Employing Joseph Strange CG-CC-CR-CV Model to the Malayan Campaign

Employing Joseph Strange CG-CV-CR-CC model tothe Malayan Campaign

INTRODUCTION

War is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable

wills, each trying to impose itself on the other1. It is a complex and violent art2 of

organized chaos, typically resulting in immediate bloodshed, destruction and

suffering3. Bloodshed, destruction and suffering came to Malaya and Singapore in

the early hours of 8th Dec 1941. The Japanese Empire's 25th Army invaded Malaya

and rapidly advanced towards Singapore. From the moment the first Japanese

soldier set foot in Malaya, the Allied forces lost the initiative and never regained it

throughout the campaign4. In a mere 68 days, the “impregnable fortress” of

Singapore fell, and the manner in which the defeat was dealt to the British Empire

led to Winston Churchill calling the fall of Singapore the 'greatest and most

humiliating defeat in British history'5.

The Japanese were able to achieve such overwhelming success in the

Malayan Campaign for they were acutely aware of the Center of Gravity (CG) and

Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) of the allied strategy. The 25th Army systematically

rendered the CGs ineffective by attacking the requirements and support that the CG

needed.

The CG-CV concept was theorized by Clausewitz in Vom Kriege, published

some 180 years ago. Dr Joseph Strange further refined this and added two other

1 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1: Warfighting. UnitedStates of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.3

2 Thomas Gavin. (Mar 2006). Assessing the Joint Pub 5-0 interpretation of “Center of Gravity”. WillIt Help or Confuse Joint Planning?. United States Army, U.S. Army War College. pp.5


4 COL Ong YuLin. (2008). In Search of An Ideal Victory. Bellona Quarterly 1/ 2008 (652). pp.665 Masanobu Tsuji. (1997). Japan's Greatest Victory/ Britain's Greatest Defeat, edited by H. V. Howe;

translated by Margaret E. Lake. Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount.

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elements, Critical Capabilities (CC) and Critical Requirements (CR) in the late

twentieth century, giving rise to the CG-CC-CR-CV construct. Although this

construct was not available in World War II, how the eventual campaign plan

unravelled itself during the Malayan Campaign seemed to suggest that the Japanese

had already understood the inter-related concept.

It is not the intent of this paper to address at length the evolution and

definition of Center of Gravity, nor does it seek to dissect and interpret Clausewitz

articulation of a CG. Instead, this paper will first establish a common understanding

of the term “Center of Gravity” before exploring Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV model.

This construct will then be applied to the only military conflict fought on the soil of

Singapore during World War II - the Malayan Campaign.

UNDERSTANDING CG-CC-CR-CV

The study of Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities is becoming

increasingly important and relevant in warfare of recent years as economy of effort

demands the military to focus their efforts towards some object or factors of decisive

importance in order to achieve the greatest effect at the least cost6. This has

compelled the military to elect a manoeuvrist approach towards the conduct of war to

'circumvent a “problem” and attack it from a position of advantage rather than to

meet it straight on. The goal is to attack the enemy's “system” - to incapacitate the

enemy systematically7.'

6 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1-2: Campaigning.United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.41


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This is also where Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV model comes in particularly

useful for military planners. This model has now become a widely accepted way for

staffs to plan military Courses of Action and operations that effectively engage (or

protect) centers of gravity8. For one to be able to employ this CG-CC-CR-CV

construct, there is a need to first understand the individual components and how they

are intricately inter-related.

Center(s) of Gravity

After Vom Kriege was first published posthumously in 1832, numerous

translation followed, and even more interpretations (and misinterpretations!) have

emerged. Of interest to many military academics and armed forces is the study of

Center(s) of Gravity. One of the more often cited and referenced translations of Vom

Kriege was Howard and Paret's On War. In it, they interpreted Clausewitz's

articulation of a CG as 'the hub of all power and movement on which all depends'9.

Military publication across the world have also tried to define what a CG is.

Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) Pub 1 describes a CG as 'the characteristics,

capabilities and locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action,

physical strength or will to fight. At the strategic level centers of gravity may include

a military force, an alliance, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national

8 CDR Darren E. Anding. (2007). Center of Gravity and the Range of Military Operations: Can AnOld Dog Apply to New Tricks?. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.6

9 Carl von Clausewitz, trans. & ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (1984). On War. UnitedStates of America: Princeton University Press. pp.595 - 596

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strategy itself'10. JFSC's definition acknowledges and differentiates that there exist

different CGs at the various levels of war (strategic vis-a-vis operational/ tactical).

The Joint Reference Publication 1 of the Singapore Armed Forces defined CG

as

“[in a military conflict] the hub of all power and movement upon whicheverything in the conflict depends. It is that characteristic[s], capabilityor location from which the military force derive their freedom of action,physical strength or will to fight”11.

In both JFSC and SAF definitions, CGs are characteristics, capabilities and

localities. This is further reinforced by the Marine Corps, where CGs may be

intangible characteristics such as resolve or morale, or they may be capabilities,

such as armoured forces or aviation strength, and that CGs may also be localities

such as a critical piece of terrain that anchors an entire defense system12. It may

also be the capital of a country, where the seat of the government or the ruling elite13

is located.

Amongst the few literatures presented, one can broadly categorise CGs into

two: a tangible element, and an intangible element. Tangible CGs are physical.

This is in congruence with Schneider and Izzo's interpretation of Clausewitz's

articulation of CGs in Book Six of Vom Kriege14. Tangible CGs are easily seen, such

10 Joint Forces Staff College. (2000). The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, [online]. Availablefrom:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf>> [18 May 2011]

11 Singapore Armed Forces. (Jul 2009). Joint Reference Publication 1 (JRP-1): Dictionary of MilitaryTerms, Abbreviations and Acronyms, Singapore Armed Forces, pp.2-42


13 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and CriticalVulnerabilities. Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity, [online]. Availablefrom:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

14 James J. Schneider, Lawrence Izzo. (1987). Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity. Parameters:US Army War College Quarterly, Sept 1987. pp46-57

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as the military force (as defined by JFSC Pub 1), armoured forces, or aviation power

(MCDP-1). It has the ability to resist, react and respond. Intangible CGs, on the

other hand, are harder to identify. It can be resolve or morale (MCDP-1), national

will (JRP-1), alliances (JFSC Pub 1), or political or military leadership. An intangible

CG could also be the national strategy itself (JFSC). In essence, intangible CGs are

associated with the cognitive responses of people.

Regardless whether a CG is tangible or intangible, it is clear that CG is a

source where strength is drawn from: a strength which allows both the tangible or

intangible Centers of Gravity to exhibit Machet15.

Critical Capabilities

In the original version of Vom Kriege, Clausewitz specifically uses Machet

[power] in association with “Schwerpunkt” [center of gravity]16, implying that

Clausewitz meant for a CG to exhibit certain elements of power, or in other

synonymous terms, force, might or strength. This meant that Clausewitz had

intended for a CG to be represent as a “source of strength”.

This “strength” should possess some ability (or abilities) that makes it a center

of gravity in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission17. In other words,

what is within this CG that an opponent fear most? What capability does this CG

15 In Vom Kriege, “machet” was used in the same breath as “power”. Clausewitz uses “machet” inassociation with “Schwerpunkt” (Center of Gravity), implying that Clausewitz actually meant for aCG to exhibit elements of power, or strength.

16 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and CriticalVulnerabilities. Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity, [online]. Availablefrom:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

17 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and CriticalVulnerabilities. Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyzethe Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities, [online]. Availablefrom:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

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brings to the “fight”? Strange describes that the Critical Capability (CC) must be able

to (1) destroy something, (2) seize an objective or (3) prevent you from achieving the

mission18.

In addition to Strange's articulation of the aforementioned trio of capabilities,

this paper will offer a forth capability: that (4) a critical capability must also be

paramount in facilitating the achievement of a mission or an objective.

