Enclosure 3: STP Risk - Informed Tech Specifications ...

24
ENCLOSURE 3

Transcript of Enclosure 3: STP Risk - Informed Tech Specifications ...

Page 1: Enclosure 3: STP Risk - Informed Tech Specifications ...

ENCLOSURE 3

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STP Risk-Informed TechnicalSpecifications

STPNOC Meeting with NRC Staff toDiscuss RAI ResponsesDecember 14 -15, 2005

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STP Participants

- Rick Grantom- Scott Head- Wayne Harrison- Evans Heacock-Jim Morris- Drew Richards- Bill Stillwell

Risk Management ManagerLicensing ManagerLicensingElec. Design EngineeringLicensingRisk ManagementRisk Management

12/12/2005 2

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Desired Outcomes13 Status/Resolve RAls. Identify all remaining

significant issues.2. Demonstrate STP's Configuration Risk

Management Program (CRMP).3. Agree on content of next STP submittal.4. Establish actions required for Risk Managed

Technical Specifications (RMTS) guide and how itwill be approved.

5. Agree on schedule for NRC visits.6. Establish milestone plan for completion with target

dates and deliverables.

12/12/2005 3

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Agenda* Introduction and agreement on desired outcomes* STP Overview and brief demonstration of CRMP* Review responses to RAIs / Identify remaining issues* Agree on content of next STP submittal* Establish action required for the RMTS guide* Establish tentative scope and schedule for NRC site

visits* Establish milestone plan for completion with target

dates and deliverables

12/12/2005 4

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STP RITSDRAFT

3/4.13 RISK MANAGEMENT

3/4.13.1 ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME DETERMINATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.13.1 When referred to this specification, equipment that has been declared inoperable shall beevaluated for its impact on plant risk and allowed outage times determined accordingly.

APPLICABILITY: As re uired by the referencing specification(s) xm M~

ACTION:

1. a rmh~ jhilge XLf§ ieo h eeecn peiito ~ ~ ~ ~ e~fgri~ ~ byondthe llowe outgetine fo th6~ef ~ then gs~foati~

AND

2. determine that the configuration is acceptable for continued operation beyond theallowed outage time for the referencing specification(s) whenever configuration changes occurthat may affect plant risk,

AND

3. Restore required inoperable subsystem, component to OPERABLE status within the acceptableallowed outage time extension or 30 days, whichever is shorter.

Note: The 30-day limitation may be applied individually to each specification for whichSpeifiatin .131 hs een entered koiet!tIO n

OR

Take the ACTION(s) required in the referencing specification(s) for required action or completion time notmet

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.13.1 As required by the referencing specification(s)

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 13-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No.Unit 2 - Amendment No.

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STP RITS| DRAFT |

E1YIGY YES

W~~ L~W~~ OATIb sIiATO 1~gOyws : OA:~-T

JH PMNT

MAMIMN TqfOJO P-1

e*or e t~on a,

PANot0.f'rnVs' aM' at which7peif

AC0 ho ~ ~tae tirrie~t~r He~~d~coh' p ti ~ h~ehre~ ~hus~~sliortest aft9ed a!wdpefQ oIu ~~w~~pcfdp!W~

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 13-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No.Unit 2 - Amendment No.

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|STP RITS||DRAFT |

Bases for Specification 3.13.1

Specification 3.13.1 establishes provisions for performing a risk assessment to determinerequired actions and allowed outage times for specifically identified specifications for structures,systems, and components. Application of the risk assessment is consistent with therequirements of the Maintenance Rule, 1OCFR50.65(a)(4), to assess and manage the increasein risk that may result from maintenance activities. The process to manage the risk assessesthe rate of accumulation of risk in plant configurations and determines the allowed outage time(AOT) by calculating the time required to cross a Potentially Risk-significant Threshold (1.OE-05).

