Emotions AnteEmotionsAntecedencesResponesReg.pdf Cede Nces Resp Ones Reg

8/12/2019 Emotions AnteEmotionsAntecedencesResponesReg.pdf Cede Nces Resp Ones Reg

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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1998, Vol. 74, No. 1, 224-237 Copyright 1998 by (he American Psychological Association, Inc.0O22-3514/98/$3.O0

Antecedent- and Response-Focused Emotion Regulation:Divergent Consequences for Experience, Expression, and PhysiologyJames J. GrossStanford University

Using a process model of emotion, a distinction between antecedent-focused and response-focusedemotion regulation is proposed. To test this distinction, 120 participants were shown a disgustingfilm while their experiential, behavioral, and physiological responses were recorded. Participantswere told to either (a) think about the film in such a way that they would feel nothing (reappraisal,a form of antecedent-focused emotion regulation), (b) behave in such a way that someone watchingthem would not know they were feeling anything (suppression, a form of response-focused emotionregulation), or (c) watch the film (a control condition), Compared with the control condition, bothreappraisal and suppression were effective in reducing emotion-expressive behavior. However, reap-praisal decreased disgust experience, whereas suppression increased sympathetic activation. Theseresults suggest that these 2 emotion regulatory processes may have different adaptive consequences.

What happens when we get so angry with an erratic driverthat we feel like yelling at him, yet we do not? Or when wefeel down but want to be in good spirits for a party? Or whenwe find something outrageously funny but need to stifle ourlaughter during a formal ceremony? At times such as these, weregulate our emotions. That is, we attempt to influence whichemotions we have, when we have them, and how these emotionsare experienced or expressed.As these examples suggest, emotion regulation is a regularfeature of everyday life (Morris & Reilly, 1987; Rippere, 1977).Nine out of 10 undergraduates report that they alter their emo-tions, about once a day, and most can readily recall a recentexample (Gross, Feldman Barrett , & Richards, 1998). Indeed,attempts at regulating emotions are so comm on that we typicallytake emotion regulation for granted, noticing only its absence,such as when a child throws a temper tantrum (Thompson,1991), a friend shows too little happiness at our good news, adepressed colleague is unable to stem overwhelming feelingsof sadness (Gross & Munoz, 199 5), or we lose our compo surein the heat of the moment and say things we later regret.Considering the ubiquity of emotion regulation, one mightexpect theoretical and empirical analyses to abound. Surprisingly,

This research was supported by Behavioral Science Track Award forRapid Transition (B/STAKT) Grant MH53859 from the National Insti-tute of Mental Health. I would like to thank Paul Ekman, Oliver P. John,Richard S. Lazarus, Jane M. Richards, Jeanne Tsai, and Robert Zajoncfor their thoughtful comments on a draft of this article and RobertW. Levenson for making his laboratory facilities available. This articlebenefited from the comments of both members of the Emotion ResearchGroup at its February 1996 meeting at Vanderbilt University, Nashville,Tennessee, and members of the International Society for Research onEm otio nal its August 1996 m eeting at the University of Toronto, Toronto,Ontario, Canada.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to JamesJ. Gross, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, Cali-fornia 94305-2130. Electronic mail may be sent via the Internet [email protected].

this is not the case.1Moreover, the two broad literatures in whichemotion regulation has been considered, one concerned with psy-chological health and the other with physical health, offer remark-ably divergent conclusions about the consequences of emotionregulation. In the following sections, I first review these twoliteratures. I then use a process model of emotion to draw adistinction between two forms of emotion regulation and suggestthat this distinction may help to reconcile these two literatures.Emot i on Regu l a t i on : Less S t r ess and Bet t e r