This is actually an extension of Strange's articulation of the third capability: If

two warring belligerents are trying to impose their wills on each other, and if

belligerent A carries a capability that prevents belligerent B in achieving his mission,

then it follows that belligerent A possesses a critical capability that facilitates him in

achieving his mission.

Critical Requirements

For an object to function, it needs certain resources. Similarly, for a CG to

continually exhibit the CC, it needs to be “supplied” or be provided with certain

resources. It is what the CG is dependent on for continual existence. This, in the

CG-CC-CR-CV construct, is known as Critical Requirements (CR). Strange

describes CRs as (1) conditions, (2) resources, and (3) means that are essential for

a Center of Gravity to achieve its critical capability.19 Typically, CRs could range

from the tangibles (logistics, time, line-of-communications, intelligence etc.) to the

18 iBid19 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical

Vulnerabilities. Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyzethe Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities, [online]. Availablefrom:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

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intangibles (such as a certain condition, e.g. maritime or air superiority, weather

conditions, political alliances).

A simple CG-CC-CR relationship thus far is demonstrated in the following

simple illustration. For example, a car is a CG because it offers mobility (CC) from

point A to point B. For the car to continue to move, it needs fuel, an operator, good

set of tyres (CR). This brings the discussion to the last element in the construct –

Critical Vulnerabilities.

Critical Vulnerabilities

If CG is equated to a source of strength, then Critical Vulnerability (CV) is

translated as a weakness. A vulnerability must satisfy the cardinal requirement of

undermining a key strength for it to be considered “critical”. And the CV should be

something that can be attacked effectively20. Again, falling back to Strange's

articulation for consistency, CV are critical requirements, or components thereof, that

are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to

a center of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability21.

To neutralise an adversary's strength, one may consider to attack the center

of gravity in three fundamental ways: A CG can be defeated by (1) rendering it

irrelevant22. This can be achieved by operational art, and attacking the enemy's

strategy, as theorized by Sun Tze. Another method is (2) to strip the Center of

20 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1-2: Campaigning.United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.43

21 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and CriticalVulnerabilities. Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyzethe Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities, [online]. Availablefrom:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

22 iBid

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Gravity of the support it needs23: attack the critical requirements of the CG,

rendering it powerless. A third way of neutralising a CG is (3) to exploit systemic

weakness24. The above 3 methods would be explored in detailed in the Malayan

Campaign.

THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN: DEC 1941 – FEB 1942

“... the fall of Singapore... was.. the worse disaster and largestcapitulation of British history”

~ Winston Churchill, 1950

The Impregnable Fortress – The Singapore Strategy

The British defence policy was to hold the territories of the empire in Asia

against all comers25, and the military strategy for the policy was the implementation

of what was known as “The Singapore Strategy”. Central to the strategy was the

construction of a modern naval base in Sembawang, and with the main fleet located

in the European waters. In time of crisis, a powerful naval squadron would be sent

to Asia, and would operate off that base.

In addition, any approach from the North would entail the invading forces to

negotiate the dense impassable jungles of Malaya Peninsular. This would buy

sufficient time for British ground reinforcements to arrive from the Middle East. The

impassable jungles also meant that armoured tanks were surplus requirements to

the overall defence of the British colonies. Approach from the South via the sea, the

23 iBid24 iBid25 Brian P. Farrell. (2008), The British Defence of Singapore in the Second World War: Implications

for the SAF, Pointer Monograph No. 6: Malayan Campaign 1941-41, Lessons for ONE SAF.Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. pp.4

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invading forces would have to content with the 15-in coastal guns that dotted the

Southern coastline. The final piece of the puzzle in the Singapore Strategy was the

Air Plan that the British had drawn up. The British believed that the Royal Air Force

(RAF) fleet of combat aircrafts were ideal against any sea based invasion. By 1941,

a total of 11 such air bases were constructed in the Malaya.