Application of the risk assessment to manage allowed outage time in different plantconfigurations is complemented by the station's programs to monitor performance indicators forlong-term availability of risk-significant components. The requirement to achieve acceptablelong-term performance indicators provides a significant disincentive to the potential to regularlyextend baseline AOTs to the detriment of availability.

TS 3.13.1.a establishes the conditions for performance of the risk assessment. The LCOssubject to the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) specifically reference TS3.13.1. The baseline AOT or required completion time specified in the LCO may be used toapply the TS 3.13.1 to determine an alternate AOT and compensatory actions.

The requirement to continuously determine the acceptability of the plant means that once thesubject LCO has exceeded the baseline AOT, the risk assessment must be reperformed asneeded to determine the required action and time limits for any TS component thatsubsequently becomes inoperable. This requirement provides assurance that the configurationrisk is adequately assessed. In a configuration with multiple LCOs not met, the risk assessmentmay determine that the AOT is shorter than what would be allowed by the baseline time in theaffected LCOs. With more than one LCO not met, the baseline time for a subsequentinoperable TS component might also be a non-conservative time to perform a risk assessmentto determine the appropriate required action and time. Consequently, the risk assessmentprocess may also be applied to determine how much time is available to perform a riskassessment for subsequent inoperable TS components.

TS 3.13.1 is applied with the referencing specification and the ACTION required by thereferencing specification must be taken if the configuration risk exceeds the Potentially Risk-significant Threshold. It recognizes that the plant is in an extended AOT that has a specifiedrequired action if the required action time is exceeded. In a configuration where the riskexceeds the Potentially Risk-significant Threshold, the calculated AOT has been exceeded andthe action required at the expiration of LCO AOT must be taken. If more than one LCO isbeyond its frontstop time, the LCO with the most limiting required action must be followed.

0ha k f Anpct n 'ogic)-..mf~aeq~piieni d.Ii t, MYe noLprable an z renon as, _functkiS ti io_,t.;'p5bl2 ofbefrg dresd -;t'H-6 P tTid . 'ft will :ihdSEto - ba-

ePO il aaFr th~j,~rp~~s f tis j,6ifiatin, ossof uncio ocAursWhe hr sidf~iia

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STP RITSI DRAFT |

> dz :retiile

V;=_. Kg 'u SO~aaeip r-bi bPi~r 4 i hi aep It&i a r

Sorh Way theIr d

ffSSG2Wjt iip m uanulect

TS 3.13.1 establishes a backstop, ACIT of 30 days. This backstop AOT prevents allowing acomponent with little or no risk significance from being inoperable indefiniteY and resulting in adefacto chan e to the desin or ficnsin basis of the pl ntant.

MUMhVdeWi !t M es 1eZ m m1

Bases for Technical Specification 3.13.2

Technical Specification 3.13.2 requires confirmation that the specified allowed outage times areacceptable when ACTIONs are entered for components on different safety trains. The allowedoutage momes for SSCs are often based on no other SSC being inoperable at the same time.Some configurations where the plant is in two or more LCO ACTION statements couldpotentially impose an unacceptable level of risk. This is particularly the case if the affectedcomponents are in different safety trains because the redundancy of accident mitigationcapability could be adversely affected.

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STPEGS UNIT IOperations Report

November 28, 2005

1. A. GENERATION LAST 24 HOURS

Reactor Power: 100%Hourly Electrical Output (MW-hrs)24 Hour Total (MW-hrs)

Thermal Power:Gross.... 1344Gross.... 32270

3853 MWtNet... .1293Net....31035

B. RCS Integrity / Risk

RCS Identified Leak Rate is <0.12 gpm.RCS Unidentified Leak Rate is <0.12 gpm.Planned maintenance risk for the week is 3.34 E-09Actual maintenance risk as of 06:00 is 0.0Planned BOP trip risk for the week is 0%.Actual BOP trip risk as of 06:00 is 0%.

C. TRAIN STATUS

All required equipment is operable.

