Ending East of Suez

ENDING ‘EAST OF SUEZ’

OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS

Editors. . . .

. . .

. . . -

. .

Ending ‘East of Suez’

The British Decision to Withdrawfrom Malaysia and Singapore,

1964–1968

P. L. PHAM

1

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Pham, P. L.Ending ‘‘east of Suez’’ : the British decision to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964–1968 /

Phuong Pham.p. cm.—(Oxford historical monographs)

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978–0–19–958036–1 (hardback : acid-free paper) 1. Great Britain—Foreign

relations—Malaysia. 2. Malaysia—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 3. Great Britain—Military policy.4. Great Britain—Politics and government—1964–1979. 5. Southeast Asia—Defenses. 6. GreatBritain—Foreign relations—Singapore. 7. Singapore—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 8. Great

Britain—Foreign relations—1964–1979. 9. Indonesia—History—1950–1966. I. Title.DA47.9.M4P53 2010

959.505’1—dc22 2009036127

Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, IndiaPrinted in Great Britain

on acid-free paper byMPG Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk

ISBN 978–0–19–958036–1 (Hbk.)

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents

Acknowledgements viiAbbreviations & Conventions ix

Introduction 1

PART I. COMPROMISE

Introduction to Part I 13

1. Beginning the Defence Review: October 1964–June 1965 15

2. The Perils of Alliance: June–September 1965 34

3. A Dubious Compromise: October 1965–February 1966 58

Conclusion to Part I 88

PART II . CONFLICT

Introduction to Part II 95

4. The End of Consensus: March–October 1966 98

5. From Dissent to Revolt: October 1966–April 1967 130

6. The Battle for Withdrawal: April–July 1967 150

Conclusion to Part II 195

PART III . BREAKDOWN

7. A Symbolic Sacrifice: July 1967–January 1968 201

Conclusion 237

Appendix: Personae 243

Bibliography 250Index 261

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Acknowledgements

In the course of completing a work such as this, one inevitably incurs agreat number of debts. I must extend my profound thanks:

to John Darwin, my doctoral supervisor and advising editor, whosesense of duty, diligence and care helped nurture this work to its fruition;

to Martin Conway and Simon Skinner, my tutors at Balliol College,Oxford, whose support and sympathy were indispensable;

to Richard Coggins, Jonathan Tepper and Zoe Laidlaw, with whom Ihad many intelligent, stimulating and enjoyable discussions throughoutthe course of my studies;

to the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Fund, the Arnold, Read and BryceFunds, and Balliol College, Oxford, whose immense generosity enabledme to carry out my local and international research;

to the staffs of the Public Record Office, London, the NationalArchives of Australia, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin,Texas, the United States National Archives, the Bodleian Library, andthe State Library of Victoria, whose valuable service and facilities wereessential to my work; and finally,

to Ian Jackson, whose patience, generosity, dedication, and lovehelped it all happen.

Abbreviations

AHC Australian High CommissionAMDA Anglo–Malaysian Defence AgreementANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)BHC British High CommissionBod Bodleian Library, OxfordCF Country FileCINC(FE) Commander-in-Chief, Far EastCO Commonwealth Office, LondonConf F Confidential FileCRO Commonwealth Relations Office, LondonDEA Department of Economic Affairs, LondonDEAC Australian Department of External Affairs,

CanberraDRWP Defence Review Working PartyFADC Australian Foreign Affairs and Defence

CommitteeFO Foreign Office, LondonFRUS Foreign Relations of the United StatesHMG Her Majesty’s GovernmentLBJL Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texasmemcon memorandum of a conversationMOD Ministry of Defence, LondonNAA National Archives of Australia, CanberraNSF National Security FileOPD Defence and Oversea Policy CommitteeOPD(O) Defence and Oversea Policy (Official)

CommitteePLP Parliamentary Labour PartyPRO Public Record Office (now the National

Archives), Kewtel. telegram

x Abbreviations

USNA United States National Archives, College Park,Maryland

WHCF White House Central File

A NOTE ON SPELLING

For the sake of consistency, British spellings have been adopted throughout.Foreign names have been rendered in the conventional British spelling of theperiod. All dates have been expressed according to British convention, i.e.day/month/year.

Introduction

The purpose of post-war British government, a senior civil servant oncesaid, was ‘the orderly management of decline’.¹ When the then PrimeMinister was told this by his Treasury head, he was shocked by thedefeatism which he felt the statement implied. Yet sentiment aside,the problem being named was one that bedevilled successive BritishGovernments: how to reduce Britain’s role to match its resources andwhat to reduce that role to. In the late 1940s, the crux of the issuewas how to manage India’s independence. In the 1950s and 1960s, itwas how to manage the great wave of decolonization sweeping Africaand Asia.

Even after these major shifts, Britain retained the outlook andsignificant trappings of a world power. It continued to be an active partyto a web of alliances and treaties across the globe, and maintained amajor military presence in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.While the territorial empire might have been diminishing, the claim toa worldwide role remained. It would take another chapter in Britain’ssaga of ‘decline’ before this last vestige of Empire was lost. In January1968, the Wilson Government announced that Great Britain would beabandoning any special role ‘East of Suez’. No longer, the Governmentdeclared, was Britain a world power with special worldwide interestsand responsibilities. The Empire was gone. Britain’s concerns wouldnow be limited almost exclusively to Europe and the North Atlantic.

The purpose of this book is to examine the change in policy that layat the core of the British Government’s professed change in outlook.Its focus is on how Harold Wilson’s Labour Government arrivedat the central reorientation of foreign policy that was sealed withthe January 1968 statement: the decision to end Britain’s role inMalaysia and Singapore. The twin states were of major symbolic

¹ Sir William Armstrong to Edward Heath, quoted in Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London:Secker and Warburg, 1989), p. 76.

2 Ending ‘East of Suez’

and strategic importance for British defence and foreign policy. Theywere the keystones of Britain’s presence in Southeast Asia, a presencesubstantially greater than that in the Middle East, and of equivalentsize to that in mainland Europe. Britain’s role in the region lay atthe intersection of two of Churchill’s three great spheres of Britishinfluence: the Commonwealth and the Anglo–American relationship.For the Commonwealth, the British presence expressed the country’scommitment not simply to the new states in the Indo-Pacific region,but also to the old dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Forthe Anglo–American relationship, the presence embodied Britain’spartnership with the United States in maintaining the Western positionagainst Communism in Southeast Asia. Britain’s withdrawal from thisrole meant a loosening of its Commonwealth ties, and a diminution ofits status as key US partner in the Western Alliance.

How did the Wilson Government reach so significant a decision,affecting not simply Britain’s military deployments but its sense of statusand position in the world? Did the Government live up to its putativepurpose of achieving the ‘orderly management’ of Britain’s withdrawalfrom the world stage to a purely European role? Or was it a morehaphazard journey, with little firm consensus or clear understanding ofwhat Britain should be ‘declining’ to, or what its future role should be?

Lord Curzon had predicted a different outcome. Once India becameindependent, he had argued, the rationale for Britain’s overseas rolewould evaporate. With India gone, Curzon had claimed, ‘Your ports andcoaling stations, your fortresses and dockyards, your Crown Coloniesand protectorates will go too’.² But Curzon was wrong. For two decadesafter the restoration of British power in Malaysia and Singapore atthe end of the Second World War, Britain’s Southeast Asian presenceremained a key component in the country’s worldwide role. While Indiagained independence, Malaysia and Singapore assumed a new value inBritish eyes. In a world rapidly being redrawn by the politics of theCold War and in which Britain struggled to compete, Malaysia andSingapore emerged as major economic and strategic assets.

Economically, the Malaysian states, with their rich resources of tinand rubber, were vital in the effort to maintain sterling’s position inthe world financial markets. Battle-weary, debt-burdened Britain had

² Quoted in Philip Darby, Britain’s Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London:Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 1.

Introduction 3

been desperate for hard US currency since the end of the Second WorldWar. The wider sterling area was a key resource: in 1952/3, its Asianmembers contributed 45% of sterling’s balance of payments surpluswith the US dollar; Malaya and Singapore by themselves contributedmore than 35% of the total, the single largest earners of US currency.³

Strategically, the British presence in Malaysia—encompassing themajor army, air force and naval base on Singapore, air force basesat Butterworth, Seletar and Tengah, and army bases at Terendakand Johore—was an asset for both Britain and its allies. It enabledBritain to defend the local communal elites, on whom British powerdepended, from Communist insurgency. Through this, it helped justifythe privileged position of British business in the peninsular states. WithAustralia and New Zealand both concerned to maintain a strategyof forward defence, the British presence was also an expression of itscommitment to those two countries, to which Britain was bound byties of sentiment and history as well as economic self-interest. Most ofall, the British presence was perceived by the United States as a bulwarkof Western power in a region which was becoming the focus of intensesuperpower rivalries.

While the US had maintained a coolly critical attitude towards the oldEuropean empires during the Second World War, this attitude was soonmodified after Roosevelt’s death and the emergence, beginning with thepost-war settlement, of competing ideological blocs. US pressure on theDutch had aided the emergence of an independent Indonesia underPresident Sukarno in 1948, but within the next two years Americanattitudes towards the European colonial powers shifted markedly, afterthe ‘loss’ of China, the signing of the Sino–Soviet treaty, and theoutbreak of the Korean War. From this point on, Communism, notcolonialism, in Southeast Asia was America’s main concern, a shiftin attitude crystallized by the support they now gave the French inIndochina.⁴

The US thus came to regard the British presence in Southeast Asianot only as benign, but as bolstering their own position and that ofthe West’s. The old colonial powers were formally drawn into the

³ A.J. Stockwell, ‘British Imperial Strategy and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia’, inBritain and Southeast Asia, ed. D.K. Bassett and V.T. King (Hull: University of Hull Centrefor Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p. 82.

⁴ A.J. Stockwell, ‘Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of the European ColonialEmpires’, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 2 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999), pt 2, ch. 1.


security structure of the region with the establishment of the SoutheastAsian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. An effective division oflabour was developed, with Britain responsible for curbing Communistinsurgency on the Malayan peninsula, during the Malayan Emergencyfrom 1948 to 1960, and the US replacing the faltering French inIndochina. This division of responsibilities persisted as the Americanrole in Vietnam escalated. While, through the mid-1960s, the USrepeatedly asked the British to contribute at least a token force toVietnam, the British consistently declined, pointing to their own rolein Malaysia. Though not enthusiastic about the lack of an active Britishrole in Vietnam, the Americans largely accepted this, appreciating andvaluing Britain’s Malaysian commitments.⁵ While no match for theAmerican military machine, British forces, thanks to their historic rolein the region, could defend areas where American involvement wouldbe locally unacceptable. By these means, Britain could lay claim to bethe United States’ leading partner not just in Europe but across theglobe.

If these factors provided some justification for the British presencein Malaysia and Singapore, on the other side of the ledger was anothercluster of factors that limited both Britain’s desire and ability to maintainthis. There were political and financial reasons for diminishing Britain’srole: politically, regional nationalism had to be dealt with in one wayor another; financially, there were substantial benefits to be had if thecost of direct colonial rule could be reduced. In reaching for a solutionto these issues, however, the British ironically only added to theirburdens, becoming entangled in the fractious political battle betweenKuala Lumpur and Singapore, and in the costly Confrontation againstthe new Malaysian Federation’s enemies.

From the declaration of the Emergency in 1948 onwards, the fervourof Malaya’s nationalist movement had been tempered by the relianceof communal elites on British defences against Communist insurgency.Nevertheless, British authorities still had to reach some sort of accom-modation with nationalist leaders. Colonial officials were well awarethat they needed to provide concessions and eventually grant indepen-dence to ‘responsible’ local authorities if stability was to be maintained,British economic interests safeguarded, and political radicalism checked.Malaya achieved independence in 1957, in a federation of the peninsularstates that sought to preserve the traditional political primacy of Malay

⁵ Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004).

Introduction 5

elites, and with that Anglo–Malay collaboration. Thereafter, there stillremained the thorny problem of Britain’s remaining possessions ofSingapore, Sarawak, British North Borneo (later Sabah) and Brunei.None of these territories appeared to contemporary eyes to have themaking of viable independent states: they all appeared too small and,in the case of the Bornean territories, too undeveloped. But the Britishwanted to be relieved of the burdens and costs of direct colonialism.Moreover, some formula had to be found to satisfy the nationalist aspi-rations of Singapore while maintaining the security of the strategicallyvaluable Singapore base and preventing the largely Chinese-populatedisland, with its strong Communist Party, from becoming a SoutheastAsian version of Cuba.

The solution that was found to this quandary—as was often the casein similar moments of decolonization—was to form a wider federationof these states. In theory at least, the formula was supposed to providesatisfaction to all the major parties. In achieving independence throughthe Federation in September 1963, Singapore could be freed from theshackles of colonialism while its security was still guaranteed in a largerentity. Malaya benefited from gaining some measure of control over itsisland neighbour. At the same time, the delicate racial mix of the Fed-eration was not upset—nor the Malayan position of primacy—as theaddition of the Bornean territories counterbalanced the incorporationof the Chinese from Singapore. From Britain’s point of view, it wasnow relieved of the cost and burden of directly administering its formerpossessions. Its only residual responsibility for the Malaysian Federa-tion—as it had been for Malaya before—was a guarantee of assistancein the country’s external defence, as stipulated in the Anglo–MalaysianDefence Agreement. In return, Britain retained the key strategic assets ofits bases on the Malaysian Peninsula and Singapore, and the economicbenefits of continuing close association with these territories.

As was so often the case in these post-colonial experiments withfederation, however, practice did not meet the expectations of theory.The conservative, hierarchical suzerainty of Brunei did not meld aswell with its neighbours as the planners had hoped. Even beforefederation had been achieved, its population revolted in December1962—a movement that was firmly quashed—and it withdrew fromthe arrangement. Moreover, there were continuing tensions between theleaders of Singapore, especially its ambitious Prime Minister, Lee KuanYew, and the central government in Kuala Lumpur. Malayan leadersresented and feared what they perceived to be Chinese efforts to usurp


their traditional authority on the peninsula. The Chinese Singaporeans,in turn, were antagonized by their subordinate position and the Malayanattempts to confine their political activity only to the island. Magnifiedby clashes in temperament and personality, these tensions only increasedafter federation. In early 1965, they would lead the Malaysian PrimeMinister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to propose altering the one-and-a-half-year-old constitution so that Singapore’s leaders would have moreindependence on their island and less power in Kuala Lumpur. Theplans were abandoned after the British raised strong objections. Only sixmonths later, though, the British would get no chance to comment orobject whatsoever when, in August 1965, Singapore was ejected withoutwarning from the Malaysian Federation.

Not only was Malaysia challenged from within; after the Bruneirevolt, neighbouring Indonesia declared a policy of ‘Confrontation’against the alleged ‘neo-colonialism’ of the nascent Federation, with itscontinuing British involvement. In its initial phases, Confrontation didnot take the form of a conflict. Rather, the Indonesian Governmentattempted to forestall the creation of Malaysia: producing propagandaagainst the proposed state, encouraging internal revolt, and aiding‘freedom fighters’ in Borneo. At another level, though, diplomaticexchanges still appeared constructive. In mid-1963, foreign ministersfrom Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia met in Manila to discusstheir differences. The talks achieved some success, with the ministerssigning a loose agreement on the need for regional co-operation, leadingto an eventual ‘Maphilindo’. This agreement, however, came unstuckwith the proclamation of the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963:rather clumsily, this was declared before a United Nations assessment ofthe Federation’s popular legitimacy had had a chance to report. In theimmediate aftermath, there were attacks on the British and Malaysianembassies in Jakarta, and Indonesia cut commercial ties with Malaysia.From early to mid-1964 there was continuing low-level friction betweenthe two states and little diplomatic success at resurrecting the ManilaAgreements at conferences in Bangkok and Tokyo. During this period,moreover, Indonesia’s internal political balance shifted sharply to theleft, to the benefit of the PKI, the country’s Communist party. Thisled, from mid-1964, to the intensification of Indonesian attacks onMalaysia, including landings on the peninsula itself.

The response in Malaysia was for Britain to build up the country’sdefences enormously, sending in nearly 70,000 troops and 80 ships,including two aircraft carriers. A stalemate ensued: Indonesia continuing

Introduction 7

sufficient low-level attacks to tie the British down, without goingso far as to provoke and justify any major British retaliation. Thesituation persisted for several months while, internally, Indonesianpolitics lurched further leftward. This radicalization was symbolized byPresident Sukarno’s withdrawing Indonesia from the United Nationsin January 1965, and his declaration in August that same year of an axisrunning from Jakarta through Hanoi to Beijing. The growing stature ofthe PKI, however, antagonized their chief competitors for power in theIndonesian army: after most of the country’s senior generals were killedin an attempted coup in October 1965, the army moved to destroythe PKI. The resulting purge would claim between a hundred thousandand a million lives. Consumed by its inner convulsions, the IndonesianGovernment let its policy of Confrontation evaporate, though theconflict would not officially be declared over until August 1966.

By the mid-1960s, then, the costs and benefits of Britain’s presencein Malaysia and Singapore were reaching a delicate balance. While theBritish bases served some strategic and political interests in maintainingthe Western position in Southeast Asia, the benefits were diminishedby the regional hostility they attracted and the difficult politics of theirSoutheast Asian hosts. The economic value of Malaysia and Singaporewas counterbalanced by the costs which close association incurred. Ina period where the pound was under regular attack and the Britisheconomy was afflicted with a chronic balance of payments deficit, the£1 million a day cost of Confrontation was not easily borne. The Britishrole in Southeast Asia helped embody Britain’s alliance with the UnitedStates and its continuing ties to the old Commonwealth of Australiaand New Zealand—but the meaning and weight of these relationshipswas shifting as Britain prevaricated at the threshold of Europe. Thenew Wilson Government’s mandate to modernize Britain could implya need to shake off old colonial commitments or a reinterpreted worldrole for Britain in protecting newly independent states. Moreover, indomestic politics the Labour Government would need to balance itspriorities between social expenditure and defence.

Against the background of this subtly shifting mix of national anddomestic national interests, how did the Wilson Government cometo decide that Britain should withdraw from its last major overseasrole? This book seeks to answer this question by examining the periodfrom October 1964 to January 1968, the earlier date marking theelection of the Wilson Government, the later being the moment


when this Government announced the final decision to withdraw fromBritain’s overseas role. This volume is further divided into three parts,each concentrating on one of the period’s three major statements ofBritish defence and foreign policy towards Malaysia and Singapore: the1966 Defence White Paper, which limited, but maintained, Britain’sSoutheast Asian presence and role; the 1967 Supplementary Statementon Defence, which announced a withdrawal from the Malaysia andSingapore bases in the mid-1970s but with the continuation of aBritish role; and the January 1968 statement on public expenditure,which, following devaluation of the pound, moved forward the Britishwithdrawal to 1971 and abandoned any further special role in the regionthereafter.

For all three parts, the focus is on the process leading to the respectivestatement of policy on Britain’s role in Malaysia and Singapore. Thisincludes examination of the roles of the major British departments ofstate, their political masters, Cabinet and parliamentary politics, and therelationships with and between Britain’s major allies. However, it pre-cludes deep consideration of issues which may have had some impact onthe decision-making process but were external to it, such as the detailedconduct of Confrontation. While the British presence in Malaysia andSingapore was the most significant part of the country’s ‘East of Suez’role, that role included several other components, including the Britishpresence in Aden, a string of island bases across the Indian Ocean, andBritish commitments to Brunei and Hong Kong. All these componentswere held together in popular rhetoric by the notion of ‘East of Suez’,but at a hard policy level they were largely considered independently.The British withdrawal from Aden, for example, was determined muchmore by the particular circumstances of the British base and the conflictsurrounding it than by the rather broad and imprecise concept of ‘Eastof Suez’.⁶ Thus, while reference may be made to these other areas, thisbook will not examine them in any great detail.

The book is based on research principally conducted at a numberof governmental archives in Britain and overseas. The bulk of theresearch was undertaken in the National Archives, Kew, covering therecently released papers produced by all the departments in the Wil-son Government involved in the foreign policy process: the Foreignand Commonwealth Relations Offices, the Ministry of Defence, the

⁶ Karl Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire (Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1991).

Introduction 9

Treasury and Department of Economic Affairs, and the Cabinet andPrime Minister’s Offices. In the National Archives of Australia, PrimeMinisterial, Cabinet, External Affairs and Defence papers were similarlyexamined. The US National Archives in College Park, Maryland pro-vided documents from the US Defence and State Departments, whilethe Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, supplied White Housefiles. All the relevant documents in the National Archives appear nowto have been released; this contrasts with my experience in the over-seas archives, where many files were inaccessible because of remainingsecurity classifications. The Governments of Malaysia and Singapore,most notably, have not publicly released any of their internal documentsrelating to the period.

In addition to the material found in these governmental archives,a number of supplementary resources were also utilized. The Archivesof the Parliamentary Labour Party, kept in facsimile in the BodleianLibrary, provided a record of the political relations between the WilsonGovernment and its party, while Hansard documented its parliamentarytravails. A number of interviews with former diplomats, kept at theChurchill Archives Centre in Cambridge, provided some personalinsights, as did the many published diaries and memoirs of significantfigures involved. The Times, read in microfilm in the State Libraryof Victoria, provided a glimpse of the broader public perspective ofthe time. The breadth and range of records used—official, personaland public—has enabled a close and detailed picture of the decision-making process to be developed. While inevitably, official records havehad to be used as the predominant source for examining the details ofdecision-making, those of different countries have provided illuminatingperspectives and, often in diplomatic despatches, individualized colour.At key points, personal diaries have conveyed the emotional weight anddrama of major decisions far more fully than the official record. Fullerdetails of all this material, and other secondary sources used, are givenin the Bibliography.

An analysis of the British decisions to withdraw from Malaysia andSingapore has relevance well beyond the immediate subject area. Theseevents were, in and of themselves, major watersheds in post-war Britishforeign policy. They have been held to mark the end of Britain’s claimsto be a world power. But this book has implications, not simply for thestudy of decolonization and British contraction, but also for the subjectof Anglo–American relations during a particularly difficult periodfor US foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, and Anglo–Australian


relations at a time when they were undergoing substantial redefinition.Looking inward, this book seeks to cast a bright light on the practiceof British foreign policy making, both in periods of fairly orthodoxpolicy revision and in periods of acute economic and political crisis. Incasting this light, the book can illuminate the question of how well theBritish Government fulfilled that informal purpose named at the verybeginning: the management, orderly or not, of Britain’s last period of‘decline’ and imperial retreat.

PART I

COMPROMISE

Introduction to Part I

In February 1966, the Wilson Government published a Defence WhitePaper. The paper was supposed to crystallize the findings of more thana year’s searching revision of British defence and foreign policy. It wassupposed to be the major defence and foreign policy statement of theWilson Government, establishing the direction of British policy intothe 1970s. Later critics have largely read the paper as testament tothe Wilson Government’s essential conservatism. While it proposedsome limits to Britain’s overseas role, it planned no radical overhaulof commitments. British power in Southeast Asia would continueto be centred on Singapore and Malaysia, though some planning ofalternatives would take place should these bases no longer be available.While the Government hoped to achieve greater co-operation with itsallies in the region, it continued to plan on maintaining a major militarypresence.

The surface continuity of the White Paper, however, belied a yearof dramatic shifts in British planning. Even at the point of the WhitePaper’s publication, the underlying direction of policy towards Malaysiaand Singapore remained in flux, caught between the desire of planners tomaximize British influence with minimal risks and commitments, andthe desire of Britain’s major allies to maximize its role as a supplement totheir own. The factors leading to the gyrations in British planning werenumerous. Not only were issues of cost at stake, but also the problems ofthe Confrontation versus Indonesia, the fragile position of the pound,the fractious politics of Malaysia and Singapore, and, most importantly,Britain’s complex relations with the United States and Australia. Due tothese factors, British policy planning swung from one pole to anotherand back again: from seeking to maintain continuity, to planning aradical restructuring of commitments, to falling back towards relativelyminor adjustments to Britain’s role.

Part I examines the planning process from the election of the WilsonGovernment to the publication of the February 1966 Defence White


Paper. Chapter 1 focuses on the first few months of the WilsonGovernment, from October 1964 until about the middle of 1965.During this period, the Wilson Government came to establish a firmdirection for its planning in Southeast Asia. It did so within thecontext of its Defence Review but before any consultation with itsallies. Thus the main concern of Chapter 1 is how policy planningdeveloped within the British Government, through the actions of itsmajor interested Whitehall departments—the Cabinet Office, ForeignOffice, Commonwealth Relations Office, Ministry of Defence, andTreasury—and their respective ministers and officials.

Chapter 2 carries the story from mid-1965 to the immediate aftermathof the separation of Malaysia and Singapore. During this period, officialssought to bring Britain’s principal allies—namely the United States,Australia and New Zealand—into the policy process. These initialmoves, however, were interrupted by the abrupt separation of Malaysiaand Singapore. In response, British officials hastily revised their plansfor the region, but these plans were forcefully rejected by the ANZUSallies.

Finally, Chapter 3 covers the events leading up to the publication ofthe Defence White Paper of February 1966. After a period of coolerrelations with their allies following the earlier rejection of their plans, theBritish re-engaged with the ANZUS powers to negotiate the contents ofthe White Paper. Again, the effect of these negotiations was to modifyBritish plans in Southeast Asia significantly.

1Beginning the Defence Review: October

1964–June 1965

It seemed the most fragile of beginnings. When the Wilson Govern-ment was elected to office on 16 October 1964, its claim to powerwas based on a breathtakingly slender parliamentary majority: a merefour seats. Few commentators—indeed few parliamentarians them-selves—believed that the new Government would last more thanseveral months. The inevitable vicissitudes of political life were expectedto chip away at the Government’s majority, and it was likely to beforced back to the polls soon afterwards. But though the Government’sposition was precarious, that did not necessarily force it into a posture ofconservatism. On the contrary, the Labour Government projected itselfas a force of modernization and reform, energized and enraptured by the‘white heat of the technological revolution’, to use Harold Wilson’s fa-mous phrase. The Government promised to release the British economyfrom the ‘stop–go’ policies that had characterized more than a decadeof Conservative rule. It planned to steer the country out of the endemicbalance of payments rut that led to continual sterling crises, even atthe moment the new Government was being installed. It proclaimed anew era of sustainable growth, underwritten by an ambitious NationalPlan, and scripted by the skilled technocrats staffing the newly createdDepartment of Economic Affairs.

As Prime Minister, Harold Wilson was the active and energetic driverof the new Government. Intellectually agile and youthful—at that timethe youngest Prime Minister of the century—Wilson represented agenerational change after the genteel stewardship of his predecessors,Alec Douglas-Home and Harold Macmillan. At the other cornersof the leadership triumvirate were two former runners-up for theLabour leadership: James Callaghan as Chancellor of the Exchequerand George Brown as Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Theywere counterpoints in personality as well as counterweights in ambition:


Callaghan, measured and pragmatic; Brown, sometimes brilliant but alsoerratic, and not infrequently inebriated. The key foreign and defencepolicy positions were held by the Labour Right. The cultured butformidable, even brutal Denis Healey would serve as Defence Secretaryfor the entire duration of the Wilson Government. Patrick GordonWalker was Wilson’s initial choice as Foreign Secretary, but after he wasunable to regain a seat in the Commons, he was replaced by the solidMichael Stewart in January 1965.

Though the Wilson Government tried quickly to establish its mod-ernizing credentials in domestic and economic policy, its stance indefence and foreign affairs was more equivocal. Certainly, senior min-isters were not shy in reaffirming their commitment to Britain’s ‘worldrole’. But they expressed this commitment, not in the old languageof empire, but in the fresh parlance of the Commonwealth and theprotection of its newly independent states. At the same time, they wereprepared to impose, for the causes of both fiscal stringency and left-wingpreference, a firm ceiling on defence spending. To this end, the Gov-ernment instituted a far-reaching Defence Review to examine all aspectsof Britain’s global defence posture. Within the forum of the DefenceReview, the established players in defence policy—the Treasury, theForeign and Commonwealth Relations Offices, and the Ministry ofDefence—found voice for their interests.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the tensions betweenthese different factors played out in the early months of the WilsonGovernment and the first stages of the Defence Review. At the timeof the Government’s election, defence and foreign policy was in aninchoate and incoherent state. Within eight months, by the middle of1965, the various factors had combined to establish a firm directionfor the British Government’s preferred policy. This chapter will seekto document and to explain how the change took place: from theearly months, when the new Government’s ministers appeared keen toemphasize Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role; to the period of reassessmentinstigated by the Defence Review; to the key ministerial meetings inJune 1965, where a new direction for Britain’s foreign policy was set.

On coming to power in October 1964, the Wilson Government wasconfronted with a tense international situation, particularly in SoutheastAsia, where Britain was already heavily committed in Malaysia. A daybefore the British election, the People’s Republic of China had explodedits first nuclear bomb. Two months earlier, the US Congress had

Beginning the Defence Review: October 1964–June 1965 17

passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, authorizing President Johnson torespond to attacks on US forces and to use all measures including forceto defend Southeast Asian nations—a significant step in the escalationof America’s involvement in Vietnam.

Indonesia’s Confrontation, which had been declared against thenascent Malaysian Federation in 1963, had reached a high pitch oftension. There had been a number of attempts to sabotage Singapore’swater and transport infrastructure in June and July 1964, and possi-ble Indonesian connivance in instigating race riots on the island thatSeptember. ‘Vivere pericoloso’, President Sukarno had told his coun-try—this was the year of living dangerously—and Indonesia was trueto his word, landing multiple groups of guerillas on the Malay Peninsulafrom August to October 1964. While these incursions were easily con-tained by the British and Malaysians, they contributed to an ongoingsense of instability and tied down significant British forces in the region.

The Wilson Government did not shirk from the Southeast Asiancommitments it inherited. On its election it immediately reaffirmed theBritish Government’s resolve in opposing Confrontation. Moreover,in private and public statements senior ministers outlined a visionwhich saw Britain maintaining a major Southeast Asian role into thefuture. Harold Wilson had revealed this vision in a private meetingwith US President Lyndon Johnson some months before the election. ALabour Government, the then Opposition leader had assured Johnson,would want Britain to continue to act ‘in active support of US effortsto maintain world-wide security’.¹ Britain would deploy ‘fire brigadeforces’ to help put out ‘brush fires’ ‘East of Suez’ and elsewhere.²Denis Healey, the incoming British Defence Secretary, reiterated thistheme to Australian ministers soon after his arrival in office. Whenhe first met with Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister for ExternalAffairs, he explained that the Government felt the need ‘primarily . . .for maintaining forces overseas’.³ In particular, Healey emphasized theimportance of East Asia as the main area of instability in the world.Britain’s Singapore base was a ‘first priorit[y]’ which ‘would have to bemaintained and strengthened’.⁴

¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 213: memcon, Lyndon Johnson and Harold Wilson, Wash-ington, DC, 2/3/1964.

² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 213: memcon, Robert McNamara and Harold Wilson,Washington, DC, 5/3/1964.

³ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: AHC, London to DEAC, tel. 7708, 11/11/1964.⁴ Ibid.


In mid-November 1964, the new Government held a major discussionto review defence and foreign policy. Present at Chequers, the BritishPrime Minister’s official country residence, were Harold Wilson and allhis senior defence and foreign policy ministers, the permanent headsof their departments, and the chiefs of the defence forces. For the firsttime since the election, ministers were given a comprehensive accountof their officials’ assessment of where British foreign policy should beheading. They were presented with a paper by the Defence and OverseaPolicy (Official) Committee (OPD(O))—the most senior committeeof officials on defence and foreign affairs—on ‘British Interests andCommitments Overseas’. As its title suggested, the official paper took aglobal approach to British strategy, and sought to stress, for the benefitof the new ministers, the underlying rationale for British policy.

Officials weighed the three major components of Britain’s overseasrole—in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.⁵ They rankedBritain’s commitments in Europe as the first priority because of geogra-phy and history, and because of Europe’s role as one of the main politicaland economic centres of power. The importance of oil placed the Mid-dle East second. As for Southeast Asia, however, officials doubted thatthe economic interests at stake fully justified Britain’s expenses in theregion. While the Commonwealth still comprised one third of Britishtrade, that trade was not a compelling reason for the heavy British mil-itary expenditure in the Southeast Asian region. The expenditure wasbeing incurred because of the current conflict of Confrontation; oncethe conflict ended, the need for it would be reduced. The remainingrationale for the British presence would be, in the words of the paper,‘primarily politico-strategic’, namely, the need to prevent the spread ofCommunism and to maintain Britain’s position with Australia, NewZealand, and the United States.⁶ Given these priorities, officials argued,if ministers felt it necessary to reduce Britain’s presence in one of thethree areas, the reductions should be made in Southeast Asia.

The ministers at Chequers disagreed. Though they were not enter-taining the idea of dropping precipitately any of Britain’s roles, they diddiffer from their officials’ assessment and expressed ‘considerable sup-port’ for maintaining Britain’s overseas commitments as a first priority.⁷

⁵ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/2: OPD(O), ‘British Interests and CommitmentsOverseas’, 18/11/1964, para. 20.

⁶ Ibid., para. 33.⁷ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/1st Meeting: Defence Policy, Chequers, 21/11/1964.


With mutual deterrence making war in Europe unlikely, they argued,the greatest threats to peace lay overseas. Here Britain’s inherited al-liances and commitments provided the country with a role that no othercountry could fulfil. If the cost of these commitments was too great forBritain to bear, then perhaps contributions could be sought from thoseallies whom Britain’s presence also benefited: Australia, New Zealand,and the United States.

While the Wilson Government’s ministers were keen to maintainBritain’s globally oriented, interventionist foreign policy, they alsohad concerns about the costs which such a broad defence role wasimposing. Defence spending was currently projected to consume anever-increasing percentage of Gross National Product, already at 7%the highest level for any industrialized country other than the UnitedStates.⁸ If left unchecked, the annual budget would grow in real termsfrom the £2,000 million estimated in 1964/5 to £2,400 million in1969/70. Such expenditure, argued the Treasury and the Departmentof Economic Affairs, imposed a heavy burden on the British economy. Itdid little to stimulate growth. Instead, it squeezed out other public sectorprogrammes, added substantially to the country’s balance of paymentsdeficit, and committed the most advanced industries and most skilledworkers to non-economic work. Britain’s economic problems couldnot be solved, the ministers at Chequers were warned, unless theGovernment called a halt to increases in the defence budget, and aimedfor expenditure in 1969/70 to be held to the same level as the 1964/65annual budget of £2,000 million.

This case was underlined by the sense of economic crisis alreadygripping the new Government. The pound had been under heavy attackand the Governor of the Bank of England was urging that immediate,drastic measures be taken to counter this. The combination of argumentand circumstance was more than adequate to convince ministers. Theyeasily agreed in principle to the adoption of the £2,000 million targetfor defence spending in 1969/70, with neither the Foreign nor DefenceSecretaries raising objections.⁹ The Chequers conference concluded thatwork should begin on reducing defence expenditure, though on thebasis that Britain’s global role be maintained.¹⁰ To this end the meeting

⁸ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/1: Treasury and Department of Economic Affairs, ‘TheFuture Size of the Defence Budget’, 13/11/1964.

⁹ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/1st–4th Meetings, 21–2/11/1964.¹⁰ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/4th Meeting: Defence Policy, Chequers, 22/11/1964,

Prime Minister’s summing up.


commissioned a Defence Review, to be conducted by the Ministry ofDefence, aimed at determining what capabilities needed to be cut forthe spending target to be met.

In the month or two that followed, the senior figures in the WilsonGovernment publicly reinforced their preference for Britain’s ‘East ofSuez’ role to be the first priority. In his first major foreign affairsstatement to the House of Commons as Prime Minister, in December1964, Harold Wilson explained how the relevance of Britain’s heavyexpenditure on European defence was ‘thrown into doubt’ by thestrategic deadlock in the region, and the fact that ‘the balance of dangeris shifting away from the terrain of Europe to newer areas’.¹¹ He arguedthat Britain’s privileged status in NATO, in the Anglo–Americanalliance, and in the Commonwealth depended upon a British presencearound the globe in areas that no other ally, not even the UnitedStates, could match. Whatever the Government might do to lighten theburden of defence expenditure, Wilson maintained, ‘we cannot affordto relinquish our world role, . . . our ‘‘East of Suez’’ role’.¹²

Later that month, Wilson and Defence Secretary Healey visitedthe United States and conveyed the same message. In pre-summitbriefings and in meetings with the President himself and his seniorofficials, Wilson and Healey argued that the world now faced a strategicstalemate in Europe and active conflict in Southeast Asia. It thus madesense for Britain to reduce its costs in NATO and emphasize its presence‘East of Suez’.¹³ This argument was given further public reinforcementin the Wilson Government’s first Defence White Paper, published inFebruary 1965.¹⁴ While the nascent state of the Defence Review meantthat it could not provide any detailed plans, the Paper did, as USofficials interpreted it, express ‘more forcefully and formally than before’the Labour Government’s new direction.¹⁵ It questioned the logic ofNATO expenditure, and emphasized the problem posed by China’snewly acquired nuclear power. It hinted that Britain’s nuclear deterrentmight usefully be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region to help contain

¹¹ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report (London: HMSO,1964), Session 1964/5, vol. 704, col. 423.

¹² Ibid.¹³ PRO: PREM 13/103: memcon, Harold Wilson and David Bruce, London, 27/11/1964;

PRO: CAB 133/266: PMV(W)(64)2nd Meeting, 7/12/1964.¹⁴ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, Cmnd 2592 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1965).¹⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Thomas Hughes to Dean Rusk, ‘Analysis of 1965 British

Defence White Paper’, 5/3/1965.


the Chinese threat. It expressed support for greater allied co-operation‘East of Suez’, for Britain’s worldwide interests were shared with manyother countries, and the associated defence burdens could be ‘assumedor shared by our allies’.¹⁶ Though the US State Department privatelyexpected that the British would shy away from any commitment oftroops to Vietnam, in broader Southeast Asia the British Governmentwere presenting US and UK interests as being ‘interdependent andrequiring a co-operative response to the Communist threat’.¹⁷

While the Wilson Government’s senior ministers openly stressed the im-portance of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role, this attitude was not fully sharedwithin all parts of Whitehall. A glimpse of official scepticism at the long-term value of Britain’s Southeast Asian presence had been given in thepapers presented to ministers at Chequers in November 1964. More-over, under the previous Government, though Wilson’s ministers wereunlikely to know of it, the Chiefs of Staff had secretly considered, thoughrejected as impractical, withdrawing from Singapore to a much reducedpresence in Australia as a means of escaping the strain of Confronta-tion.¹⁸ While the British Government was still officially committed todefending Malaysia for the immediate future, long-term planners withinthe Foreign Office were questioning whether the costs of Britain’s pres-ence in Malaysia and Singapore were coming to outweigh the benefits.

This strand of thinking was most clearly voiced in a planning paperpresented by the Foreign Office to OPD, the Cabinet’s most seniorsub-committee on foreign policy and defence, in November 1964.¹⁹The paper had originated as something of a free-thinking exercise by theplanning staff in early 1964, but was then approved up the ranks of theForeign Office and was now being presented to ministers.²⁰ Officialsargued that the trade which had once justified Britain’s Southeast Asianpresence was no longer a significant factor. The immediate area wasworth only 3% of British trade and less than 6% of overseas investmentrevenue.²¹ If trade was no longer a compelling interest in SoutheastAsia, Britain’s regional role was now justified by its politico-strategic

¹⁶ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, para. 21.¹⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Thomas Hughes to Dean Rusk, ‘Britain on Vietnam’,

26/2/1965.¹⁸ Easter, British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia, ch. 5.¹⁹ PRO: CAB 148/17: OPD(64)10: ‘British Policy Towards Southeast Asia’, 19/11/1964.²⁰ PRO: FO 371/177824: J.E. Cable, ‘British Policy in Southeast Asia’, 3/4/1964.²¹ PRO: CAB 148/17: OPD(64)10: ‘British Policy Towards Southeast Asia’, paras 8–9.


interests: the need to contain the spread of Communism; to upholdAnglo–American partnership across the globe—which was ‘cardinal tothe conduct of our whole foreign policy’; and to maintain Britain’s tieswith Australia and New Zealand, to whom Britain was bound not onlyby trade and investment, but also by sentiment and history.²²

How well were these interests served by the Singapore base, Britain’smajor strategic asset and presence in the region? The Foreign Officepaper noted that the base consumed 15% of the British defence budgetand 40% of defence costs overseas, figures now wildly out of proportionwith the immediate area’s economic value. Its direct strategic valuewas declining. While the base currently formed the cornerstone ofMalaysian defence, the very fact of the British presence provoked someof the agitation it was supposed to prevent. The rising tide of nationalismin Southeast Asia meant that the base was slowly becoming a political‘liability’.²³ Thus, the paper argued, the Government should beginplanning how to protect Britain’s continuing but limited interests inthe area by some means other than the Singapore base, so that Britishforces might withdraw safely after Confrontation had concluded, beforebeing forced by local hostility to do so.

The Foreign Office’s planners thought it too soon to decide what formresidual British forces in Southeast Asia should take after withdrawalfrom Singapore, though they noted that developing Indian Ocean orAustralian bases was feasible, if expensive. Nevertheless, they were pre-pared to outline what they believed should be Britain’s ultimate goals forthe region. Here again they emphasized the problems presented by thelocal political climate. Fewer than one third of the population of South-east Asia were governed under Western-oriented regimes, while morethan half were officially non-aligned. The case of Vietnam demonstratedthe financial and strategic impossibility of compelling more countriesto become more closely aligned to the West. If it was not possibleto convert Southeast Asia to Western alignment then the only viablemeans of preventing Communism from extending into Southeast Asiawould be to find a modus vivendi between the competing forces. TheCommunist and Western powers needed to reach some kind of agree-ment, whether tacit or formal, to a neutralized Southeast Asia. Underthis arrangement, a variety of nationalist regimes would co-exist—theircolours varying from ‘socialist’ to laissez-faire capitalist—with neither

²² PRO: CAB 148/17: OPD(64)10: ‘British Policy Towards Southeast Asia’, paras 8–9.²³ Ibid., para. 22.


Communist nor Western influence predominating. SEATO would bedisbanded, and Western forces disengaged from the area. This policy didnot imply, however, any early departure from the area—certainly notwhile Confrontation continued—since that would lead to the collapseof pro-Western sentiment and the advance of Communism. Rather,Britain had to adopt a policy of ‘firmness with mediatory diplomacy’.The Communist threat had to be contained until the Communistpowers conceded neutralization on the basis of their own interests.²⁴

The Foreign Office’s paper conflicted with the current view of thePrime Minister and other senior ministers that Britain’s presence inSoutheast Asia was its most important role; but that did not stop OPDrubber-stamping the paper. This authorization, though, was not a signthat senior ministers had changed their minds, more that their mindswere really elsewhere. They did not give the paper much in-depthconsideration: while it was nominally presented to them in OPD, theynever actually discussed it. Nor, it seems, had most of them read ituntil more than a month later, after the Christmas recess. Only thendid some ministers pass around a few cursory critical comments.²⁵The reason for this lax behaviour probably stemmed from the factthat the paper related to long-term policy. The Government was livingday to day on the most slender of majorities, having to cope withits transition to power at a moment of economic crisis: presumably,long-term foreign policy planning fell well outside ministers’ immediateconcerns.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Office’s paper on policy towards SoutheastAsia was an important signal of the direction which officials’—thoughnot yet ministerial—thinking was taking on Britain’s future role in theregion. Its long-term aims of partial retreat and regional neutralizationwere reaffirmed when British Heads of Missions in Southeast Asia metto discuss future policy, first in Kuala Lumpur in January 1965 andthen in Bangkok three months later. Both these conferences came tosimilar conclusions.²⁶ They doubted that a continuing Anglo–Americanpresence would keep the region Western-aligned. On the contrary, ‘the

²⁴ Ibid., para. 28.²⁵ PRO: FO 371/180205: Arthur Bottomley to Patrick Gordon Walker, 30/12/1964;

James Callaghan to Patrick Gordon Walker, 1/1/1965; Patrick Gordon Walker to JamesCallaghan, 7/1/1965.

²⁶ PRO: FO 371/180206: Lord Head to Arthur Bottomley, ‘Malaysia: The Long-termProblem of Southeast Asia’, 10/2/1965; FO 371/180207: ‘Meeting of British Representativesin Southeast Asia at Bangkok’, Apr. 1965.


longer it remains, the more likely it is that it will be resented’.²⁷ Instead,the United States and Britain should withdraw their forces to theperiphery ‘as soon as possible’.²⁸ Nationalism should be welcomed, evenat the expense of short-term economic interests, for it would prove theonly effective obstacle to the expansion of Chinese Communism.

These kinds of ideas also had a long history in British official thinking.Planners under the Macmillan and Home Governments had toyed withthe idea of adopting a peripheral strategy to Southeast Asian defenceafter a possible future loss of Singapore. Regarding British views ofthe wider area, the US State Department privately recorded in 1965that ‘for over a decade the UK has believed that the best answer to theproblems of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was neutralisation’.²⁹ It hadregarded SEATO and the Geneva Accords not as final solutions, but‘steps on the way to the attainment of reciprocally tolerable relations’.³⁰When it came to decolonization, successive British Governments hadoften sought a quick retreat as a means of conceding power to an‘acceptable’ successor regime. In the context of the Cold War, thismeant giving way to nationalist regimes in the hope of building up theanti-Communist bloc.³¹ While ministers in the Wilson Governmentwere initially enthusiastic about an activist foreign policy, it is clearthat officials’ long-term policy thinking remained within this pragmatic,accommodationist tradition. As the remainder of this chapter will show,once it became clear that the constraints imposed by the DefenceReview compelled a change in Britain’s overseas posture, this traditionof thinking became increasingly influential.

While Foreign Office planners were pondering the future directionof foreign policy, other parts of Whitehall were busy deciding oncuts to overseas and defence expenditure. Ministers were moving tocut a number of future defence projects (the TSR-2, HS-681 andF-1154 aircraft, and the fifth Polaris submarine). Meanwhile, withinthe Ministry of Defence, the Defence Review was considering how

²⁷ PRO: FO 371/180206: Lord Head to Arthur Bottomley, ‘Malaysia: The Long-termProblem of Southeast Asia’, 10/2/1965; FO 371/180207: ‘Meeting of British Representativesin Southeast Asia at Bangkok’, Apr. 1965.

²⁸ Ibid.²⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Hughes to Rusk, ‘Britain on Vietnam’, 26/2/1965.³⁰ Ibid.³¹ William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonisation’,

Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22 (1994), pp. 462–511.


existing military capabilities might be cut in order to meet the budgettarget of £2,000 million. A draft report of the Review’s initial findingswas presented by the Chiefs of Staff to the Defence Secretary and hissupporting ministers at the beginning of March 1965.

Unsurprisingly given their interests, the Chiefs of Staff’s draft reportsought strongly to deny that there was much potential for any majordefence cuts without dire consequences. The report provided a multitudeof arguments on the difficulty of making any reductions. The Chiefsargued that most of Britain’s forces were already committed to numerousroles: for example, while more than half the Navy was currently inEast Asia, 85% of naval forces were also theoretically committed toNATO. Thus no savings would accrue from simply making cuts in onetheatre or another. Only if forces, men and equipment were completelywithdrawn and disbanded would there be any reduction in costs.³²They further argued that making cuts to Britain’s two main foreignroles—in Germany for NATO, and in Singapore and Malaysia—wouldbe particularly problematic. While British forces in Europe exceededstrategic requirements, achieving any reductions would be politicallyvery difficult since they would almost certainly be opposed by Britain’smajor NATO allies. In Southeast Asia, once forces were reduced toa post-Confrontation level—an eventuality assumed in the projectedcostings—there would be little scope for any further reduction, giventhe extent of Britain’s current responsibilities. The Chiefs concludedthat the choice facing the Government was stark: it would have to decide‘whether [it] attach[ed] more importance to the European role or theworld-wide role’.³³ If drastic cuts were made to the former, expenditurecould just be brought to target. If cuts were to be made to the latter, thealready stretched state of the armed forces meant that ‘there may be nohalfway house between something near present expenditure levels andmore or less total withdrawal’.³⁴

The ministers presiding over the MOD reacted sceptically to these direwarnings. Defence Secretary Denis Healey thought the conclusions ‘notsatisfactory’ and ‘unrealistic’.³⁵ His deputy, Frederick Mulley, agreedthat they were ‘much too sweeping’.³⁶ Lord Shackleton, Minister for the

³² PRO: DEFE 13/829: Ministry of Defence, Draft of ‘Defence Expenditure Review1964/5’, 5/3/1965, paras 22–4.

³³ Ibid. para. 41. ³⁴ Ibid.³⁵ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to the Chiefs of Naval Staff,

Ground Staff and Air Staff, 15/3/1965.³⁶ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Frederick Mulley to Denis Healey, 15/3/1965.


RAF, was ‘disturbed’ by the unwarranted assumption that savings wereimpossible without cuts to commitments, especially given that studiesof possible military efficiencies were still currently under way.³⁷ Yetthough these ministers were dismissive of the paper’s hyperbole, theywere not unsympathetic to the substantive core of the Chiefs’ claims.They agreed that a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of British commitmentswould be necessary if the Review were to proceed further and savingsfound. As Navy Minister Christopher Mayhew complained—withDenis Healey’s concurrence—the problem with the Review was that its‘political assumptions [were] so inadequate’.³⁸ While previously defencepolicy may have been decided with scant regard for financial costs, therisk now lay the other way: of making defence decisions according to aprecise budget target, with little regard for underlying policy objectives.

Mayhew and Mulley both argued that it was necessary for the po-litical departments—the Foreign Office and Commonwealth RelationsOffice—to estimate more precisely what Britain’s position and com-mitments ‘East of Suez’ would be in the future. ‘Can we be sure of beingin Singapore [when] . . . Confrontation is at an end?’ asked Mulley.³⁹Thus, while the ministers demanded that the conclusions be refinedand toned down, they left the basic thrust of the paper unaltered.If the £2,000 million expenditure target was to be reached, the finalMOD paper concluded, the Government needed to decide ‘which ofthe present major roles can be reduced’.⁴⁰

It was hardly surprising that the MOD would react to the prospectof budget cuts by claiming them to be impossible unless foreign policycommitments were cut first: equally unsurprising was the Foreign Of-fice’s retort to this claim, arguing that efficiencies should be maximizedbefore any commitments were touched. When the Defence Reviewpaper was circulated to relevant departments within Whitehall, ForeignOffice officials came up with a number of criticisms in this vein: that theDefence Review studies had not examined possible savings at home; thatthere had been no rigorous testing of the cost-effectiveness of currentarrangements; that there had been no attempt to find efficiencies atthe Singapore base. Yet while these officials tried to poke holes in the

³⁷ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Lord Shackleton to Denis Healey, 11/3/1965.³⁸ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Christopher Mayhew to Denis Healey, 22/3/1965; Denis Healey

to Christopher Mayhew, 23/3/1965.³⁹ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Mulley to Healey, 15/3/1965.⁴⁰ PRO: CAB 148/42: OPD(O)(65)16: Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Expenditure Review

1964/5’, 18/3/1965.


MOD’s arguments, they also conceded amongst themselves that theForeign Office would likely be called upon to find some means ofreducing commitments.⁴¹

So it turned out: when OPD(O) met to discuss the Defence Reviewpaper at the end of March 1965, the discussion all ran the MOD’sway.⁴² No objection was noted to the argument of the Permanent UnderSecretary for Defence that the review’s next step should be a reassessmentof commitments. After some discussion of the parameters of such anexercise, the meeting concluded that the MOD should complete itsstudies of what reductions could be made to present capabilities. Asthis approach was unlikely to yield sufficient savings, a working party,with representatives from the political departments, Defence and theTreasury, should also be set up to examine the possible shedding ofcommitments.

Through April 1965, the Defence Review Working Party examinedBritain’s worldwide commitments. Its approach was to divide the worldinto five different areas: the Caribbean; South Africa and the SouthAtlantic; Germany; the Mediterranean and Middle East; East andSoutheast Asia. In the first two areas, the roles under question weresmall and if relinquished would only yield a saving of around £2 millionapiece—far short of the approximately £200 million of savings that stillneeded to be found.⁴³ In Europe, £90 million might be saved if Britain’scommitment to NATO in Germany were halved, but such a reduction‘unless very carefully handled indeed [would] lead to dangerous politicalconsequences’.⁴⁴ The only proposal the Working Party thought viablewas a complete reorganization of European defence on a multilateralbasis.⁴⁵ Clearly, though, so massive a reorganization could only producesavings in the longer term. In the Mediterranean and Middle East, theWorking Party concluded that it would be possible to find up to £120million in savings depending on what kind of forces the Government feltnecessary to retain in the area. On this issue, however, the political andeconomic departments were divided. The former believed some residual

⁴¹ PRO: FO 371/184508: M.R. Morland to J.A.N. Graham, 2/3/1965; J.N.T. Spreckleyto Lord Chalfont, 19/3/1965; brief by J.A.N. Graham on OPD(O)(65)16, 24/3/1965.

⁴² PRO: CAB 148/41: OPD(O)(65)8th Meeting, 26/3/1965.⁴³ PRO: CAB 148/42: OPD(O)(65)24: DRWP, ‘The Caribbean’, 3/5/1965; OPD(O)(65)

25: Defence Review Working Party, ‘South Africa and the South Atlantic’, 4/5/1965.⁴⁴ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)28: DRWP, ‘Reduction by Half of British Forces in

Germany’, 3/5/1965, para. 42.⁴⁵ Ibid.


forces to be essential for the protection of British oil interests, while thelatter judged that the economic self-interest of local governments wouldkeep the oil wells flowing.⁴⁶

It was in East and Southeast Asia where the greatest possible savingswere identified. If the British forces in the area could be completely dis-banded, after some satisfactory conclusion to Confrontation, the result-ing savings would come to somewhere between £400 to £580 million.⁴⁷The political catch, however, lay in the form of the Anglo-MalaysianDefence Agreement (AMDA), by which Britain was bound to providethe Malaysian Government ‘such assistance as . . . [might be] require[d]for the external defence of its territory’.⁴⁸ The Foreign Office plannerswarned that any termination of AMDA without Malaysian approvalwould cause ‘irreparable damage to British prestige’, both worldwide andwithin the Commonwealth.⁴⁹ If Britain ‘were seen to abandon Malaysia’it would become ‘obvious to everyone that a British alliance was nolonger worth having’.⁵⁰ That would spell the ‘end to our pretensionsto be a world power. We have invested more prestige in the defence ofMalaysia than we could ever hope to salvage in a unilateral withdrawal’.⁵¹

But was ‘abandoning’ Malaysia the only way in which the Britishpresence in Southeast Asia might be reduced? Others in the ForeignOffice and on the Defence Review Working Party felt that this was onlyan extreme case, and that it was plausible—even probable—that a moreamicable means of reduction or retreat might be found. Once Con-frontation was over, argued the head of the Foreign Office’s PlanningStaff, it would surely be possible to convince the Malaysian Governmentthat a formal Defence Agreement was no longer necessary. They mightbe persuaded that such an arrangement ‘put them in a rather invidiousneo-colonialist position’.⁵² Even if Britain retained some form of reducedcommitment to its various allies with interests in Southeast Asia, was itnot possible to find some way of meeting these defence requirements

⁴⁶ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)31: DRWP, Area study of the Mediterranean andMiddle East, 4/5/1965.

⁴⁷ PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)5: FO, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East’,21/4/1965.

⁴⁸ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)32: DRWP, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East’,5/5/1965, para. 5.

⁴⁹ PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)5: FO, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East,para. 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid. ⁵¹ Ibid.⁵² PRO: FO 371/184519: A.M. Palliser, brief on OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)5: ‘Southeast

Asia and the Far East’, 27/4/1965.


by means other than the highly expensive base in Singapore? It wasprecisely these possibilities that the Working Party focused on when itcame to finalize its report.⁵³

In its completed form, the report clearly borrowed heavily fromofficials’ prior long-term thinking on policy towards Southeast Asia.This thinking, which had envisaged a neutralized Southeast Asia withreduced British forces guarding the perimeter in the Indian Ocean andnorthern Australia, had now been recast. No longer was the scenario along-term strategic goal. Instead it had become the medium-term meansto achieve defence reductions.

In articulating its proposed approach, the DRWP report dismissedthe option of a complete and unilateral withdrawal from SoutheastAsia as likely to damage severely Britain’s position in the world, andespecially its relations with Australia, New Zealand, India and theUnited States.⁵⁴ Instead, the report suggested a two-pronged approachto defence reductions, with both political and military components.

Politically, the British Government should encourage Malaysia ‘totake on a more Afro-Asian and neutralist stance, which might eventuallyresult in their asking us to leave’ the Singapore base.⁵⁵ As part of thisprocess, Britain would help Malaysia build up its own defence forces.This in turn would allow the renegotiation, or even the mutually agreedtermination, of the Defence Agreement. Even if it proved politicallyimpossible to end AMDA, Malaysia might still be persuaded to accept amuch smaller British presence, or a ‘longer-ranged commitment, basedon the establishment of new but reduced facilities elsewhere’.⁵⁶

Militarily, those new but reduced facilities would become the meansfor Britain to fulfil its commitments. British forces would depart fromMalaysia and Singapore once Confrontation was over. As a substitute fortheir presence, Britain would establish a string of minimally equippedbases in the Indian Ocean shared with the United States, and abase in northern Australia, paid for by Australia itself, from whichgreatly reduced British forces might operate.⁵⁷ This reduced presence,the planners hoped, would be sufficient to reassure Britain’s alliesin the region that it was not abandoning Southeast Asia. It mightencourage Australia and the US to share the burden of defence costs

⁵³ PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(65)3rd Meeting, 23/4/1965; 7th Meeting,4/5/1965.

⁵⁴ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)32: DRWP, ‘Southeast Asia and the Far East’, para. 8.⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 6. ⁵⁶ Ibid. ⁵⁷ Ibid., paras 9, 15, 17.


and responsibilities. It could still, if necessary, satisfy the requirementsof SEATO.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the withdrawal of Western forces fromSingapore would facilitate ‘the orderly evolution of Malaysian politicalopinion towards the kind of Western oriented neutralism’ that offeredthe ‘best prospect for Malaysia’s survival and the maintenance ofBritish commercial interests’.⁵⁹ Thus, the report concluded, whileConfrontation continued the Government should begin military andpolitical preparations for the provision of much reduced, alternativefacilities to those currently in Malaysia. Then it would be possible, onceConfrontation had ended, for Britain to withdraw honourably to theperimeter of Southeast Asia, while realizing significant savings.

But why should the British wait until Confrontation had ended?Given that the Indonesian and British Governments ostensibly shareda long-term aim of removing the British presence from Southeast Asia,why could the two not come to some sort of agreement? ForeignSecretary Michael Stewart posed precisely these questions to his offi-cials in mid-May 1965.⁶⁰ Demonstrating how officials’ doubts aboutthe value of Singapore were now influencing ministers, Stewart askedwhether the abandonment of the base might be offered as an incentiveto Indonesia to end Confrontation. Officials in the Foreign Office,however, were sceptical. They felt that the Indonesian Governmentwould not negotiate in good faith; nor would it be satisfied if Britainmaintained a presence in Australia, which would be necessary if Britainwere to keep faith with its allies.⁶¹ Most fundamentally, officials be-lieved that Sukarno’s policy of Confrontation was motivated by internalpolitical considerations, not external strategic aims, and thus no num-ber of British concessions could have the desired effect of stoppingthe conflict.⁶² Britain, to the officials’ regret, would simply have tosoldier on.

At the beginning of June 1965, ministers and officials gathered onceagain at Chequers to assess the progress of the Defence Review, andapprove the direction for policy planning which had been establishedthrough this process. Once again, the immediate context of the Chequers

⁵⁸ Since Britain’s commitments to Malaysia were larger than those to SEATO, it wasargued that anything which could satisfy the former could also satisfy the latter.

⁵⁹ PRO: CAB 148/43: OPD(O)(65)32: DRWP, ‘Southeast Asia. . . ’, para. 9.⁶⁰ PRO: FO 371/181501: T.E. Bridges, ‘Indonesia’, 18/5/1965.⁶¹ PRO: FO 371/181501: J.E. Cable, ‘Indonesia’, 19/5/1965; A.A. Golds, 28/5/1965.⁶² PRO: FO 371/181501: A.A. Golds to Michael Stewart, ‘Indonesia’, 3/6/1965.


meeting was one of economic crisis, with the Government bracing itselfthat weekend for the publication of poor balance of payments figureson the coming Monday.⁶³ The conference began with the Chancellor ofthe Exchequer, James Callaghan, emphasizing the necessity of defencereductions.⁶⁴ Denis Healey followed. After reiterating the MOD’s casethat commitments as well as capabilities needed to be cut, he outlineda programme for action: reorganization of the Reserves and abolitionof the Territorial Army; reduction of forces or sharing of costs inHong Kong and Germany; withdrawal from the Caribbean and SouthAtlantic; reductions in the Mediterranean and Middle East; reductionsin Britain’s intervention capabilities; and the revision of commitmentsin East Asia.⁶⁵ The last consisted of two goals derived from the DRWP’sreport: first, the development of an Australian base to replace Singapore,following consultations with Australia and New Zealand; second, theestablishment of co-operative arrangements with the United States andAustralia for joint air and naval power in the Indian Ocean. TheGovernment should ‘decide in principle to withdraw from SoutheastAsia as soon as possible but to maintain a reduced role in the widerarea’.⁶⁶

No dissent was noted to these proposals. Both the Foreign andCommonwealth Secretaries—whose officials in the DRWP had in-deed partially drafted the policy—accepted that Britain’s commitmentsshould be reduced in this way. Speakers sought to emphasize thatthe proposed policies made not only financial but also strategic sense.In a gesture which hinted that the Foreign Secretary had not beenentirely persuaded by his officials, Michael Stewart raised again hishope that, while Britain’s Southeast Asian commitments would have tolast the duration of Confrontation, a settlement with Indonesia to endthe conflict might include a British departure from Singapore. Othersargued that, even if Malaysian and Singaporean leaders wanted Britainto stay, ‘they would probably be unable to resist popular pressure for ourwithdrawal’.⁶⁷ Warnings were raised, however, over the possibility ofregional co-operation with the United States: a difficult thing to achievewhen the US and Britain did not share the same long-term vision forthe area.

⁶³ Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 107–8.⁶⁴ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/5th–7th Meetings, 13/6/1965.⁶⁵ PRO: DEFE 13/829: Denis Healey, ‘The Defence Review: A Personal Note’, 11/6/1965.⁶⁶ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/8: ‘Defence Expenditure Review’, para. 23.⁶⁷ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/6th Meeting, 13/6/1965.


Towards the end of the day’s proceedings, a sketch was drawn ofwhat was expected to be Britain’s defence position in the 1970s. Therewould be a higher proportion of forces in the UK and Europe; a smallstrategic presence in the Middle East; an Australian-funded base inthat country’s north; and island bases shared with the United Statesin the Indian Ocean. There would be no presence in Malaysia orSingapore; indeed, no permanent presence in East Asia proper otherthan at Hong Kong. ‘East of Suez’ would be shrunk back to emphasizeBritain’s historic commitments to the ‘old’ Commonwealth, Australiaand New Zealand, and its political commitments to its major ally, theUnited States. A new direction for policy had been set. The task forthe next few months would be to see if these plans could be madeviable.

In the period from the election of the Wilson Government to mid-1965,Britain’s policy planning towards Southeast Asia evolved substantially.On coming to office, ministers envisaged that they expected to emphasizeBritain’s ‘East of Suez’ role. Eight months later, they were approvingsecret plans that included encouraging Britain’s major Southeast Asianregional ally, Malaysia, towards non-alignment; withdrawing the Britishpresence from the immediate area; and stationing much-reduced forceson the perimeter of the region in northern Australia.

What brought about this change? One major factor was the ForeignOffice’s changing assessment of Britain’s major interests and ideallong-term strategy. It is clear that, even before the election of theWilson Government and the initiation of the Defence Review, officialswithin the Foreign Office were moving to the opinion that Britainshould have a long-term aim of retreating partially from its positionin Southeast Asia.⁶⁸ Despite what its critics have sometimes alleged,the Foreign Office was not so bogged down by inertia that it wasunable to contemplate any significant change to Britain’s ‘East ofSuez’ commitments.⁶⁹ On the contrary: its officials readily perceivedthat Britain’s diminishing economic interests in the region no longerjustified the extent of its commitments, and that its remaining politicaland strategic interests—its relations with the ANZUS powers—could

⁶⁸ Dockrill, ‘Power and Influence’; Easter, British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia, ch. 5;Subritzky, ‘Britain, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the Malaysian-IndonesianConfrontation’, p. 308.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Darby, Britain’s Defence Policy, ch. 8; Wallace, The Foreign PolicyProcess, p. 274.


be better served by a rescaled and redeployed military presence onSoutheast Asia’s periphery.