The Road to War

Avoidance of war with the West had been a major tenet of Japanese foreign

policy26. However, the USS Panay incident27 and the Nanking Massacre during the

second Sino-Japanese war swung Western opinions adversely towards the

Japanese Empire. Fearing a growing hegemony of power, western allies, mainly

United States, United Kingdom and France, provided war supplies to the Republic of

China. Australia also prevented a Japanese government-owned company from

26 LCDR Alan C. Headrick, A. C. (Feb 1994). Bicycle Blitzkrieg: The Malayan Campaign and theFall of Singapore. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.3

27 The incident was an attack on the United States Navy (USN) gunboat USS Panay in the YangtzeRiver in Dec 1937, outside Nanking. Although the Japanese apologises shortly after the incident,it marked the start of adverse opinions against the Japanese.

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Figure 1: The famed 15-inch guns. The gun barrels were 16.5m long. The figure on the leftshows British troops “pulling through” the barrel. The figure on the right shows the guns firing.

These guns are capable of engaging targets over 20 miles away (WWII British War Office).

taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned iron ore exports to Japan in 193828.

In an effort to pressure the Japanese Empire to end hostilities in China, the United

States, and the resource-rich British and Dutch East Indies in South East Asia

(S.E.A.), began oil and steel embargoes - raw materials essential for the conduct of

war - against Japan. Faced with strangulating sanctions by the West, Japan began

carrying out plans to secure S.E.A as an intermediate objective in order to complete

its conquest of China29.

South East Asia, brimming with essential raw materials such as iron ore,

rubber, aluminium, and petroleum reserves30, would prove to be of great importance

to Japan if war came to the Pacific. The seizure of S.E.A, would also free Japan

from dependence on Western power for raw materials. However, at that time, many

countries in S.E.A were under European colonial rule31. Singapore, a small island

located at the Southern tip of Malaya, was a vital part of the British Empire and was

touted to be an “impregnable fortress”. Japan had long coveted the European

Colonies in S.E.A - Malaya and Indonesia being the vital resource region; Singapore

being a choke point between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean and also a symbol of

British power in Asia. With the sanctions imposed by the West, and to support her

own agenda in China, war, inevitably, came to S.E.A on December 1941, and the

Malayan Campaign began with the landing of the Japanese in Kota Bahru.

Kirimomi Sakusen – Japan Invades

28 J. McEwen (May 1940). 221 Memorandum by Mr J. McEwen, Minister for External Affairs,Available from: <<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf (LookupVol NoNumber)/3 ~221>> [14 Jun 11]

29 COL Ong YuLin. (2008). In Search of An Ideal Victory, Bellona Quarterly 1/ 2008 (652). pp.330 Masano Tsuji. (1961). Singapore: The Japanese Version. New York: St Martin's Press. pp18-19.31 Countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam were under French Colony, Indonesia went to the

Dutch, Malaya and Singapore came under British Colony.

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The Japanese launched an amphibious assault on the north east coastline of

Malaya at 0215 hours (local time), on 8th Dec 1941 - an hour and 20 minutes before

the attack on Pearl Harbour32. The landings were largely unopposed and the 25th

Army, lead by General Yamashita, continued their advance southwards towards

Singapore. In response to the Japanese landings, the British launched Force Z, a

strategic naval detachment that arrived in Singapore only on 2nd December. Force Z

comprised modern battleship HMS Prince of Wales, battle cruiser HMS Repulse, and

four other destroyers33. However, Prince of Wales and Repulse sank on 10th

32 The invasion was a series of coordinated military strikes in the Pacific, that was to take place overa seven hour period in the following order: Pearl Harbour, (7 December US time due tointernational dateline), Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, and Wake Islands. John Keegan (1989).The Second World War, New York: Penguin Books. pp. 256 - 257

33 HMS Electra, HMS Express, HMS Encounter and HMS Jupiter.

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Figure 2: Operation Plan of Japanese 25 th Army .(Available from http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/pacific1/1malaya4142.htm)

December enroute to intercept Japanese landings under relentless waves of aerial

attacks by Japanese torpedo bombers.