Psycho l og i ca l Hea l t hClinical tradition dating back to Freud has emphasized that

psychological health hinges on how affective impulses are regu-lated (Freud, 1923/1961). This has led psychodynamic re-searchers to focus on the health consequences of characteristicemotion regulatory styles (e.g., Haan, 1993; Vaillant & Drake,1985). Recently, proponents of other theoretical persuasionsalso have elaborated the view that psychological health requiresthat emotional impulses be regulated properly. For example,Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979) and Seligman (1991)have argued that cognitive strategies may be used to prevent oralleviate depression and Barlow (1991) has advanced a modelof emotion dysregulation and affective psychopathology.But what support is there for the proposition that emotionregulation has measurable beneficial consequence s? Lazarus and

colleagues provided some of the first evidence in an influentialseries of studies (Lazarus & Opton, 196 6). In one representativestudy, Lazarus and Alfert (1964) showed students a filmed cir-cumcision ritual and manipulated the accompanying soundtrack.Some participants heard a soundtrack that had been designedto minimize the negative emotional impact of the film by deny-ing the pain involved in the surgery and emphasizing the joyful

' In the developmental literature, however, there has been a recentsurge of interest in emotion regulation (e.g., Campos, Campos, & Bar-rett, 1989; Eisenberg el al., 199 5; Fox, 1994; Garber & Dodge, 199 1). 4


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TWO FORMS OF EMOTION REGULATION 225aspects of the procedure. Other participants heard no soundtrackat all. Compared with the no-soundtrack condition, participantswho heard the soundtrack had slower heart rates, lower skinconductance levels, and more pleasant mood ratings. Thesefindings suggested that leading participants to view the film lessnegatively decreased the stressfulness of what otherwise wouldhave been a quite distressing experience.

Studies such as this one demonstrated that cognitive strategiescould reduce stress responses and suggested that such regulationmight have benefits for psychological health. This view hasbeen incorporated into theories of emotion {e.g., Frijda, 1988;Laza rus, 19 91; Plutchik, 19 80 ), coping and stress reduction(e.g., Katz & Epstein, 1991;Lazarus & Folkman, 198 4; Meichen-baum, 1985), delay of gratification (Mischel, 1974; Shoda, Mis-chel, & Peake, 1990), and psychopathology (e.g., Barlow, 1988;Beck et al., 1979; Sayette, 1993). Despite its wide currency,however, the view that cognitive strategies may be used to de-crease negative emotion has a surprisingly weak empirical foun-dation. Since Laza rus's pioneering studies, there has been at leastone failure to replicate (Steptoe & Vogele, 19K6) and only onesuccessful replication (Dandoy & Goldstein, 1990). As Wegner(1994) demonstrated so elegantly in the realm of thought sup-pression, attempts to influence ongoing mental processes mayhave paradoxical or unintended effects. This suggests caution inassuming that the cognitive control of emotion has uniquely, oreven primarily, salutary consequences.Emot i on Regu l a t i on : More Phys i o l og i ca l Act i va t i on

and Worse Phys i ca l Hea l t hWith the advent of psychosomatic medicine, the impact ofemotion regulation on physical health took center stage (A lexan -der, 1939). Here, however, emotion regulation was cast not ashero, but as villain. Indeed, the notion that the regulation of

negative emotions could have deleterious consequences becamea cornerstone of the entire psychosomatic enterprise (Alexan-der & French, 1946; Dunbar, 1954). The chronic inhibition ofsadness and crying was thought to lead to respiratory disorders,such as asthma (Alexander, 1950; Halliday, 1937); the chronicinhibition of affiliative tendencies was linked to gastrointestinaldisorders, such as ulcers (Alexander, 1950); and the chronicinhibition of anger was associated w ith cardiovascular disorders,such as hypertension (Alexander, 1939).Although some of these hypotheses have fallen into disfavor,others have remained popular, such as the view that chronichostility and anger inhibition may b e linked to hypertension andcoronary heart disease (e.g., Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987;Manuck & Krantz, 1986; T. W. Smith, 1992; Steptoe, 1993). Inaddition, new hypotheses involving emotion regulation haveemerged, suggesting that emotion inhibition may exacerbate mi-nor ailments (Pennebaker, 1990) and that inexpressiveness mayaccelerate cancer progression (Fawzy et al., 1993; Gross, 1989;Spiegel, Bloom, Kraemer, & Gottheil, 1989).The theme that unites these hypotheses is that tight controlof negative emotions may adversely affect physical health. Justhow this might happen is not known, but the underlying premiseusually is that inhibiting emotion leads to acute increases inphysiological response parameters that may, over the long term,do damage (Krantz & Manuck, 1984). Results of studies that