D. BOP STATUS

All required equipment is available.

2. REGULATORY NOTIFICATIONS

None

3. PRIORITY CONDITION REPORTS DURING PAST 24 HOURS.

None

4. CONDITION REPORTS DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS WITH A PENDINGOPERABILITY OR REPORTABILITY REVIEW.

None

5. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION STATEMENT.

None

Submitted by: Klay Klimple

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STPEGS UNIT 2Operations Report

November 28,2005

1. A. GENERATION LAST 24 HOURS

Reactor Power: 100% Thermal Power: 3853 MWtHourly Electrical Output (MW-hrs) Gross.... 1344 Net.... 129324 Hour Total (MW-hrs) Gross.... 32249 Net .... 31038

B. RCS Integrity / Risk

RCS Identified Leak Rate is <0.12 gpm.RCS Unidentified Leak Rate is <0.12 gpm.Planned maintenance risk for the week is 3.73 E-07Actual maintenance risk as of 06:00 is 1.65 E-08Planned BOP trip risk for the week is 0.1%.Actual BOP trip risk as of 06:00 is 0%.UNIT 2 is the Load Control Unit

C. TRAIN STATUS

Train "A" Essential Cooling Water, Essential Chill Water, Component Cooling Waterand Emergency Diesel #21 are removed from service for planned maintenance.All other required equipment is operable.

D. BOP STATUS

Low Pressure Heater Drip Pump #23 and Condenser Air Removal Pump #23 areremoved from service for planned maintenance.All other required equipment is available.

2. REGULATORY NOTIFICATIONS

None

3. PRIORITY CONDITION REPORTS DURING PAST 24 HOURS.

None

4. CONDITION REPORTS DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS WITH A PENDINGOPERABILITY OR REPORTABILITY REVIEW.

None

5. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION STATEMENT.

OAS 10310 Component Cooling Water Train "A" declared inoperable for plannedmaintenance. Entered Tech Spec 3.7.3 that requires restoration within 7 days(12/4/05 @ 22:00) or a plant shutdown is required.

OAS 10311 Essential Chill Water Train "A" declared inoperable for planned maintenance. Entered TechSpec 3.7.14 that requires restoration within 7 days (12/4/05 @ 22:00) or a plant shutdown isrequired.

OAS 10312 Emergency Diesel #21 declared inoperable for planned maintenance. Entered TechSpec 3.8.1.1 that requires restoration within 14 days (12/12/05 @ 01:00) or a plant shutdown isrequired.

OAS 10313 Essential Cooling Water Train "A" declared inoperable for planned maintenance. Entered TechSpec 3.7.4 that requires restoration within 7 days (12/4/05 @ 22:00) or a plant shutdown isrequired.

Submitted by: Robert Brinkley

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Planned Risk Profiles for Unit 1 Week of 11/28/2005Baseline Trip Risk = 0.036 tripshweek

1 e-7 - 3.34E-09 P 10% - 0.0% P9e-8- U) 9% _8e-8 2 8% -

2 7e-8- ' 7% -

° 6e-8- 6% -5e-8- 5% -

O 4e-8- 4% -3e-8- 3% -

) 2e-8- L 2% -< 1e-8 1% -

Oe+O r T Tra . I I I I I I MT a a a a . aua a 0% I_CD 0) 0 ) C CO tfU> OD 0) O co LOt 'C ( _ CY) _ 0 0 0 0O _"4 _ CV) 0 0O 0 01O- N 4 C4 N N N NN N N N

Duration PRA BOPPRA Maint State BOP Maint. State Start End (hh:mm) Norm. Norm.