The 25th Army went through what was thought to be the “impassable” buffer of

the dense jungle in Malaya. Using a combination of light tanks and the clever use of

Japanese-styled blitzkrieg or Kirimomi Sakusen, the allied troops were no match for

the Japanese quick and ferocious advance. Despite having conquered 700 miles of

jungle terrain, by 31st January, the Japanese had pushed the allied forces out of

Malaya, with General Yamashita sitting in the tower of the Johore Palace,

overlooking the coast of Singapore. The 25th Army invaded Singapore on 8th

February and within a week, the allied General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya,

Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival, surrendered the “impregnable fortress”.

ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH

Strategic Level Analysis of CG-CC-CR-CV

Singapore was a strategic Center of Gravity for the British because of its

location and what it offered. This is in congruence with “location” being a CG as

articulated earlier. S.E.A. offered abundant raw materials necessary for the conduct

of war (CC#1). In addition, Singapore, sitting astride the Malacca straits, controlled

the maritime movement between India and China (CC#2). It would prove to be vital

in ensuring unhindered movement of palm oil and other war essential raw materials

from S.E.A to Japan. Capture of S.E.A., and eventually China, would offer a

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hegemony of the Far East under the guise of their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere34.

Continuing to hold Singapore to project the symbol of power, while preserving

her Asian interest requires a strong defence, augmented with a credible navy. This

was evident in the desire to build a naval base large enough to be seen as a 'naval

key to the Far East', where it would serve as a 'deterrence against attacks' or as a

'staging point' for counter offensive operations35. At that point in history, the United

States was not involved in World War II. The Japanese Empire, aware that the

Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour represented the most serious threat to interdict their

operations, conducted pre-emptive destruction of the naval vessels, while at the

same time launched a near simultaneous amphibious landing in Kota Bahru. Still

reeling from the shock of the pre-emptive attack, the Japanese effectively removed

the assistance from the United States out of the equation.

At the strategic level, the Japanese Empire also relied on their alliance with

the Axis to keep British occupied in the European theatre and prevented the British

from diverting their forces into the Far East. The army defending the Northern

Malayan Peninsular were a non-homogeneous mix of Indians, Malays and

Australians, all lacking common training and combat experience. When the

Japanese invaded, friction began to surface and finger pointing were apparent. The

experienced and combat-harden soldiers were preserving British's european interest

34 Allen, Raymond W. Jr., William H Roedy, Charles L. Hassmann, John J. Outcalt, Allan F. Clark,Jr., Edmund K. Daley, Thomas Q Donaldson IV, Charley P. Eastburn, John R. Elting, Clayton S.Gates. Ronan C. Grady. Jr., Robert A. Hill, Max S. Johnson, Lawrence J. Lincoln, Alfred D.Starbird, Harrison G. Travis. (1956). A Military History of World War II, Volume II, Operations inthe Mediterranean and Pacific Theatres, Edited by T. Dodson Stamps. West Point: United StatesMilitary Academy. pp.88.

35 Brian P. Farrell. (2005). The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940 – 1942, Stroud: Tempus. pp.76-77, 386.

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in the Middle East, and could not be deployed in time for the defence of the Malayan

Peninsular. When the Japanese invaded Singapore, they made Bukit Timah one of

the first few objectives to be captured as that was where water and ammunition

supplies were kept and stored. That accelerated the capitulation of Singapore as

they were seen as essential objectives to defeat the city36. Percival had no choice

once Bukit Timah was captured. With less than 24 hours of water left for the allied

troops, Percival surrendered and the Malayan Campaign came to a close.

Center of Gravity Critical Capabilities

Location of Singapore

> Access to natural resources in Malaya.

> Vital maritime access along MalaccaStraits.

Critical Requirements Critical Vulnerabilities

Strong defence > Troops reinforcements> Coalition of Australians, Malays andIndian contingents

> Reinforcements from Middle East tobe re‐deployed to Malaya in time> Non‐homogeneous Coalition may be asource of friction.> Lack a common training, languagebarrier.

Naval base large enough to host acredible naval fleet

> U.S. Pacific Fleet requires time toarrive in Malaya> Force Z lacks carrier based support/Air cover.

