Encuadre en Pasado Colectivo Genera Sentimientos Anti Inmigración

International Journal of Intercultural Relations 43 (2014) 7486

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International Journal of Intercultural Relations

j ourna l h omepa ge: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / i j in t re l

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Frank Moa School of Polib School of Psy

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Article history:Received 22 AAccepted 25 A

Keyword:Critical junctu

Contents

1. Natio2. The p3. The p

3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5.

4. Theor5. Limita6. Concl

Refer

Author no Correspon

E-mail add

http://dx.doi.o0147-1767/ s, no glory: How framing the collective past paves ther anti-immigrant sentiments

ls a,, Jolanda Jettenb

tical Sciences, University of Queensland, Australiachology, University of Queensland, Australia

l e i n f o

ugust 2014ugust 2014

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Populist Right-Wing Parties (PRWPs) have made a remarkable comeback since the 1980s,especially in Western Europe. In this paper we argue that in order to explain such successeswe need to understand the creative way in which PRWP leaders frame the collective past,present and future. We examined speeches of PRWP leaders in France, The Netherlands, andBelgium and examined in each of these unique contexts how these leaders instill collectivenostalgia and perceptions of discontinuity between past and present to justify a tougherstance on immigration, asylum-seeking and multiculturalism. We found that these PRWPleaders use temporal narratives about history and identity to persuade their audience that(a) our past is glorious, our future is bleak, (b) we know who brought the country down,(c) we were once glorious because we were tough, (d) we need to be tough once more,and (e) we are the only party prepared to take on the enemy. We conclude that PRWPleaders not only feed collective angst and fear of losing collective roots, they also provide(potential) followers with a historicized justication for harsher treatment of migrants andminorities, arguing that history has shown that the nations survival depends on its abilityto be uninching.

2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

nal identity and time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75ast, present and future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76resent research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Stage 1: content analysis of representations of the nations trajectory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78Results stage 1 analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78Stage 2: in-depth thematic content analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Results stage 2 analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

etical implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84tions and future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85usion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85ences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

te: This research was supported by the Australian Research Councils Discovery Project funding scheme (DP120100053).ding author at: School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia.resses: [email protected] (F. Mols), [email protected] (J. Jetten).

rg/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.08.0142014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

F. Mols, J. Jetten / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 43 (2014) 7486 75

My dear friend, we, national ghters, who are the enlightened guardians of the national spirit and the interests ofour people, we have to decide our choices guided by the imperative of victory. [. . .] In the history of countries andnations, one encounters moments where a generation has carried the responsibility for the survival of the group, itscontinuity, as a conscious human entity. Its this responsibility that our generation, and our organization in particular,carries. (Marine Le Pen, 14 November 2010)

Populist Right-Wing Parties (PRWPs) openly advocating anti-immigrant sentiments have made a remarkable comebackin recent years in many Western countries. This trend can even be witnessed in countries where multiculturalism was oncecelebrated as a core value dening the national identity. Consider the Netherlands, where the PVV (Freedom Party) led byGeert Wilders increased its number of seats in parliament from 9 in 2006 to 24 in 2010. Another case in point is Sweden,where, for elections. Atime to conGreece enti

These mpolitical lanpolitical agehas becomea real threain 2010 Gernonsense. Toff tolerancand much m

PRWP lecollapse, reis typicallypresent as narratives anever existeon the use relies heavare PRWP lpresent as inational idto avoid a ba critical juunrecognizepromoting the dominaan induced2010).

In orderLe Pen), Thlective pastcontinuity.

1. Nationa

Accordinin social grois essential & Higgins, common fa2005; Moscwhich unde

1 There is cosocieties can bthe way in whifor immigrantdangers facingthe rst time in the countrys history, the extreme-right secured a seat in the national parliament in the 2010lthough PRWP leaders typically refrain from inciting violence, their followers may nonetheless conclude it isfront immigrants and asylum-seekers. For example, there is growing evidence that Golden Dawn supporters ince others to violence toward minorities (BBC, 2 October 2013).ay be rather extreme cases, but it is clear that even in countries where PRWPs are not part of the traditionaldscape, the issue of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers and integration in the host-society are high on thenda. Moreover, in many Western countries, mainstream party leaders have moved to the right. For example, it

commonplace for inuential politicians to argue multiculturalism has failed, thereby portraying immigrants ast and those promoting multiculturalism as representing the old left and out of touch with reality. For instance,manys Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel described multiculturalism as obsolete, dismissing it as multikulti-hese views were echoed by the British Prime-Minister David Cameron in 2011, when he argued that the hands-e of those who reject Western values has failed, calling for a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent yearsore active, muscular liberalism (BBC News, 5 February, 2011).

aders1 tend to go a step further adopting an alarmist narrative, suggesting that their country is on the brink ofquiring strong leadership and preparedness to take immediate and decisive action. To make this point, nostalgia

evoked, whereby the countrys distant past is painted in a positive way, the more immediate past and theone of dramatic decline, and its future as one marked by imminent loss of national identity. These nostalgicre one-sided representations of the past and involve considerable exaggeration and a longing for a past thatd (Cheng et al., 2010; Kashima et al., 2009; Liu & Khan, 2014). Even though PRWP leaders do not hold a monopolyof nostalgia, it is fair to say that these leaders have discovered a new master-frame (Rydgren, 2005), one thatily on, among other things, nostalgia as a strategy to increase their appeal among swinging voters. But whyeaders drawn to nostalgic narratives? We propose that by presenting the past as glorious and positive and then decline, nostalgic reminiscing about a glorious past not only serves to essentialize, antagonize, and mobilizeentity (Liu & Khan, 2014), it also serves to convey a sense of urgency, and need for immediate drastic measuresreak between past and present. More specically, we propose that PRWP leaders do not lie in waiting untilncture (i.e., exogenous shock) occurs, but that they actively promote the idea of the country facing an as yetd critical juncture, one that has to be addressed urgently to ensure historical continuity. In other words, byidentity threat and fear about the future vitality of the nation (discontinuity), these leaders not only challengent West European state symbology (Liu, Onar, & Woodward, 2014), they also create what can be considered

critical juncture, which is subsequently used to justify calls for drastic policies to protect the nation (Mols,

to illustrate these processes, we unpack speeches of PRWP leaders in France (Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marinee Netherlands (Geert Wilders), and Belgium (Filip Dewinter) and explore how PRWP leaders portray the col-, present and future, highlighting specic identity threat themes: identity loss, status loss, and loss of identity

l identity and time

g to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), part of peoples sense of self is derived from their membershipups. Akin to personal history being an anchor for knowledge about the personal self, a group or nations historyto develop, establish and shape the collective self (Hilton, Erb, McDermott, & Molian, 1996; Liu, Wilson, McClure,1999; Sani et al., 2007). Indeed, a shared collective history enhances ingroup cohesion, promotes a sense ofte, and helps establish the content of group identity (e.g., group values, beliefs, and norms; e.g., Liu & Hilton,ovici, 1988). This is because in reecting on group history, the unique heritage of ones group becomes salient,rscores how the ingroup is different and distinct from other groups. A groups collective history thus provides

nsiderable disagreement among social scientists about the exact denition of Multiculturalism, and the question of which countries ande regarded as truly Multicultural (Berry, 2006; Kymlicka, 2007). We will refrain from entering into this discussion here, and instead focus onch PRWP leaders seek to persuade people that multiculturalism (conceived in rather general terms as the host society having to accommodates and cultural minorities) is dangerous, and that those promoting multiculturalism are nave, blind, and unable/unwilling to recognize the

the host society.