have examined the acute physiological effects of emotion regu-lation empirically have been mixed (for a review, see Gross &Levenson, 1993), but more recent work has shown that emo-tional suppression lead s to acute increases in sympathetic activa-tion of the sort postulated by these models (Gross & Levenson,1993. 1997) .In tegrat ing the Two Li teraturesWhen p laced side by side, the literatures on psychological andphysical health give the uncomfortable impression that emotionregulation may benefit psychological health but harm physicalhealth. Are psychological well-being and physical well-beingreally at odds with one another?

To address this issue, I have adopted the process model ofemotion shown in Figure 1. This m odel is a distillation of majorpoints of convergence among researchers concerned with emo-tion (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Ekman, 1972; Frijda, 1986; Izard,1977; Lang, 1995; Lazaru s, 19 91; Levenson, 1994; Plutchik,1980;Scherer, 1984; Tomkins, 1 98 4). According to this consen-sual model, emotion begins with an evaluation of external orinternal emotion cues. Certain evaluations trigger a coordinatedset of behavioral, experiential, and physiological emotional re-sponse tendencies that together facilitate adaptive responding toperceived challenges and opportunities. However, these responsetendencies may be modulated, and it is this modulation thatgives final shape to manifest emotional responses.

Clearly, this input-output model does not doand is notmeant to dofull justice to the complexities of emotion. Forexample, this model does not adequately represent the multifac-eted evaluation and modulation processes. Neither does thismodel capture the dynamic and recursive nature of emotion.Nor does it provide sufficient m eans of representing differencesamong em otions or differences am ong individuals. These limita-tions notwithstanding, this model does suggest two major waysin which emotions might be regulated.As shown in Figure 1, this model suggests that emotions maybe regulated either by manipulating the input to the system (ante-cedent-focused emotion regulation) or by manipulating its output(response-focused emotion regulation). Within these two broadclasses of emotion regulation, more fine-grained distinctions maybe made (see Frijda, 1986; Gross, 1998). For example, anteced-ent-focused emotion regulation includes situation selection, inwhich one approaches or avoids certain people or situations onthe basis of their likely emotional impact; situation modification,in which one modifies an environment so as to alter its emotionalimpact;attention deployment,in which one turns attention towardor away from something in order to influence one's emotions;andcognitive change,in which o ne reevaluates either the situation

one is in or one's capacity to manage the situation so as toalter one's emotions. Response-focused emotion regulation alsoincludes a multiplicity of types, such as strategies that intensify,diminish, prolong, or curtail ongoing emotional experience, ex-pression, orphysiological responding.22The distinction between anteceden t- and response-focused em otionregulation should not be confused wilh Lazarus and colleagues' distinc-tion between problem- and emotion-focused coping, a distinction re-cently retired in favor of more specific coping strategies (Folkman &Lazarus, 1988). Emotion-focused coping refers to efforts to regulatestressful em otion and thus is coextensive with the superordinate catego ry


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22 6 GROSS

Emot ionalCues EmotionalResponse Tendencies

BehavioralExperientialPhysiological

Emot ionalResponses

Antecedent -FocusedEmo t ion Regulat ion(e.g., Reappraisal)

Response-Foe usedEmotion Regulation(e.g., Suppression)

Figure I. A consensual process model of emotion that highlights two major classes of emotion regulation.

Yet even Ihis initial distinction between two broad classes ofemotion regulation may help to reconcile the two literaturesreviewed above. The psychological health literature might beseen as concerned primarily with cognitive forms of antecedent-focused emotion regulation, that is, regulation before the emo-tion is triggered. The physical health literature, by contrast,might be seen as concerned primarily with response-focusedemotion regulation that involves the inhibition of emotionalresponse tendencies once the emotion already has beengenerated.