No Risk-Significant Maintenance No Risk-Significant Maintenance 11/28 00:00 11/30 07:00 055:00 0.79 1.00PZPRVB No Risk-Significant Maintenance 11/30 07:00 11/30 10:00 003:00 1.86 1.00No Risk-Significant Maintenance No Risk-Significant Maintenance 11/30 10:00 12/05 00:00 110:00 0.79 1.00

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Planned Risk Profiles for Unit 2 Week of 11/28/2005le-6 -

.j 9e-7 -

*= 8e-7-2 7e-7 -

°. 6e-7 -

0 5e-7 -

Q 4e-7 -

E 3e-7 -

. 2e-7 -

< le-7-Oe+O

-373E-07-PU)co

(0

I0a-0.-

2n

cai-

10% -

9% -

8% -7% -6% -5% -

Baseline Trip Risk = 0.036 tdpslweek0.1% P

4% -3% -2% -1% -0% 5,.-I- - -- r-rr - r-r-n-rI.. -r-... -....-. r

co

C14

N0

0

N04N)

o o oN iN

CoN1 t N I ) 0 0

t- ' N Nr '5- ,

co -TO> C>N N

r -

PRA Maint. StateCHACHA EWACCA CHA DGA EWACCA CHA DGA EWACCA CHA DGA EWACHA DGADGADGANo Risk-Significant Maintenance

BOP Maint. StateNo Risk-Significant MaintenanceNo Risk-Significant MaintenanceCAR13/23AC13123 CAR13/23CAR13/23CAR13/23CAR13/23No Risk-Significant MaintenanceNo Risk-Significant Maintenance

Start11/28 00:0011/28 01:0011/28 03:0011/30 07:0011/30 09:0012/01 01:0012/01 12:0012/01 21:0012/03 12:00

End11/28 01:0011/28 03:0011/30 07:0011/30 09:0012/01 01:0012101 12:0012/01 21:0012/03 12:0012/05 00:00

Duration(hh:mm)001:00002:00052:00002:00016:00011:00009:00039:00036:00

PRANorm.

0.933.943.943.943.943.133.023.010.79

BOPNorm.

1.001.001.001.011.001.001.001.001.00

i

i!

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Actual Risk Profiles for Unit 1 Week of 11/28/2005e-7 13.34E-09 P

B e-B-Uz~r 8e-8 -

M 7e-8 -

°0 6e-8 -

4) 5e-8 -

o 4e-8 -

0 3e-8 -

L) 2e-8 -" 1e-8-

Oe+O

_ 1.32E-OUA

10%0-0 9

E 8% -

' 7%

Baseline Trip Risk = 0.036 tripslweek0.0% PO.0X/ A

_* 6% -

Zt 5%-, 4%-2 3% -

0 2%-

0%.duui.upouw,.uurp,.pup.uauwa.wpu ...r lc. .

coa0N~

I s,.a I,, I,, IC 1 * I I J l*. Ior '- 0 (V) .(-

izq 0-1 04 0V. . - -

~Tn-T -r -rw C'-4 -' C'J r CTr r

-~ C'i t- '- C?

'-T'-0 co 0m) o C- CD Cf) C

~~ 04 04 0: 0T' - CV4 C-

i ~*- i

C>04

PRAComponent

CHA NOTE 1PZPRVB

BOPComponent

CAR1 1/21NOTE 2

Planned TimeNon-Functional

N/A1 1130/2005 07:00

Planned TimeNon-Functional

N/A

Planned TimeFunctional

N/A11/30/2005 10:00

Planned TimeFunctional

N/A

Duration(hh:mm)

N/A003:00

Duration(hh:mm)

N/A

Actual TimeNon-Functional

12/01/2005 07:4011/30/2005 06:25

Actual TimeNon-Functional

11t28/2005 22:00

Actual TimeFunctional

12102/2005 05:4511/30/2005 15:20

Actual TimeFunctional

11/29/2005 04:24

Duration(hh:mm)022:05008:55

Duration(hh:mm)006:24

NOTE I - Essential chiller 12A tripped. CR# 05-15756

NOTE 2 - CARS pump cooling water temperature control valve failed. CR# 05-15612.