Was this Foreign Office view of long-term strategy sufficient tochange the Wilson Government’s defence and foreign policy planning?Not on its own. In the early months, senior ministers clearly disagreedwith their officials on what Britain’s priorities should be. These viewswere expressed by Harold Wilson and Denis Healey to the House ofCommons, in the United States, and in their first Defence White Paperof February 1965. But stronger than these ministers’ sentiments on‘East of Suez’ was their understanding that defence spending needed tobe restrained, a position backed by the weight of the Treasury and theDepartment of Economic Affairs and their powerful ministers.

When it became clear, after the first stage of the Defence Review, thatequipment cuts alone would be insufficient to reach the Government’s£2,000 million target for defence expenditure, senior ministers werewilling to initiate a wider review of Britain’s overseas commitments.Within this wider review, the Foreign Office could reintroduce its plansfor Britain’s Southeast Asian role, though reconfiguring them now to benot simply a long-term strategic goal but also a medium-term means toachieve defence reductions. When ministers were presented with theseplans at Chequers in June 1965, they were happy to countenance asharply reduced Southeast Asian presence, as part of a general slimmingdown of Britain’s role across the globe. They readily acceded to planswhose governing assumption was that Britain’s interests did not requirethe retention of historic bases on ex-colonial territories for their own sake;that its major concern should be to support its historic and now ColdWar allies in Southeast Asia—the United States, Australia and NewZealand. The senior Wilson Government ministers might have earlierexpressed strong sentiments about the value of Britain’s worldwide role,but these sentiments were sufficiently flexible to accommodate a muchleaner version of that role if Britain’s precarious finances demanded it.

2The Perils of Alliance: June–September

1965

British policy could not be developed in a vacuum. While, as docu-mented in the previous chapter, British officials began their DefenceReview as a private exercise, this isolation could not persist. Britain’sprincipal allies in Southeast Asia—the United States, Australia andNew Zealand—would have to be consulted on the direction of policy,and persuaded of the virtue in the Government’s preferred plans. Partly,this need to consult sprang from general obligations of loyalty. TheAnglo–American relationship, most notably, was the cornerstone ofBritain’s international policy, and this relationship depended on thetwo countries maintaining close and wide-ranging consultations on allaspects of their foreign policies.

Beyond this general obligation to consult, the British also had twospecific reasons to discuss future policy in Southeast Asia with theirallies. The first lay in the simple fact that this policy envisaged greaterco-operation between Britain and the ANZUS powers. Clearly theallies had to be agreeable to this if the policy were to be implemented.The second reason derived from the major politico-strategic interestthat Britain’s Southeast Asian policy was supposed to preserve: themaintenance of Britain’s relationship with those powers themselves. Asdescribed in the previous chapter, the Foreign Office identified the majorpurpose of the British presence in Southeast Asia as the embodimentof the country’s partnership with the United States, Australia and NewZealand. Thus, any change to this presence had to gain not merely theacceptance but the support of those allies if it was not to undermine itsprimary purpose.

The focus of this chapter is on how the British Government soughtto persuade the ANZUS powers—though not yet Malaysia or Singa-pore—to agree to its plans for greater allied co-operation in SoutheastAsia and the withdrawal of the British presence to Australia. The

The Perils of Alliance: June–September 1965 35

chapter covers the period from mid-1965 to September of that year. Atthe beginning of this period, British ministers and officials started gentlyintroducing the allies to the direction of their thinking in the DefenceReview. After some initial exchanges, these consultations were brutallyinterrupted by the sudden separation of Singapore from Malaysia. Inresponse to this event, British officials hastily accelerated their plans towithdraw from the immediate area. These plans, however, were categor-ically rejected by the ANZUS governments, a rejection that forced theWilson Government to backtrack. The aftermath left British planningin considerable disarray.

The first intimations of British thinking reached allied capitals in mid-May 1965. While neither Washington nor Canberra knew the extentto which the Wilson Government was currently considering a retreat inSoutheast Asia, they were aware of the pressures on defence and foreignpolicy planners to make some kind of reduction. US Embassy officialsin London reported to their superiors that the British Government wasnow ‘truly serious in its determination’ to cut commitments either inEurope or ‘East of Suez’ unless some other relief to its economic andbalance of payments problem was quickly found.¹ Australian officialsbelieved that the economic diarchy of George Brown at the DEA andJames Callaghan at the Treasury was pressing Defence Secretary DenisHealey to make cutbacks, with the risk that the pressure might buildfor a total withdrawal from East Asia.² The budget target of £2,000million might only be reached by ‘eliminating something . . . previously. . . regarded as essential’.³

Officially, the British conveyed a double message to US and Australianofficials: partly a threat, of the cuts which they might have to implement,and partly an offer, of the plans for co-operation which they wantedto institute. When US Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Londonthat May, Harold Wilson informed him that the Defence Review hadbegun reviewing commitments, and that ‘there were no sacred cows’.⁴Speaking personally, the Prime Minister said that he would rather the

¹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: John Leddy to Dean Rusk, 13/5/1965.² NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, ‘Far East’,

17/5/1965.³ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Department of Defence, ‘United Kingdom Defence

Review’, June 1965.⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1890: memcon, Harold Wilson and Dean Rusk, London, 14/5/1965;

LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: memcon, Dean Rusk and Harold Wilson, London, 14/5/1965.


cuts take place in Europe than ‘East of Suez’. Moreover, he felt thatmost of his colleagues would agree with him. He hoped, though, thatsome form of collective arrangement might be instituted in SoutheastAsia. Rusk made only some general comments in response: that theUS wanted regional organizations to carry a greater burden of defence;that the US was adamant it could not play ‘world policeman’ alone;and that the allies should focus more on Communist ‘wars of liberation’than on the threat of nuclear conflict.⁵

In the Australian case, the message was passed by Denis Healeyto Paul Hasluck, the Australian Minister for External Affairs. Whenthey met that month, Healey expressed the view that ‘closer militaryco-operation with Australia was essential to both of us’.⁶ He suggestedthat, looking to the 1970s, there might be a need for a base in northernAustralia, and thought it time to start ‘relaxed conversations’ on thematter.⁷ He stressed, however, that there was no rush to make an earlycommitment; rather, he wanted to have a ‘friendly and informal yarn’.⁸

Privately, Australian officials were divided on how to respond tothe British proposals. Some thought they provided the best means ofkeeping the British in the region. The Head of the Australian JointServices Staff in London suggested seeking a firm agreement on DenisHealey’s hint regarding a UK base in Australia. This would ‘tie [Britain]to a positive commitment to us’.⁹ Others were more wary. The DefenceDepartment noted that an Australian base would be expensive, and thatprevious proposals had been dropped for fear that their pursuit woulddangerously undermine the British position in Malaysia.¹⁰

The threat of British cutbacks raised concerns in Washington as well.US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara expressed fears to the Aus-tralian Prime Minister that he regarded Britain as ‘somewhat wobbly onits commitments’ in Southeast Asia.¹¹ When speaking to British min-isters, McNamara’s approach was more stern. To Denis Healey—whowas rumoured to want to cut forces in Europe—McNamara warnedthat any withdrawals from the British Army on the Rhine would lead

⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1890: memcon, Wilson and Rusk, London, 14/5/1965.⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Paul Hasluck to DEAC, tel. 3665, 7/5/1965.⁷ Ibid. ⁸ Ibid.⁹ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, ‘Far East’,

17/5/1965.¹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Department of Defence, ‘United Kingdom Defence

Review’, 6/1965.¹¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6124: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC; Washington, DC,

to DEAC, tel. 1971, 9/6/1965.


to a ‘sharp reaction’ in the US.¹² To Minister for Aviation RoyJenkins—who was known to favour cuts elsewhere—McNamara ar-gued that Britain had ‘an inescapable commitment’ to Southeast Asia‘for at least the next ten years’.¹³ British Embassy officials in the USnoted that the Johnson Administration was beginning to display clear‘anxiety about [Britain’s] future intentions . . . East of Suez’.¹⁴

The provoking of such anxiety was not unintended. British ForeignOffice officials recognized the connection between Britain’s commit-ment to Malaysia and its support for the US in Vietnam. They diagnosedthe US as fearing that a British withdrawal from Southeast Asia wouldlead to a weakening in that support. Moreover, the United Statesmight not easily fill the breach in Western security opened up by aBritish withdrawal. Should the US be sufficiently disturbed by such aprospect, British officials reflected, it could be prepared to pay ‘quitea substantial price’ to prevent its occurrence.¹⁵ Not only might theAmericans be induced into some kind of co-operative—and henceburden-sharing—arrangement in Southeast Asia; they could also beencouraged ‘to assist us financially on a scale sufficient to enable us tomaintain our existing commitments’.¹⁶

The bargaining began in June 1965, with meetings between US Na-tional Security and British Embassy officials. Was the US Government,the British asked, ‘prepared to look at the UK problem, and UK–USrelations as a whole’: not only Britain’s foreign commitments, but alsoits long-term financial and economic health.¹⁷ A Labour Government,the British argued, could not be expected to follow ‘Tory’ economicand foreign policies without some US assistance for the long term,specifically with the balance of payments problems those foreign poli-cies incurred. The American response was open-minded. Francis Bator,the President’s Deputy National Security Adviser, agreed that the USwould be prepared to look ‘at [the] problem as a whole’ over the sum-mer.¹⁸ More specifically, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James

¹² PRO: PREM 13/214: memcon, Denis Healey and Robert McNamara, London,30/5/1965.

¹³ PRO: PREM 13/215: Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 10/6/1965. ¹⁴ Ibid.¹⁵ PRO: FO 371/184509: Michael Palliser to Sir Bernard Burrows, ‘The Defence Re-

view—Anglo–American Co-operation’, 5/5/1965.¹⁶ PRO: FO 371/184510: Sir Bernard Burrows to Michael Stewart, 20/5/1965.¹⁷ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Francis Bator, ‘Conversation on UK Situation

and Callaghan Visit with John Stevens’, undated (9/6/1965 and 16/6/1965). Emphasis inoriginal.

¹⁸ Ibid.


Callaghan, visited Washington at the end of June, US officials wouldbe prepared to discuss ways to bridge the US$300 million balance ofpayments gap created by Britain’s foreign commitments.

Internally, the Administration was divided on how to deal with theBritish proposals. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, weigheddown with the problems of Vietnam, was adamant that the US couldnot pick up any commitments the British might shed. Thus the UShad to ensure that this situation would not arise.¹⁹ National Securitystaff were of a similar mind: ‘we might be very much better off to payfor part of their presence—if they really cannot afford it—than financeour own’.²⁰ Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler had a differentview. Mindful of the fragile position of the United States’ own balanceof payments, he insisted that the Administration should ‘not commit[any] bilateral action which [would] damage this’.²¹ The US shouldonly take part in a multilateral assistance package. Meanwhile, the USEmbassy in London warned that domestic political pressures mightbuild to force British defence cuts and reductions in commitments inany case. It was, however, ‘highly improbable’ that these changes wouldsignificantly affect the Malaysian commitment, given the problems ofConfrontation: ‘No British Government could abandon or transferresponsibility for defence of Malaysia.’

Unresolved on whether to help the British pay for defence, USofficials were tough on Callaghan when he arrived in Washington atthe end of June. They emphasized their displeasure at any plans toreduce Britain’s role, and made minimal reference to the possibility offinancial assistance. Defence Secretary McNamara was most forceful inhis arguments. He was insistent that the British achieve their targets bycutting costs, not commitments. He was blunt in his assessment of whereAmerican strength had made British forces superfluous—the ‘Navy isa luxury’.²² He issued the threat that if the British pulled back fromtheir commitments, then the US would have ‘to reconsider its wholedefence posture, its worldwide treaty obligations and all aspects of itsrelations with the UK’.²³ Only if Britain maintained its role would the

¹⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, 26/6/1965.²⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, 1/6/1965.²¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 207: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, 28/6/1965.²² LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Francis Bator, memcon, James Callaghan,

Robert McNamara, George Ball, Francis Bator et al., Washington, DC, 30/6/1965.²³ PRO: PREM 13/216: memcon, James Callaghan, Robert McNamara et al., Washington,

DC, 30/6/1965.


United States help Britain with its foreign exchange. James Callaghanwas equally insistent in reply: ‘I cannot carry [the foreign exchange]commitment and it’s got to come down.’²⁴ He rebuked McNamara fordrilling him on defence, when it was finance he was there to discuss.Denis Healey would talk to McNamara about defence, but only ‘whenhe is ready’.²⁵ After some further exchanges, the meeting broke upwithout reaching any conclusions.

When Richard Neustadt toured England a month later, in July1965, he found the British still fuming at the conduct of the meeting.Sir Henry Hardman, Permanent Under Secretary for Defence, waspuzzled as to why McNamara would push so hard, given that he knewthe Defence Review would not reach its final conclusions for severalmonths yet. Denis Healey professed ‘outrage about . . . McNamara’slecture to the Chancellor’.²⁶ George Brown protested that ‘We aren’t abanana republic and don’t like [McNamara] talking to us as though wewere.’²⁷ Neustadt reported that Healey went on to complain about theAmericans’ ‘peculiar, juvenile ways of doing business’: ‘What sense didit make to talk as Bob [McNamara] had done, and to the Chancellorbesides? If [the US] were going to threaten he’d threaten back.’²⁸

Meanwhile, on the Australian front, the British Government washaving more success in getting its case across. The argument was put bysenior ministers to the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies,when he visited London at the beginning of July. They focused on threeissues: the need for joint allied arrangements in the area; the viability ofthe British base at Singapore; and the possibility of replacement facilitiesin Australia.

When Menzies met with the British ministers, Harold Wilson beganby assuring Menzies that Britain was still committed to its role ‘Eastof Suez’. Due to the limits on its resources, however, Britain could notdo the job on its own. Hence it wanted to examine the possibility ofmultilateral arrangements with Australia, New Zealand and the UnitedStates, sharing planning, facilities, and the burdens of defence. AsDenis Healey went on to explain, there was ‘absolutely no chance atall’ of reaching the Government’s £2,000 million target for defence,

²⁴ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Bator, memcon, Callaghan, McNamara etal., 30/6/1965. Emphasis in original.

²⁵ Ibid. Emphasis in original.²⁶ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: Richard Neustadt to McGeorge Bundy,

‘Round-up on Trip to England’, 9/8/1965.²⁷ Ibid. ²⁸ Ibid.


unless ‘commitments were shared or cut’.²⁹ At the same time, Wilsoncontinued, the Government had serious doubts about the long-termviability of the Singapore base. While they intended to stay for theduration of Confrontation—which for planning purposes had beenassumed to end by 1970, though this could not be assured—they didnot expect to be able to stay for long beyond that. Looking ahead,Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart warned, Western bases in Asia wouldlikely prove a political impossibility, so the best situation to aim forwould be ‘a neutral belt of states between Australia and mainlandChina’.³⁰ Should Singapore go, Britain hoped it would be able to shiftto facilities established in Australia on a co-operative basis. It seemedunwise to ‘leave all [the] eggs in [the] Singapore basket up to 1969–70and beyond’.³¹

In response, Menzies’ first concern was to ask for the American reac-tion to the British proposals. Once assured by Wilson, not entirely truth-fully, that US Secretary of State Dean Rusk had expressed ‘keen interest’,Menzies was prepared to add his own enthusiasm. While he noted thatAustralia hoped that Britain would stay in Singapore as long as possible,he agreed that they should start planning alternative bases in Australia.On four-power co-operation, the ‘sooner plans were drawn up and thecloser the collaboration the better’.³² He supported the principles thatWilson had outlined, and so hoped to get to the real business of discus-sion as soon as possible. The four parties should ‘get down to brass tacksat the earliest’.³³ With this agreement in hand, Wilson explained that theBritish would move to present firm proposals in the next few months,once the Defence Review had made further progress. These wouldprovide a basis for moving to fully fledged quadripartite discussions.

Privately, Australian officials sought to assess the reasons for the plansthe British were proposing. They noted that the current British studiesof Southeast Asian defence assumed, though they did not make explicit,that Britain’s future capabilities would be ‘largely dependent upon mainbase facilities in Australia’.³⁴ The Australians sensed that these plans

²⁹ PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Sir Robert Menzies, Harold Wilson, Denis Healey,Michael Stewart and Arthur Bottomley, London, 1/7/1965.

³⁰ Ibid.³¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 2: Sir Robert Menzies to John McEwen, ‘Defence

Talks’, 3/7/1965.³² PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Menzies, Wilson et al., 1/7/1965.³³ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 2: Menzies to McEwen, ‘Defence Talks’, 3/7/1965.³⁴ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, 20/7/1965.


were underpinned by a changing set of priorities. The British were nothappy with having to continue committing so many troops to Malaysiaas Confrontation dragged on. The ‘real issue for the UK in the Far Eastis [the] defence of AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND and . . . afterConfrontation any other policy would not seem to be very likely’.³⁵

If US officials had seemed at first reluctant to discuss with the Britisha linking of finance and defence, by July 1965 this reticence haddisappeared. This was not due to a sudden conversion of US officialsto the British case. Rather, it was because Britain was facing increasingfinancial difficulties, a circumstance which at once made the questionof finance impossible to avoid, while increasing the United States’bargaining position over Britain. Sterling was pegged to the US dollarat a rate of US$2.80, but increasing pressure in the foreign exchangemarkets was making it difficult for the Bank of England to defend thepound at this level. In response to the deepening crisis over sterling,Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan was forced to adopt stricteconomic measures, including immediate domestic spending cuts, atthe end of July. These problems increased the US Administration’sleverage over the Wilson Government: now the British needed short-term assistance to help defend sterling, not only the longer-term balanceof payments assistance they had earlier sought.

The shift in advantage led American officials to ponder whether theyshould try to extract greater concessions from the British in return forfinancial aid. Could the link between economics and defence be extendedto include Vietnam? The chief prosecutors of the war certainly hoped so.National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy wanted to tell the Britishthat ‘a British Brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars atthe moment of truth for sterling’.³⁶ Robert McNamara agreed.³⁷ Otherswere more wary. George Ball—a noted ‘dove’ on Vietnam—warnedthat any such deal ‘would be making mercenaries of the soldiers’.³⁸Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler declared himself unwilling ‘to be aparty to anything of this sort’.³⁹ A deal, he argued, could only take placeon the basis of Britain’s existing commitments.

³⁵ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir Edwin Hicks, 9/8/1965.Capitalization as in original.

³⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, 28/7/1965.³⁷ LBJL: Papers of George Ball: George Ball, memcon, George Ball and Henry Fowler,

telephone, 29/7/1965.³⁸ Ibid. ³⁹ Ibid.


The British, moreover, still possessed some leverage of their own.Derek Mitchell, the PM’s Principal Private Secretary, had warnedMcGeorge Bundy that if the US pushed the British too hard, this might‘cause ministers to lose heart and decide on really drastic action of adifferent sort’—meaning devaluation.⁴⁰ A British devaluation, Fowleradvised the President, could wreck the world financial system.⁴¹ Otherswarned that if the US did not bail out the British, their withdrawal fromdefence commitments would be certain.⁴² George Ball concluded thatso great was the US interest in maintaining both sterling and Britishdefence that it might have to come to Britain’s assistance even if not allof its demands were met.⁴³ The weight of such arguments persuadedPresident Johnson to order his officials to keep the subjects of Vietnamand sterling clearly separate.⁴⁴

When Sir Burke Trend, the British Cabinet Secretary, visited Wash-ington at the end of July, the US position was explained to him. Aftera discussion of the economic measures the British Government neededto implement, McGeorge Bundy stated the one condition for Americanassistance: ‘no one-sided political and economic decisions during [asterling] crisis. Specifically, no pull-back or disengagement as a meansfor dealing with [a] crisis’.⁴⁵ Sir Burke Trend was cautiously responsive.He pointed out that the British, while wanting to cut costs, were notplanning a wholesale withdrawal. Moreover, should the Defence Reviewrecommend any changes, the Government was sure to discuss them firstwith the US. But he could make no commitments: ‘if the cataclysm doeshappen, I don’t know what we’d really do. There would be immensepressure to cut unnecessary overseas expenditures’.⁴⁶

Fortunately a financial cataclysm did not immediately arise; but twoweeks later a major political crisis did. On 9 August the Malaysian

⁴⁰ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 2: McGeorge Bundy, memcon, McGeorgeBundy and Derek Mitchell, telephone, 26/7/1965.

⁴¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, 6/8/1965.⁴² LBJL: WHCF: Conf F: CO 305 UK: Box 12: Gardner Ackley to Lyndon Johnson,

9/8/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: George Ball, ‘British Sterling Crisis’, 6/8/1965;David Bruce to George Ball, 6/8/1965.

⁴³ LBJL: Papers of George Ball: George Ball, memcon, George Ball and McGeorge Bundy,telephone, 29/7/1965.

⁴⁴ LBJL: Files of McGeorge Bundy: Box 10: McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson,2/8/1965.

⁴⁵ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 23: memcon, Sir Burke Trend, McGeorgeBundy, Francis Bator et al., Washington, DC, 30/7/1965.

⁴⁶ Ibid.


Government announced without warning that the island state ofSingapore was separating from the rest of the Malaysian Federation.As noted in the Introduction, tensions between the Federal Govern-ment in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore’s own Government had beenendemic since the establishment of the Federation in 1963. FromKuala Lumpur’s perspective, Malaysia was supposed to be an exten-sion of the old Malaya, with Malays retaining primacy and politicalparties organized on a communal basis. Malaysia’s Prime Minister,Tunku Abdul Rahman, expected that Lee Kuan Yew’s left-wing, non-communal People’s Action Party (PAP) should focus on governing alargely Chinese-populated Singapore. From Singapore’s perspective, thePAP had a legitimate ambition to participate in the politics of Malaysia,rather than being confined to the island state as a mere appendageto Malaya. Thus the PAP had moved to contest Malaysian federalelections in 1964, seeking to build a broad base of support acrossthe country under the banner of a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’—in opposi-tion to a ‘Malayan Malaysia’. These stirrings had led Tunku brieflyto consider, early in 1965, a constitutional rearrangement providingthe Singapore Government with more autonomy, in return for lessSingaporean participation in the central Kuala Lumpur Government.The plans had not been realized and tensions persisted, exacerbated bypersonality clashes between the conservative, established Tunku and theambitiously left-wing Lee Kuan Yew, and intensified by the threat ofcommunal clashes and Sino–Malay race riots. Pressed on the one sideby the PAP’s continued campaigning for a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ andon the other by Malayan radicals braying for Lee’s arrest, the Tunkuconcluded in mid-1965 that the only solution was for Singapore tobe cast adrift. Secretly, his ministers pushed a reluctant SingaporeanGovernment to agree to the separation, arguing that it was the onlyway to avert communal bloodshed. An agreement was signed and thenannounced to the parliament on 9 August 1965, with the British gettingbarely 12 hours’ advance notice of the break-up.

The separation of Singapore from Malaysia came as a profound shockto the British Government and shunted its deliberations about its futurepolicy towards Southeast Asia on to a different track. As documented sofar in this volume, these deliberations had been proceeding in an orderlybut leisurely manner. No direct attention had been paid to the currentcircumstances of Confrontation, as policy planning had assumed thatsome satisfactory conclusion to the conflict would be found, and focusedon the moment thereafter. When Singapore suddenly separated from


Malaysia, this neat separation of policy disintegrated. It was no longerclear whether and how Britain’s current policy of resisting Confrontationwould continue, and both this policy and future plans would have to bereassessed in the light of the changed circumstances of Britain’s clientstates.

The separation appeared disastrous for current British policy. TheIndonesian Government had instigated its policy of Confrontationagainst Malaysia on the grounds that the Federation was an artificial,‘neo-colonialist’ creation. While by mid-1965 the Confrontation itselfwas manifested in little more than nuisance raids, President Sukarno’srhetoric spoke ever more grandiloquently of anti-imperialist revolu-tion. Britain had committed tens of thousands of troops to Malaysia’sdefence, only now to find that this entity was beginning to breakup, in accordance with Indonesia’s demands. In the aftermath, couldBritain maintain the defence of a separate Malaysia and Singaporeagainst Indonesian hostility? Would it now even want to do so? Orwould it be better for the British to withdraw before their posi-tion deteriorated further and a humiliating loss to Indonesia becameinevitable?

In the immediate wake of the separation, British opinion was dividedas to the best course of action. Some officials counselled caution. LordHead, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, thought itbest to let the dust settle. One official in the Joint Malaysia/IndonesiaDepartment advised that if the Government tried too quickly ‘ ‘‘tocut our losses’’ and get pell-mell out of Singapore and let the Tunkuand Lee go hang’, they risked alienating the Americans and ‘reviv[ing]all the bitterness in Australia which followed the loss of Singaporeto the Japs’.⁴⁷ Others, while recognizing these risks, felt that theGovernment had to grasp the opportunity to relieve itself of the burdenof Confrontation—or else face the even worse risk of having to defend arump Bornean state against Indonesia if Malaysia disintegrated further.Denis Healey advised Harold Wilson that the Government shouldnegotiate its way to a withdrawal from Borneo, even if this meanthaving to give a firmer commitment to Singapore and Australia so as togain their and the other allies’ acquiescence.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ PRO: FO 371/181528: D.A. Greenhill to Sir Saville Garner, ‘Singapore and All That’,13/8/1965.

⁴⁸ PRO: PREM 13/431: Denis Healey to Harold Wilson, ‘Malaysian Situation’,13/8/1965.


On 15 August Harold Wilson broke from his summer holiday toconvene an emergency meeting of senior ministers and officials to discussthe situation. Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State for CommonwealthRelations, and Lord Head advised the meeting that the current situationdid not demand any immediate action by the Government—on thecontrary, to act in such a way risked provoking further havoc. Equally,however, unless the Government took discreet but firm steps in the nearfuture, it risked becoming captive to a worsening situation. Singaporeand Malaysia could not be expected to maintain harmonious relationsindefinitely, and with every step they took apart, the efficacy and securityof the British bases in the countries would suffer.⁴⁹

This prognosis received the general assent of the meeting. In dis-cussion, a range of further doubts was expressed about the Singaporebase: the local Communist party was attracting a threateningly largepercentage of support; the base was wholly dependent on local labour;as Singapore became more assertively independent in its foreign policy,it would seek to put restrictions on the use of the base; the base’svery existence prejudiced the international standing of the SingaporeGovernment, and this was not in Britain’s interest. Thus the meetinggenerally endorsed the view that the British Government should finda means to bring Confrontation to a speedy conclusion, enabling awithdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore in the next few years. To thisend, the meeting ordered that a secret quadripartite conference be heldto discuss with the ANZUS powers the possibility of implementingthese plans.

The quadripartite conference was scheduled for two and a halfweeks later, at the beginning of September 1965. During this intervalWhitehall officials firmed up the options available, and clarified theirunderlying reasoning. None of this material, however, was released earlyto any of the allies, and throughout August they were left to guess atwhat the British position might be.

At first, officials in Australia had been confident that the British wouldremain strongly committed to Malaysia and Singapore. Initial word fromthe Assistant Under Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Officehad been that the ‘consensus of officials was broadly in favour of ‘‘defencebusiness as usual’’ ’.⁵⁰ Within a few days, however, the Australians heard

⁴⁹ PRO: CAB 130/239: MISC 76/1st Meeting, 15/8/1965.⁵⁰ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and

Singapore’, tel. 6886, 11/8/1965.


rumours of the changing British position. The British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East was reported to be ‘gloomy’ about the prospects fordefence co-operation between Malaysia and Singapore.⁵¹ The AssistantUnder Secretary at the CRO was now pointing out that the ‘situation inpolitical and practical terms had been changed fundamentally’.⁵² Whereonce the British bases had been guaranteed by a single government withwhom HMG had had relations of ‘intimacy and implicit trust’, nowthey were dependent on two governments whose interests might clash,who did not get along, and whose trustworthiness in the eyes of theBritish had been undermined.⁵³

There were rumours that the Ministry of Defence would imposea fixed term of four to five years on the Anglo–Malaysian DefenceAgreement when it was renegotiated to take account of the separation.While this would buttress the British presence in the immediate future,it would also provide them with a release around 1970. This year,Australian officials noted, had long been the ‘magical’ date by whichtime the defence economies were supposed to be achieved.⁵⁴ Somesuspected that the British were now feeling let ‘off the hook’.⁵⁵ Theyhad found a means by which they might honourably negotiate a releasefrom their commitments to Malaysia, and shift to a reduced presencein Australia. While Australian officials were sure that Britain’s defenceand foreign affairs ministers still believed in the value of an overseasrole—though possibly on a reduced basis—there were rumours thateconomic ministers were seizing the opportunity to push for greatercuts.⁵⁶ Officials warned that some ‘looseness’ was possible in Britishthinking, in the lead-up to the quadripartite talks.⁵⁷

The other allies had similarly mixed news. The New Zealand HighCommissioner in Kuala Lumpur reported that his British counterpartwas ‘convinced’ that Britain would stay committed to Malaysia while

⁵¹ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: William Pritchett to DEAC, tel. 693,12/8/1965.

⁵² NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and Singapore’, tel. 7036,13/8/1965.

⁵³ Ibid.⁵⁴ Ibid.; NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and Singapore’,

tel. 7037, 14/8/1965. NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Geoff Hartnell to Sir EdwinHicks, 18/8/1965.

⁵⁵ NAA: A1838/346, TS691/1 PART 3: Hartnell to Hicks, 18/8/1965.⁵⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: Allan Eastman to DEAC, tel. 7230,

20/8/1965.⁵⁷ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia and Singapore’, tel. 7037,

14/8/1965.


Confrontation lasted.⁵⁸ He believed, though, that planning would soonbegin for the mothballing of the Singapore base and the setting upof a base in Australia in the medium term. On the other hand, inWashington, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs told Australian officials that he did not himself sense ‘anythingimminent in the British mind’.⁵⁹ There was, he said, ‘no sign’ that theBritish would immediately pull out of Singapore, though they might seta date for their departure in a few years.⁶⁰

This mixture of doubts over Britain’s intentions appears to haveencouraged Australian ministers to shift firmly away from the idea ofa future British base in their country. While Menzies had previouslyexpressed interest in the idea, as described earlier in this chapter, whenit came to the Cabinet’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee atthe end of August, it was received much more coolly. No doubt partof the reason for the shift was tactical. The Australian Governmentwould not wish to give the British any encouragement to leave precip-itately from Malaysia and Singapore, especially now that there seemedsome risk of this happening. The FADC’s disagreement, though, wasexpressed in fundamental, strategic terms. The major objective of Aus-tralian policy, according to the FADC, was to keep the UK and USinvolved to a maximum extent in Southeast Asia. The UK presencewas necessary for stability, as a means of containing Indonesia, andto facilitate passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. MovingBritish forces from Malaysia and Singapore to Australia would ‘changematerially the purpose they would serve’, and run contrary to the un-derlying objectives of Australian policy.⁶¹ It was important, the FADCargued, to convince the British to stay in Southeast Asia as long aspossible.

In Singapore itself, it was clear that the island’s government hada similar view of its interests—and was apparently concerned at anyrumour of a withdrawal. Privately, the new Singapore Ministers forDefence and Foreign Affairs assured Australian officials that theyunderstood the need not to take actions which might threaten the

⁵⁸ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: New Zealand High Commissioner to Welling-ton, tel. 491, 20/8/1965.

⁵⁹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, tel. 2916,25/8/1965.

⁶⁰ Ibid.⁶¹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: FADC, ‘Proposed Quadripartite Talks Arising from the

Separation of Singapore from Malaysia’, 1173 (FAD), 26/8/1965.


position of the British base. The base was a key source of employmentand stability for the fledgling island state. They recognized that theyshould not undermine confidence by publicly clashing with KualaLumpur, imposing restrictions on the use of the base, or seeking aseparate settlement with Indonesia.⁶²

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew publicly emphasized the point. In theimmediate aftermath of the separation, Lee had sought an assurancefrom the US Government that it would come to Singapore’s defenceshould it be attacked. But now, when the US ambassador returned togive a general assurance, Lee refused to hear it.⁶³ Instead, he gave apress conference where, according to the US Consulate, he displayed‘almost slavish respect for British wisdom and judgement’.⁶⁴ At thesame time, he stridently attacked the US and declared that it couldnever occupy the Singapore base. Privately, he told US officials that theattacks were supposed to prevent Malaysia from ejecting the British inthe expectation that the United States would replace them.⁶⁵ US officialsassessed these tactics as a means of ‘ ‘‘blackmailing’’ [the] British intoremaining in Singapore since [the] alternative of [the] US filling thevacuum [is] not on the cards’.⁶⁶

By the end of August 1965, a few days before the quadripartitetalks were due to begin, British officials and ministers had finalized theposition they would be presenting to their allies. The stance they tookcombined their early assessment that the separation compelled an earlierBritish departure from Singapore with the medium-term strategy thathad been emerging from the Defence Review. The final position paper,agreed to by all departments involved, reiterated the view that Britain’scosts in Southeast Asia were wildly out of line with its interests.⁶⁷ Asbefore, a complete withdrawal from the region was ruled out, as itwould be blocked by the ANZUS allies. A partial withdrawal from

⁶² NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 1: William Pritchett to Paul Hasluck, tel. 726,17/8/1965. Also, NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Malaysia—Separationof Singapore’, tel. 6919, 11/8/1965.

⁶³ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: AHC, Kuala Lumpur, to DEAC, ‘Lee KuanYew and the United States’, 4/9/1965.

⁶⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: Richard Donald to DeanRusk, 31/8/1965.

⁶⁵ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: William Pritchett to DEAC, tel. 805,3/9/1965.

⁶⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: Donald to Rusk, 1/9/1965.⁶⁷ PRO: CAB 148/22: OPD(65)123: ‘Repercussions on British Policy in Southeast Asia

of the Secession of Singapore from Malaysia’, 25/8/1965.


Singapore to Australia was recommended instead. As well as the twoolder reasons of cost and the long-term strategy of neutralization, athird, substantial issue had become salient. The separation of Singaporefrom Malaysia meant that the island’s security was now tenuous. Itwould be ‘unrealistic’ and ‘dangerous’ to assume that the British basecould be kept secure for more than a few years.⁶⁸ To achieve the goalof partial withdrawal, a quick end to Confrontation would have to benegotiated which preserved security and stability in the area. Whileofficials were uncertain about how such negotiations might be initiated,none dissented from these basic aims.⁶⁹

Importantly, the paper argued that the agreement of Britain’s allieswas vital at every stage in the process. A settlement of Confrontationcould only be kept secure if it received the assent of all the allies,Malaysia and Singapore as well as those in ANZUS. Indonesia wouldbe likely to seize upon any major disagreement between these allies andBritain, which would jeopardize the possibility of peace. Moreover, asBritain’s long-term goal was to maintain its relations with Australia,New Zealand and the United States, their agreement to the policy ofpartial withdrawal was necessary to its success.

On 3 September 1965, senior British officials revealed the Gov-ernment’s thinking in confidential talks with US, Australian and NewZealand representatives in London. They emphasized that the separationhad placed the Singapore base ‘in serious jeopardy’.⁷⁰ Thus the Govern-ment had concluded that it urgently needed to end Confrontation, evenon terms less favourable than those previously possible. British forceshad only a very limited tenure on Singapore, and once this had expiredthey would have to be redeployed, on a reduced, co-operative basis tonew facilities in northern Australia.

The allies were aghast at the British presentation. They were deeplyconcerned at the idea of negotiating with Indonesia’s President Sukarno,who had shifted sharply leftward over the previous few months, grandlydeclaring the creation of a ‘Jakarta–Peking–Pyongyang–Hanoi–Phnom Penh’ axis.⁷¹ They were perplexed by the British belief that

⁶⁸ Ibid.⁶⁹ PRO: CAB 130/239: MISC 75/5: Working Party on Singapore, ‘Repercussions on

British Policy in Southeast Asia of the Secession of Singapore from Malaysia’.⁷⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, ‘Quadripartite Talks’,

3/9/1965.⁷¹ LBJL: Administrative History of the Department of State: Vol. 1: Box 2: Ch. VII:

L. Indonesia.


Singapore was necessarily threatened, and appalled by the idea thatBritain might act on so hasty an assessment.

In the quadripartite meeting, all three allies rounded on the British.The New Zealand delegation argued that any attempt to negotiate withIndonesia would lead to the ‘total loss of the Singapore base’.⁷² SamuelBerger, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far EasternAffairs, damned the British proposals as ‘dangerous’.⁷³ The Australianssharply criticized the British position as drawing ‘gloomy conclusionson [the] basis that [the] worst happened’ in every possible scenario forthe future.⁷⁴ It was ‘disturbing’ that the British were implying thatConfrontation must be ended by any means.⁷⁵ All the allies doubtedthat Indonesia would negotiate in good faith. All agreed that therewas no strategic substitute to Singapore, and that problems should betackled on the basis that it should be maintained, not that forces shouldbe reduced. Chastened by the criticism from Britain’s allies, Sir NeilPritchard, Under Secretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office,agreed to convey their view to ministers that Britain should ‘soldier onuntil [the] position [is] clarified’.⁷⁶

The meeting adjourned for a few days so that each party mightconsider its position. Privately, US officials were deeply concerned atthe risks entailed by Britain even contemplating these plans. They weresure, on the grounds of both strategic logic and private assurances, thatthe Singapore Government was keen to have Britain retain its base.⁷⁷But if British intentions leaked, the Singapore Government would beforced to reassess its position radically. If Lee Kuan Yew had it confirmedto him how seriously the British were considering withdrawal, he wouldbe compelled by self-interest to find some sort of accommodation withIndonesia or Communist China. The Western position in Singaporewould ‘deteriorate with almost incredible swiftness’.⁷⁸

US officials in Indonesia doubted that it would be possible to holdconstructive negotiations with President Sukarno. If he scented the

⁷² PRO: FO 371/181529: QT(65)1st Meeting: CRO, memcon, ‘Quadripartite Talks: TheRepercussions in Southeast Asia of the Separation of Singapore’, London, 3/9/1965.

⁷³ Ibid.⁷⁴ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Edwin Hicks and Sir Laurence McIntyre to DEAC,

‘Quadripartite Talks’, 3/9/1965.⁷⁵ Ibid. ⁷⁶ Ibid.⁷⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: James Bell to Dean Rusk,

3/9/1965; Richard Donald to George Ball, 6/9/1965.⁷⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: Asia and the Pacific: Box 281: Singapore: Donald to Ball, 6/9/1965;

LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Dean Rusk to US Embassy, London, 7/9/1965.


possibility that Britain might withdraw, he would push for their totalcapitulation, and the Indonesians would have won a ‘striking victory’.⁷⁹The United States, embassy officials concluded, should tell the ‘British[to] pull up their socks’, and maintain their staunch opposition toConfrontation.⁸⁰

Privately, Australian officials were no less scathing. The British posi-tion represented a ‘complete turn-about’ from previous British policy,especially with regards to Confrontation.⁸¹ While the British claimedthat the West should not capitulate to Sukarno’s demands, there was a‘strong implication that if capitulation is called something else it willbe acceptable’.⁸² The suggestion that Britain should quickly withdrawfrom the region was a ‘triumphant vindication’ of the aggressive policiespursued by the Indonesian regime.⁸³

US and Australian officials were also perplexed at British motives.What concerns were driving them to contemplate so fundamental ashift in foreign policy? Some believed that the British were ‘dead seriousabout the slim prospects of their being able to remain in Singapore’.⁸⁴But it was clear that financial considerations were playing a part as well.The US and Australian officials involved in the negotiations both feltthat British officials were ‘struggling hard to rationalise’ a determinationto cut spending by ‘underlining (and perhaps exaggerating)’ theirdifficulties regarding Confrontation and maintaining the Singaporebase.⁸⁵ Though the British made little mention of these financialproblems, one US official noted that, ‘it [was] apparent from briefcorridor exchanges that this looms large in British calculations’.⁸⁶ Somein the US defence staff bluntly concluded that, ‘it is in our interest tobuy their support if necessary’.⁸⁷

Such thoughts appear to have driven Samuel Berger to make a discreetsuggestion to the British. In a lunchtime conversation with E.H. Peck,

⁷⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: Indonesia: Box 247: Marshall Green to Dean Rusk, 7/9/1965.⁸⁰ Ibid.⁸¹ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 1: K.H. Rogers, ‘Quadripartite Talks: British

Memorandum’, 3/9/1965.⁸² Ibid. ⁸³ Ibid.⁸⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: F.J. Blouin to John McNaughton, ‘British Plan

to Withdraw from Singapore’, 7/9/1965.⁸⁵ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Edwin Hicks and Sir Laurence McIntyre to DEAC,

tel. 7673, 3/9/1965.⁸⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, ‘Quadripartite Talks’,

7/9/1965.⁸⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: Blouin to McNaughton, ‘British Plan’, 7/9/1965.


an Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, ‘he hinted that there might beadvantage in our stressing a little more the financial difficulties’.⁸⁸ Peckwas unsure of Berger’s meaning: was this the inkling of an offer thatthe US might provide financial assistance? Or was it a threat that USsupport for sterling might be withdrawn? In any case, Peck explainedto Berger, financial considerations might have originally caused theDefence Review to examine Britain’s Southeast Asian deployment,but it was the political circumstance of separation that had led to itsurgent consideration now. Berger did not pursue the matter muchfurther—though, as will soon be shown, other US officials did.

On 7 September 1965, the quadripartite talks reconvened.⁸⁹ It wasclear to the ANZUS governments that the British had softened theirstance.⁹⁰ British officials denied that they had reached a fixed position.While the paper they had presented had been passed by ministers,they claimed this was as a basis for discussion, without commitment.There would be no decisions on future defence planning until theDefence Review was complete, and no reductions while Confrontationcontinued. While they hoped that this conflict would soon end, theywould not rush precipitately into negotiations with Indonesia, noract without the approval of Malaysia and Singapore. Nevertheless, theBritish stuck to some parts of their original assessment of the longer-termprospects. After Confrontation, they argued, Malaysia and Singaporewould likely shift to non-alignment and want to be rid of the Britishbases. The UK did not envisage making an indefinite security guaranteeto the two countries by itself. It would be prepared however to be partof an international guarantee, embodied in some sort of co-operativearrangement.

With the allies somewhat mollified by Britain’s softened stance, thetalks were able to conclude. Rounding up the talks, Sir Neil Pritchardagreed to convey the views of the other Governments to his superiors:that Britain should ‘wait and see’ before making any further moves onConfrontation, and that there was ‘considerable doubt’ that Westerninterests would be served by even planning the evacuation of British

⁸⁸ PRO: FO 371/181530: E.H. Peck, ‘Quadripartite Talks on Singapore/Malaysia: USAttitude’, 6/9/1965.

⁸⁹ PRO: FO 371/181529: QT(65)2nd Meeting: CRO, memcon, ‘Quadripartite Talks:The Repercussions in Southeast Asia of the Separation of Singapore’, London, 7/9/1965.

⁹⁰ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Edwin Hicks and Sir Laurence McIntyre to DEAC,‘Quadripartite Talks’, tel. 7756, 7/9/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Philip Kaiser toDean Rusk, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, 7/9/1965.


forces from Malaysia and Singapore.⁹¹ The allies had succeeded inpreventing any hasty British withdrawal. In return, they agreed to beopen to discussions on future ‘co-operative’ arrangements, whereby theburdens of Southeast Asian defence might be shared.

The next day, American officials moved to keep the British to theirword. Over the previous month British and US officials had beeninvolved in multilateral negotiations to construct a short-term safetynet for the British pound. The ‘Martin–Cromer’ plan—named jointlyafter the Chair of the US Federal Reserve and the Governor of the Bankof England—envisaged a US$1 billion package to support sterling,involving ten countries. The United States was to contribute the lion’sshare of the package, worth some US$400 million. By early September1965, these negotiations were approaching a final agreement.

On 8 and 9 September 1965, Under Secretary of State George Balland Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler were scheduled to meet HaroldWilson in London. Dean Rusk gave strict instructions to the UnderSecretary of State. Rusk explained that it had been ‘at best prematureand at worst extremely dangerous’ for the British to suggest that theymight withdraw from Singapore.⁹² The US had ‘told the British flatly’on several occasions that its co-operation on both short- and long-term financial problems assumed the British would make no unilateralchanges to their defence commitments.⁹³ This should be re-emphasized.The US was willing to examine long-term issues, but only in the contextof the Defence Review and discussions of British economic and politicalgoals. It was ‘vital for you’, Rusk urged Ball, ‘to hit [Harold Wilson]very hard indeed’ on these points.⁹⁴

George Ball acted true to his orders. In meetings with Michael Stewartand Harold Wilson, he attacked London’s calling of the quadripartitetalks as ‘both premature and hazardous’.⁹⁵ The American people wouldnot accept a decreasing British commitment to Southeast Asia while theircommitment in the area was increasing. If news of British intentionshad leaked, there would have been ‘disastrous consequences’.⁹⁶ In theirown defence, Stewart and Wilson explained that the talks were onlyintended to examine possible contingencies. They gave Ball ‘a categorical

⁹¹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Hicks and McIntyre to DEAC, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, tel. 7756,7/9/1965.

⁹² LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 22: Dean Rusk to George Ball, Henry Fowlerand David Bruce, 7/9/1965.

⁹³ Ibid. ⁹⁴ Ibid.⁹⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: George Ball to Dean Rusk, 9/9/1965. ⁹⁶ Ibid.


reassurance that the United Kingdom had no present intention ofreducing its commitments in Southeast Asia’.⁹⁷ Moreover, Wilsonassured Ball, the Defence Review ‘would not come up with a policyof scuttle’.⁹⁸ That would be ‘contrary to everything he . . . had eversaid and would make him eat a great number of his own words’.⁹⁹ Itappeared, reported Ball, that the British now clearly understood thatthe US had no ‘intention of letting [them] off the hook in SoutheastAsia’.¹⁰⁰

Alone with Wilson, George Ball pushed the matter further still. He‘vigorously pressed the argument’ that the maintenance of Britain’sdefence commitments was ‘an essential element in the total An-glo–American relationship’.¹⁰¹ Wilson disagreed. He ‘insisted thatno clear link could be made between US efforts to assist sterling and acommon approach to foreign policy’.¹⁰² Ball was little satisfied with thisresponse. To make the US position clear, he arranged to meet Wilsonagain the next day, 9 September, directly after they had both met withSecretary Fowler to discuss financial issues.

At the meeting with Secretary Fowler, where the agreement toimplement the Martin–Cromer plan was concluded, there was a hintthat Wilson had shifted his position. After Fowler had outlined thesupport package that was involved, Ball chimed in to ‘emphasise . . .the importance of the United Kingdom’s retaining its world wideresponsibilities’.¹⁰³ Wilson hinted at a change by referring to increasingco-operation between the United States and Britain in the future.

The point was made clearer in the meeting between Ball and Wilsonwhich followed. Ball opened by repeating the points he had made theday before. The Anglo–American relationship could only be consideredin totality. While Ball was careful to note that there was no explicitquid pro quo linking British and American policies, he explained thatthe British Government would be making ‘a great mistake’ if it did notrecognize that American financial assistance was ‘inextricably related’ toBritain’s defence commitments.¹⁰⁴ The Prime Minister made it clear

⁹⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: George Ball to Dean Rusk, 9/9/1965.⁹⁸ PRO: PREM 13/2450: memcon, Harold Wilson, George Ball et al., London, 8/9/1965.⁹⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Ball to Rusk, 9/9/1965.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. ¹⁰² Ibid.¹⁰³ PRO: PREM 13/2450: memcon, Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, Henry Fowler,

George Ball et al., London, 10.25 p.m., 9/9/1965.¹⁰⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Ball to Rusk, 9/9/1965. PRO: PREM 13/2450:

memcon, Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, George Ball et al., London, 11.15 p.m. 9/9/1965.


that he had backed down.¹⁰⁵ He dissembled that his previous objectionswere aimed at the notion that Britain might contribute troops toVietnam. He conceded that ‘all aspects of the relationship of the twoGovernments must be considered as a totality’.¹⁰⁶ With this concessionwon, the meeting concluded.

After this understanding was reached in September 1965, the Britishparticipants were always careful to deny that it had ever taken place,as that would have been politically explosive. Within that very month,Harold Wilson insisted to the Cabinet and the Labour Party morebroadly that the Americans had made no connection between economicand defence policies.¹⁰⁷ He would later go on to maintain that positionin his autobiography.¹⁰⁸ James Callaghan claimed, somewhat disingen-uously given his presence at some of the Anglo–American meetings,that he had no inkling of any possible deal.¹⁰⁹ Richard Crossman, as amember of the Cabinet and later of OPD, suspected the truth but couldnever confirm it, and this appears to have been the position of manyothers in the Cabinet and Parliamentary Party.¹¹⁰

How could a secret understanding connecting British defence andeconomic policies have maintained its force if few ministers apartfrom the most senior members of the Cabinet knew about it? Quitesimply because, for the period in question, the Cabinet did not havemuch say on the direction and formulation of defence and foreignpolicy. Throughout August and September 1965, the topic of Britain’sSoutheast Asian role was only brought up once in Cabinet, where thePrime Minister and Foreign Secretary essentially presented the currentpolicy as a fait accompli.¹¹¹

British defence policy in Southeast Asia was firmly under the controlof the relevant senior ministers and officials, and within these circles therelationship between sterling and defence was widely known and heeded.

¹⁰⁵ This retreat, it may be noted, was all the more humiliating by being forced by anAmerican official who was the Prime Minister’s junior.

¹⁰⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208: Ball to Rusk, 9/9/1965.¹⁰⁷ PRO: CAB 128/39: CC(65)49th Meeting, 23/9/1965; LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 208:

Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 29/9/1965.¹⁰⁸ Wilson, Labour Government, pp. 232, 264.¹⁰⁹ James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p. 176; Alan Dobson,

‘The Years of Transition: Anglo–American Relations 1961–1967’, Review of InternationalStudies, 16 (1990), pp. 239–58.

¹¹⁰ Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 1, Minister of Housing1964–66 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), pp. 456, 540.

¹¹¹ PRO: CAB 128/39: CC(65)49th Meeting, 23/9/1965.


Dean Rusk had earlier noted that James Callaghan, Sir Burke Trendand British Ambassador Patrick Dean had all been told of US views.¹¹²A British record of the meeting between Wilson and Ball was kept andgiven limited circulation within the Foreign and Cabinet Offices, whosepersonnel clearly understood the meaning of the agreement. As oneofficial succinctly put it, both the White House and State Departmenthad ‘said that sterling and defence were linked; neither tied the linkageto any particular quid pro quo; both implied the need for consultationbefore any action affecting defence commitments’.¹¹³ Most importantly,in the months and years that followed it is clear that the key defenceand foreign policy officials and ministers in the British Governmentwere aware of the Johnson Administration’s views and intentions, andsought to shape the direction of Britain’s policies accordingly.

The conclusion of the September quadripartite talks on Malaysia/Singapore, and the concomitant understanding reached between HaroldWilson and Johnson Administration officials, marked a significantwatershed in British policy planning towards Southeast Asia. The eventssealed a major private failure of the Wilson Government and its officials.A few months earlier, in mid-1965, the Government had instigateddiscussions with its key overseas allies with a number of goals in mind:to reach agreement on a revised strategy for Southeast Asia that wouldsee British forces moved from Malaysia and Singapore to the region’speriphery; to reduce the burden of Britain’s Southeast Asian role byinstitutionalizing co-operation with the ANZUS powers; and to gainlong-term financial assistance from the United States to alleviate boththe direct and foreign exchange cost of Britain’s role.

At the conclusion of the September talks, the British Governmenthad not only failed to achieve its goals, but moved even further awayfrom being able to reach them. Its allies had forcefully rejected therevised British strategy, and any attempt to move forces away fromSingapore. They were now much more suspicious of any changes theBritish might propose. Worse still, thanks to Britain’s weak financialposition, the tables had been turned in the Government’s attempt to useits continuing role in the region to extract long-term assistance from theUnited States: instead, the US extracted from them an understandingthat they should make no unilateral changes to the bases in Malaysia and

¹¹² LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 22: Rusk to Ball et al., 7/9/1965.¹¹³ PRO: FO 371/179587: G.E. Hall, 13/10/1965.


Singapore—though the British were now much more sceptical abouttheir value and practicality—in return for only a short-term bailout ofthe pound.

How had this failure of British policy come about? Partly, it was a caseof unfortunate timing and circumstances. The British had had a muchstronger hand when they began negotiations with the United States inJune, but their position was sharply undermined with the sterling crisisof the late summer, which made them desperate for US assistance. Atthe same time, the sudden break-up of Malaysia and Singapore causedBritish officials to introduce their plans to the ANZUS allies muchmore suddenly. They did not have any time to prepare the allies fortheir shift in thinking; their proposals were presented as a much sharperand faster change of policy than they otherwise would have been. Thecombination of these events meant that the ANZUS powers were morehostile to the British proposals, and more able to force their views.

Even without these circumstantial difficulties, however, there werefundamental differences between the British and ANZUS positions,and an inherent contradiction in Britain’s aims. The British wereseeking to reduce their role in Southeast Asia to match their economicresources, while maintaining their wider interest in close relations withthe ANZUS powers. But these allies’ main concern was to keep Britainin as active a role in Southeast Asia as possible: to back their ownefforts in Vietnam, and, for Australia and New Zealand, to supporttheir preferred strategy of forward defence. The conflict between theseinterests underlay the dispute between Britain and its allies at theSeptember 1965 quadripartite talks. It had not been resolved at theconclusion of the talks. The allies had got their way in preventing asudden change in British policy; but the problem of how Britain couldreduce its Southeast Asian role to match its limited economic interestsand resources still remained.

3A Dubious Compromise: October

1965–February 1966

In the remaining months of 1965 and into 1966, the Wilson Gov-ernment had to complete its Defence Review and prepare the De-fence White Paper. This task, however, had been made significantlymore difficult by the outcome of the September quadripartite talks.The British plans, which the ANZUS allies had firmly rejected atthe talks, had not been plucked out of thin air in reaction to theMalaysia–Singapore split. Rather, they had been a reasonable, albeitabbreviated, reflection of the thinking that had been slowly emergingfrom the Defence Review. British officials now faced the challengeof having to convince the allies of their views when these viewshad already been summarily rejected. Moreover, the ANZUS gov-ernments had become much more suspicious of British motives andintentions.

This chapter traces the period from the aftermath of the Septemberquadripartite talks to the publication of the Defence White Paperin February 1966. The period might be considered as comprisingtwo major stages, divided by Harold Wilson’s December 1965 visitto Washington. The first stage was characterized by noticeably moredistant relations between Britain and the ANZUS powers. Chastenedby the harsh reception their ideas had received at the September talks,the British avoided further consultations with these allies until theend of 1965. At the same time, they privately continued to developtheir arguments and ideas for a partial withdrawal from Singapore toAustralia. This self-imposed silence caused the ANZUS governments tobecome increasingly concerned about the direction that future policywas taking, and led them to ponder ways in which the British might beinduced to stay in Southeast Asia.

In December 1965, Harold Wilson broke the slowly thickening icewith his visit to Washington. Yet while relations improved, it was

A Dubious Compromise: October 1965–February 1966 59

still clear that the allies sharply diverged from Britain on what itsfuture position in Southeast Asia should be. The second stage of theperiod, spanning the final two months before the publication of theDefence White Paper, saw British officials trying to bridge the gapbetween themselves and their ANZUS allies, so that they might beable to produce a mutually acceptable policy. With only days leftbefore the final talks, there was still no resolution in sight until DenisHealey came up with a slightly reworded yet fundamentally recastversion of British intentions. After some difficult negotiations, thispolicy was accepted by the ANZUS governments. The Malaysian andSingaporean Governments were informed of British intentions, and thepolicy was duly published in the Defence White Paper of February1966.

In the immediate wake of the September talks, British officials soughtto downplay the rift their proposals had created between themselves andthe ANZUS powers. They tried to reassure American and Australianrepresentatives that their plans for negotiating with Indonesia and partialwithdrawal from Singapore to Australia were not so firm as they hadappeared.

In a private talk with the Australian High Commissioner in London,Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the permanent head of the Foreign Office, triedto smooth the waters by minimizing the extent of disagreement. Hetold the High Commissioner that the British paper was not supposedto contain firm proposals, only matters for discussion. He ‘did notdeny’ that its pessimism was exaggerated, and ‘virtually admitted’ thatthere were Cabinet divisions on the matter.¹ He hinted, the HighCommissioner claimed, that ‘the Foreign Office view is not far removedfrom our own’.² Other British officials claimed to the Australians thatthey had not made their intentions clear, and said that they regrettedtheir attempt at the paper: its quality was compromised by having toreconcile many conflicting views; its gloomy tone was a reaction againstpast papers which had ‘tended too much to gloss over the pessimisticaspects’.³ On the other hand, the permanent head of the AustralianDepartment of External Affairs reported that all within the FO and

¹ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Sir Alexander Downer to Sir Robert Menzies, ‘QuadripartiteTalks’, tel. 7866, 10/9/1965.

² Ibid.³ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 1: DEAC, ‘Quadripartite Talks: Future

Relations with Malaysia and Singapore’, 10/9/1965.


CRO were ‘very upset about the deal’—implying a greater regret at thereaction to the paper rather than its contents.⁴

Denis Healey so much wished to distance himself from the Septem-ber talks that he told the Australian High Commissioner that he hadnot even seen the British paper presented there, and only knew abit about it.⁵ This prompted some private scepticism from Australianofficials, who noted that, as Defence Secretary, his views would havecarried a great deal of weight. His views, moreover, still appeared to be‘no different’ from the paper’s contents.⁶ To the High Commissioner,Sir Alexander Downer, he argued that Britain’s response to Confronta-tion should be either to escalate or to compromise with Indonesia. Hewas ‘pessimistic’ on the future of Malaysia, and on Lee Kuan Yew’sposition in Singapore.⁷ Though Healey denied that he was thinking ofany immediate reorientation of British policy, Downer noted that hekept returning to the phrase: ‘if we decided to abandon our East of Suezpolicy’.⁸ Downer saw the Defence Secretary as ‘seized with the idea ofBritish impermanence in Singapore’, an idea which led him to lookfor a way for Britain ‘to retreat without indignity’.⁹ As Australia andthe United States opposed any such move, Healey claimed that theywere doing Britain a disservice by ‘virtually compelling’ it to stay in theregion.¹⁰

In a similar vein, Harold Wilson wrote a telegram to Sir Robert Men-zies which suggested that Australia and the other allies had succeeded instopping immediate British action but not in changing British minds. Inhis message, Wilson affirmed that his Government would be adoptingthe ‘wait and see’ policy on Confrontation that Australia had urged.He further affirmed that the Government still believed that Britainshould maintain its ‘East of Suez’ role, albeit on an interdependentbasis. But he did not make any retreat from his Government’s earlierpropositions: that the tenure of the Singapore base could not be assuredafter 1970; that the ability to oppose Confrontation had been reducedby the separation; and that it was necessary to plan on a contingency

⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: A.T. Griffith to Sir John Bunting, ‘Comment onDowner Interview with Healey’, 11/10/1965.

⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Sir Alexander Downer to Sir Robert Menzies,20/9/1965.

⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Griffith to Bunting, ‘Comment on DownerInterview with Healey’, 11/10/1965.

⁷ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Downer to Menzies, 20/9/1965.⁸ Ibid. ⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰ Ibid.


basis for a shift from Singapore to Australia. Regarding both Singaporeand Confrontation, Wilson warned, ‘time is not on our side’.¹¹

The Australians were wholly correct in their suspicion that the Britishwere still wanting to withdraw from Singapore. Despite the FO’s andCRO’s attempts to appear sympathetic to the allied viewpoint, all theBritish departments concerned continued to believe privately that forcesshould be withdrawn from the immediate Southeast Asian region to itsperimeter. These plans remained the working assumption of the DefenceReview, as it continued with its work through the autumn of 1965.

In the aftermath of the unsuccessful quadripartite talks, the DefenceReview Working Party had extended its studies of future strategy toinclude the option of remaining in Singapore.¹² It is clear, however,that it was not enthusiastic about this possibility. The Working Partydid not think it worthwhile to examine the option thoroughly andonly expressed scepticism about its value. Trade and investment inEast Asia were ‘in no way paramount factors’ which might justify aBritish military presence.¹³ On the contrary, a continuing presence inthe immediate region would more likely be a cost than a benefit, for‘the extent of our commitment [to Malaysia and Singapore] could notthen necessarily be limited’.¹⁴ Some within the Working Party indeedargued for a much more hands-off approach, suggesting that it might bein Britain’s ‘long term interest to allow some countries in the Far Eastto go Communist, in the hope that they would go neutralist rather thancome under Chinese domination’.¹⁵

At the most senior official level, similar views were being maintained.Within OPD(O) it was again felt that keeping British forces in Malaysiaand Singapore after Confrontation would entail an open-ended militarycommitment. At the same time, these forces would incur the hostilityof local nationalists, making their tenure neither practical nor secure.Sir Bernard Burrows, Deputy Under Secretary in the Foreign Office,summed up his department’s position: it was ‘likely that we should beout of Singapore by 1970 and . . . it would be desirable for this to beso’.¹⁶ It was not only strategic factors that were relevant. The financialpressures against a continuing large-scale presence in Southeast Asia were

¹¹ PRO: PREM 13/889: Harold Wilson to Sir Robert Menzies, tel. 2521, 25/9/1965.¹² PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)9thMeeting, 17/9/1965.¹³ PRO: CAB 148/52: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)10thMeeting, 24/9/1965.¹⁴ Ibid. ¹⁵ Ibid.¹⁶ PRO: CAB 148/41: OPD(O)22nd Meeting, 11/10/1965.


also mounting. In their studies of British forces in Europe, the DefenceReview Working Party had found that the UK could make no unilateralreductions to its forces without endangering the stability of NATO,already under threat because of French actions. The conclusion was‘unwelcome but inescapable’.¹⁷ Large-scale reductions in British forcescould only come about through some multilateral NATO arrangement,and this approach was ‘unlikely to yield any short-term economies’.¹⁸With reductions in Europe ruled out, the pressure to find savings inSoutheast Asia only increased.

While the Australian Government were not privy to the inner workingsof the British Defence Review, their suspicions drove them to considerhow to handle the likelihood that the British were still planning asubstantial withdrawal. Australian officials were sceptical at the strategicarguments that the British had put forward. While there might besome regional pressure on Britain to leave, would it have any realforce? Would Malaysia really want to be left without defences againstIndonesia? Would Singapore want to lose its main source of employmentand security?¹⁹ But the real problem for the Australian Governmentwas not how to rebut British arguments, but whether such a rebuttalwould be enough to keep the British resolute on their commitments. Itwas doubtful that only strategic assessments were prompting the Britishto think of leaving. Senior Australian officials noted that the much-cited date of 1970 as the year for departure seemed to relate ‘at least asmuch to the . . . aim of containing defence expenditure . . . as to anyassessment of the likely political situation’.²⁰ They warned Australianministers that if they did not seek actively to persuade the Britishto stay, there might be no opportunity to convince them of this oncethe Defence Review had concluded.²¹ That was the key problem for theAustralian Government in the later months of 1965: how to induce theBritish to remain committed to their Malaysian and Singaporean bases.

One suggestion was leaked by Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassadorto Washington and a supporter of the ‘East of Suez’ role. He hinted at

¹⁷ PRO: CAB 148/41: OPD(O)21st Meeting, 4/10/1965. ¹⁸ Ibid.¹⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: P.H. Bailey to Sir John Bunting, ‘Defence

Committee Discussion on the British Presence in Southeast Asia’, 13/10/1965.²⁰ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/20: Defence Committee, ‘British Presence in Southeast Asia’,

18/10/1965.²¹ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 1: Sir Laurence McIntyre to Paul Hasluck,

‘The British Defence Role in Southeast Asia’, 11/10/1965.


the link between the United States’ interests in Southeast Asia and itssupport for the British economy. He suggested that an Australian letterto the British might begin by subtly reminding Harold Wilson aboutAustralia’s similar views about the state of sterling.²²

Within Australia, the Defence Committee, representing the views ofthe most senior officials and the chiefs of staff, proposed a more radicalplan of action. They argued that the Australian Government should seizethe initiative and approach the British. It should express understandingof their problems and co-operate with them to help preserve theMalaysia and Singapore bases, while also helping them develop jointcontingency plans for the time when these facilities were lost. Plans forthis contingency needed to involve alternative arrangements, includingan Australian base. At the same time, the Australian Government shouldinform the US Government of its actions and consult with them.²³

The Australian Cabinet’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committeerejected these proposals.²⁴ Unfortunately, as the discussions of thesenior ministers on the Committee were not minuted, the reasons forthis decision cannot be stated with certainty. One possible reason mayhave been that if the Government appeared too receptive to the ideaof an Australian base, this would detract from the case for maintaininga presence in Malaysia and Singapore. This interpretation is consistentwith the decisions the FADC had taken the month before, retreatingfrom any endorsement of an Australian base in the aftermath of theMalaysia–Singapore split. Another reason was provided by the PrimeMinister’s Assistant Secretary for External Affairs: the British role inSoutheast Asia was complementary to that of the United States; thus,Australia should not embark on any independent initiatives regardingthe British presence, but should always ensure that the United States wasinvolved and engaged in the process.²⁵ This argument appears to haveheld some weight for the FADC, for its implications were followed inthe Australian Government’s subsequent attempts to revive some formof quadripartite talks.

²² NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: Sir James Plimsoll to Paul Hasluck, ‘BritishDefence Commitments’, tel. 3666, 20/10/1965.

²³ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/20: Defence Committee, ‘British Presence in Southeast Asia’,18/10/1965.

²⁴ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/20: FADC, ‘Submission No. 1095—British Presence inSoutheast Asia’, 1330(FAD), 19/10/1965.

²⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 1: A.T. Griffith, ‘British Presence in SoutheastAsia’, 6/10/1965.


Towards the end of October 1965, Sir Robert Menzies wroteto Harold Wilson. While he acknowledged the economic problemsfacing Britain, he argued that Communist China posed a majorthreat to peace in Asia and throughout the world. Containing thisthreat required the ‘continued physical presence in Asia’ of bothBritain and the United States, the only two powers capable ofexercising worldwide roles.²⁶ He doubted that the end of Con-frontation would mean the sudden ejection of Britain from Malaysiaand Singapore—and so fundamental was the British presence toSoutheast Asian security that it should be maintained ‘even in ad-versity’ for as long as possible.²⁷ Stability in the region dependedon co-operation between all the allies, with the British and Ameri-can contributions at the core. With this in mind, he asked that aquadripartite discussion be convened at ministerial level as soon aspossible.

The British response was less than enthusiastic. In his reply toMenzies’ letter, Wilson rejected the request for a quadripartite meeting.He excused himself on the grounds that the Defence Review had notyet made sufficient progress, and that discussions should only take placeonce the Government had a clearer view of its plans. Once this stagewas reached, the Government would consult with Australia and NewZealand—the lack of reference to the United States a clear snub to theAustralian request for quadripartite talks.²⁸ Clearly the British were notvery keen to restage the September meetings, where the ANZUS powershad presented such a united front.

The coolness with which Wilson treated Menzies was borne out atother levels. Officials at the Australian High Commission in Londonsensed ‘a degree of ‘‘clamming up’’ in the Ministry of Defence’.²⁹ TheForeign Office claimed in reply that this reticence was due simply tothere being a lack of anything new to say.

The British were no more forthcoming with the Americans thanthey had been with the Australians. While Denis Healey had earlierpromised the US Government intensive official and then ministerialtalks on the Defence Review, there was no sign that these intentions

²⁶ PRO: PREM 13/889: Sir Robert Menzies to Harold Wilson, 22/10/1965.²⁷ Ibid.²⁸ PRO: PREM 13/889: Harold Wilson to Sir Robert Menzies, tel. 2978, 19/11/1965.²⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6174: AHC, London, to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy East

of Suez’, tel. 9416, 22/10/1965.


would be met.³⁰ In late October, US Assistant Secretary of DefenceJohn McNaughton visited Healey in London and pushed for earlyAnglo–American talks. He found Healey unwilling to arrange anydiscussions before a ministerial meeting scheduled for late November.McNaughton advised his Government that if it wanted consultations,it ‘had better press the British for them’.³¹

In early November, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundywrote a ‘personal’ message to Sir Burke Trend to express his concerns.³²He feared a repeat of the earlier ‘confusion’ on Singapore or themisunderstanding over Skybolt.³³ Was there a risk that the consultationswould effectively take place after the important decisions had beenmade? The message ended with a veiled threat: British ministers hada full right to come to their own conclusions, but this should notpreclude ‘an understanding of the relation between their decisions andours’.³⁴

Still the British Government did not respond. Privately, Healey ad-vised Wilson in mid-November that the consultations should continueto be put off. The US Government was likely to have undertaken de-tailed studies to establish what it thought British defence policy shouldbe. At the same time, US fears about British resolve gave the UK greaterbargaining leverage. The British should not enter talks until they had es-tablished firm objectives and the range of options over which they mightnegotiate.³⁵ Not everyone within the British Government agreed withHealey’s approach. Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador to the US, hada ‘rather alarming impression’ of Healey’s negotiating strategy.³⁶ LordChalfont, a Minister of State at the Foreign Office, expressed himself‘deeply concerned’ at the idea that the British Government should notconsult fully with the United States.³⁷

³⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Departments of State and Defence, ‘UK DefenceReview: Joint State–Defence Scope Paper’, 21/1/1966.

³¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: John McNaughton, memcon, John McNaughton andDenis Healey, London, 26/10/1965.

³² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: McGeorge Bundy to Sir Burke Trend, 3/11/1965.³³ Ibid. For more on the Skybolt crisis, see Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt

Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).³⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Bundy to Trend, 3/11/1965.³⁵ PRO: PREM 13/686: Denis Healey to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Review: Consultation

with US Government’, 19/11/1965.³⁶ PRO: FO 371/184515: Sir Patrick Dean, 12/11/1965.³⁷ PRO: FO 371/184515: Lord Chalfont to George Thomson, ‘Defence Review’,

15/11/1965.


Healey only partially got his way. When Robert McNamara andGeorge Ball arrived in London for the ministerial talks at the end ofNovember, the timetable was pushed back again. However, HaroldWilson announced a firm date for the beginning of consultations, in-forming the Americans that he would discuss the Defence Review whenhe visited Washington in the middle of December.³⁸ Privately, BritishArmy Minister Fred Mulley tried to explain the delays to US officials.He noted that senior ministers felt that the September quadripartitetalks had been ‘mishandled’ by British officials.³⁹ Thus, they wantedthe consultations over the Defence Review to begin at leadership level,rather than beginning with officials, as had originally been proposed.

Before Wilson met President Johnson, the British Government had toreach some conclusions on what plans they would propose for theirrole in Southeast Asia. Officials presented to ministers the final reportof the Defence Review in mid-November, and ministers reviewed andapproved it by the end of the month.

The Defence Review was finalized against the backdrop of a rapidlychanging situation in Indonesia. At the end of September 1965, asmall faction within the army had attempted a left-wing coup againstthe military’s leadership. While the attempted coup had eliminatedsix of the most senior generals, it had missed some key figures, inparticular General Suharto, then head of the strategic reserve. Suharto’sforces quickly quashed the nascent rebellion and took control of theIndonesian capital. Over the weeks and months that followed, the armypurged the country of the Communist Party—its erstwhile rivals forpower—in a bloodletting that would eventually cost up to a million lives.While the extent—if any—of British or American complicity in theseevents is unclear, from Britain’s perspective, the political developmentsin Indonesia were positive, with the Indonesian Government becomingtoo consumed by the country’s internal ructions to continue the vigorouspursuit of Confrontation.

In this context, the final report of Britain’s Defence Review reaffirmedthe direction that had developed over the previous year on what Britainshould do once Confrontation had ended. It reiterated the argument

³⁸ PRO: PREM 13/681: memcon, Harold Wilson, Denis Healey, Michael Stewart, RobertMcNamara, George Ball et al., London, 26/11/1965.

³⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1865/6124: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to DEAC, ‘BritishDefence Review’, tel. 4176, 30/11/1965.


that Britain could not and should not retain forces based in Malaysiaand Singapore. Though officials noted that the ANZUS powers hadargued that Britain would be able to stay, they saw no reason to reassesstheir views in the light of this. They argued that ‘events over the next sixmonths or a year will demonstrate . . . that we cannot count on retainingthe Singapore and Malaysian bases up to or beyond 1970’.⁴⁰ Howeverkeen Lee Kuan Yew might be privately to retain the Singapore base, hewould be ‘unable to proclaim this publicly’, and it was ‘doubtful whetherhe [would] be able to resist for long the pressure for our withdrawal’.⁴¹Nor did officials have any doubts that a withdrawal from Malaysia andSingapore was in Britain’s own interests: only then could expenditurein East Asia be in ‘reasonable accord . . . with our broader interests inthis region’; only then would there be ‘a reasonable prospect of reducingour total defence expenditure to the target figure’ of £2,000 million.⁴²Strategically too, a withdrawal would help further the long-term aim ofneutralizing the region.

Though arguing for a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore, offi-cials unanimously agreed that a military presence had to be maintainedin the broader area for the sake of relations with Britain’s ANZUSallies. Delicately averring to the link between defence and US supportfor the pound, they noted Britain’s ‘close links with, and dependenceon, United States policy in other parts of the world’.⁴³ A completewithdrawal would jeopardize Britain’s historic ties with Australia andNew Zealand, and this would have ‘serious repercussions’ for Britain’sinternational standing.⁴⁴

The British forces retained in the region would have to cost nomore than £186 million per year—this figure representing not theprice of any projected forces, but rather what was left after subtract-ing all other costs from the £2,000 million budget target.⁴⁵ Officialsenvisaged that these forces would be based in northern Australia, andinterdependent of forces from the ANZUS powers. The case for inter-dependence rested on financial grounds: it made it more likely that theallies would pay for the cost of the Australian base, and it meant thatany remaining commitment to Malaysia and Singapore—especially ifthere was a resurgence of Confrontation—could be shared. Such apolicy carried political risks. It meant that Britain would be committing

⁴⁰ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/14: OPD(O), ‘Defence Policy’, 8/11/1965.⁴¹ Ibid. ⁴² Ibid. ⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ Ibid.⁴⁵ PRO: PREM 13/216: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, 12/11/1965.


itself ‘to maintaining a military presence in the Far East for an in-definite period’.⁴⁶ Moreover, interdependence meant that the Britishcould be forced to take part in allied operations about which theyhad misgivings. Nevertheless, it was felt that these risks would ‘haveto be accepted if we are to achieve a substantial reduction of ourforces’.⁴⁷

In their meetings in mid- and late November 1965, senior ministerson foreign policy and defence affirmed this direction for policy.⁴⁸ Therewas no opposition to the idea of withdrawing forces from Malaysiaand Singapore after Confrontation had ended, and moving them toAustralia. Ministers were also clear on what interests justified theremaining forces. One Minister put it the most bluntly: ‘the degree ofour direct interest suggested that we should seek to make the smallestcontribution which was acceptable to our Allies’.⁴⁹

While the general direction of policy was not contested, there wereconcerns about how interdependence could be made a reality. Somedoubted that Britain’s allies could be so easily induced to pay foran Australian base. As Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, notedsceptically to the Prime Minister, the idea was ‘a mere assumption—andan improbable one, given what we know of the Australasian attitude todefence expenditure’.⁵⁰ There were also disagreements on how closelyBritain could risk being attached to the United States in Southeast Asia,especially given the background of the Vietnam War. Denis Healeywarned that, unless the tasks of interdependent forces were carefullylimited, Britain could end up ‘trapped into fighting the wrong war in thewrong place by the wrong means at the wrong time’.⁵¹ Fred Mulley, theDeputy Secretary of Defence and Minister for the Army, leaked his sideof the argument to US Embassy officials. He revealed that Healey andWilson were attracted to the idea of retaining only air and naval forcesin Southeast Asia, since they did not want to get bogged down withexpensive land forces as they had done in Borneo and the Americanshad in Vietnam. Mulley felt that such cuts would make the ‘East of

⁴⁶ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/14: OPD(O), ‘Defence Policy’, 8/11/1965.⁴⁷ Ibid.⁴⁸ Those present at the meeting included: the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the

Exchequer, the Secretaries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Commonwealth Relations, ColonialAffairs and Economic Affairs, the Chiefs of Staff, and related officials.

⁴⁹ PRO: CAB 130/213: MISC 17/8th Meeting, 13–14/11/1965.⁵⁰ PRO: PREM 13/216: Trend to Wilson, 12/11/1965.⁵¹ PRO: PREM 13/216: Denis Healey, ‘The Defence Review: Personal Note’, 12/11/1965.


Suez’ presence ‘an empty gesture’.⁵² The US Embassy privately observedthat such a complaint was likely to be grounded in Mulley’s desire toprotect his own turf as Army Minister. Despite these disagreements onemphasis, however, all ministers and officials were agreed that the bestpolicy for the future lay in the general direction of Britain withdrawingfrom its bases in Malaysia and Singapore to a sharply reduced presencein Australia, and the allies sharing the burden of Britain’s remainingcommitments through some sort of interdependent arrangement.

From December 1965, the Wilson Government began consultingagain with its allies on the direction of its Southeast Asian policies.The Government, however, was not about to repeat its mistakes ofSeptember 1965 and provide a forum where its allies could jointlyreject its policies. Instead, it adopted a strategy of holding bilateralconsultations, beginning with the United States and then extendingto the regional allies: Australia and New Zealand first, then Malaysiaand Singapore. Clearly, the British hoped that if they could secure theacquiescence of their most powerful ally, they would be able to ride outany objections coming from the others.

Unsurprisingly, the smaller allies were not at all enamoured withthe British tactics. The Australian Government was deeply unhappyat the prospect of being left out of the decision-making process untilits very last stages. Increasingly concerned, the Government tried tooffer the British greater incentives to consult. Sir Robert Menzies,the Australian Prime Minister, invited the British High Commissionerfor a briefing and sought to stress how much Australian and Britishinterests were intertwined. Emphasizing that the Australian Governmenthoped that the British would stay in Singapore for as long as possible,Menzies offered to ‘consider any concrete proposal’ which the Britishmight present for increased co-operation.⁵³ Asked to elaborate, Menziesexpressly mentioned the possibility of financial assistance to Britain, orhelp with the provision of Australian bases in addition to Singapore.

The British Government was unmoved. They informed the Austra-lians that their bilateral consultations would not take place until February1966, a month and a half after the initial Anglo–American discussions.Australian officials were privately concerned that this meant they would

⁵² LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 13/12/1965.⁵³ PRO: PREM 13/889: Sir Charles Johnston to CRO, tel. 1428, 24/11/1965. Emphasis

in original.


be presented with a ‘virtual fait accompli’, but conceded that this mighthave to be faced as simply one of the ‘facts of life’.⁵⁴

The Malaysian Government was even further away from beingconsulted than the Australians. But when the Australian Minister forExternal Affairs, Paul Hasluck, visited Kuala Lumpur, he found PrimeMinister Tunku Abdul Rahman sanguine about the situation. Thefailed coup and ongoing elimination of Communist sympathizers inIndonesia had pushed any active pursuit of Confrontation into thebackground. With the external threat to Malaysia now dissipating, theTunku declared to Hasluck that he would not mind if the British tookaway ‘half of their existing forces in Malaysia tomorrow’, providing therewas no publicity.⁵⁵ Obviously unaware of the peregrinations of Britishpolicy in recent months, the Tunku claimed that Britain’s defenceof his country stemmed from a desire to protect British investments,and Malaysia would be adequately shielded by whatever protection wasnecessary for these. Even if forces were reduced, they could be reinforcedif necessary. While the Tunku’s indifference and ignorance might havebeen alarming, his Deputy and Minister of Defence, Tun Abdul Razak,was more reassuring to Australian ears. He said he would be ‘veryunhappy’ if the British implemented any reductions, for Indonesia hadnot yet settled down, and such a move would be bad for morale andpublic relations in the Southeast Asian area generally.⁵⁶

In mid-December 1965, Harold Wilson finally arrived in Washingtonto begin the consultations on future British policy. Through pre-summitbriefings, the Americans had a good idea of what Wilson was planningto say. They knew that the idea of cutting costs in Europe had beendropped, thanks to the political fragility of NATO. They were relievedthat the British had decided to maintain their position in Southeast Asiauntil at least the end of Confrontation. They were deeply concerned,however, at what they heard were the British Government’s plans toreduce dramatically its Southeast Asian presence after Confrontation,including closing the Singapore base in favour of reduced facilities innorthern Australia.⁵⁷ They feared that if such plans were even mooted,

⁵⁴ NAA: A4940/1, C4266: Peter Lawler to Sir Robert Menzies, 10/12/1966.⁵⁵ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: memcon, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Paul

Hasluck, et al., Kuala Lumpur, 19/12/1965.⁵⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 2: memcon, Tun Abdul Razak, Paul Hasluck,

et al., Kuala Lumpur, 19/12/1965.⁵⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, ‘British Problems and

Policies on the Eve of the Wilson Visit’, 7/12/1965; Memo (author unknown) to Lyndon


‘the impact on our own effort [in Vietnam] will be real’.⁵⁸ At a meetingof the American leadership in preparation for Wilson’s visit, RobertMcNamara maintained that they should insist that the British tryto retain Singapore. He warned that the argument ‘will fall on deafears unless we make [a] push’: the Americans needed to ‘hit Wilsonhard’.⁵⁹

In his presentation to the American leadership, Wilson sought tominimize the conflict by underplaying the question of Singapore.Instead, he concentrated on the big picture, and the strategic argumentsthat were supposed to drive his policies. He emphasized that the centralstrategic question should be how to contain the threat of ChineseCommunist expansion. He argued that, within the Government’slimit of £186 million on Southeast Asian expenditure, this could andshould only be done on an interdependent basis, with co-operationbetween the four powers of Australia, New Zealand, the United Statesand United Kingdom. Unexpectedly, he raised the idea that thisco-operation could include a collective nuclear defence arrangement,to which Britain’s Polaris submarines might be committed. While hemaintained that the British Government believed its tenure on Singaporeto be limited, Wilson stressed the strategic alternatives: a quadripartitebase in northern Australia and, more radically, the rehabilitation ofIndonesia, once Confrontation ended, as part of a system to containChina.⁶⁰

The Americans sought to appear at least sympathetic to Wilson’spresentation. Robert McNamara suggested that any collective arrange-ment could also include Japan, thus avoiding the political pitfalls ofa purely white organization. He also professed ‘great interest’ in thenotion of some kind of nuclear co-operation in East Asia.⁶¹ But fun-damentally the Americans were critical of any voluntary withdrawal.

Johnson, ‘Talking Paper for the Wilson Visit’, 15/12/1965; McGeorge Bundy to LyndonJohnson, ‘The Wilson Visit’, 16/12/1965; LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: FrancisBator to McGeorge Bundy, ‘Wilson Visit’, 14/12/1965.

⁵⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Bundy to Johnson, 16/12/1965.⁵⁹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Lyndon Johnson,

George Ball, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Francis Bator et al., Washington, DC,16/12/1965.

⁶⁰ PRO: PREM 13/686: memcon, Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson, George Ball, Mc-George Bundy et al., Washington, DC, 16/12/1965; memcon, Harold Wilson, RobertMcNamara, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy et al., Washington, DC, 17/12/1965. PRO: CAB131/272: PMV(W)(65) 1: Foreign Office, ‘Defence Review’, 10/12/1965.

⁶¹ PRO: PREM 13/686: memcon, Wilson, McNamara et al., 17/12/1965.


As the British record discreetly put it, ‘It was here that the greatestdifficulties arose.’⁶² McGeorge Bundy suggested that Singapore should‘be regarded as a key point in the containment of Chinese expansion’.⁶³If the British voluntarily left the base, ‘it might be interpreted as theabandonment of Malaysia’.⁶⁴ Robert McNamara proposed that he andDenis Healey should discuss the relative strategic merits of Singapore andnorthwest Australia. The US would not cling to Singapore for its ownsake, but wanted the most effective defence stance. Bundy emphasizedthat any British decision had to be based ‘on sound politico-strategicconsiderations rather [than] on the grounds that [they] simply couldnot afford to stay’.⁶⁵ Unless the British could justify their argumentsstrategically—and no doubt the Americans were sceptical that theycould—the US Government would not agree to a voluntary withdrawalfrom Singapore.

Despite these unresolved differences, the Anglo–American discus-sions ended amicably. American officials were privately satisfied thattheir firm but measured stance had helped to ease the tensions of theprevious months. Though they noted that Wilson was careful not tomake any ‘commitment that British decisions would conform to ourviews’, the discussions were still ‘unusually successful’ in improvingthe atmosphere of the Anglo–American relationship.⁶⁶ The Presidentprofessed himself ‘confident’ that the talks would lead to the twoGovernments working ‘fruitfully together’ in the future.⁶⁷

The Wilson visit may have been partly successful in easing some ofthe tensions in the Anglo–American relationship that had been presentsince September. But fundamentally, the views of the respective gov-ernments remained far apart. At the end of 1965 and into early 1966,the British Government was continuing to develop its plans for a post-Confrontation withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. In its studiesand costings of Britain’s projected force structure, the Ministry of De-fence assumed that its Southeast Asian forces would be based in northern

⁶² PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson et al., Washington,DC, 16/12/1965.

⁶³ PRO: PREM 13/686: memcon, Wilson, McNamara et al., 17/12/1965.⁶⁴ Ibid. ⁶⁵ Ibid.⁶⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: David Bruce, Summary of Harold Wilson’s Meetings

with Lyndon Johnson, George Ball, and Robert McNamara, 17/12/1965. LBJL: President’sAppointment Diary (Diary Backup): (author unknown), ‘Comment on the President’s ThreeForeign Visitors’, 20/12/1965.

⁶⁷ LBJL: President’s Appointment Diary: (author unknown), ‘Comment on the President’sThree Foreign Visitors’.


Australia, with the capital costs paid by the Australian Government.⁶⁸The Commonwealth Relations Office undertook studies of what kindsof treaty arrangements would have to replace the Anglo–MalaysianDefence Agreement once the British withdrew. Their preferred arrange-ment would see the quadripartite powers jointly providing coverage ofMalaysia and Singapore. Yet there was an obvious problem with theseplans. As the CRO noted, if new quadripartite security arrangements inSoutheast Asia were to work, it would be ‘very important to have thecomplete support of our Allies at every stage’.⁶⁹ But these allies wouldhardly agree to a treaty arrangement when they did not agree on theunderlying defence strategy. And the allies had displayed only deep op-position to a defence strategy that proposed the voluntary relinquishingof the Singapore base. At the end of 1965, there still appeared to be noway out of this impasse.

Across the Atlantic, US officials were privately concerned with morethan just the fate of Singapore. They were worried that once the nebulousconcept of ‘interdependence’ was fleshed out, it would hinder more thanassist the execution of US policy. British thinking appeared to be tendingtowards the idea that ‘interdependence’ should be institutionalized ina formal linkage between the UK and the ANZUS treaty whichbound together Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Britishforces, including possibly its nuclear Polaris submarines, would becommitted to this organization. American officials feared that USpolicy would be severely encumbered by so formal a structure. TheBritish were seeking ‘as firm an institutionalised grip as they canmanage’ on US policy in East Asia.⁷⁰ If Polaris were assigned to a jointcontainment of China, ‘domestic UK politics will always ‘‘veto’’ us,and tie our hands’.⁷¹ Furthermore, attaching the UK to ANZUS wouldcreate a ‘white man’s club in Asia’, something that would antagonizenot only Indonesia but also the West’s Asian allies.⁷² And bringingBritain into an ‘Anglo-Saxon Asian defence club’ would hinder Britishintegration with Europe, and with it the possibility that Britain might

⁶⁸ PRO: CAB 148/45: OPD(O)(65)82: MOD, ‘Defence Review: Force Structure andCosts’, 20/12/1965.

⁶⁹ PRO: CAB 148/45: OPD(O)(65)73: CRO, ‘Defence Aid to Malaysia and Singapore’,ANNEX B: ‘Future Defence Commitments to Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei’, 22/12/1965.

⁷⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, ‘UK East of SuezProposals’.

⁷¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Jack Valenti to Lyndon Johnson, 24/1/1966.⁷² Rostow to Johnson, ‘UK East of Suez Proposals’.


encourage the Europeans to take up greater responsibilities in the widerworld.⁷³

Despite these further misgivings about the British proposals, as thedate for the second round of consultations approached, the US Stateand Defence Departments jointly counselled that the US should appearas responsive and forthcoming as possible. They noted that America’sfirm stance at the September quadripartite talks had led the Britishto avoid consultations for several months. Though the US positionmay have been fundamentally correct, if those tactics were repeated,it could convince the British that there was no benefit in consultingat all.⁷⁴ Moreover, if the US sent the British Foreign and DefenceSecretaries ‘home empty-handed’ without financial or strategic backing,then economic ministers could force even deeper cuts to British forces.⁷⁵Thus, while US officials maintained that ‘a major British presence in theSingapore-Malaysia area [was] essential for the foreseeable future’, theyshould be prepared to agree to quadripartite discussions, which mightcover alternatives to Singapore should it become unviable.⁷⁶

The second round of Anglo–American consultations on the DefenceReview were scheduled for the end of January 1966, just before con-sultations with the other allies. As they pressed ever closer, the Britishfinally began to face up to the fundamental impasse to which theDefence Review had led them. All their strategy, plans and costingshad assumed that they would leave Singapore as soon as Confrontationended. Yet there had not so far been even the glimmer of a possibilitythat the ANZUS powers would agree to a voluntary withdrawal fromSingapore. If the British pushed ahead, the allies would be outraged,the quadripartite strategy would be in tatters, and all hope that Britainmight be able to share its commitments to Malaysia and Singaporewould be dashed. Moreover, Britain would be left holding the shreds ofa defence policy with no allies willing to back it—a situation which noBritish Government would dare to repeat after the debacle of the SuezCrisis.

The problem was finally faced in the week before the Anglo–Americandiscussions. Denis Healey proposed a new approach to the ministers

⁷³ Rostow to Johnson, ‘UK East of Suez Proposals’.⁷⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 215: Departments of State and Defence, ‘UK Defence

Review: Joint State–Defence Scope Paper’, 21/1/1966.⁷⁵ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 2: Francis Bator to McGeorge Bundy, ‘The UK

Position on the Indo-Pacific’, 27/1/1966.⁷⁶ ‘UK Defence Review: Joint State-Defence Scope Paper’.


in OPD. He argued that any open plan to leave Singapore would beimmediately rejected. Instead, the British should propose to reduce theirforces to the pre-Confrontation level once the conflict had ended. Theyshould indicate a willingness to maintain the Singapore base for as longas the local government provided reasonable conditions in which to doso. They should warn their allies, however, that they did not believethese conditions would last and that, if the British were forced out anddid not have prepared facilities in Australia, they would have nowhereelse to go but home. Thus it would be necessary to have quadripartitediscussions focusing on developing a joint base in Australia.⁷⁷

The ministers in OPD agreed to Healey’s approach. There wereno suggestions of any other means of gaining the approval of theirallies. Moreover, both Healey and other ministers argued, the desiredwithdrawal from Singapore would probably still take place, as theBritish were likely to be forced out before the end of the decade.It was ‘unlikely’ that a settlement of Confrontation would excludewithdrawal.⁷⁸ A change in wording—from withdrawing ‘as soon aspossible’ to staying ‘as long as conditions allowed’—would appeaseBritain’s allies, but in the ministers’ opinion, these conditions wouldalter neither the fact nor the timing of a withdrawal.

Notwithstanding these sentiments, ministers, in adopting Healey’sapproach, had initiated a fundamental shift in their policy planning. Nolonger were they intending to withdraw from Malaysia and Singaporeas soon as they were able, an intention which had been assumed bythe Defence Review for more than seven months. Instead, once theyhad brought these proposals to their allies, they would have committedBritain to remaining in its bases for as long as the regional politicsof Southeast Asia allowed them to stay. While ministers hoped andexpected that this politics would soon ‘force’ them to withdraw, thisoutcome was far from guaranteed. The British had effectively madethemselves hostage to events.

This last-minute reversal of policy by the British did mean, however,that the likelihood of any clash with their allies had eased considerably.When Denis Healey leaked the change in policy to the US Ambassador,David Bruce, the latter reported back to his superiors with satisfaction:

⁷⁷ PRO: CAB 148/26: OPD(65)12: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Review: Personal Note bySecretary of State for Defence’, 14/1/1966. PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(65)8th Meeting,23/1/1966.

⁷⁸ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(65)8th Meeting, 23/1/1966.


the British had now conceded that ‘they should stay in Singapore aslong as possible’.⁷⁹ He further observed that Healey now appeared to be‘quite relaxed about the Far East issue, giving [the] impression that it willbe resolved to the satisfaction of [the] US’.⁸⁰ The US Administrationwas further comforted by the fact that the British were moving toconclude a long-mooted deal to purchase 50 American F111 bombers.These aircraft, Robert McNamara noted, were ‘only good for [the] FarEast’.⁸¹ A deal would provide concrete proof of a British intention toremain ‘East of Suez’.⁸²

On 27 January 1966, the second round of Anglo–American consul-tations began, with Denis Healey and Michael Stewart meeting withsenior Johnson Administration officials to discuss the conclusions of theDefence Review. Healey and Stewart played out the tactics that hadbeen approved by OPD. They claimed to the Americans that Britainactually ‘would like to stay in Singapore’.⁸³ But they said they haddoubts about the security of their tenure, and should Singapore be lostwith no available alternative, they would have to withdraw completelyfrom the region. Thus they wanted the four powers to co-operate inestablishing an Australian base.

Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara were measured but critical intheir response. Their concerns about the Singapore base had been partlyassuaged—and they claimed to be impressed and pleased with the forcesBritain now proposed to retain in the region. But though this matterwas resolved, they retained their doubts about the logic of the proposedquadripartite arrangements if Singapore became untenable. What wasthe precise rationale for these? It would be politically impossible for theUS to enter into new treaty commitments. And it would antagonizeregional sensitivities if an ‘Anglo-Saxon club’ were established. Could itmeet the West’s strategic requirements? ‘How did the United Kingdomsee us meeting the Chinese threat with no forward position in the area?’asked Dean Rusk. ‘Both Australia and New Zealand were a long wayaway.’⁸⁴

⁷⁹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 21/1/1966.⁸⁰ Ibid.⁸¹ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: memcon, Lyndon Johnson, George Ball,

Robert McNamara et al., Washington, DC, 16/12/1965.⁸² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, 16/2/1966.⁸³ PRO: FO 371/190785: memcon, Michael Stewart, Denis Healey, Dean Rusk, Robert

McNamara, Washington, DC, 27/1/1965.⁸⁴ Ibid.


Stewart and Healey were somewhat evasive in their replies. Un-doubtedly, it was obvious to all that Britain’s major reason forproposing a quadripartite arrangement was to induce the country’sallies to carry some of the burden of its commitments: but clearlythe British would have to provide the Americans with a more sub-stantial strategic justification than that. Stewart and Healey, however,only answered in very general terms. Healey complained that it was‘unfair’ for the US to demand a precise rationale for the proposedarrangements, as ‘future developments in the region are so uncer-tain’.⁸⁵ Neither the US nor the UK wanted to act alone in theregion, while Australia and New Zealand were necessarily involved.Given these overlapping interests, Healey argued, quadripartite dis-cussions would provide a focus for working together more closely infuture.

Despite the vague justifications provided to them, the Americanswere careful to emphasize that they were not ruling out quadripartitearrangements altogether—presumably because they did not want to ap-pear too hostile to British ideas. While Dean Rusk stated his oppositionto any formal alliance or exclusive arrangement, he then qualified this.If the four powers could agree on philosophy and strategy, and did notexclude other countries from their plans, Rusk maintained, then the USwas prepared to explore possible quadripartite arrangements in deepertalks.⁸⁶ With this limited agreement in hand, the British departed,Michael Stewart back to Britain, Denis Healey onward to consultationswith the Australians.

While Healey winged his way across the Pacific, Dean Rusk pri-vately briefed the Australian Government on his assessment of theAnglo–American talks. His greatest scepticism was reserved for the pro-posed quadripartite arrangements. He did not feel that they addressedthe problems in Southeast Asia. Rather, they appeared ‘more like areduction of existing commitments’ than a means for handling them.⁸⁷He would not agree to any changes to the ANZUS treaty, and stronglyfelt that moving British troops from Singapore to Australia was movingthem in precisely the wrong direction.

⁸⁵ Ibid.⁸⁶ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Michael Stew-

art, Denis Healey, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara and Francis Bator, Washington, DC,27/1/1966.

⁸⁷ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/21: Keith Waller to DEAC, ‘Defence Review’, tel. 353,31/1/1966.


After the American consultations came Australia. Finally breaking thesilence that had been effectively imposed for four months, Denis Healeyarrived in Canberra for discussions at the beginning of February 1966,only three weeks before the Defence White Paper was due to bepublished.

Before Healey arrived, the British sent the Australians an advancebriefing paper describing their proposed direction for policy. Despitethe small steps the British had taken to soften the edges on theirearlier policies, the briefing paper still raised deep concerns amongstthe Australians, and provoked a frenzied discussion on how Healeyshould best be handled. The paper restated the British belief thattheir tenure in Malaysia and Singapore was limited—though nowthey did not predict a departure date. They argued that a belt of‘ostensibly non-aligned states’ should be built up in Southeast Asia, withWestern forces moved to the periphery, the British themselves movingto Australia.⁸⁸ This move would require joint planning, while theBritish role would itself be embedded within joint machinery including,possibly, joint consultation and command. Implicit in such a proposalwas a demand that Britain’s allies should contribute more—militarilyor financially—to the region’s security.

It was clear to the Australians that while the British spoke ofwithdrawal as a contingency, they were planning in the expectation thatit would happen, and in the none too distant future. More than this, theBritish appeared to be looking hopefully towards this date. As one seniorAustralian official interpreted it, the British were trying ‘to avoid beingin a situation of primary commitment in Southeast Asia and [saw] thebest way of doing this [to be] to remove the base from inside the area’.⁸⁹Though the British were no longer setting a precise date for departure,the fundamental intention of withdrawing to Australia remained. Thusthe Australian Government still had to convince the British to changefrom a strategy based on ‘fortress Australia’ to its own preference forforward defence.⁹⁰ What made this task harder was the British claim thattheir plans for leaving Singapore were only a ‘contingency’. Australianofficials saw as ‘irresistible’ the argument that at least some contingency

⁸⁸ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: Foreign Office, London, ‘Four Power DefenceArrangements in the Indo-Pacific Area’, 24/1/1966.

⁸⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: A.T. Griffith to Sir John Bunting, 27/1/1966.⁹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: Sir John Bunting to Harold Holt, ‘Meeting with

Mr Healey’, 30/1/1966.


plans should be made for the possibility of being forced out.⁹¹ Thoughthey dreaded such an eventuality and thought the British overstated therisk, the Australian Government still recognized that an eviction fromSingapore was possible. Their fear was that in preparing for this risk,they would help the British in planning a voluntary withdrawal.

How could this trap be avoided? Australian officials argued that thebest tactic would be to tie the British down with their own quadripartitearrangements. Britain should not be encouraged into starting immediateplanning for a future withdrawal. Rather, as Britain was seeking greaterco-operation, planning should develop on this basis. The first step wouldbe to hold quadripartite discussions. Their initial aim would be to arriveat shared strategic concepts and goals. Once these shared objectives hadbeen established, they could form the basis for the joint contingencyplanning which Britain desired.⁹²

From Australia’s point of view, the advantage of this tactic was that itcompelled the allies to agree on strategy as the first step. This would givethe allies the opportunity to challenge and possibly to change Britishstrategic thinking, without denying the need to prepare eventually for apossible eviction from Singapore and its replacement with an Australianbase.⁹³ It was vital, senior ministers decided, to dissuade Britain from anyprecipitate departure from Singapore while, at the same time, ‘avoidingany impression that the Government was refusing to have British basesin Australia’, since if Britain were forced out, ‘the Government wouldunhesitatingly want to have British bases here’.⁹⁴

On 1 February 1966, Denis Healey finally arrived in Canberra.Through two days of discussions, he negotiated with senior Australianministers towards a joint position. The two sides approached that goalfrom different directions. Denis Healey, whose presentation opened thetalks, emphasized the problems of the cost of Britain’s overseas roleand the need for Britain’s allies to help it share its burden. If theseproblems could be resolved, then it would be possible for the British tocommit themselves to the region for the long term, through some formof quadripartite co-operation. Australia’s ministers took the oppositeapproach. They wanted quadripartite discussions to be held, during

⁹¹ Ibid.⁹² NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 ATTACHMENT 1: Defence Committee, ‘British Defence

Review: Report by Defence Committee on British Proposals’, Jan. 1966.⁹³ NAA: A1209/80, 1965/6595 PART 3: A.T. Griffith to Sir John Bunting, 19/1/1966.⁹⁴ NAA: A5839, XM1 Vol. 1: FADC, ‘British Defence Review’, 33(FAD), 30/1/1966.


which first questions of strategy, then those of apportioning roles,could be resolved. They did not want to bind themselves to greatercommitments until the four allies had agreed on aims and objectives forthe region.

Healey warned that there would be great pressure on the Britishto make further cuts unless Australia gave some indication of whatcontributions it would make, including what facilities might be availablein the country’s north. The Australian ministers replied that they wantedthe possibility of staying in Singapore examined more thoroughly beforelooking at the feasibility of moving. Deputy Prime Minister JohnMcEwen warned that if the British were intent on leaving Singapore,Australia would do ‘nothing whatsoever to help them in this matter’.⁹⁵In reply, Healey threatened, should Australia and New Zealand not beresponsive to the British approach, then once Confrontation were overthe British would ‘have to retain complete freedom of action for thefuture’.⁹⁶ The Australians reacted sharply against this implied threatof complete withdrawal. It was ‘unthinkable’, protested McEwen, thatBritain might ‘relinquish all further responsibility towards Australia’.⁹⁷Healey relented slightly: any examination of an Australian base wouldbe without commitment, and the quadripartite proposals could begin asthe Australians wished, with initial talks aimed at agreeing on a strategicconcept and principles.

This concession was sufficient for the Australian Government. Theagreed minute noted both these aims: the two Governments would seekquadripartite talks, discussing first strategy, then later co-operation andfuture co-ordination; meanwhile military representatives would meet‘without commitment’ to examine what might be involved if Britainwere to base its forces in Australia.⁹⁸ With this further agreement inhand, Denis Healey flew on from Australia to Malaysia and Singapore.

Unlike the discussions in Washington and Canberra, Healey’s separatemeetings in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur passed without friction. Un-doubtedly this was helped by the minimally controversial presentationswhich Healey gave. As neither the Malaysian nor the Singaporean gov-ernments had been officially aware of the peripatetic changes in British

⁹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/889: ‘Defence in the Far East: Record of Discussions in Canberra,1–2 February, 1966’; NAA: A5839, XM1 Vol. 1: FADC, ‘Defence Consultations’, 22(FAD),2/2/1966.

⁹⁶ PRO: PREM 13/889: ‘Defence in the Far East’, 1–2/2/1966. ⁹⁷ Ibid.⁹⁸ PRO: PREM 13/889: Sir Charles Johnson to CRO, tel. 151, 2/2/1966.


planning over the previous year, Healey could present the outcomeof the Defence Review as a policy of incremental change. He statedthat the British would maintain a substantial presence in Malaysia andSingapore, though this would of course be reduced once Confrontationhad concluded. They would examine the possibility of alternative bases,but Healey claimed that this was only as ‘long term insurance’.⁹⁹ AsBritain could not afford its full Southeast Asian commitment by itself,it was looking at co-operation with the ANZUS powers, but there wasno possibility of any formal arrangement ‘in the immediate future’.¹⁰⁰

Both the Tunku in Kuala Lumpur and Lee Kuan Yew in Singaporewere pleased with this outcome. So pleased was the Tunku that hetactlessly quipped, ‘stay as long as you like. The longer you stay the lesswe have to pay for our own defence.’¹⁰¹ Healey was further irritatedby indications from both Malaysia and Singapore that their efforts toco-ordinate defence were not succeeding. Lee Kuan Yew described theirCombined Defence Committee as ‘a flop’.¹⁰² Moreover, he evinceda fear that a coup might be mounted against his government byMalay Singaporeans, or that a future Malaysian government might tryto crush the fledgling island state. Healey was cool in his response.To the Singaporean Government, he agreed to a greater sharing oflocal intelligence information, lest any insurgency be brewing. To theMalaysians, he warned that the complex of British bases across thepeninsula and island could only operate as a single entity, and anydifferences between Malaysia and Singapore would interfere with this.

Once Healey returned to London, the Government set about the taskof finalizing its decisions for the Defence White Paper. Thanks to thevarious pressures and reversals of the last few months, the policy thatemerged was far less clear than it superficially appeared. Indeed, therewas no single policy at all, rather an amalgam of different plans andintentions: what had been originally planned and costed; what had beenpromised to Britain’s allies; what British defence and foreign policyplanners actually hoped for; and what the Government publicly said itintended.

⁹⁹ PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Denis Healey, Lee Kuan Yew et al., Singapore,4/2/1966.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.¹⁰¹ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’, tel.

316, 5/2/1966.¹⁰² PRO: PREM 13/889: memcon, Healey, Lee et al., Singapore, 4/2/1966.


Underlying the policy documents which were reviewed in OPD andthen the Cabinet were costings based on the British Government’soriginal intentions. As before, these costings assumed that the Britishwould withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore before 1970, to bereplaced by a ‘visible military presence based on Australia’, comprisingextensive sea, land and air forces.¹⁰³ This costing maintained the £186million figure for Southeast Asia established the previous November,now part of a total planned defence budget that had crept up to £2,060million.

The problem with the costing, of course, was that it was basedon a policy which the British Government had since promised itsallies it would not voluntarily implement. As the covering paper notedwith some understatement, the assumptions on which the costingshad been based could prove to be ‘unrealistic’.¹⁰⁴ The British werenow ‘committed to remaining in Singapore and Malaysia as long aspossible’.¹⁰⁵ Thus they could not ‘base decisions on expenditure there. . . on an assumption that the forces will have been withdrawn by aparticular date. We can only assume that, when Confrontation ends,the forces there will be reduced.’¹⁰⁶

How could the gulf between the Government’s assumed commit-ments and its projected costs be bridged? The answer to this lay inwhat British officials and senior ministers still expected—and clearlyhoped—would eventuate. Policy planners had not discarded the beliefthat had partly prompted them to suggest voluntary withdrawal inthe first place: that Britain would find its footing in Malaysia andSingapore untenable after Confrontation, whether it wanted to stayor not. Singapore was not secure—a point reinforced during DenisHealey’s visit. And after so much experience with anti-colonial na-tionalism—and their contemporary difficulties with the British basein Aden—officials ‘[could] not believe’ that Malaysia and Singaporewould tolerate an indefinite British presence.¹⁰⁷ With such an expulsion,substantial reductions would be inevitable.

Moreover, the Government clung to another hope that it haddeveloped in the wake of the Australian consultations. The MOD had

¹⁰³ PRO: CAB 148/27:OPD(66)31: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Review: Revised ForceStructure and Costs’, 9/2/1966, ANNEX A.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. ¹⁰⁵ Ibid. ¹⁰⁶ Ibid.¹⁰⁷ PRO: T 225/2712: G.R. Bell to R.G. Lavelle: ‘Defence Review: Revised Force Structure

and Costs: OPD(66)31’, 10/2/1966. For more on Aden, see Pieragostini, Britain, Aden andSouth Arabia.


been ‘surprised’ at what they perceived to be Australian resistance toany stationing of British ground forces there.¹⁰⁸ They interpreted thisresistance—not wholly correctly—to ‘knock the major assumption outof all the planning on long-term deployment’, which had been thatBritain would have to maintain a major presence in Australia ‘because,mainly, of our obligations’ to that country.¹⁰⁹ The implications of thiswere far-reaching. If Britain could not stay in Malaysia and Singapore,and the Australians rejected a substantial presence in their country, thenit would ‘no longer be able to maintain any significant presence in thePacific area at all’.¹¹⁰

When the final papers went to OPD in mid-February, both DenisHealey and Michael Stewart alluded to the possibilities they hopedfor, suggesting that moving to a reduced Australian presence wouldlikely lead to even larger savings in foreign exchange and budgetarycosts than the papers projected.¹¹¹ In the Cabinet, where the draftDefence White Paper was only briefly discussed, a similar point wasmade.¹¹² This gave Richard Crossman the impression that OPD ‘wantus out of Singapore in 1970 and very much hope the Australianswill turn us down when we ask for a British presence there after ourwithdrawal from Singapore’.¹¹³ Crossman was probably overstatingthe point. Given the sensitivity of all overseas ministers to Americaninterests, they would have been hoping to maintain a sea/air presence inAustralia—fleshed out with new F111s—rather than no presence at all.But the substantive point remains. While explicit British plans describeda substantial commitment to, and presence in, Malaysia and Singapore,the hopes and expectations of overseas ministers and officials were thatthese would be significantly curtailed by events: firstly, an eviction fromSoutheast Asia by Malaysia and Singapore; then a rejection by Australiaof a substantial British presence. As Crossman noted, ‘we have to waitfor facts to force withdrawal on us’.¹¹⁴

Towards the end of February 1966, the British Government pub-lished its Defence White Paper, announcing the conclusions of the

¹⁰⁸ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Hartnell to Hicks, ‘Post CANBERRA Conference Com-ments’, 14/2/1966.

¹⁰⁹ PRO: T 225/2712: Bell to Lavelle, ‘Defence Review’, 10/2/1966. ¹¹⁰ Ibid.¹¹¹ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)12th Meeting, 11/2/1966; PRO: CAB 148/27: OPD(66)

31: Healey, ‘Defence Review’, 9/2/1966.¹¹² PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)8th Meeting, 14/2/1966. Richard Crossman noted in his

diary that some ministers were unhappy at how the Cabinet only got to rubber-stamp theWhite Paper: Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 1, p. 455.

¹¹³ Ibid. ¹¹⁴ Ibid.


Defence Review. The paper limited British commitments, for theBritish Government now declared that it would no longer engage in‘major operations of war except in co-operation with allies’.¹¹⁵ Norwould the Government feel obliged to provide another country withmilitary assistance unless adequate advance facilities were provided.Finally, the Government would make ‘no attempt to maintain de-fence facilities in an independent country against its wishes’.¹¹⁶ Thepaper also included substantial changes to British forces, includingthe purchase of 50 F111 long-range bombers, and the cancellationof a new aircraft carrier. The latter announcement prompted theresignations of the First Sea Lord and the Minister for the Navy,Christopher Mayhew, who both argued that the loss of the aircraftcarrier would mean that Britain would not be able to meet its commit-ments. Their actions, however, had little lasting effect within Whitehalland publicly. Their claim that Britain required both a new aircraftcarrier and the F111s seemed driven by obvious sectional interestsand had little pull on the Defence Secretary and the other armedservices. Moreover, Mayhew’s political effectiveness was undercut byhis complicated claim that either Britain should opt for both sets ofweaponry—thus maintaining the capacity to act without allies—orpurchase none at all, instead shedding most of Britain’s overseas com-mitments.¹¹⁷

While some noise and controversy was generated by the changes tothe armed forces, the White Paper was much quieter, and not verycandid, on the British Government’s expectations in Southeast Asia.The Paper sought to stress its continuity with previous policy, andreaffirmed the undertakings which the British Government had given toits allies. It stated that Britain would remain in Malaysia and Singaporefor as long as their governments set ‘acceptable conditions’.¹¹⁸ At thesame time, it announced that discussions had begun with the AustralianGovernment on the practical possibility of moving defence forces there‘if necessary’, should the Southeast Asian bases no longer be freelyavailable.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 , Cmnd 2901 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1966),p. 7.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.¹¹⁷ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)4th Meeting, 19/1/1966; Hansard , Session 1965/6,

vol. 725, cols 254–65, 22/2/1965. See also Christopher Mayhew, Britain’s Role Tomorrow(London: Hutchinson, 1967).

¹¹⁸ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 , p. 8. ¹¹⁹ Ibid.


Politically, the domestic reaction to the Defence White Paper wasmuted. The stir from Mayhew’s resignation was partly overshadowed bycontroversy over the manner of his departure, in particular a longer andwider-ranging resignation speech than usual to the House of Commons.Moreover, his actions helped quell criticism from the Labour Left ofthe level of defence spending: if major defence figures were resigningbecause they felt the cuts had gone too far, this bolstered the argumentto the Left that they may have gone far enough.¹²⁰ The response tothe White Paper from the Opposition Conservatives was also limited inits effectiveness. While Edward Heath and Enoch Powell, the ShadowDefence Secretary, criticized some of the cuts and the £2,000 milliontarget for defence expenditure, their position was muddied—and easilypilloried by Denis Healey—because of a conspicuous Conservative splitbetween Powell, who had previously claimed that Britain’s ‘East ofSuez’ role should be relinquished, and most other Tories, who wantedit retained.¹²¹

As far as the overseas political reaction was concerned, the AustralianGovernment was pleased with the White Paper’s enunciation of theBritish position in Southeast Asia. The head of Australia’s External Af-fairs Department thought the statement ‘a far more strongly stated inten-tion than we could reasonably have hoped for’.¹²² To President Johnson,Prime Minister Holt wrote that the British paper crystallized ‘significantgains’ from both Australia’s and the United States’ point of view.¹²³ It‘clarifie[d] the situation a good deal’, while the apparent restatement ofBritain’s commitment to the region ‘implie[d] an abandonment of [the]earlier theorising’ on the possibility of neutralizing the region.¹²⁴

In publishing the 1966 Defence White Paper, the British Governmentpublicly committed itself to a policy contrary to the intentions, plansand costings it had been maintaining for the previous year. Morethan that, the Government could only hope that the gap between its

¹²⁰ PRO: PREM 13/802: George Wigg to Harold Wilson, tel. 658, 23/2/1966; Hansard ,Session 1965/6, vol. 725, cols 254–65; ‘East of Suez Withdrawal by the 1970s: Mr MayhewStates his Case’, The Times, 23/2/1966, p. 12; Edward Short, Whip to Wilson (London:Macdonald, 1989), pp. 225–6.

¹²¹ Hansard , Session 1965/6, vol. 725, cols 1748–1864, 1927–2052, 2357–67: AnnualDefence Debate, 7/3/1966.

¹²² NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Sir Edwin Hicks to Paul Hasluck, ‘British White Paperon Defence’, 22/2/1966.

¹²³ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/22: Harold Holt to Lyndon Johnson, 24/2/1966.¹²⁴ Ibid.


commitments and its secret intentions would soon be bridged by therepudiation of those commitments through external events. How hadthe Wilson Government reached this point?

The British Government did not decide to maintain its position inMalaysia and Singapore for ‘as long as conditions allowed’ on the basis ofan assessment of Britain’s own direct interests. On the contrary, on thisassessment alone, all parts of the Government were agreed in judgingthat British commitments in the region should be minimized. But theyalso believed that Britain’s role in the region had to be sufficient to gaintheir major allies’ support, since that role was largely justified by theneed to maintain those relationships.

Australia, New Zealand and the United States had given the BritishGovernment a strong indication of their views at the quadripartite talksin September 1965. In the aftermath of these talks, however, the BritishGovernment did not materially alter the direction of its policy planning.It continued in secret to plan on a partial, voluntary withdrawal, whilekeeping its allies at a distance and ignoring their requests for closerconsultation. These tactics had the small merit of putting off any opendisagreement between Britain and its allies on the issue of SoutheastAsian strategy—but they did nothing to alter the fundamental groundsof the disagreement. When the British resumed their consultations withtheir allies, starting with Wilson’s December 1965 leadership summitwith President Johnson, the distance between the two sides once againbecame manifest, even if it was more gently expressed than before. TheAmericans would in no way agree with a voluntary British withdrawalfrom Malaysia and Singapore, and were clearly hostile to interdependentarrangements that appeared only to be a means to relieve the British ofsome of their defence burden.

Still the British continued to work—producing plans, costings, andforce structures—as if the ANZUS allies might somehow be convincedat the last moment to accede to British plans. The allies would not.Instead, with only weeks to go before the publication of the DefenceWhite Paper, the British changed course, Denis Healey altering thewords for Britain’s tenure in Malaysia and Singapore, from leaving‘as soon as possible’, to staying ‘as long as conditions allow’. The gapbetween these two positions was bridged by the expectation and hopethat regional Southeast Asian politics would be sufficiently hostile tothe British to force them out in the near future. The revised formulawas sufficient to gain the acceptance of Britain’s allies at the finalconsultations. Moreover, after some hard persuasion, they agreed to


begin looking more closely at some form of quadripartite co-operationin the region as well.

The publication of the Defence White Paper in February 1966was supposed to mark the end of the British process of policy re-vision. The Paper, however, fell short of being fully candid on theaims of British policy-makers. These aims would not be fulfilleduntil a host of further events—largely outside the Government’scontrol—had occurred: a clear end to Confrontation; the turningof Malaysian and Singaporean opinion against the British, leadingto the eviction of their forces; and the agreement of the ANZUSpowers to some sort of reduced, interdependent British role in theaftermath. Moreover, the British economy had to remain sufficientlystrong to continue to support a defence budget of £2,060 million.The question of whether all these conditions could be met—and whatwould happen if they were not—is the subject of the chapters thatfollow.

Conclusion to Part I

The February 1966 Defence White Paper was supposed to be thedefinitive statement of defence and foreign policy for the WilsonGovernment. It concluded more than a year’s work on the DefenceReview, which examined all aspects of Britain’s defence posture aroundthe globe. The Review’s conclusions—contained not simply in thepublic White Paper, but in the more rigorous policy documents whichunderpinned it—were supposed to establish the direction of Britishdefence policy until the beginning of the 1970s.

The Defence Review was publicly perceived, both at the time andfor many years afterward, as having arrived at relatively conservativeconclusions. While it limited the occasions and conditions under whichBritish forces might be deployed, it did not publicly step back fromany of the major aspects of Britain’s worldwide role. For many latercritics, the apparent timidity of the 1966 White Paper represented amissed opportunity. The Wilson Government, they have often argued,was too enamoured with an imperial notion of Britain’s ‘greatness’ tobe rigorous in reducing Britain’s overseas role to match the country’seconomic resources.¹ Had it done so, it would not then have had toundergo the humiliating reversals and retrenchments of 1967 and 1968.

Part I of this book has demonstrated this argument to be fundamen-tally mistaken. It has made clear that all the relevant departments inthe British Government involved in the Defence Review were willing toendorse significant and far-reaching changes to Britain’s Southeast Asianrole which would have seen Britain’s overseas commitments substan-tially reduced. This reassessment was driven by a long-term reappraisalof Britain’s international interests, coupled to the medium-term eco-nomic constraint imposed by the £2,000 million ceiling on defence

¹ R.F. Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900–1970 (Lon-don: Fontana, 1991), ch. 9; Darby, Britain’s Defence Policy, ch. 8; Darwin, Britain andDecolonisation, ch. 7; Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez, pp. 136–7.


expenditure. The Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices hadbeen coming to the view, at the time of the Wilson Government’selection, that Britain’s direct interests in the region did not justify thesize of its role and its costs, and that both should be reduced. The Gov-ernment’s senior ministers had been keen to emphasize the importanceof Britain’s overseas role when they first arrived in office. But their beliefwas not so fixed or rigid as their critics have judged: when ministersrealized that a £2,000 million budget could not accommodate all ofBritain’s commitments, they were readily persuaded that Britain’s roleshould be substantially reduced—including a partial withdrawal fromMalaysia and Singapore to Australia.

The catch, however, lay in gaining the agreement of Britain’s majorallies in the Southeast Asian region: the United States, Australia andNew Zealand. It was for the sake of their alliance that the Britishhad felt the need to maintain a residual presence in the first place.Moreover, such a residual presence needed to operate with the allies’co-operation if Britain’s remaining responsibilities were to be fulfilled.As Chapters 2 and 3 have described, the allies firmly rejected the Britishproposals. They were angry and appalled by the sudden presentationof the proposals in the aftermath of the Malaysia/Singapore split. Soperturbed were the Americans that they forced on Harold Wilson aconnection between Britain’s Southeast Asian presence and any USsupport for the pound. All the allies were suspicious that the Britishwanted to renounce their responsibilities in Southeast Asia; and all weresceptical of the strategic arguments that the British used to justify theirproposals. Despite these rejections, however, the Wilson Governmentcontinued to work until the beginning of 1966 as if its plans couldbe realized. Only at the very last moment, before the final round ofconsultations, did the Government change course: slightly rewording itsintentions, but fundamentally changing the nature of its policy—andhoping and expecting that events would come to bridge the gap betweenthe two.

Why did the British Government continue to work on a policythrough all of 1965 and into 1966 when it had become clear inSeptember 1965 that its allies would most likely reject it? Why didthe Government maintain an approach that only led it to an impasse,forcing it to change course at the very last moment, thus destroying thebasis on which the previous year’s work had stood?

The British Government’s justification to itself for ignoring its alliesuntil almost the end lay in its different assessment of the situation


in Malaysia and Singapore. It maintained, to itself and to the allies,that local nationalist politics would lead to the British being forcedout soon after the end of Confrontation. On this basis, moreover, theBritish justified their last-minute decision to stay ‘as long as conditionsallowed’, since the difference in time between that moment and thefirst opportunity to leave voluntarily would be minimal. Certainly, inmuch of the Government’s knowledge and experience, it was not whollyunreasonable to expect that local politics would soon become hostileto the British presence. That had been the case through much of theprocess of decolonization; it was currently the case for the British basein Aden.² The Malayan Emergency, Indonesia’s Confrontation, andthe United States’ own battles in Vietnam could all be interpreted ina similar light. But the British Government’s judgement—and thatof its Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices—would prove tobe wrong. The US, Australian and New Zealand Governments weresceptical that the Malaysian and Singaporean Governments would soquickly change their stripes: and they were right. As later chapters willshow, once Confrontation had ended, neither Malaysia nor Singaporewas suddenly eager to evict the British: on the contrary, in 1967 and1968 they both pleaded with the British to stay.

So why did the British so stubbornly stick to their assessment,without ever seriously considering the alternatives, when their major,influential, and ultimately correct allies judged the situation completelydifferently? Arguably, because once the British had concluded thattheir financial circumstances compelled withdrawal from Malaysia andSingapore, the nature and practices of the British foreign policy processmade it very difficult to reopen this issue. Previous commentators havenoted that one of the major flaws of this process was its tendency toreach mutually agreeable compromises at committee level which couldnever be reopened, and which were insulated from external analysisor criticism.³ Precisely such a tendency was observable through 1965.While the British foreign policy process was able to re-examine Britain’s‘East of Suez’ commitments in the early stages of the Defence Review,once a new approach had been settled upon, the process was unwillingand unable to change course in response to external opposition.

Fairly early in the Defence Review, before mid-1965, British officialsfound a way to make defence cuts that was acceptable to all departments,

² Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia, chs 6–7.³ Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 274.


involving, in Southeast Asia, a withdrawal from Malaysia and Singaporeto reduced facilities in Australia. With all departments in agreementand all the relevant ministers following suit, the British Governmenteffectively locked itself into a policy without having broached the topicwith its allies. None of the participating departments had an interestin breaking the deal apart: if the plans agreed upon were unachievable,the Treasury would risk its £2,000 million budget ceiling, the Foreignand Commonwealth Relations Offices would risk having to implementdeeper cuts to commitments, and the Ministry of Defence wouldface further reductions to its forces. When the allies made clear theiropposition to the British plans, the response of the Government was notto reconsider them, but rather to continue planning along almost exactlythe same track, while avoiding further consultations with the allies for aslong as possible. The consensus within Whitehall was undisturbed, butonly by ignoring a fundamental breach between Britain and its allies.This tactic led the British Government to its final impasse, at whichpoint it essentially had to reverse the assumption on the basis of whichit had been planning for nearly all of the previous year—albeit withsome expectation and much hope that regional events would correct thedifference.

What would have happened if the British Government had been moreopen and more rigorous in its policy planning, and less wilfully blind inlate 1965 to the opinions of its allies? Arguably, it would have meant thatthe conflicts and eventual breakdown that would occur from late 1966to 1968 would have manifested themselves sooner. If the British hadproperly listened to their allies, it would have become clear that therewas now a growing conflict between Britain’s economic and financialinterests—which demanded a sharply reduced role in Malaysia and Sin-gapore—and its political interests—which required Britain to maintaina Southeast Asian presence for the sake of the country’s main allies.

This was the fundamental conundrum that the Wilson Governmentfaced over ‘East of Suez’. It was not how to manage a conflict betweenBritain’s limited economic capacity and its residual imperial role—forthe Government was rather more clear-sighted on the limited value ofits Southeast Asian presence than many critics have alleged. Rather, itwas how to manage a conflict between Britain’s economic means and itsinterests and relations with its major allies, especially the United States.Britain’s straitened circumstances were compelling a sharp reductionin the country’s international role, but the allies were refusing tocountenance this.


Thanks to its closed processes and wilful blindness, the BritishGovernment managed to avoid dealing with this painful conflict ofinterests for most of the Defence Review. The problem was thenpatched over by Denis Healey’s formula for retaining the Singaporebase—which could be interpreted to mean one thing to the allies andpublic, and another thing to the British. The Government now hopedthe issue would solve itself by Britain being forcibly ejected from itsbases in the near future. But if this eventuality did not arise, or if thefundamental conflict between British interests manifested itself too soonor too sharply, the Government would then be forced to face the issue.How this happened, and how it was then resolved, would be the WilsonGovernment’s preoccupation for two more years to come.

PART II

CONFLICT

Introduction to Part II

In July 1967, less than a year and a half after the 1966 DefenceWhite Paper, the Wilson Government released a second major defencepaper. In this Supplementary Statement on Defence, the Governmentrecanted much of the policy it had issued before. No longer wouldBritain be maintaining its forces in Malaysia and Singapore for aslong as local conditions allowed. Nor would it be contributing to anyinterdependent Southeast Asian force. Instead it would be removing itspermanent forces in two stages: cutting them in half by 1970/1, andwithdrawing completely by the mid-1970s. There was no mention ofany Australian base. The only remnant of the British role in SoutheastAsia would be a special military capability, earmarked for use in the areaif required.

The reasons for this reversal of policy were complex. It was not simplya case of the key players changing their minds, for the altered dynamicsand patterns of the policy process shifted the identities and roles ofthe key players themselves. Institutional pressures and relationships hadchanged, players and personalities had been repositioned, and morebroadly, political sentiments had shifted.

In 1965/6, the British policy process had been running relatively har-moniously. The major Government departments had worked towardssimilar goals; their chief ministers had not dissented from this direction.Neither the Cabinet nor the Parliamentary Labour Party had beengiven much chance to debate or examine Government policy, nor hadeither raised any substantive criticism of it. The only major oppositionhad come from Britain’s allies. With the defence and foreign policydepartments and their ministers in firm control of policy planning, theviews of these governments had been given key importance and policyhad been altered in this light.

In 1966/7, the policy process was much more fractious. The majordepartments strongly disagreed on what direction policy should take.There were sharp differences between some ministers and their officials.


The Cabinet and Parliamentary Labour Party were prepared to intervene,creating much noise and controversy. While Britain’s allies still hadstrong views, they were much less able to give effect to them, as theirprincipal internal allies, the foreign policy departments, had a weakergrip on the policy process. These disputes reflected deep divisions ofopinion on how to resolve the fundamental problems of British defencepolicy: first, the conflict between Britain’s economic interests and itsinterest in maintaining its relations with its major allies; and then, oncethat conflict had been settled in favour of a British withdrawal, a battleover the politics, symbolism and presentation of how that withdrawaltook place.

The next three chapters examine these times of change in greaterdetail. Chapter 4 covers the period after the launch of the DefenceWhite Paper until October 1966, when the Government launchedanother Defence Review. This period witnessed the dissolution of thefragile basis of agreement that had enabled the passing of the DefenceWhite Paper. Britain and the ANZUS allies fitfully attempted to initiatequadripartite co-operation in Southeast Asia. Their efforts peteredout as it became clear that there was unlikely to be any agreementon strategic aims in the region. At the same time, the political andeconomic pressures on the British Government to alter its defencestance increased. An enlarged and unruly Labour backbench began toexpress vocal concerns over the extent of Britain’s overseas defence effort.A midsummer seamen’s strike, and the sterling crisis resulting from it,forced the Government to reopen the issue of its overseas expenditure.To that end, Defence Expenditure Studies—in effect, a second DefenceReview—were initiated in October 1966.

Chapter 5 follows the course of the Defence Expenditure Studies untilApril 1967. The path of development was rocky, with disagreementsbetween departments, divisions within OPD and the Cabinet, andpolitical pressure mounting within the Labour Party. The LabourParty’s dissent exploded into revolt in February 1967 when there was amajor backbench rebellion against the Government’s defence policy. Inthe wake of the rebellion, the Government discarded the initial resultsof the Defence Expenditure Studies and hurriedly developed plans for atwo-stage withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore.

Finally, Chapter 6 examines the final course of negotiations fromApril to July 1967 leading up to the Supplementary Statement on Defence.In this period, the key players engaged in a pitched battle over thepolitics and presentation of how Britain should withdraw from Malaysia

Introduction to Part II 97

and Singapore: whether it should do so in a way which suggested thatBritain was still retaining its interests and role in the region, or whether itwas engaged in a fundamental and wholesale retreat. Arguments rangedwidely on the issue: from the ANZUS allies who hoped that maximumcontinuity would be maintained, to the more radical ministers in OPDand the Cabinet, who wanted Britain to abdicate its remaining rolein the world as quickly as possible. Their battles meant that Britishpolicy would be forced through a number of further revisions before itscrystallization in the July 1967 statement.

4The End of Consensus: March–October

1966

The February 1966 Defence White Paper was supposed to have set-tled the question of Britain’s defence and foreign policy posture forthe foreseeable future. Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, whatappeared superficially to be a conservative and incrementalist documentconcealed an unstable amalgam of hopes, promises and expectations.Fundamental questions had not been properly resolved by the WhitePaper: the nature and role of Britain’s Southeast Asian forces onceConfrontation was over; whether Britain could or should retain itsSingapore base; whether and how quadripartite arrangements mightlighten Britain’s responsibilities; and what Britain’s remaining com-mitments to Malaysia and Singapore would be in the future. While1966 might be considered largely a transitional period—with no ma-jor decisions pending or announced—through this time a numberof separate and disconnected events combined, with profound im-plications for the future. They initiated a process that would latercome to resolve most of those questions the White Paper had leftunanswered.