76 F. Mols, J. Jetten / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 43 (2014) 7486

something fundamental: history makes social identity possible and, as several researchers have noted, the only way tounderstand a groups social identity is by understanding where that group is coming from and where it plans to go (Condor,1996; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2011). In other words, social identity cannot be understoodin a time vacuum, as either frozen in time, or as something emerging suddenly on the spot. Indeed, social identity is betterconceptualCondor, 199and where

Even thobeen more psychologisidentity in tto study gro& Wohl, 20

Sociologhave an imptheorized tscholars resocial identidentities ahistorical exthat when ehistory texttotal neglec

Social psbility and idwho garnerfuture (Hasthe only onto considerDream (Aug

Of morethis researcthe audiencand interprOthers haveand the enmultiple en(Finlay, 200

An impoprototypicamore specihave achievand affect winto active repeat whe

PRWP leargue that, among folltough leadeHowever, awhy drasticaccepted assuccess. Moto past succ

2. The pas

We knoMcLaren, 2also know tnations pasized as a process of becoming (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Hopkins, &7; Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001) whereby the present is evaluated in the light of where the group is heading

it is coming from (Zhang, Jetten, Iyer, & Cui, 2013, see also Tajfel, 1978).ugh identities are conceptualized as context-dependent, uid and exible, it is also fair to say that there has

attention for their stability than for their continuous changing nature (Condor, 1996). Unfortunately, when socialts study identity, the timeline of identity is often ignored. Experimental social psychologists in particular studyhe here and now, and the reason why they study groups in the laboratory is precisely because this enables themups that have no history, and because history can therefore not contaminate current identity processes (Jetten

12).ists and political scientists interested in national identity tend to be more sensitive to the notion that identitiesortant time dimension to them. However, there are other problems with the way in which these researchers have

he way the past affects the present and future. For example, Mols and Weber (2013) argued that constructivistsearching political attitudes often start with strong claims about the malleability and context-dependence ofities, only to slide gradually into what is best regarded as an overly sticky Historical Institutionalism, in whichre conceived in an essentialist way, as having evolved over very long periods of time, and reecting sharedperiences. That is, very quickly, national identities have regained historically determined stability. It thus appearsxamining the way the past affects the present and the future, the challenge is to avoid both (a) over-reliance onbooks (as this could lead to an overly static or even stereotypical understanding of national identities) and (b) at of history text-books (as this could lead to an overly uid understanding of national identities).ychologists examining leadership and followership have sought to reconcile this tension between identity sta-entity malleability. For example, it is now widely accepted that politicians are crafty identity entrepreneurs,

support for their political project by presenting it as consistent with the groups collective past, present andlam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). It is clear from this research that PRWP leaders are notes to interpret society and social relations creatively. For example, research has revealed that Barack Obama wentable lengths to downplay his ethnicity, and to become regarded as a quintessential American living the Americanoustinos & De Garis, 2012).

direct relevance here, though, is research examining the discursive techniques used by PRWP leaders. Much ofh focuses on discursive strategies used to delineate group boundaries (us-them distinctions), and to reinterpretes self-understanding. For example, researchers found that PRWP leaders anticipate being accused of racism,et salient in- and out-group identities in a way that neutralizes this criticism (Rapley, 1998; Verkuyten, 2013).

shown that PRWP leaders go to considerable lengths to silence dissent, by instilling fear for the enemy withinemy without (Finlay, 2007). Yet others have shown that PRWP leaders tend to portray their group as facingemies, and as the victim of the malicious ruling elite, which has betrayed its roots, and is siding with the enemy7; Mudde, 2007; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Van Der Valk, 2003; Wodak, KhosravaNik, & Mral, 2013).rtant lesson to emerge from this research is that social inuence depends in great measure on perceived leaderlity, and on being perceived to be one of us (Turner, 1991). What remains less well understood, though, is thec question of how PRWP leaders legitimize proposed harsher treatment of immigrants and minorities once theyed perceived prototypicality. In other words, perceived prototypicality may be a prerequisite for social inuence,hether followers are receptive to the new norms the leader promotes. However, in order to convert followers

advocates, the leader will have to provide a legitimizing logic, which followers can understand, relate to, andn seeking to persuade others of the need to resort to harsher treatment.aders often portray immigrants and minorities as enjoying preferential treatment by the elite, and one couldin so doing, they prepare the ground for harsher treatment by cultivating a more general sense of resentmentowers. There is evidence from the so-called BBC prison study that such a strategy can be effective, and thatrship can nurture perceived injustice and bolster authoritarianism among followers (Reicher & Haslam, 2006).s career politicians, PRWP leaders are also expected to display factual knowledge, and to explain in more detail

harsh measures are required. Our hypothesis, explored in this paper, is that PRWP leaders (once regarded and prototypical) will justify the need for harsh measures and uninching leadership by coupling harshness withre specically, we hypothesize that PRWP leaders will glorify the past, thereby portraying toughness as the keyess and glory, and softness as the root of all contemporary woes.

t, present and future

w that perceived identity threat increases the electoral appeal of PRWPs (e.g., Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000;003), and that PRWP leaders use populist tactics to cultivate such fears (Mudde, 2007; Wodak et al., 2013). Wehat PRWP leaders tend to wallow in nostalgia and traditionalism (Gilmour, 2008), and that they re-imagine thet, present and future in such a way that the group becomes perceived as sharing an ancient and uninterrupted and


uncontaminated pure past (Sani et al., 2007). Such representation of the past, present and future, evoke powerful emotionssuch as nostalgia and pride in the nations past, and reduce the need to offer causal explanations (Liu & Khan, 2014). Recentresearch has shown, with help of social psychological experiments, that exposure to messages in which the nations past isframed as either tolerant or intolerant does have a signicant impact on peoples attitudes toward immigration and minorityrights (Smeekes et al., 2012). This research can be seen as a useful reminder that leaders not only evoke nostalgia to render aparticular social identity salient (and to become regarded as prototypical of that identity), but also to disseminate new norms,and to redene what it means to be a good member of the group in question. We argue that PRWP leaders use nostalgicnarratives to popularize and legitimize new norms (harsher treatment), and to discredit the legitimacy of established norms(tolerance and multiculturalism).

