal cases, the burden of proof asto the offense charged lies on the prosecution.Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution toestablish by positive evidence the allegation thatthe accused falsely represented himself as a CISagent, by presenting proof that he knew that hewas no longer a CIS agent, having been dulynotified of his dismissal. It is essential to presentproof that he actually knew at the time of thealleged commission of the offense that he wasalready dismissed from the service. A mere

disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient.

The Solicitor General has argued in hismemorandum, that it makes no difference whetherthe accused was suspended or dismissed from theservice, "for both imply the absence of power torepresent oneself as vested with authority toperform acts pertaining to an office to which heknowingly was deprived of ". The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused werecharged with usurpation of official function (secondpart of Article 177), but not if he is charged merelywith usurpation of authority (first part of Article177). The information charges the accused with thecrime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly andfalsely representing himself to be an officer, agentor representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government."

Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of officialfunctions. It has not been shown that theinformation given by PAL to the accused wasconfidential and was given to him only because hewas entitled to it as part of the exercise of his


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official function. He was not charged in theinformation for such an offense. In fact, it appearsfrom the record of the case that the information,which was not claimed to be secret andconfidential, was readily made available to theaccused because PAL officials believed at the timethat he was a CIS agent. And this was the onlyoffense with which he was charged in theinformation, that he knowingly and falsely

represented himself to be a CIS agent.

USING FICTITIOUS NAME

LEGAMIA v. IAC

CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:

Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias inviolation of CA No. 142, as amended. The facsappear that Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for19 years. uring their live-in arrangement theyproduced a boy who was named Michael RaphaelGabriel L. Reyes. From the time Corazon and Emiliolived together until the latter's death, Corazon wasknown as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as

Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends asMrs. Reyes.

Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when hedied. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio'sdeath, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michaelwith the Agricultural Credit Administration fordeath benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L.Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment was alsosigned "Corazon L. Reyes."

Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed acomplaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is liable under CA 142.

HELD:

NO.

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for awoman to represent herself as the wife and use thename of the man she is living with despite the factthat the man is married to another woman. Thepractice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neitheris it unduly frowned upon. A number of women canbe Identified who are living with men prominent inpolitical, business and social circles. The womanpublicly holds herself out as the man's wife and

uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact thathe is not her husband. And yet none of the womenhas been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant andunderstanding society. It is in the light of ourcultural environment that the law must beconstrued.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living withEmilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her tothe public as his wife and she assumed that roleand his name without any sinister purpose orpersonal material gain in mind. She applied for

benefits upon his death not for herself but forMichael who as a boy of tender years was underher guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could nothave meant to criminalize what Corazon had doneespecially because some of them probably hadtheir own Corazons.

ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORMS ORINSIGNIA

PERJURY G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990

REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

According to the information filed Reolandi M.

DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad SantosHigh School and, therefore, a public employee, didthen and there feloniously commit falsification of official documents, to wit: by executing and filing inthe office of the Civil Service Commission of saidmunicipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS Form No.212(65), an official document, stating and maltingit appear therein that he was a fourth yearBachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at theCosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges whichdocument is a requirement for his reappointmentas School Administrative Assistant I of the Jose


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Abad Santos High School and wherein theacademic requirement to said Position is at least afourth year college undergraduate, when in truthand in fact, the said accused well knew that thestatement is false and he did not reach the fourthyear in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, andconsequently, by reason of said untruthfulnarration of facts, his appointment to the saidposition was approved by the Civil Service

Commission.

ISSUE: whether thr crime commited wasfalsification

HELD: no.

In the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz and the earliercase of United States v. Tupasi Molina the crimecommitted under the foregoing facts, is perjury.

This offense, as defined in Article 183 of theRevised Penal Code is the willful and corruptassertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmationadministered by authority of law on a materialmatter.

The elements of the crime of perjury are

(a) That the accused made a statement under oathor executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was madebefore a competent officer, authorized to receiveand administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accusedmade a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavitcontaining the falsity is required by law or made fora legal purpose.

All the foregoing elements are present in the caseat bar.

G.R. No. 93173 September 15, 1993

HONORIO SAAVEDRA, JR., petitioner,

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTOF PASIG, BRANCH 67 and GREGORIO M.RAMOS,respondents.

Andres B. Soriano for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 2 July 1987, the owners of Pine Philippines, Inc.(PPI for brevity), including private respondentGregorio M. Ramos, sold their shares of stock topetitioner Honorio Saavedra, Jr., for P1.2 millionpayable in installments. A "Memorandum of Agreement," and a "Deed of Assignment" wereexecuted to evidence the transaction. The formerdocument contained an automatic rescissionclause in case any installment was not paid on its

due date.

Payments were made in the total amount of P936,380.00, leaving a balance of P263,620.00payable on 15 September 1987. On said date,however, petitioner withheld payment for thereason that the sellers failed to comply with theirwarranties. Nevertheless, the balance wasdeposited in escrow subject to release once thewarranties were complied with.