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Actual Risk Profiles for Unit 2 Week of 11/28/20051e-6]-n " 120E-07A-Ko~t. -.-.-- ' -'''''-- - ---- -- - - - - - - -

3.73E-07 P

t 8e-75- 7e-7°1 6e-7°) 5e-7O 4e-7U 3e-7C) 2e-7

I 1e-7Oe+O

0

0

I-

.00

2A.S10i.

10% -

9% -

8% -

7% -

6%-5% -

4% -

3% -

2%-1%-0%

Baseline Trip Risk = 0.036 tripstweek0.1% P0.1%A

.. -- W_ ...P.._q.. .,I~~ ~ ~ ~ ... _. .........

6)N or-

0

a

0 0 N 'NN

0)N

0M~ ON

0N

CNCD

o oN N_> C

PRAComponent

CCACHA Note ICHADGA Note 2DGAEWA

BOPComponent

ACt3/23CAR13/23

Planned TimeNon-Functional

11/28/2005 03:00N/A11/28/2005 00:00N/A11/28/2005 01:0011/28/2005 01:00

Planned TimeNon-Functional11/30/2005 07:0011/2812005 03:00

Planned TimeFunctional

12/01/2005 01:00N/A12/01/2005 12:00N/A12/03/2005 12:0012/01/200501:00

Planned TimeFunctional

11/30/2005 09.0012/01/2005 21:00

Duration(hh:mm)070:00

N/A084:00

N/A131:00072:00

Duration(hh:mm)002:00090:00

Actual TimeNon-Functional11/28/2005 01:0012/04/2005 12:1511/28/2005 00:0012/03/2005 21:2611/28/2005 01:0011/28/2005 01:00

Actual TimeNon-Functional

11/30/2005 17:4511/28/2005 04:00

Actual TimeFunctional

12/01/200520:1512/05/200500:0012/01/2005 22:3912/04/2005 05:2712103/2005 16:0912/01/2005 20:15

Actual TimeFunctional

11/30/2005 18:0011/30/2005 11:20

Duration(hh:mm)091:15011:45094:39008:01135:09091:15

Duration(hh:mm)000:15055:20

Note I - Essential chiller 22A has excessive excess purge, hi discharge pressure and abnormal vibrations. CR#05-15864.

Note 2 - DG 21 declared functional after EAOT PMT commenced. The DG is declared non-functional forscheduled governor oil change after PMT run. Original Risk profile did not declare functionality betweenthese two maintenance states.

Note 3 - DG 21 exceeded it's planned out of service time due to expanded scope of maintenance (multipleWAN's). EW, CH, and CC exceeded their out of service time due to expanded scope of maintenance onEW-0019 (WAN 195735) and EW-0016 (WAN 195734).

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

Response acceptable.

2 10/27/05 STP doesn't credit operatoractions for functionality whencalculating RICTs. Forcalculation of Maint. Rule a(4)functionality, operator action iscredited in accordance with theguidelines of NUMARC 93-01.

Need to revise to state "neverwill be credited" unless inPRA.

RICTs are based on inoperability,even though may be functionalper MR.

3a 10/11/05, Staff asked whether consistent STP will confirm determination10/17/05 with GL 91-18. of operability is consistent with

GL 91-18.Additionally, STP willrecommend EPRI RMTSguidance document be revisedto reflect GL 91-18.

3b 10/17/05 See 3a above.3c 10/17/05 Need to revise our response to STP response will be revised

clarify. Answer is not really "no." to state that if the operabilitydetermination identifies thesame degraded or non-conforming condition exists inthe redundant traincomponents, they will bedeclared inoperable.

3d 10/17/05 STP needs to look at context to STP will change "componentssee if we need to revise RAI to "component failure modes."response. STP will clarify that insights

are not used in calculation ofRICTs.