Anotherelicit. For exat present (can increasface of threand perceivconditions

Howeveto the indivand Jetten (the past anparticipantidentity thrthe presentthat this is eemphasize

There is historical csecurity peProulx, 200they will lostudies of tof resistancmore they ralso found tthat the methe more ththeir resistaof English hby historicafound in twhistory was

The comleaders to pfor the futuonly instill measures to

3. The pres

Even thowhat they sperceived nWhereas mthemselvesto wear theZeitgeist, in

2 Another siRather than topopulist Zeitg potential reason why PRWP leaders tend to evoke and cultivate nostalgia is that nostalgia is relatively easy toample, there is evidence that individuals experience nostalgia for the past spontaneously when facing a threatsee Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2008) and that concrete threats such as organizational reformse employees nostalgia for the past (Brown & Humphreys, 2002; Milligan, 2003). Such enhanced nostalgia in theat serves a restorative function by producing benecial effects for psychological functioning, including wellbeinged ability to cope with challenges (Sedikides et al., 2008). It thus appears that fear aroused by threat (that livingare about to worsen) and nostalgia (longing back to an imagined glorious past) go hand in hand.r, it is also clear that nostalgia for the past does not necessarily serve as a resource if that past is no longer availableidual (i.e., indicating low levels of identity continuity). Indeed, although nostalgia is a positive emotion, as Iyer2011) showed experimentally, the positive effects of nostalgia were only obtained when participants perceivedd the present as continuous. In contrast, feeling nostalgic about the past had negative consequences and leds to hold on to the past when the past and present were perceived as discontinuous. This research suggests thateat is evoked when people are exposed to a nostalgic narrative that highlights that the past is disconnected from

(as opposed to when people are given reassurances that their social identity will remain intact). We proposexactly what PRWP leaders appear to be doing: they not only emphasize nostalgic accounts of the past, they alsoidentity discontinuity.a growing body of work showing that perceived identity discontinuity enhances anxiety. This is because perceivedontinuity provides grounding and security (Bluck & Alea, 2008; Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008), and without thisople will experience a decline in psychological wellbeing, and an increase in feelings of stress (see Chandler &8). There is also good evidence that group members respond quite strongly and will resist change when they fearse their rich history and the connectedness between past and present. Jetten and Hutchison (2011) found in twohe merger between six Scottish Army Regiments that historical continuity perceptions were a unique predictore to the merger: the more that army personnel perceived that their regiment had a long and glorious history, theesisted the upcoming merger that would involve the disbanding of their regiment. Jetten and Hutchison (2011)hat the relationship between historical continuity and resistance to the merger was mediated by the perceptionrger represented a break with the past. In other words, the more participants perceived historical continuity,ey perceived the upcoming merger as interrupting the connectedness with the past, and this, in turn, predictednce to the merger. Other work examining the effect of historical continuity perceptions (in the representationistory) has found that it is in particular those higher in identication with the county that feel most threatenedl discontinuity (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Moreover, and this is relevant for the present research, these researcherso studies that only for those more highly identied with the country, opposition to immigration was higher when

represented as discontinuous rather than continuous.bination of nostalgic narratives and instilling perceptions of discontinuity between past and present allows PRWPresent the country strategically as being on a downward trajectory thereby arousing collective angst a fearre vitality of the country (Wohl, Squires, & Caouette, 2012). Such identity threats are powerful because they nota sense of imminent threat, they also create a sense of urgency, which, in turn, is used to justify the use of harsh

address the threat (Bar-Tal, 2000) and to make alternative futures more viable (Zhang et al., 2013).

ent research

ugh contemporary PRWPs come in different guises (Bale, 2012; Kitschelt, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Wodak et al., 2013),hare is a common concern with the preservation of Western (Judeo-Christian) national culture and identity, andeed to curb the inuence of non-Western (primarily Muslim) inuence in government and society at large.2

ore mainstream parties concerned about the potential dangers of non-Western inuences will tend to limit to views about specic policy challenges (e.g., laws allowing/prohibiting Muslim women in the Public Service

veil), PRWPs will cast the net much wider, and use nostalgic and discontinuity narratives to create a pessimistic which immigrants and asylum-seekers are held responsible for the overall (moral and material) decline of the

milarity is the tendency to portray society in populist terms, as the realm of a struggle between the virtuous people and the malicious elite. provide examples of this narrative in this paper, we refer the reader to Muddes (2007) work on how populist leaders seek to cultivate aeist.


nation. Drawing on existing research showing that attitudes toward minorities are affected differently by the way the pastis represented (Smeekes et al., 2012; see also Liu & Khan, 2014), we predict that PRWP leaders, in their eagerness to carveout a unique niche, will engage creatively and strategically with the nations past, present and future.

We collected and analyzed transcripts of speeches by four well-known PRWP leaders in three different European countries(Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in The Netherlands, and Filip Dewinter in Belgium). In onecase (The Netherlands) we were able to retrieve speech transcripts from the PRWPs own website (Geert Wilders PVV). Intwo of the cases (France and Belgium) we were unable to retrieve ofcial transcripts, and relied on transcripts made availableby independent followers of the leaders and parties in questions (Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen, Filip Dewinter).3

In the French and Dutch case, we were able to retrieve a relatively large number of speech transcripts (France 27;Netherlands 58). However, we were forced to rely on a smaller sample of speech transcripts for Belgium (7). This would beproblematito merely inumber of to illustratejustifying h

3.1. Stage 1

In ordersignicant tto a rst rotime dimendifferent hifuture, and we did not oreferring totradition, treferring toprosperitydecline (e.g

This rsdifferent napast to a glo

3.2. Results

(a) A glorio

From thprolic useyears of groa), both JeaMarie Le Pemeasure, anfollow narrway the tw

TheypurchSinceeveryFrancincomsham

3 Our choiceWe are aware of narratives a

4 Because oexamples can c if we were putting forward claims about differences between these leaders and parties. However, our aim isllustrate the widespread use of a particular narrative. We accept that it would have been better to have a largecases and a large number of transcripts for each of these cases. However, we feel that we have sufcient data

that PRWP leaders have a particular way of portraying the past, present and future, which is geared towardarsher treatment of immigrants and minorities.