Might this model also be used to make more specific predic-tions regarding these two forms of emotion regulation? Tn theconte xt of a potentia lly stressful situation, anteced ent-foe usedemotion regulation might take the form of reevaluating the situa-tion so as to decrease its emotional relevance (see Lazarus,1991; Scherer, 19 84; C. A. Smith & E llsworth, 19 85 ). Thisshould decrease the extent to which emotion respon se tendenciesare activated, leading to lesser subjective, physiological, andexpressive signs of negative emotion than otherwise would havebeen evident. Response-focused emotion regulation, by contrast,should target response tendencies that have been produced oncethe emotion is under way. For example, consider suppression,defined as the conscious inhibition of ongoing emotion-expres-sive behavior. Because regulatory efforts selectively focus onbehavior, we would expect lesser emotion-expressive behavior.The subjective consequences of hiding expressive behavior area matter of some dispute, but recent reviews (G ross & Levenson,1993, 1997) suggest that suppression should have little or noimpact on subjective experience, at least in the context of anegative emotion.3 Because inhibitory pathways would be acti-vated concurrently with the physiological response tendenciesassociated w ith emotion, we might exp ect a mixed physiologicalstate. This state would include increased sympathetic activationdue to the additional task of suppressing behavioral response

of emotion regulation (at least for stre ssfu l em otio ns). By contrast,problem-focused coping refers to attempts to modify a troublesome envi-ronment and thus is one form of antecedent-focused emotion regulation.

tendencies as they are generated (Gross & Levenson, 1993,1997); decreased somatic signs of emotion, because these arethe target of suppression; and decreased heart rate, which isinfluenced by somatic activity (Obrist, 1981).

The Presen t S t udyThe goal of the present study was to test the general proposi-tion that shutting do w n an emotion at the front end wouldhave different consequences from shutting down an emotionthat already had generated powerful response tendencies. Thus,the present study directly compared one form of antecedent-focused emotion regulation, reappraisal, and one form of re-sponse-focused emotion regulation, suppression, with a controlcondition. Reappraisal was defined as interpreting potentially

emotion-relevant stimuli in unemotional terms (see Speisman,Lazarus,Mordkoff, & Davison, 1964).Suppression was dennedas inhibiting emotion-expressive behavior while emotionallyaroused (Gross & Levenson, 1993).A potent film stimulus known to elicit disgust was used. Thisfilm's potency ensured that most participants would have thedesired emotional response tendencies (Gross & Levenson,19 95) . However, it also increased the likelihood that some parti-cipants would be overwhelmed. To decrease this possibility, allparticipants first viewed a neutral and a disgusting film underno special instructions, to acquaint them with the film materialsand procedures. Only then did they view a second disgustingfilm, during which participants in the two experimental condi-

tions were to regulate their responding w hile control participantssimply watched the film.Although emotion theorists agree that emotions involvechanges in the response domains of experience, expression, andphysiology, previous studies of emotion regulation typically

3 The opposite prediction would be made by thefacial feedback hy-pothesis (FFH). However, recent reviews and empirical findings suggestthat the FFH-inspired notion that suppression and exaggeration are oppo-site ends of a single continuum may be mistaken (see Gro ss& Levenson,1993, 1997) .


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TWO FORMS OF EMOTION REGULATION 7have sampled only one or two of these domains. One uniquecontribution of this study was the examination of all three do-mains. By directly comparing two forms of emotion regulationwith a control condition, this study tested three hypotheses.

The first hypothesis concerned expressive behavior. I pre-dicted that both reappraisal and suppression participants wouldshow fewer behavioral signs of disgust than would control parti-cipants. [ expected this effect to be evident whether expressivebehavior was assessed in discrete terms (i.e., specific signsof disgust), dimensional terms (i.e., the intensity of overallemotional responding), or global terms (i.e., overall activitylevels). Because of the way I operationalized reappraisal andsuppression, I did not expect emotion regulation participants tolook away from the film or avert their gaze to a greater extentthan control participants (which would represent yet anotherform of emotion regulation).