Internationally, Britain and the ANZUS powers sought, and failed, tofind a basis for quadripartite co-operation. At the same time, Confronta-tion was winding down, as Sukarno’s power in Indonesia evaporatedwhile Suharto’s position was consolidated. This had major consequencesfor the British defence position. It meant that forces could be broughthome and costs reduced. It also freed Malaysia from having to align itselfso closely to Britain, and the release of accumulated tensions resulted ina few months of difficult relations in mid-1966.

Domestically, the Labour Government was boosted by its landslidere-election in March 1966. However, this proved to be a mixed blessing,as the newly enlarged backbench was much more outspoken and unrulythan the old. Without the discipline instilled by a fragile majority and

The End of Consensus: March–October 1966 99

a looming election, Labour MPs became increasingly critical of theGovernment’s policies, especially regarding defence.

Economically, the Government was faced once again with a sterlingcrisis, triggered by the mid-year seamen’s strike. With emergency foreignexpenditure cuts introduced in July, defence spending once again cameunder sharp scrutiny, and new Defence Expenditure Studies wereinitiated in October 1966.

All these factors combined to undermine Britain’s position in Malaysiaand Singapore. The time from the publication of the Defence WhitePaper to the reopening of the Defence Review can be divided into twoperiods. The first period was characterized by the slow dissolution of thefragile agreement on which the conclusions of the White Paper had beenfounded: Britain and its allies failed to find any basis for co-operation inSoutheast Asia; the Parliamentary Labour Party’s support for the Gov-ernment’s policies weakened; and Malaysia drifted further away from aBritish orbit. This process of dissolution was accelerated by the sterlingcrisis in July 1966, whose consequences dominated the second period:the general consensus on foreign policy within the British Governmentbroke down as the economic departments started pursuing a muchtougher line on expenditure; under this pressure, the formal process ofreviewing defence was reopened in October 1966. While, in the timecovered by this chapter, none of these events heralded a significant shiftin policy, they were sufficient to start building the momentum for themajor reassessments which took place in the period that followed.

In the first few months following the Defence White Paper, the BritishGovernment and its ANZUS allies began exploring the possibilities forquadripartite co-operation. As described in the previous chapter, theBritish had pursued such co-operation as a means of reducing their role inSoutheast Asia and moving towards a strategy of peripheral defence. TheANZUS allies had reluctantly agreed to examine these forms of interde-pendence: reluctant, because they suspected that Britain was seeking toshift its burden onto them; acquiescent, ultimately, because they recog-nized the need to be responsive to the British, lest the latter refuse to talkabout their future policies, or, worse still, be tempted to act unilaterally.

The timetable for the quadripartite talks was fairly relaxed, with thefirst conference mooted for June 1966. The British were distractedby their general election in March. The Americans were naturallymore preoccupied with the Vietnam War, and wary of any furthercommitments. The Australians were suspicious of British motives. And


jointly, the allies were finding it difficult to establish a shared basis onwhich to proceed.

The Australian Government was, from the beginning, open in itsscepticism about British strategic thinking. Their doubts were rootedin the same concerns they had expressed in the consultations leadingto the February Defence White Paper. To British Embassy officialsin Canberra and Washington, the Australians expressed criticism ofthe notion of neutralizing Southeast Asia. Any such plan, they argued,might ‘impel [the UK] to leave Singapore sooner than necessary’.¹SEATO would be endangered. And, without effective forces located inthe region, the allied ability to respond to threats would be limited toeither acquiescing to an incremental, hostile takeover of the region orengaging in massive, possibly nuclear, retaliation.²

The US Government was less concerned with long-term strategicquestions; indeed they were irritated that the British should bring upsuch topics at all, given the rather more urgent problem of the conflictin Vietnam. US officials told the British Ambassador that PresidentJohnson wanted to maintain a sharp distinction between the immediatequestion of how to keep the British in Malaysia and Singapore, and thelong-term issues of command, planning and organization in SoutheastAsia. While the Americans said they were not ruling out some formof quadripartite co-operation, equally they were not working hard forit—they had sufficient problems in Vietnam and did not want anymore commitments.³

The differences between Britain and its allies were noted and discussedby British officials on the Defence Review Working Party, the committeenow charged with implementing the Defence White Paper policies.They noted a ‘clear’ divergence in emphasis between the Americans andAustralians.⁴ Given this divergence, the Working Party felt it bettertactically not to confront each ally head on in bilateral talks. Rather,they argued that the Government should only favour discussions withina quadripartite format, where the British would be able to play offthe allies against each other. Australian insistence on the long-termimportance of Singapore would be undermined by the United States’ lessdogmatic approach. US reluctance to get very involved in quadripartitearrangements would be mitigated by Australian acquiescence.

¹ PRO: PREM 13/890: Sir Charles Johnston to CRO, tel. 278, 25/2/1966.² PRO: PREM 13/890: Sir Patrick Dean to FO, tel. 774, 4/3/1966. ³ Ibid.⁴ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)2nd Meeting, 11/3/1966.


Even with these tactical gambits, though, British officials were stillfinding it difficult to frame a position for the quadripartite talksthat would be effective with their allies. The ANZUS powers wereunsympathetic to all the major arguments justifying Britain’s favouredstrategy of withdrawal to the Southeast Asian periphery. They hadbeen sceptical of the British view that their tenure on Singapore wasnecessarily limited. They had ‘discount[ed]’ the economic reasoningwhich the British felt had compelled them to change their defenceposture.⁵ And the allies would react very sharply if the British triedto advocate even a limited neutralization of Malaysia, Singapore andIndonesia, given Britain’s stated commitment to stay in Singapore foras long as conditions allowed.⁶ If British officials gave neutralization‘undue prominence’ it would be likely to attract hostility.⁷ Later, theythought discretion the better part of valour and dropped the term‘neutral’ from their position paper altogether, in favour of the lesscontroversial ‘non-aligned zone’.⁸

Since it was unlikely that the British would be able to convince theallies of their long-term strategy, officials argued it would be best tofocus the talks on short-term tactics and concrete measures, such asdeveloping the Australian base. But even then, they noted, they wouldhave to be careful in focusing on these smaller topics, lest they beperceived as obsessed with only their own problems.⁹

The unsettled relations between Britain and its allies were underscoredwhen Paul Hasluck, the Australian Foreign Minister, visited Washingtonand London. In Washington, Dean Rusk expressed to him his doubtsabout British motives. Rusk asked rhetorically whether the mootedquadripartite arrangements in Southeast Asia were supposed to helpmaintain Britain’s political role, or whether they were a means to moveaway from any active participation: ‘Were the British itching to getout or were they determined to stay as long as possible?’¹⁰ On the

⁵ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)3rd Meeting, 23/3/1966.⁶ PRO: CAB 148/54: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)4: FO, ‘Synopsis of Draft Paper for Submission

to Ministers: Future Indo-Pacific Policy’, 28/3/1966.⁷ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)3rd Meeting, 23/3/1966.⁸ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)4th Meeting, 31/3/1966. ‘Non-alignment’ was

less controversial than ‘neutrality’ since it implied that a country would actively opposeintervention by either superpower, rather than being somewhat passive and acquiescent.

⁹ PRO: CAB 148/54: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)4: FO, ‘Synopsis of Draft Paper for Submissionto Ministers: Future Indo-Pacific Policy’, 28/3/1966.

¹⁰ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, ‘Quadripartite Talks’, tel.1335, 12/4/1966.


other hand, Robert McNamara appeared to Hasluck to be more opento the British arguments. The US Defence Secretary ‘entirely agreed’with the Australian response that the first step should be quadripartitediscussions to develop shared strategy and aims.¹¹ But, worryingly forthe Australians, he was also softer on the question of Singapore. Hepointed out that the F111s, with their increased range and flexibility,‘need not be based on the Southeast Asian mainland’.¹² And he felt thatthe Australians should ‘encourage the British to have bases in Australia’,though he then qualified this, saying it should only happen once theBritish were forced from Singapore.¹³

In London, Hasluck found the British position disconcertingly vague.Australian officials observed, in the lead-up to his visit, that the Britishseemed to be shying away from their earlier arguments for neutralizingSoutheast Asia. The Australians detected ‘discomfort among [neutral-ization’s] proponents and a disinclination to argue its merits in detail’.¹⁴This pattern was repeated all the way to the top. Hasluck’s discussionswith Harold Wilson were inconclusive. The Prime Minister claimedto be looking forward to the quadripartite talks, but noted that theBritish had not yet been able to advance their thinking—a not whollyhonest position, given the Defence Review Working Party’s work ofthe month before. When Hasluck suggested that the quadripartitetalks should aim for some agreement on policy, Wilson was evasivein his response. He claimed there were still too many ‘imponder-ables’: Vietnam was unresolved and with that the whole US stancein Southeast Asia; Indonesia’s future position in the region was un-clear.¹⁵ The Prime Minister’s evasiveness reflected the basic dilemmaof British foreign policy. On the one hand, the British wanted toshare and thereby reduce their commitments to Malaysia and Sin-gapore. On the other, they could not openly argue for the strategythey had developed to achieve this, as it would lose them their allies’co-operation.

Denis Healey took a blunter approach with Hasluck than hadWilson: not verbal dexterity but simple threat. He stressed that therewas considerable domestic opposition to Britain’s position in SoutheastAsia. The Government’s desire to maintain its worldwide commitments

¹¹ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 1351, 13/4/1966.¹² Ibid. ¹³ Ibid.¹⁴ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: T.K. Critchley to Paul Hasluck, ‘Talks in London’, tel.

3281, 6/4/1966.¹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/890: memcon, Harold Wilson and Paul Hasluck, London, 19/4/1966.


was an ‘improbable’ policy, and ‘somewhat idealistic’.¹⁶ He spelt outthe implications: if the Australians ‘did not take the opportunity to tieBritain down’ with an Australian base, they ‘might lose [the] opportunityto keep the British in Asia’.¹⁷ Hasluck was stalwart in defending hisgovernment’s position: though Australia would consider a base if theBritish were forced out of Singapore, they firmly believed in maintainingforces further north if at all possible.

From spring into the summer of 1966, Britain’s Southeast Asian rolefaced pressure on two separate fronts: from Malaysia itself, due todifficult relations between that country and Britain; and from Britishdomestic politics, as a more vocal and restive Labour backbench beganto assert itself.

The discord which upset the Anglo–Malaysian relationship in thesummer of 1966 might be considered a by-product of the release ofpressure accompanying the winding down of Confrontation. The In-donesian Army had steadily entrenched its authority over the archipelagonation in the early months of 1966. Although Sukarno retained theformal position of President, General Suharto increasingly assumedexecutive power and moved to ban the Indonesian Communist Partyin March 1966. Conciliatory statements toward Malaysia followedin April, with Suharto indicating in May that a British withdrawalfrom Singapore would not be a necessary precondition for a peace-ful settlement. Diplomatic exchanges continued through the next fewmonths—the Indonesians stepping carefully to maintain face while inretreat—and in mid-August an agreement was signed between Jakartaand Kuala Lumpur to formally end hostilities and normalize relations.¹⁸

As the threat posed by Indonesia and Confrontation receded overthe first half of 1966, so the need declined to maintain a front ofabsolute agreement between Britain and Malaysia. A number of separateissues—some symbolic, some more substantial—led to public displaysof friction between the two governments.

The first issue concerned the way in which the British Govern-ment sought to end Confrontation. In theory at least, the MalaysianGovernment was supposed to be the leading partner in dealing withIndonesia, with the British only supposed to be providing ‘assistance’.As the British bore the main burden of actual defence, however, it

¹⁶ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/24: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 3664, 20/4/1966.¹⁷ Ibid. ¹⁸ Mackie, Konfrontasi, ch. 11.


was unsurprising that they occasionally overstepped the bounds of theirnominally subordinate role. In late November 1965, the British Gov-ernment had publicly suggested that it was ready for negotiations to endConfrontation. In April 1966, the British Government offered Indone-sia emergency aid of £1 million, intended as a goodwill gesture to helpsecure a peace agreement. Both these actions irritated the MalaysianGovernment, which felt that the British had not adequately consultedthem, and that their own prerogative to negotiate had been usurped.¹⁹Later in mid-1966, the two governments had a further dispute on howquickly Britain’s Confrontation forces should be withdrawn, the twoparties disagreeing on when and how territory could be securely left topurely Malaysian forces. Australian observers were more sympathetic tothe Malaysian position. The Australian High Commissioner in KualaLumpur noted that the Malaysians ‘resented’ what seemed to them aBritish policy of withdrawing forces according to the ‘economic andother policies of Whitehall regardless of [the] wishes of Malaysia and[the] needs of [the] situation’.²⁰ He recommended that the AustralianGovernment ‘clearly dissociate’ itself from any British pressure for earlydisengagement.²¹

A second irritant in the Anglo–Malaysian relationship stemmed fromthe continuing problems arising from the separation of Malaysia andSingapore. Senior members of the Malaysian Government harbouredsuspicions that the British were guilty of bias towards Singapore. Thesefeelings were crystallized in a dispute about defence aid in the middle of1966. The Malaysian Government had requested aid from the BritishGovernment to enable it to build up its defence forces. The British,however, made their aid conditional on the Malaysian Governmentcoming to a defence agreement with Singapore, defence being oneof the outstanding issues between the separated states. The SingaporeGovernment, in the meantime, refused to come to a defence agreementwith Malaysia unless it could also come to a favourable economicagreement. Thus the Malaysian Government inferred, not illogically,that the conditions the British were attaching to aid would work toSingapore’s economic advantage.

¹⁹ Dato’ Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963–1970(Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), ch. 6; Chin, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,ch. 7.

²⁰ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Allan Eastman to DEAC, ‘Disengagement ofForces’, tel. 1539, 20/6/1966.

²¹ Ibid.


In mid-May 1966 the British Government decided not to awardMalaysia any further defence aid. Publicly, the British pleaded budgetaryconstraints and a lack of need on the part of Malaysia, but privately itsreasoning was based on the failure of Malaysia and Singapore to cometo any defence or economic agreement.²² The Malaysian Governmentwas outraged. Its leaders publicly and sharply rebuked the BritishGovernment. The Minister of Finance was quoted in the Sunday Times asdescribing Britain as ‘a tired and dispirited nation which perhaps has lostthe will even to govern itself’.²³ Less flamboyantly but more substantially,the Malaysian Government went on in August to loosen the Malaysiandollar’s ties to sterling and to remove preferences on Commonwealthgoods. Privately, Australian observers again sympathized with Malaysia.They felt Malaysia to be ‘understandably annoyed’ at the way Britain had‘clumsily’ handled the issue of defence aid.²⁴ Moreover, they argued thatMalaysia’s sharp reaction had a long-standing justification. A natural andcathartic anti-colonial outburst upon independence had been stymiedby the Emergency and then by Confrontation.²⁵ Britain’s relations withMalaysia over the past three years had had ‘an insensitive and hectoringstrain running through’ them.²⁶ Now freed from the constraints whichConfrontation had imposed, the Malaysian Government was givingvent to a history of frustrations.

Did these tensions in the Anglo–Malaysian relationship have any sub-stantive impact on the British military position in the region? Arguably,it is difficult to see any direct relationship. As was described in Chapter 1,the British strategy of retreating from a direct presence in SoutheastAsia to the periphery preceded any of the tensions. Notwithstanding thedifficulties attending the Anglo–Malaysian relationship, the MalaysianGovernment always maintained that Britain should maintain its defencecommitments and role. And, as will be documented later, when theBritish Government finally decided to withdraw, this decision was moreopposed than aided by the Malaysian Government.

²² PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)24th Meeting, 13/5/1966.²³ Sunday Times, 5/6/1966, quoted in Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s

Foreign Policy, pp. 126–8. See also Sharma, British Policy Towards Malaysia, pp. 116–17.²⁴ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: DEAC, ‘Malaysia and the Commonwealth’,

Aug. 1966.²⁵ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Parkinson to DEAC, ‘British Malaysian

Relations’, tel. 1703, 12/7/1966.²⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: DEAC, ‘Malaysia and the Commonwealth’,

Aug. 1966.


Yet the manifest tensions in their relationship in 1966 can be argued tohave had an indirect effect on the withdrawal. The British Government’sview that nationalist forces might one day make the bases untenablecan only have been bolstered by the Malaysian Government’s verypublic assertions of its independence and national interests—even ifthese assertions were only rhetorical gestures aimed at domestic politicalopinion. Given that, when it published the Defence White Paper, theGovernment had been privately hoping that Malaysian hostility wouldeventually force them out, it is easy to suspect that the British mighteven have been trying to stir up tensions with the Malaysians. Certainly,as the Australians observed, the British were not treating the MalaysianGovernment’s feelings with much care or consideration. But the policydocuments regarding such issues as defence aid did not record anyulterior motives on the part of the British—which is not to say thatthey did not exist, only that they must remain suspected rather thanproven.

The other allies were worried about where a continuation of theAnglo–Malaysian tensions might lead. Lee Kuan Yew privately criticized‘Malaysia’s carping attitude’ to the Australian Government as ‘just thewrong way to go about things’.²⁷ He thought it essential, if the allieswere to convince the British to stay, that the British feel appreciated andtheir role to be worthwhile. The Australians, while more sympathetic tothe Malaysian case, also privately agreed on the risk. They noted thatMalaysia’s criticisms were playing very badly in the British press andpublic, to the detriment of Australia’s interests. The British were being‘given scope for feeling that their presence in the Malaysian region maysoon be no longer welcome’.²⁸

While the British position in Southeast Asia was being eroded fromwithout, it was also being questioned from within. From Labour’sre-election in the spring, the Parliamentary Labour Party’s criticismof Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role built up in a slow crescendo until thesummer of 1966.

The change in the domestic political climate could be directly at-tributed to Labour’s landslide victory of March 1966. Prior to this

²⁷ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: William Pritchett to DEAC, tel. 1005,15/8/1966.

²⁸ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: DEAC, ‘Malaysia and the Commonwealth’,Aug. 1966.


moment, the Government’s precarious majority had helped keep anybackbench dissent to a minimum. This constraint had now been elimi-nated by a 97-seat majority. As Richard Crossman recorded in his diary,the backbench would now have to be much more carefully handled,as there was no longer the means to impose discipline automatically.²⁹Edward Short, then the Labour Chief Whip, later noted that it wasimmediately obvious that the backbench were now ‘going to adopt avery different and highly critical, attitude towards their own Govern-ment’.³⁰ Moreover, Harold Wilson had not taken the opportunity afterthe election to reiterate the Party’s Standing Orders, which providedguidance on when Labour MPs might abstain or vote freely. From thistime on, argued Short, the Parliamentary Labour Party ‘ceased to be acoherent, disciplined body’.³¹

The rumbles of dissent began about a month after the election. Inthe House of Commons Foreign Affairs Debate, Denis Healey found itnecessary to defend the Government’s policies staunchly after criticismfrom all shades of the political spectrum.³² Two weeks later, left-wingcritics of the Government’s foreign policy won a symbolic victory bysecuring the deputy chair of the Party’s Foreign Affairs Committee.US observers noted that while the Committee had ‘no major policyinfluence’, the victory, coupled with the larger Labour majority, wouldlead to a ‘more assertive’ left wing on foreign policy issues.³³

There was a sudden explosion of dissent at the end of May 1966,when a Parliamentary Party meeting was convened to discuss the Gov-ernment’s policies ‘East of Suez’. The meeting had been called at therequest of various critics of the ‘East of Suez’ policy, and included amotion calling for withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the PersianGulf by 1970. In the event, the motion was deferred until the nextmeeting as, according to the Chair, insufficient notice had been given.Nevertheless, the meeting provided a forum for a wide variety of criticsto speak out. The lead was taken by Christopher Mayhew, the formerNavy Minister, who reiterated the argument he had employed at thetime of his resignation. As defence expenditure was falling, logic com-pelled Britain’s commitments to fall commensurately. Britain’s alreadyoverstretched forces could not maintain their overseas role while having

²⁹ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, p. 492.³⁰ Edward Short, Whip to Wilson (London: Macdonald, 1989), p. 258.³¹ Ibid., p. 255. ³² Hansard , Session 1966/7, vol. 727, cols 542–669, 26/4/1966.³³ USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2776: US Embassy, London, to State Department,

‘Joint Weeka No. 19’, 12/5/1966. See also Short, Whip to Wilson, p. 263.


their capabilities cut. The Government was prescribing an ‘impossibleposture to take up’.³⁴ Mayhew was followed by a range of other criticsfrom all wings of the Party. Most emphasized the economic conse-quences of excessive defence expenditure: investment and productionwere being drawn away from more beneficial activities; the country’sbalance of payments was being adversely affected by the massive overseascosts. Others argued that Britain should be concentrating its energieswithin Europe. They noted that no EEC country maintained so heavya worldwide burden. Doubts were cast on the effectiveness of Britain’srole in maintaining peace and security.

Senior ministers sought to be conciliatory in their response. Theonly sharp comment came when Harold Wilson angrily—and dishon-estly—denied that British policy and US support for sterling were inany way linked. Otherwise, Michael Stewart and Denis Healey empha-sized their sympathy with their critics’ arguments. Healey spent sometime detailing the cuts to defence which were already in train. Bothministers agreed with their critics that Britain’s long-term aim shouldbe to disengage from Southeast Asia. However, they argued that such adisengagement had to be carefully phased, so that peace and stability inthe region could be maintained. Britain could not ‘simply . . . walk outand ignore the consequences’, argued Healey. The Government ‘neededtime to phase our withdrawal without causing chaos’.³⁵ Thus, Healeyconcluded, there was ‘no real disagreement on ultimate aims’, but ‘thefinal responsibility’ for deciding the timing of withdrawal ‘must be leftwith the Government’.³⁶ At that point the Party meeting adjourned, tomeet again two and a half weeks later to vote on the motion for an earlywithdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore.

Early reports suggested that the Government was likely to be badlystung by the Parliamentary Labour Party’s vote. The Times’ politicalcorrespondent gathered from his Labour Party sources that the critics’resolution would ‘be carried, and the Government . . . expected torephase their defence plans accordingly’.³⁷ The Australian Governmentpanicked in the face of such reports, and asked that its High Commis-sioner be granted an emergency meeting with Harold Wilson.³⁸ Whilethe US Government was more confident that the British Government

³⁴ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 256, 25/5/1966.³⁵ Ibid. ³⁶ Ibid.³⁷ ‘Labour unity on defence role’, The Times, 26/5/1966, p. 13.³⁸ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 1: Harold Holt to Sir Alexander Downer, ‘British

Defence Policy’, tel. 3067, 27/5/1966.


would prevail, they worried that it could be ‘possibly by an unimpressivemargin’.³⁹ They were concerned that opposition to ‘East of Suez’ had‘increased and [was] not going to dissipate after the vote’.⁴⁰ Moreover,the opposition included not only ideologues in the Labour Party, but alsoa ‘substantial element among influential civil servants in Whitehall’.⁴¹

When the Australian High Commissioner visited 10 Downing St,however, he found the Prime Minister in a bullish mood. Wilsonwas scornful of the critics. They were men ‘disappointed at not beinggiven office’.⁴² Christopher Mayhew was ‘a nutcase’, while left-wingpacifists were ‘impossible to reason’ with.⁴³ The Prime Minister wassure that the Government would win if the issue came to a vote. Inthe aftermath, Mayhew would ‘have such a sore tail he will not beable to sit down’.⁴⁴ The Australian High Commissioner was impressedby this show of conviction. He assessed Wilson as being genuinely ‘incomplete command of the situation’.⁴⁵ Certainly the Prime Minister‘had unbounded confidence in his own powers of persuasion andleadership, and what he can do when pressed, with the rank and file ofhis party’.⁴⁶

The Prime Minister’s confidence was not misplaced. When theParliamentary Labour Party finally met and voted in the middle ofJune, the Government scored a substantial victory over its critics. Themeeting began badly for the dissenters when one of their number wascalled to account for leaking the previous meeting’s proceedings to thepress. Thereafter a number of backbenchers spoke, some reiteratingthe criticisms of the Government which had been aired before, otherscoming out in favour of its present policies.⁴⁷ The Prime Ministeraddressed the meeting last. He emphasized the progressive aspects ofthe Government’s defence policy. It aimed to provide physical supportto United Nations peacekeeping and collective defence. There was nointerest in maintaining massive bases against unwilling populations,but equipment and facilities were essential if British forces were toreach where intervention or peacekeeping operations were required,

³⁹ USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2776: US Embassy, London, to State Department,‘Joint Weeka No. 23’, 9/6/1966.

⁴⁰ Ibid.⁴¹ LBJL: NSF: Files of Walt W. Rostow: Box 13: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘Christopher

Mayhew on East of Suez Policy’, 9/6/1966.⁴² NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 1: Sir Alexander Downer to Harold Holt, tel. 5295,

1/6/1966.⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ Ibid. ⁴⁵ Ibid. ⁴⁶ Ibid.⁴⁷ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 256, 15/6/1966.


principally in Asia and Africa. On the question of Singapore, Wilsonbalanced his argument carefully. He claimed, not inaccurately, that ifthe Government had only itself to think of, ‘we would be glad to leavethere as quickly as possible’.⁴⁸ But Britain was needed and wanted byits major allies in the area: Singapore, Australia and New Zealand—thePrime Minister carefully omitting reference to the less popular UnitedStates and Malaysia. Singapore, Wilson added for the Party’s benefit,was led by a Prime Minister ‘as good a left wing and democratic socialistas any in this room’.⁴⁹ While the Government would ‘not stay a daylonger than is necessary’ to achieve its defence objectives, equally itcould not ‘leave a day earlier than is necessary if we are to fulfil theseobjectives’.⁵⁰ Wilson ended his speech on a grand theme—with moreinflated ambitions than any more serious or concrete policy documenthad ever suggested. The Prime Minister argued to the Party that itwas Britain’s role to prevent the world becoming polarized betweenthe superpowers: the United States, China and the Soviet Union. Ina phrase that would later become notorious, he argued that if Britaindeparted the stage, the superpowers would be left standing ‘eyeball toeyeball to face this thing out’.⁵¹ Britain had a duty to neutralize theworld’s hotspots, and a duty to influence the US so as to prevent such aconfrontation happening.

Wilson’s speech appeared a resounding success. The Labour Partymet the Prime Minister’s speech with ‘prolonged applause’.⁵² Mayhew’smotion for immediate, sharp reductions was solidly rejected, 225 votesto 54, with about 50 abstentions. US sources noted that most ofthose voting against the Government were inveterate left-wingers, withits centrist and right-wing critics abstaining. The Prime Minister hadscored a ‘notable personal’ victory, for though he probably changed fewminds amongst his firm critics, the ‘force of his presentation and thesize of his majority . . . probably considerably reduced the credibility ofthe dissenting point of view’.⁵³

Impressive though the Government’s majority was, it was question-able whether it carried as much conviction as it appeared to. Certainly,more than a few ministers quietly maintained the view that Britain

⁴⁸ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes: Speech by Harold Wilson to ParliamentaryLabour Party, Card 257, 15/6/1966.

⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ Ibid. ⁵¹ Ibid.⁵² Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 256, 15/6/1966.⁵³ USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2776: US Embassy, London, to State Department,

‘Joint Weeka No. 24’, 16/6/1966.


should be withdrawing more quickly from Malaysia/Singapore. BarbaraCastle and Richard Crossman were not convinced by Wilson, thoughboth continued to vote with the Government.⁵⁴ Chancellor of theExchequer James Callaghan whispered private dissent to Crossman,and suggested that George Brown and Denis Healey thought similarly.This was almost certainly true of George Brown, who was commonlyunderstood to be a strong pro-European. Healey’s position was rathermore complex since, unknown to Crossman, Healey had been solidlywith those planning for withdrawal during the Defence Review, butequally had been the first to suggest modifying these plans in the lightof allied opinion.

Against this backdrop of domestic political doubts and dissent, the alliesentered their first quadripartite conference in the middle of June. Asnoted earlier in the chapter, the British Government was caught in anawkward position coming into the talks. Officials had not discarded thelong-term objectives of withdrawal and neutralization, yet could notdiscuss them with the allies—much less pursue them seriously—forfear of causing offence. As Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart noted tohis colleagues on OPD, given the situation in Vietnam, raising the ideaof neutralization ‘would be most unwelcome to our allies’. It could leadto ‘considerable disagreement between us which might become publiclyknown’.⁵⁵ Equally, though, the topic of short-term deployments raisedproblems. With Confrontation winding down, the opportunity wasarising for the British to make deep cuts to their Southeast Asian forces,bringing them down to the cost envisaged in the Defence Review.Ministers, with Denis Healey leading, were clear that these residualforces would have to be based in Singapore, given the commitmentswhich had been made to Britain’s allies. But they were worried that withtheir Confrontation troops freed, the British would be under furtherpressure from their allies to send forces to Vietnam or Thailand. If theyrebuffed the allies too strongly, it was again ‘likely to lead to maximumill-will’.⁵⁶ British representatives would have to deflect allied requestsvery carefully if relations were not to be damaged.

Coming into the quadripartite ministerial talks, the Americans notedthe quiet evasiveness of the British position. They observed that the

⁵⁴ Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964–1976 (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 69;Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, p. 540.

⁵⁵ PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)29th Meeting, 17/6/1966. ⁵⁶ Ibid.


British had not worked hard for the talks. Indeed they had ‘shownalmost no initiative recently’.⁵⁷ Rather it was the Australians who hadbeen doing most of the running. This pattern was repeated in thetalks themselves. The British did not volunteer extensive informationabout their plans and thinking. Rather, the allies repeatedly had topress the British on their aims, while the British repeatedly deflectedany suggestion of broadening their role. Would the British defendAustralia and New Zealand from attack? asked the allies. Undoubtedlyso, Michael Stewart replied, as these countries had stood by Britain intwo world wars. What of Malaysia? In case of direct aggression, yes;in case of subversion it would depend on the case: there was no point inpropping up unpopular regimes. What about the situation in Indonesia?the allies continued. Michael Stewart was ambiguous in reply: ‘one doesnot want to quarrel unnecessarily with [so] large a country’.⁵⁸ DeanRusk privately interpreted this as a hint that the British might arguethat ‘major continued deployments in Malaysia would be offensive toIndonesia and therefore should be reduced’.⁵⁹ Rusk then asked ‘ratherpointedly’ whether the British wanted to be invited to stay in Malaysiaat all.⁶⁰ Stewart was equivocal in his reply: if Britain could leave underconditions which maintained stability it would want to do so; if Malaysiawanted it to stay, then Britain would stay.⁶¹ Rusk ended with morea hope than a question, that Britain might let its post-Confrontationforces ‘go north on behalf of SEATO’.⁶² Pointedly, Stewart did notrespond to the approach.

The ANZUS allies were dismayed at the outcome of the quadripartitetalks. This would not be the last quadripartite meeting—there wouldbe a further inconsequential exchange of views in October 1966—butit had been made abundantly clear that there was little basis on whichto build further allied co-operation, of whatever form. Paul Hasluckexpressed his ‘disappointment’ to the Americans and New Zealandersat the ANZUS summit the next day.⁶³ None of the allies was pleased

⁵⁷ LBJL: NSF: Files of Walt W. Rostow: Box 13: Background Paper for QuadripartiteDiscussions in Canberra, 30/6/1966.

⁵⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Dean Rusk to US Embassies in London, Canberra,Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta and Bangkok, 12/7/1966.

⁵⁹ Ibid. ⁶⁰ Ibid.⁶¹ PRO: PREM 13/1454: memcon, Michael Stewart, Dean Rusk, Paul Hasluck, Keith

Holyoake et al., ‘Quadripartite Ministerial Discussions’, Canberra, 30/6/1966.⁶² Ibid.⁶³ NAA: A4940/1, C3739: memcon, Paul Hasluck, Dean Rusk, Keith Holyoake et al.,

‘ANZUS Council Meeting’, Canberra, 1/7/1966.


that the only assurance the British were willing to give was to helpdefend Australia and New Zealand: an assurance both irrelevant, giventhe existing strategic threats, and superfluous, given the strength of theANZUS alliance. The allies agreed that they should individually tryto turn the British position around. Privately, though, the Americanswere pessimistic. Rusk told President Johnson that he felt there was nohope that the British would go any further north in Southeast Asia,and that the British ‘would be glad to be invited out of Malaysia atthe earliest possible moment’.⁶⁴ National Security Adviser Walt Rostowadvised Johnson that it was ‘likely’ that the British would pull back.⁶⁵Not unaware of these sentiments, Australian officials fretted at theAmericans’ ‘rather fatalistic approach’.⁶⁶

While the allies despaired at keeping the British in a useful role in South-east Asia, within Britain even the current reduced and limited presencewas coming under pressure. Through late May and June 1966, Britishdocks were paralysed by a seamen’s strike. The strike exacerbated analready endemic balance of payments problem, and together these pre-cipitated a major deterioration in sterling’s position from late June 1966.

The crisis opened up a major split within the ruling economic tri-umvirate of Harold Wilson, James Callaghan and George Brown. Brownargued that the Government’s policies had clearly failed to pull the coun-try out of the balance of payments rut that produced its endemic sterlingcrises. It was time, Brown argued, for the Government to re-examinethe basic parameters of its policies: in particular, Britain’s internationalrole—both military and financial—which imposed ‘burdens and lim-itations which most other countries do not have to bear’.⁶⁷ Unless theGovernment rethought its attachment to sterling’s rate of parity andBritain’s overseas defence commitments, there would be no escapingthe country’s continuing economic problems. Unless the Governmentreoriented Britain towards Europe, the country would have no prospectfor future growth. Brown recognized it would be difficult to convince

⁶⁴ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Dean Rusk to Lyndon Johnson and George Ball,1/7/1966.

⁶⁵ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Walt Rostow’s note on Rusk to Johnson and Ball,1/7/1966.

⁶⁶ NAA: A1945/37, 287/3/226: Department of Defence, ‘Conversations with Advisers tothe United States Delegation for the Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting of 30th June, 1966’,1/7/1966.

⁶⁷ PRO: T 230/772: George Brown, ‘Economic Policy’, 27/6/1966.


the country’s allies to agree to any of these changes quickly—but theyhad to be told squarely that Britain’s current direction was unsustain-able, and either they had to pay the bills to shore it up, or accept a sharpchange in direction.

Others in the Government, in particular James Callaghan as Chancel-lor, were dismissive of Brown’s analysis. Robert Nield, the Chancellor’sclosest adviser in the Treasury, argued that all the issues that Brown hadbrought up—sterling, Europe and defence—required cool and carefulhandling.⁶⁸ It was implausible that President de Gaulle would allow aquick British entry into Europe, and impossible to imagine the UnitedStates and other allies remaining sympathetic to Britain’s case while thecountry tried to foist its defence costs and burdens upon them: Brown’s‘whole proposition d[id] not stand up’.⁶⁹

Callaghan and Brown were deadlocked in disagreement about sub-stantial defence cuts but stopped short of a withdrawal. Brown arguedthat the Government should devalue the pound, and dramatically reori-ent the country, turning away from the world role and towards Europe.With its economic leaders in sharp disagreement, the Government’sresponse to the financial crisis seized up. A number of measures werediscussed by officials to correct the situation—raising interest rates,imposing duties on imported fuel, tightening rules on hire purchase andbuilding activity—but with the Government’s leaders in disagreementon even a basic direction, none of these measures gelled into a properpackage. Even on 13 July, the day before the Cabinet was to meet todecide on emergency measures, the Government had no firm sense ofwhat it might implement. Late that evening, the permanent head of theTreasury rang the Governor of the Bank of England to warn him that itwas ‘very difficult to give any concrete news about what was happening’and the only thing certain was that the final package for the Cabinetwas ‘likely to be different from that which he had mentioned earlierin the day’.⁷⁰ Through the night of 13 July, the Government’s leaderscontinued to argue over what an emergency package should comprise.Exactly what transpired in their arguments is somewhat murky, withneither the documentary record nor any other people outside the rulingtriumvirate bearing witness to the debate. What is clear is that, while

⁶⁸ Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),p. 261.

⁶⁹ PRO: T 230/772: R.R. Nield, ‘Economic Policy: First Secretary’s Paper’, 28/6/1966.⁷⁰ PRO: T 230/772: A.J.C. Edwards, ‘Special Deposits’, 13/7/1966.


Brown, Callaghan and Wilson were unable to agree on a fundamentalstrategy to deal with the sterling crisis, they were all prepared to argue forsubstantial defence cuts as an immediate measure to ease the situation.

The next morning, on 14 July, the Prime Minister introduced tothe Cabinet a number of stopgap measures which could be announcedthat afternoon to stem the crisis temporarily. With the principal figuresstill in strong disagreement, the measures were limited: an immediatelifting of interest rates, a £100 million cut in overseas expenditure for1967/8, and the foreshadowing of a further set of economic measuresto be announced in a week or so. The £100 million cut in foreignexchange was supposed to come largely from defence, half from forcesin Germany, half from ‘East of Suez’.⁷¹

Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, however, reacted sharply againstthe unheralded proposals. Richard Crossman observed that the ForeignSecretary ‘obviously hadn’t been consulted until the night before’.⁷²Stewart responded to the proposals, in Barbara Castle’s eyes, ‘in amore emphatic temper than I have ever seen him’.⁷³ He argued thatemergency cuts of this depth would necessarily involve partial orcomplete withdrawals from the main areas of Britain’s world role. Thesewould be contrary to the commitments made to allies in the DefenceReview. It would do ‘incalculable harm to our international standing;and both the decisions and the damage would be irrevocable’.⁷⁴

While many in the Cabinet might have looked favourably on furtherdefence cuts in principle, they were also sympathetic to Stewart’sarguments about the appropriate way to achieve them. Though someargued for even more drastic defence cuts, the majority agreed that somajor a reorientation of Britain’s defence and foreign policies couldnot be implemented without warning as a response to an immediateeconomic crisis. It was agreed that the announcement of a £100 millioncut to defence expenditure should be delayed, giving the Defenceand Foreign Secretaries time to examine how savings on that scalecould be achieved. That afternoon, the Prime Minister announced theGovernment’s immediate measures to shore up the pound: the raisingof interest rates, some reductions in bank liquidity, and a declarationthat further measures would soon be implemented.⁷⁵

⁷¹ PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)36th Meeting, 14/7/1966.⁷² Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, p. 569. ⁷³ Castle, Diaries, p. 73.⁷⁴ PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)36th Meeting, 14/7/1966.⁷⁵ Hansard , Session 1966–67, vol. 731, col. 1733–5, 14/7/1966.


In the days that followed, the economic crisis—only worsened bythe Prime Minister’s stalling statement—and the continuing divisionswithin the leadership group precipitated a political crisis. The failureof the British Government to correct the situation caused the USTreasury Secretary to take the unusual step of calling James Callaghanprivately to rebuke him on the Government’s handling of the situation.Callaghan retorted that the US Government was only exacerbating thesituation by insisting the British maintain so substantial an overseasdefence presence.⁷⁶ The British Government’s unity of purpose wasnot aided by Harold Wilson flying to Moscow for a few days on aprearranged visit. In his absence, rumours abounded that ministers infavour of devaluation were orchestrating a leadership plot. On Wilson’sreturn, the Cabinet finally pulled together a package to address thecrisis. Devaluation was rejected, though with a solid minority, includingGeorge Brown and Roy Jenkins, in favour. A massive deflationarypackage was adopted instead. Prices and wages were frozen. There weretax rises and spending cuts amounting to 1.3% of GDP.⁷⁷

Michael Stewart and Denis Healey put forward revised proposals tocut £100 million of the Government’s overseas expenditure, largely fromdefence, but also from aid, information and diplomatic costs. Althoughthe actual detail of the cuts still required further work by officials, thebroad intention was not to threaten the basic lines of British defenceand foreign policy. Rather, the cuts were only supposed to speed up thereductions mooted as the outcome of the Defence Review. In particular,they took advantage of what appeared to be an earlier than expectedwinding down of Confrontation, which thus allowed reductions inSoutheast Asia to proceed faster than originally intended. The Cabinetapproved these measures. It agreed not to push further, on the groundsthat this would compromise the Government’s defence and foreignpolicies. There is some hint, however, that there was at least somepressure in the Cabinet for further cuts, for in the compromise wordingthe Cabinet agreed that the cuts had to be ‘at least’ £100 million.⁷⁸George Brown was open in his dissent. He had threatened to resign atvarious points during the crisis, though he had been dissuaded by theargument that so public a breach would undermine the Government’s

⁷⁶ PRO: T 230/773: memcon, James Callaghan and Henry Fowler, 15/7/1966.⁷⁷ For more on the political crisis and alleged leadership plot, see Wilson, Labour

Government, pp. 252–8; Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, pp. 569–77; Castle, Diaries, pp. 69–76.⁷⁸ PRO: CAB 128/41: CC(66)36th Meeting, 14/7/1966.


measures completely and precipitate even greater attacks on sterling. Hetold Barbara Castle that Wilson was too much in thrall to the Americansand President Johnson, and thus would neither devalue sterling norabandon ‘East of Suez’. In Brown’s opinion, ‘both these have gotto go’.⁷⁹

The emergency measures adopted by the Government were sufficientto shore up the country’s economic position, at least in the short term.Moreover, the sterling crisis marked a significant turning point in theprocess which led to Britain’s eventual withdrawal from Malaysia andSingapore. This is not to say that the British presence was immediatelythreatened in the wake of the crisis. On the contrary, while the defencecuts planned in response to the crisis would have reduced the Britishpresence in Southeast Asia, they fell a long way short of eliminating it.Indeed, there was substantial hope and belief within the Governmentthat the measures would be sufficient to prevent a similar crisis recurringin the future. Certainly, Wilson was sufficiently secure to continue tocommit his government ‘East of Suez’ when he visited Washingtonlater in the month. However, the sterling crisis instigated a numberof changes in the British policy process which would have profoundimplications later on for the dissolution of Britain’s Southeast Asian role.

The first change was in personnel. Having diverged fundamen-tally from the Prime Minister and Chancellor on economic policy,George Brown could no longer remain Secretary for Economic Affairs:thus he was moved to the Foreign Office in the middle of August1966. Brown’s pro-European and anti-‘East of Suez’ inclinations werewell known and had been thoroughly aired during the sterling cri-sis. Though Brown changed portfolio because of disagreements oneconomic policy, rather than in order to facilitate a change in for-eign policy, his presence in the Foreign Office would later assist themovement away from Britain’s Southeast Asian commitments. Cer-tainly, Brown was not shy in letting his preferences be known fromthe beginning. Within a week of his appointment, the Treasury ob-served to its pleasure that Brown was ‘insisting on re-examining thefundamental policy assumptions’ and demanding ‘that the argumentsfor maintaining our presence, influence etc in the Far East have realsubstance’.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Castle, Diaries, p. 75.⁸⁰ PRO: T 225/2714: C.S. Bennett to M.G.F. Hall: ‘Defence and Oversea Policy (Official)

Committee: Defence Review Working Party’, 16/8/1966.


The other major consequence of the July 1966 sterling crisis was tosignal that the consensus within the Government on the direction ofBritish foreign policy was starting to dissolve. As shown in previouschapters, senior ministers and their departments had all been broadlyin agreement on policy up to and beyond the February Defence WhitePaper. All had supported the plans to withdraw from Malaysia andSingapore to Australia, as had been crafted in the Defence Review. Andall had been willing to modify these plans in the face of strong USand allied opposition.

Under the pressure of the sterling crisis, however, this consensus beganto break down. As described earlier, both James Callaghan and GeorgeBrown were willing to entertain sharp defence cuts as a means of stem-ming an immediate economic crisis, and were prepared to bring themto the Cabinet without informing or consulting the Defence or ForeignSecretaries. It appears that this plan had been proposed partly becauseit was one of the few measures on which Callaghan and Brown couldagree. But it also signalled that the economic ministers and their depart-ments were no longer prepared to accept without question the politicaldepartments’ definition of the necessary extent of Britain’s defence role.

From this point on, the economic departments—especially theTreasury—became much more vigorous in pursuing tighter defenceexpenditure, rather than accepting Foreign and Commonwealth Officeassurances that Britain’s position was already at the minimum acceptableto the allies. There was no longer a consensus within the BritishGovernment on how the conflict between Britain’s economic andpolitical interests should be reconciled. A growing disagreement betweenthe economic and political departments—augmented by the differingpersonalities of their ministers—would persist from this moment rightthrough to the ultimate decisions to withdraw.

In the face of Britain’s recurring crises, officials within the UnitedStates began openly questioning whether they should continue pressingBritain to maintain its multiple roles. Would it be better in the endfor the US to bite the bullet and concede a British withdrawal from‘East of Suez’ in order to help cure the country’s economic problemsand avoid the worldwide repercussions of a currency crash? Given theextreme fragility of NATO, with French withdrawal now compoundedby German political and financial difficulties, would it be better forBritain’s energies to be concentrated within Europe? Or would a Britishwithdrawal from Southeast Asia irremediably weaken the American


position in Vietnam, implying that this role should be maintained atalmost any cost?

Johnson Administration officials were deeply divided on the issue.Under-Secretary of State George Ball undertook the most radical re-thinking of US policy. In a memorandum notable both for its lengthand its distance from current policy—presaging his departure fromthe Administration shortly thereafter—Ball argued that it was time toaccept Britain’s reduced status as a middle European power. Britainshould no longer live beyond its means: it should abandon its nu-clear deterrent, give up the leading role of sterling, join the EEC, andeventually withdraw from its role ‘East of Suez’. While the US shouldnot encourage this withdrawal, argued Ball, neither should it seek toprevent it, for such an attempt would exact an ‘exorbitant price’.⁸¹ TheAmerican public did not see the UK as essential to the US role in EastAsia, and US attempts to prevent withdrawal would prove ‘a vain effortto alter the inevitable’.⁸²

The views of other senior US officials were decidedly mixed. DeanAcheson, the former Secretary of State and now adviser to the President,agreed that Britain’s European role should be the first priority.⁸³National Security Advisor Francis Bator argued that while Ball’s long-term vision was essentially correct, in the short term the proposalswere politically unworkable. Moreover, he questioned whether a Britainwithout ‘East of Suez’ would encourage Europe to a greater world role:‘A little England going into Europe is likely to favour a policy of littleEurope once she is in’.⁸⁴ Treasury Secretary Fowler argued that a strongBritish economy and stable pound should be first priorities for boththe UK and US. If the US forced Britain to maintain its SoutheastAsian role, this would ‘either cost us a weak Britain and a great dealof balance of payments money or . . . a weak Britain and an eventualdevaluation of sterling’.⁸⁵ Either course would be ‘disastrous for [the]dollar’.⁸⁶ The UK would not maintain a policy at the behest of theUS unless the latter paid for it, Fowler noted, but ‘I do not think we

⁸¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: George Ball to Lyndon Johnson, ‘Harold Wilson’sVisit—the Opportunity for an Act of Statesmanship’, 22/7/1966.

⁸² Ibid.⁸³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, ‘The pound, the

Dollar and What We Want from Harold Wilson’, 14/7/1966.⁸⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, 26/7/1966.⁸⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, ‘The sterling Crisis

and the US Bargaining Position vis-a-vis the UK’, 18/7/1966.⁸⁶ Ibid.


can afford the price’.⁸⁷ But the two most senior officials charged withdefence and foreign policy were of a decidedly different view. DefenceSecretary McNamara thought it ‘absolutely essential’ that Britain stayin Southeast Asia, for any pullout would fatally undermine the US inVietnam.⁸⁸ Dean Rusk agreed, though he feared that the British did not‘have it in them to stick it out’.⁸⁹

The argument was decided by President Johnson in late July, at aleadership meeting called to prepare for an upcoming visit of PrimeMinister Wilson. At the meeting, Rusk and McNamara insisted that, forthe sake of Vietnam, Britain had to be induced to remain ‘East of Suez’.Fowler argued that there was a basic conflict in US objectives: it was notpossible for Britain to sustain major military roles in Europe and Asiawhile maintaining its economic health. President Johnson was little in-terested in such arguments. He bluntly stated, ‘I want them East of Suez,on [the] Rhine, and solvent’.⁹⁰ Secretary Fowler warned that ‘if we take[the] ‘‘hard line’’, we’ll pay the price’.⁹¹ Burdened with the problems ofVietnam, however, Johnson refused to entertain any other possibilities:‘[we] don’t want to face up to [a British] pull-out right now’.⁹²

Fortunately for President Johnson, Harold Wilson did not presenthim with any such ultimatum when he visited at the end of July 1966.Instead, he appeared keen to impress the President with the solidity ofthe British position. Even before Wilson had arrived, Foreign Officeofficials had told the State Department that ‘the hard decision hasbeen made—that the UK will go ahead with its commitments’.⁹³ Athis meetings with the President on 29 July, Harold Wilson offeredunconditional assurances that Britain would remain ‘East of Suez’,would not devalue the pound, and would continue to support USpolicy in Vietnam. The American record noted with some surprisethat Wilson ‘did not—repeat not—ask for any aid for sterling nor. . . for a commitment of aid in the future. The question did notcome up.’⁹⁴

⁸⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: Henry Fowler to Lyndon Johnson, ‘The sterling Crisisand the US Bargaining Position vis-a-vis the UK’, 18/7/1966.

⁸⁸ Ibid. ⁸⁹ Ibid.⁹⁰ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Lyndon Johnson,

Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Henry Fowler et al., Washington, DC, 22/7/1966.⁹¹ Ibid. ⁹² Ibid.⁹³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 209: memcon, William Bundy and Dennis Greenhill, ‘Prime

Minister’s Agenda for His Talk with the President on Southeast Asia’, 28/7/1966.⁹⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson, ‘Background Talking

Points on your Meeting with Harold Wilson Today’, 29/7/1966. Emphasis in original.


Why did Wilson forgo an obvious opportunity to seek Americanassistance in defraying defence costs? The Prime Minister had a numberof reasons for doing so. In pre-summit briefings with the British,US officials had referred to the doubts some felt about the stabilityof Britain’s position. The continuation of the close Anglo–Americanrelationship, US officials stressed, rested on Wilson’s ability to convinceJohnson that his government ‘had all the threads of the situation in theirhands’.⁹⁵ This would help ‘restore the President’s shaken confidence inthe reliability of Britain as an ally’.⁹⁶ There was also, however, a morefundamental reason why Wilson could not seek assistance from Johnsonat the July 1966 leadership meeting. The Prime Minister was visitingWashington only a week after the announcement of his government’smassive deflationary package to bolster the pound. If he were to askPresident Johnson for financial assistance now, it could, in the words ofBritish officials, have ‘arouse[d] suspicion that we have lost faith in ourrecent measures’.⁹⁷ If the suspicion developed on the financial marketsthat the Government’s package had been inadequate, the consequencesfor the British economy would have been disastrous.

Wilson’s confident stand in the US did not go unnoticed back athome. Barbara Castle noted that the Prime Minister seemed in a differentmood in Washington: firm on remaining ‘East of Suez’ and firm onbacking the US. In return, Johnson’s support for Wilson seemed tobolster the latter’s credibility in the financial markets. But it all came witha political cost, noted Castle: ‘No wonder the Left now hate Harold!’⁹⁸

The Americans themselves were satisfied with the British position.While before the sterling crisis, as noted earlier in the chapter, theyhad hoped that the British might be persuaded to redeploy their post-Confrontation forces elsewhere in Southeast Asia, these expectationshad been lowered in the wake of the crisis. The Australians heard thatwhile Dean Rusk still believed that Britain had a ‘moral obligation’to contribute further in Southeast Asia, Lyndon Johnson was ‘morerelaxed’.⁹⁹ He was content with the size of British troop reductions,providing they were not timed to appear like a ‘scuttle’.¹⁰⁰ Moreover he

⁹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1262: John A. Thomson, ‘The Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington’,18/7/1966.

⁹⁶ Ibid. ⁹⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1262: John Stevens to Sir Patrick Dean, 25/7/1966.⁹⁸ Castle, Diaries, p. 80.⁹⁹ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to

DEAC, ‘Ending of Confrontation’, tel. 3212, 11/8/1966.¹⁰⁰ Ibid.


was ‘anxious’ to preserve the traditional Anglo–American relationship:he valued Wilson’s support on Vietnam and would be satisfied witha substantial British presence ‘East of Suez’, but would not press hardfor any greater British involvement in Southeast Asia.¹⁰¹ A degree ofself-interest motivated the American position. As the Australians noted,if the US were to push the British for any more, the latter’s bargainingleverage would increase substantially.

Confident though Wilson may have seemed in Washington, back athome there was continuing pressure on the Government’s defencepolicy. Economically, while the immediate sterling crisis had eased,the Treasury was doubtful about Britain’s economic prospects, anddemanded that further measures be taken to shore up the country’sposition. It was increasingly concerned that a failure to check Govern-ment expenditure was undermining efforts to rein in the balance ofpayments.¹⁰² Politically, George Brown, as the new Foreign Secretary,was personally keen to see a further review of the country’s defence andforeign policies. Though the Foreign Office resisted Brown’s lead, thestrength of the Treasury and its economic warnings alone were suffi-cient to convince the Government to initiate new Defence ExpenditureStudies at the end of October 1966.

In mid-August 1966, Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghanwrote to Denis Healey asking that further studies be undertaken on howdefence spending might be reduced. He noted that such studies werenecessary given that the Cabinet had decided to examine further cutsto public expenditure overall. Thus he expected that the MOD wouldaim to find means to reduce the defence budget by £150 million for1970/1.¹⁰³

The Ministry of Defence was said to be ‘bowled over’ by theChancellor’s letter.¹⁰⁴ They had not yet worked out how to bridge thegap between the final £2,060 million budget at which the DefenceReview had arrived and the £2,000 million target. Nor had officialsyet identified the additional £100 million of foreign expenditure cuts

¹⁰¹ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 4: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, toDEAC, ‘Ending of Confrontation’, tel. 3212, 11/8/1966.

¹⁰² Alec Cairncross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s: A Treasury Perspective(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 156ff.

¹⁰³ PRO: PREM 13/802: James Callaghan to Denis Healey, 11/8/1966.¹⁰⁴ PRO: FO 371/190820: G.G. Arthur to C.M. MacLehose, ‘New Defence Economies’,

18/8/1966.


agreed by the Cabinet during the sterling crisis. Now they were beingset a new budget goal of £1,850 million. Denis Healey was firm in hisresponse to the Chancellor. While he agreed to undertake the requestedexercise, he would only treat it as a contingency plan and wouldnot ‘regard [himself] as in any way committed to reductions below theDefence Review levels’.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, he refused to follow the Treasury’spreferred schedule: ‘the last Defence Review took some 18 months; wecan hardly hope to do a new one properly in a few weeks’.¹⁰⁶

Privately, the MOD was deeply sceptical that it would be able toachieve the proposed cuts without some major readjustment to Britain’sforeign policy. Healey asked for four possible cuts to be examined:complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia; severe reductions in Eu-rope, leaving only token forces; cuts to research and development; andassembling minor reductions from all areas. They doubted that thelast course would be feasible, and hence a foreign policy reorienta-tion appeared most likely.¹⁰⁷ The Foreign Office, however, was deeplyconcerned that any cuts implemented in this way would lead to ‘themost serious difficulties in external policy’.¹⁰⁸ The British Governmenthad only very recently reassured its allies of its continuing determina-tion to maintain its worldwide role and commitments. It would beimpossible for it to go back on its word ‘without losing our crediteverywhere’.¹⁰⁹

George Brown, as the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, exhibitedrather fewer qualms than his department. He agreed with the Chancellorthat a further examination of defence costs was a ‘necessary exercise’.¹¹⁰He appeared to take the exercise more as an opportunity to re-evaluateforeign policy than a threat. He suggested to Healey that it wouldallow the ‘re-opening [of] various questions not fully thought throughin the Defence Review’.¹¹¹ Clearly the questions Brown had in mindrelated to Britain’s Southeast Asian presence. To the Prime Minister,he posed the question whether Britain’s ‘eventual objective . . . should[be to] get right out of Southeast Asia’.¹¹² He stressed his agreementwith the Chancellor that cutting back overseas defence expenditure was

¹⁰⁵ PRO: PREM 13/802: Denis Healey to James Callaghan, 16/8/1966. ¹⁰⁶ Ibid.¹⁰⁷ Arthur to MacLehose, ‘New Defence Economies’. ¹⁰⁸ Ibid. ¹⁰⁹ Ibid.¹¹⁰ PRO: FO 371/190820: N.M. Fenn to Sir Bernard Burrows, ‘New Defence Economies’,

20/8/1966.¹¹¹ PRO: FO 371/190820: C.M. MacLehose to G.G. Arthur, ‘The £1,850 m. Exercise’,

19/9/1966.¹¹² PRO: PREM 13/1454: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, 3/9/1966.


essential, but argued that Europe should be spared, with the cuts fallingelsewhere.¹¹³ So manifest were his European preferences that the PrimeMinister moved to restrain him. In the lead-up to Brown’s first USvisit as Foreign Secretary, American officials received from Wilson the‘unusual request that we enlighten Brown on the importance of Britain’sworld role and thus hopefully dampen his enthusiasm for Europe’.¹¹⁴The Americans did not respond to the request, noting that to do somight encourage the British to reduce their responsibilities in Europeand NATO.

Not only was the Prime Minister resisting the direction GeorgeBrown was taking. Parts of the Foreign Office also refused to followhis lead. Officials repeatedly questioned the political acceptability andpracticality of attempting to withdraw from Southeast Asia completelyby 1970/1. Senior officials argued that it would be a ‘useless wasteof time’ to study the option unless it was clear that the Governmentreally wished to exercise it, despite the fact that ‘it would be totallycontrary to a large number of statements of assurance given by BritishMinisters, including particularly the Prime Minister’.¹¹⁵ Instead, theyrecommended less drastic and damaging measures be taken. They notedthat the main foreign policy justification for Britain’s Southeast Asianpresence—to maintain relations with the ANZUS powers—did notspecify a precise minimum level for these forces. With Confrontationnow formally over, the Government could cut British forces in SoutheastAsia to the level it could afford. The only catch came with Britain’scommitment to Malaysia and Singapore, a commitment impossibleto avoid if any British presence in the two countries was retained.But this presence was only maintained at the Australian Government’sinsistence, and thus if the level of forces Britain could afford were belowthe level that the commitment required, the British could reasonablyinsist that the Australians bridge the gap. British officials acknowledgedthat negotiating such a policy would require the Government ‘to betough and stay tough: it would take a lot of nerve’.¹¹⁶ But this seemedthe best way to achieve reductions while maintaining Britain’s mainoverseas interests.

¹¹³ PRO: T 225/2714: F.E. Figgures to A.J.C. Edwards, 7/9/1966.¹¹⁴ USNA: RG 59: POL 1964–66: Box 2786: John Leddy to Dean Rusk, ‘Wilson’s Desire

that We Brainwash Brown’, 13/10/1966.¹¹⁵ PRO: FO 371/190821: Sir Bernard Burrows to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 30/9/1966.¹¹⁶ PRO: FO 371/190821: G.G. Arthur, ‘The £1,850m Exercise’, 6/10/1966.


A final point of pressure on the Government’s defence policydeveloped in mid-October 1966 when the Working Party on OverseasExpenditure reported back to ministers. This body had been chargedwith detailing the £100 million of savings in overseas defence expendi-ture which, as discussed earlier, had been agreed by the Cabinet to stemthe July sterling crisis. It was now apparent that the Working Party hadfallen far short of its goal. It had not been able to find even half of theexpected savings: it saved only £19 million of the expected £43 millionfrom accelerating the Defence Review reductions, and only £45 millionof the expected total of £100 million.¹¹⁷ The reasons for the shortfallwere logistical. It was simply not physically possible to reduce Britishforces quickly enough to achieve the desired savings. Officials wereglum on the prospect of managing any further savings. They noted intheir draft report that ‘several difficult and unpalatable decisions will berequired if we are even to get nearer to the target, let alone achieve it’.¹¹⁸Curiously, they dropped this suggestion of a need for radical policychange in their final report to the ministers on OPD. This was possiblybecause officials were all too aware of the domestic political pressures onthe Government to retrench British forces radically. Certainly, the tenorof their advice elsewhere suggested that many, especially within the po-litical departments, preferred a more incremental approach. Whateverthe reasons, in their final report to ministers, the Working Party simplynoted that, though they had found only limited savings, there was ‘littlescope for further economies on the basis of the Defence Review forcelevels’.¹¹⁹ They implied that officials recognized that further reductionsin defence commitments were necessary, but were unwilling to push theGovernment in too radical a direction.

On 22 October 1966, a small group of senior ministers met onceagain at Chequers to discuss defence and foreign policy. The question forconsideration was whether and how to push ahead with further studies ondefence reductions to achieve the Treasury’s new budget target of £1,850million. The main paper for discussion was written by the Foreign Office.Once again, Foreign Office officials emphasized that if cuts on the scaleproposed by the Treasury led to a withdrawal from Europe or ‘East ofSuez’, it would ‘undermine the structure and purpose of our present

¹¹⁷ PRO: CAB 148/73: OPD(O)(66)(O)(E)4, 7/10/1966. ¹¹⁸ Ibid.¹¹⁹ PRO: CAB 148/73: OPD(O)(66)(O)(E)7, ‘Government Expenditure Overseas’,

18/10/1966.


foreign policy’.¹²⁰ Withdrawing from Germany would have ‘disastrouspolitical consequences’, while withdrawal from Southeast Asia would bea ‘complete reversal of the present Government’s international policy’and would contradict the undertakings it had ‘repeatedly and publiclygiven to our American allies and Commonwealth partners’.¹²¹ Thus,the Foreign Office recommended that there be studies of more limitedreductions across the range of international policy: one third in Europe,and a half in Southeast Asia, as well as cuts in administration andresearch and development. Such cuts might not succeed in reaching thebudget target of £1,850 million which the Chancellor had proposed,but they would make substantial progress toward that goal, and giventhe major interests that would be threatened by further cuts, ‘the foreignpolicy case for not going further will be very strong indeed’.¹²²

At Chequers, Defence Secretary Denis Healey took the lead. Hebacked the Foreign Office’s case, noting that reductions even onthat limited scale would likely ‘involve considerable difficulties’ withBritain’s allies.¹²³ Nevertheless this would be less problematic thanif the Government attempted to withdraw entirely from a the-atre—inevitably Southeast Asia—which would be ‘a major reversalin our foreign policy . . . caus[ing] critical difficulties’.¹²⁴ In the of-ficial record, Foreign Secretary George Brown was noted as brieflysupporting Healey’s position. However, Richard Crossman recordedin his diary a rather different version of events. Brown, according toCrossman, was rather too drunk after dinner to contribute meaning-fully to the discussion. Instead, all through Healey’s presentation, heshouted:

But you just said something different to me last time, Denis. What do you reallymean? Is there no cut in commitments? How can you make such an enormouscut without demanding something of me as Foreign Secretary?¹²⁵

Healey’s response, Crossman noted, was to state simply and quietly thatno such change in foreign policy was necessary; there would still besufficient forces to maintain it.

Crossman recorded himself as appalled at what seemed to him anattempt to maintain token forces ‘quite unable to fulfil any of the precise

¹²⁰ PRO: FO 371/190821: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, ‘1850 Operation: Brieffor Ministerial Dinner: Chequers, 22 October’, 19/10/1966.

¹²¹ Ibid. ¹²² Ibid.¹²³ PRO: CAB 130/301: MISC 129(66)1st Meeting, 22/10/1966.¹²⁴ Ibid. ¹²⁵ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 85.


obligations we’ve undertaken’.¹²⁶ He privately thought it ‘so crude, sounskilful—a futile attempt to remain Great Britain, one of the threeworld powers, while slicing away our defences’.¹²⁷ But the others inthe discussion disputed his arguments. Britain’s central commitmentto stand by its ANZUS allies in Southeast Asia did not imply anyparticular level of forces: rather it was the fact of Britain’s presence andits political support which were valued. If the Government reneged onthese commitments, it would ‘gravely imperil . . . relations’ with theallies, and this would endanger Britain’s vital interests.¹²⁸ Crossman feltdressed down by the others. He was reminded that he was the newestand most junior member of the senior ministers’ group involved in thediscussion, and thus that he ‘must mind [his] tongue especially because[he] couldn’t yet fully understand what was involved’.¹²⁹ The discussionended with Crossman’s dissent quelled.

The meeting concluded that the Government should begin pursuingreductions on the scale proposed by the Foreign Office: one thirdin Europe, and one half in Southeast Asia, along with other cutsin administration and research and development, with the aim ofreaching a budget target of £1,850 million. Only a few months afterthe publication of the 1966 Defence White Paper, ministers were onceagain inaugurating a further revision of defence policy.

It took less than a year for the Defence Review to dissolve: the processof reopening and revising its conclusions began within eight monthsafter it ended. As this chapter has described, those conclusions—alreadyunstable and contradictory when written—failed to take hold in theimmediate period after their publication, and were radically underminedby the sterling crisis of mid-1966.