: content analysis of representations of the nations trajectory

to determine whether history and the group/nations trajectory (collective past, present and future) were ahemes in PRWP leader speeches, worthy of further, more systematic analysis, we subjected the speech transcriptsund of qualitative analysis, in which we merely highlighted relevant sections in which the narrative had a clearsion (collective past, present and future). In order to get a sense of the way in which time was discussed, we usedghlighting colors to differentiate between statements about (a) the nation, (b) the nations past, present and(c) between optimistic and pessimistic statements about the nations past, present and future. In order to ensureverlook relevant sections, we subjected all speeches to a search for three types of keywords. They were keywords

the nation and the nations history (e.g., our past, our future, our nation, our values, our culture, ourhis generation, future generations notre histoire, notre avenir, onze geschiedenis, onze toekomst), keywords

times in which the nation was successful (glory, glory days, glorious, golden, golden age, success, prosper,, thrive, triumph, victorious), and keywords referring to times in which the nation was unsuccessful and in., threat, crisis, decline, destruction, degradation, slipping, sliding, drifting, cliff, struggle, annihilation).t round of analysis was intended to examine support for our rst and most basic prediction that, across thesetional contexts, PRWP leaders tend to portray their nation as on a downward trajectory, going from a gloriousomy future.

stage 1 analysis

us past, a bleak future

e group of PRWP leaders we examined, the French leaders (Jean-Marie, en Marine Le Pen) turned out the mostrs of references to Frances glorious past, its reputation as one of Europes oldest nations, and to Frances thirtywth and prosperity (1950s1970s), an era referred to as Les Trente Glorieuses. As Tables 1 and 2 illustrate (columnn-Marie and Marine portray Frances (distant and more recent) history as marked by glory,4 For instance, Jeann draws attention to the fact that it is On Frances territory, on this soil, where 20 centuries of Gallic fury, Greekd Roman order come together (Jean-Marie Le Pen, Nice, 19 April 2007). Both Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen

atives that the past was glorious and give strong warnings that the nations glory has come to an abrupt end. Theo narratives are connected by these leaders is well illustrated in the following extract:

[the liberal Euro-Globalization enthusiasts] who have, since the 1970s, broken everything [. . .] employment,asing power, social cohesion, enterprise, secularity, conscription, schools, agriculture, childhood, birthrate. . .

30 years, the people in power, who succeeded each other, resorted to ideology, demagoguery, only to breakthing that worked in our country. [. . .] Their arrogance must have been exceptional, for them to lead thise of thirty years of glory, into catastrophe, this France of a mixed economy [. . .] They must have been exceptionallypetent to lead this France of thirty years of glory to the France of 30 years of pity, this France of thirty years ofe, in which we sunk from the mid-1970s. (Jean-Marie Le Pen, Bourget, 12-11-2006)

of cases was informed by the authors language skills (Dutch, French), and our preference to not have to rely on external translation services.that we could have included a wider range of parties, and that this would have increased our ability to make claims about the generalizabilitynd themes used by leaders of this party family. However, this was beyond the scope of this study.f space limitations, only a limited number of speech extracts are provided in the text that are illustrative of the broader narrative. Furtherbe obtained from the rst author upon request.


Table 1Jean-Marie Le Pen (Front National).

(a) A glorious past,a bleak future

(b) Our opponentsbrought the nation

(c) We wereglorious because we

(d) We need to betough once more

(e) Follow me intobattle

Valmy20-09-200

Nice19-04-200

Toulouse25-03-200

In the Nglorious padanger of igexample:

[In Ento theAnd yup anwas hthe aRomecrosssacke

At otherthe currentstance towa

[In Ensamedown were tough

6We are the onlyones to have foughtfor this nationalindependence,which enables us topreserve ourcommon heritage,our moral values,and social progress.[. . .] Let me remindyou that the soldierswho triumphed herein [the battle of]Valmy did soshouting Vive laFrance.

It is the illegitimateelite who betrayedthe nation, itspeople, and theRepublic [. . .] It isthem who, throughselsh politics ornave beliefs,surrendered us toforeign powers, andexposed us tomass-immigrationand globalization.What a reversal.How dare they?

We, who havefought for France,have every right tobe in this sacredplace. [. . .] To thosewho were surprisedthat I choose thisplace [to give apublic address], Isay, I chose Valmyconsciously[because] I havefaith in thecontinuing glory ofour people [. . .}Heroic acts likethese have madeour nation great.

We have beenridiculed andprosecuted, [but] wehave been the onlyones to have takenup the courageousght for nationalindependence,enabling us topreserve our sharedheritage.My dear fellowcitizens, the reason Iam here today is toannounce that anew Valmy awaitsus!

Dear fellow citizens,thinking about theght that awaits us,I feel rejuvenated.[. . .] I, the manwhose entire lifewas forged bychallenges andstruggle, who wasborn and who livesfor this ght, thischallenge! [. . .] atthe service of thepeople [. . .]entrusted to call youto this peaceful anddecisive battle

7Let us be proud.France is glory ornothing [. . .] It isour tragic, glorious,renowned history,

I thank those whohelped to informfellow citizens aboutwhat is at stake, andour plan to stop the

Im proud to leadyou to victory [. . .] Isee change on thehorizon, a sign fromheaven for those

Their sacricesshould not be invain, we owe it tothen to win thisbattle, as we owe it

Let us unite, mycomrades. Letsmobilize ourselvesso we can engravethe victories of Aprilwhich gave theworld national prideand [. . .] its sense ofliberty, equality, andbrotherhood.

country being ledinto disaster bypolitician on the leftand right, whobelong to thesystem

betraying us, [. . .] atime whenprovidence shapeshistory, like the1917 battle ofChemin des Dames,when 30.000 Frenchdied for France

to the millions ofFrench who livedbefore us, whoseheritage comes withduties ofremembrance,courage, andrecognition.

22nd and May 6th2007 in the marbleof history. Long livethe nation, Long livethe Republic, Longlive France.

7[EU integration andunbridledfree-marketcapitalism] areamong the causes ofa drop inproductivity, from4% during the ThirtyGlorious Years, to 1%after 1990.

This cartel ofpoliticalestablishment seemsto forget thedramatic state ourcountry is in, andthat they all prefer asmooth electioncampaign, in a posh,cozy corner.

[We oppose the EU]Think of the Frenchwho went before us,who suffered, whofought, to pass onthis heritage [in somany battles] tosafeguard oureternal homeland.

The situation today[. . .] requiresrevolutionarymeasures to stopthis lethaldegradation of ourpeople [. . .] andmen with courage,lucidity, honesty,and goodcharacter.

So, and I say thisfrom the bottom ofmy heart, do notfear! Once more,France willrediscover itself, likein has done so often,in the nestmoments in itshistory.

etherlands, Historical references also play an important part in the way Geert Wilders makes a case for thest and the bleak future (see Table 3, column a). Interestingly too, Wilders also frequently draws attention to thenoring the looming danger, by referring to historical examples where leaders or cities responded too slowly. For

glish] Rome is a very appropriate place to address these issues. [. . .] In the 5th century, the Roman Empire fell Germanic Barbarians. There is no doubt that the Roman civilization was far superior to that of the Barbarians.et, Rome fell. Rome fell because it had suffered a loss of belief in its own civilization. It had lost the will to standd ght for survival. [. . .] Rome did not fall overnight. Rome fell gradually. The Romans scarcely noticed whatappening. They did not perceive the immigration of the Barbarians as a threat until it was too late [. . .] At rst,

ttraction of the Empire on newcomers could be seen as a sign of the cultural, political and economic superiority of. [. . .] But then, on December 31st in the year 406, the Rhine froze and tens of thousands of Germanic Barbarians,ed the river, ooded the Empire and went on a rampage, destroying every city they passed. In 410, Rome wasd. (Geert Wilders, Rome, 25 March 2011)

times, Wilders uses more recent European history to plead his case. For example, speaking in London, he likens situation in Europe with the one facing Britain in 1939, thereby portraying Neville Chamberlains reconciliatoryrd Nazi Germany as a recipe for disaster, and Winston Churchills tough stance as the only way to divert downfall.

glish] In 1899, in his book The River War, Winston Churchill warned that Islam is threatening Europe in the way as the Barbarians once threatened Rome. [. . .] Mohammedanism, Churchill wrote, and I quote, is a militant


Table 2Marine Le Pen (Front National).