Command of Singapore as a symbol ofpower to the British Empire

> Bukit Timah holds water and supplies.

Table 1: CG-CC-CR-CV Analysis at the Strategic Level.

Yamashita attacked the CRs by removing the Pacific Fleet out of the

equation. In addition, the capture of Bukit Timah also accelerated the capitulation of

Singapore by softening the resolve and will of the allied defence. Yamashita also

exploited the systemic weakness of the “coalition” defending the Northern Malaya by

a combination of outflanking manoeuvre while relying of the other axis alliances to

keep British troops engaged in the Middle East.

36 LCDR Alan C. Headrick, A. C. (Feb 1994). Bicycle Blitzkrieg: The Malayan Campaign and theFall of Singapore. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.3

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Operational Level Analysis of CG-CC-CR-CV

The center of gravity at the operational level was the whole defence system of

Singapore. The basis of the defence was that the enemy must be prevented from

landing or, if he succeed in landing, he must be stopped near the beaches and

destroyed or driven out by counter-attack37. This was evident from how the defences

were arrayed and the capabilities that the defence system brings. The defence

system must be capable of (CC#1) intercepting Japanese landing as far out at sea

as possible, (CC#2) to interdict the Japanese advance and approach via the air, and

also to (CC#3) compel the Japanese to fight a protracted war by holding the

Japanese ground forces in the dense jungles of Malaya while waiting for

reinforcements from the Middle East for the counter attack. And should an attack

come from the South via the sea, other than maritime fleet, (CC#4) the coastal guns

that dotted the southern coastline were capable of destroying the invading force's

naval ships.

37 Arthur Percival. (1949). The War In Malaya. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. pp. 263.

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Figure 3: Graphical representation of strategic analysis of Allied CG-CC-CR-CV construct .

Although a naval fleet made it in time before the commencement of the

Malayan Campaign, it was not at full strength. The initial composition of Force Z

included HMS Indomitable, an aircraft carrier. However, Indomitable ran aground off

the Caribbean in November 1941 and was not adequately replaced. When launched

to interdict the landings, Force Z was spotted, and under relentless wave of aerial

attacks by Japanese bombers, sank on 10th December.

In addition, the RAF also lacked sufficient aircrafts in the theatre to provide

adequate response. From the initial assessed 586 aircrafts required to defend

against a major invasion, only 18138 were available in Malaya and Singapore by

December 1941. The surprise landings on Kota Bahru caught the Allies by surprise,

and towns after towns, and airfields after airfields were swiftly taken. With the

sinking of Force Z, both maritime and air power were lost in the initial phases of the

campaign.

The Japanese also made the naval guns redundant by invading from the

North. Although some of these 15-inch guns had all round traverse capabilities and

would be able to thwart the Japanese invasion from the North, they were supplied

with Armoured Piercing (AP) rounds, aimed at piercing the hull of naval ships, and

not High-Explosive ammunition39. These guns proved to be ineffective in the

defence of Singapore. Another plan, codenamed MATADOR40, drafted in 1937 to

38 Out of the 181 aircrafts, less than 25% were first line aircrafts, such as the Hudson bombers. Themajority of the aircrafts were Amercan-supplied Brewster Buffalos and other torpedoe bomberunits that “were so obsolete (that) they could make no dent against the overwhelming Japaneseairpower”. Brian P. Farrell (2008), The British Defence of Singapore in the Second World War:Implications for the SAF, Pointer Monograph No. 6: Malayan Campaign 1941-41, Lessons forONE SAF. Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. pp.10

39 Mike Bennighof. (Jan 2010). The Guns of Singapore. [online]. Available from:<<http://www.avalanchepress.com/GunsOfSingapore.php >> [30 May 11]

40 Ops MATADOR was a plan by the Malayan Command to pre-position forces in Siam and Malayato counter Japanese amphibious landing. This was not executed as the British Government did

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prevent the likelihood of an assault from the North was never executed. The British

Government did not wish to violate the sovereignty of Siam without a prior

declaration of war41. Again, the surprise attack meant that the British had lost the

initiative in positioning her forces to prevent an invasion.