The initial months of the period were supposed to have witnessedprogress towards one of the key features of the new British defencepolicy: greater co-operation between Britain and its allies. For the BritishGovernment, co-operation with the ANZUS powers was supposed toexpress the major relationships which justified the British presence inSoutheast Asia; in recognizing the allies’ shared interests, it was supposedto help spread the burden that Britain’s responsibilities in Malaysia andSingapore imposed. But Britain and its allies did not even take the first

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 86. ¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 87.¹²⁸ PRO: CAB 130/301: MISC 129(66)1st Meeting, 22/10/1966.¹²⁹ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 86.


steps down this path. They were in fundamental disagreement on whatstrategy should be pursued: whether the West should adopt a posture offorward or peripheral defence in Southeast Asia. What was worse, thedisagreement could not even be properly acknowledged or discussed.The British had used some verbal sleight of hand to gain the allies’assent to talks in the first place, saying that they would stay in Malaysiaand Singapore ‘as long as possible’, though hoping that this would notbe very long at all. This now meant that they could not so much asmention the strategy of peripheral defence they wished to pursue, forfear of being perceived to have gone back on their word. The allies wereno more eager than the British for discussions: the Australians, for fearthat they might give the British an opportunity to withdraw voluntarilyfrom Singapore; the Americans, in irritation at any distraction fromthe pursuit of their war in Vietnam. Thus, no meaningful exchangesever took place within the quadripartite forum: the notion of alliedco-operation was dead before it had even been properly raised.

What did this failure between Britain and its allies imply for theBritish position in Malaysia and Singapore and the eventual decisionsto withdraw? From one perspective, not very much. The ANZUSallies might not have committed Britain to a revised role in SoutheastAsia, but equally they were doing nothing to force Britain out: onthe contrary, their inaction reflected a desire that the British shouldremain in Southeast Asia more or less exactly as before. This also meant,however, that they missed out on a chance to pin the British down withnew co-operative arrangements in the region. They failed to help theBritish develop a reduced role which might have been more sustainable.And they gained no greater purchase on British policy—an omissionthey might have subsequently regretted, for, as later chapters will show,the allies became increasingly irrelevant in the decision-making process.

At the same time that the possibility of quadripartite co-operationwas disintegrating, the British presence in Malaysia and Singaporewas undermined on other fronts. As Confrontation wound down,the relationship between Britain and Malaysia became increasinglyprickly—a development which, it must be said, the British Governmenthad earlier predicted, and which they now had some reason secretlyto encourage. Whether or not they did so is unclear, but certainly itcan be said that the tensions added more to the case for the Britishto withdraw than it did to the case to stay. At home, the enlargedranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party were becoming restive aboutthe Government’s defence policy. While the dissent was fairly easily


quelled during this period, it foreshadowed a greater revolt with moresubstantial effects in a year to come.

The major watershed of the period, however, was marked by thesterling crisis of July 1966. For defence policy, the immediate effects ofthe crisis were limited. While the senior economic ministers had soughta cut of £100 million to the cost of overseas defence, the immediateimpact of this demand had been deflected by the intervention of ForeignSecretary Michael Stewart. Where the crisis did have a more profoundeffect was in sharpening the conflict between Britain’s economic andpolitical interests, and precipitating a breach between the economicand overseas departments over the direction of future policy. Thegeneral consensus within Whitehall that had characterized the DefenceReview was now at an end. The Treasury’s policies during that periodhad failed to free the British economy from its balance of paymentsdifficulties, and these had led only to a succession of sterling crises.Beginning with the massive deflationary package that curbed the July1966 crisis, the Treasury would now try to pursue a much more rigorousapproach to public expenditure. Their new approach was heralded witha demand that the defence budget be reduced again, to fit under anoverall ceiling of £1,850 million. The MOD and Foreign Office soughtto channel this demand along a course least damaging to the currentdirection of their policies—though they were not aided in this by theindependent politics of George Brown as the new Foreign Secretary.The adoption of the new budget ceiling led to the initiation of a newset of Defence Expenditure Studies, with the aim of reducing costsby a half in Southeast Asia and a third in Europe. With the changeddisposition of the major actors—the Treasury less sympathetic to theoverseas departments, the Foreign Secretary more independent from hisdepartment, and the Parliamentary Labour Party more willing to speakout—this policy process, as will soon be described, would play out verydifferently from the Defence Review.

5From Dissent to Revolt: October

1966–April 1967

From October 1966 to April 1967, the British Government secretlydeveloped its plans for reducing British forces further in Southeast Asia.It kept its allies wholly in the dark about this development. Despitethe absence of external intervention, however, the policy process didnot run smoothly throughout this time. In the first part of the period,from October 1966 until early 1967, officials were charged with findingdefence cuts along the lines agreed by ministers at the October 1966Chequers meeting. The new Defence Expenditure Studies, unlikethe Defence Review of 1965, were characterized by infighting betweenthe Treasury and the overseas departments on the direction and extentof the cuts being contemplated. The process of policy review wasdramatically derailed in February 1967 when the Government presentedits annual Defence White Paper to the House of Commons. Largenumbers on the Labour backbenches rebelled and refused to vote inapproval of the Paper, which, due to the unfinished state of the DefenceExpenditure Studies, proposed no concrete reductions. At the same time,the new defence studies had secretly failed to find sufficient savings tomeet the Treasury’s target. The combination of this failure and the hintof a political rebellion in the air caused great alarm amongst seniordefence officials. Seeking to head off any further rebellion, they shiftedfrom planning deep but limited reductions, to proposing a completewithdrawal from Southeast Asia, leaving at most a residual presencein Australia. While the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices resistedthese plans, Denis Healey and George Brown pushed ahead regardless.Even these deeper cuts were insufficient to satisfy many ministers in theCabinet, and they were passed only with difficulty in April 1967.

In the aftermath of the October 1966 Chequers meeting, Whitehallofficials began to prepare studies on further defence reductions. Officials

From Dissent to Revolt: October 1966–April 1967 131

from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and CommonwealthOffices began drafting terms of reference for the studies on furtherdefence reductions, with the aim of achieving an annual budget in thevicinity of the Treasury’s stated goal of £1,850 million. They proceededon the basis which Denis Healey had outlined in the Chequers meeting,namely proposing cuts of a third in Europe and a half in Southeast Asiawhile maintaining the broad thrust of current foreign policy.¹

While this direction had received the collective approval of ministersat Chequers, it was still questioned in some quarters. The Treasury,in particular, was seeking to lock in substantial defence cuts as partof a renewed strategy, from late 1966 and early 1967, to attack thestructural problems of the British economy: endemic low growth, highpublic expenditure, and a fragile balance of payments.² With the pursuitof this strategy in mind, officials within the Treasury privately hoped,and were beginning to manoeuvre, for a more drastic reorientation offoreign policy.

Treasury officials saw two risks arising from the plans to cut forceswithout changing foreign policy commitments. On the one hand,there was a risk that the Government might be forced to maintainexpensive forces at home, as reinforcement for these commitments.Clearly the Treasury would have to guard against this possibility if itwere to achieve the full extent of the savings it desired. On the otherhand, the Government might, after planning its cuts to forces, discoveritself unable to meet its commitments adequately, and this wouldcompel it to withdraw completely from a theatre—a path which offeredthe possibility of substantial and permanent budget savings. Thus,Treasury officials began to push discreetly for such an eventuality: ‘theOverseas Departments could be induced, consciously or unconsciously,to embrace it’.³

Treasury officials saw ‘one of the unacknowledged objects’ of thenew Defence Expenditure Studies as getting the political departments,‘nudged by the Chancellor’, to reorient British foreign policy—thoughthis would more likely come about by inducing a ‘Ministerial reactionto outside events rather than as a result of deliberate prior decision’.⁴Obviously, there were enormous political risks if the Treasury were seen

¹ PRO: CAB 148/68: OPD(O)(66)19th Meeting, 24/10/1966.² Cairncross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s, pp. 159ff.³ PRO: T 225/2716: I.P. Bancroft to G.R. Bell, ‘New Defence Review’, 27/10/1966.⁴ Ibid.


openly to be pushing its own foreign policy, and officials noted that theywere entering ‘explosive territory’.⁵ Nevertheless, Treasury officials wereprepared to act. When the Defence Review Working Party reconvenedto discuss the new studies, the committee initially noted that they hadministerial instructions to assume that there should be no changes toforeign policy because of the planned cuts. Officials from the economicdepartments, however, were keen to stress that ministers were not yetcommitted to these assumptions, and might consider other optionslater on. In particular, the officials pointed out, ‘no decision had beentaken to exclude the possibility of a total withdrawal of forces fromany overseas theatre or a major redeployment of forces, such as fromSingapore to Australia’.⁶

While the pressures for withdrawal were mounting within Whitehall,externally Britain’s allies continued to stress the importance of thecountry’s overseas commitments. In mid-November 1966, the US or-dered US$35 million worth of equipment from the UK in a temporarymeasure to help offset the foreign exchange cost of British forces inGermany. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow argued to PresidentJohnson that the money should also help ‘further nail Wilson ‘‘East ofSuez’’ ’.⁷ Harold Wilson was less keen on this interpretation. When Ros-tow suggested to Wilson that the US$35 million should be understoodas linked to ‘East of Suez’ as well, the Prime Minister demurred. Britainhad made no commitments beyond the Defence Review decisions,Wilson stated, to withdraw or not to withdraw.⁸

Through late November and into early December, the Treasurycontinued to press for a more radical reappraisal of foreign policy.Its officials argued privately that there should at least be a study ofwithdrawing from Singapore to Australia, so that the option could beconsidered.⁹ Senior economic officials were openly sceptical about theproposed manner of reductions the MOD and political departmentswished to pursue. If the earlier Defence Review had really trimmedBritain’s capabilities to the minimum that its commitments required,

⁵ PRO: T 225/2716: I.P. Bancroft to G.R. Bell, ‘New Defence Review’, 27/10/1966.⁶ PRO: CAB 148/53: OPD(O)(DR)(WP)(66)19th Meeting, 11/11/1966.⁷ LBJL: Special Head of State Correspondence: United Kingdom: Box 56: Walt Rostow

to Lyndon Johnson, 13/11/1966.⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: memcon, Walt Rostow, Harold Wilson and James

Callaghan, London, 22/11/1966.⁹ PRO: T 225/2716: I.P. Bancroft to G.R. Bell and A.J.C. Edwards, ‘Defence Expenditure’,

14/11/1966.


how was it possible to consider further radical cuts without alteringforeign policy? The response from the overseas departments was ratherfudged: even if Britain’s formal commitments were unaltered, it wasargued, they would de facto be reduced if the forces assigned to themwere cut back.¹⁰

In early December 1966, the Treasury won a small victory for its cause.Defence Secretary Healey formally presented to senior ministers theproposed reductions which the MOD and Foreign and CommonwealthOffices supported. As before, they involved a one third cut of forcesin Europe and a halving of forces in Southeast Asia, but no changesto commitments. Healey argued that it was politically impossible toplan any fundamental change to foreign policy less than a year afterthe Defence Review, and thus a total withdrawal from any theatre hadto be ruled out. James Callaghan and Richard Crossman were bothcritical of the proposals. Privately, Crossman found the presentation‘totally and completely unconvincing’.¹¹ He and Callaghan both arguedto their senior ministerial colleagues that it was implausible to maintainthe current foreign policy on such sharply reduced forces. Either theresidual forces would be ‘so small that they might well be ineffective forthe ends in view’, or they would require substantial backup in the eventof an escalation of conflict.¹² It was desirable to undertake a study of theeffects of a complete withdrawal from Southeast Asia so that, even if thechoice were not exercised, the Government would know the full rangeof options available to it. Against the views of the Defence, Foreign andCommonwealth Secretaries, Callaghan and Crossman won out, andHarold Wilson, in summing up the discussion, agreed that the optionof total withdrawal from Southeast Asia should also be examined.¹³

From January 1967, the Defence Review Working Party beganexamining in detail the various proposed reductions to Britain’s defenceforces. Within the Working Party, the tensions between the economicand political departments continued to be played out. The politicaldepartments managed to win back some ground against the option oftotal withdrawal. They argued that it would be impossible to undertakea complete study of this option in the time required, and hence therecould only be a shorter study of its political implications.¹⁴ But the effect

¹⁰ PRO: CAB 148/68: OPD(O)(66)20th Meeting, 15/11/1966.¹¹ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 155.¹² PRO: CAB 148/25: OPD(66)48th Meeting, 9/12/1966. ¹³ Ibid.¹⁴ PRO: CAB 148/55: OPDO(DR)1st Meeting, 3/1/1967.


of this narrower focus, Treasury officials privately complained, wouldbe to highlight the negative political consequences of total withdrawal,while minimizing the economic gains.¹⁵ The political departments,in the Treasury’s view, were seeking to present the option of totalwithdrawal as a question to be ‘put to Ministers to which the answer‘‘no’’ is expected and seen to be expected’.¹⁶

On the other hand, the Treasury seemed to be having more success inachieving sharper reductions by stealth. Its officials argued that, ratherthan openly pursuing cuts to Britain’s commitments, a better strategywould be ‘to get our forces cut to the point where the commitments tendto wither away because we just cannot meet them’.¹⁷ The Treasury’sargument questioning the viability of reduced forces appeared to behaving some effect. The permanent head of the Foreign Office, Sir PaulGore-Booth, openly pondered ‘whether there is a point beyond whichreductions become so drastic that you either have not to reduceor to evacuate completely’.¹⁸ This kind of argument caused alarmin the Commonwealth Office. They were all too aware that it was‘undoubtedly the aim of the [Treasury] to get us into a positionin which local dissatisfaction will not make it worth our while tostay’.¹⁹ They felt they were being pushed into the ‘ludicrous position’where budget restrictions ‘whittled away [the role of British forces] tovirtually nothing’, and the justification for the British presence wouldevaporate.²⁰ Other officials in the Foreign Office tried to rebut theargument. They pointed out that even a token presence was ‘muchmore advantageous to us politically vis-a-vis the Americans than nopresence in the Far East at all’.²¹ Even if the British sharply reducedtheir forces, the Americans were unlikely to believe that they ‘might aswell not be there at all’.²²

While the Whitehall departments continued their machinations, theactual work of the Defence Review Working Party was reaching someunsettling conclusions. On their preliminary calculations, they estimatedthat if the British presence in Southeast Asia were reduced by half, as

¹⁵ PRO: T 225/3054: P. Nicholls to I.P. Bancroft, ‘Defence Policy Supplementary Studies’,18/1/1967.

¹⁶ PRO: T 225/3054: P. Nicholls, ‘Defence Studies’, 23/1/1967.¹⁷ PRO: T 225/3054: Nicholls to Bancroft, ‘Defence Policy Supplementary Studies’,

18/1/1967.¹⁸ PRO: FCO 46/30: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to Sir J. Rennie, ‘Malta and Singapore’,

7/2/1967.¹⁹ PRO: FCO 24/46: A.H. Reed to Walsh Atkins, 27/2/1967. ²⁰ Ibid.²¹ PRO: FCO 46/32: R.A. Sykes to R.L.L. Facer, 3/3/1967. ²² Ibid.


their terms of reference proposed, the net saving would only be abouthalf the £200–300 million target.²³ At the same time, there was littlecurrent prospect of any revision of NATO strategy allowing a reductionto British forces in Europe. Moreover, the political departments arguedthat it would be impossible to get Britain’s allies even to acquiesce toa reduction by half to forces in Southeast Asia in the short term, ifthe Government tried simultaneously to plan larger long-term savingsthrough either reductions to a minimal presence in Southeast Asia or acomplete withdrawal. The Government would have to choose betweennegotiating immediate but limited savings, or spending more timelooking at the possibility of deeper cuts.²⁴

Privately, senior defence figures were deeply concerned at the pre-liminary findings. At a meeting with his head of department and theChiefs of Staff, Denis Healey expressed the fear that the Defence ReviewWorking Party was on the ‘wrong track’.²⁵ Its final conclusions wereunlikely to find sufficient savings, but by then it would be too late togo back and undertake new studies in time for an expected statementon Government expenditure in July. The Permanent Under Secretaryof Defence warned that if the MOD and political departments did notfind adequate savings on their own, ‘there would be a serious risk ofMinisters [in the Cabinet] deciding somewhat arbitrarily that cuts indefence votes of up to . . . £300m would have to be made’, without evena proper assessment of their implications.²⁶

At the end of February, the British Government published its 1967Defence White Paper, an occasion which provided a vivid demonstrationof the domestic political pressure to make sharper defence cuts. Thanksto the incomplete state of the new Defence Expenditure Studies, theWhite Paper contained little in terms of policy statements. As CabinetSecretary Sir Burke Trend noted to the Prime Minister, it was ‘essentiallya stalling White Paper’.²⁷ It only discreetly presaged the possibility ofdefence reductions in the future, noting that the Defence Review was ‘acontinuing process’ and that the Government was ‘re-examin[ing] thepolitical, economic, and military implications of our deployment outside

²³ PRO: CAB 148/55: OPDO(DR)9th Meeting, 24/2/1967. ²⁴ Ibid.²⁵ PRO: DEFE 13/584: Defence Secretary’s Office, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’,

20/2/1967.²⁶ Ibid.²⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1383: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Statement of Defence

Estimates—Policy and Planning Sections’, 26/1/1967.


Europe’.²⁸ Innocuous though the White Paper was, its publication gavethe Parliamentary Labour Party the opportunity to vent all its pent-upgrievances about the Government’s defence policy.

Labour Party restiveness had been increasing all through February,with every Party meeting witnessing backbench criticism of the Gov-ernment’s support for the US in Vietnam.²⁹ When the Governmentdiscussed the White Paper with the Parliamentary Party on 22 Febru-ary, ministers had to contend with a barrage of criticism. ChristopherMayhew, still the most vocal critic of defence policy, proposed a mo-tion to the Party asking for ‘an earlier and more extensive reduction’of the country’s ‘East of Suez’ commitments.³⁰ George Brown andDenis Healey succeeded in averting a vote on the motion, insteadhaving it merely noted. This, though, was only achieved after the twoministers had given assurances to the Party that they were pursuingdefence reductions as quickly as possible, and were only being de-layed in reducing commitments by the time needed to negotiate withallies.

A week later, it was clear that the Government had not managedto assuage its critics. The Times reported in the days leading up to thedefence vote in the House of Commons that a number of backbenchMPs were publicly calling for sharper budget cuts.³¹ Richard Crossman,as Leader of the House, was privately ‘extremely alarmed at [the] mood’of the backbench.³² He found Labour MPs in the lobbies saying, ‘ifwe don’t do it this time how can we ever oppose this bloody defencepolicy?’³³ Though the Chief Whip had been assuring senior ministersthat only about 40 backbenchers were likely to abstain in the defencevote, Crossman predicted it could be half as many again.

In their opening speeches for the two days of the defence debate,Denis Healey and George Brown sought to placate their critics. Bothemphasized once again the Government’s ambition to reduce defenceexpenditure: ‘We cannot be the policemen of the world’, claimedHealey, ‘and no one in the Government believes that we should go on

²⁸ Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967 , Cmnd 3203 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1967),pp. 2–3.

²⁹ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 260, 2/2/1967, 14/2/1967, 16/2/1967.

³⁰ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes, Card 260, 22/2/1967.³¹ ‘Tories hope to force split on defence’, The Times, 23/2/1967, p. 2; ‘Rebels move on

defence’, The Times, 24/2/1967, p. 2.³² Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 256. ³³ Ibid., p. 257.


doing all that we have been doing until now’.³⁴ But, as Healey andBrown pointed out, the Government did not have a completely freehand to reduce defence expenditure as quickly as it liked. It had to bemindful of the interests of the country’s allies, and of the need not toendanger economic and political stability.

These points did little to convince the critics. While attempts bythe Conservative Opposition to attack the Government were bluntedby its muddled position—with some Tories backing the ‘East of Suez’roles and others wanting cutbacks—a much clearer line of criticismwas mounted by Labour’s backbench critics. For the two days of thedebate, Labour MPs lined up in the House to criticize the Government’spolicies and to ask why, as one backbencher put it, Labour in powerwas ‘so much like the Tory Government’ in the ‘enormous sumsof money’ it spent on defence.³⁵ Speaker after speaker attacked themaintenance of Britain’s worldwide role. The objections were largelyeconomic and strategic. Britain’s overseas defence expenses comprisedthe major portion of the country’s balance of payments deficit, andthe persistence of this deficit hampered the ability of the economy togenerate growth. The achievement of Government’s social aims wasbeing threatened by the tight policies it was enforcing—policies whichhad led unemployment nearly to double in the last six months of 1966,from 300,000 to 500,000.³⁶ At the same time, the critics alleged, theoverseas role that the country maintained was too meagre to have asubstantial strategic effect. It was a ‘delusion’, as one MP put it, for thecountry to think it could still act as policeman for the world.³⁷

While he would have agreed with many of the sentiments beingexpressed, Richard Crossman thought the debate ‘a disaster’ from theGovernment’s point of view, and despaired at ‘the malaise in the Partythat was mounting up’.³⁸ When Healey closed the debate, his speech wascontinually interrupted by jeers and laughter from Labour’s own ranks.³⁹Crossman observed that Healey appeared ‘hopelessly out of touch withhis own people’.⁴⁰ When the House moved to approve the Defence

³⁴ Hansard , Session 1966/7, vol. 742, cols 115, 281ff., 27/2/1967.³⁵ Ibid., col. 137.³⁶ Cairncross, Managing the British Economy in the 1960s, p. 159.³⁷ Stanley Orme in Hansard , Session 1966/7, vol. 742, col. 334, 28/2/1967.³⁸ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 257.³⁹ Hansard , Session 1966/7, vol. 742, col. 400, 28/2/1967; ‘62 Labour rebels on defence’,

The Times, 1/3/1967, p. 1.⁴⁰ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 257.


White Paper, the Government’s malaise was formally confirmed. TheLabour Party’s majority, normally close to a hundred, dropped to just39, with 62 Labour MPs registering their protest by abstaining from thevote. The result was a major setback for the Government. It was, as USEmbassy officials observed, the ‘most massive, back-bench disaffection’the Government had faced since coming to power.⁴¹

Two days later, the Cabinet met privately to discuss the LabourParty’s problems. Harold Wilson began the meeting, in Crossman’saccount, with a statement ‘accusing us all of being out of touch withthe backbenchers’.⁴² Ministers were being disloyal and leaking to thepress against one another. The Cabinet agreed that the Party neededto regroup, and that discipline should be sharply reimposed. Wilsonwas quick to act. At the Party meeting that afternoon he gave the rankand file what The Times described as ‘the stiffest and most autocraticdressing down they [had] ever had’.⁴³ Crossman saw the performanceas ‘silenc[ing] the critics by smashing them’.⁴⁴ Wilson argued that thebackbench had a duty to support the Labour Government, for every MPhad been elected for the Party, not as an individual. He threatened, in aphrase that would become notorious, to revoke the Party endorsementof rebel MPs: ‘every dog is allowed one bite, [but a] dog that goes onbiting all the time . . . may not get his licence renewed’.⁴⁵ Wilson’swords provoked a storm of public controversy that would persist forweeks.

In the wake of the defence vote, there was an immediate and dramaticshift in the temper of the British policy process. Denis Healey and hissenior staff were concerned that Cabinet critics of the current defencepolicy—who had previously been ignored—would now be energized toexpress their views. Fearful a Cabinet rebellion on defence might forcemassive and arbitrary cuts in defence, senior MOD staff moved rapidlyto sharpen the extent of their own plans for reductions. George Brownand Harold Wilson quickly backed them. Other ministers and officialswho sought to adopt a more measured and incremental approach weresimply left behind.

⁴¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 1/3/1967.⁴² Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 259.⁴³ ‘Prime Minister thrashes Labour rebels’, The Times, 3/3/1967, p. 1.⁴⁴ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 262.⁴⁵ ‘Prime Minister thrashes Labour rebels’, The Times, 3/3/1967, p. 1; Bod: PLP Archives:

Party Meeting Minutes, Card 260, 2/3/1967.


On 6 March 1967, Denis Healey’s Private Secretary, Patrick Nairne,proposed a new approach to defence reductions. In a private note toHealey, he pointed out the limitations of the Defence Review WorkingParty. It was evidently not going to find savings on the scale requiredby the Treasury, and there was ‘little or no chance of [it] producing theministerial guidance and momentum required’ if a solution was to befound by July.⁴⁶ He argued for a new way of looking at the problem.The Government should accept that it would not be possible in practiceto make the full budget cuts by 1970/1. But it should implement thosecuts it could as an interim stage to realizing larger savings and a moredramatic cutting of commitments at a later date, say 1975/6. ThoughNairne did not say so explicitly, it was clear that such an approach wassupposed to help deflect the political pressures for an immediate anddrastic cut to defence spending.

Healey took up Nairne’s proposal. A week later, on 13 March, heoutlined a new schedule for reductions to his most senior officials.Britain should remove all its forces from Malaysia and Singapore by themid-1970s. It should run down its forces to half strength by 1970/1 and,by 1975, restrict its treaty commitments to Malaysia and Singapore.It was possible that residual sea and air forces might be maintained inAustralia, though this might be changed.⁴⁷

Over the next few days, Healey met with Harold Wilson, and thenwith George Brown and Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden, todiscuss the new approach. Ahead of these meetings, officials from theForeign and Commonwealth Offices made clear to their ministers thatthey were not enthusiastic about Healey’s new plan. The permanent headof the Commonwealth Office, Sir Neil Pritchard, reminded Bowdenof all the problems an early, voluntary withdrawal might bring about:Australia and New Zealand would regard Britain as ‘untrustworthy’,while in Southeast Asia a precipitate move would ‘create chaos’.⁴⁸Withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore to Australia was ‘not a realisticalternative’, as it would neither meet the concerns of the ANZUS alliesnor help Malaysia and Singapore.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Pritchard admittedthat a ‘withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia by, say, 1975/6 would not

⁴⁶ PRO: DEFE 13/585: P.D. Nairne to Denis Healey, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’,6/3/1967.

⁴⁷ PRO: DEFE 13/585: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 13/3/1967.⁴⁸ PRO: FCO 24/46: Sir Neil Pritchard to Herbert Bowden, ‘Defence Review—Far East’,

14/3/1967.⁴⁹ Ibid.


be a surprise to anyone’.⁵⁰ But he then advised against pursuing thisdirectly. Cutting Britain’s Southeast Asian forces by half ‘should be ourmaximum target’.⁵¹ Even this would create difficulties with Britain’sallies. Any more would be much more difficult again, and should awaita proper assessment.

The Foreign Office counselled a similar approach. It argued that ifthe ultimate goal of a near complete withdrawal were pursued openlyand with a rigid timetable, it would be much harder to negotiate withallies. It averred to the British Government’s experiences in Malta andAden, where the announcement of public timetables for withdrawal hadled to civil unrest. A quiet rundown that sped up in later years wouldbe much less likely to provoke disastrous consequences and would bemuch better placed to achieve ‘the largest net savings’.⁵²

While officials within the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices werewary of Healey’s plans, their leading ministers were not all of thesame view. Unfortunately, the initial response of the CommonwealthSecretary to Healey’s plan was not recorded. It is clear, however, thatGeorge Brown as Foreign Secretary agreed with Healey’s plan and indoing so was prepared to go against his department’s advice. Indeed, hewas willing to push ahead even further than Healey. While the latter waswilling to concede the political utility of maintaining for ‘some years asmall token presence on the mainland of Southeast Asia’, Brown wasmore sceptical, labelling such a residual presence a ‘tethered goat’.⁵³

Towards the end of March, the Defence Review Working Partyfinally reported on its attempts to find the target of £200–300 millionin defence savings. The Working Party concluded, as expected, that ithad been unable to find savings to match the Treasury’s earlier demands.Given the assumption that foreign policy should remain unchanged,even drastic reductions to defence forces could only achieve maximumsavings of about £100–125 million.⁵⁴

As MOD staff had predicted, the DRWP was unable to give anyfirm guidance on what should happen next. None of the depart-ments represented on the Working Party recommended a complete

⁵⁰ PRO: FCO 24/46: Sir Neil Pritchard to Herbert Bowden, ‘Defence Review—Far East’,14/3/1967.

⁵¹ Ibid.⁵² PRO: FCO 46/32: R.A. Sykes to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies:

Interim Report’, 15/3/1967.⁵³ PRO: FCO 46/32: R.A. Sykes to Sir John Rennie, 17/3/1967.⁵⁴ PRO: CAB 148/31: OPD(67)22: OPD(O), ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 22/3/1967.


withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Australia. But beyond that therewas no agreement. The Foreign and Commonwealth Offices said thatthey believed that Britain’s long-term aim should be to withdraw fromMalaysia/Singapore to Australia, but then argued that the best tacticto maximize savings would be ‘probably [to] limit our target . . . atthis stage to making reductions of about a half’.⁵⁵ To attempt more,given the political situation in Southeast Asia, would attract the oppo-sition of Britain’s allies. The Treasury and Department of EconomicAffairs took the opposite tack, arguing that the Government neededto decide to withdraw from Malaysia/Singapore to Australia ‘by adefined date early in the 1970s’.⁵⁶ The MOD argued that its ownplanning purposes required the naming of a firm date for withdrawalto a minimal presence in Australia, given that all departments alreadyfundamentally agreed that this should be the Government’s ultimateobjective. The MOD favoured, along the lines of Healey’s new plan,1975/6 as a target, with 1970/1 as the halfway mark in reductions.The argument was fleshed out in a paper that Healey circulated pri-vately to the key ministers on OPD. It predicted—in figures which theMOD had not made available to the DRWP—savings of £150–200million by 1970/1 and up to £300 million by 1975/6 if his plan wereadopted.⁵⁷

Not every official was impressed by Healey’s attempt to bouncethrough his new proposals. The Prime Minister was informed that ‘theCabinet Office, and particularly Mr Rogers [Chairman of the DRWP],are seething with indignation about [the MOD] paper’, feeling it was‘somewhat dishonest’ of the MOD to continue working with themon the DRWP studies ‘without telling them that this was in theirmind’.⁵⁸ This indignation was made manifest in the Cabinet Secretary’sbriefing to the Prime Minister for OPD. He noted it was ‘unfortunate’that the MOD’s paper had ‘been put forward at the last minuteand without any opportunity for interdepartmental discussion’.⁵⁹ Heexpressed incredulity that OPD was supposed to decide on this optionwhen ‘the political implications . . . have not been examined in even the

⁵⁵ PRO: CAB 148/31: OPD(67)22: OPD(O), ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 22/3/1967.⁵⁶ Ibid.⁵⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1384: MOD, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/3/1967.⁵⁸ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure

Studies’, 21/3/1967.⁵⁹ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure

Studies’, 21/3/1967.


most cursory and preliminary fashion’.⁶⁰ It was neither reasonable norright that the Government should commit itself to a new defence andforeign policy ‘at less than 24 hours’ notice and two days before Easter’.⁶¹The Government had to assess interdepartmentally the benefits, risksand consequences of adopting a 1975/6 target for withdrawal beforecommitting itself to such a plan. Michael Palliser, the Prime Minister’sPrivate Secretary for Foreign Affairs, counselled a similar course. Heemphasized the gravity of the changes being presented: ‘we should beunder no illusion that it is anything but the end of Britain’s ‘‘worldrole’’ ’.⁶² He pointed out that they would also be an abrupt reversal ofthe policies the Prime Minister had publicly advocated. Though thesewere not conclusive arguments against change if it was politically andeconomically right, they were ‘pretty decisive arguments against takingany firm decision now, before everyone disperses for Easter’.⁶³

Whatever the advice of officials, when the ministers in OPD meton 22 March, they were not in the mood to contemplate even aminor delay. Little time was spent discussing the official report fromthe DRWP, which, as Denis Healey emphasized in his introduction,had failed to find the targeted savings. Instead Healey, who had beenallowed to open the discussion by the Prime Minister, focused on hisown paper. He underlined the savings that his new proposals wouldyield: £150–200 million by 1970/1, with half of Britain’s SoutheastAsian forces withdrawn; £300 million by 1975/6, with only a minimalpresence remaining in Australia. George Brown indicated his assent,stating his ‘general agreement’ with Healey’s proposals.⁶⁴ However,Brown appeared to have given way slightly to his officials’ advice: heexpressed reservations on fixing 1975/6 as the firm date for withdrawaland objections to announcing such a date publicly for fear of theconsequences. But he put a different spin on his reservations to that ofhis officials. They had warned that a withdrawal should be contingenton regional stability. He reinterpreted this to suggest that, if the datewere flexible and circumstances allowed, Britain might be able to leaveMalaysia/Singapore even earlier.

Herbert Bowden, as Commonwealth Secretary, spoke more closelyto his departmental brief. He was the only minister on OPD even to

⁶⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence ExpenditureStudies’, 21/3/1967.

⁶¹ Ibid.⁶² PRO: PREM 13/1384: Palliser to Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/3/1967.⁶³ Ibid. ⁶⁴ PRO: CAB 148/30: OPD(67)14th Meeting, 22/3/1967.


raise the question of how a withdrawal from Southeast Asia would affectBritain’s allies. In doing so he strayed into the Foreign Secretary’s brief,arguing that such a withdrawal would ‘have serious consequences for ourrelations with the United States and with Australia and New Zealand’.⁶⁵He obviously sensed a hostile political climate, however, and arguedas a fallback that, even if the Government were set on withdrawal by1975/6, it should delay announcing this for as long as possible. Anypremature disclosure, he warned, would ‘cause grave damage to ourrelations with our allies’.⁶⁶

When OPD moved to open discussion it was clear that ministerswere firm in their intent to change British policy sharply, ignoring theconcerns expressed in official advice. There was ‘a wide measure ofsupport’ on OPD for Healey’s proposals.⁶⁷ However, the key minis-ters were not prepared to countenance a complete withdrawal whereno residual presence would be retained in Southeast Asia or Aus-tralia. Not even the Treasury had been willing to propose this, andwhen Richard Crossman raised it he was roundly criticized. Britainwas bound by honour to Australia and New Zealand, it was claimed,due to ‘the whole course of British history over the last fifty years’,during which these countries had ‘voluntarily joined with us in re-sisting aggression’.⁶⁸ Though a British presence in Australia might belittle more than a token, it would still have ‘intense importance’ forthe host.⁶⁹ On the question of whether the Government should fixa firm target date of 1975/6 for withdrawal from Southeast Asia, thecommittee quickly agreed to the MOD’s argument that for planningpurposes this was necessary. On the question of whether this shouldbe announced, there were greater divisions and no agreement wasreached. In any case, the ministers agreed that none of these deci-sions was final until after consultation with Britain’s allies had takenplace.

This caveat notwithstanding, the ministers on OPD had, at the closeof their meeting, fundamentally reoriented Britain’s defence and foreignpolicies towards a decisive contraction in British power. Only a monthbefore, the planned trajectory of defence policy had been towards a cutby one half in Britain’s Southeast Asian forces but no more than that.After the revelation that these plans would achieve less than half therequired savings, and the political jolt provided by the defence vote,

⁶⁵ Ibid. ⁶⁶ Ibid.⁶⁷ Ibid. ⁶⁸ Ibid. ⁶⁹ Ibid.


the senior defence and foreign policy ministers had rapidly endorsed amuch more fundamental change: aiming for a one half cut by 1970/1,and then almost completely withdrawing by 1975/6. Moreover, theministers had done so according to a plan that had only been drafted inDenis Healey’s office less than two weeks earlier.

A week and a half later the Cabinet was presented with the proposalsthat OPD had approved. But such was the mood of the wider groupof ministers that the plans for retrenchment were sharpened again. InOPD, Richard Crossman had been a minority of one in proposing acomplete withdrawal without leaving a residual presence: but in thewider forum of the Cabinet, Crossman found himself in the majority.

The Cabinet debate on 4 and 11 April 1967 vividly demonstratedthe deep divisions of opinion which existed within the Government.On the one side, expressing the views of both the Foreign and Com-monwealth Offices but alone within the Cabinet, was Herbert Bowden,the Commonwealth Secretary. In the middle were George Brown andDenis Healey, jointly presenting the OPD-approved plans for phasedreductions leading to a minimal presence. And on the other side were ahost of critics, headed by Roy Jenkins and Richard Crossman, seekingfaster reductions and a complete withdrawal.

Denis Healey opened the Cabinet discussions with a presentationsimilar to that which he had given OPD. He noted the failure ofthe official studies to find adequate savings. He then explained indetail the alternative proposal which he and the Foreign Secretarywere putting forward: the reduction of forces in half by 1970/1 andin full by 1975/6 but for a token presence in Australia.⁷⁰ GeorgeBrown followed, emphasizing his agreement with both the financialand strategic arguments for reductions. He further pointed out that itwould still be difficult to get Britain’s allies to agree to the proposals.He underlined, in a pre-emptive attack on advocates of completewithdrawal, advice he had received from the British Ambassador inWashington: a residual presence in Australia ‘might be crucial toobtaining the acquiescence of our allies’.⁷¹

Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden spoke against Healey andBrown, firmer now in his criticism of the proposals than he had been inOPD. In a separately tabled paper, he argued that Healey and Brown’s

⁷⁰ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 16th Meeting, 4/4/1967.⁷¹ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967.


plan was ‘a major reversal’ of Government policies which were onlya year old and had been consistently reaffirmed to Britain’s allies.⁷²He stressed that the proposals were very likely to damage relationswith Australia and New Zealand and would have ‘very serious’ politicaland economic effects on Singapore and Malaysia.⁷³ He argued thatit would be better if the Government decided only on reductions byhalf in the near term, leaving a decision on withdrawal for a fewyears down the track. Nevertheless, Bowden conceded the strength offeeling in the opposite direction. If the Government had to decidenow, however, on withdrawal, Bowden asked that three guidelines beadopted: that the Government would act with the clear aim of not‘creat[ing] a chaotic situation in the Malaysia/Singapore area’; thatit would accept the need to grant mitigating aid to both countries;and that it should be full and frank in its consultations with all itsallies.⁷⁴

Bowden was altogether right in his sense of the strength of feeling infavour of withdrawal. After the first Cabinet session on the proposals,Sir Burke Trend noted to the Prime Minister that the brief discussionshad suggested that ‘some Ministers might find it difficult to give [theproposals] support’ and would push for greater reductions.⁷⁵ Thiswas made manifest in the second Cabinet session. The Chancellor ofthe Exchequer, James Callaghan, was only guarded in his approval,noting that the plans did not achieve adequate savings in 1971 andthus that reductions in other areas should also be considered. Otherministers agreed, pointing to ‘the relatively small savings . . . that wouldaccrue . . . in the lifetime of the present Parliament’.⁷⁶ Some questionedthe planned residual presence after withdrawal: would it prevent theGovernment from cutting back on the hefty cost of equipment, suchas the F111? Did the proposals make all that much sense, or wouldit be ‘more logical to decide to withdraw altogether from the Far Eastthan to maintain a maritime and air presence in Australia’?⁷⁷ Againstthese arguments it was countered that it would be difficult to gain theacquiescence of Britain’s allies, even with the proposals as they were.

⁷² PRO: CAB 129/128: C(67)41: Herbert Bowden, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’,31/3/1967.

⁷³ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967.⁷⁴ PRO: CAB 129/128: C(67)41: Bowden, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’.⁷⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Expenditure

Studies’, 10/4/1967.⁷⁶ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967. ⁷⁷ Ibid.


Furthermore, it was simply not logistically possible to make reductionsat a much faster rate.

In the end, Richard Crossman counted only six clear supporters forthe Healey–Brown proposals, with the majority of the Cabinet feeling‘strongly that the cuts were not radical enough’.⁷⁸ With a substantialproportion of the Cabinet dissenting from the proposals being presented,the Prime Minister had to use his personal authority to swing the policythrough. Employing his prerogative to sum up the discussion, Wilsonconcluded that ‘on balance’, the Healey–Brown proposals could bepassed as the basis for consultations with Britain’s allies.⁷⁹ However, ina nod to the critics, these consultations had to ‘leave open for decisionin June/July’ the final date for withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore,and whether or not to maintain a residual force.⁸⁰

The outcome was a curious and contradictory fudge. On the onehand, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries had now been givenauthority to consult with allies on the basis of the Healey–Brownproposals. On the other hand, the door had still been left slightly openfor the Cabinet to repudiate these proposals when it came to make finaldecisions. George Brown complained openly to the Cabinet about thedifficult position he was being put in: he was now supposed to negotiatean orderly withdrawal with allies, he noted, knowing full well that ‘mostof Cabinet wanted a drastic revision of policy next July’.⁸¹

In the period from October 1966 to April 1967, the consensus ofpolicy-makers on Britain’s future direction dissolved completely. Thisdissolution had begun in the period before, with the July 1966 sterlingcrisis, but sharply accelerated from late 1966 to early 1967.

After the October 1966 ministerial meeting at Chequers, officialsbegan a process of reviewing Britain’s defence posture, with the aimof reducing forces by a half in Southeast Asia and a third in Europe.In the abstract, this process was similar to the early stages of theDefence Review a year and a half before: a process of interdepartmentalpolicy review, out of sight of Britain’s allies. In practice, though,the Review in late 1966 was very different from that of 1965. Noconsensus had been reached between departments on Britain’s direction;

⁷⁸ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 308.⁷⁹ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67) 17th Meeting, 11/4/1967; Wilson, Labour Government,

p. 481.⁸⁰ Ibid. ⁸¹ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 308.


indeed, the Treasury wanted the Review to proceed with completelydifferent assumptions. Thus the Review was marked by disputes betweenthe Treasury, who wanted sharp cuts in Britain’s commitments, andthe Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, who sought to block these. Thefundamental problem of British foreign policy was out in the open: theconflict between Britain’s economic interests and its need to maintainits relations with its key allies.

A full debate on the conflict between Britain’s interests, however,was never held, for any such possibility was overridden by politicalcontingencies. In the February 1967 Defence Vote, the ParliamentaryLabour Party dramatically demonstrated its unhappiness with the Gov-ernment’s slow pace on defence reductions. The Government’s majorityin the Commons was reduced to the lowest since the last election.Spurred on by the fear that a further Cabinet rebellion would imposearbitrary cuts, especially as the initial Defence Expenditure Studies hadfailed to find sufficient savings, the Defence Secretary and his seniorstaff hastily formulated a new plan for reducing Britain’s presence inSoutheast Asia to half by 1970/1, and withdrawing completely, saveperhaps for a residual presence in Australia, by the mid-1970s. Healey’splans gained the quick assent of George Brown, as Foreign Secretary,and further ministerial support on OPD.

These plans had not been drafted or approved in terms of anyassessment of Britain’s foreign policy interests. On the contrary, theyhad been put together so hurriedly that the Cabinet Office and Foreignand Commonwealth Offices had had little notice of them, and no timeproperly to judge their effects. Healey’s plans for a two-stage withdrawalfrom Malaysia and Singapore went from an initial draft to beingapproved by OPD in only three weeks, a sharp contrast to the 1965Defence Review, which had taken more than a year. But when Healey’splans were presented to the Cabinet, the domestic political pressure thatmade such urgency necessary was clearly demonstrated. Most of theministers wanted even more radical defence cuts, and Healey’s proposalswere only saved by the Prime Minister’s summing up, which postponeda final Cabinet decision on the details of withdrawal until July.

Why did domestic, and in particular Cabinet, political pressuresbuild up so quickly, forcing the Defence Secretary to concede plansfor a withdrawal so as to retain a semblance of a defence strategy?Was the widespread dissent regarding the Government’s defence policyconnected to the other major policy change of that time, regardingBritain’s role in Europe? Certainly the timing was suggestive. Harold


Wilson undertook a series of tours to European capitals in early 1967to gauge support for a second British application to join the EEC.Around the time that the Cabinet was discussing Healey’s proposals fora staged withdrawal from Southeast Asia, in April 1967, it also cameto decide in favour of a renewed approach to the Common Market.Yet it must also be observed that none of the official records makeany explicit connection between approaching Europe and withdrawingfrom Southeast Asia—not those from the Cabinet, nor from OPD, norfrom any of the overseas departments. The Government had rejectedreductions to British forces in Europe because of the fragile state ofNATO, not because of its approach to the EEC. None of the LabourMPs who criticized Britain’s overseas defence role in Parliament did sowith reference to a new British role in Europe. While some ministerswho were sceptical of Britain’s Southeast Asian role were also Europeanenthusiasts—notably George Brown and Roy Jenkins—others, such asRichard Crossman and much of the Labour Left, were critical of both.There appears to have been no generally accepted rule of logic or politicsthat led from one policy to the other.

The more likely reasons for the upsurge of Labour Party dissentappear to lie in the issues publicly mentioned by MPs and ministers.Many of them were clearly dissatisfied with the domestic and economiccosts of Britain’s defence role. The Government had been pursuingstrict policies at home to help correct the structural imbalances of theBritish economy, in particular its endemic balance of payments problem.Labour MPs appear to have become increasingly concerned with thegrowing social effects produced by these strict policies—in their effectson unemployment, and the constraints they imposed on domesticspending. They hoped that a firmer line on defence would allow thedomestic effects of the Treasury’s tough policies to be mitigated.

At the same time, Labour MPs and ministers in the Cabinet alsoappear to have been sceptical about the strategic merit of Britain’s con-tinuing role in Southeast Asia. Those who spoke out in the Parliamentarydebate thought the role smacked of delusions of grandeur. Those inthe Cabinet who critically judged Healey’s proposals were doubtful thatresidual forces in Australia would have any strategic rationale.

Economic and strategic factors, however, had deep roots, and MPs’and ministers’ concerns about them had been long-standing: they wouldnot be sufficient on their own to explain the precise timing of theirchanged attitude. One reason for the shift may have lain in an increasingsense of frustration at how the Labour Government appeared to have


lost its direction ever since the financial crisis in the middle of theprevious year. A more basic answer, however, may be found in simplepolitical contingency. Defence policy was rarely the subject of discussionin Parliament: the debate and vote on the annual Defence White Paperwere the only major occasions when it assumed centre stage. Tensionsin the Cabinet and Parliamentary Labour Party on defence policy hadexisted and had been building for some time, but the defence debateprovided the conducting rod through which these tensions could bedischarged. With a flash of Parliamentary anger, the political moodwas transformed, and a staged withdrawal from Malaysia and Singaporewent from a distant possibility to a necessary concession to stave off afurther revolt.

In making these decisions, the Cabinet had fundamentally changedthe direction of British foreign policy: from an ambiguous postureimplying reductions of an uncertain scale, to the endorsement of a nearcomplete withdrawal of Britain’s military presence from the region. Butthough the problem of the clash between Britain’s economic and inter-national political interests had thus been effectively settled—withoutever having been fully and openly addressed—this did not mean thatthe debate was over. Rather, as will be shown in the next chapter,the terms of the debate were transformed from military fundamen-tals—whether or not British forces should be withdrawn—to politicsand symbolism—how Britain should withdraw, and what intentions itshould retain towards the region in the aftermath.

6The Battle for Withdrawal: April–July

1967

For four months, from April to July 1967, an intense battle was wagedbetween all the key actors on British defence policy to decide the exactterms of a British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. While, asdescribed in the previous chapter, the Cabinet had provisionally ap-proved Healey’s plans for a staged withdrawal in 1970/1 and 1975/6 as abasis for consultation with Britain’s allies, important issues had still beenleft open. The Government had not yet decided whether and how thereshould be an announcement of the plans for a British withdrawal—asensitive question in terms of both domestic and international poli-tics. And a decision was also needed on whether Britain should retainany military capability in Southeast Asia after its permanent bases hadclosed. The key debate had changed from whether or not Britain shouldwithdraw, to how to handle the presentation and meaning of thatwithdrawal: whether it was purely a change, albeit a major one, to troopdispositions, or whether it implied a greater diminution of Britain’s role.This was not an insignificant issue: on the contrary, it struck at the heartof the notion of ‘East of Suez’. Was the Government only modifyingthe size and kind of forces it was prepared to deploy internationally, orwas the ‘world role’ itself dead? To the ANZUS allies, the answer to thisquestion was the test of whether Britain was still politically committedto the Western Alliance in Southeast Asia; to domestic critics, it wasan indication of whether the Government’s attitude and outlook hadchanged to match the country’s diminishing means and interests.

All these matters of contention, and the profound effect that deci-sions on them would have on Britain’s position in the world, meantthat the period from April to July 1967 was fraught with unusuallysharp conflicts: between the British Government and its overseas allies,between ministers and officials, between departments, and within theCabinet.

The Battle for Withdrawal: April–July 1967 151

While these conflicts were dense, complicated and ongoing, they canbe broken down into four stages: the initial round of consultationsbetween the Foreign and Defence Secretaries and Britain’s allies; thereaction against the proposals, which succeeded in securing a continuingBritish military capability in Southeast Asia, even after withdrawal; asecond round of consultations, this time between Harold Wilson andother heads of government; and a final period of internal Governmentdebate culminating with the Cabinet decision on withdrawal in earlyJuly. The process was formally capped with the Wilson Government’spublication, on 18 July 1967, of a Supplementary Statement on DefencePolicy, detailing the terms and conditions of a British withdrawal fromMalaysia and Singapore.

Through the whole period from October 1966 to early April 1967,while the Wilson Government had been hastily reassessing the directionof its defence policy, the country’s allies had been kept very much inthe dark. They had not been told that the Government had reopenedfundamental questions on British policy in Southeast Asia, nor werethey aware of the hasty revisions of planned policy that had taken placein the wake of the rebellious defence vote in February 1967. The processof consultation only began in April 1967, when George Brown andDenis Healey were dispatched from London for discussions with eachof the affected governments.

A few weeks before the April consultations began, the allies began tohave their first inklings of British intentions. Even then, though, thewarning signals were mixed, and US and Australian officials were stymiedby a lack of firm information. In late March, the US Embassy reporteda conversation with Foreign Secretary George Brown, who ‘appeared tobe complaining’ that unless the US gave Britain more assistance, it couldno longer shoulder the financial burden of its forces in Malaysia andSingapore.¹ US officials, however, found Brown’s remarks ‘so disjointedthat we could not be sure of their precise reference’.² At the beginning ofApril, the Australian High Commission in London picked up word thatHarold Wilson had been mentioning the notion of withdrawing fromSingapore.³ There was some suggestion that the backbench revolt overthe February Defence White Paper had had a significant impact. High

¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 21/3/1967. ² Ibid.³ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘Britain East of Suez’,

tel. 4014, 7/4/1967.


Commission officials’ diagnosis was that such were the ‘pressures withinthe Labour Party’ that the British Government would likely ‘want to seta time limit for remaining in Southeast Asia’.⁴

A week later, further news suggested that some sort of move wasimminent. The Australians were notified by the British that DenisHealey would be visiting the Far East Command in Singapore from22 April. While the visit was supposed to be ‘routine’, the subject ofdefence reductions would be on the agenda. At about the same time,Foreign Secretary George Brown would be giving an account of theBritish Government’s thinking to the ANZUS allies in Washington.⁵The Secretary of the Australian Prime Minister’s Department was‘apprehensive’ about these upcoming events.⁶ He warned Harold Holtthat it seemed likely a revised British position would be unveiled eitherin Washington or Singapore. Moreover, the fact that Healey and Brownwere speaking almost simultaneously in the two cities suggested thatthe British had already reached a ‘cut-and-dried view’: ‘any question ofHealey ‘‘discussing’’ the situation disappears if Brown is simultaneouslytalking in Washington’.⁷

While the Americans were starting to receive similar information, theywere more sceptical about its veracity. Acting Secretary of State NicholasKatzenbach had been given secondhand reports from a ‘top-level’ Britishsource that the Wilson Government was on the verge of deciding—orhad even already decided—to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore.Katzenbach professed ‘some astonishment’ at the news, given thatin recent meetings George Brown had left no such impression.⁸ Hewondered whether the reports were true, or whether his source hadjust been exposed to some of George Brown’s ‘mood music’.⁹ RobertMcNamara was of a similar frame of mind. He told Australian ExternalAffairs Minister Paul Hasluck that he saw no reason for the sudden rushof rumours. He could not believe that Denis Healey and George Brownwould simply walk away from all the assurances they had given him.¹⁰

⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘Britain East of Suez’,tel. 4014, 7/4/1967.

⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: J.C. Morgan to Sir John Bunting, 14/4/1967.⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: Sir John Bunting to Harold Holt, 14/4/1967.⁷ Ibid.⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Nicholas Katzenbach to US Embassy in London,

12/4/1967.⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 1543,17/4/1967.


US Embassy officials in London were similarly perplexed. On the onehand, George Brown had been dropping a number of hints recently, andthere was ‘considerable evidence’ that British staff had been working onhow to shrink drastically the defence budget, ‘at least on a contingencybasis’.¹¹ On the other hand, US officials had received no corroboratinginformation from regular channels, while Denis Healey appeared stillfirm in his commitments. Moreover, there was no immediate economiccrisis to compel a sudden change in policy.¹² The British Government’srecent painful experience in Malta, where an early military withdrawalhad had to be abandoned after its announcement provoked local civilunrest, suggested that the Government would not court a similar debacle‘East of Suez’. Perhaps George Brown, whose taste for personal diplo-macy sometimes led him to act without consulting staff or colleagues,was ‘launching a trial balloon . . . just to test the air’.¹³ But even thisthe Embassy found unlikely. US officials concluded that if there existedany plans to withdraw, the British ‘have been at considerable pains tokeep them from us. But we don’t think there are’.¹⁴

The Embassy was wrong. In the early hours of 18 April 1967, whileGeorge Brown was flying to Washington for a SEATO conference, theUS Ambassador in London rushed through a warning that Brown wascarrying bad news. While he doubted that any final Cabinet decisionshad been made, Ambassador Bruce reported that key UK ministers hadagreed to speed up defence reductions, aiming at ‘complete withdrawal[from Malaysia and Singapore] by the mid-1970s’.¹⁵ He observed,with the benefit of hindsight, that there had been clear signs of animpending shift in policy. There had been ‘deliberate leaks’ to thenewspapers presenting the issue in stark terms—including a prominentreport in the Sunday Times that major decisions were imminent.¹⁶ BothAmerican and Australian officials had detected that anti-‘East of Suez’ministers were providing encouragement to dissenting backbench MPs:‘keep [the pressure] up’, those ministers had been saying; ‘you’re getting

¹¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘British Position East ofSuez’, 14/4/1967.

¹² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Foy Kohler to Dean Rusk, ‘British Presence East ofSuez’, 14/4/1967.

¹³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: Bruce to Rusk, ‘British Position East of Suez’, 14/4/1967.¹⁴ Ibid.¹⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 210: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘UK East of Suez’,

18/4/1967.¹⁶ Sunday Times, 16/4/1967.


results’.¹⁷ The main point of uncertainty, the US ambassador stated,was the question of how resolute the British were in their intentions.Would the British avoid too sharp and explicit a change in policy if theAmericans and Australians were prepared to provide sufficient financialand military assistance? Or were they already set on a dramatic policyshift so as to achieve the greatest domestic political advantage?

The answer became a little clearer that morning. On his arrival inWashington, George Brown finally opened his Government’s formalconsultations with its allies on the planned defence reductions. Hebegan with a hectic series of meetings with senior representatives ofeach government: Dean Rusk at breakfast, then New Zealand PrimeMinister Keith Holyoake, next Robert McNamara, and finally AustralianExternal Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck at lunch the following day. Ateach meeting George Brown presented the same arguments. The Britisheconomic situation had forced the Government to look once again atits spending. It intended to issue a statement in July, detailing newcivil and defence cuts. The Government was acting now to explainthese plans to all the relevant allies, so that their views could be takeninto account. The plans essentially consisted of a two-stage withdrawalfrom Malaysia and Singapore, with forces reduced to half by 1971, andwithdrawn altogether by the mid-1970s. It was possible that the BritishGovernment might retain a minimal presence in Australia, although,Brown noted, he was under strict instructions from the Cabinet not tomake any commitment to this effect. While the plans had been forcedby economic circumstance, Brown explained, the British Governmentalso thought they made political sense. By the mid-1970s, ‘white faceson the mainland [of Asia] would be increasingly a liability’ and so itwould be sensible to start planning now for their departure.¹⁸

All of the ANZUS allies reacted against the British proposals, but thestrength and focus of their immediate replies differed considerably. TheAmericans were the most restrained, responding with deep reservationsthough not outright disapproval at the British proposals. Dean Ruskexpressed ‘considerable concern’ that the British were planning with-drawals while the Vietnam War was going on.¹⁹ He was also worriedabout the responsibility for Malaysian security, something the United

¹⁷ Sunday Times, 16/4/1967; NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: T.K. Critchley toGordon Jockel, tel. 4607, 20/4/1967.

¹⁸ PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Dean Rusk, Foy Kohler, John Leddy,William Bundy, et al., Washington, DC, 18/4/1967.

¹⁹ Ibid.


States would not be willing or able to pick up. Robert McNamarastated that it would be ‘disastrous’ if the British walked away fromtheir security commitments.²⁰ A minimal British presence in Australiawould be useless, Rusk commented further, unless it were committedto Malaysia and SEATO, not simply the defence of Australia. However,neither Rusk nor McNamara, as George Brown privately noted to theForeign Office, expressed any ‘objection in principle to our leaving themainland’.²¹ Their initial concerns were largely focused on the fate ofMalaysia’s security, a point on which Brown sought to reassure them bynoting that AMDA would continue, albeit with revised clauses on itsimplementation.

While the Americans had responded with concern but restraint tothe British proposals, the initial reactions of Australia and New Zealandwere much sharper. Keith Holyoake’s immediate response to Brownwas to call the proposals ‘a very disappointing shock’.²² Paul Hasluckstated bluntly that he ‘disagreed fundamentally’ with the ‘white faces’argument.²³ Both Holyoake and Hasluck firmly expressed the view thata British presence in Australia would be no adequate substitute forthe loss of the Singapore base. The Australian Government, continuedHasluck, was ‘bound to deplore’ an action that would compromisethe security of the entire region.²⁴ When Brown pointed out that theBritish withdrawal would not take place for several years, Hasluck andHolyoake each countered with the claim that a decision to withdrawwould damage confidence and security as soon as it was taken. In theface of Australian opposition, Brown issued a stark warning: Australiashould not react ‘too hastily or too violently’, for Brown and Healey hadhad to fight hard in Cabinet for even the possibility of maintaining anyresidual role.²⁵ If Australia was ‘uncompromising and unconstructive[in its] attitude’, then Brown feared that ‘those elements in Cabinetwould triumph who wanted to abandon completely a British role Eastof Suez’.²⁶

²⁰ PRO: FCO 46/54: George Brown to FO, ‘Force Reductions in Far East’, tel. 1248,18/4/1967.

²¹ Ibid.²² PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Keith Holyoake et al., Washington, DC,

18/4/1967.²³ PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Paul Hasluck et al., Washington, DC,

19/4/1967.²⁴ Ibid.²⁵ NAA: A4940/1, C4626: Paul Hasluck to Harold Holt, tel. 1585, 20/4/1967.²⁶ Ibid.


To the Foreign Office and Harold Wilson back at home, GeorgeBrown telegraphed his assessment of the allies’ initial reactions to theBritish proposals. He noted that the Australians had taken them ‘harderthan any of the others’.²⁷ Hasluck had been ‘reluctant to accept anyof the arguments’ for withdrawal, and, when asked for a constructiveopinion, had only ‘continue[d] with emotional arguments’.²⁸ Neverthe-less, Brown concluded that even the Australian ‘reactions were muchas we had expected’.²⁹ He warned, though, that the Australians would‘clearly talk to the others concerned and try to organise them againstus’.³⁰

Brown’s assessment was probably accurate, for by the next day, whenall four allies met together, the US position had shifted somewhat closerto the Australians and New Zealanders. Rather than concentratingheavily on the future of Malaysian defence as they had a few days before,the Americans picked up on some of the issues which concerned theothers. Rusk and Holyoake jointly challenged George Brown on the‘white faces’ argument. Many East Asians, Rusk pointed out, wouldprefer ‘friendly Whites to hostile Chinese’.³¹ Holyoake took issue withthe argument’s implication that ‘newer countries’, such as Australiaand his own, ‘would be even less welcome’.³² All the ANZUS alliesspoke of the risks a change of British policy would provoke. Malaysia,Rusk suggested, might be sufficiently unnerved by its uncertain futureso as to ‘come to terms with Peking’.³³ He feared that a shift inthe British position would lead to a ‘chain reaction’ throughout theregion.³⁴

In response, Brown countered that Western influence in SoutheastAsia would be more enhanced than impaired if it were made lessvulnerable to attack by anti-colonialists. The Americans had said them-selves that they would withdraw from mainland Southeast Asia oncethe Vietnam War had concluded. The British needed to decide on adeparture date now for its own planning purposes. Referring to theintense pressure in the Labour Party for defence cuts, he warned thatit was necessary for the Government to announce these decisions ‘tothe country, and certainly to Parliament, since he doubted whether the

²⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1384: George Brown to Harold Wilson, tel. 1269, 19/4/1967.²⁸ PRO: PREM 13/1384: George Brown to FO, tel. 1277, 19/4/1967. ²⁹ Ibid.³⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Brown to Wilson, 19/4/1967.³¹ PRO: FCO 46/54: memcon, George Brown, Dean Rusk, Paul Hasluck, Keith Holyoake,

et al., Washington, DC, 20/4/1967.³² Ibid. ³³ Ibid. ³⁴ Ibid.


situation could be held otherwise’.³⁵ The meeting concluded with theANZUS allies once again stating their objections. These statements,however, also made obvious the differences in emphasis and degreebetween the allies’ reactions. Dean Rusk claimed his Government tobe concerned less with the substance of a 1975 withdrawal than withits announcement in the near future. Keith Holyoake said that hedid not object to the reductions up to 1971, but urged that theBritish not commit themselves to anything more than a reassessmentof their dispositions beyond that. Paul Hasluck, tougher than theothers as before, expressed his objection even to the reductions upto 1971.

Why did the ANZUS allies respond differently to the British propos-als? While they were all keen for the British to maintain their role inSoutheast Asia, this sprang from their individual and particular strategicinterests. The United States’ chief concern in Southeast Asia was, ofcourse, its current involvement in the Vietnam War. Thus it was mostperturbed by the possibility of an immediate announcement of a Britishwithdrawal from the region. Equally, however, it could also envisagethat a withdrawal would have less effect on its interests if it occurred aftera successful conclusion to the war. The key issue for Australia and, to alesser extent, New Zealand was more fundamental than that, for theyboth had an unalterable geographic interest in the long-term securityof the region. For these two countries, then, the damage resulting froma British withdrawal was not contingent on present circumstances butpermanent.

Once the meeting between Britain and the ANZUS allies hadconcluded, the British assessed privately the success of their first con-sultations. They maintained their impression that ‘neither Rusk norMcNamara were unsympathetic’, with both not objecting in principleto a British withdrawal from the mainland.³⁶ But the Australians andNew Zealanders were adamant in their opposition, with the formernotably not exhibiting any interest in a relocated British base, perhapsfor fear of weakening the case on Singapore. The British Governmentwould clearly have to face ‘a lot of difficulty’ with these two countries,and there was a further possibility that the ‘American attitude [might]

³⁵ Ibid. Interestingly, the document originally read ‘and certainly to the Party’, but thiswas crossed out and replaced with the phrase ‘and certainly to Parliament’.

³⁶ PRO: FCO 46/54: R.A. Sykes to George Brown, ‘OPD Meeting on Friday 21 April’,20/4/1967.


harden once they have had time to reflect’.³⁷ Nevertheless, the Britishprivately concluded that the initial negotiations ‘went a good deal betterthan we might have feared’.³⁸

The strength of the Australian and New Zealand Governments’ reac-tion to the British proposals was underlined by messages which HaroldWilson received from the two countries’ Prime Ministers immediatelyfollowing the Washington meeting. Keith Holyoake told Wilson thathe was ‘shocked and dismayed’ at the British proposals.³⁹ He criticizedthem as being ‘entirely at variance with all the assurances we havereceived’.⁴⁰ He noted that he had ‘urged’ and indeed ‘implored’ theBritish Government not to decide now on its plans for 1970 to 1975,and certainly not to set a date for withdrawal.⁴¹

Reactions from Australia were even stronger. The British High Com-missioner in Canberra reported that when he had conveyed news ofthe British proposals to Prime Minister Harold Holt, the latter had‘looked badly shaken and grey in the face’.⁴² While Holt had remainedcalm, it was clear that he had been ‘profoundly upset’.⁴³ This emo-tional reaction was not confined to the Prime Minister. When theAustralian High Commissioner in London personally delivered Holt’sresponse to Downing St, he appeared, Wilson’s Private Secretary ob-served, ‘in a distinctly emotional condition’.⁴⁴ The High Commissionerexplained that the British proposals were ‘particularly distressing tohim[self]’ personally, given how he had spoken up for Britain to his ownGovernment.⁴⁵ He predicted that if the policies were implemented at atime when Britain was backsliding on Vietnam and preparing for entryinto Europe, it ‘would be catastrophic for Anglo/Australian relationsand would make inevitable the break-up of the Commonwealth itself’.⁴⁶Harold Holt’s message to Wilson, which the High Commissioner wasdelivering, was not so dramatic but was equally severe. The AustralianPrime Minister explained that he was ‘gravely troubled’ by the Britishproposals.⁴⁷ He took issue with the ‘white faces’ argument, and fearedthat a British withdrawal would have ‘a serious, and perhaps decisive,

³⁷ PRO: FCO 46/54: R.A. Sykes to George Brown, ‘OPD Meeting on Friday 21 April’,20/4/1967.