Paris14-11-201

Tours17-1-2011

and pas felRome

Wherearelatively umaking moBelgium is hextent to wcontext, a Paudiences. party Vlaamdistinctiven

[In Dinstafor mliving(Antw

Also herTable 4, coldown were tough

0In this moment,when our country issliding into theabyss, forced toaccept globalizationand EU integration,when make nomistake a carefullyprepared plan isrolled out to replacethe population,there is no time tosit back and watch.

President Sarkozyreceives his ordersfrom European andGlobal institutions,instructions toadapt Franceglobalization, toturn our countryinto the teacherspet of this [systemthat believes in a]mortal utopianillusion.

To illustrate whathappens to thosewho are not tough:Beforecolonization, Haitiand the DominicanRepublic wereinhabited by theTanos, whichColumbus describedaffectionately as akind, warm,welcoming people[. . .]In 1492 theywere in theirhundred thousands,[. . .] ten years laterthere were only tenthousand left, livingas slaves andcommitting suicide.

FN is not a party,we are a resistancemovement, drivenby a profound belief,a belief that makesus frown upon titles,and orders us tochoose right, butdangerous roadtowards the summit,to charge towardsthe cliff rather thanthe easy, windingowery path thatleads nowhere.

My friends, wehave a long way togo [. . .] More thananyone else, I knowthat politicalenterprises are notbuilt by one personalone. I need you all,today, when weelect the next FNleader, andtomorrow if yougrant me the honorto become yourleader in thePresidential electioncampaign

For fteencenturies we stroveto become united

Brussels imposes itsdestructiveultra-liberalism and

Our countryshistory is marked byconstant struggle,

We need torediscover ourRepublic spirit

From today, letshave this ghtTo all French, to all[. . .] we are theinheritants of thismillennia old legacy,which we shouldtreasure like ajewel.The whole worldstudies and admiresour ideas, and ourphilosophers.FN was established40 years ago, whenFrance was still inits glory years.

free-market regimeeverywhereOur politicianspresent us with falsechoices; the Euro orthe Euro?Immigration orImmigration?We see it, we feel it.We are nearing theend of the [old]system.

between the forcesof decline andrecovery, betweenthose who sleep andthose who dare tosay No.FN is not simply aparty: it embodiesin France today thespirit of resistance,resistance againstthe feudal system,against injustice,againsttotalitarianismssuch as Islam andGlobalization.

We, FN, more thananyone else, recallthe 1989 declarationon the rights andduties of Man.To religious groupstrying to imposetheir laws, werepeat ComteClermont Tonnerreswords, Everythingfor the citizen;nothing forcommunities

my friends, I say, themost beautiful daysare yet to come.Long Live FrontNational, Long Livethe Republic, LongLive France!

roselytizing faith. No stronger retrograde force exists in the World. The civilization of modern Europe might fall,l the civilization of ancient Rome, end of quote. Churchill is right, if Europe falls, it will fall because, like ancient, it no longer believes in the superiority of its own civilization. (25 March 2011)

s Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen in France, and Wilders in the Netherlands are able to deploy their countrysncontested national narrative, and able to invoke standard textbook references to their countrys great history-ments on the long road to nationhood, PRWP leaders in other countries face a more complex context. For example,ome to multiple language communities marked by deep historical divisions, placing reality constraints on thehich leaders can talk about one glorious past (Ellemers, van Rijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997). In the BelgiumRWP leader will be forced to tread more cautiously, and use slightly different narratives to address differentAs an example, our analysis of speeches by Filip Dewinter, the leader of the Flemish nationalist and secessionists Belang, revealed that he makes references to Flanders unique history and its struggle for linguistic and culturaless within the Belgian nation-state and that it therefore needs to be protected from other cultures.

utch] Antwerp, Ghent, Sint-Niklaas, Genk, Hasselt, Kortrijk, Bruges, Vilvoorde and Roeselare belong in rstnce to the Flemish. Flanders is rst and foremost of those whose parents, grandparents, great grandparents andany generations, have worked and struggled in difcult circumstances, in order to give us a high standard of

and well-being, which we, and hopefully our children can enjoy. Flanders is of the Flemish, and no one else!erp, 7 October 2012)

e, these narratives set the stage for other narratives that emphasize the glorious past and the bleak future (seeumn a).


Table 3Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom).






London12-2-2009

Rotterdam26-4-2010

In sum, aof their histcivilizationoutline of tdecline of sand it is thibeen lost anof a proud a

3.3. Stage 2

Having ctrajectory),about the caim of this sthe factor(sat uncoverimore relaxewhat PRWPdownfall (bdown were tough

I am deeplyhumbled to speakbefore you here [inthe Houses ofParliament] whereWinston Churchillstood rm, andwarned for thedangers looming.[. . .] Today, I comebefore you to warnof another greatthreat. [. . .] Islammeans submission.The question iswhether the Britishpeople, with itsglorious past, islonging for thatsubmission.

I am under guardpermanently,courtesy to thosepreferring violence.But for the leftist fanclub of Islam, that isnot enough. Theystarted a legalprocedure againstme. [The Court andHome Ofce] aredoing Islams dirtywork: Sharia byproxy. That isapparently the pricewe have to pay forthe project of massimmigration, andthe multiculturalproject.

For a moment Ifeared I would berefused entrance.But I was condentthe Britishgovernment wouldnever sacrice freespeech because offear of Islam.Britannia rules thewaves, and Islamwill never ruleBritain [. . .]By letting me speaktoday you show thatMr. Churchills spiritis still very muchalive.

Ladies andgentlemen, thedearest of our manyfreedoms is underattack. In Europe,freedom of speech isno longer a given.We have to defendfreedom of speech.[During World WarII] the BBC offered adaily glimpse ofhope, in thedarkness of Nazityranny. [. . .] Thewords This IsLondon were asymbol for a betterworld coming soon.

If only the Britishand Canadian andAmerican soldierswere here. Whatwill be transmittedforty years fromnow? Will it still beThis Is London? Orwill it be this isLondonistan? Willit bring us hope, orwill it signal thevalues of Mecca andMedina? [. . .] Thechoice is ours. Ladiesand gentlemen. Wewill never apologizefor being free. Wewill never give in.We will neversurrender.

Today we start ourcampaign, here inRotterdam, the city

The diagnosis ofmost problemsfacing the

Our ancestors sawa muddy river deltaand said: this is

Our pride, thewelfare state, whichthe Dutch paid for

The [labor] mayorof Amsterdam hasno backbone. Evenof Pim Fortuyn, whopaid with his life forhis ideas, the citywhich suffers frommass-immigrationand Islamizationlike no other. [. . .]What once was thelargest port of theworld, has becomethe capital ofEurabia.

