Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success April 2, 2001 Hoover Institution.
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Transcript of Ending Civil Wars: Determinants of Implementation Success April 2, 2001 Hoover Institution.
List of Cases
Failed Partial Success Success
Angola, 92-93 Bosnia and Herze- El Salvador, govina, 95-00 93-95
Angola, 94-98 Cambodia, 91-93 Guatemala, 92-98
Rwanda, 93-94 Lebanon, 91-00 Mozambique, 92-94
Somalia, 92-93 Liberia, 90-99 Namibia, 89
Sri Lanka, 87-88 Nicaragua, 89-91
Sierra Leone, 98 Zimbabwe, 1980
Guatemala
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Namibia
Cambodia
Liberia
Bosnia
Lebanon
Angola I
Rwanda
Angola II Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Success
Partial Success
Failure
< 2,500 2,500-7,500 7,500 – 60,000
Puzzle 1: What constitutes an adequate security “guarantee”?
N U M B E R S O F T R O O P S
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
UNAVEM II
Angola I
1991-93 $175
UNAMIR
Rwanda
Oct 93 – April 94
$35
ONUSAL
El Salvador
Jul 91 – April 95 $124
UNTAC & UNAMIC
Cambodia
Nov 91 – Sept 93 $1,621
IFOR, SFORBosnia & Herzegovina
Dec. 95 – now $16,000 + +
Mission Years Total Expenditure
Puzzle 2: Which cases get the most international attention?
Given a world of limited resources and
attention, which of the following tasks would
you prioritize when implementing a peace
agreement?
Human Rights? Local Capacity Building?
Disarmament? Demobilization? Elections?
Refugee Repatriation? Police and Judicial Reform?
Puzzle 3
It’s simple to predict when implementation will succeed: when it is easy and when there are lots of resources.
Conflict Score
• More than 2 parties• Disposable Resources• No Agreement/Coerced Agreement• Collapsed State• Likely Spoilers• Hostile Neighbors• >50,000 soldiers• Secession
Cases By Difficulty (From Most to Least Difficult)
Sierra LeoneBosniaLiberia
Sri Lanka
CambodiaLebanonSomalia
Angola IAngola IIZimbabwe
Rwanda
MozambiqueEl SalvadorNicaragua
GuatemalaNamibia
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 2 4 6 8
Difficulty Score
Inte
rest
Sco
re
SuccessPartial SuccessFailure
Guatemala
Namibia
El Salvador
Mozambique Zimbabwe
Lebanon Bosnia
Liberia
Sri Lanka
Sierra Leone I
Angola I
Somalia
Interest & Difficulty: Case Outcomes
Rwanda
Nicaragua Cambodia
Angola II
…It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional peacekeeping. United Nations forces for complex operations should be sized and configured so as to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers as to which of the two approaches the Organization has adopted.
- Brahimi Report
Mission PopulationTotal Expenditure
(millions)
IFOR, SFOR (95-now)
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3,835,777$16,000 ++ $4,171.25
KFOR/UNMIK (99-now)
Kosovo
1,902,000 $3,500 $1,840.16
UNTAC & UNAMIC (91-93)
Cambodia
12,212,306 $1,621 $132.73
UNAVEM II (91-93)
Angola I
10,145,267 $175 $17.25
UNAMIR (93-94)
Rwanda7,229,129 $35 $4.84
Peacekeeping ExpendituresExpenditure
Per capita
“If we had gone to the Security Council three months after Somalia, I can assure you no government would have said, “Yes, here are our boys for an offensive action in Rwanda.”
- Iqbal Riza
“There is no way I or anyone in this situation can presume you are dealing with a party out to dupe you. We came in believing that each side was talking in good faith.”
- Oluyemi Odeniji
SRSG, Sierra Leone
May 14, 2000
“A key to understanding the failure of the Lusaka Accords is to unravel how the U.N. officials could certify UNITA compliance with cantoning its troops and demobilizing its army, while unofficially acknowledging that UNITA withheld 15-25,000 soldiers.”
- Angola case study
“You can’t go to the Security Council and say, ‘We think Indonesia is going to implement a scorched-earth policy and we need a foreign intervention now.’ The politics of the council are such that you can’t paint a worse-case scenario.”
- Unnamed Diplomat
“I deeply regret that we were unable to prevent the senseless bloodshed of August and September. But if we compare the prospect now with that of two years ago, we see that East Timor is one more case where time and patient diplomacy have brought hope to what had been a hopeless situation.”
- Kofi Annan
December 14, 1999
Policy Recommendations
1) Need to treat great/regional power interest as hard constraint
2) Without great/regional power interest, don’t do the hard cases
3) Need for better strategic assessment concerning case difficulty
4) If there are spoils, spoilers, and hostile neighbors, don’t implement unless you have the capability to manage them
5) Need for intelligence gathering and analysis capability
6) Need for contingency planning
Given a world of limited resources and
attention, which of the following tasks would you prioritize when implementing a peace
agreement?
Human Rights? Local Capacity Building?
Disarmament? Demobilization? Elections?
Refugee Repatriation? Police and Judicial Reform?
Policy Recommendations: Subgoals
1) Ambitions must be commensurate with resources and permitted strategies
2) Priority in implementation should go to demobilization of soldiers and demilitarization of politics
3) Reconceptualize relationship between democracy and human rights and peace implementation
4) Pursue civilian security and local capacity building