³⁸ Ibid.³⁹ PRO: FCO 46/54: Keith Holyoake to Harold Wilson, tel. 446, 21/4/1967.⁴⁰ Ibid. ⁴¹ Ibid.⁴² PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Charles Johnston to CO, tel. 636, 21/4/1967.⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ PRO: DEFE 13/586: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, 21/4/1967.⁴⁵ Ibid. ⁴⁶ Ibid.⁴⁷ PRO: DEFE 13/586: Harold Holt to Harold Wilson, 21/4/1967.


influence’ on American opinion about the United States’ own role.⁴⁸ Itwould be a ‘shattering blow to morale’ in Southeast Asia if Britain wereperceived to be deserting the area.⁴⁹ He urged that whatever reductionsthe British did make, they should be ‘neither intended by you, norpublicly presented, as a final withdrawal’.⁵⁰

A few days later, on 23 April 1967, Denis Healey arrived in SoutheastAsia for meetings with the Malaysian and Singapore Governments, inorder to complete the British Government’s first round of consultationswith its allies. The gap of five days between the Washington and theMalaysia/Singapore meetings allowed time for the Australians to lobbydiscreetly their Southeast Asian counterparts.

The Australian High Commissioner in Singapore met with Goh KengSwee, the country’s Defence Minister, three days before Healey’s visit.Goh was personally sceptical at the possibility of preventing a Britishwithdrawal in the long term, but thought his Government could betterhandle such a withdrawal in a few years. He doubted that Singaporeanswould react to the threat of a British withdrawal with protests andunrest: it would be ‘too undignified and we are too proud’.⁵¹ But hecould not be certain of the economic impact and political effects: inthe past, riots had developed unexpectedly and rapidly. He ‘agreedenthusiastically’ that the situation in Vietnam and the wider SoutheastAsian region meant that Britain should not ‘rock the boat’.⁵² Despitethe expression of these sentiments, Australian officials privately assessedthe Singapore Government as unlikely to plead with the British tostay or demand that they do so, as they would not want to appearbeholden to the UK. They would more likely emphasize the adverseeconomic effects of a rapid closure of the Singapore base, somethingthe British would find difficult to deny. It would be ‘a case of tryingto shame rather than to argue with the British into staying for a whileyet’.⁵³

The Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur had a similardiscussion with Malaysian Minister of Defence Tun Abdul Razak. Razaknoted that his Government was having sufficient difficulties with internal

⁴⁸ Ibid. ⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ Ibid.⁵¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘Healey’s Visit’, tel.

713, 20/4/1967.⁵² Ibid.⁵³ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: AHC, Singapore, to DEAC, ‘Healey’s Visit’, tel.

722, 21/4/1967.


security that it would not be happy with having to pick up externaldefence as well. The Malaysian Government would express ‘concern’ atany substantial reduction in British forces, focusing on the questions ofwhether and how the UK would honour its Defence Agreement.⁵⁴ TheAustralian High Commissioner thought that Razak was ‘quite firm inhis views’, but that the Defence Minister had presented them ‘more insorrow than in anger’.⁵⁵ Thus the High Commissioner doubted thatRazak would be emphatic in his opposition to the proposals that Healeywould be presenting.

The Australian Government fretted at the lack of strong feelings inMalaysia. Hoping to shore up the Malaysian response, the AustralianPrime Minister sent a message to his counterpart, Tunku Abdul Rah-man, on the eve of Healey’s visit. Prime Minister Holt emphasized theAustralian Government’s support for the current defence arrangementsand the seriousness with which they viewed the threat of a British with-drawal. He welcomed statements which the Malaysian Government hadmade about the value of Commonwealth forces—a ‘useful corrective’to the British view that its forces might not be welcome.⁵⁶ In a privateaside to the Australian High Commissioner, he ordered Australian of-ficials to continue to impress on the Malaysians the importance of notletting Healey assume they were indifferent or opposed to the Britishpresence.

The Australian efforts had little tangible effect. When Denis Healeymet with the Singapore and Malaysian Governments he had a mucheasier time than George Brown had had in Washington. He foundthe Singapore Government deeply concerned at the prospect of anypublic announcement of British proposals to withdraw, but much morewilling than the Australians to accept the substance of such plans. TheMalaysians appeared rather more relaxed again, registering only thelimited concern that the British should not withdraw too dramaticallyor with great fanfare.

Healey had two meetings with Singapore Prime Minister Lee KuanYew, the first on the leader’s yacht, the second in his office. Healeybegan by admitting that what he had to say would be ‘unpalatable’ to

⁵⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: DEAC to Paul Hasluck, tel. 1223, 21/4/1967.⁵⁵ Ibid.⁵⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: Harold Holt to AHC, Kuala Lumpur, tel. 1121,

22/4/1967.


the Singapore Government.⁵⁷ He explained the economic and financialstrains which were forcing the British Government to its new plans:to reduce its forces in half by 1970/1, and to be off the mainland ofSoutheast Asia by the mid-1970s. Lee Kuan Yew, the British recordnoted, was ‘clearly shaken by what Mr Healey had said’.⁵⁸ He did notattempt to formulate an immediate response, but confined himself toasking questions about the firmness, timing and details of the Britishdecision. Gradually, however, Lee ‘became his vigorous self again’,asserting that his main concern was with the damage to confidencethat would result from an announcement of plans for a completewithdrawal.⁵⁹

He elaborated on this point the next day when their discussion con-tinued. At this meeting, Lee admitted that his reaction was tempered bythe knowledge that Britain could not stay at pre-Confrontation strengthindefinitely. But if plans for a British withdrawal were publicized, itwould have the ‘most damaging effect on the whole region’.⁶⁰ Otherpowers would sense an impending vacuum in the region, and this wouldhave gravely destabilizing effects. Confidence in the continuing viabilityof Singapore itself would evaporate, and the resulting flight of capitalwould cripple the fledgling state. Lee urged the British to announce theirplans only to 1970/1. This reticence would allow the two governmentsto work on building confidence before the remaining British objectiveswere revealed. Singapore, Lee assertively concluded, ‘fully intended tosurvive the shock of [a British] departure’.⁶¹ Privately, British officialswere reasonably pleased with this result, judging Lee’s reaction to be asgood as could be expected, and his approach to be ‘constructive andfriendly throughout’.⁶²

Two days later, Denis Healey arrived in Kuala Lumpur for a similarseries of meetings with the Malaysian leadership. Here, Healey hadan even easier ride. He noted happily to officials in London that theMalaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was ‘as welcoming

⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 24/24: memcon, Denis Healey, Lee Kuan Yew et al., Singapore, 23/4/1967.⁵⁸ Ibid.⁵⁹ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 196,

23/4/1967.⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 200,

24/4/1967.⁶¹ Ibid.⁶² PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 196.


as ever and in his best form’.⁶³ Once Healey explained the BritishGovernment’s proposals, the Tunku pronounced that they ‘had notcome as a surprise’.⁶⁴ Neither he nor the Defence Minister, Tun Razak,expressed opposition in principle to a British withdrawal in the mid-1970s. Their central concerns were that the British ‘should not maketoo much noise about it’, and should maintain a presence, even ifreduced, until that point.⁶⁵ As long as Britain continued to stand bythe joint Defence Agreement, the Malaysian Government would not bevery worried.

On Healey’s return to London, the British Government privatelyassessed the progress that had been made in the first round of consul-tations with allies. George Brown provided the top-level appraisal forthe Cabinet. He reported that the consultations ‘proved somewhat lessdifficult than he had expected’.⁶⁶ There had, however, been ‘strong op-position’ to the British plans to announce a complete withdrawal by themid-1970s, opposition which ‘generally had stiffened’ once US officialshad consulted with the Australians.⁶⁷ He argued that the talks had beenmade ‘much more difficult’ because he had not been able to assure theallies that a residual presence would be maintained in Australia afterwithdrawal.⁶⁸ The Cabinet noted this statement, but made no move toalter its position in the light of this.

Why had the reactions of Singapore and especially Malaysia beenso much more muted than those of the ANZUS powers? As therelevant archives remain closed, one can only speculate. Partly, theirresponses may have reflected their status as newly independent states.They would not have wanted to be beholden to the former colonialpower—and certainly would not have wanted to be perceived that way.More fundamentally, however, the two Governments might also havejudged that a British withdrawal would not necessarily cause muchdamage to their own security. Now that their relations with Indonesiawere improving, the main regional threat was Communism. But thetwo Governments might have calculated that if a major Communistchallenge was mounted against them, the United States and Australiawould be likely to feel compelled to intervene, as they had donein Vietnam and Thailand. US officials had recently observed that

⁶³ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Kuala Lumpur, to CO, tel. 411, 26/4/1967. ⁶⁴ Ibid.⁶⁵ PRO: FCO 24/23: BHC, Kuala Lumpur, to CO, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit’, tel. 410,

26/4/1967; BHC, Kuala Lumpur, to CO, tel. 411, 26/4/1967.⁶⁶ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)23rd Meeting, 27/4/1967. ⁶⁷ Ibid.⁶⁸ Ibid.


the Malaysian Government appeared to be viewing the United Statesas increasingly having ‘responsibility for [the] ultimate security [of]Malaysia’.⁶⁹ When President Johnson had visited Kuala Lumpur inOctober 1966, the Malaysian king had publicly welcomed him bydeclaring the United States to be the ‘protector of small nations’.⁷⁰ TheMalaysian and Singaporean Governments clearly might have concludedthat if the British withdrew, the burdens of security would pass to theother major powers in the region, rather than to themselves.

Within the British Government there was also another assessmentof why the ANZUS powers had reacted so strongly against the Britishproposals, and this lay in George Brown’s tactics rather than thestrategic fundamentals. The permanent head of the CommonwealthOffice, Sir Saville Garner, told his Foreign Office counterpart thathe thought George Brown’s handling of the Washington negotiationshad been ‘undesirably strong and blunt’.⁷¹ Garner felt that Brownshould have employed only the economic arguments for withdrawal.It was ‘not at all right’ to use the ‘white faces’ argument. Neither wasit politically necessary, nor was it a ‘happy phrase’ to use with theAustralians, who were sensitive about their status as a white country inAsia.⁷² The British High Commissioner in Canberra judged Brown’suse of the phrase ‘a red rag to the Australian bull’.⁷³ And Denis Healeyleaked to the Australians and New Zealanders his opinion that GeorgeBrown ‘had been silly to use these words to white Asians’ such asthemselves.⁷⁴

From the end of the initial round of consultations in late April until theend of May 1967, opposition mounted against the British proposals forwithdrawal. This opposition ranged across several different fronts. Onone, British officials sympathetic to the allied cause secretly encouragedstronger attacks against their own Government’s plans. On another, theANZUS allies sought to develop a co-ordinated and unified responseto the British plans. On a third front, the ANZUS allies sought to

⁶⁹ FRUS, vol. 26, pp. 612–13: James Bell to State Department, 17/11/1966.⁷⁰ Ibid.⁷¹ PRO: FCO 46/30: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to Sir John Rennie, ‘Defence Expenditure

Studies’, 24/4/1967.⁷² Ibid.⁷³ PRO: PREM 13/1384: Sir Charles Johnston to CO, tel. 636, 21/4/1967.⁷⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2A: AHC, Kuala Lumpur, to DEAC, tel. 1105,

27/4/1967.


bolster Singaporean and, in particular, Malaysian opposition to theBritish plans. The cumulative effect of this opposition caused the BritishGovernment to concede that it should retain a military capability foruse in Malaysia and Singapore even after the planned withdrawal in1975/6.

Within the British Government, not all ministers and officials,especially within the defence and overseas departments, were happywith the gathering momentum for withdrawal. Many officials andministers felt that the direction the Government was taking would leadto too abrupt, public and total a withdrawal from Britain’s overseasrole. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the permanent head of the Foreign Office,discreetly warned Sir Saville Garner that he ‘could not guarantee’ thatGeorge Brown would adopt a position the Commonwealth Officewould find agreeable.⁷⁵ Thus it would be ‘very necessary . . . for theCommonwealth Office to speak out loud and clear’, especially againstany intention to announce the plans for withdrawal.⁷⁶

This kind of dissent was transmitted beyond Whitehall. A numberof officials and ministers registered their opposition with Britain’s allies,doing everything from discreetly dropping hints to openly encouragingthe allies to push their case harder. The Head of the Foreign Office’sDefence Department gently nudged the US Ambassador by hinting that‘he felt Wash[ington’s] reaction [to have] been milder than expected’.⁷⁷Denis Healey made his personal position clearer when, at the AustralianHigh Commission in Singapore, he dutifully criticized Australian fearsabout a loss of regional confidence as a case of ‘crying wolf’, but thenruefully added that ‘the wolf is 95 per cent there’.⁷⁸ George Thomas,a new Minister of State at the Commonwealth Office, confirmed toAustralian officials in London the greater sympathy Healey had for theircountry’s views. Thomas further advised the Australian Governmentto press its case more firmly to ministers: ‘Australia must hit hard.They will take notice of what you say.’⁷⁹ There were British ministerswho wished to maintain a residual presence in Southeast Asia, and ifAustralia were seen to meet British concerns halfway, their case couldsucceed.

⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 46/30: Gore-Booth to Rennie, ‘Defence Expenditure’. ⁷⁶ Ibid.⁷⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 24/4/1967.⁷⁸ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘Healey’s Visit’, tel.

739, 25/4/1967.⁷⁹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: Sir Alexander Downer to Harold Holt, tel. 5449,

5/5/1967.


The hints did not pass unnoticed. Dean Rusk quickly tried tocorrect the impression British officials had of his position. He claimedto be not so relaxed as some sources had suggested, ‘not . . . relaxedabout this’ at all.⁸⁰ He thought it was essential that nothing shakeconfidence in Southeast Asia while the Vietnam War was continuing.He understood the British Government’s desire to plan ahead, but wasfirm in his position: ‘Plan as much as you like but for God’s sakedon’t go announcing it all now.’⁸¹ George Brown was not impressed bythe Secretary of State’s change in pitch. ‘I fully understand!’ he noted.‘Someone has got at him since.’⁸²

These sentiments notwithstanding, George Brown and the otheroverseas policy ministers were prepared to concede the depth of alliedopposition to their plans. At the beginning of May, Brown, Healey andWilson met privately to discuss the progress of the British plans. Theyall agreed that it would be necessary to push the Cabinet to accept thatsome sort of military capability would have to be retained for use inMalaysia and Singapore. Unless this concession was granted, they feltthat they would be ‘powerless to negotiate with [Britain’s] allies’.⁸³ Thethree senior ministers were less sure, however, on whether to grant theallies any further concessions than this. They knew that all the allieswere firmly against any announcement of long-term British intentions.But they also noted that an announcement would have advantages,‘both planning-wise and domestic political’.⁸⁴ George Brown made thepolitical calculus clear. He argued that it would be ‘extremely difficult’ toget the Cabinet to agree to retain a continuing capability for SoutheastAsia unless there was some definite announcement of a British intentionto withdraw completely from the mainland.⁸⁵

While senior British ministers were adjusting their position, officialsin the other allied capitals sought to co-ordinate their response. Atthe beginning of May, officials from the three ANZUS powers met inWashington to discuss the situation and their tactics. They noted thatthe British had so far maintained that their plans were only proposals,

⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 46/53: memcon, Michael Palliser, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, Bonn,3/5/1967.

⁸¹ Ibid.⁸² PRO: FCO 46/53: annotation by George Brown to memcon, Palliser, Rusk and Rostow,

3/5/1967.⁸³ PRO: FCO 46/46: C.M. Maclehose, memcon, George Brown, Denis Healey and

Harold Wilson, ‘Overseas Defence Expenditure Studies’, 3/5/1967.⁸⁴ Ibid. ⁸⁵ Ibid.


with no final decisions having been made. There was ‘some scepticism’that this was actually the case: certainly, the British were acting as if theywere fairly sure their proposals would be coming into effect.⁸⁶ But theANZUS allies agreed that there would be no benefit in assuming this tobe true. It would be better to take the British at face value and negotiateas if it were possible to prevent a withdrawal taking place.

This resolution was reflected in the position the Americans took upsoon afterwards. Previously, their opposition had focused on the dangersensuing from a British announcement of a withdrawal—a stance whichhad tacitly acquiesced to a decision to withdraw providing it was keptsecret. From mid-May, the Americans took up a firmer approach, closerto the Australian position. Dean Rusk explained the reasoning to USofficials in London. ‘If [the British] take the decision at all, it cannotfail to be known’: thus the Americans should ‘strike at the basic actionitself and not talk in terms of an announcement’.⁸⁷

The stronger American position was conveyed by Robert McNamaraand Dean Rusk to their British opposites. McNamara, speaking toDenis Healey at a NATO summit, argued that it would be ‘a disaster’for the British to talk of complete withdrawal.⁸⁸ He emphasized thatthe US Government was ‘most anxious’ at the possibility of a Britishdecision to withdraw, and ‘even more worried’ at the prospect of publicknowledge of this.⁸⁹ Dean Rusk took an even stronger line with GeorgeBrown. He argued that a British decision to pull out would ‘have themost devastating repercussions’, and would ‘set up chain reactions thatwill strike at the very basis of our whole post-war foreign policy’.⁹⁰He claimed, not completely honestly, that all five affected powers wereunanimous in questioning why it was necessary for a British decisionto be made now. He accepted that substantial reductions up to 1971might be needed to ease domestic pressures, but he saw ‘no overridingneed why you must decide now on what you will do six to ten yearshence’.⁹¹

In response, Denis Healey was just as firm as his American inter-locutors. He explained in greater detail the reasons behind the British

⁸⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: J.K. Waller to DEAC, tel. 1804, 2/5/1967.⁸⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to David Bruce, 11/5/1967.⁸⁸ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, memcon, Robert

McNamara and Denis Healey, 9/5/1967.⁸⁹ PRO: FCO 46/52: memcon, Denis Healey and Robert McNamara, 9/5/1967.⁹⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to George Brown, 11/5/1967.⁹¹ Ibid.


position. The Cabinet had settled the size of the defence budget theprevious year; two months ago it had become clear that the target wouldnot be met. Thus the Cabinet had decided that ‘a drastic change inforeign policy’ was necessary.⁹² The only way for the Government tomeet its goals was for Britain to ‘get rid of her base installations inSingapore–Malaysia’.⁹³ Though earlier he had claimed that the Britishwere working on assumptions, not final decisions, he stated that therewas ‘no chance [that the Government might] change the decision torun down to zero the British bases’.⁹⁴ He admitted that he was ‘per-sonally against it, but there was no other way to make the budgetarysavings’.⁹⁵

When McNamara tried to challenge the main decision, Healey statedthat there were ‘areas that are closed and areas that are open; it is upto the US to decide how to play it’.⁹⁶ When McNamara asked whetherEurope might be cut in preference to Southeast Asia, Healey replied thatneither the State Department nor the trilateral discussions on offsettingBritish defence costs in Germany had allowed this possibility. Moreover,‘a decision by the UK to join Europe inevitably means a turning awayfrom other parts of the world’.⁹⁷ US efforts would have little impacton the domestic pressures for withdrawal: ‘there are some things thatcannot be changed by bribes, bullying, or even good reasoning’.⁹⁸ Itwas clear, the American record of the conversation concluded, that forpractical purposes the decision to close the British bases in SoutheastAsia had been made.

The official British stance might have been discouraging to theAmericans and Australians, but they also continued to have secretsympathizers within the Government’s ranks. While Denis Healey,George Brown and others had to defend their Government’s proposalsagainst allied attacks, at a lower level British officials and staff weregiving the opposition discreet advice and encouragement. Australianand American officials in Southeast Asia overheard that Britain’s seniormilitary staff in the region were ‘strongly opposed’ to the proposals, butfelt constrained from speaking out on a political issue.⁹⁹ One BritishEmbassy official in Washington was far more forward. He privately feltthat the tougher line Dean Rusk was now taking with George Brown

⁹² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Rostow to Johnson, memcon, McNamara and Healey,9/5/1967.

⁹³ Ibid. ⁹⁴ Ibid. ⁹⁵ Ibid. ⁹⁶ Ibid.⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ Ibid.⁹⁹ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1641: James Bell to Dean Rusk, 10/5/1967.


was ‘absolutely right’.¹⁰⁰ He claimed that officials in the Foreign Officeand MOD were now seeking to be responsive to the US position. It wasessential that the US ‘not let down anyplace along the line’, and crucialthat the President ‘absolutely knock the pants off’ Harold Wilson whenhe visited in June.¹⁰¹ George Brown had thought he had managed aneasy ride through the initial Washington talks, so if the United Stateswas to have some impact, it would ‘have to hit these guys—who areused to rough and tumble—smack between the eyes’.¹⁰²

The ANZUS allies employed a range of tactics to fight the British pro-posals. While they were debating directly with the British Government,they also sought to bolster the support of Malaysia and Singapore fortheir cause. A visible split between the ANZUS and Southeast Asianpowers, or between Malaysia and Singapore themselves, would aid crit-ics of the British presence. Even if, as Harold Holt claimed to LyndonJohnson, Malaysia and Singapore were keeping quieter ‘than their realfeelings would have warranted’ for fear of provoking uncertainty, thisquietness was undermining the allied case.¹⁰³

In Singapore, the Government appeared resigned to a British with-drawal. While Lee Kuan Yew reaffirmed to Harold Holt his belief inthe value of the British presence, he said he was very sceptical about thestrength of British resolve.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, he felt their resolution was movingin the opposite direction. He had gained the impression, from his talkswith Denis Healey, that the British were moving towards a principleof never again committing land forces to a conflict in Asia. This, Leetold the Australians, was likely to be ‘a deeply held moral viewpoint’which would be ‘difficult to dispel . . . completely’.¹⁰⁵ Thus he doubtedit would be possible to reverse the British proposals. At best the alliescould hope to delay the foreclosing of options, and postpone the takingof decisions. To this end, Lee himself was avoiding discussions on futureregional defence and mitigating aid with the British, so that they wouldnot get the impression that planning for their departure had alreadybegun. Lee also warned against the five affected powers appearing tocollude too much in their response to the British, lest that provoke astrong negative reaction from London.

¹⁰⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: memcon, Jeffrey Kitchen and John Killick, 17/5/1967.¹⁰¹ Ibid. ¹⁰² Ibid.¹⁰³ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: Harold Holt to Lyndon Johnson, 4/5/1967.¹⁰⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2A: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Holt, 28/4/1967.¹⁰⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 2A: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, tel. 760, 28/4/1967.


In Malaysia, American officials found the Government even morerelaxed. US Ambassador Bell was told by a senior official that theMalaysian Government ‘understood and generally accepted’ the Britishposition.¹⁰⁶ They were comfortable with the projected reductions,though they were ‘much more disturbed’ by the prospect of an eventualcomplete withdrawal.¹⁰⁷ The Malaysian Government—clearly demon-strating the reasoning on which their relaxed response was based—couldsee ‘no alternative’ but to rely on friends such as the US and Australiain the future: their presence was more likely to guarantee security thandefence arrangements between countries within the region, given thefailure of other forms of co-operation so far.¹⁰⁸

These responses from Singapore and especially Kuala Lumpur causedconsternation within the US and Australian Governments. The regionalgovernments could well afford to be unconcerned about a prospectiveBritish departure, if they held the belief that the United States andAustralia would fill the gap. But it was obviously not in the interest ofthe ANZUS powers to let that view gain currency. William Bundy, theUS Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, ordered his ambassador inSingapore to convey the point that the US would not be able to pick upany further commitments in Southeast Asia. It was important, Bundyargued, for Lee to understand that the US did not want a greater roleand would push for the UK to maintain its presence. Hopefully, if Leeunderstood the US position, he would ‘press Singapore’s case with morevigour’.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, the Australian High Commissioner in Singaporesought to convince Lee to speak out. He argued to the Singapore PrimeMinister that his measured response was creating the impression thatthere was little real opposition to the proposals for withdrawal. He feltthat it was important for the Singaporeans to correct the record andput their views clearly to the British Government.¹¹⁰

At the same time, in Kuala Lumpur, the Americans and Australianstried to convince the Malaysians to take a stand as well.¹¹¹ To this end,the Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur met repeatedly

¹⁰⁶ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1651: James Bell to Dean Rusk, 1/5/1967.¹⁰⁷ Ibid. ¹⁰⁸ Ibid.¹⁰⁹ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1651: William Bundy to Francis Galbraith,

5/5/1967.¹¹⁰ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’,

tel. 962, 23/5/1967.¹¹¹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to David Bruce, 12/5/1967; NAA:

A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 3: Allan Eastman to DEAC, tel. 1179, 4/5/1967.


with senior Malaysian ministers through May, and questioned themon whether they were happy with the British plans. He impressed onthem that if they had problems with a planned British withdrawal, theyshould come out against it in principle, and clearly convey this to theWilson Government.¹¹²

The American and Australian efforts finally reaped some success atthe end of May. In messages transmitted to the Wilson Government,both the Malaysian and Singaporean Governments expressed moreclearly and firmly than before that they had misgivings about theBritish proposals. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister forDefence, Tun Razak, wrote to Denis Healey and took a far strongerstance than his Government had previously adopted. He argued that theBritish proposals would impose unmanageable strains on the Malaysianmilitary, would encourage Communist activities in Southeast Asia andChinese expansionism, and would threaten the regional balance ofpower. He stressed the ‘importance of not making a public statement’about the fate of British forces in the mid-1970s.¹¹³ Moreover, he wenta step further and stated that his Government ‘strongly [felt] it wiserfor Britain not to decide in 1967’ about withdrawal in the mid-1970sat all.¹¹⁴

Lee Kuan Yew wrote directly to Harold Wilson. He stressed less theactual economic consequences of a withdrawal on Singapore—thoughthese would be ‘painful’ and ‘grievous’—than the immediate effect onconfidence once a decision had been taken.¹¹⁵ He argued that as soon asknowledge of this became widespread, Communists and others wouldbegin to plan and act on the basis of an impending vacuum in the area.Singapore’s ‘fragile basis of independence’ would be threatened, whilethere would be ‘jubilation’ amongst Southeast Asia’s Communists.¹¹⁶He recognized that the British Cabinet had to contend with a hostof other economic and political difficulties, but urged that they delayany public commitment to withdrawal until 1971 so that there wouldbe time to assess the consequences. Britain’s eventual withdrawal, hehoped, could be implemented in a way ‘that would give us a maximumchance to continue as a viable community’.¹¹⁷

¹¹² USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1651: James Bell to Dean Rusk, 10/5/1967;NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4: Allan Eastman to DEAC, tel. 1278, 17/5/1967; AllanEastman to DEAC, tel. 1340, 24/5/1967.

¹¹³ PRO: PREM 13/1456: Tun Razak to Denis Healey, 1/6/1967. ¹¹⁴ Ibid.¹¹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1456: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Wilson, 26/5/1967. ¹¹⁶ Ibid.¹¹⁷ Ibid.


The cumulative weight of all the allies’ objections appeared to yieldsome results. At the end of May 1967, Denis Healey brought to theCabinet a paper proposing that Britain retain a continuing capabilityfor use in Southeast Asia even after 1975. As described earlier in thechapter, this proposal had been privately agreed to by Healey, Brownand Wilson in the wake of the first round of consultations with alliesat the end of April. Now, after a month of lobbying by the allies,the proposal was being brought to the Cabinet to establish the BritishGovernment’s stance for the next round of consultations.

When Healey presented the proposal to Cabinet, he carefully craftedhis argument to appeal to critics of Britain’s defence role. He didnot pay attention to the general effects of the original withdrawalproposals. Rather, he focused on how a refusal to compromise at allon a complete withdrawal would affect the Government’s ability toimplement its defence rundown. Healey put forward two arguments:the first emphasizing the need to gain allied co-operation, the second,the importance of maintaining regional stability. In the first argument,he noted that the five other interested powers were prepared to acquiesceto the proposed defence reductions up to 1971, but their co-operation‘depend[ed] critically’ on Britain providing some sort of assurance onthe longer-term situation.¹¹⁸ The Prime Minister was about to entera second round of bilateral consultations, and these could only pavethe way for smooth and rapid reductions if Britain were prepared toappear responsive to allied concerns. In Healey’s second argument, hefocused on the need to maintain regional stability—not simply for itsown sake, but for the benefit of Britain’s own defence position. Hepointed out that if Britain wanted an orderly withdrawal, it had a stronginterest in the survival of a co-operative regime in Singapore. But if itannounced decisions that led to a dramatic loss of confidence, the endresult could be the fall of the present Singapore government, producinga situation which would make ‘the orderly withdrawal of our forces . . .impossible, combining the worst features of our experience over Adenand Malta’.¹¹⁹ Obviously, such an outcome portended ‘dangerous andcostly consequences for our own rundown’.¹²⁰ As well as those twoarguments, Healey also presented the plan for a continuing militarycapability in terms as innocuous as possible. He argued that the size,

¹¹⁸ PRO: CAB 129/130: C(67)81: Denis Healey, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies: Consul-tation on Defence Policy’, 23/5/1967.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. ¹²⁰ Ibid.


character and deployment of the forces need not be decided until afterfurther study, and that whatever form the capability took, it could stillfit within a projected £1,800 million defence budget.

Healey’s arguments were obviously designed to defuse any possiblecontroversy over his plans. Treasury officials briefing the Chancellornoted that it was difficult to object to the proposed continuing capabil-ity, given that no cost for it had been specified. They could only insistthat the budget limit be rigorously enforced.¹²¹ Despite Healey’s efforts,however, the paper still had a difficult ride through Cabinet. Someministers argued that it would be a ‘mistaken policy’ to make commit-ments which would not come into effect until the mid-1970s.¹²² Othersquestioned whether the role Healey envisaged could really fit withinhis projected budget. Still others argued that a continuing military rolein East Asia would be out of scale with the role Britain could affordto play in the world. There was ‘considerable support’ in the Cabinetfor making no commitments to a future presence in Australia.¹²³ Andsome would only support a continuing capability for Southeast Asia ifit could be met with the forces that were required to meet Britain’scommitments elsewhere.

Against this tide of criticism, George Brown and Denis Healey hadto put up a strong defence. They had to point out that they were notentering any new commitments: on the contrary, their plans involveda huge reduction in Britain’s present commitments. The projectedcuts in forces would be ‘the largest we had ever made in so short aperiod except immediately after a World War’.¹²⁴ They reiterated theargument that it simply would not be possible to implement thesereductions without making the commitment they were proposing: theresulting objections from allies and risks to security would jeopardizethe whole process. Whether these arguments managed to convince fullythe majority of ministers is open to question, but they were sufficientto gain the Cabinet’s acquiescence. When Harold Wilson summed upthe discussion, he concluded in favour of the overseas ministers. TheGovernment’s main goal, he stated, was to achieve a one-half reductionof forces in Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, and a total reduction by

¹²¹ PRO: T 225/3059: P. Nicholls to G.R. Bell, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies: Consulta-tion on Defence Policy C(67)81’, May 1967.

¹²² PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)34th Meeting, 30/5/1967. ¹²³ Ibid.¹²⁴ Ibid.


the mid-1970s. The Government had to pay the price of achieving itsgoal, and this cost was to maintain a capability for use in the SoutheastAsian region.

Through June and into July 1967 the Wilson Government conductedthe second round of consultations with its allies. These discussionsconsisted of a series of bilateral meetings between Harold Wilson andthe affected heads of government—first with the US President inWashington, then with the New Zealand, Australian and SingaporePrime Ministers in London.¹²⁵ The bilateral format was preferred byboth the British and the allies. The British did not want to meet all theiropposition in one group. The allies feared that a multilateral summitwould attract undue publicity, and risked being counterproductive ifthey were seen to be ‘ganging up’ against Britain.¹²⁶

The first meeting took place in Washington, between Harold Wilsonand Lyndon Johnson, in early June 1967. In advance of the talks, theAmericans heard news of the British Cabinet’s decision to maintain amilitary capability for use in Southeast Asia beyond the mid-1970s. TheAmerican reaction was mixed. On the one hand, they recognized thedecision as a partial defeat of those in Britain who wanted a firm andunequivocal decision for and announcement of British withdrawal. Theformula ‘fuzzed [the] question of [the] actual physical presence [of] UKforces’ in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia in the mid-1970s.¹²⁷ On theother hand, Dean Rusk complained to the Australian Prime Ministerthat the ‘phraseology [was] so ambiguous as to be meaningless’.¹²⁸ Still,the fact that this decision had been taken at all suggested that Americanopinion was having some effect. Frederick Cooper, Assistant Secretary atthe MOD, briefed US officials that his government had only concededthe decision because of ‘strong pressures’ from the US, Australia andNew Zealand.¹²⁹ Other British sources suggested that ‘a few words’ from

¹²⁵ The Malaysian Prime Minister also visited London from 5 to 10 July, but his visit didnot take place until the British Cabinet was already making its final decisions.

¹²⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4A: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, toDEAC, ‘Prime Minister’s Discussions with Mr McNamara’, tel. 2354, 2/6/1967; LBJL: NSF:CF: Singapore: Box 281: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk, ‘British Position East of Suez’,9/6/1967.

¹²⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 30/5/1967.¹²⁸ NAA: A1838/346, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, to

DEAC, tel. 2352, 2/6/1967.¹²⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Bruce to Rusk, 30/5/1967.


the US might further help prevent an announcement of any withdrawalof permanent forces.¹³⁰

Despite this advice, American officials briefing the President before themeeting were divided on whether there was much chance of extractingfurther concessions from the British. Some advised Johnson to adopt atough bargaining position. Assistant National Security Advisor FrancisBator urged the President to ‘push [Wilson] very hard on East of Suez’,since George Brown had misinterpreted the United States’ ‘light-touchreaction’ earlier on.¹³¹ State Department officials suggested two coursesof action. If Harold Wilson took the firm line that British domesticpolitics and Europe demanded a clear decision and announcementto withdraw, then the US should threaten to ‘reappraise’ its existingsecurity policies and arrangements.¹³² If Wilson looked as though hemight be persuaded to delay a decision to withdraw, then the US shouldmaintain that no such decision at this time ‘could be made palatableto us’.¹³³

In contrast to this, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was more pes-simistic. He wrote as if the decision to withdraw was already a foregoneconclusion, describing the British as having ‘finally decided’ on theirfuture role in the world, shifting away from the remnants of Empireand into Europe.¹³⁴ He expected that in time this shift would alter theAnglo–American relationship. For the moment, though, the US andUK shared a similar view of the world. The British, Rusk expected,would still ‘take a constructive part in helping maintain world order’,but now more through ‘ideas and dexterity . . . than military might’.¹³⁵While Rusk advised the President to voice his opposition to British plansto withdraw, his tone suggested that he did not expect much success.

This state of American ambivalence was detected by Michael Palliser,one of Wilson’s private secretaries, in an advance trip to Washington

¹³⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Philip Kaiser to Dean Rusk, 1/6/1967.¹³¹ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Box 16: Vol. 29: Francis Bator to Lyndon

Johnson, ‘Your Meeting with Harold Wilson’, 31/5/1967.¹³² LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Department of State, ‘Background Paper: East of Suez’,

29/5/1967. Threatening the ‘special relationship’ was also suggested in LBJL: NSF: CF: UK:Box 216: Foy Kohler to Walt Rostow, ‘Presidential Talks with Prime Minister Wilson on theBritish Presence East of Suez’, 26/5/1967.

¹³³ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Department of State, ‘Background Paper: East of Suez’,29/5/1967.

¹³⁴ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 216: Dean Rusk to Lyndon Johnson, ‘Your Talks withBritish Prime Minister Harold Wilson on Friday, June 2, 1967’, 31/5/1967.

¹³⁵ Ibid.


ahead of the Prime Minister’s visit. He diagnosed the Americans asreacting to the British proposals with ‘an odd mixture of indignation,incomprehension and resignation’: indignation, because they saw theplans as ‘a stab in the back as long as they are bogged down in Viet-nam’; incomprehension, because they thought the proposals politicallyirresponsible and unnecessary given that they reached so far ahead intothe future; and resignation, ‘because in their heart of hearts, they believethat Britain is pulling out of her world role and that nothing they cando or say will do more than delay this’.¹³⁶ While the Americans werecontinuing to ask that no decision to withdraw be made, Palliser feltthat ‘all they really hope from us—but this they do most energeticallypress for’ was that there be no announcement of the British plans.¹³⁷He sensed that the Americans were not very impressed with the idea ofthe British retaining a capability for the area: certainly it was not suf-ficient to compensate for an announcement of long-term intentions towithdraw.

When Wilson met with Johnson on 2 June 1967, exactly whattranspired between them is unclear, for initially they met alone, withoutadvisers or note-takers. Wilson reported to his own officials that he andPresident Johnson only briefly touched on the topic of ‘East of Suez’,though the President ‘spoke quite firmly, but in the friendliest way aboutthis’.¹³⁸ The President’s brief report to his advisers was somewhat atvariance with Wilson’s, for he claimed to have taken a very strong line intheir private conversation. Despite these measures, Wilson had avoidedmaking any commitments with respect to the British decision.¹³⁹

The second meeting between Johnson and Wilson was complete withadvisers, and thus officially minuted. Wilson sought hard to defendhis Government’s position without giving any ground. He emphasizedthat ‘no decision’ had yet been reached.¹⁴⁰ But he had a ‘Cabinetproblem’—and it was in that forum that the decision would haveto be taken.¹⁴¹ In his own Government’s defence, he pointed to the

¹³⁶ PRO: PREM 13/1906: Michael Palliser to Harold Wilson, ‘My Washington Recon-naissance’, 1/6/1967.

¹³⁷ Ibid.¹³⁸ PRO: PREM 13/1906: memcon, Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, Washington,

DC, 2/6/1967.¹³⁹ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Dean Rusk to US Embassy in London, 16/6/1967;

LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 5: John Leddy to David Bruce, 15/6/1967.¹⁴⁰ LBJL: Papers of Francis M. Bator: Box 24: Francis Bator, memcon, Lyndon Johnson,

Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Harold Wilson et al., Washington, DC, 2/6/1967.¹⁴¹ Ibid.


recent decision to maintain a capability in the area. But this concessionnotwithstanding, he doubted that the Cabinet would be willing tomaintain a base and troops in Singapore indefinitely. The Americanresponse was relatively muted. While Dean Rusk and Robert McNamararaised their standard criticisms, the President himself said little. Beforethe conversation had reached a conclusion, Johnson steered it back ontocontemporary problems in the Middle East. Administration officialswere slightly puzzled by the President’s tactics. Asked one later: ‘Wereyou being gentle because there were too many people in the room?’¹⁴²The President replied that he had taken a sufficiently strong approachin his private meeting with Wilson earlier that day.

Ten days after his visit to Washington, Wilson himself hosted twovisitors, as the round of bilateral consultations continued. On 12 June,the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister, J.R. Marshall, met Wilsonand other senior ministers for one day of discussions. Following him, theAustralian Prime Minister, Harold Holt, had several days of meetingswith ministers in London.

The discussions with Marshall trod a familiar path, with the NewZealand Prime Minister raising a variety of objections to the Britishproposals, and the British ministers squarely hitting the ball back again.Marshall expressed deep concerns about the effect on regional stabilityshould Britain announce a pending withdrawal. Southeast Asia was hiscountry’s front line, and if Britain departed, New Zealand would notbe able to maintain its position there either. Wilson was conciliatoryin tone, but unmoved in substance. He pointed out that Britain wouldnow be retaining a capability for use in the region. Any greater burdenthan that would be too expensive to shoulder. Singapore and Malaysiawould inevitably have to take more responsibility for their own defencein the future.¹⁴³ Healey gave Marshall a similar response. However, headded a glimmer of hope. While he argued that it was unreasonable forthe allies to expect the British Government to reverse major planningassumptions, it could adjust matters of detail and presentation withtheir interests in mind.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² LBJL: WHCF: Conf F: CO 305 UK: Box 12: Francis Bator to Lyndon Johnson,13/6/1967.

¹⁴³ PRO: PREM 13/1456: memcon, Harold Wilson, J.R. Marshall et al., London,12/6/1967.

¹⁴⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1456: memcon, Denis Healey, Herbert Bowden, J.R. Marshall et al.,London, 12/6/1967.


Healey’s meaning became somewhat clearer in the days that followed,when Harold Holt arrived in London with his Defence Minister, AllenFairhall, for a further round of consultations. Both the British and theAustralians appeared to be trying to avoid the direct clashes that hadcharacterized their previous exchanges. Harold Holt adopted a muchmore conciliatory stance from the beginning of the talks. Gone wasthe blunt refusal to accept any part of the British proposals. Instead,he claimed not to want a wholesale reversal of the British plans, onlya modification on two points: first, that as Britain reduced its forcesin Southeast Asia, those remaining should be weighted towards landforces, rather than sea and air; secondly, that the British should cometo no final decisions or announcements on withdrawal, even if theycontinued to plan for it as a contingency.¹⁴⁵

The British were initially unyielding in their response. Denis Healeyrefused to give way on the shape of the rundown, pointing out thatground forces were much more expensive to retain than sea or airforces, and that, in any case, the Singapore and Malaysia governmentspreferred the latter as they could not provide their own. On whether tomake a final decision and announcement, Healey pointed out that if theBritish were planning a withdrawal it would inevitably become publicknowledge, no matter what had been formally decided or announced.If the British were too vague on the date, it could lead to expectationsthat they would be withdrawing even earlier. And, domestically, therewould be ‘great political kudos’ in announcing a firm date—not onlywith regards to Labour Party opinion, but also, Healey claimed, withregards to general popular support for the policy.¹⁴⁶

On the next day, however, Healey offered the Australians an opening.In a meeting with Holt and Fairhall in the Ministry of Defence, theDefence Secretary claimed that he personally felt ‘there must be a wayof presenting the British position without saying that we proposed toleave the bases in 1975’.¹⁴⁷ He suggested that he could push for avaguer statement if he could say in his Cabinet that the Australian PrimeMinister ‘accepted that the formula left open the possibility of leavingthe bases earlier than 1975 as well as later’.¹⁴⁸ Holt was cautiouslyresponsive. If the British Government could find a formula which still

¹⁴⁵ PRO: CAB 133/329: AMV(67)1st Meeting, 13/6/1967. ¹⁴⁶ Ibid.¹⁴⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1323: memcon, Denis Healey, Harold Holt, Allen Fairhall et al.,

London, 14/6/1967.¹⁴⁸ Ibid.


allowed them their forward planning and financial savings but ‘withoutgiving the impression the world East of Suez could go to hell’, Holtwould find it ‘highly desirable’.¹⁴⁹

A day later again, on 15 June 1967, Holt presented this argumentmore firmly to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan. Hesaid that he was prepared to take the risk that a vaguer date couldallow an earlier as well as a later withdrawal. Callaghan took the point,but underlined that a clearer statement of a date also held benefitsfor economic and political planning. Holt responded by urging thattheir governments should be able to agree to a formula on the linesof: ‘planning was proceeding on the assumption of such [a] withdrawalbarring unforeseen eventualities’.¹⁵⁰ Still cautious, Callaghan notedHolt’s offer, but made no further commitment.

Privately, the Australians were not displeased with the course thetalks had taken. Harold Holt noted to his Deputy Prime Minister thatthe British had exhibited ‘rather more flexibility of mind on the secondday’.¹⁵¹ The Australian High Commission in London was optimistic.Its officials’ assessment was that it now seemed ‘more likely . . . thatan announcement of a decision to withdraw in the mid-70s can beavoided’.¹⁵²

A week later the last visitor to London arrived: Singapore’s PrimeMinister, Lee Kuan Yew. Like the others before him, he did the roundsof the key overseas policy ministers; unlike the others, he also extendedhis discussions to include other ministers in the Cabinet and, indeed,the Parliamentary Labour Party as a whole.

Lee’s first meeting was with Denis Healey and Herbert Bowden, theCommonwealth Secretary. In their talks, Lee presented arguments verymuch in a similar vein to those he had put to Healey and Wilson before.His main stress was on the importance of maintaining confidence inthe region, so that hostile forces would not stir and investment wouldnot take flight, leaving Singapore in financial ruins. He warned of the

¹⁴⁹ PRO: PREM 13/1323: memcon, Denis Healey, Harold Holt, Allen Fairhall et al.,London, 14/6/1967.

¹⁵⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1323: memcon, James Callaghan, Harold Holt, et al., London,15/6/1967.

¹⁵¹ NAA: A1838/346, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: Harold Holt to John McEwen, tel. 7759,16/6/1967.

¹⁵² NAA: A1838/346, 3006/10/4/1 PART 3: AHC, London, to DEAC, tel. 7763,16/6/1967.


dangers that Britain would face if there were a crisis of confidencefollowing an announcement of withdrawal: ‘the rot would set in, andBritain would actually have to send in more troops to salvage what shecould of her interests in Singapore’.¹⁵³ He argued that two elementswere necessary to prevent such a crisis: the British Government shouldmake no statement which suggested that it was going to abandon theregion, and the capability retained for use in Malaysia and Singaporeshould have credible value as a deterrent.

Herbert Bowden spoke little, leaving Denis Healey with the task ofreciting the usual litany of justifications the British had been providingfor their proposals, in terms of economics and political pressures. Healey,however, added a further comment making clearer than before the extentof his sympathy for the allied position. He argued that, personally, hefelt the British Government should only make a limited announcementof its intentions. It should state clearly that it would be running downits forces up to 1970/1. Beyond that, however, it should only say thatit would be making further, unspecified reductions after 1970/1, butthat it was committed to retaining a capability for use in the region forthe foreseeable future. Such a course, Healey hoped, would be sufficientto maintain confidence in Malaysia and Singapore, while providing thenecessary cuts to satisfy domestic political demands.¹⁵⁴

After this relatively congenial discussion with the overseas ministers,Lee moved on to the harder task of presenting his case to the criticsof Britain’s defence role, both those in the wider Parliamentary LabourParty and specific ministers within the Cabinet. He spoke to Labourbackbenchers and sought to persuade them that the continuing Westernpresence in Southeast Asia was not an instance of neo-imperialism. ThoseAsians seeking to evict the West were not necessarily speaking with puremotives: some wanted the West out so that ‘big Asian countries couldsettle their problems with the smaller ones’.¹⁵⁵ The smaller countries hadthe right to ask the West to help redress the balance. US Embassy officialsheard that Lee’s speech had ‘real impact on some Labour MPs’ who hadbeen critical of Britain’s defence role.¹⁵⁶ Richard Crossman noted, withirritation, that Lee had made an ‘immense impression’ on the Party.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ PRO: PREM 13/1832: memcon, Denis Healey, Herbert Bowden, Lee Kuan Yew,et al., London, 22/6/1967.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. ¹⁵⁵ Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, p. 54.¹⁵⁶ LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: John P. Roche to Lyndon Johnson, 29/6/1967.¹⁵⁷ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 400.


Lee supplemented his speech with private meetings with a number ofthe Cabinet critics: Barbara Castle, Roy Jenkins, Lord Gardiner, JamesCallaghan and Richard Crossman. He found almost all of these criticswilling to listen though not to yield. Roy Jenkins sustained objections toBritain’s continuing defence role, but Lee hoped that their conversationhad left Jenkins ‘slightly more amenable’.¹⁵⁸ A half hour meeting withCallaghan stretched into a one and a half hour discussion. Lee thoughtCallaghan ‘reasonable and open to persuasion’.¹⁵⁹ At the end of theirmeeting, Callaghan had indeed been slightly persuaded: he had beencommitted to naming a date for withdrawal publicly, but now, heclaimed, he would ‘think over what you [Lee] have told me. I have anopen mind.’¹⁶⁰ In contrast to Callaghan there was Richard Crossman,whom Lee found to be ‘very rude’, and ‘the most emotionally involvedand voluble’.¹⁶¹ Lee recorded that for an hour Crossman ‘hectored andberated’ him on the need for Britain to withdraw rapidly from ‘Eastof Suez’.¹⁶² Crossman, in turn, noted that Lee looked ‘appalled andthunderstruck’ by his views.¹⁶³ Crossman told Lee that the pressureto withdraw was dominant at party level, but was supported only bya minority within Cabinet. He warned the Singapore Prime Minister:‘For the time being you will have your way. But I shall win in theend.’¹⁶⁴ Lee noted the warning but was not cowed: he privately assessedthat Crossman was ‘too extreme to carry weight’.¹⁶⁵

Lee was fairly satisfied at the close of his visit, which marked thesubstantive end of the British Government’s consultations with its allies.The Singapore Prime Minister had been struck by the despair of LabourMPs at the state of their Government and the country’s economicproblems; was scornful of Labour’s ‘young intellectuals from the red-brick universities’—Lee had a double First from Cambridge—who werepreoccupied with ‘vitamin pills, eye glasses, and bigger pensions’ but had

¹⁵⁸ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘British DefencePolicy’, tel. 8574, 3/7/1967.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. ¹⁶⁰ Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, p. 54.¹⁶¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’,

tel. 1305, 10/7/1967.¹⁶² Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, p. 55.¹⁶³ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 400.¹⁶⁴ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Holt, 6/7/1967.¹⁶⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Critchley to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’,

tel. 8574, 3/7/1967.


no geopolitical awareness.¹⁶⁶ But he was also reasonably confident that,after his efforts, the likely outcome would accord with Healey’s ownview: that the British Government should say it was looking towardswithdrawal but would announce no date for it.

The Singapore Prime Minister may have been feeling confident, but aninside observer would have felt much less certain of the likely conclusionto the Whitehall debates which raged through late June and early July1967. For three weeks, concluding at the end of the first week of July,an intense argument took place within the British Government overthe final details of how Britain would withdraw from Malaysia andSingapore. As had been the case in the consultations with allies, thesearguments were not focused on the fact or rate of British withdrawal:these issues had been largely settled in April and May. Rather the mainbone of contention was the extent to which British plans should beannounced. Opinion was divided between two sides: those who felt thatdomestic—not least Labour Party—political pressures and the needto gain economic confidence made an announcement of withdrawalessential, and those who argued that the risks and damage to Britain’sinternational relations produced by an announcement would be toogreat. Through all of April and May 1967, OPD and the Cabinet hadleft the issue undecided. By the end of the first week of July, however,the Government needed to come to a decision on an announcementso that it could move forward to its planned defence statement in themiddle of that month.

The Whitehall departments were divided on whether there should bean announcement of the planned withdrawal. Opinion in the Treasuryleaned towards the desirability of making a full public statement. Partof the reasoning was tactical: if such a public commitment were made,there would be less danger of the cuts being privately eroded by theefforts of the defence and overseas departments. Treasury officials alsofelt that the cuts being implemented to 1971 would be perceived asonly taking spending ‘a very small margin . . . below its present level’.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Defence Policy’,tel. 1305, 10/7/1967; LBJL: NSF: CF: Singapore: Box 281: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk,‘British East of Suez’, 8/7/1967.

¹⁶⁷ PRO: T 225/3060: P. Nicholls to I.P. Bancroft, ‘Presentation of Defence Policy’,8/6/1967.


For the statement to have much impact on the financial markets, theChancellor would have to be able to herald further cuts to come. But theTreasury’s reasoning was also couched in terms of political realism: therewould be enormous political pressure to make cuts greater than thosethat would be announced for 1971; it was highly probable that theGovernment would be heavily questioned on its long-term planningbeyond that date; whatever decisions were made would be very likelyto leak. Thus the Treasury believed there was ‘no practical alternativeto announcing our intentions’.¹⁶⁸ That said, it did not maintain itsargument vociferously. In the Defence Review Working Party’s finalreport, the Treasury did not openly contradict the majority conclusionthat there should be no announcement of the withdrawal, instead onlyreserving its position on the matter.¹⁶⁹

With the Treasury taking up this measured stance, the views ofthe foreign and defence policy departments prevailed at official level,in the DRWP’s report, and in the advice for ministers preparedby OPD(O). The Foreign and Commonwealth Offices and MODtogether argued that even if British plans were leaked, it would be lessdamaging than if they were announced. All the allies were opposed to anannouncement, and if the Government persisted against this oppositionit would find it more difficult to achieve even the planned defencesavings to 1970/1, not least because of the risk of damaging stability inMalaysia and especially Singapore. The overseas departments disputedthe Treasury’s claim that the Government should be candid to preventit losing the momentum for reductions: an internal agreement on thereductions, they claimed, would ensure that they would be achieved.And damaging publicity would make it harder to implement the cuts,not easier.¹⁷⁰

The Foreign Office’s opposition to an announcement, however,was not fully supported at ministerial level. Through June and intoJuly 1967, a serious rift opened up on this question between ForeignSecretary George Brown and the officials in his ministry. At first,George Brown simply pronounced himself ‘not altogether impressed’with the strength of arguments against an announcement.¹⁷¹ WhenForeign Office staff continued to brief him on the same lines, he

¹⁶⁸ PRO: T 225/3060: C.T. McDonnell, ‘OPDO(67)11: Defence Expenditure Studies’,14/6/1967.

¹⁶⁹ PRO: CAB 148/32: OPD(67)46: DRWP, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/6/1967.¹⁷⁰ Ibid. ¹⁷¹ PRO: FCO 46/59: D.J.D. Maitland to R.A. Sykes, 17/6/1967.


stuck to this position, saying that he was ‘not wholly persuaded’ bytheir arguments and ‘not happy’ with their recommendations.¹⁷² WithBrown refusing to budge, the tone of Foreign Office advice became morestern. Sir Paul Gore-Booth, the permanent head, told Brown that theForeign Office was ‘quite unanimous in advocating this. We are entirelyconvinced that your interest as Foreign Secretary lies on this side of theargument’.¹⁷³ Other overseas ministers agreed. Junior Foreign MinisterFred Mulley added his weight to those against an announcement.¹⁷⁴Denis Healey complained to the Australians that Brown, ‘against theadvice of ‘‘his whole ministry’’, was pressing for an announcement’.¹⁷⁵Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden expressed a strong hopethat Brown would join him in opposing an announcement. But theForeign Secretary’s response was firm: ‘He will not !’¹⁷⁶ Treasury officialsobserved that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary felt anannouncement of the planned withdrawal was necessary ‘for the purposeof convincing opinion that the attack on defence expenditure overseaswas being pressed hard enough’.¹⁷⁷ And Brown reinforced to his officialsthe pressures being exerted by such critics as the Lord President, RichardCrossman, who argued for an even faster withdrawal: ‘You’ll be verylucky to live with my proposal [and] not the Lord P’s!’¹⁷⁸

The intensity of these arguments was magnified by the fact that,for the first time, those within the Government were debating notsimply the future of Britain’s defence forces but the fate of the country’s‘worldwide role’. Before this point, the question of Britain’s role hadvery rarely been touched upon and never discussed in serious policydebate. It had been taken as an unquestioned and unexamined axiomthat, even in a period when the Government at all levels had beenseeking to reduce sharply Britain’s overseas activities, some semblanceof a ‘world role’ would remain. In all the discussions from 1965 toearly 1967 about a possible withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore,

¹⁷² PRO: FCO 46/30: D.M. Day to R.A. Sykes, 27/6/1967.¹⁷³ PRO: FCO 46/33: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, 30/6/1967.¹⁷⁴ PRO: FCO 46/33: annotation by Fred Mulley on Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George

Brown, 5/7/1967.¹⁷⁵ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 4A: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, ‘British Defence

Policy’, tel. 8450, 30/6/1967.¹⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 46/33: annotation by George Brown on R.A. Sykes to Sir John Rennie,

30/6/1967. Emphasis in original.¹⁷⁷ PRO: T 225/3061: P.R. Baldwin, ‘Public Expenditure: Defence’, 26/6/1967.¹⁷⁸ PRO: FCO 46/33: annotation by George Brown on Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George

Brown, 5/7/1967.


the issues had been cast by British officials and ministers as a change instrategy within the Asia-Pacific region, never as an abandonment of thatregion altogether.

Such were the nature of the cuts being considered in mid-1967,however, that Britain appeared on the brink not simply of a quantitativereduction in its forces, but a qualitative change in its strategic orientationand status. Privately, officials from all departments appeared preparedto admit and, indeed, to agree to this. The report from OPD(O),representing the views of all the concerned departments, was unequivocalabout it. By the mid-1970s, it stated, ‘we shall have ceased to play aworldwide military role. We agree with this assessment.’¹⁷⁹ Britainwould soon become a purely European power. The Foreign Officebacked this stance, and advised George Brown to endorse it.¹⁸⁰

Yet while the defence and overseas departments were prepared tomake the fundamental admission in private that Britain would ceaseto have a ‘world role’ in the mid-1970s, they were deeply unwilling toabandon the symbolic remnants of that role, or to present the defencereductions as a qualitative change in Britain’s posture. As noted above,they were strongly against any firm public announcement of Britishplans. Their preferred statement would have fudged the issue. Britainwould be said to be looking to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore.But no date would be fixed, and it would be said that when the timecame for departure a capability would be retained for use in the area,possibly with forces based in Australia if allies agreed.¹⁸¹ Moreover,none of the defence and overseas departments was prepared to outlinewhat the retained capability should comprise, leading to suspicions frominternal Government critics that they were waiting for a more politicallypropitious moment to reintroduce the idea of a major British overseasforce.

These concerns made Treasury officials question whether theircolleagues in defence and overseas affairs were truly committed toeliminating the ‘worldwide role’. The Treasury regarded defence andoverseas policy officials as having been forced to reconsider Britain’srole by the need for financial cuts, rather than through a willingnessto accede to any strategic or political argument. Thus they seemedless concerned with radically rethinking Britain’s commitments than

¹⁷⁹ PRO: CAB 148/32: OPD(67)46: OPD(O), ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/6/1967.¹⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 46/30: R.A. Sykes, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 23/6/1967.¹⁸¹ PRO: CAB 148/32: OPD(67)46: DRWP, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, 21/6/1967.


with ‘salvaging what they can of our present worldwide role from thewreck’.¹⁸² There was a risk that they would surreptitiously reintroducesomething like Britain’s current commitments by letting the role ofthe retained capability quietly creep upwards: the capability presented‘the most immediate danger . . . of the revival of the concept of theworldwide role’.¹⁸³ The Treasury would have to monitor this carefullyif it was to ensure that Britain did not remain committed across theglobe.

At the end of June and in early July 1967, these debates reached theirultimate conclusion. In OPD, and then in the Cabinet, ministers madefinal decisions on the pace and nature of the withdrawals, and whatshould be announced.

In OPD, Denis Healey presented the conclusions of the DefenceExpenditure Studies and the draft of the Defence White Paper thatwould be their public statement. His presentation followed by nowwell-established lines: proposing that forces in Malaysia and Singaporebe reduced to half by 1970/1, and withdrawn altogether by 1975/6; andthat, after this, a capability be retained for use in the area. He arguedthat the main issue in question was how the Government’s policyshould be presented publicly. He described the strong representationsmade by all of Britain’s allies, and added that if the announcement ofwithdrawal was too dramatic, it could threaten the smooth achievementof the defence expenditure savings and undermine the stability of theSingapore Government. On these grounds, he made it clear that hesupported officials’ advice from OPD(O) that judged it wiser not tomake public the Government’s plans to 1975/6.¹⁸⁴

At this point, Richard Crossman broke in to argue that the plannedrate of reductions was too slow. He felt the Government should actuallyadopt a faster rate of withdrawal. Its planned cuts were in politicalterms ‘dangerously slow’: it would be better if Britain could withdrawcompletely by 1970/1.¹⁸⁵ Crossman’s intervention was not well received.

¹⁸² PRO: T 225/3060: C.T. McDonnell, ‘OPDO(67)11: Defence Expenditure Studies’,14/6/1967.

¹⁸³ PRO: T 225/3061: P. Nicholls, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies: OPD(67)46’,22/6/1967.

¹⁸⁴ PRO: CAB 148/30: OPD(67)24th Meeting, 28/6/1967. As noted earlier, Treasuryofficials on OPD(O) reserved their position on the issue of whether there should be anannouncement.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.


It was pointed out by other members of the Committee that the rateof withdrawal had already been approved by ministers as the basis forconsultation with allied Governments. To attempt to withdraw on adifferent basis would lead to further delays. Moreover, there were soundreasons in Britain’s own interests to continue to plan on this basis:a faster withdrawal would induce greater allied opposition and wouldthreaten Singapore’s stability, and both of these possibilities would inturn damage Britain’s own ability to withdraw smoothly.

With Crossman’s dissent quelled, OPD moved at a second meetingto decide the issue of how much to announce. The Prime Minister,Chancellor and Foreign Secretary were all privately known to be infavour of a full public statement, which suggested that the Defenceand Commonwealth Secretaries would have little chance of stoppingthem.¹⁸⁶ So it proved, with the arguments for an announcement domi-nating the discussion: it was argued that the degree of leaks so far madeit impossible to avoid some sort of public disclosure; an explanation ofthe rundown beyond 1971 was necessary; and, perhaps most impor-tantly, without a clear public statement ‘the political advantages thatwould flow from an announcement of the decision would be lost’.¹⁸⁷Thus the Committee decided in favour of an announcement. As aconcession to those against, two caveats were attached, which partlyderived from suggestions that had been aired in the consultations withthe Australians: the target date of the ‘mid-1970s’ would be blurredpublicly to mean ‘between 1973 and 1977’, and it would be statedthat the precise date of departure would depend on ‘progress towardsstability in the area and the solution of other associated problems’.¹⁸⁸Coupled with the earlier decision to retain a continuing capabilityfor use in Southeast Asia, these concessions meant that at least somesymbolic tokens of Britain’s interest and role in the region would beretained.

Three days later these conclusions were brought to the Cabinet tobe ratified. Denis Healey presented the conclusions of the expenditurestudies and the draft Defence White Paper, emphasizing the headlinereductions in forces, costs and foreign exchange: £200 million inexpenditure, and the effective elimination by 1975/6 of the balance ofpayments burden of overseas defence.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ PRO: T 225/3061: Baldwin, ‘Public Expenditure: Defence’, 26/6/1967.¹⁸⁷ PRO: CAB 148/30: OPD(67)25th Meeting, 3/7/1967. ¹⁸⁸ Ibid.¹⁸⁹ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)45th Meeting, 6/7/1967.


Against the Defence Secretary’s arguments, Richard Crossman spokeout once again in dissent, criticizing the proposed timing of thereductions and the promised capability that would be retained inthe aftermath. He backed himself up more solidly this time with apaper he had circulated to the Cabinet outlining his arguments. Herepeated his claims that a drawn out timetable for withdrawal waspolitically dangerous. It was more likely to be challenged and disrupted,and every revision of British plans would damage the Government’scredibility further: ‘the plan of withdrawal will be knocked sidewayslong before the process is over’.¹⁹⁰ A capability retained for use inSoutheast Asia would be a ‘residual delusion of grandeur with whichwe would delude only ourselves’.¹⁹¹ He argued that the Cabinet shouldinsist on a study of the possibility of complete withdrawal in five yearsor less.

Crossman’s arguments, however, were met by a counter-paper tabledby the Commonwealth Secretary, Herbert Bowden. He pointed to themany statements of opposition Britain’s allies had already lodged toan announcement of withdrawal in the mid-1970s. He argued thatit would be difficult to gain their co-operation in implementing theGovernment’s policies unless the British made some concession to theirwishes. If the Government did not do this, but took an even furtherstep backwards and sought to withdraw on a shorter timetable, theconsequences would be grievous. The allies would ‘accuse [Britain] of[negotiating in] bad faith and there would be bitter recrimination in allfour [Commonwealth] countries’.¹⁹² The economic effects on Singaporewould be disastrous, while all of Southeast Asia would be thrown intopolitical uncertainty.

The effect of the two conflicting papers was, as Treasury officialsnoted, to ‘cancel each other out’.¹⁹³ The Lord President could not obtaina faster withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore or the abandonmentof a residual capability; nor could the Commonwealth Secretary avoidan announcement of British plans to the mid-1970s. While the Cabinetrecord noted that there was ‘some support’ for a faster withdrawal, the‘general view’ was that it was ‘not realistic’ to change the timetable

¹⁹⁰ PRO: CAB 129/131: C(67)116: Richard Crossman, ‘Defence Withdrawals’, 3/7/1967.¹⁹¹ Ibid.¹⁹² PRO: CAB 129/131: C(67)119: Herbert Bowden, ‘Far East Defence: Consultations

with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore’, 4/7/1967.¹⁹³ PRO: T 225/3061: I.P. Bancroft to R.G. Lavelle, ‘Defence Expenditure: C(67) 116,

118, 119, 120, 121’, 5/7/1967.


which had been the basis for the consultations with all the allies.¹⁹⁴ Onthe question of making an announcement, it was ‘strongly urged’ thatthe Government make its decision public according to the formula thatOPD had passed, as it would prevent any of the defence savings beingeroded, and would allow the Government to receive full publicity onthe extent of savings it was achieving up to the mid-1970s. Thus, theCabinet decided in favour of making an announcement and agreed topass, with only minor amendments in wording, the defence proposalsand White Paper as had been approved before in OPD.