Netherlands is thesame: the elite havelost touch withreality. [. . .] theyembrace the idea ofanything goes, thereis no good or evil, allcultures are equal[. . .] Moreover, theleft authorities haveunited with Islam[. . .] and chose toignore the manyproblems facing ourcountry.

going to be on oasis.The citizens ofRotterdam once sawtheir city beingreduced to rubble byair raids, and said:lets x thistogether. The Partyfor Freedom sees acountry that issinking further andfurther in theswamp, and says, letthe ght start!

passionately overmany decades, hasdecayed into amagnet for fortuneseekers. [Thecountry] no longeris a protective shieldfor the weaker insociety, but atakeaway forloiteringimmigrants. Andwho is paying forthat? You! Henkand Ingrid pay forAli and Fatima!

his colleagues callhim the beach ball,which drifts withthe wind. TheLabor Party used tohave a red ag, Nowit has a red carpetwelcoming Islam Itell you, our countrydoesnt need beachballs, it needsleadership. Myfriends, on June 9th,you can choose.

lthough PRWP leaders face a different context (and at times different reality constraints), they all highlight aspectsory that enable them to glorify the nations (and/or countrys) shared past (e.g., victories on the battleeld, its, its values, or it superior culture and identity). Interestingly, the glorious past narrative often precedes a detailedhe many ways in which the present is no longer that glorious. Many of the leaders emphasize the downfall andociety and talk at length about the problems of the present. Together, these narratives form a powerful discourse,s discourse that PRWP leaders use to instill a sense of identity threat. It makes salient that over time, identity hasd that the past is no longer connected to the present (i.e., identity discontinuity). Indeed, it is the combinationnd glorious past, which citizens are about to lose forever that makes nostalgia so bittersweet.

: in-depth thematic content analysis

orroborated our basic proposition (PRWP leaders portraying the nation in declinist terms, as on a downward we subjected the speeches to a more ne-grained analysis of the way in which PRWP leaders mobilize ideasollective past, present and future to defend/legitimize a harsher stance on immigration and minority rights. Theecond round was to identify the factors to which PRWP leaders attribute the nations successes and failures, and) that are deemed in need of change in order to restore the nations glory. In other words, this analysis was aimedng the causal story and to identify the logic used to defend/legitimize harsh policies, and to attack/delegitimized/tolerant policies. Rather than to search for new key-words, we re-analyzed the relevant sections focusing on

have to say about (a) the causes of actual or looming downfall and the group or groups deemed responsible forlame attribution) and (b) the causes of past success.


Table 4Filip DeWinter (Vlaams Belang).


(b) Our opponentsbrought the nationdown

(c) We wereglorious because wewere tough



Antwerp17-10-201

Lille28-4-2013

3.4. Results

The narneed for haopponents (d) we needthese themTables 14 these differ

(b) Our opp

Our ananation (seeas either nacooperationin order to against thepowerful elsocial syste

In particbreaking will-informed2[Belgium] hasbecome asuper-market, orworse still, a themepark, for criminals.Crime pays[because ourcountry no longerpunishes criminals]Criminals fromaround the worldcome here to steal,to burgle, to rob,and to plunder.

Leftist politicianswant to turn policeofcers into socialworkers, turncriminals intovictims, and turnvictims intocriminals.Let us repeat [ourmessage] loud andclear once more, thesoft approachresults in hardcrime, and not theother way around

Non-Europeanimmigrants areeleven times morecriminal than ourown people. [To stopcrime] we need toclose theimmigration tap.We have not onlyimported exoticfoods, clothing andintolerance towardswomen andhomosexuals, butalso a culture ofviolence inherent inIslam

We [nowadays]treat victims ofcrime as theoutlaws, whilsttreating theperpetrators asuntouchable.Its time we turn thetables and stopcuddling criminals,and to declare themoutlawsMany[non-European]immigrants onlyrespect authoritywhen backed byforce

Together we havechosen the difcultpathTogether, we willmake sure that, onOctober 14th,Vlaams Belang willsurvive, and thatour own peoplerst message will beheard.As Thomas Jeffersonsaid, In matters ofstyle, swim with thecurrent; in mattersof principle, standlike a rock.

Our Europeancivilization issuperior to Islam,and it is high timewe dare to say thisloud and clearly!Dear friends. Whatunites us is our ghtto save our

At present, acultural andreligious war isbeing fought in ourschools, in ourcompanies, in ourcities, and oursuburbs, a culturalJihad, in which we

We areexperiencing a thirdIslam invasion. Therst one occurred in8th Century Spainand the secondcame from the East.Each time braveEuropeans stopped

It is absolutelyessential that we putan end to this third[Islamic] invasion,and send Islam backwhere it belongs, onthe other side of theMediterranean.Winston Churchill

Multiculturalism isthe Trojan horseIslam uses toconquer Europe.Comrades, the timehas come to showcharacter. We haveto end thisimmigrationcivilization and ourEuropean traditions.The current invasionof immigrants isunparalleled inhistory, andrepresents a threatto our identity.

are losing more andmore terrain.Politicians andleftist intellectualsbehave increasinglyas the Islamcollaborators.

the invasion, rst inPoitiers in 732, thenin Vienna in 1683Islam is a religionthat wants toconquer the entireglobe, and,historically, Europehas always been itsenemy.

was right when hesaid that aboutkindness to theenemy, that it is likecontinuing to feedthe crocodile in thehope he will eat youlast.

invasion, defend thesuperiority of ourcivilization, stop theIslamization ofEurope, and giveback Europe to theEuropeans.

stage 2 analyses

rative we encountered was one consisting of four themes, which together form a narrative that justies thersher measures and heroic leadership. In addition to (a) a glorious past, a bleak future, these themes are (b) ourbrought the nation down (often because they forgot their history), (c) we were glorious because we were tough,

to be tough once more to avoid collective downfall, and (e) I am prepared to lead you into battle. Even thoughes manifested themselves in different ways, and not all themes are equally prevalent in all national contexts, asshows there is also remarkable level of similarity between the different leaders. In what follows, we will unpackences and similarities in greater detail.

onents who brought the nation down

lysis revealed that PRWP leaders are quite happy to identify explicitly those who in their view betray(ed) the Tables 14, column b). More mainstream parties and their leaders are typically portrayed by PRWP leadersve/incompetent and unable to recognize the dangers of immigration, multiculturalism and transnational (EU), or in a more populist way as a morally corrupted, self-serving elite, who willfully ignore these developments

secure personal gains. What is also interesting is the terminology PRWP leaders use to pitch the virtuous people malicious elite. For example, our analysis revealed that Marine Le Pen routinely refers to a small caste ofites (e.g., Metz, 11 December 2011; Table 2, column b), this presumably to underscore the unfairness of currentm, and to convey the idea that upward mobility is impossible.ular in France and the Netherlands, the accusation is often quite specic and centers on opposition leadersith the nations glorious past. Such attacks not only involve the accusation that political opponents support/pursue

policies (immigration and multiculturalism), but also, and more importantly, the charge that they would not


support/pursue these policies if they were more familiar with their nations glorious legacy. In contrast, their own party ispresented as the natural home for those who do remember the collective past, and the lesson that toughness has provenof existential importance. As a result, it becomes possible for PRWP leaders to draw parallels between their leadership andfamous heroic leaders (e.g., Jeanne DArc, Winston Churchill, William of Orange, etc.), presumably in the hope that they toowill be rem