3e 10/17/05 Response acceptable. No STPNOC will recommendadditional information needed. revising the RMTS Guidance

to reflect that failure ratesneed not be adjusted for asingle failure.

3f 10/17/05 Response acceptable. No STP will revise response toadditional information needed. more emphatically state that

approved TS will require actionwhen threshold exceeded.

4 10/11/05, Need additional information. Need additional discussion

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

with NRC regarding whetherstaff wants to review results ofLevel 2 update.

5 Discussed controls on whatactions should be taken if exceed1 E-6 threshold. Actions need"more teeth." Will address"residual functionality." Controlscould be put in to place todocument occurrences, includingcorrective actions and notificationto plant management. Also needto clarify use of RICTs formultiple equipment in TS LCOs,and "planned" vs "emergent"thresholds.

Need additional discussionwith NRC regarding plannedvs. emergent exceedance of1 E-6 threshold.

6 10/17/05 Need to send augmented Table 2 STP to revise Table 2 asthat shows / discuss stated.asymmetries. (Meeting discussion topic)

7 10/17/05 Response acceptable. No STP will provide riskadditional information needed. calculation program

demonstration.8a 10/11/05, Discussed possible use of SFDP- STP proposes revised TS

10/17/05 like tool, which evaluates whether 3.13.1 and 3.13.2, and Bases.function is lost. Can proposedInitiative 6 changes be used?Discussed concept of "residualfunctionality."

8b 10/11/05, Staff asked whether PRA STP to identify where PRA10/17/05 modeled all TS functions. does not model specific TS

functions.STP will provide exampleSafety Injection system tableat meeting.

8c 10/17/05 Need to identify / clarify STP to provide requestedfunctionality vs. operability. clarifications. STP will tieDiscussed that CRMP is oriented answers to 8c with answer totowards a(4), and not always 8a.compatible with RICTs. Need toclarify how these would differ.

9 10/17/05 No discussion. Placekeeper -refers to RAI questions 25through 38.

10a 10/27/05 As stated, STP will remove RTBs STP to remove TS 3.3.1 Unitfrom submittal. 20 from scope of application.

1 Ob 10/27/05 Will discuss at Decembermeeting.

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

Question Telecon Discussion Notes STP Follow-up ActionDate

10c 10/27/05 Will discuss at Decembermeeting.

10d 10/27/05 Will discuss at Decembermeeting.

11 10/27/05 STP does model cooldown STP to confirm Maintransition (Steam Line Breaks), Feedwater Isolation Valvesbut small contribution. (MFIVs) are only TS

equipment not modeled.1 2a 10/27/05 As stated, STP will remove STP will remove PZR safeties

subject TS from submittal. from submittal.12b 10/27/05 Response acceptable. No

additional information needed.12c 10/27/05 Response acceptable. No

additional information needed.13 10/27/05 Response acceptable. No

additional information needed.1 4a 10/27/05 Response acceptable. No

additional information needed.1 4b 10/27/05 If outside boron limits, then non-

functional and thereforeinoperable.

15 10/27/05 Need to change "and" to mor." STP will make wordingchange.

16 10/27/05 RCFCs are credited ifcontainment is intact. This is aplant-specific calculation. Nofurther information needed.

17 10/27/05 STP will adjust wording to agree STP will make wordingwith NRC comment. STP will changes. Also see Questionlook at MFIVs. 11 follow-up action above.

18 10/27/05 Model assumes normal summerconditions throughout year.Coolers are modeled withassociated system functions.

19 10/27/05, Response acceptable. No12/07/05 additional information needed.

20 10/27/05, TS 3.13.2 would replace TS STP to correct wording.12/07/05 3.8.1.1.d. Typo in ACTION. RAI

response states "OPERABLEstatus within or..." Should state"OPERABLE status within thecalculated Allowed Outage Timeor..."NRC to look at further.

21 10/27/05, If inoperable, will be included in Will be shown in program12/07/05 RICT. NRC to look at this further. demonstration.