On 5 November 1987, petitioner filed in behalf of PPI a verified civil complaint for damages 4 against

private respondent, alleging that he (petitioner)was the President and principal stockholder of thecompany. By way of answer, respondent Ramosquestioned petitioner's capacity to sue in behalf of PPI, claiming that petitioner ceased to be itspresident when the sale of the PPI, shares of stockto him was automatically rescinded on 15September 1987.

After executing a document entitled "Recission of Memorandum of Agreement," Ramos and his groupfiled a case5 on 20 November 1987 with theSecurities and Exchange Commission (SRC)

praying that the rescission be declared valid andlegal. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleginglack of jurisdiction on the part of the SEC but thesame was denied on 11 December 1987. Petitionerwent to the Supreme Court which, on 21 March1988, upheld the jurisdiction of the SEC and ruledthat under Sec. 5, par. (b), of P.D. No. 902-A, theSEC has "primary and exclusive" jurisdiction overthe twin issues of ownership and automaticrescission, they being intracorporate disputes. 6Accordingly, proceedings in Civil Case No. 55247were suspended.

On 7 December 1987, during the pendency of SECCase No. 3257, private respondent filed a criminalcase for perjury against petitioner with theProvincial Prosecutor's Office in Pasig alleging thatpetitioner perjured himself when he declared in theverification of the complaint in Civil Case No.55247 that he was the President of PPI. 7 In hisanswer-affidavit, petitioner contended that sincethe issues of ownership and automatic rescissionwere still pending and unresolved in the SEC, therewas no basis to the charge that he asserted afalsehood by claiming to be the President of the


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company especially when he was such per recordsextant with the SEC. 8

By Resolution dated 25 July 1988, the ProvincialProsecutor found a prima facie case for perjuryagainst petitioner and on 26 October 1988 filed thecorresponding Information with the Regional TrialCourt of Pasig, docketed as Crim. Case No. 74919.9 The evidence supporting the charge was theSecretary's Certificate dated 5 December 1987reflecting private respondent's election asPresident of PPI by the former owners thereof whenthey convened following the automatic revocationof the "Memorandum of Agreement" and "Deed of Assignment."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is liable of perjury

HELD:

YES. Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is notenough to amount to perjury. The assertion mustbe deliberate and willful. While there may havebeen a falsehood asserted, which we are notprepared to accept, no evidence exists to showthat the same was done deliberately and wilfully.On the contrary, the records tend to show that theassertion was done in good faith, in the belief thatthe non-payment of the last installment price was

justified by the sellers' non-compliance with theirwarranties. Besides, petitioner alleges that he hasdeposited the balance in escrow, which is notdisputed. Consequently, a finding of probablecause does not follow as a matter of course even if SEC decides adversely against petitioner, for anessential element of the crime appears to bewanting in the case before us, i.e., that thefalsehood is willful and deliberate.

Moreover, as a rule, pleadings need not be verifiedunless otherwise required by the Rules of Court,and no rule requires complaints for damages, as inthe case before us, to be under oath. Since thecomplaint filed by petitioner against privaterespondent is not required to be verified, anotheressential element of the crime of perjury is absent,

i.e., that the sworn statement containing the falsityis required by law. Consequently, petitioner cannotbe prosecuted on the basis of an alleged falsehoodmade in a verified pleading which is not mandatedby law to be verified. 18

Verily, there is grave abuse of discretion in theissuance of the Resolution of 25 July 1988 finding aprima faciecase for perjury against petitioner.

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Brion, J.:

FACTS:

Tomas was charged in court for perjury underArticle 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) formaking a false narration in a Certificate againstForum Shopping.The accusation stemmed frompetitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sumof money with prayer for a writ of replevin againstthe spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a JohnDoe. The first complaint was filed on April 13,1998. The second complaint, was filed on March15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, PasayCity. Both complaints showed that Tomas executedand signed the Certification against ForumShopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC byfalsely declaring under oath in the Certificateagainst Forum Shopping in the second complaintthat she did not commence any other action orproceeding involving the same issue in anothertribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that thevenue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay Citycourt (where the Certificate against ForumShopping was submitted and used) and not theMeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate againstForum Shopping was subscribed) that has

jurisdiction over the perjury case.

ISSUE:

What court has proper jurisdiction in perjury cases?

HELD:

It is the court where the Certificate against Forumwas subscribed and sworn to which is Makati Cityin this case.

Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rulesof Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal actionshall be instituted and tried in the court ormunicipality or territory where the offense wascommitted or where any of its essential ingredientsoccurred. [emphasis ours]

In relation to the crime of perjury, the materialmatter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping isthe truth of the required declarations which isdesigned to guard against litigants pursuingsimultaneous remedies in different fora.Tomasdeliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood


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was allegedly shown when she made the falsedeclarations in the Certificate against ForumShopping before a notary public in Makati City,despite her knowledge that the materialstatements she subscribed and swore to were nottrue. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue andMeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try theperjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure as all the essential elementsconstituting the crime of perjury were committedwithin the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, notPasay City.