On 18 July 1967, the British Government released its SupplementaryStatement on Defence Policy.¹⁹⁵ It announced that British forces inMalaysia and Singapore would be halved by 1970/1, and that Britainwould withdraw from its bases there altogether ‘in the middle 1970s’,the precise timing dependent on ‘progress made in achieving a new basisfor stability in Southeast Asia and in resolving other problems in the FarEast’.¹⁹⁶

Significant though these announcements were, they were cushionedby phrases carefully crafted to suggest that Britain was not renouncingits ‘world role’. It was argued that Britain should continue to have arole in security beyond Europe, because of its own interests and thoseof its dependencies, friends, and allies. The British Government wouldcontinue to honour its obligations to SEATO and AMDA, though itwould modify the way these commitments were met. While Britainmight be withdrawing from its overseas bases because their cost was toohigh, it would still maintain the capacity to intervene across the globe:new aircraft would enable forces to be moved around the world quicklyand in large numbers; these technologically sophisticated forces werethe most valuable contribution Britain could make to its friends andallies. Importantly, the paper stressed that ‘we cannot assume that . . .we shall never again have to use our forces in the Far East’.¹⁹⁷ Thusa military capability would be retained for use in the area. While itwould be stationed in Britain, some naval and amphibious forces would‘probably’ be kept in East Asia, and facilities could be used in Australiaand the Indian Ocean.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)45th Meeting, 6/7/1967.¹⁹⁵ Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967, Cmnd 3357 (London: HMSO, July

1967).¹⁹⁶ Ibid., paras 6, 8. ¹⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 9. ¹⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 10.


The response in allied capitals was mixed. The Malaysians were themost relaxed. The Tunku, who had been visiting London at the time ofthe final Cabinet decisions, had privately told Harold Wilson that ‘hecould not follow [the] argument’ of those objecting to a withdrawal:‘If Britain decided that she must withdraw, it would be unreasonableto object, since she bore most of the burden.’¹⁹⁹ As long as Britaindid not appear to be abandoning the area, or encouraging Communistaggression, there would be no problem. Publicly, the Tunku upheldthat view. After the withdrawal was announced, he stated that heremained ‘quite happy’, so long as the British continued to honourtheir treaty obligations and consulted on the implementation of theirreductions.²⁰⁰

The other allies were rather less content. Harold Holt remarkedbitterly to Lee Kuan Yew that he felt the attempts at negotiation hadbeen a charade, for the British decisions ‘appear[ed], in retrospect, tohave been made in substance before any of us embarked on our exercisesof persuasion’.²⁰¹ The British Ambassador in Washington observedthat Robert McNamara appeared ‘extremely sad and dismayed at ourdecisions’, while the Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach,emphasized his own ‘extreme disappointment’ and was sceptical that thedecisions had ‘any real relevance to [Britain’s] economic position’.²⁰² Butnone of the allies wished to express such severe opinions in public for fearof damaging confidence in the region further. Harold Holt stated to thepress that his Government ‘very much regret[ted]’ that the British wereplanning a withdrawal so far ahead, but ‘welcome[d]’ the decision tomaintain a military capability in the region.²⁰³ The US Administrationalso expressed disappointment, but publicly suggested that they still feltit possible for them to persuade the British Government not to withdrawcompletely from the Southeast Asian bases in the mid-1970s.²⁰⁴ At apress conference, Secretary of State Dean Rusk drew attention to the

¹⁹⁹ PRO: CAB 133/359: CMV(67)2nd Meeting: memcon, Harold Wilson, Tunku AbdulRahman et al., London, 5/7/1967.

²⁰⁰ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 5: AHC, Kuala Lumpur, to DEAC, ‘BritishDefence Policy’, tel. 1820, 22/7/1967.

²⁰¹ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 5: Harold Holt to Lee Kuan Yew, tel. 1514,14/7/1967.

²⁰² PRO: FCO 46/49: Sir Patrick Dean to FO, tel. 2380, 17/7/1967.²⁰³ NAA: A1209/80, 1966/7335 PART 6: press briefing by Harold Holt to Heads of

Bureaux in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, Canberra, 19/7/1967; A1209/80, 1966/7335PART 5: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, tel. 1344, 15/7/1967.

²⁰⁴ ‘US hope to stem withdrawal’, The Times, 19/7/1967, p. 1.


British caveat that the withdrawal would not occur without taking intoaccount the prevailing political situation.²⁰⁵

Rusk’s assurance, however, was somewhat undermined by the BritishPrime Minister when, under tough questioning in the Commons,Harold Wilson clumsily ended up contradicting his own new policy.When asked by Edward Heath whether the Government would leaveMalaysia and Singapore even if the area were not stable in the mid-1970s, Wilson first tried to duck the question. Asked again whether theGovernment would withdraw even in the midst of instability, Wilsoncapitulated: ‘Yes, Sir. We intend to withdraw by the middle 1970s.’²⁰⁶He justified this by claiming that staying even longer would be likely toprovoke even greater instability.

The uncertainty the Prime Minister’s remark created, however, wasquickly damped down. The Commonwealth Office rushed a messageto Kuala Lumpur stating firmly that Wilson’s comments should notbe interpreted as a change in policy. The White Paper had alreadynoted that it was not possible to plan in detail after 1970/1: ‘it wouldtherefore be unprofitable to look for too precise an indication of ourintentions’.²⁰⁷ The Malaysian Government was unflustered in response.While the Defence Minister, Tun Razak, publicly noted the divergencebetween Wilson’s comment and the White Paper’s policy, he thenindicated that his own government would continue to rely on thewritten statements of policy contained in that Paper and in Wilson’scorrespondence to the Tunku.²⁰⁸

At home, the Government received criticism from both sides. ShadowDefence Secretary Enoch Powell attacked the ‘arbitrary’ expendituretargets. He argued that the announcement of a date for withdrawalrepeated the mistakes of Aden, and now risked stirring up elementshostile to Britain pushing for a faster retreat.²⁰⁹ But his argumentswere undercut by Denis Healey highlighting a continuing split onthe Conservative front bench, where Powell wanted Britain to shedits worldwide role while others wanted it maintained.²¹⁰ In contrast,from both wings of the Labour Party long-standing critics of the

²⁰⁵ ‘Understanding for British decision’, The Times, 20/7/1967, p. 4.²⁰⁶ Hansard , Session 1966/7, vol. 751, p. 1103, 27/7/1967.²⁰⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1457: CO to BHC, Kuala Lumpur, ‘Defence Policy’, tel. 795,

31/7/1967.²⁰⁸ PRO: PREM 13/1457: Sir Michael Walker to CO, tel. 753, 2/8/1967.²⁰⁹ Hansard , Session 1966/7, vol. 751, cols 1013, 1017, 27/7/1967.²¹⁰ Hansard , Session 1966/7, vol. 751, cols 1006–9, 27/7/1967.


‘East of Suez’ role were united in the view that the Governmentwas moving in the right direction, but not quickly or firmly enough.In both the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting and the House ofCommons debate afterwards, the Labour critics argued that the costs ofthe slow rundown would damage domestic social programmes. If theGovernment was concerned about the economic or social consequencesof a faster withdrawal on Singapore, it should provide direct aid, ratherthan the inefficient subsidy of a defence presence. They suggested thatthe real reason for the gradual rundown was pressure from the UnitedStates and Australia.²¹¹

At least some major figures, however, had been placated by theGovernment’s decisions. Barbara Castle was privately exasperated bythe continuing criticism from her colleagues: ‘They really are the limit.Can’t they realise there has been a revolution in our defence policy andthat East of Suez is dead?’²¹² But few others were willing to admit tothis interpretation. Domestic critics on the Left wanted to argue thatsharper and harder defence cuts were still possible. Defence and foreignpolicy officials and allied governments wanted to suggest that continuityand stability were still being maintained.

The period from April to July 1967 opened with the Wilson Governmenthaving already made a provisional decision to withdraw from Malaysiaand Singapore by half in 1970/1, and completely in 1975/6. For thefour months of the period, however, the Government was caught up inan intense battle over the precise details of how a withdrawal would beimplemented, especially the issues of what continuing role Britain wouldhave in the region, and if and how the withdrawal would be publiclyannounced. These were not fundamental questions of Britain’s militaryposture—a problem that had already been effectively decided in favourof withdrawal—but rather questions over the presentation and meaningof the withdrawal. Nevertheless, they were still deeply significant issues:‘East of Suez’ and the ‘world role’ were more statements of politicalintent and outlook than military doctrines. Depending on how thewithdrawal was presented, Britain might be interpreted as a continuing,albeit slimming, world power, or as a country whose international rolewas being discarded. The importance of these issues is attested by the

²¹¹ Bod: PLP Archives: Party Meeting Minutes: Card 261, 19/7/1967; Hansard , Session1966/7, vol. 751, cols 985ff., 27/7/1967.

²¹² Castle, Diaries, p. 143.


intensity of the arguments that took place through the period. It was notsimply a dispute between Britain and its allies, whose adverse reactionwas predictable, given their obvious interests and the objections theyhad raised to British plans previously. It was also an argument betweendifferent Government departments, between officials and ministers, andwithin the Cabinet. Consensus had completely dissolved into conflict.What forces and interests caused the policy process to become sofractious?

The stances taken by Britain’s allies were anchored in what werewell established as being their interests: for the United States, to retainsymbolic and actual backing in Southeast Asia from the Western allieswhile it prosecuted the Vietnam War; for Australia and New Zealand, toensure the long-term security and stability of the region which formedtheir northern perimeter. Malaysia and Singapore had a similar interestin Southeast Asian stability, but from their perspective this could bemaintained just as easily by the Americans and Australians as by theBritish. Coupled to the domestic political advantages of being seen tobe independent from the former colonial power, this meant that thetwo regional governments took a rather more ambivalent stance on theBritish withdrawal than did the ANZUS powers.

Within the British Government, the position of the overseas depart-ments reflected their judgement of Britain’s overseas interests. Theydid not argue fundamentally against a withdrawal from Malaysia andSingapore: though they had been pushed unhappily into accepting thetimetable, they had ultimately acceded to a withdrawal in principle, andwere prepared to acknowledge its long-term strategic logic. But they didargue that a withdrawal had to be undertaken in a manner that would notlose allied co-operation or contribute to instability in the region: eitherrisk held severe dangers and could ultimately jeopardize the withdrawalitself. On this basis, the defence and overseas departments favoured themaintenance of a British capability in the region after withdrawal, andargued strongly against any announcement of the Government’s plansto 1975/6. In contrast, the Treasury was suspicious that a continuedcapability would lead to higher defence costs. And it argued, thoughnot vehemently, for an announcement of the withdrawal as necessary tobuild economic confidence, and because the plans would be impossibleto hide in any case.

The position of Britain’s allies and the debates between departments,however, did not ultimately have a decisive impact on the policyoutcome. Departmental officials’ pique at how they were being sidelined


in the policy process was strongly in evidence in the degree to which theyleaked and briefed against their own Government to overseas allies—asharp contrast to the solidarity they had maintained during the 1965Defence Review.

In deciding how a British withdrawal should be announced andwhat, if any, symbolic remnant of the former British presence shouldbe retained, the Wilson Government was deciding a largely politicalissue; and it did so with reference not only to international politicalconsiderations and their possible consequences, but also to its owndomestic political circumstances. The judgement of the Cabinet’s mostimportant figures on defence and foreign policy—Harold Wilson,George Brown and Denis Healey—was key.

All three were in favour of maintaining a capability for use in SoutheastAsia. They clearly regarded this kind of concession as necessary if theGovernment were to gain even the grudging acquiescence of its overseasallies. The existence of the capability meant that Britain would not haveto abrogate its commitments unilaterally. It could be used to suggest thata British role in the region was still being upheld—a symbolic tokenof a remaining ‘world role’. To the Americans, it would help maintainconfidence while they were fighting the Vietnam War—even if theproposal as yet involved no specified forces, deployments or costs. Withthe case for the capability presented so innocuously, the Chancellor didnot appear to object strongly to it. While the home ministers—andpossibly even the majority of them—might have been opposed, thePrime Minister could still tilt the Cabinet to support this last remainingtoken of Britain’s Southeast Asian role.

In contrast, Wilson and Brown split from Healey on the issue ofwhether to announce the British withdrawal. Against their officials’advice, both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were stronglyin favour, and were at one with the majority of ministers in OPDand the Cabinet on that matter. The Defence Secretary was backedonly by the Commonwealth Secretary, but this was counterbalancedby Richard Crossman, who argued strongly for an even more radicalretrenchment of British defence forces. The case for an announcementmight have been weak in terms of policy or international politics—noWhitehall department argued strongly for it—but it is clear evenfrom the veiled official record of OPD and the Cabinet that domesticpolitical considerations were uppermost in ministers’ minds. Theirexact calculation cannot be known—unsurprisingly, these ministershave all glossed over their political motives in their memoirs—but their


reasoning can easily be guessed. Presumably, a government which hadrecently faced a major revolt on defence would not want to deny itselfthe benefits of making a major public announcement of changes to thatpolicy. And a government that was popularly perceived to have lostits way would certainly want to maximize the advantages to be gainedfrom showing that it was implementing new policies and finding a freshdirection.

Conclusion to Part II

Why did the Wilson Government take only 18 months to repudiate thepolicies it had announced in its 1966 Defence White Paper? How wasa commitment to maintain the British bases in Malaysia and Singaporefor ‘as long as conditions allowed’ transformed into a determinationto withdraw British forces from the region entirely by the mid-1970s,save for an undefined capability that was to be used in the areaafterwards?

As was argued in Part I, the underlying issue the Government facedin considering its defence policy in Southeast Asia was how to resolvethe conflict between its economic interests and its desire to maintainBritain’s relations and standing with its major allies, especially theUnited States. In the period from March 1966 to July 1967, thatconflict was fundamentally resolved, with the decision to withdraw intwo stages from Malaysia and Singapore, against the express views of theANZUS powers. This resolution, however, was not simply arrived atthrough a measured process of policy development. For, just as the issuewas belatedly being broached by the Government’s formal mechanismsfor reviewing policy, any full consideration of it was swept aside by thedemands of Cabinet and Labour Party politics.

The conflict between Britain’s interests started to become apparentsoon after the Defence White Paper was published in early 1966.Britain and the ANZUS allies failed to come to any agreement overquadripartite co-operation thanks to the inherent contradiction inBritish aims, which on the one hand sought to bind the country securelyto its major allies, and on the other hand hoped to minimize the Britishexposure in Southeast Asia. Then the sterling crisis in the summer of1966 sharpened the conflict again, by emphasizing the parlous state ofthe country’s finances. It ultimately spawned new Defence ExpenditureStudies, with the Treasury being much more determined than beforeto seek sharp cuts to defence spending. This process should havefinally confronted, debated, and resolved the contradictions of British


policy: but it did not. Instead, the Treasury and the political departmentscontinually haggled over what might or might not be examined in thenew studies, what options might or might not be put forward. Thisplayed out for five months, and had reached no useful conclusion when,in February 1967, it was suddenly overtaken by domestic politicalevents.

The great turning point of the period was the Parliamentary defencedebate and vote in February 1967. Before this point, British defencepolicy in Southeast Asia had been almost wholly the province of theinterested Whitehall departments and their ministers. The Cabinet hadhad little sighting of any policy issues, and almost no chance to reviewthem seriously. The Parliamentary Labour Party had raised its voiceoccasionally, but had been fundamentally ignored. But the Februarydefence vote acted like a lightning conductor for all the tension that hadbuilt up on defence policy, energizing all those who had been unhappybut quiescent on the issue finally to speak out. From this point on, thelogic of the policy process was dominated by the politics of Cabinetand the wider Parliamentary Labour Party, and the judgement by seniorministers of what needed to be done to secure their domestic politicalsupport. The Whitehall departments, most notably the Foreign andCommonwealth Offices, were largely sidelined—their impotence mademanifest in their leaking to Britain’s allies with the hope of gainingsome influence on ministers.

After the defence vote, Denis Healey, as Defence Secretary, rushedthrough plans for a two stage withdrawal from Malaysia and Singaporeas a means of forestalling any wider Cabinet revolt on the issue.These plans were never appraised for their wider political and strategicconsequences. The logic of their existence was determined purely by theneed to satisfy Cabinet pressures for a withdrawal from Southeast Asia,while preventing a short term liquidation of the British position. Eventhen, the Cabinet was hostile, and the plan was only saved by the PrimeMinister’s careful deferment of final decisions.

The major issue for the remainder of the period was no longerone of strategic fundamentals—for those had now been effectively de-cided—but one regarding the politics and presentation of withdrawal:how much the Government should assuage its allies by minimizing thepublic change in policy and maximizing the remnants of Britain’s role;versus how much it needed to emphasize that change for domestic po-litical advantage. On these issues, the Government’s decisions mollified,though did not wholly satisfy, both sides.

Conclusion to Part II 197

The Cabinet was the major forum for decision making, with thePrime Minister, Defence and Foreign Secretaries the most importantand authoritative figures. Wilson, Brown and Healey were the ones whojudged that Britain needed to retain a capability for use in SoutheastAsia after the withdrawal, if the Government were to obtain even thereluctant acceptance of the plans by its international allies. Many ofthe other ministers within the Cabinet, however, were critical of thisconcession. In view of their opposition, Denis Healey had to minimizethe proposed capability to little more than a symbolic token of Britain’srole to cover the fact of withdrawal. It had no defined size, deploymentor cost, and could not do so for fear of raising greater ministerialhostility. Even then, the Cabinet’s acquiescence was only won throughthe Prime Minister’s power to summarize the discussion according tohis will and judgement.

Having gained this concession, the Prime Minister and ForeignSecretary went with the clear majority in OPD and Cabinet on thefinal important issue regarding the withdrawal—whether or not itshould be announced. No departmental advice was strongly in favourof an announcement. No convincing argument in policy or strategicterms was widely propounded in its favour. But clearly, when de-ciding this issue of politics and presentation, ministers judged thatthe domestic benefits deriving from an announcement outweighed theother liabilities. Only Denis Healey and Herbert Bowden defended thecase against an announcement: the others, with Harold Wilson andGeorge Brown leading them, appeared to hope that a public state-ment of new policy would refresh the Government and consolidate itsparliamentary base.

In deciding on and announcing a withdrawal from Malaysia andSingapore for the mid-1970s, the British Government finally committeditself to a major change to its policies in Southeast Asia. It had largelyresolved the conflict between its economic interests and its desire tomaintain its relations with its significant allies. Economic interests weremet by the decision for an almost complete British withdrawal fromSoutheast Asia. International political interests were partly assuaged byshielding the announcement with the symbolic remnants of Britain’s‘worldwide role’—not only the continuing military capability for usein Southeast Asia, but also the insistence that Britain would stillcontribute to security around the globe, and would still be willingto intervene internationally for its own interests or those of its allies.These qualifications meant that, while some of Britain’s allies were


displeased by the decisions, none was irremediably offended. TheWilson Government had managed to achieve a fundamental changeto British foreign policy without causing significant damage to thecountry’s international relations or standing.

But while the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy was notconcealing a major gulf between the Government’s public plans andprivate intentions, as had the 1966 Defence White Paper, it had openedup a disjunction between a fundamental posture of retreat, and thelanguage and symbolism of a continuing world role. Britain’s underlyingorientation was shifting profoundly, but the nature and extent of thechange had been publicly fudged to smooth over the controversy. Therhetoric of British power was persisting even when its substantive corein Southeast Asia was slowly but surely being withdrawn: allies couldhighlight it to demonstrate that security and confidence in the regioncould be maintained; critics could point to it to show that a last residualburden of Empire still had to be discarded.

PART III

BREAKDOWN

7A Symbolic Sacrifice: July 1967–January

1968

Devaluation came as a profound defeat. On 18 November 1967,the Wilson Government was forced to announce a devaluation ofthe pound against the US dollar, signifying that the Government’seconomic policies over the previous three years had completely failed.The Government had been desperately trying to avoid this outcome,fearful of branding the Labour Party forever as the party of economicmismanagement, after the Attlee Government’s similar experience in1949.

During the process of devaluation and its aftermath, the WilsonGovernment undertook a third, wrenching reappraisal of defence policy.Once again the Government came to repudiate policies it had onlyrecently announced. In its January 1968 statement of measures to shoreup the British economy after devaluation, it completely revised itsdefence policies towards Southeast Asia. The withdrawal from Malaysiaand Singapore was sharply accelerated to conclude in only three years’time, in December 1971 rather than the ‘mid-1970s’. Britain wouldretain no specific military capability for use in the region after it hadwithdrawn. And, perhaps most important in psychological terms, theGovernment declared that Britain was fundamentally a European power,that it had to come to terms with having only a limited role in theworld. ‘East of Suez’, the ‘worldwide role’, the claim to be the ‘world’spoliceman’: all these were gone.

Devaluation and the end to ‘East of Suez’ are commonly perceived tohave come together, in one fell swoop. But, as this chapter will show,the process was less straightforward, and more subject to contingencyand politics, than that perception would suggest.

After briefly covering the state of affairs between the July 1967statement and devaluation, the chapter will examine the circumstancesof devaluation itself. As part of the package immediately accompanying


devaluation, the Government implemented defence cuts, but thesewere not supposed to affect the basic lines of defence and foreignpolicy. Following devaluation, Roy Jenkins replaced James Callaghanas Chancellor of the Exchequer. A notably liberal Home Secretaryand on his appointment the youngest member of the Cabinet, Jenkinswould prove to be a tough Chancellor. Under Jenkins’ stewardship, theTreasury embarked in December 1967 on a second round of measuresto shore up the British economy. For a month, ending in mid-January,the British Government was consumed by an intense battle to decidethe extent of the measures, which affected not only defence policy,but all aspects of Government expenditure, including many of theLabour Party’s most cherished domestic policies. The battle on defencepolicy went through four stages. In the first stage, Jenkins set out themeasures he proposed to implement. The second stage comprised theinitial Cabinet debates on the economic measures. The third witnessedthe sharp reaction of Britain’s allies and much of the defence andforeign policy establishment against Jenkins’ proposals. The last stagesaw the Cabinet reaching its final decisions on Britain’s defence policyin Southeast Asia and the fate of Britain’s world role.

After the July 1967 Supplementary Statement on Defence, British defencepolicy in Southeast Asia appeared to have been settled for the foreseeablefuture. The only activity in the following months was attempts toexamine how security in the region should be developed once theBritish had withdrawn. The main moves on this front came from theMalaysian Government, which tried to induce the British into attendinga five-power conference on defence in the region, involving, as well asthese two governments, those of Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand.

During the July consultations the idea of such a conference had beenfloated by the Tunku as a means of developing a security structure for theregion during and after the British withdrawal. The British Governmenthad expressed sympathy at the time but made no commitment. Nowthat the British plans had been officially announced, the Tunku pushedthe idea of a conference with greater vigour.

The response within the British Government was mixed. The PrimeMinister was strongly against the idea, fearing that a meeting with theother four allies would lead to Britain being put ‘in the dock’.¹ ButBritish officials in Kuala Lumpur noted that the idea of the five-power

¹ PRO: PREM 13/1457: Michael Palliser to D.A. Macleod, 21/8/1967.

A Symbolic Sacrifice: July 1967–January 1968 203

conference was helping the Malaysian Government manage the politicalfallout from the announcement of the withdrawal. If the British rebuffedthe Malaysians too strongly, the smoothness of their own rundown couldbe impaired.²

The Australians were similarly ambivalent. On the one hand they werewary, probably fearing that they would be left holding a commitmentto Malaysia and Singapore while Britain was in retreat.³ On the otherhand, with Britain withdrawing, some sort of multilateral discussionwas probably the best way to sort out security in the future.⁴

The ambivalence of the two governments induced a similar reactionin each: they both sought to have the conference delayed until thefollowing year. The British excused themselves on the grounds that aproductive conference would require a lot of preparatory work and theGovernment had not yet thought through the issues.⁵ The Australianshad a similar excuse: they were currently reviewing their defence posture,and so would not be ready for discussions until the next year.⁶ Theirtactics succeeded, and the five-power conference was put off until1968.

It thus appeared, by the early autumn of 1967, that the possibilityof any new movement on British defence policy towards Malaysiaand Singapore had now completely subsided. The fallout from July’smajor reorientation of policy seemed to have settled. When WalterHeller, Chairman of the US Government’s Council of EconomicAdvisers, visited London, he observed that the British Government was‘obviously relieved to have this decision behind it without a majoradverse effect on US-UK relations’.⁷ Low-level rumbling about defencepolicy continued in the outer reaches of the Labour Party: there was anunsuccessful motion at the October Party Conference that the ‘East ofSuez’ reductions should be accelerated, while the Parliamentary Partycontinued to be restless on Vietnam.⁸ But as far as the central defence

² PRO: PREM 13/1457: Sir Michael Walker to CO, ‘Proposed Five Power Talks’, tel.824, 24/8/1967.

³ PRO: PREM 13/1457: BHC, Canberra, to CO, tel. 1184, 17/8/1967.⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1457: BHC, Canberra, to CO, ‘Five-Power Talks’, tel. 1239,

25/8/1967.⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1457: CO to BHC, Kuala Lumpur, tel. 863, 22/8/1967.⁶ PRO: PREM 13/1457: BHC, Canberra, to CO, ‘Defence and Internal Politics’,

20/9/1967.⁷ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Walter Heller to Lyndon Johnson, 9/9/1967.⁸ ‘Government defeated on Vietnam and Greece’, The Times, 5/10/1967, p. 7; Bod: PLP

Archives: Party Meeting Minutes: Card 261, 8/11/1967.


and foreign policy organs were concerned, British policy was nowfixed.

The settlement did not last. In the autumn of 1967, the position of thepound once again became increasingly precarious. Waves of offshoreselling were making it increasingly difficult for the Bank of England todefend sterling at its pegged value of US$2.80. Continuing strife on thedocks contributed to a quadrupling of Britain’s trade deficit, from £81million a month in the third quarter, to £159 million in September and£331 million in October.⁹ The devaluation the Labour Governmenthad been consistently trying to avoid, for historic as well as economicreasons, loomed increasingly closer.

If a devaluation were to succeed, the Government had to implementstringent economic measures to help bolster the pound at its new level.Since 1965, the Treasury had regularly convened a top secret committeeof officials to maintain a ‘war book’ of actions that would need to betaken in the event of a devaluation.¹⁰ As the crunch loomed ever closerin the autumn of 1967, the committee worked with increasing urgencyon what measures would need to be implemented.

Its thinking was guided by the likely circumstances of any devaluation.In a crisis, a decision would have to be taken quickly, and there wouldbe no time for a lengthy political debate over any measures that weretoo controversial: ‘Consultation with Ministers will be minimal: theTreasury must itself form a view of what is required and what canbe achieved.’¹¹ The need for stringent cuts would have to be balancedagainst a pragmatic political judgement of what it would be possible toachieve under highly pressured circumstances.

This tension appears to have produced a degree of ambivalencein the committee’s views on what cuts needed to be imposed ondefence spending. Economic officials argued that any cuts needed ‘todemonstrate our determination to withdraw from a worldwide militaryrole’: ‘new policy decisions, involving the reopening of the DefenceReview, can (indeed must) be made’.¹² But they also recognized theneed to work with the Defence Secretary. It was important that the

⁹ Cairncross, Managing the British Economy, p. 183.¹⁰ PRO: T 230/878–82; T 312/1398–1401, 1635–7: FU Committee.¹¹ PRO: T 230/879: FU(67)19 (Revise): ‘Accompanying Measures: Public Expenditure’,

26/10/1967. Emphasis in original.¹² PRO: T 230/879: FU(67)19 (4th Revise): ‘Accompanying Measures: Public Expendi-

ture’, Annex A: ‘Defence Expenditure’, 14/11/1967.


proposed cuts ‘not unnecessarily impair international confidence in oursoundness as an ally’.¹³

Similarly, at ministerial level, as senior ministers scrambled to agreeon a package that could go to the Cabinet, opinions on what partdefence and foreign policy cuts should play were divided. As always,Richard Crossman took the toughest line. He argued to the PrimeMinister that devaluation would be a ‘Churchillian’ move, but couldonly work if accompanied by ‘really major defence cuts’, including arapid withdrawal from the Middle East and East Asia, and the scrappingof the F111 and the nuclear deterrent.¹⁴ The Prime Minister was notunsympathetic. He later noted to President Johnson that he had notbeen able to see any way of securing the necessary savings ‘without majorchanges in our defence posture both in Europe and East of Suez, goingfar beyond the decisions announced in our Defence White Paper fourmonths ago’.¹⁵ George Brown, as Foreign Secretary, was ambivalent.On the one hand, he judged that a potential Labour Party rebellionagainst too severe a deflationary package could be headed off by severedefence cuts: ‘if the package included total withdrawal from Singaporeby 1970, this would help carry the Party’.¹⁶ On the other, he alsopointed out that no possible changes to foreign policy would make anysavings available in the coming year.¹⁷ But Denis Healey was adamantlyopposed to any reversal of a defence policy that was only four monthsold. Instead, he offered to find £55–60 million of savings in the defencebudget which could be implemented without changing overarchingpolicy.¹⁸ With this offer on the table and the Defence Secretary resistantto any more dramatic cuts, the possibility of a sharp change in overseaspolicy disappeared off the agenda.

On 16 November 1967, the Chancellor, James Callaghan, broughtthe devaluation package to the Cabinet. No paper on the measureswas circulated in advance or even at the meeting itself. Instead, theChancellor gave only an oral explication of the reasons for devaluationand the measures he proposed. He grimly admitted that in reaching thisjuncture the Labour Government had failed: it was ‘the most agonisingreappraisal I have ever had to do and I will not pretend that it is anything

¹³ Ibid.¹⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1447: Richard Crossman to Harold Wilson, 13/11/1967.¹⁵ PRO: PREM 13/1447: Harold Wilson to Lyndon Johnson, 17/11/1967; also, PRO: T

225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins and Sir William Armstrong, London, 7/12/1967.¹⁶ PRO: T 230/877: M.V. Hawtin, ‘Contingency Planning’, 14/11/1967.¹⁷ PRO: PREM 13/1447: George Brown to Harold Wilson, 15/11/1967. ¹⁸ Ibid.


but a failure of our policies’.¹⁹ The package he presented comprised£500 million of cuts necessary to shore up sterling at its new level.The bulk of these savings would take place in civil expenditure, but,as Callaghan admitted to the Cabinet, these ‘would not be politicallyacceptable without further economies in defence expenditure’.²⁰ Thusthe Chancellor had consulted the Defence Secretary further, and hadextracted greater savings to take the defence cuts to £110 million. Thesechanges, however, would be achieved ‘without significant changes inforeign commitments and policy’.²¹ Instead, they would be focused oncutting spending on research and development, and by adjusting theforces’ rate of re-equipment.

With only the Chancellor’s oral description to go by, the Cabinetbarely had a chance to question the package. Some were outragedat Callaghan’s tactics. Richard Crossman recorded himself as loudlycomplaining that he had ‘never seen business done in such a deplorablyincompetent way’.²² Roy Jenkins also objected, arguing that ‘we can’thave these decisions taken in a split second’.²³ But the ability of theCabinet to resist the Chancellor’s package was limited when there wasno evident alternative at hand. The decision to devalue sterling wasendorsed unanimously and, after some discussion, the rate of parity andaccompanying measures were agreed to as well.

With the Cabinet’s agreement in hand, James Callaghan sent a grimone-line note to US Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler indicating thelooming change in policy: ‘There is a limit to the hammering we cantake.’²⁴ The next day, on 18 November 1967, the Chancellor announcedthat the pound would be devalued by 14.3%.

Foreign and defence policy officials rushed to assure the allies thatthe change in policy would not radically affect Britain’s stance. DenisHealey explained to Robert McNamara that he had been anxiousnot to change the programme outlined in July, especially Britain’scommitments, deployments and capabilities. Thus he had focused thenew round of cuts on refinements of current expenditure, and rephasingof previously planned changes. The main change to Britain’s defenceprogramme would be to cancel a proposed joint US–UK base in theIndian Ocean. This would have a substantial political impact in terms of

¹⁹ Castle, Diaries, p. 162.²⁰ PRO: CAB 128/42: CC(67)66th Meeting, 16/11/1967. ²¹ Ibid.²² Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 575. ²³ Ibid., pp. 575–6.²⁴ LBJL: Papers of Henry H. Fowler: James Callaghan to Henry Fowler, 17/11/1967.


savings, he hoped, without incurring too great a loss in military value.²⁵Similar messages were sent to the other allied Governments.²⁶ Publicly,in the House of Commons, Denis Healey maintained the line that theGovernment was continuing to implement its policies from July 1967,with the present round of cuts only affecting minor equipment andresearch and development.²⁷

James Callaghan, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was deeply woundedby the failure of economic policy that was crystallized by devaluation.At the end of November, after the panic of the event had calmeddown, he was relieved of his position, swapping jobs with the HomeSecretary, Roy Jenkins. Jenkins’ honeymoon as the new Chancellor wasshort-lived. Within a week of his arrival he was in serious discussionswith the permanent head of the Treasury, Sir William Armstrong, onimplementing further stern measures to shore up the pound, still veryfragile at its reduced rate.

Jenkins declared from the outset his belief that the Government’smeasures would have greater public and political impact if it did notattempt to make piecemeal cuts at the margin, but instead implementeda strategy involving a single package of deep cuts. Moreover, a ‘necessarycondition’ for any Cabinet acceptance of substantial civil cuts would bea prior agreement to ‘very big cuts’ to defence expenditure.²⁸ Sir Williamagreed, and noted that the most likely area for these defence cuts wouldbe a faster withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ and the cancellation of severalexpensive aircraft programmes, including the purchase of the F111.

The day after their conversation, on 8 December 1967, Treasuryofficials began the task of examining the possible range of defence cuts.They brooked no interference from the Ministry of Defence in theirinitial investigations: on the contrary, one Treasury official declaredfirmly to another that ‘we will not, of course, consult the Ministryof Defence’.²⁹ The MOD would more likely than not prove to beobstructive. Only in the past few days and weeks, it had taken actions

²⁵ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: Denis Healey to Robert McNamara, ‘Defence Impactsof New Economic Measures’, 19/11/1967.

²⁶ NAA: A1838/280, 3006/10/4/1 PART 6: T.K. Critchley to DEAC, tel. 14691,20/11/1967.

²⁷ Hansard , Session 1967/8, vol. 755, cols 43ff., 27/11/1967.²⁸ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins and Sir William Armstrong, London,

7/12/1967.²⁹ PRO: T 225/3066: I.P. Bancroft to M.V. Hawtin, ‘Defence Expenditure’, 8/12/1967.


that would make the achievement of any further cuts more difficult:after devaluation, Denis Healey had put himself on record in the Houseas committing the Government to sticking to its July 1967 plans; on thesame basis, discussions had taken place with allied governments on theshape of the forthcoming rundown. It would be better if the Treasuryhad a strong idea in mind of what it wanted to achieve, before it beganwhat were likely to be difficult negotiations with the defence and foreignpolicy departments.

Within a few days, Treasury officials had developed a clearer senseof their aims. They were firm, but not unrestrained, in their ambitions.It was carefully noted that, however drastic the changes that might beproposed, they would have little economic effect until after 1969/70.Moreover, if the proposals were unrealistically severe, Britain’s allieswould be more likely to force the plans to be watered down, and thiswould undermine the cuts’ credibility. Thus it was agreed that theTreasury’s plans should still follow the general lines of defence policyas outlined in July 1967, though accelerating the rundowns whereverpossible.³⁰

The centrepiece of the Treasury’s plans was to bring forward the finaldate of withdrawal from East Asia, preferably to the end of March 1971.Officials admitted that there was a risk that this change would provokeinstability in the region and increase the cost of aid to the affectedcountries. Nevertheless, given the financial considerations, they judgedthat ‘the net effect on international confidence would be favourable’.³¹The second change would be to eliminate the planned special militarycapability for use in the region after withdrawal. Though it had neverbeen precisely costed, Treasury officials felt that its elimination wouldgenerate ‘sizeable’ savings.³² It was also a desirable move in termsof broader policy: even with the special capability, ‘our ability toinfluence the course of events in the Far East [would] be virtuallynil anyway; and it would be sensible to recognise it’.³³ Finally, theTreasury proposed that there should be other force and equipmentcuts, including the cancellation of the order for fifty F111 aircraft.This, however, would have to be handled carefully because of thereciprocal financial arrangements that the US Government had agreedto, to help facilitate their purchase. In conclusion, Treasury officialsalso counselled caution on how their proposals should be presented.

³⁰ PRO: T 225/3066: I.P. Bancroft to P.R. Baldwin, ‘Defence Expenditure’, 13/12/1967.³¹ Ibid. ³² Ibid. ³³ Ibid.


A straight demand to the MOD and Foreign Office would be likelyto provoke a counter-reaction. It would be ‘most imprudent for theTreasury ever to admit that it has its own defence and overseas policy.But as the Chancellor will see from this minute . . . we have a fairly clearidea of our objectives.’³⁴

The day after the Treasury’s proposals had been minuted, the Chan-cellor, Roy Jenkins, met with Denis Healey over a private lunch tosound him out about the proposed cuts. In Jenkins’ own words,it was supposed to be a ‘softening up’ exercise.³⁵ To the Chancel-lor’s surprise, the Defence Secretary did not react very harshly tothe Treasury’s plans. While he did not agree with the Chancelloron some of the cuts, he was prepared to entertain ‘very substantial’changes to commitments, including a withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’by 1971/72.³⁶ Jenkins later described Healey as reacting ‘without faint-ing or blustering’.³⁷ At the time, he privately noted to his officialsthat, if this was the Defence Secretary’s opening position, ‘there was agood prospect of obtaining agreement eventually to 1970/71 instead of1971/72’.³⁸

Healey may have simply been pulling his punches. Soon after, ina setting more conducive to argument than a gentlemanly lunch, hewould have no compunction in taking on the Chancellor. But for themoment, Jenkins’ plans were proceeding apace. A day after talking withthe Defence Secretary, he met privately with the Prime Minister todiscuss the complete package of economic measures the Governmentshould adopt to shore up the pound. Wilson and Jenkins quickly cameto agree on the size and direction of the proposed package. The measurescomprised four key items, all of which were likely to be controversialwithin the Cabinet and wider Party: a restoration of prescription charges,a postponement of the raising of the school-leaving age, and the twokey defence cuts, accelerating the withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ andcancelling the order for the F111s. Neither the Prime Minister norChancellor could be sure how well the package would survive a Cabinetbattle, but from this point in mid-December on, Wilson and Jenkinswere committed, if undeclared, allies.³⁹

³⁴ Ibid. ³⁵ Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 222.³⁶ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins and Sir William Armstrong, London,

15/12/1967.³⁷ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 223.³⁸ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Jenkins and Armstrong, 15/12/1967.³⁹ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 223; Wilson, Labour Government, p. 479.


With the Prime Minister’s backing now privately assured, Jenkinscommitted his proposals to paper and presented them more formally tothe Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries. The Chancellortook an even more forward stance than he had in his earlier discussions,making unashamedly clear the European orientation which underpinnedthe foreign policy he preferred—a conspicuous position his officials hadcautioned against only days before. Jenkins argued that Britain’s standingin the world depended on the health of its economy, and so no budgetaryitem could be sacrosanct in a moment of ‘acute economic crisis’.⁴⁰ Thus,there should be an accelerated reduction of Britain’s commitments anda faster withdrawal of its forces; the curtailment of equipment purchases,including the cancellation of the order for the F111; and further cutsin the supporting infrastructure at home. But Jenkins went a stepfurther and stated openly that he wanted a withdrawal from all non-European bases ‘and [the] ending of associated treaty commitments, soas to complete the process of world wide military disengagement by1970/1’.⁴¹ There would be no fudging or disguising the end of Britain’sworldwide role as there had been in the past. Jenkins demanded thatthere be clear, public decisions on commitments, forces and equipment,and that the ‘announcement . . . must include our decision to withdrawinto Europe by 1970/1’.⁴²

The political departments were not at all impressed by the incursionof the Chancellor onto their own territory. Privately, Foreign Officeofficials admitted that, given the necessity for cuts, they were thinking‘on the same scale’ as the Chancellor.⁴³ But they could not accept hisproposals without examining for themselves the possible options. TheTreasury should stick to quantifying the savings required, and leave thepolitical departments and MOD to decide where the cuts should fall,given that this was their responsibility.⁴⁴

On 20 December 1967, the Chancellor met with the defence andoverseas ministers to discuss his proposals. From Jenkins’ own perspec-tive, this was a tactical mistake, for it meant that he met all the affectedministers in one group. As Jenkins described in his own memoirs, itgave them a chance collectively to round on him.⁴⁵ The hardest line

⁴⁰ PRO: T 225/3066: Roy Jenkins, ‘Defence’, 23/12/1967. ⁴¹ Ibid.⁴² Ibid.⁴³ PRO: FCO 46/43: Donald Maitland to George Brown, ‘Further Defence Cuts’,

19/12/1967.⁴⁴ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, 19/12/1967.⁴⁵ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, pp. 224ff.


came from the recently appointed Commonwealth Secretary, GeorgeThomson, whose departmental interests were the most severely affected.The Chancellor had admitted at the beginning of the meeting thatno defence cuts would be able to yield any substantial savings in thenext two years, but that they were politically necessary in order to gainCabinet acceptance of the civil cuts he was proposing. This admissionearned him a sharp reply from the Commonwealth Secretary. He ‘couldnot agree that in order to meet a short-term political problem’ theGovernment should adopt, without proper examination, policies thatwould make ‘a permanent difference to the whole posture of Britishoverseas policy’.⁴⁶ He ‘could not accept’ that Britain should abandonall its commitments outside Europe; nor could he accept as realistic agoal of withdrawing from Malaysia and Singapore by 1970/1.⁴⁷ Whileall courses of action needed to be investigated, they had to be properlyjudged on their own merits.

Denis Healey and George Brown fiercely backed the CommonwealthSecretary—the first, according to Jenkins’ admittedly partisan account,frequently ‘shouting’, the second engaging in ‘a good deal of bangingof the table’.⁴⁸ Healey was strongly critical of how his department hadborne the brunt of previous rounds of cost cutting while civil expendi-ture had escaped lightly: he would not accept further defence cuts thistime unless he were satisfied by the extent of civil cuts. Brown questionedwhether the Treasury was seeking too great a reduction in demand, andargued that it should only set out the extent of savings required, leaving itto the responsible departments to decide where the cuts should fall. ButHealey and Brown were also prepared to concede some part of the basicthrust of Jenkins’ proposals. Both the Defence and Foreign Secretariesadmitted that if substantial cuts had to be imposed, it would be better,rather than hobbling all of Britain’s deployments, to eliminate one wholetheatre—inevitably ‘East of Suez’ rather than Europe. But this admis-sion was a long way short of agreement with the timing and manner ofthe Chancellor’s proposals. After an hour ‘of being knocked around likea squash ball’, Roy Jenkins ‘escaped’ from his meeting with the otherministers.⁴⁹ With no agreement in sight, the permanent heads of the rel-evant departments were directed to continue negotiating on the topic.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ PRO: PREM 13/1999: memcon, Roy Jenkins, George Brown, Denis Healey, GeorgeThomson et al., London, 20/12/1967.

⁴⁷ Ibid. ⁴⁸ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 225. ⁴⁹ Ibid.⁵⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1999: memcon, Jenkins, Brown et al., 20/12/1967.


While these private discussions were taking place, the Governmentbegan to prepare the ground with its allies about the cuts that were inthe offing. Rumours had already reached Singapore in the past week thatthe British Government was contemplating a much faster withdrawalfrom its Southeast Asian base. The Singapore Prime Minister had senta number of messages asking, in increasingly desperate terms, thatthe Government quash these rumours.⁵¹ Matters were not helpedwhen, on 18 December 1967, Harold Wilson announced to theHouse of Commons that the Government was undertaking a stringentreview of all areas of expenditure to help secure the country’s financialposition. He warned that ‘no area of expenditure can be regarded assacrosanct . . . no spending commitment whether inherited three yearsago, or incurred since’.⁵² He twice stated that defence and overseasspending would be reviewed as strictly as civil expenditure, and notedominously that this spending would have to fit what was ‘appropriateat a time when we have been, and are, reassessing Britain’s role in theworld’.⁵³

Given that the Government had not properly decided for itself whereits cuts would fall, it was not in a position to relieve the state ofuncertainty in which its allies were languishing. Nevertheless, seniorministers felt it would be best if the allies were given some sort ofwarning of what lay ahead, especially given that, once the cuts had beendecided on, there would be no time to consult the affected parties. Itwas agreed that the Prime Minister should convey this warning to theother leaders.⁵⁴

This occasion was unexpectedly provided by the memorial ser-vice that was held in Melbourne after the Australian Prime MinisterHarold Holt had drowned at sea. In a quick succession of meet-ings with each of the leaders after the service, Wilson conveyed thesame short message: following devaluation, the whole field of gov-ernment expenditure was being re-examined afresh; the reductionswere likely to include defence, with faster cutbacks ‘East of Suez’ apossibility. The various leaders each took note of Wilson’s message,

⁵¹ PRO: PREM 13/2392: BHC, Singapore, to CO, ‘British Military Withdrawal’, tel.914, 12/12/1967; Lee Kuan Yew to Denis Healey, tel. 932, 15/12/1967; Lee Kuan Yew toHarold Wilson, 18/12/1967.

⁵² Hansard , Session 1967/8, vol. 756, col. 923. ⁵³ Ibid.⁵⁴ PRO: PREM 13/1466: Michael Palliser, memcon, Harold Wilson, George Brown,

Denis Healey, George Thomson et al., London, 20/12/1967.


but, with no more information being offered, made no further com-ment.⁵⁵

Back in London, senior officials from the relevant departments followedup on the heated ministerial discussions that had taken place on theproposed defence reductions. On 22 to 23 December, officials from theForeign and Commonwealth Offices and the Ministry of Defence firstmet privately, away from the stern gaze of the Treasury, to co-ordinatetheir responses to the proposed cuts. After that, their heads met withthe Permanent Secretary of the Treasury to see if they could make anyfurther progress.

In their meetings, the overseas and defence departments reaffirmedthat they were prepared to accede to further cuts ‘East of Suez’, butcould not accept the Treasury’s highly abbreviated timetable. Thepermanent heads of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices bothsaw ‘the difficulties of a precipitate withdrawal’ from Malaysia andSingapore, and wanted ‘to delay any withdrawal beyond the panic datessuggested by the Chancellor’.⁵⁶ But there were also tensions betweenthe MOD and the political departments. The MOD feared that thepolitical departments would acquiesce to defence cuts providing thepolitical effects to commitments were blurred as much as possible.The Chiefs of Staff were firmly against this. Having already enduredfive rounds of cuts under the current government, the Chiefs wantedas clear and well-defined a statement of future policy as possible. Theyasked for ‘a firm announcement about [a] reduction in commitments’,which, for credibility, needed to ‘be specific, . . . refer to an early dateand . . . be precise in area’.⁵⁷

When officials from the three departments met with the Treasury,however, their differences were kept well hidden, presumably for fearthat this would give the Treasury the opportunity to divide andconquer. Instead, the defence and overseas departments stressed theirshared objections to the Treasury’s proposals. The heads of the Foreignand Commonwealth Offices argued that the demand for a definitivestatement in January left no time for meaningful consultations with

⁵⁵ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Harold Wilson with, separately, Tun Razak, Lee KuanYew, Keith Holyoake, John McEwen, and Lyndon Johnson, Melbourne, 22–3/12/1967.

⁵⁶ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Saville Garner to George Thomson, ‘Defence Economies’,22/12/1967.

⁵⁷ Ibid.


any of the affected powers. The plans for a withdrawal from Singaporeby 1970/1 would destabilize the local government, leading to riots anddisturbances and the ‘probability’ that British troops would have to fighttheir way out.⁵⁸ The political departments strongly preferred that theybe given time—around six to eight weeks—to negotiate with allies fora withdrawal by March 1972, or six months ahead of that at most. TheMOD backed these dates for withdrawal as the most practicable fromits point of view. In addition, the political departments asked that a‘general capability’ be maintained for use in Malaysia and Singapore, forthis would ‘materially ease’ their political difficulties by allowing themto avoid the abrogation of AMDA and SEATO.⁵⁹

Sir Saville Garner, the permanent head of the CommonwealthOffice, reported to his minister that Sir William Armstrong, the Headof the Treasury, appeared not unsympathetic to these views. Armstrong,according to Garner, ‘agreed’ that an announcement should be in generalterms, raised no objection to a general capability being maintained, andappeared willing to accept a 1972 withdrawal.⁶⁰ On this basis, Garnerfelt there were reasons for hope. But Armstrong also indicated thatthe Chancellor had strong opinions on these issues. In the Treasury’sown record of the meeting, only that part of Armstrong’s views wasnoted: ‘the Chancellor’, Armstrong was recorded as saying, ‘would beextremely dissatisfied with the upshot of the meeting’.⁶¹ Armstrong wasnot completely right. The Chancellor did not appear particularly fussedby the views which had been aired by officials, for, as was borne outby his later actions, he was less interested in engaging in detailed policydebates than in winning a political war in the Cabinet.

On Christmas Day 1967, Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins privatelydiscussed their tactics to get the Chancellor’s package of measurespassed. The Chancellor’s paper was to be presented to the affectedministers on 27 December, and then put to Cabinet early in theNew Year. Wilson and Jenkins agreed that the best tactic would notbe to circulate the proposals to ministers in advance, but rather onlyto release them at the 27 December meetings. Obviously, this tacticprovided the best means of preventing any debate before the proposalsreached the Cabinet. Wilson and Jenkins also agreed that they should

⁵⁸ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Sir Burke Trend, Sir William Armstrong, Sir PaulGore-Booth, Sir James Dunnett, and Sir Saville Garner, London, 23/12/1967.

⁵⁹ Ibid. ⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Saville Garner to George Thomson, 23/12/1967.⁶¹ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Trend, Armstrong et al., 23/12/1967.


both focus on George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, as the one mostlikely to yield to their own position. Brown, Wilson said, was ‘rathermore flexible’ than the Commonwealth Secretary.⁶² Jenkins agreed,judging that the Foreign Secretary ‘would be prepared for some form ofcompromise’.⁶³

When the senior ministers met on 27 December, Jenkins soughtto finesse the differences between his opponents’ positions. GeorgeThomson, Jenkins reported to his officials, wanted at least six more weeksto consult with Britain’s allies on the withdrawals, but Brown appearedwilling to settle for two weeks extra. Thomson was adamantly opposedto a withdrawal in 1970/1, but Jenkins got the impression that Healeywas less firm on this, and Brown weaker again.⁶⁴ Still, these differenceswere not sufficient for Jenkins to capitalize on, despite him making aconcession of his own. To the other senior ministers, he maintained thatthe Government could not sustain binding commitments to providemilitary assistance to countries after it had withdrawn. But it could,he conceded, ‘offer to do [its] best to provide help from the Europeantheatre in case of need’.⁶⁵ This formula implied that the Chancellorwas prepared to acquiesce to the political departments’ request for a‘general capability’ that could be used in Southeast Asia—and Britainwould only have to reinterpret its commitments to SEATO and AMDA,not abrogate them unilaterally. But this agreement aside, at the closeof the meeting there remained a substantial gulf between the positionof the Chancellor and that of the defence and overseas ministers onthe fundamental issue: whether an earlier British withdrawal fromMalaysia and Singapore should be completed by 1970/1 or by the‘early 1970s’.

Britain’s allies had little information on the content and direction of thedebates that were raging within Whitehall. Their concerns, however, hadbeen provoked by the warnings they had received from Harold Wilsonin Melbourne. In the week after Christmas, they let these concerns beknown both to the British Government and to each other.

⁶² PRO: PREM 13/1999: Michael Palliser, memcon, Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins,25/12/1967.

⁶³ Ibid.⁶⁴ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Roy Jenkins, Sir William Armstrong et al., London,

28/12/1967.⁶⁵ PRO: T 225/3066: memcon, Harold Wilson, Roy Jenkins, George Brown, Denis

Healey and George Thomson, ‘Defence Expenditure’, 27/12/1967.


British representatives in both Australia and the United States wereaware of deep concern brewing in the respective capitals. The diag-nosis of the High Commission in Canberra was that there would be‘strong and unfavourable reactions’ if the British announced an ac-celeration of their withdrawal from Southeast Asia.⁶⁶ They would beattacked for their failure to stand by their previous assurances. Theman likely to succeed Harold Holt as Prime Minister, John Gorton,had been ‘most critical’ and ‘outspoken’ about British foreign policybefore; his election would likely spell ‘trouble [for] our relations withAustralia’.⁶⁷

Sir Patrick Dean in Washington spoke in similar tones about theprobable American reaction. The Johnson Administration was ‘greatlyalarmed’ that the British Government would discard with ‘dangeroushaste’ its strategic assets, assets they regarded the British ‘as holding intrust for the West through [their] presence’.⁶⁸ While the Americans hadreconciled themselves to an eventual British withdrawal from SoutheastAsia in the mid-1970s, they would be ‘much upset’ by any accelerationof this timetable, especially with the Vietnam War continuing.⁶⁹ Thereaction of the US Congress, Dean further warned, could have asignificant sting in its tail. If they became convinced that the US was‘subsidising the British Welfare State’ while Britain shifted defence costsonto American shoulders, they could make it ‘very difficult . . . for theAdministration to provide the financial support we need when sterlingis in trouble’.⁷⁰

The allies did not restrict themselves to conveying their distress to theBritish. Out of the British Government’s sight, the allies also sought toco-ordinate their positions. The Malaysian and Australian governmentscommunicated to each other their shared concern that the Britishwould no longer be seriously honouring the Anglo–Malaysian DefenceAgreement. The Malaysians stressed that the two governments shouldconsult on an appropriate response to the British plans once they wererevealed, especially to prevent the British trying to play the allies offone another. The Australians were cautiously responsive, but warnedthat such joint action had to be conducted secretly, since the existence

⁶⁶ PRO: PREM 13/2081: BHC, Canberra, to CO, ‘Review of Government Expenditure’,tel. 1854, 28/12/1967.

⁶⁷ Ibid.⁶⁸ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth and Sir Burke Trend, tel.

3, 1/1/1968.⁶⁹ Ibid. ⁷⁰ Ibid.


of allied co-operation would provide the British with greater excuse toleave.⁷¹

The views of allied governments and the British defence and foreignpolicy establishment did not appear to be having much effect in deterringthe Chancellor from his chosen path. As the date approached for theopening of Cabinet discussions on the economic package, Jenkinsappeared more and more concerned with the politics of getting hispackage passed, and less and less interested in the arguments for oragainst any particular component.

The permanent head of the Treasury reported to his colleagues inthe Foreign and Commonwealth Offices that, while he was personallysympathetic to their arguments, he did not think that they would findmuch favour with the Chancellor. Jenkins, he explained, was ‘basinghis argumentation entirely on political grounds and [was] no longertaking specific Treasury arguments into account’.⁷² One symptom ofthis was the Chancellor’s view that 1972 as a withdrawal date was‘over the dam’—past the date of the next general election, and thusreversible.⁷³ Richard Crossman privately recorded the same impression.Jenkins had emphasized to him personally how important it was thatthe withdrawal take place during the term of the current Government.Crossman noted Jenkins as feeling that ‘We must be out of Singaporeby the next election.’⁷⁴

Tony Benn described Denis Healey as furious at how the Chancellorwas pushing ahead with his policies. The Defence Secretary fumedthat ‘the defence cuts were mad; that they were just being done tomake it possible to introduce prescription charges; that the whole thingwas crazy’.⁷⁵ With political, rather than strategic or even economic,considerations apparently paramount, the permanent head of the For-eign Office warned his Foreign Secretary that ‘it would appear . . . thatexternal policy will not be discussed on merit’.⁷⁶

⁷¹ NAA: A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 PART 5: W.L. Morrison to Sir James Plimsoll, tel.2590, 30/12/1967; Sir James Plimsoll to W.L. Morrison, tel. 34, 5/1/1968; W.L. Morrisonto Sir James Plimsoll, tel. 40, 6/1/1968.

⁷² PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, ‘Defence Cuts’, 3/1/1968.Emphasis in original.

⁷³ Ibid. ⁷⁴ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 612.⁷⁵ Tony Benn, Office without Power: Diaries 1968–72 (London: Hutchison, 1988),

p. 1.⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 46/43: Gore-Booth to Brown, ‘Defence Cuts’.


From 4 to 15 January 1968 the British Cabinet endured a marathonof eight meetings to agree on the contents of the economic package.The package that the Chancellor presented to the Cabinet compriseda number of major cuts on the civil front: the introduction of chargesfor prescriptions; deferment of the raising of the school-leaving age;reductions in road and house building; the abolition of free milk insecondary schools; and drastic reductions in the civil defence service.Many of these items were deeply controversial in the Labour ranks andwithin the Cabinet itself. Part of Jenkins’ strategy to get his packagethrough was to place defence first on the chopping block. This wouldhelp mollify those critics on the Labour Left who refused to countenanceany cuts to social programmes without there first being significant cutsto defence.

The first day of Cabinet meetings, on 4 January, brought out all theheavyweights on foreign policy and defence. As well as the Chancellor’spaper outlining all the measures he proposed across both defenceand civil fields, there were papers in response from the Foreign andCommonwealth Secretaries, and from the Defence Secretary.

The defence cuts outlined in the Chancellor’s paper followed identi-cally the plans he had proposed before. These comprised the withdrawalfrom Britain’s worldwide commitments and their associated militarypresence by March 1971; the cancellation of equipment purchases,including the order for 50 F111 bombers; and extensive cuts to themilitary establishment at home. The Chancellor bolstered his case byfocusing on the economic crisis which necessitated these measures. Hestated that an £850 million cut in demand was needed if devaluationwere to be successful and an unsupportable expansion stopped. TheGovernment had little time to implement these measures. It wouldhave to err on the side of toughness, for the cost of a failure wouldbe ‘exceedingly damaging’.⁷⁷ He noted that his proposed defence cutscould have little effect on spending for the next two years: in the tableof figures he provided, the defence savings in 1968/9 would be nil,and those in 1969/70 were denoted only by a question mark.⁷⁸ Butit was on this basis that he argued that radical cuts would be neededfor future years: the impossibility of immediate reductions made it allthe more important ‘that our decisions on defence should be seen to

⁷⁷ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)5: Roy Jenkins, ‘Public Expenditure: Post-devaluationMeasures’, 3/1/1968.

⁷⁸ Ibid.


be both radical and credible in terms of our present and foreseeablesituation’.⁷⁹

The Chancellor had stuck firmly to his original position, notwith-standing all the discussions he and the Treasury had had with theoverseas departments and ministers. In reply, the overseas ministersfought back with a united front, the Foreign and CommonwealthSecretaries presenting a joint statement to Cabinet. The two overseasministers claimed that they recognized the necessity of defence cuts,given the grave economic situation. But they argued that if Britainwere seen to break its word and its commitments, without any re-gard for stability, security and the value of its own investments, thenthe country would be perceived ‘beyond question and at last [to]be finished’.⁸⁰ If that became common perception, ‘the consequencespolitically, economically, and for the position of sterling, would beexceedingly grave’.⁸¹ On these grounds, the two ministers asked fora number of modifications to the Chancellor’s plans. They proposedthat the withdrawal from Singapore be accelerated, but only for com-pletion by March 1972, so that the damage to the island’s economywould be reduced. And they put forward their request—to which theChancellor had informally acquiesced before—that a ‘general capabil-ity’ be kept, not particular to Southeast Asia, ‘but simply an expressionof the fact that our strategic reserve would be available to be usedanywhere in the world where we thought it in our interests to doso’.⁸² This would mean that the Government, while limiting severelyits commitment to AMDA, could avoid having to abrogate its treatycommitments unilaterally, a highly dangerous move. The Foreign andCommonwealth Secretaries concluded that cuts on the scale they pro-posed would still be ‘unpalatable’ internationally, but would allow easierconsultations and a smoother transition, thus limiting the damagingconsequences.⁸³

The Defence Secretary also entered the fray with his own paper,adding weight to Brown and Thomson’s arguments. While Healeyconfined himself more directly to defence policy, he stressed that therundowns in Southeast Asia had to be ‘conducted in as favourable alocal political atmosphere as possible if we are to minimise the risks of

⁷⁹ Ibid.⁸⁰ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)7: George Brown and George Thomson, ‘Public Expendi-

ture: Post-devaluation Measures: Defence Cuts’, 3/1/1968.⁸¹ Ibid. ⁸² Ibid. ⁸³ Ibid.


military conflict’.⁸⁴ He argued that the Government, while announcingits cuts to commitments in January, should not rush into the details ofcutting forces, for this would ‘smack of panic, cause great difficulty withthe Services and certainly be inefficient and probably wasteful’.⁸⁵

After the major players had spent more than an hour introducingtheir papers, the debate in the wider Cabinet continued for several morehours.⁸⁶ Some ministers argued that the ‘minimal savings’ accruing fromwithdrawal in 1970/1 compared with 1971/2 would not be worth thesubstantial political and economic risks involved.⁸⁷ Others questionedwhether a year would make a critical difference to Britain’s allies: whilethey would be displeased, would that displeasure be materially altered bya year’s timing? The clinching argument, however, had little to do withstrategy or economics. Though the Cabinet record obscures the point,both Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman record the same impression.The decisive advantage of a 1970/1 withdrawal over 1971/2 was that theearlier date would be within the term of the current Government. Thewithdrawal would be complete by the next election, and the LabourGovernment could gain full credit for the new policy.⁸⁸

The Cabinet decided in the Chancellor’s favour: Castle thought it anarrow decision, carried only by Wilson’s own voice, while Crossmanthought a large majority were in favour of the faster withdrawal. Aftera further heated debate, it also decided to cancel the order for the 50F111s. As a concession to the foreign and defence policy establishment,it was also agreed that a ‘general capability’ for possible use aroundthe globe would still exist, and that Britain’s treaty commitmentsto AMDA and SEATO could therefore be reinterpreted and notwithdrawn. Furthermore, if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries‘encountered a strong reaction’ from Britain’s allies, they could bringthese responses back to Cabinet.

After the defence reductions had been discussed and decided on 4 Jan-uary, the Cabinet turned to examine the domestic side. While thiswas taking place, George Brown and George Thomson flew to theappropriate capitals to inform Britain’s allies of the Government’s de-cisions. Their announcements provoked a wave of negative responses

⁸⁴ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)11: Denis Healey, ‘Public Expenditure: Post-devaluationMeasures: Further Defence Cuts’, 3/1/1968.

⁸⁵ Ibid. ⁸⁶ Castle, Diaries, p. 176; Crossman, Diaries, p. 635.⁸⁷ PRO: CAB 128/43: C(68)1st Meeting, 4/1/1968.⁸⁸ Castle, Diaries, p. 176; Crossman, Diaries, p. 635.


from the allied governments. Coupled with a near revolt by manyparts of Britain’s own defence and foreign policy establishment, thisproduced a sharp and widespread reaction against the Government’splanned cuts.

On 7–8 January, George Thomson met with senior Malaysian minis-ters to inform them of the British Government’s decision. Their responseto the Commonwealth Secretary was anxious but restrained. DefenceMinister Tun Razak seemed, according to Thomson, ‘genuinely non-plussed about where to turn’ after the British decision.⁸⁹ He questionedwhether the British could really uphold the Defence Agreement withno forces trained for or assigned to the area. Finance Minister TanSiew Sin stressed the losses which Malaysia had sustained by stayingloyal to sterling through devaluation. Prime Minister Tunku AbdulRahman, according to Thomson, ‘could not disguise his distress’.⁹⁰Malaysia had trusted and been loyal to Britain. The Tunku explainedthat they had wanted, ‘the British to remain and relied on them toprotect her. Without Britain’s help she would be defenceless.’⁹¹ WhileMalaysia recognized the inevitability of withdrawal, it was vital thatBritain be willing to provide assistance should it be required. Thomsonwas sympathetic but firm in response: while Britain would retain a gen-eral capability for assistance it could make no automatic commitment;it could only send help if resources and circumstances allowed.

The response that Malaysia communicated to the other allies wasless restrained. The Australians found Razak ‘clearly distressed’ andTan Siew Sin ‘acidic’ in his remarks on British policy.⁹² The USState Department judged the Malaysians to be ‘privately bitter butpublicly restrained’.⁹³ They were ‘incensed at having been let downby a trusted ally, humiliated at being informed of a decision ratherthan consulted, and genuinely concerned about the implications’.⁹⁴Officially, the Malaysian Ambassador requested the US Secretary ofState to make representations to the British Government against the

⁸⁹ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Reductions’, tel.21, 7/1/1968.

⁹⁰ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, ‘Defence Cuts’, tel. 22,8/1/1968.

⁹¹ Ibid.⁹² NAA: A4940/1, C4626: W.L. Morrison to Sir James Plimsoll, ‘British Withdrawal’, tel.