22 10/27/05 Will discuss further at December

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

Question Telecon Discussion Notes STP Follow-up ActionDate

meeting.23 10/27/05, STP will propose Note in TS STP will propose Note in TS

12/07/05 3.8.2.1 to restrict use of TS 3.8.2.1 to restrict use of TS3.13.1. SeeAttachment1. 3.13.1.

Reviewer requested that STP will revise response toresponse be revised to include RAI 23 to remove channel-additional information regarding specific information.Channel II and IV batteries.

STP will bring cross-train feedReviewer asked for additional procedures to meeting.clarification on cross-train feedprocedures.

24 10/17/05 RG 1.200 requirements are met STP will provide detailedby current model. Following response.completion of Rev. 5, then willhave resources to providedetailed answers on how wecomply.

25 10/17/05 'A's and 'B's will be signed off as STP to proved additional detailpart of Rev. 5. Will do peer as discussed.review w.r.t HRA methodology.Won't be able to answer fully untilfinal report.

Individual Table 1 itemsdiscussed:

EH-05 Need to provide moredetailed answer.

DE-09 Discussed whether 1 E-7screening criteria is smallenough.

QU-03 NRC will evaluate whenRev. 5 completed.

L2-06 Need to provide moredetail.

26 10/17/05 Key sources of uncertainty / key STP expects will provide firstassumptions will be included in quarter of 2006.Rev. 5 update.

27 10/17/05 RG 1.200 Self-Assessment will Need to discuss NRCbe submitted. expectations for

documentation.28 10/17/05 Documentation will be upgraded Need to discuss NRC

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

Question Telecon Discussion Notes STP Follow-up ActionDate ___

as part of Rev. 5 documentation. expectations fordocumentation.

29 10/17/05 Will be provided followingcompletion of Rev. 5

30a 10/17/05 No additional information.Arequested.

30b 10/17/05 Not an issue for STP.30c 10/17/05 STP model automatically adjusts

for maintenance impact.30d 10/17/05 No initiator frequency

adjustments.30e 10/17/05 Seasonal adjustments not used

in STP model - use summer forentire year.

30f 10/17/05 Need additional information Response will be revised toregarding how equipment repair state that STP's PRA modelis credited. does not take credit repair of

out-of-service equipment as arecovery action forconfiguration risk calculations.There is limited credit forrepair of standby dieselgenerator failures after aninitiating event.

31 a 10/17/05 Being addressed in Level 2 PRA Response will be providedupdate, currently in progress. upon completion of update.

31 b *10/17/05 Being addressed in Level 2 PRA Response will be providedupdate, currently in progress. upon completion of update.

31 c 10/17/05 Being addressed in Level 2 PRA Response will be providedupdate, currently in progress. upon completion of update.

31 d 10/17/05 Being addressed in Level 2 PRA Response will be providedupdate, currently in progress. upon completion of update.

31 e 10/17/05 Being addressed in Level 2 PRA Response will be providedupdate, currently in progress. upon completion of update.

31f 10117/05 Being addressed in Level 2 PRA Response will be providedupdate, currently in progress. upon completion of update.

32a 12/07/05 Reviewer questioned how 3.13.1 Additional note to 3.13.1 haswould apply in case of excessive been proposed whichbattery discharge. addresses use for batteries.

STP will bring referencedprocedures to meeting.

32b No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

32c No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

Page 5 of 8

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

Question Telecon Discussion Notes STP Follow-up ActionDate

33a 12/07/05 Reviewer asked about procedural STP will bring procedures forcontrols which address degraded response to degraded DC busDC power. and station blackout.

33b No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

33c No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

33d No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

34a 12/08/05 Refer to Attachment 1 General Need to discuss possibleComments. regulatory commitment to

stabilize plant. Shouldstatement be added to RMguidance document?