The second hypothesis concerned subjective experience. I ex-pected that reappraisal participants would report less subjectiveexperience of emotion than control participants; in the contextof a film that specifically targeted disgust subjective experience,I expected that these reductions would be specific to disgust.By contrast, on the basis of prior findings, I predicted thatsuppression and control participants would report equivalentexperience of disgust.

The third hypothesis concerned physiological responding.Here, my expectation was that reappraisal participants wouldshow less sympathetic activation (as measured by finger pulseamplitude, finger temperature, and skin conductance), less so-matic activity, and lower heart rates than control par ticipants.By contrast, because I conceptualize suppression as involvingthe activation of inhibitory processes over and above the ongoingemotion, I expected suppression participants to evidence amixed physiological pattern, characterized by greater sympa-thetic activation than control participants but less somatic andheart rate reactivity.

Method-Overview

Participants watchedadisgust-eliciting rtlm under oneofthree condi-t ions.In the reappraisal condition, participants were asked to adoptadetached and unemotional attitude as they watched the film.In thesuppression condition, participants were asked tobehave insuchaw aythat a person watching them would not know that they were feelinganythingatall. The w atch condition served asacontrol;inthis condition,participants were simply asked to watch the film. Participants werevideotaped, andtheir physiological responses were mon itored. Partici-pants also used emotion-rating forms todescribe their subjective experi-ence ofemotion.

ParticipantsOne hundred twenty undergraduates(60menand 60women) partici-pated in individual experimental sessions, tofulfill a research require-mentintheir psychology course.4Onaverage, participants were 21 yearsold(SD= 4.1). The ethnic compositionofthis sample w as mixed:1%African A merican, 55% Asian American, 3 3% Caucasian, 3%Latino,and 8%other.

Stimulus FilmsThree well-validated silent films were used (Gross & Levenson,1995) . The first film(1 min) wasadynamic abstract display that elicitsvery little emotion of any kind. The second and third films showedmedical procedures. These were first usedbyPaul Ekmanofthe Univer-sity of California, San Francisco (seeEkman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan,1988). Thefirst showed thetreatment of bum victims (burn film)and

was 55 s long.The second showed a close-upof theamputation of anarm (amputation film)andwas64 slong.Inpretesting, thesetwofilmselicited self-reported disgust, with little report of other emotions.

ProcedureOn arrival, participants were seatedin awell-lit4 x 6-mroom. Theywere informed that the experiment was concerned with emotion and thatthey would be videotaped. Physiological sensors were attached,andparticipants used a self-report form to answer questions concerningdemographics and current m ood. Participants then were shown threeshort films on a 19-in. color television monitor at a distance of 1.75m. All instructions were prerecorded andpresented via the televisionmonitor.Before thefirstand second film trials, participants were told lhatthe

television screen would beblank for about aminuteand that this timeshouldbeusedto clea r your mindofall thoughts, feelings,andmemo-ries. After this 1-minbaseline period, participants received thefollow-ing instructions: Wewill now be showingyou a short film clip.It isimportant to us that youwatch the film clip carefully, but if youfindthe film too distressing, just say 'stop.' These instructions werefol-lowed by either the neutral film (first trial)or theburn film (secondt r ia l ) . After each film, therewas a 1-minpostfilm period, at the end ofwhich participants completed an emotion-rating form (describedbe-l o w ) , to assess their emotional reactions during thefilm.The third trial began withthe same 1-min baseline procedure. Partici-pants then received one of three instructions, determined by randomassignmentto one of three conditions (watch, reappraisal, or suppres-sion ). Assignment wasconstrained so that equal numbers of me nandwomen were assigned to each condition. For watch participants (n =

4 0 ) , theforegoing instructions w ere repeated. Reappraisal participants(n = 40)received thefollowing instructions:We willnow be showingyou a short film clip.It is importanttous that youwatch the film clip carefully, but if you findthefilmtoo distressing, just say sto p. This time, please try to adopt adetached andunemotional attitudeas youwatch thefilm.In otherwords,as youwatch thefilm clip,try to think about whatyou areseeing objectively, in terms of the technical aspectsof theeventsyou observe. Watch the film clip carefully, butpleasetry to thinkabout what you are seeinginsuchaway that you don't feel anythingatall.