42, 8/1/1968.⁹³ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: Thomas Hughes to Dean Rusk, ‘UK Plan

to Accelerate Its Military Withdrawal Embitters Malaysia and Singapore’, 10/1/1968.⁹⁴ Ibid.


decisions. Dean Rusk replied to the Ambassador that his Governmentwas entirely on their side.⁹⁵

After his talks in Kuala Lumpur, George Thomson went on toSingapore for two days of talks with senior government ministers.The Singaporeans were much more openly angry and upset than theMalaysians had been. George Thomson found Lee Kuan Yew to be‘fighting mad’.⁹⁶ The Singapore Prime Minister complained bitterlyabout being presented with a unilateral decision. He did not believe thatthe accelerated date of withdrawal had any direct relevance to Britain’simmediate economic problems, and ‘vigorously refuted’ the figures thatThomson presented in reply.⁹⁷ Lee continued that the announcementof so early a date of departure would ‘destroy Singapore’s future’, andhis government would make this clear to the British by invoking ‘everyform of retaliatory action that they could devise’.⁹⁸ They were preparedto announce that Singapore would withdraw sterling balances of £200million and break up Britain’s monopoly on the island in shipping,banking and insurance. Thomson fended off these threats by stressingthat they were ‘utterly the wrong way’ to change the British position:they would not respond to blackmail, while the threats Lee proposedcould not be better designed to undermine confidence in his owncountry. Thomson noted that Lee appeared to take this rebuff on board.Nevertheless, neither Lee nor his staff were prepared to let up on theirefforts. At dinner that evening, they mounted ‘a systematic campaign ofpressurisation’ the strength of which the British officials had ‘never intheir experience been subjected to’.⁹⁹

The next day, Lee moderated the wilder of his threats: he admittedprivately to the Australians that the threat to withdraw Singapore’ssterling balances was something of ‘a blunt instrument’.¹⁰⁰ The modifi-cation in his tactics, however, did not imply a modification in his aims.In his next meeting with the Commonwealth Secretary, the SingaporePrime Minister calmly, but with no less determination, stressed thedangers the British decisions posed for his country: they would destroyconfidence in the fledgling state; they gave notice to Indonesia that itcould prepare for aggression in a few years; and they provided no time

⁹⁵ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: memcon, Tan Sri Ong Yoke Lin, DeanRusk et al., Washington, 9/1/1968.

⁹⁶ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 26, 8/1/1968.⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ Ibid. ⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ NAA: A4940/1, C4626: A.R. Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Withdrawal’, tel. 63,10/1/1968.


for Singapore to prepare an adequate defence force to meet this threat.Lee and Thomson continued to trade ‘sharp exchanges’ for anothertwo hours, but at the end the Singapore Prime Minister concludedthat little more could be achieved at the moment: he would fly toLondon and bring his arguments straight to the Chancellor and PrimeMinister themselves.¹⁰¹ Possibly—though the British record obscuresthis—Lee was given some encouragement to adopt this tactic by theCommonwealth Secretary. Certainly, Lee reported to the Australiansthat he had gleaned from Thomson that it could be possible to push theBritish timetable back by a year.¹⁰²

After the drama and threats of Singapore, Thomson found his nextmeetings, in Wellington and Canberra, rather less stressful affairs. TheNew Zealand Prime Minister reacted with ‘general understanding’,expressing his views more in a mood of ‘sadness rather than anger’.¹⁰³His main anxiety was over whether the ‘general capability’ would beseen to have teeth. If Britain were perceived to have ‘washed [its] handsof the area’ it would have ‘serious and continuing repercussions inNew Zealand’.¹⁰⁴ The atmosphere in Australia was sombre but similarlyrestrained. The new Prime Minister, John Gorton, expressed ‘anxietyand dismay’ at the proposals.¹⁰⁵ His government feared the effects theplans would have on regional security, and was deeply unhappy that‘such large decisions should be made for the sake of comparativelysmall savings’.¹⁰⁶ He expressed the hope that, if the British Governmentcould not alter the principles of its withdrawal, it could at least delayits timetable, retain some capacity for intervention, and declare acontinuing interest in the region.

While George Thomson was taking care of Britain’s Commonwealthallies in Southeast Asia, on the other side of the globe George Brownwas in Washington undertaking the same task with Britain’s principalally. The Foreign Secretary had to prepare for a frosty reception for, asthe British Ambassador described, the ‘timing could . . . not be worse’for the policy decisions.¹⁰⁷ The Vietnam War was intensifying, its

¹⁰¹ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 32, 9/1/1968.¹⁰² NAA: A4940/1, C4626: Parsons to DEAC, ‘British Withdrawal’, tel. 63, 10/1/1968.¹⁰³ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 78, 11/1/1968.¹⁰⁴ Ibid.¹⁰⁵ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Thomson to Harold Wilson, tel. 83, 12/1/1968.¹⁰⁶ Ibid.¹⁰⁷ PRO: PREM 13/2081: Sir Patrick Dean to George Brown and Sir Paul Gore-Booth,

tel. 115, 9/1/1968.


costs were now weighing heavily on the domestic economy, and theAdministration was facing an election year. While the US Governmentwould want to see Britain restored to financial health, they ‘cannotand will not be sympathetic’ to decisions damaging to the free world,themselves, and what ‘they would expect to be our own hard-headedcalculation of our own national security interests’.¹⁰⁸

George Brown himself was apprehensive about his upcoming mission.He sent a blunt telegram to Wilson saying that he would fulfil hisappointed role, but also expressing his deep misgivings about it: ‘wehave taken wrong decisions. Much worse . . . we have taken them forthe wrong reasons. We are putting the country’s future in peril for ashort-term gain which we may not in fact get.’¹⁰⁹ Denis Healey was of asimilar cast of mind. He did not, however, express his views only withinthe British Government but also leaked them to US Embassy officials.He made clear to them that he was bitter about Harold Wilson’s rolein pushing for faster defence cuts, against the opposition of Brown,Thomson, Callaghan and himself. He hinted, however, that some delayto the timetable might be possible, and ‘indirectly urg[ed]’ the USSecretary of State to focus on this issue with George Brown, as it wasthe only area where there was some hope of changing British policy.¹¹⁰

Dean Rusk took Healey’s advice on board, but chose a differenttack. When Brown met Rusk on 11 January, they had, in Brown’sdescription, a ‘bloody unpleasant meeting’.¹¹¹ Though Rusk maintainedhis customary courtesy and restraint, he ‘did not disguise the depth offeeling and at times even contempt’ he had for the British decisions.¹¹²After Brown had described the changes that would be implemented,Rusk did not try to negotiate on details, instead opting to convey simplyhis ‘profound . . . dismay’ with proposals which were ‘tantamount to [a]British withdrawal from world affairs’.¹¹³ They possessed, he said, ‘theacrid aroma of the fait accompli’.¹¹⁴ He feared the cuts would bolster

¹⁰⁸ PRO: PREM 13/2081: Sir Patrick Dean to George Brown and Sir Paul Gore-Booth,tel. 115, 9/1/1968.

¹⁰⁹ PRO: PREM 13/2081: George Brown to Harold Wilson, tel. 142, 11/1/1968.¹¹⁰ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1640: David Bruce to Dean Rusk, ‘Healey

Views on UK Defence Policy’, 9/1/1968.¹¹¹ PRO: PREM 13/1999: George Brown to FO, ‘Defence Cuts’, tel. 54, 11/1/1968.¹¹² Ibid.¹¹³ PRO: FCO 46/43: memcon, George Brown, Dean Rusk et al., Washington, DC,

11/1/1968; LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: memcon, Dean Rusk and George Brown,Washington, DC, 11/1/1968.

¹¹⁴ PRO: FCO 46/43: memcon, Brown, Rusk et al., 11/1/1968.


the position of isolationists within the United States. They wouldput in jeopardy regional co-operation in Southeast Asia, and Britain’sown success against Confrontation. He thought the proposed ‘generalcapability’ would be of little consequence. If Britain withdrew to ‘littleEngland’, it would lead to a ‘descending spiral for British interestsaround the world’.¹¹⁵ He ‘found it embarrassing to say to his Britishcolleague: ‘‘For God’s sake be Britain’’ ’.¹¹⁶

Privately, George Brown expressed his sympathy for the Americanposition. He admitted to Walt Rostow and Robert McNamara overlunch that ‘these were the saddest days of his life’.¹¹⁷ He doubted that thesituation could be changed: Wilson’s political base on the Left insistedthat the upcoming austerity package include cuts to defence; certainmembers of the Cabinet had ‘little England’ views; while ChancellorJenkins was hoping that the package could lead to a budget surplusby mid-1969. Nevertheless Brown—along with British AmbassadorSir Patrick Dean—encouraged President Johnson to write, as a last-ditch effort, the ‘strongest letter possible’ to Harold Wilson.¹¹⁸ Thisthe President did, though no doubt as much on his own initiativeas on the advice of British officials. Beyond expressing opposition tothe proposed cuts, the letter also included a veiled threat: had thePrime Minister and Cabinet, the President asked, ‘taken fully intoaccount the direct and indirect consequences’ of the course they wereadopting?¹¹⁹

Brown and Dean’s private encouragement to the US Governmentto oppose their own Cabinet’s decision was not an isolated example. Ahost of British officials, in the Services and in Whitehall, were criticaland sometimes caustic in their private and not-so-private opinions. InSingapore, US Embassy officials observed that British officers on theisland were ‘openly denigrating British leaders to an extent which almostborders on the seditious’.¹²⁰ The British High Commissioner Designatefor Singapore was scarcely more diplomatic. To the Australians, hecharacterized Labour Government ministers as viewing the ‘East ofSuez’ role as a ‘ ‘‘conspiracy’’ between the bankers, the military and the

¹¹⁵ Ibid. ¹¹⁶ Ibid.¹¹⁷ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson, 11/1/1968.¹¹⁸ Ibid.¹¹⁹ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Lyndon Johnson to Harold Wilson, 11/1/

1968.¹²⁰ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk, tel.

1169, 11/1/1968.


Australians. They were not willing to examine rationally the interestsinvolved’.¹²¹

Back in London, senior staff and officials took their concerns straightto the Prime Minister. The Chiefs of the Defence Staff warned thatthe accelerated rundown would damage service morale and jeopardizethe recruitment of men.¹²² The permanent head of the Foreign Officealso took the unusual step of going above his minister—while GeorgeBrown was in Washington—and spoke directly to Wilson. He expressedconcerns about the risks of the accelerated withdrawal. Moreover, heargued that if this were coupled to the cancellation of the F111, Britainwould lose the status of even a middle-ranking power.¹²³

The combination of these efforts caused economic ministers to fearthat there would be a ‘strong counter-attack’ against the defence cutsin the Cabinet that week.¹²⁴ The prediction came true on GeorgeBrown’s return to London from Washington. Immediately, he wentto the Cabinet and warned of the threat he saw the cuts posing toAnglo–American relations. He judged that Anglo–American relationshad reached a ‘critical’ state.¹²⁵ The Government’s defence ‘proposalshave probably already done so much harm that it is too late to retrieveit’.¹²⁶ The Government could only limit this damage if it conceded twopoints: delaying the withdrawal, and maintaining the order for the F111bombers. But the Prime Minister and Chancellor stood their groundand dismissed the Foreign Secretary’s arguments. Wilson’s response wasindicative of how profoundly his attitudes towards Anglo–Americanpartnership had shifted. Both Britain and the United States, he argued,‘must each look after our own economic interests’.¹²⁷ James Callaghanintervened to argue that Britain ‘could not afford’ to ignore Americanwishes: even if the US took no hostile action, but simply refused tohelp the country in a moment of crisis, Britain would be in desperatetrouble.¹²⁸ Jenkins’ response sought to demolish not only that argument

¹²¹ NAA: A1838/346, 691/1/1 PART 3: AHC, London, to DEAC, tel. 641, 12/1/1968.

¹²² PRO: PREM 13/1999: Michael Palliser, memcon, Harold Wilson, Denis Healey, theChiefs of Staff et al., London, 12/1/1968.

¹²³ PRO: FCO 46/43: Sir Paul Gore-Booth to George Brown, ‘Talk with Prime Minister’,10/1/1968.

¹²⁴ PRO: T 225/3068: J.C. Burgh to H.L. Jenkyns, ‘Public Expenditure: Post-devaluationMeasures’, 10/1/1968.

¹²⁵ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)6th Meeting, 12/1/1968; Castle, Diaries, p. 178.¹²⁶ Castle, Diaries, p. 178.¹²⁷ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)6th Meeting, 12/1/1968. ¹²⁸ Ibid.


but the former Chancellor’s credibility as well. He stated that he andCallaghan were diametrically opposed: the latter wanted ‘us to continueas we have done for the past three years. I don’t believe we can affordto do so’.¹²⁹ The Government had to make a decisive break from itsprevious policies. It could no longer act at the behest of the UnitedStates. The Anglo–American friendship ‘had been valuable to us; butwe had often paid a heavy price for it’.¹³⁰ The US was now dealing withits balance of payments problems through a policy based on self-interest;it could not object if Britain did the same. The Prime Minister’s andChancellor’s statements blocked any chance of rebellion. Though DenisHealey fought for the cancellation of the F111 order to be rescinded,this was rejected by the Cabinet. The March 1971 date for withdrawalwas also left unaltered, though it was agreed that this would have to bereconfirmed after the Singapore Prime Minister had presented his casein London.

Two days later, on 14 January 1968, Lee Kuan Yew arrived in Londonfor last-ditch discussions with the British leadership. Immediately onhis arrival he went to 10 Downing St to meet Harold Wilson andsenior foreign and defence policy ministers. Their discussions startedin the late afternoon, went on through dinner, and continued for fiveand a half hours into the night.¹³¹ The Singapore Prime Ministerrepeatedly pressed his hosts on the reasoning behind the acceleratedwithdrawal. He questioned whether a faster withdrawal would not infact create extra costs. He asked whether the price of maintaining asmall force in Singapore for two more years could really be that high.He pointed out that the sale of the British Government’s assets inSingapore would attract a much higher price if confidence in the islandwere maintained.

The British ministers, however, were unmoved. Wilson told Lee,somewhat dishonestly, that the March 1971 departure date had beenagreed by Cabinet almost unanimously and could not be moved.¹³² Heand Denis Healey maintained that the cuts were being implemented foreconomic reasons and would yield great savings.¹³³ Around 7.00 p.m.they were joined by the Chancellor and, over ‘liberal glasses of claret’,

¹²⁹ Castle, Diaries, p. 179.¹³⁰ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)6th Meeting, 12/1/1968.¹³¹ PRO: PREM 13/2081: SMV(68)1st and 2nd Meetings, 14/1/1968; Lee, From Third

World to First, pp. 59–60.¹³² Lee, From Third World to First, p. 59.¹³³ PRO: PREM 13/2081: SMV(68)1st Meeting, 14/1/1968.


the debate continued.¹³⁴ Two hours later, there were the first signs ofgreater flexibility in the British position. Harold Wilson continued toargue that the British had to withdraw early—by which, he said, hemeant ‘earlier than 1973’—but the date for this in 1971 was ‘not yetdefinite’.¹³⁵ Lee continued to press for 1973. George Brown replied thatthere was no possibility of a 1973 withdrawal, but there was still someargument between 1971 and 1972. A difference of a year would be athird of the time of withdrawal, and, Brown pointed out, ‘by any viewthis was worth fighting for’.¹³⁶ On this note of indecision the meetingclosed, but the next morning the Singapore Prime Minister sent HaroldWilson a message taking up the point. While he reiterated his desire forthe withdrawal not to be completed until 1973, he also conceded that‘every year, even every month beyond the date’ of March 1971 wouldbe ‘that much time gained’.¹³⁷

On 15 January, the Cabinet sat for the last time on the economicpackage. It was presented with a paper by George Thomson describingthe course of his discussions with all the Commonwealth leaders. Hestressed that all the allies felt a March 1971 withdrawal to be too soon,and the ‘general capability’ remaining afterwards to lack credibility. Hewarned that if the proposals went ahead many of the allies ‘would becompelled in their own interests to take action which would hurt us’.¹³⁸He noted Lee Kuan Yew’s recent threats of retaliation and claimed thatthe Singapore Prime Minister was in a ‘near-hysterical and unpredictablestate’.¹³⁹ Thus he strongly urged that the Government should shift thedate for its withdrawal to March 1972—still less than what the allieswanted, but sufficient to mitigate the damage.

Thomson’s case was bolstered by a final letter from Lyndon Johnsonto Harold Wilson which was presented to the Cabinet. The President’sletter stressed once again the risks to Western security if the Britishsought a precipitate withdrawal. It raised the stakes further, however,by threatening economic retaliation if the withdrawal were coupled to acancellation of the F111 order: the offset arrangements facilitating thepurchase would be dropped; US domestic pressure to abandon foreign

¹³⁴ Lee, From Third World to First, p. 60.¹³⁵ PRO: PREM 13/2081: SMV(68)2nd Meeting, 14/1/1968. ¹³⁶ Ibid.¹³⁷ PRO: PREM 13/2081: Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Wilson, 15/1/1968.¹³⁸ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)23: George Thomson, ‘Defence Cuts: Discussions with

Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore’, 15/1/1968.¹³⁹ PRO: CAB 129/135: C(68)23: Thomson, ‘Defence Cuts’, 15/1/1968.


procurement would build, and this ‘would almost inescapably lead tocomplete cancellation of recent awards of military contracts to Britishfirms’.¹⁴⁰

Under this pressure, the resolution of the Cabinet began to buckle.It was argued that a delay in withdrawal to March 1972 would cost lessthan £10 million, which could well be worth paying to avoid greaterdamage to Britain’s interests. The Government could not afford toignore the wishes of the United States, on whom Britain depended in somany areas. While it might be illogical for the Singapore Governmentto take retaliatory action, if the British plans were too damaging it mightnot ‘act in a wholly rational fashion’.¹⁴¹ A withdrawal in March 1972would still be a major change in policy, and ‘its credibility would notbe enhanced by advancing the date by a year in face of all official andpolitical advice to the contrary; this would look like panic’.¹⁴² Slowly,one by one, Richard Crossman observed, more ministers began to swingbehind a March 1972 withdrawal.¹⁴³

The Chancellor and his allies, though, were resolute. They arguedthat the situation had not materially changed from when the Cabinethad decided for a March 1971 withdrawal. Though the United Statesmight threaten, it had rarely been the case in the past that it had actuallycarried out such retaliation, given the two countries’ common interests.All these threats were a smaller risk ‘to sterling than [Britain would]face if the expenditure cuts as a whole failed to carry credibility’.¹⁴⁴ Forthese reasons, the March 1971 withdrawal date had to stand.

Between the two sides, the Prime Minister stepped in with a compro-mise. He argued that a 1972 withdrawal would lose the ‘presentationaland catalytic advantages’ of March 1971.¹⁴⁵ But a withdrawal at the endof 1971 would maintain those advantages—presumably by being close,though no longer before, the next election—while providing someconcession to allied opinion. The Cabinet agreed, resolving that theBritish withdrawal would now be planned to be complete by December1971. With this matter settled, there were calls for the decisions on theF111 and other civil matters to be reopened. These calls, however, werequelled by the recognition that a reopening of one matter would leadto the unravelling of the entire package. Thus the Cabinet agreed to

¹⁴⁰ LBJL: NSF: Memos to the President: Lyndon Johnson to Harold Wilson,14/1/1968.

¹⁴¹ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)7th Meeting, 15/1/1968. ¹⁴² Ibid.¹⁴³ Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 650.¹⁴⁴ PRO: CAB 128/43: CC(68)7th Meeting, 15/1/1968. ¹⁴⁵ Ibid.


the rest of the economic measures substantially as the Chancellor hadoriginally intended.

The next day, on 16 January 1968, Harold Wilson made a statementto the House of Commons, announcing the package of measures theGovernment was implementing to shore up the pound. The pack-age comprised roughly £750 million of expenditure cuts spread overthe following two financial years. The defence cuts made up only alimited fraction of this—nothing at all in the first year, £110 mil-lion in the second. The Prime Minister, however, gave the greatestprominence to these cuts, devoting the first quarter of his statementto defence and foreign policy. In sharp contrast to the previous state-ments on this issue, there was no suggestion that Britain’s status androle were being maintained; nor was it argued that the new policieswere the result of strategic reassessments rather than economic de-mands. Wilson made clear the change in Britain’s position: ‘we haveto come to terms with our role in the world’; in defence, as in civilexpenditure, ‘we have been living beyond our means’.¹⁴⁶ The worldrole was gone. Britain’s ‘security lies fundamentally in Europe’; otherthan some scattered dependencies, by 1971 Britain would ‘not bemaintaining military bases outside Europe and the Mediterranean’.¹⁴⁷Once it had withdrawn from Malaysia and Singapore, there would beno military capability specifically designated for their defence, only a‘general capability based in Europe . . . which can be deployed over-seas as, in our judgement, circumstances demand’.¹⁴⁸ AMDA andSEATO would have to be reinterpreted to reflect these new reali-ties.

The reaction of Britain’s allies was public dismay and private anger.In a measured retaliation, the US Government cancelled the preferentialpurchasing agreements which were to help meet the foreign exchangecosts of the F111 order. Officially, the State and Defence Departmentsexpressed their ‘regret’, but did not elaborate any further.¹⁴⁹ Privately,the opinion of American officials was rather more harsh. The normallyreserved David Bruce, US Ambassador in London, described the cutsas ‘calamitous, destructive, selfish, myopic, and threatening to world

¹⁴⁶ Public Expenditure in 1968–69 and 1969–70, Cmnd 3515 (London: HMSO, Jan.1968), para. 11.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., paras 11–12. ¹⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 13.¹⁴⁹ PRO: FCO 46/42: British Embassy, Washington, DC, to FO, tel. 219, 17/1/1968.


orderliness’.¹⁵⁰ They constituted ‘the most deplorable resolve, exceptfor Munich, that any British [Government] had taken during the last150 years’.¹⁵¹ Publicly, the reactions of the Singapore and AustralianGovernments were restrained. Lee Kuan Yew said that he was ‘verysad’ at the withdrawal, but emphasized his Government’s intentionto shore up the country’s security by that time.¹⁵² Both he and theAustralian Prime Minister also underlined the importance of the nine-month reprieve which the British Government had granted.¹⁵³ But theSingapore Defence Minister remained privately scathing, calling thedecisions a ‘disgraceful breach of [the] understanding given us [and a]scuttling of [British] responsibilities’.¹⁵⁴

These harsh sentiments were echoed by the Conservative Opposition.In a marathon series of rowdy debates in the Commons, Edward Heathclaimed the Government had ‘ratted’ on its commitments, leading to‘the flagrant breach of pledges, . . . [the] letting down of friends andallies, and the humiliation of this country’. He committed himself todelaying the withdrawal if he were elected, saying that that would help‘restore the good name of Britain’.¹⁵⁵

In contrast, the appetite of the Parliamentary Labour Party for furtherdefence cuts had finally been sated. While there was considerable distressat the nature and extent of the civil cuts being implemented, the scale ofthe defence reductions was sufficient to mollify the Party critics. Indeed,The Times reported that the Labour Party’s Left Wing was ‘overjoyed’at finally winning their campaign against military spending.¹⁵⁶

In the long-term aftermath of the British Government’s January 1968decisions, the possibility of multilateral co-operation in Southeast Asiawas revived. Five-power discussions, which had first been mootedin mid-1967, took place in mid-1968, between Malaysia, Singapore,Australia, New Zealand and Britain. The grouping slowly evolved into a

¹⁵⁰ LBJL: NSF: CF: UK: Box 211: David Bruce to William Bundy, 15/1/1968.¹⁵¹ Ibid.¹⁵² ‘Vain hopes raised by Mr Lee’s visit to London’, The Times, 17/1/1968, p. 8.¹⁵³ ‘Australia unable to fill the gap,’ The Times, 18/1/1968, p. 3.¹⁵⁴ USNA: RG 59: DEF 1967–1969: Box 1642: Francis Galbraith to Dean Rusk, ‘British

Military Withdrawal Singapore’, 20/1/1968.¹⁵⁵ Hansard , Session 1967/8, vol. 756, cols 1967, 1971, 18/1/1968; col. 430, 24/1/

1968.¹⁵⁶ ‘Mr Wilson makes his main economies in defence field’, The Times, 17/1/1968,

p. 1.


loose Five-Power Defence Arrangement, which succeeded AMDA afterit was officially terminated in November 1971.¹⁵⁷ The Arrangement,which obliged its signatories to consult in the event of an externalattack though it compelled no other commitments, did not affect thecourse of the British withdrawal. The only alteration to that came withthe election in 1970 of the Heath Government. Staying true to theundertaking Heath had made at the time of the cuts, they changedthe timing, though not the substance, of the withdrawal, and Britishnaval forces eventually departed Singapore in 1975, with ground troopsfollowing the next year.¹⁵⁸

What killed ‘East of Suez’? As this chapter has described, there was nosimple law of causation which led from devaluation to an acceleratedwithdrawal from Southeast Asia and the ending of any British roleoutside Europe. While these dramatic changes to Britain’s foreignpolicy occurred in a context of economic crisis, that context did notdetermine the end result.

The brute economic numbers did not compel the policy changes thattook place. According to the Treasury’s own figures during the debate,the financial gain from an accelerated withdrawal from Southeast Asiawas nil in 1968/9 and unknown in 1969/70. For the final statement,the defence cuts constituted only a seventh of the package of measuresthat was announced. A purely rational approach to economic policywould not have ranked cuts to ‘East of Suez’ as the most importantpriority.

But while the economic effect of the defence reductions was ultimatelyquite small, the political and psychological contribution they madewas much larger. They were presented by the Government as thefirst and major component of its economic package, taking up theopening quarter of the policy statement. Dutifully, though contraryto the financial truth, The Times’ page one headline reported that‘Mr Wilson makes his main economies in defence field’.¹⁵⁹ And thepolitical impact of the Government saying that Britain no longer hada role outside Europe undoubtedly carried greater weight than thenumerical sum of defence cuts: the cuts announced in 1966 and 1967

¹⁵⁷ Chin, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, ch. 9.¹⁵⁸ Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge,

1995), p. 95.¹⁵⁹ ‘Mr Wilson makes his main economies in defence field’, The Times, 17/1/1968.


were financially larger, but they had nothing like the same effect as thoseof January 1968.

Why was the battle over the 1968 defence cuts so heated, when the1966 and 1967 cuts had been more substantive? Partly it may have beena question of style. Both the 1966 and 1967 defence statements hadbeen preceded by consultation processes within Government and withBritain’s allies. In contrast, in the climate of the post-devaluation crisisand once Jenkins had acceded to the Chancellorship, it was clear that theviews of the foreign policy departments and overseas allies would be givenshort shrift—thus incurring their sharper response. The acceleratingtimetable for withdrawal also made its potential consequences muchmore real. The earlier timing of withdrawal in the ‘mid-1970s’ had beenabout eight years away when it was announced in July 1967, and wasclearly after the next election, hence potentially reversible. However,Jenkins’ preferred date of March 1971 was only three years away, fullyachievable within the Government’s current term of office. Moreover,the decisions in early 1968 were freighted with greater symbolic andemotional import: Britain was turning away from its historic world role,with little attempt at rhetorical or political disguise. Such symbolism wasnot simply superficial in its impact. For as long as Britain maintainedpublicly that it had a continuing role and interests in Southeast Asia, itsallies could call upon it for assistance—and the existence of that lifeline,even if the military capability underpinning it was limited, contributedto the security of the region. The lifeline was clearly becoming evermore tenuous, and hence Britain’s allies ever more exposed.

What necessitated the heavy political emphasis on the defence cuts?Though Jenkins’ own memoirs obscure this point, it is clear from thearchival record that the Chancellor’s strategy for getting the completepackage of cuts through Cabinet required that defence suffer heavyreductions first off. The other major components of the package, partic-ularly the introduction of prescription charges and the postponement ofthe raising of the school-leaving age, conflicted with deeply held Labourideals. The majority within Cabinet to get the measures through wasparticularly fragile: Richard Crossman and Harold Wilson were the soleministers prepared to back the Chancellor on every point.¹⁶⁰ Jenkinswas only able to have major social cuts approved by a deeply appre-hensive Cabinet by ensuring that defence policy was sacrificed at the

¹⁶⁰ Jenkins, Life at the Centre, p. 228.


outset. The defence cuts were a device—financially relatively small, butsymbolically weighty—to help gain much larger cuts in social spending.In this instance at least, the Empire was not being abolished to pave theway for the welfare state.¹⁶¹ Rather its abolition was politically necessarybefore a Labour Cabinet could contemplate reducing the welfare state’sbenefits.

That this kind of bargaining was both necessary and possible reflecteda number of changes in the policy process itself. The relative positionsof actors had shifted: Jenkins now being the key figure, Wilson relativelyweaker, the defence and overseas policy ministers almost sidelined; theCabinet becoming the central decision-making body, the Whitehalldepartments and officials irrelevant.

The vital role of Roy Jenkins in the decisions to accelerate the Britishwithdrawal and abandon any overseas role was cemented by the fact thatit was his agenda and priorities, his sense of tactics within Cabinet, andhis determination not to yield on any point that drove the debate to itsconclusion. Jenkins did not, as James Callaghan had done before him,set a financial target for defence cuts and allow the relevant ministers todevelop a policy around that. Rather, he pushed his own defence andforeign policy. He established the terms of the Cabinet bargain wherethese were the cuts imposed on defence so that commensurate socialcuts could be achieved. And, when much of the Cabinet began to waverafter the sharp reaction at home and overseas to their decisions, it wasJenkins’ determination to keep his package together that prevented anysubstantial softening of the Government’s approach.

Jenkins had Harold Wilson’s backing through all of this. The PrimeMinister’s precise reasoning for doing this—and thus reversing hisprevious commitment to Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role—cannot be knownfor sure. Importantly, Wilson signalled that he recognized the change indefence policy meant a change in the Anglo–American relationship aswell: the two countries were now acting not as partners but in terms oftheir individual self-interest. But Wilson may have been acting as muchin his personal political interest as from a sense of Britain’s changingglobal priorities. It would not be exaggerating the situation to saythat his premiership—so damaged by devaluation—now rested on thenew Chancellor’s ability to right the Government’s and the country’sfortunes.

¹⁶¹ See T.O. Lloyd, Empire, Welfare State, Europe, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993).


Within the Cabinet itself, however, the Prime Minister’s support inthis round of decision-making was less pivotal than it had been in thepast. Previously, when the Prime Minister had aligned himself withthe defence and overseas policy ministers, he had been prepared andable to summarize Cabinet discussions in their favour, even thoughthis may have been against the wishes of the strict majority, had a votebeen taken. But Wilson’s authority had been weakened by devaluationand its aftermath. Through all the January 1968 Cabinet discussions,he did not dare to summarize the decisions according to his will andjudgement, but carefully tallied up all the votes of individual ministers,using his own vote to back the Chancellor if there was a tie.¹⁶²

Wilson’s shift meant in turn that the defence and overseas policyministers were effectively sidelined. Though their supporters had pos-sibly always been in the minority in the Cabinet, they had benefitedfrom the Prime Minister’s authority and support, and his ability toturn Cabinet decisions in their favour. Now that they had lost thebacking of the Prime Minister and their strength had been reducedto their actual numbers in Cabinet, they lost much of their formerpower. This loss was reflected in the clear encouragement they gave toAmerican officials to put more pressure on Harold Wilson in supportof their view.

The changes in the dynamics of the Cabinet in turn had widerrepercussions on the policy process. With no single claque of ministersdominating proceedings, this meant the Cabinet as a whole became theonly important forum for the deciding of policy. None of the officialor ministerial committees charged with developing defence and foreignpolicy ever had even a chance to discuss the plans for withdrawal.The views of the various departments and officials were ultimatelyirrelevant, for they had little influence on the Cabinet’s proceedings andonly their representative ministers to speak for them. Reduced to thisstatus, they leaked their discontent extensively to allied governments.These governments, in turn, had no purchase through the conventionalchannels of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices. They only gainedtheir limited influence to soften the British decisions through theirability to deal directly with ministers and the Cabinet: for example,

¹⁶² Wilson, Labour Government, p. 481. Jenkins was later critical of what he felt wasWilson’s weak support for his position. In contrast, Crossman was pleased by what heinterpreted as the revival of Cabinet, as opposed to prime ministerial, government: Jenkins,Life at the Centre, p. 224; Crossman, Diaries, vol. 2, pp. 639, 652.


Lee Kuan Yew and his hint of emotionally driven retaliation; LyndonJohnson and his blunt threat of sanctions.

In conclusion, then, it was not the economics of devaluation thatforced an acceleration of Britain’s withdrawal from Malaysia and Sin-gapore and an ending of its overseas role. Rather, these policy changesresulted from the political consequences of devaluation and its after-math. The old structure of authority within the Wilson Government,which had maintained the remnants of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ role,broke down after devaluation. The new order, with power distributedacross the Cabinet but Roy Jenkins as its leading figure, required theelimination of Britain’s international role as a symbolic sacrifice, beforeBritain would accede to major social cuts to shore up the country’sfinancial base.

Conclusion

Next year we shall be living in a countryThat brought its soldiers home for lack of money.The statues will be standing in the sameTree-muffled squares, and look nearly the same.Our children will not know it’s a different country.All we can hope to leave them now is money.

Philip Larkin¹

Philip Larkin’s astringent yet elegiac evocation of the end to ‘Eastof Suez’ encapsulates a common view of Britain’s descent in themid- to late 1960s: that a nebulous yet deep sense of the country’sstatus as a Great Power vanished with the onset of a cold, rudeeconomic winter. Sterling had been devalued; the ‘world role’—thatlast vestige of Empire—abolished. The country could only beat at thedoor of Europe. Britain’s position in the world appeared irremediablydiminished. Unsurprisingly, the Wilson Government’s decisions towithdraw from Malaysia and Singapore have usually been cast withinthat broad arc of Britain’s decline.

Notwithstanding this overarching sweep of history, as this book hasdetailed, the policy process leading to the decisions to withdraw weremore complex than a straightforward narrative of retreat. The forcesthat drove the Government towards withdrawal were more varied andless consistent than the fundamentals of Britain’s economic position.And the opposition to this process was more powerful and sophisticatedthan mere sentimental conservatism or emotional inertia. At the broadestlevel, this book has presented one straightforward and one more complexargument. The straightforward argument centres on the question ofwhat the key problems were for the Wilson Government’s defencepolicy towards Malaysia and Singapore between 1964 and 1968. The

¹ Philip Larkin, ‘Homage to a Government’ (1969), repr. in High Windows (London:Faber and Faber, 1974).

238 Conclusion

complex argument is about how those problems were handled andresolved.

The book has argued that the Wilson Government had to strugglewith two substantive issues regarding its future defence policies inMalaysia and Singapore: the first regarding Britain’s interests, and thesecond regarding the politics and symbolism of withdrawal. The twowere connected in time, with the second supplanting the first almost assoon as it was settled.

The first issue was a question of how to resolve a conflict betweenBritain’s fundamental interests: between the country’s limited economicmeans—which compelled cuts to the direct and overseas costs ofBritain’s defence forces—and its need to maintain its relations with itsmajor allies, especially the United States, all of whom wanted Britainto maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia. It wasthis conflict that the 1965 Defence Review tried but failed to resolve,eventually patching it over with the dubious formula contained inthe 1966 Defence White Paper—stating that Britain intended to stayfor ‘as long as conditions allowed’, while planning and hoping thatthey would be forced out in the near future. The conflict underlaythe dissolution of quadripartite co-operation between Britain and theANZUS allies in early 1966, and the growing antagonism betweenthe Treasury and political departments later that year. It was broughtto a sudden end in the aftermath of the Parliamentary Labour Party’srebellion against defence policy in February 1967, when senior ministershastily developed and decided on a plan to withdraw from Malaysia andSingapore in two stages up to 1975.

At this point, a second central issue arose to supplant the first,this time a political and presentational question: how to balance thepolitical pressure within the Labour Party and Cabinet for a fast, publicand complete withdrawal, against demands from Britain’s allies thatthe symbolic remnants of the country’s international role be retainedfor as long as possible, notwithstanding the fundamental decision towithdraw. This was not a minor issue, for the question of ‘East ofSuez’ was at its centre: whether and how Britain could still maintainthe outlook, politics and rhetoric of its ‘world role’. The questionunderpinned the final four months of debate before the publication ofthe Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy. And it was a contest inpolitical symbolism—between the retention of a nominal British rolein Southeast Asia and its dramatic abandonment—that was at the coreof the heated debates of December 1967 and January 1968, leading

Conclusion 239

to the Cabinet’s decision finally to end ‘East of Suez’. To say thata symbolic commitment was at stake, however, is not to say it wasmerely a superficial issue. For though it was not clear what hard militarycapability could be assigned to Britain’s world role when that capabilitywas increasingly being whittled away, for as long as Britain maintainedthe politics and rhetoric of ongoing interests and commitments overseas,it extended an implicit lifeline to the Southeast Asian region that couldpotentially be called upon should circumstances have required it, andbolstered confidence even when they did not. Ending the world rolemeant casting off the rhetorical cloak of security.

Those two issues—Britain’s underlying interests, and the symbolismand politics of withdrawal—were the fundamental problems that theWilson Government grappled with in planning policy towards Malaysiaand Singapore from 1964 to 1968. But while the central issues can besimply expressed at this high level of abstraction, the question of howthey were handled and resolved demands a more complicated response.Any explanation needs to encompass a number of factors, in economics,domestic politics, strategy, and international relations. None sufficedon its own. Moreover, the relationship between all of them variedconsiderably over the period.

As noted in Part I, covering the time leading to the publicationof the 1966 Defence White Paper, the policy process was relativelyconfined. The Cabinet and Parliamentary Labour Party had little or noinfluence on the outcome. The key players were the central Whitehalldepartments on defence and foreign policy, their leading ministers, andBritain’s ANZUS allies. The deciding factors were economics, strategyand Britain’s international relations with its major allies. Economicconstraints and a strategic reassessment of Britain’s future interests androle in Southeast Asia combined to produce the British Government’sprivate plans to withdraw its forces from Malaysia and Singaporeto the region’s periphery. But when presented in the aftermath ofthe Malaysia/Singapore split, these plans were quickly rejected bythe ANZUS allies. A deadlock ensued, lasting right through to thepublication of the 1966 Defence White Paper, which covered over thedivision with an ambiguous declaration of Britain’s commitment tothe area.

As Part II has described, from the 1966 White Paper to the Supple-mentary Statement on Defence Policy, the policy process was considerablymore complex, and split in two by the Parliamentary Labour Party’srevolt of February 1967. Up to that point, policy planning remained

240 Conclusion

firmly in the hands of the Whitehall departments. An ever increasingdivision between the Treasury, on the one hand, and the defence andpolitical departments, on the other, embodied the deepening conflictbetween the economic demands for withdrawal, and pressure from theANZUS allies for Britain to remain.

When the Labour Party revolted, it did more than transform the termsof the debate from whether or not to withdraw, to how to withdraw.It also changed the locus of decision-making from Whitehall to theCabinet. On these political and presentational questions, the key playerswere the leading ministers in Cabinet: the Prime Minister and theForeign and Defence Secretaries. The important factors were the needto satisfy Party pressure for a clear statement of Britain’s withdrawal,and the counterbalancing need to gain allied acquiescence by retainingsome symbolic remnant of Britain’s role in the region. This oppositionproduced the strained language displayed in the Supplementary Statementon Defence Policy: an announcement of British withdrawal couched inthe rhetoric of a continuing world role.

In the final chapter, from devaluation to the end, the context mayhave been one of economic crisis, but the key factors were again political.The old structure of authority within the Cabinet had broken down.The Prime Minister was considerably weaker; every minister now hadto fight on their own. This revised order cast Roy Jenkins, as thenew Chancellor, in the most important position. His judgement andpreferences determined the shape of the Government’s post-devaluationmeasures. His central aim was to get the Cabinet to accept an economicpackage that was composed largely of cuts to social spending. In thebargain he constructed, the last remaining symbols of ‘East of Suez’ hadto be sacrificed for that goal.

In providing this account of the British decisions to withdraw fromMalaysia and Singapore, this book offers an assessment of several impor-tant factors in the decision-making process. Britain’s contemporaneousapproach to Europe, sometimes held to be an important consideration inthe withdrawal, proves to have barely featured at all. While Roy Jenkins’orientation towards Europe clearly shaped his policy preferences, forother ministers there was no consistent rule linking EEC and overseasdefence policy. There were no cuts to British forces in Europe becauseof the fragile state of NATO, not because of the Common Market. Onthe other hand, domestic politics—while sometimes ignored in foreignpolicy studies—here clearly played a significant role in the decisionsto withdraw. The revolt of the Parliamentary Labour Party against the

Conclusion 241

Government’s defence policy caused Denis Healey to accelerate sharplythe plans for withdrawal. The intricacies of Cabinet politics deeplyaffected the shape of the 1967 and 1968 announcements. Equally,Britain’s ANZUS allies, often overlooked in descriptions of Britain’sretreat from Empire, turn out to have been among the most impor-tant players. The British Government’s early attempts to restructureits Southeast Asian role were completely blocked by their intervention.The later decisions to withdraw instigated a major breach in the al-liance. The end to ‘East of Suez’ was a momentous event not only inBritain’s post-imperial history, but in the saga of the Anglo–Americanrelationship through its period of remission.

At the same time it should be recognized that some of the importantfactors involved did not unambiguously propel the Government downthe road to withdrawal, or slow down that journey: they were morefinely balanced and ambivalent than that. The Ministry of Defenceand Foreign and Commonwealth Offices were pushing for a voluntarywithdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore in 1965, but, once theopposition of Britain’s allies was clear, were resistant to such moves in1967 and 1968. George Brown, as Foreign Secretary, might have arguedfor a publicly announced withdrawal in mid-1967, but was stronglyagainst the more dramatic cuts that came the following January.

In its decisions to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore and, morebroadly, from ‘East of Suez’, the Wilson Government sealed Britain’sdescent from its former status as a world power. The eventual rewardfor all the economic measures it had taken would be a turnaroundin the country’s current account, with a balance of payments surplusfinally being achieved in 1969/70.² In the broader region, the UnitedStates would, of course, continue its involvement in Vietnam for severalmore years. Once it withdrew, the situation in Southeast Asia evolved,ironically, to be not so far removed from the ‘non-aligned’ regionthe British had once proposed: a Communist Vietnam would becomehostile to China; the states of the Southeast Asian archipelago—somemore American-aligned than others—would become independentlyorganized within ASEAN. Singapore would survive the British with-drawal to become one of the most upwardly mobile states in the world,economically speaking; Malaysia would follow somewhat behind. Aus-tralia would continue to depend fundamentally on the United Statesfor its security, while tying its economic future increasingly to Asia.

² Jenkins, Life at the Centre, ch. 15.

242 Conclusion

The notion that Britain’s world power was once heavily centred on theMalaysian states would come to seem an increasingly distant—evenfaintly absurd—idea.

Yet if in the long perspective the British decisions appear to be but oneshort episode during a more fundamental orientation of global politics,that should not obscure the complexity of the path to withdrawal. It wasnot a smooth and straightforward transition. It was deeply contested,rupturing Britain’s relations with its most important allies, fracturing theGovernment and its ordinary processes, and breaking down its internalauthority. The key moments of change were driven more by recurringpolitical and economic crises than by calm consideration. They wereruled as much by the fear of revolt, threatened and actual, as by anyeconomic or strategic desiderata. It was not an ‘orderly decline’—rather,it was a rout.

Appendix: Personae

Note: Positions and dates are given only where relevant to this work.

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

Bailey, Peter H. First Assistant Secretary, Prime Minister’s De-partment

Bunting, Sir E. John Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department

Critchley, T. K. Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpuruntil 1965; Senior External Affairs Representa-tive, Australian High Commission, London, from1966

Downer, Sir Alexander Australian High Commissioner, London

Eastman, Allan J. Senior External Affairs Representative, AustralianHigh Commission, London until 1965; Aus-tralian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur from1966

Fairhall, Allen Minister for Defence from 1966

Gorton, John Prime Minister from Jan. 1968

Griffith, A.T. Assistant Secretary for External Relations andDefence, Prime Minister’s Department

Hartnell, Geoff C. Head, Australian Joint Services Staff, London, AirVice-Marshall, 1964–6

Hasluck, Paul Minister for External Affairs

Hicks, Sir Edwin Secretary, Department of Defence

Holt, Harold Prime Minister Jan. 1966–Dec. 1967

Jockel, Gordon A. Assistant Secretary and Head of South and South-east Asia Branch, Department of External Affairsuntil 1964; First Assistant Secretary, Departmentof External Affairs from 1965

Lawler, Peter J. Deputy Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department

McEwen, John Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Tradeand Industry

McIntyre, Sir Laurence R. Deputy Secretary, Department of External Affairs

Menzies, Sir Robert Prime Minister until Dec. 1965

Morrison, W.L. Counsellor, Australian High Commission, KualaLumpur

244 Appendix: Personae

Parsons, A.R. Australian High Commissioner, Singapore from1967

Plimsoll, Sir James Secretary, Department of External Affairs

Pritchett, William B. Australian Deputy High Commissioner, Singa-pore until 1965; Australian High Commissioner,Singapore 1965–7

Rogers, K.H. Counsellor, Australian High Commission, KualaLumpur until 1965

Waller, J. Keith Australian Ambassador, Washington, DC

BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Armstrong, Sir William Permanent Secretary of the Treasury

Arthur, Geoffrey G. Counsellor, Foreign Office

Atkins, L.B. Walsh Under Secretary, Commonwealth Office

Baldwin, P.R. Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor from1967

Bancroft, I.P. Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor until1966

Bell, G.R. Third Secretary, Treasury

Benn, Tony Technology Secretary from Jul. 1966

Bennett, C.S. Principal, Defence (Policy and Materiel) Division,Treasury

Bottomley, Arthur Commonwealth Relations Secretary until Aug.1966

Bowden, Herbert Commonwealth Secretary Aug. 1966–Aug. 1967

Bridges, T.E. Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretaryuntil 1966

Brown, George Economic Affairs Secretary and First Secretary untilAug. 1966; Foreign Secretary from Aug. 1966

Burgh, J.C. Private Secretary to the Economic Affairs Secretary

Burrows, Sir Bernard Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office

Cable, J.E. Head, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Officeuntil Mar. 1966

Caccia, Sir Harold Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office until1965

Cairncross, Alec Economic Adviser to the Treasury

Callaghan, James Chancellor of the Exchequer until Nov. 1967

Carver, General Sir Michael Commander in Chief, Far East


Castle, Barbara Transport Secretary from Dec. 1965

Chalfont, Lord Minister for Foreign Affairs

Cooper, Frederick Assistant Under Secretary, Ministry of Defence

Crossman, Richard Housing and Local Government Secretary untilAug. 1966; Lord President of the Council fromAug. 1966

Day, D.M. Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

Dean, Sir Patrick British Ambassador, Washington, DC

de la Mare, A.J. Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office

Dunnett, Sir James Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Defencefrom 1967

Edwards, A.J.C. Private Secretary to the Permanent Secretary of theTreasury

Facer, R.L.L. Principal, Cabinet Office

Fenn, N.M. Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary

Figgures, F.E. Third Secretary, Treasury

Garner, Sir Saville Permanent Under Secretary, Commonwealth (Re-lations) Office

Golds, A.A. Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Of-fice

Gordon Walker, Patrick Foreign Secretary until Jan. 1965

Gore-Booth, Sir Paul Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office from1966

Graham, J.A.N. Assistant, Permanent Under Secretary’s DepartmentForeign Office

Greenhill, D.A. Ministry of Defence

Hall, G.E. Assistant, American Department, Foreign Office

Hall, M.G.F. Assistant Secretary, Defence (Policy and Materiel)Division, Treasury

Halls, A. Michael Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Ministerfrom 1967

Hardman, Sir Henry Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Defenceuntil 1966

Hawtin, M.V. Assistant Principal, Treasury

Head, Viscount Antony British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur until1965

Healey, Denis Defence Secretary

Henderson, J.N. Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary until 1965

Jenkins, Roy Minister for Aviation until Dec. 1965; Home Sec-retary Dec. 1965–Nov. 1967; Chancellor of theExchequer from Nov. 1967


Jenkyns, H.L. Assistant Under Secretary, Economic Co-ordinationDivision, Department of Economic Affairs

Johnston, Sir Charles British High Commissioner, Canberra

Killick, John E. Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington, DC

Lavelle, R.G. Private Secretary to the Chancellor

MacLehose, C.M. Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary 1966–7

Macleod, D.A. Private Secretary to the Minister for Common-wealth Affairs

Maitland, D.J.D. Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary from 1968

Mayhew, Christopher Minister for the Navy until Feb. 1966

McDonnell, C.T. Principal, Defence (Policy and Materiel) Division,Treasury

Mitchell, Derek J. Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Ministeruntil 1966

Moreton, John O. Assistant Under Secretary, Commonwealth Office

Morgan, J.C. Under Secretary, Far East and Mediterranean Divi-sion, Commonwealth Relations Office until 1966;Deputy British High Commissioner, Canberra from1967

Mulley, Fred Deputy Defence Secretary and Minister for theArmy until Dec. 1965; Minister for Foreign Affairsfrom Jan. 1967

Murray, D.F. Counsellor, Foreign Office

Nairne, P.D. Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary 1966 to1967

Nicholls, P. Assistant Secretary, Defence (Policy and Materiel)Division, Treasury

Nield, Robert R. Economic Adviser, Treasury

Palliser, A. Michael Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office 1965–6;Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to the PrimeMinister from 1966

Peck, E.H. Under Secretary, Far Eastern Dept, Foreign Office

Pritchard, Sir Neil Under Secretary, Commonwealth (Relations) Office

Reed, A.H. Counsellor, Commonwealth Office

Rennie, Sir John Under Secretary, Foreign Office

Rob, John V. British High Commissioner, Singapore

Rogers, Philip Deputy Cabinet Secretary

Rose, C.M. Assistant in Department, Foreign Office

Shackleton, Lord Minister for the Air Force


Spreckley, J.N.T. Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister

Stevens, John Economic Minister and Head of Treasury Delega-tion, British Embassy, Washington, DC

Stewart, Michael Foreign Secretary Jan. 1965 to Aug. 1966; Eco-nomic Affairs Secretary and First Secretary fromAug. 1966

Sykes, R.A. Head of Defence Department, Foreign Office

Thomson, George Commonwealth Secretary from Aug. 1967

Thomson, John A. Acting Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office 1966

Trend, Sir Burke Cabinet Secretary

Wade-Gery, R.L. First Secretary, Foreign Office

Walker, Sir Michael British High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur from1966

Wilson, Harold Prime Minister

Wright, J. Oliver Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to the PrimeMinister until 1966

MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT

Ong Yoke Lin, Tan Sri Malaysian Ambassador, Washington, DC

Rahman, Tunku Abdul Prime Minister

Razak bin Hussein, TunAbdul

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence

Tan Siew Sin Minister of Finance

NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT

Holyoake, Keith Prime Minister

Marshall, J.R. Deputy Prime Minister

SINGAPOREAN GOVERNMENT

Goh Keng Swee Minister for the Interior and Defence

Lee Kuan Yew Prime Minister

Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby Minister for Foreign Affairs

Toh Chin Chye Deputy Prime Minister


UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Acheson, Dean former Secretary of State Member, Panel of Con-sultants on Foreign Affairs

Ackley, Gardner Member, Council of Economic Advisers until 1965Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers from1965

Ball, George Under Secretary of State until Sept. 1966

Bator, Francis M. Deputy Special Assistant to the President for Na-tional Security Affairs 1965 to Sept. 1967

Bell, James Dunbar US Ambassador to Malaysia

Berger, Samuel D. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far EasternAffairs from 1965

Bruce, David US Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Bundy, McGeorge Special Assistant to the President for NationalSecurity Affairs until Mar. 1966

Bundy, William B. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs

Donald, Richard H. Acting Consul General in Singapore

Fowler, Henry H. Secretary of the Treasury from Apr. 1965

Galbraith, Francis J. Ambassador to Singapore

Green, Marshall Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far EasternAffairs until 1965; Ambassador to Indonesia fromMay 1965

Heller, Walter W. Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers until1965

Hughes, Thomas L. Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,Department of State

Johnson, Lyndon B. President

Kaiser, Philip Minister in the US Embassy, London

Katzenbach, Nicholas de B. Under Secretary of State from Sept. 1966

Kitchen, Jeffrey C. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

Klein, David National Security Council staff member

Kohler, Foy D. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairsfrom Nov. 1966

Leddy, John M. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairsfrom June 1965

McNamara, Robert S. Secretary of Defense

McNaughton, John Assistant Secretary of Defense


Martin, William Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board

Neustadt, Richard former Counsellor to the Department of State Pro-fessor of Government, Columbia University until1964; Professor of Government, Harvard Universityfrom 1965

Roche, John P. National Security Council staff member

Rostow, Walt W. Chairman, Policy Planning Council until Mar1966; Counsellor to the Department of State untilMar. 1966; Senior National Security Council staffmember 1965–7; Special Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs from Apr. 1966

Rusk, Dean Secretary of State

Valenti, Jack J. Special Consultant to the President

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CAB 128, CAB 129, CAB 130, CAB 133, CAB 148: Cabinet OfficeDEFE 13, DEFE 25: Ministry of DefenceDO 164, DO 169: Commonwealth Relations OfficeEW 25: Department of Economic AffairsFCO 24, FCO 46: Foreign Office and Commonwealth OfficeFO 371, FO 953: Foreign OfficePREM 13: Prime Minister’s OfficeT225, T 230, T 312: Treasury

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Index

Acheson, Dean 119Aden 8, 82, 90, 140, 171, 190Anglo-Malaysian Defence

Agreement 28–9, 46, 73, 155,188, 204, 214, 215, 219, 220,230, 232

Australia New Zealand United StatesSecurity (ANZUS) Treaty andallies 32, 34, 35, 45, 48, 52, 56,58, 64, 67, 73, 74, 77, 81, 86–7,98–9, 101, 112, 113, 124, 127–8,139, 150, 152, 154, 156–7,162–3, 165–6, 168–9, 195, 238,239–41

Armstrong, Sir William 207, 214Australia 2, 7, 216, 241

northern Australia base 29–32, 36,39, 40, 46–7, 49, 63, 67–8, 71,76–80, 82–4, 91, 103, 132,157

see also WilsonGovernment–Australiarelations

Ball, George 41, 42, 53–4, 66, 119Bator, Francis 37, 119, 174Benn, Tony 217Berger, Samuel 50, 51–2Bowden, Herbert 139, 142–5, 178–9,

183, 186–7, 193, 197Brown, George 15–16, 35, 39, 111,

113–18, 122, 123–4, 126, 129,130, 136–7, 138, 139–40, 142,144, 146–7, 148, 151–6, 160,162–8, 171–2, 182–4, 186, 193,197, 205, 210–11, 215, 218, 220,223–6, 228, 240, 241

Bruce, David 75–6, 153, 230–1Bundy, McGeorge 41, 42, 65, 72Bundy, William 169Burrows, Sir Bernard 61

Callaghan, James 15–16, 31, 35,37–9, 41, 55, 56, 111, 113,

114–18, 122–3, 131, 133, 145,178, 180, 186, 202, 205–6, 207,224, 226–7, 234

Castle, Barbara 111, 115, 117, 121,180, 191, 220

Chalfont, Lord 65China 16, 20, 50, 64, 71–2, 76, 110,

156, 241Cold War 2, 3Communism 3, 4, 21, 22, 23, 36, 45,

61, 66, 70, 162, 170, 189Confrontation see

Indonesia–ConfrontationConservative Party 85, 137, 231Cooper, Frederick 173Cromer, Lord 53, 54Crossman, Richard 55, 83, 107, 111,

115, 126–7, 133, 136–7, 144,146, 148, 179–80, 183, 185–6,187, 193, 205, 206, 217, 220,229, 233

Curzon, Lord 2

Dean, Sir Patrick 56, 62, 65, 216, 225decolonisation 1, 4–5, 24de Gaulle, Charles 114devaluation see sterling–devaluationDowner, Sir Alexander 59–60, 158Douglas-Home, Alec 15, 24‘East of Suez’ 1, 8, 17, 20–1, 26,

32–3, 36, 37, 60, 62, 68–9, 76,85, 90–1, 106, 107, 109, 115,117–22, 125, 132, 136–7, 150,155, 175, 180, 183–5, 191, 193,197–8, 201, 205, 207, 209–13,218, 225, 230, 232–4, 236,237–41

European Economic Community(EEC) 108, 119, 148, 240

Fairhall, Allen 177Fowler, Henry 38, 41, 42, 53, 54, 116,

119–20, 206

262 Index

Gardiner, Lord 180Garner, Sir Saville 163–4, 214Goh Keng Swee 159Gorton, John 216, 223Gordon Walker, Patrick 16Gore-Booth, Sir Paul 59, 134, 164,

183, 226

Hardman, Sir Henry 39Hasluck, Paul 17, 36, 70, 101–3, 112,

152, 154–7Head, Viscount Antony 44, 45Healey, Denis 16, 17, 25, 31, 33, 35,

36, 39, 44, 59, 60, 64–6, 68, 72,74–80, 86, 92, 102, 107, 108,111, 122–3, 126, 130–1, 133,135, 136–7, 138–9, 142–4,146–8, 151–3, 159, 160–8,170–2, 177–9, 183, 185–6, 190,193, 196–7, 205–11, 217–20,224, 227–8, 240

Heath, Edward 85, 190, 231, 232Heller, Walter 203Holt, Harold 85, 158, 160, 168, 176,

177–8, 189, 212, 216Holyoake, Keith 154–5, 157–8, 223Hong Kong 32Hughes, Cledwyn 45

India 2, 29Indonesia 47, 48, 50, 66, 101, 102,

104, 162, 222Confrontation (Konfrontasi) 4, 6–7,

13, 17, 18, 21, 28, 30, 40, 41,43–5, 47, 49, 50–2, 60–1, 64,66–8, 70–1, 74, 75, 80–2, 87,90, 98, 103–5, 111–12, 124,128, 22

Jenkins, Roy 37, 116, 144, 148, 180,202, 206, 207, 209–10, 214–15,217–19, 223, 226–30, 233–4,236, 240

Johnson, Lyndon B. 17, 42, 66, 85, 86,100, 113, 117, 120–2, 132, 163,168, 173–6, 205, 225, 228, 236

Katzenbach, Nicholas 152, 189

Lee Kuan Yew 5, 43, 44, 48, 50, 81,106, 160–1, 168, 170, 178–9,

189, 212, 222–3, 227–8, 231,236

McEwen, John 80Macmillan, Harold 15, 24McNamara, Robert S. 36–9, 41, 66,

71–2, 76, 102, 120, 152, 154,157, 166–7, 176, 189, 206, 225

McNaughton, John 65Malaya 4Malayan Emergency 4, 90, 105Malaysia 1, 2–3, 5–6, 42–6, 48, 70,

159–60, 163, 168–70, 241–2Singapore separation 14, 35, 42–5,

49, 57, 60, 89, 104see also Wilson

Government–Malaysia, policytowards; WilsonGovernment–Malaysiarelations

Marshall, J.R. 176Martin, William 53, 54Mayhew, Christopher 26, 84–5,

107–8, 109–10, 136Menzies, Sir Robert 39–40, 47, 60, 64,

69Mitchell, Derek 42Mulley, Frederick 25–6, 66, 68–9,

183

Nairne, Patrick 139Neustadt, Richard 39New Zealand 2, 7Nield, Robert 114North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) 20, 25, 27, 62, 70, 118,124, 135, 148, 166, 240

Palliser, Michael 142, 174–5Parliamentary Labour Party 55, 85,

98–9, 106–10, 121, 128–9, 130,136–8, 147–9, 151–2, 153, 156,177, 178–81, 190–1, 193–4,196–7, 203, 205, 231, 238,239–41

Peck, E.H. 51–2Powell, Enoch 85, 190Pritchard, Sir Neil 50, 52, 139

Rahman, Tunku Abdul 6, 43, 44, 70,81, 160–2, 189, 190, 202, 221

Index 263

Razak bin Hussein, Tun Abdul 70,159–60, 162, 170, 190, 221

Rogers, Philip 141Rostow, Walt W. 113, 132, 225Rusk, Dean 35, 40, 53, 56, 76–7, 101,

112–13, 120, 121, 154, 156–7,165–6, 174, 176, 189–90,221–2, 224–5

Shackleton, Lord 25–6Short, Edward 107Singapore 1, 2–3, 5–6, 43, 45–6,

47–8, 50, 159, 241Singapore base 17, 22, 26, 29, 31,

39–40, 47–50, 52, 56–7, 60,67, 72, 75–6, 84, 92, 98, 132,155, 159, 176

see also WilsonGovernment–Singapore, policytowards; WilsonGovernment–Singaporerelations; Malaysia–Singaporeseparation

South East Asian Treaty Organisation(SEATO) 4, 23, 24, 30, 100, 112,153, 155, 188, 214, 215, 220, 230

sterling 41, 42, 53–7, 63, 89, 99,113–15, 117–18, 119–20, 127,129, 196, 204

devaluation 8, 114, 116–17, 120,201, 204–6, 235–6, 237, 240

see also WilsonGovernment–economic policy

Stewart, Michael 16, 31, 40, 53, 55,76–7, 108, 111–12, 115, 129

Suharto, General 98, 103Sukarno, President 7, 17, 30, 44, 49,

51, 98, 103

Tan Siew Sin 221Thomas, George 164Thomson, George 210–11, 215,

218–24, 228Trend, Sir Burke 42, 56, 65, 68, 135,

141, 145

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR) 110, 116

United Nations 109

United States 2, 24, 38, 47, 48, 63–4,119, 241

see also Wilson Government–UnitedStates relations

Vietnam 4, 17, 21, 22, 24, 37, 41, 42,57, 68, 71, 90, 99–100, 102, 111,112, 119–20, 128, 136, 154, 157,159, 175, 193, 203, 216, 223, 241

Wilson Government 1, 7–8, 13–14,15–16, 24, 88, 98, 106, 147–9

Australia relations 13–14, 18, 19,29, 31–3, 34–5, 36, 39–41,44–7, 49–50, 51–2, 56–7,59–60, 62–4, 67–9, 71–3,76–9, 83, 85–6, 89, 99–103,104–6, 108–10, 112–13, 124,128, 139, 143, 145, 151–2,154–60, 162–4, 169–70, 173,176–7, 188–9, 202–3, 216,223, 231

Cabinet 55, 59, 114–16, 125, 135,138, 144–5, 147–9, 150,154–5, 162, 165, 170–2,175–6, 178, 181, 185–8, 193,196–7, 202, 205, 207,214–15, 217–20, 225, 226,228–9, 233–5, 238, 239–41

defence reviews 8, 13–14, 16,18–20, 24–7, 30–3, 46, 48,52, 58–9, 61–2, 64, 66–7,74–5, 81–8, 90–2, 98–100,115–16, 122–3, 125–7, 129,130–6, 139–44, 146–7,185–6, 193, 204, 238

economic policy 8, 19, 35, 37–8,41, 42, 46, 51, 53–7, 113–18,121, 122, 137, 148, 201–2,204–6, 218–20, 225–30,232–6, 237, 240, 241

European policy 18–19, 25, 27, 36,62, 73–4, 108, 113–14, 117,119, 124, 125–127, 131, 133,135, 146, 147–8, 167, 174,184, 205–6, 210–11, 237

Malaysia, policy towards 7–8, 13,17, 21–2, 25, 28, 31–2, 43–9,52–3, 56, 61, 64, 67–70, 75,

264 Index

Wilson Government (cont.)78, 80–4, 86–7, 89–91,98–102, 103–6, 107–8,110–11, 117–18, 124, 127–8,139, 141–2, 145, 149, 150–2,154–5, 159–62, 164–5,168–70, 172, 177, 179, 182,184–5, 188–92, 195, 197,201–3, 208, 211, 213–15,219–20, 230–1, 237–41

Malaysia relations 80–1, 103–6,159–62, 170, 189, 190, 202,221

New Zealand relations 14, 18, 19,29, 31–3, 34–5, 39, 41, 45,46–7, 49–50, 52, 56–7, 67,69, 71, 73, 76–7, 86, 89,112–13, 139, 143, 145, 155–7,163, 173, 176, 223, 231

Singapore, policy towards 7–8, 13,21–2, 25, 31–2, 43–50, 52–3,56, 61, 64, 67–9, 71, 75,78–84, 86–7, 89–91, 98–102,104–5, 107–8, 110–11,117–18, 124, 127–8, 139, 142,145, 149, 150–2, 154, 159–62,

164–5, 168–73, 176–82,184–92, 195, 197, 201–3,205, 208, 211, 213–15, 217,219–20, 228–32, 237–41

Singapore relations 80–1, 159–61,168, 170, 178–81, 212,222–3, 227–8, 231

United States relations 13–14, 17,18, 19, 20, 22, 29, 31–3, 34–9,40, 41–2, 44–5, 49–57,64–77, 85–6, 89, 91, 99–102,108–13, 114, 116, 117–21,128, 134, 143, 151–8, 162–3,165–70, 173–6, 189, 206,216, 221–31, 238, 241

Wilson, Harold 15, 18, 20, 33, 35–6,39, 40, 44, 45, 53–5, 58, 60–1,63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70–1, 86, 89,102, 108, 109–10, 113–17,120–2, 124, 132, 133, 135, 138,139, 141, 146–8, 151, 156, 158,165, 168, 170–6, 178, 183, 186,189, 190, 193, 196–7, 202, 205,209–10, 212, 214–15, 220, 223,224–30, 233–5, 240

‘world role’ see ‘East of Suez’

Ending East of Suez

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