STP will add discussion to 34aresponse regarding STP's7-day train-specific workweeks, and that STP does nottypically plan for work toextend into the following workweek.

34b 12/08/05 Reviewer would like to discuss STP will bring examplefurther how risk profile information showing howinformation is maintained and electrical TS entries whichhow 3.13.1 entries will be affected RASCAL are tracked.documented.

34c No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

35 No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

36a No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

36b No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed. _

36c 12/08/05 Discussed independence of losq Refer to!8a response.of-power instrumentation & how STP will add detail to 36cpossible common cause issues response which clarifies thatwould be addressed. Also TS 3.0.4 would prevent mode

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

Question Telecon Discussion Notes STP Follow-up ActionDate

discussed use of TS 3.13.1 for an change with an inoperableinoperable SDG and mode SDG.changes.

37 No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

38 No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

39 No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

40 No additional Reviewercomments at this time. Willdiscuss at meeting as needed.

41 10/27/05 No additional informationrequested.

42a 10/27/05 Discussed that times are driven STP will discuss proposedby TS. If AOT is a few days, can wording for TS 3.13.1 Actionscalculate ahead of time; if at meeting.shorter, can calculate quickly.No additional informationrequested.

42b 10/27/05 Similar. Driven by TS. No further Need to discuss further withinfo needed. industry.

43a 10/27/05 STP believes current toolssupport timely calculationcapability. If RICT not calculated,then will use TS limit.

43b 10/27/05 Don't believe so, but if they doexist, can promptly calculateprior. Typically, 20 to 25 minutesto perform calc.

44 10/27/05 No new TS. Standard types ofcompensatory measures havebeen developed already, but arenot tied to specific TS. STP'sprocess for developing/applyingcompensatory measures hasbeen proceduralized.NRC may look at this furtherwhen do plant visit.

45 10/27/05 Table 2 shows that not all short STP to address loss ofduration AOTs are high-risk. function in revised 3.13.1,STP will discuss this in detail at 3.13.2 (refer to Question 8a).meeting. NRC will look at on acase-by-case basis. NRC will

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STP RITSRAI Response Discussion Summary

Question Telecon Discussion Notes STP Follow-up ActionDate

evaluate possible ties to IndustryInitiative 6.

46 10/27/05 Response acceptable. Noadditional information needed.

Attach 1 12/07/05 General Comments - Discussedthat de-energized bus" refers toDC power.

Attach 1 12/07/05 3.8.1.1 Action a - Att 1 states thatAction a can be entered for eitherplanned or emergent work.Reviewer asked for details onhow 3.8.1.1.a entry is made forplanned maintenance. Reviewerasked if compensatory measuresare pre-defined.

Attach 1 12/07/05 3.8.1.1.e - Discussed how 72-hraction in 3.8.1.1.e is redundantwith actions of 3.8.1.1.a.

Attach 1 12/07/05 3.8.2.1 - Reviewer requested STP will bring requestedexample risk results for multiple information to meeting.batteries inoperable and thatbattery charger designinformation be brought tomeeting.

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STP RITS Proposed Schedule

.,,..., ....... ,,,.,........... .. .. . ..... .. .. .......

RAI w/o PRA Mid-January STP

Submit revised RMTS and RAI responses Mid-January EPRI & NEI

RAI PRA and Table 2 March 6 STP* Q 24 - Fire I External Events* Q 25 - F&O Status* Q 26 - Key uncertainties* Q 27 - Capability Categories* Q 28 - PRA Documentation* Q 29 - Common Cause Failure Modes* Q 30 - Changes to Baseline* Q 31 - Level 2 Update

Revised application May30 STP

NRC site visit March - April NRC

NRC STP SE June 30 NRC

NRC RMTS SE (?) June 30 NRC

(How will this be endorsed?)

Amendment Issued July NRCQuestions and exposures:

* ACRS before SE and amendment* Follow-up meeting(s) with NRC• Additional RAls

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