(c) Toughne

All PRWglory, and memphasizessignicant sresides, nottriumphant

In contraof the natio1917 Battleand prevailto follow thabout the mremember,

(d) We need

Once thand multicunations culgreat lengthtoday are thused to rest

Interestiour heritagto promoteconveys theEuropean idin self-denrefer to usand identitas on the bof losing itsthreat to Euglorious be(national or

3.5. Discuss

In summthat the natbeing politibut our futuneed to be not only endiscontinuiin the literatoughness ppowerful alinto a prospPRWP leadepeople to Haslam, 20embered by future generations as courageous, heroic leaders.

ss as the key to (past and future) glory

P leaders we examined defend tougher policies by portraying toughness as the key to success to past nationalildness as evidence of lack of courage and preparedness to sell out to the enemy. For example, DeWinter

that past glory is not so much linked with past military successes, but more with glory achieved throughacrices made by civilians (see Table 4, column c). These are the ordinary, hard-working battlers, whose glory

in heroic victories on the battleeld, but in their proven ability to survive long periods of hardship and to emerge.st, and building on Frances long military history and abundance of events that can be interpreted as evidencens heroic national spirit, Jean Marie Le Pen uses military examples, such as the 1792 Battle of Valmy, and the

of the Chemin des Dames, to convey the message that the French are a courageous nation, who have foughted in many battles, and, more importantly, that a true French person can be recognized by his/her preparednesse example of past generations (see Table 1, column c). As Table 2 shows Marine Le Pen too tends to reminisceany battles that were fought to secure glory for the nation, and she too portrays her party as the only party toand to have a connection with the nations past.

to be tough once more and (e) follow me into battle

e enemy has been identied (i.e., the malicious, leftists elite and its lack of courage to challenge immigrationlturalism), it becomes possible to declare war, and to call the people to arms to restore the supremacy of theirture and identity (see Tables 14, columns d and e). For example, Marine Le Pen, like her predecessor, goes tos to persuade her audience that past glory was secured through toughness, that the problems facing Francee result of (the elite) having forgotten this important lesson, and that, under her leadership, toughness will beore Frances glory (Table 2).ngly in this call to arms is that PRWP leaders tend to use terms such as we, us, them, our culture ande creatively, and interpret them differently depending on the audience being addressed, and this enables them

identity threat at different levels of inclusiveness. For instance, when addressing a domestic audience, Wilders message that the national identity is at risk, whereas during overseas trips his speeches convey the message thatentity is at stake. Our analysis of speeches by Filip DeWinter revealed a similar pattern of signicant changesition, with the leader at times using the terms we and us to refer to us Flemish, and at other occasions to

Belgians, or us Europeans (see Table 4). Consistent with previous self-categorization research into leadershipy entrepreneurship (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) we found that PRWP leaders will at times portray the nationrink of collapse, and about to be Islamized, whilst at other times portraying Europe as a whole as on the verge

enlightenment legacy and Judeo-Christian identity. However, in both these accounts (i.e., threat to the nation,rope) the call for a harsher stance on immigrants and minorities is justied using the same logic: we were

cause we were tough, we became soft and lost our glory, and we need to be tough once more to restore our European) glory.

ion

ary, our analysis of speeches conrmed that PRWP leaders go to great lengths to persuade (potential) followersions history is at stake. Rather than to invoke historical events randomly, our analysis revealed that history iscized in a systematic way, using a narrative consisting of ve related themes. These are (a) our past is glorious,re is bleak, (b) we know who brought the country down, (c) we were glorious because we were tough, (d) wetouch once more, and (e) we are the only party prepared to take on the enemy. In so doing PRWP leaderscourage followers to wallow in nostalgia and traditionalism (Gilmour, 2008), they also play up fear for identityty and identity loss (Iyer & Jetten, 2011; Liu & Khan, 2014; Sani et al., 2008). These insights are well establishedture. However, what is in our view insufciently appreciated, is that by drawing attention to instances in whichroved necessary to guarantee the nations survival and identity continuity, migrants, asylum-seekers and theirlies (typically the leftist urban elite) are not only portrayed as standing in the way of progress from a glorious pasterous glorious future, but also as a problem requiring the nation to be tough and uninching. It thus appears thatrs use their knowledge of shared history not only to underscore their prototypicality, and to call the virtuousarms against the malicious elite, but also to legitimize harsher norms (i.e., authoritarianism, see Reicher &06). To put it differently, our ndings show that PRWP leaders can be regarded as norm entrepreneurs, whose


persuasive power derives from their ability to redene their followers self-understanding, a process described in the Socialidentity literature as identity entrepreneurship (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

The ndings are consistent with a growing body of work showing that to understand the way that identity affects behaviorright now, we need to understand were identity is coming from and where it is perceived to be going (Condor, 1996; Liuet al., 1999;leaders do cultivate sustrategicallChandler &become a togive weightproponentsits connecti

It iswom

4. Theoret

The resuexperimentthat affect tIt is clear thleaders areleaders desare particua time whefrom the gl

Our resutorical paranon-CaucasBy pointingand rallied where failuNazi GermaPRWP leadeto secure than instanunprecedenGloriouses, such as the only four dsecured her

Second, PRWP leademore reconby portrayinas most repfuture (Haset al. (2014Wohl et al.treatment o

Third, thbe regardedenables theargument tas a whole.to merely voverlook ththat enable Liu & Hilton, 2005). Our analysis also shows that these understandings are not xed, but highly malleable. PRWPmore than simply harvest pre-existing perceived (national) identity threat. Rather, they go to great lengths toch threat perceptions (Mols, 2012; Wohl et al., 2012). Indeed, PRWP leaders present the past, present and futurey, and in such a way as to instill identity threat (e.g., identity loss, identity discontinuity, and collective angst;