MACHINATIONS IN PUBLICAUCTIONS

PATERNO J. OUANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS andFRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ

G.R. No. 40203. August 21, 1990

NARVASA, J.:

FACTS: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of aparcel of land with an area of about 3,710 squaremeters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, identified asPhilippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1. It was covered by

Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of theregistered owner, Rehabilitation FinanceCorporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of

the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are landsbelonging to Francisco Echavez, privaterespondent herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano.What will have to be resolved are the conflictingclaims over this lot by the vendee thereof,Echavez, and Ouano.

The property was offered for sale by public biddingby the RFC on April 1, 1958. Actually this was thesecond public bidding scheduled for the property.

The first in which both Ouano and Echavezparticipated, together with others was nullifiedon account of a protest by Ouano.

Now, it appears that prior to the second bidding,Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that onlyEchavez would make a bid, and that if it wasaccepted, they would divide the property inproportion to their adjoining properties. To ensuresuccess of their enterprise, they also agreed toinduce the only other party known to be interestedin the property a group headed by a Mrs.Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid. Theybroached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. Thelatter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw

from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 asreimbursement for its expenses.

As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thusaccepted by the RFC, was that of FranciscoEchavez, who offered P27,826.00 for the land.Echavez paid the sum of P5,565.00 representing20% deposit of the profferred price.

Thereafter, on various dates, Ouano and/or his wifedelivered sums of money to Echavez aggregatingP1,725.00, obviously in payment of the balanceindicated in Echavez's computation just mentioned,viz.: P500.00 on April 19, 1958, another P500.00 onApril 20, and P725.00 on April 27, 1958. Receiptstherefor were given by Echavez, all similarlyworded to the effect that the money was beingreceived "as part of their reimbursement for thedeposit (of P5,565.00) I have made with the RFCfor Lot 3-A-1 which I won in the bidding and whichlot I have consented to share with Mr. Paterno J.Ouano, subject to the approval of the RFC."

However, the RFC never approved the sharingagreement between Echavez and Ouanoconcerning Lot 3-A-1. It approved the sale of the lotto Echavez only, on May 9, 1958, on the conditionthat the purchase price of P27,825.00 be paid incash. Apparently Echavez found great initialdifficulty in complying with this condition. It took allof four years, and patient negotiation and diligenteffort on his part, for him ultimately to acquire titleto the property, which came about in December,1963.

It was pursuant to the absolute sale of December9, 1963 just mentioned, that a Torrens title (TCTNo. 10776) was issued in Echavez's name.

Ouano, in his turn, tried to have DBP either acceptand implement his sharing agreement withEchavez, or allow him to pay the full price of the lotin Echavez's behalf. By his own account, he sent aletter dated June 3, 1963 to the DBP, "hand carriedby his wife," "requesting among others, that he bepermitted to pay immediately either for his sharein the aforesaid lot comprising 1,828 sq. meters atthe bid price of P7.50 per sq. meter including

charges, or for the whole lot;" and that he in facttried to make such payment but the Bank turneddown his request.

Shortly after his representation with the DBP wererebuffed more precisely on June 24, 1963,months before the deed of absolute sale wasexecuted by the DBP in Echavez's favor Paterno

J. Ouano filed suit for "specific performance andreconveyance" in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Francisco Echavez and theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines (DBP).


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In his complaint, Ouano recited substantially thefacts just related, and further alleged that

". . . on June 3, 1963 plaintiffs wife and his attorneyconferred with defendant . . . Echavez for thepurpose of again requesting said defendant to signa document which would be notarized and topermit plaintiff to pay for his share direct to thedefendant DBP, but said defendant refused andinstead informed them that there had been noagreement regarding joint bidding and jointownership of Lot 3-A-1."

The complaint was amended a few weeks later,chiefly to allege that DBP was on the point of rescinding its contract with Echavez; and thatOuano's offer to the DBP to pay in Echavez's behalf the price of the lot in full (P28,206.61), had beenrejected; and that consequently, and "to show hisgood faith," he had consigned the amount with theCourt "for and in behalf of defendant . . . Echavez."

ISSUE: Whether or not a felony has beencommitted.

HELD: YES. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez hadpromised to share in the property in question as aconsideration for Ouano's refraining from takingpart in the public auction, and they had attemptedto cause and in fact succeeded in causing anotherbidder to stay away from the auction in order tocause reduction of the price of the propertyauctioned. In so doing, they committed the felonyof machinations in public auctions defined andpenalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code,supra.

The agreement therefore being criminal incharacter, the parties not only have no actionagainst each other but are both liable toprosecution and the things and price of theiragreement subject to disposal according to theprovisions of the criminal code. This, in accordancewith the so-called pari delicto principle set out inthe Civil Code. Article 1409 of said Code declares

as "inexistent and void from the beginning" thosecontracts, among others, "whose cause, object orpurpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,public order or public policy," or "expresslyprohibited . . . by law." Such contracts "cannot beratified;" "the right to set up the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410adds, the "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence . . . (thereof) does not prescribe."Article 1411 also dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of theproceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools

with which it was committed," as mandated by theprovisions of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code,this being obviously the provision "of the PenalCode relative to the disposal of effects orinstruments of a crime" that Article 1411 makes"applicable to the things or the price of thecontract."

Enemecio vs Sandiganbayan - Ouano vs CA

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