Participantsinthe suppression c ondition(n =40) received the followinginstructions:We will now beshowingyou a short film clip.It isimportant tous that youwatch the film clip carefully, but if you findthefilmtoo distressing, justsay stop . This time,ifyou haveanyfeelingsas you watch the film clip, please try your best not to let thosefeelings show. In other words,as you watch the film clip,try tobehaveinsucha waythata person watching youwouldnotknow

4A total of 127students initially participated. Of these,7 wereex-cluded from analyses because they requested tostop the am putation film(3 in the watch condition and 4 in the suppression cond ition).


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22 8 GROSSyou were feeling anything. Watchthe film clip carefully, but pleasetry tobehave so that someone watchingyouwould not know thatyou arefeeling anything at all.

Participants then watched the amputation film, which wasfollowedbya -min postfilm period. After thepostfilm period, participantscom-pleted an emotion-rating form and answered several additional questionsconcerning their responsesto the amputation film.Measures

Data were collected in three response domains: expressive behavior,subjective experience, and physiology. Because the first film (abstractdisplay) was included solelyto accustom participantsto thelaboratory,data from this film were not analyzed. R>r the bum and amputationfilms, data reduction for behavioral and physiological data wasbasedon theprefilm (1 min), instructional (1 min), film (approximately 1m i n ) , andpostfilm (1 min) periods. Self-report data were availableforbaselineandfilm periods.As manipulation checks, after the amputationfilm, participants rated three statements usinga9-point Likert-type scale,ranging from 0 {strongly disagree) to 8 (strongly agree): (a) Duringthe film, I tried not to feel anything at all; (b) during the film,I feltemotions but tried to hide them; and (c) during the film, I reactedcompletely spontaneously.

Behavior. A remote control video camera placed behind darkenedglass unobtrusively recorded participants' facial behavior and upperbody movement. Participants' behavioral responses were rated by fourcoders (two men and twowomen) , who were unaware of stimuliandexperimental conditions. Coders used a modified version of the Emo-tional Behavior Coding System (Gross & Levenson, 1993), including(a) overall disgust, (b) emotional intensity, (c) overall activity (an apriori composite defined byfour codes: m outh movem ent, facial move-ment, face touching, and body movement),and (d)obscures vision.Thefirst three mea sures w ere designedtoassess emotion-expressive behaviorin discrete (disgust), dimensional (intensity), and global (activity)terms. Obscures vision was a control variable, designed to assesswhether emotion regulation participants prevented themselves fromseeing the films by shielding their gazeorlooking away from the screen.Reliabilities were good (mean r = .92), ranging from .83 for disgustto .98 for obscures vision. As expected, the four components of theactivity composite were correlated, and the composite had alphas rangingfrom .68to.75. Final values for eachofthe measures were determined byaveraging thecode rs' ratings. Participants received scores for baseline,instructional, film,andpostfilm pe riods; change scores were c omputedby subtracting baseline scores from eachof the other scores.

Subjective experience. Participants rated howthey felt befo re eachfilm (baseline rating) and,after viewing each film, how they had feltduringthe film (film rating).On each occasion, participants rated theirdisgust, which was embeddedin asetof15 distractor items (amusement,anger, arousal, confusion, contempt, contentment, embarrassment, fear,happiness, interest, pain, relief, sadness, surprise, and tension). Eachemotion wasrated using a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 0(none) to 8 (most inmylife), adapted from Ekm an, Friesen, and Ancoli( 1 9 8 0 ) .The primary focus was on disgust experience, but change scoreswere computed for all 16measures by subtracting the baseline scorefrom the film score.