Proulx, 2008; Iyer & Jetten, 2011; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Thus, historical representationsol in the toolbox of PRWP leaders, with narratives about the nations past struggles and triumphs being used to

to the political claim that the nation owes its continuing existence to its toughness, and that failure to take on of immigration and multiculturalism amounts to forgetting the collective past, and result in the nation losingon with its glorious past (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). The following quote from Geert Wilders illustrates this:

important that we know where our roots are. If we lose them we become deracinated. We become men anden without a culture. I am here today to talk about multiculturalism. (Rome, 25 March 2011)

ical implications

lts presented here also have important implications for narrative theory and nostalgia research. Even though theal social psychological literature has examined the effects of nostalgia and has identied important moderatorshe outcomes of nostalgia (Iyer & Jetten, 2011), there has been less attention for the type of nostalgia that is evoked.at both left-wing leaders and PRWP leaders use nostalgic narratives, and that there is a difference in what these

nostalgic about. For example, whereas left-wing leaders describe the decline of the welfare state, conservativecribe the decline of the traditional family (Coontz, 1992). However, as Gilmours (2008) observed, PRWP leaderslarly adept at wallowing in nostalgia and traditionalism. The PRWP leaders studied here were nostalgic aboutn the country was ethnically homogeneous (at least in the view of the PRWP leader). By excluding immigrantsorious past, the emotional power of evoking nostalgia about that power is further amplied.lts lead to three other observations. First, it transpired from our analysis that PRWP leaders like to draw his-llels involving famous Caucasian wartime leaders (like Jeanne DArc, Winston Churchill), rather than iconician leaders who made history with help of more peaceful means (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King).

to glorious history-making moments in which the nation prevailed because it was prepared to put up a ghtbehind an uninching leader (e.g., Winston Churchills tough stance on Nazi Germany), as well as to instancesre to confront a danger resulted in a nation suffering a humiliating defeat (e.g., Chamberlains soft stance onny), PRWP leaders are able to develop powerful collective angst narratives. Interestingly too, we found thatrs, when glorifying the past, tend to focus on famous military battles in which their nation made big sacricesnal victory (e.g., Valmy, Chemin des Dames), or battles in which alien forces were kept at bay (Vienna), ratherces in which conict was resolved peacefully. This is not to say that PRWP leaders do not refer to periods ofted national prosperity and glory. Both Jean-Marie and Marine LePen refer to the post WWII era as les Trenteand portray this as the very glory France is losing. However, what is not accounted for are the less glorious times,1870 Franco-Prussian war, in which France was defeated, or the Dutch surrender to Germany on May 14th 1940,ays after the German invasion started. In sum, PRWP leaders focus selectively on moments in which the nationoic glory.by describing the nations identity (and very existence) in war-like terms as under threat from an alien force,rs seek to enhance the appeal of a belligerent leader, and to undermine the appeal of leaders advocating a softer,ciliatory stance. To use social psychological terminology, by persuading the electorate the nation is at war, andg themselves as brave wartime leaders, PRWP leaders seek to increase the extent to which they become regardedresentative of the nation (prototypical) and regarded as the most suited to lead the nation into the uncertainlam et al., 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). These ndings are consistent with those encountered by Bobowik), who found that representations of WWII inuence citizens preparedness to defend their nation, but also withs (2014) nding that fear-arousing state symbologies tend to increase peoples willingness to endorse tougherf outgroups.is composite narrative enables followers to justify norms that, under normal peacetime circumstances, would

as anti-normative. PRWP voters typically deny being racist or xenophobic, and the above-described narrativem to rationalize and legitimize anti-social attitudes. Indeed, this narrative enables PRWP voters to buttress theirhat they hold no grudge against immigrants as individuals, but that they are concerned about the nation/culture

The PRWP leader, in turn, will typically deny the charge that they are cultivating fear for identity loss, and claimoice popular concern, and daring to say what most people think. However, to accept this rebuttal would be toat PRWP leaders have a remarkable ability to redene peoples shared self-understanding, and it is this abilitys them to frame relatively mundane policy challenges as existential threats (Mols, 2010).


5. Limitations and future directions

Our analysis revealed remarkable similarities in the way in which PRWP leaders use shared historical knowledge to callthe electorate to arms, and we believe it is possible to speak of a rather unique PRWP narrative. However, it is at the sametime imporand it woulthe typical

Second, more mainsare policy eknowledgetheir eagernidentity thrmore radica

6. Conclus

As Andein a construthat a natiobook Banalas a useful rnational saincreased s

Howevenationalistiand Hopkinsupport foris about. PRusing a specritical juncresearch, wand out-grofor identity

The mespopularizedwhich is noand endurethat PRWP lpolicies.

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future imaCondor, S. (19

UK: ButterCoontz, S. (199tant not to overstate the case. First, as already noted, our analysis relies on a relatively small number of cases,d therefore be necessary to expand the scope of the research before we could make more general claims about

way in which PRWP leaders portray their nations historical trajectory.what should not be forgotten is that there are similarities between the way in which PRWP leaders and othertream parties seek to obtain followership. For example, both will do their best to show their audience that theyxperts, that they have up-to-date information about recent/current trends and developments, and possess sound

of the formal policy-making process. What should also not be forgotten is that mainstream party leaders, iness to harness support for their cause, will occasionally deploy a very similar strategy, and cultivate a sense ofeat to buttress their case, especially where there is a realistic prospect of the mainstream party losing voters tol PRWP parties.

ion

rson (1982) wrote, nations are best conceived, not in an essentialist way as groups with a shared ethnic core, butctivist way, as imagined communities. Andersons work remains useful today, not least because it reminds usn is imagined (Anderson, 1982, p. 224). What remains equally useful is Billigs (1995) insights, developed in his

Nationalism, that a nations sense of national identity can lie dormant for quite some time. Billigs work serveseminder that certain events (e.g., the World Cup Soccer, terrorist attacks) can render the categories nation andlient spontaneously, and this may have social and political consequences (e.g., a rise in football hooliganism, orupport for nationalistic parties).r, what is at times not fully appreciated is that politicians, and PRWP leaders in particular, tend to actively cultivatec sentiments so as to broaden their support base, and to harness this identity for political purposes. As Reichers (2001) have shown, politicians (not just PRWP leaders) are best regarded as identity entrepreneurs, who garner

their policy proposals by portraying the proposal in question as a dening feature of what their group/nationWP leaders go to rather extreme lengths to prepare the ground for harsher policy-proposals, and they do socic historical legitimizing narrative, one that conveys the idea that the nation faces an as yet unrecognizedture and imminent identity discontinuity (Mols, 2010). Our ndings are consistent with earlier narrative theoryhich showed that politicians use metaphors to appeal to emotions, and antagonistic themes to demarcate in-up boundaries (Liu & Khan, 2014). The present research extends this by showing the importance of induced fear

discontinuity.sage conveyed by this historical narrative is one that can be described using the aphorism No Guts, No Glory,

by US Air Force general Frederick C. Bless in his book carrying this title, or the expression No Pain, No Gain,w used in various circles to convey the idea that those who want progress should be prepared to make sacrices

suffering. It is in this way, in the name of being tough to restore the nations old glory and/or natural supremacyeaders seek to promote an alternative state symbology, and justify their calls for harsher immigration and asylum

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No guts, no glory: How framing the collective past paves the way for anti-immigrant sentiments1 National identity and time2 The past, present and future3 The present research3.1 Stage 1: content analysis of representations of the nation's trajectory3.2 Results stage 1 analysis3.3 Stage 2: in-depth thematic content analysis3.4 Results stage 2 analyses3.5 Discussion

4 Theoretical implications5 Limitations and future directions6 ConclusionReferences

Encuadre en Pasado Colectivo Genera Sentimientos Anti Inmigración

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