The Japanese Kirimomi Sakusen also saw the 25th Army overcame the dense

jungle quickly with outflanking manoeuvres on bicycles, complemented with strong

frontal pressure using light tanks. After 55 days, Yamashita had covered 700 miles

of the Malaya jungle and was ready to invade Singapore. Despite being numerically

inferior42, and running critically low on ammunition, Yamashita continued the intense

artillery bombardment and advanced into Singapore. The Malayan Campaign

concluded on 15th February 1942, and for the next 3 years and 8 months, Singapore

was known as Syonan-To.

not wish to violate the sovereignty of Siam without a prior declaration of war.41 LCDR Alan C. Headrick, A. C. (Feb 1994). Bicycle Blitzkrieg: The Malayan Campaign and the

Fall of Singapore. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.742 Some literature have the allied command outnumbering the Japanese as much as 3 : 1. While the

number was never ascertained, the allied had approximately 140, 000 troops, while the 25th Armynumbered in the region of 70, 000.

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Figure 4: Japanese advance through Malaya on bicyclesconfiscated from the civilians of Malaya (National Archives).

Center of Gravity Critical Capabilities

Defence of Singapore

> Intercept Japanese landings at sea

> Interdict Japanese advance/ approachfrom the air

> Malaya to the North allows the AlliedForces to hold Japanese infantryadvance while waiting forreinforcements.

> Naval guns facing south.

Critical Requirements Critical Vulnerabilities

Force Z > Lack carrier based support.

Air force

> Requires Air bases to launch aircrafts.> total number of aircraft less than 25%as assessed due to other theatre ofbattles.

Armoured Piercing rounds to engagewar ships.

> Supply of AP rounds only. > Lack H.E. Rounds.> Not all guns possess all round traversecapability.

Impassable jungles to fight a long battlewhile await for reinforcements

> no support due to commitment inother theatres.> Avoidance of protracted war toprevent deployment of reinforcementsfrom Middle East.> Lack of armoured tanks in jungleterrain.

Table 2: CG-CC-CR-CV Analysis at the Operational Level

At the operational level, Yamashita neutralised the CG by stripping it of the

support it needed: It sank Force Z and rendered the airforce ineffective without

proper air bases to operate from. The CC of naval guns were also neutralised with

the approach from the North, and the Japanese Army, exploited the systemic

weakness of the lack of AP rounds within the coastal guns arsenal. In addition,

Yamashita exploited the British's reluctance in executing Ops MATADOR and the

Japanese-style blitzkrieg also prevented the “long, protracted” conflict that the British

had hoped for. All these led to the neutralisation of the CG in the defence of

Singapore.

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CONCLUSION

It is clear that a CG is a source of strength, while a CV is a weakness. It is

also clear that CG and CV are not separate dichotomies and are intricately linked by

Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV construct. This construct has provided military planners of

recent times to develop a systematic approach in identifying the CG and exploiting

the CV of a warring opposition. Although Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV construct was

not developed until the late twentieth century, the Japanese Army's understanding of

Clauswitzian CG in the Malayan Campaign and how they seek to render the CG

ineffective by exploiting allied CV were manifested in the campaign plans.

Despite having covered a vast amount of land in a short span of time, and

juxtaposing that fatigue with low ammunition and being numerically inferior,

Yamashita carefully and systematically stripped the allied CG of the support it

needed and exploited systemic weakness within the British defence. The pre-

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Figure 5: Graphical representation of strategic analysis of Allied CG-CC-CR-CV construct .

emptive attack on Pearl Harbour and the surprise landing in Kota Bahru, coupled

with neutralising of Force Z, Yamashita had maritime and aerial superiority

throughout the campaign. The British never managed to recover from the opening

blow of the campaign.

One need not look further than the Malayan Campaign to see how the

analysis and application of the CG-CC-CR-CV construct can help military planners in

achieving the objective with the minimal resources.

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REFERENCE

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Employing Joseph Strange CG-CC-CR-CV Model to the Malayan Campaign

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