Physiology. Five measures were selected for use in this study toprovideabroad indexofthe activityofphysiological systems especiallyrelevanttoemotional responding.Thefirst three m easures assessed acti-vationof the sympathetic branchof the autonomic nervous system:1. Finger pulse amplitude. A UFiphotoplethysmo graph recordedthe amplitudeofblood volumeinthe finger usingaphotocell tapedto the distal phalangeofthe second fingerof the nondominant hand.

2. Finger temperature.A thermistor attachedto the palmar surfaceof the distal phalangeof the fourth finger recorded temperatureindegrees Fahrenheit.3. Skin conductance level.A constant-voltage device wasusedtopass a small voltage between Beckman regular electrodes (usingan electrolyteofsodium chlorideinUnibase) attached to the palmarsurface of the middle phalangesof the firstandthird fingersofthenondominant hand.

The fourth and fifth measures assessed somatic activity andheart rate,respectively:4. General somatic activity. An electromechanical transducerattachedto theplatform underthe participant's chair generatedanelectrical signal proportional to the amount of movement in anydirection.5. Cardiac interheat interval. Beckman miniature electrodes withRedux paste were placed in a bipolar configuration on oppositesidesoftheparticipant's chest. The interbeat interval was calculatedasthe interval (in milliseconds) between successive R-waves.

Duringthe experimental sessions, laboratory software computed sec-ond-by-second averages for each of the five physiological measuresthroughout each baseline, instructional, film, and postfilm period. Thesesecond-by-second physiological values later were used to computescores for each participant representingthe averagesofthe physiologicalvariables for the baseline, instructional, film, and postfilm periods.Change scoresforthe five measures w ere com putedbysubtracting base-line scores from instructional, film, andpostfilm periods.

ResultsRandom Assignment andManipulation Checks

All participants viewed the initial disgust-eliciting film (theburn film) under the same instructions to simply watch the film.This film therefore provided an opportunity to evaluate the ef-fectiveness of our random assignment of participants to experi-mental conditions. Overall multivariate analyses of variance(MANOVAs) for the behavioral, subjective, and physiologicaldomains failed to reveal any differences among participantsassigned to the three instructional groups during this film, sug-gesting that our random assignment had been successful.5

As emotion regulation participants received their instructions,was there evidence of preparatory activity that might distinguishthem from watch participants? In the behavioral domain, reap-praisal participants showed greater increases in emotional inten-sity than watch participants (e.g., interest, concentration), andsuppression participants showed greater increases in activitythan watch participants (see Table 1).fiAs compared with watchparticipants, both reappraisal and suppression participantsshowed greater decreases in finger pulse amplitude and fingertemperature and greater increases in skin conductance and so-matic activity (see Table 1). In general, physiological re-sponding was somewhat greater in the suppression condition

5In each analysis, participant sex was initially included as a factor.Because sex did not interact with instructional condition, sex wasdropped from the final analyses,6 As might be expected, during the prefilm period, there w ere nogroup differences inratingsofdisgust-expressive behaviororobscuringvision.


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TWO FORMS OF EMOTTON REGULATION 229Table 1Mean Cha nge in Expressive Behavior and Physiological RespondingDuring the Instructional Period

MeasureBehavioralEmotional intensityOverall activityPhysiologicalFinger pulse amplitudeFinger temperatureSkin conductanceSomatic activityInterbeat interval

ReappraiseM0.90a- 0 . 0 6 a

- 2 . 2 6 a- 0 . 0 7 a0.06a0.06a- 2 5 . 9 0 ,

SD1.010.813.190.520.620.1439.62

InstructionsWatch

M0.35h- 0 . 2 4 a

- 0 . 1 3 b0.18b- 0 . 2 0 b- 0 . 0 lh- 1 0 . 9 9 a

SD0.860.762.070.620.510.1336.54

SuppressM

0.58 ab0.30 b- 4 . 1 3 ,- 0 . 1X0.36,0.12a- 4 7 . 7 3 b

SD0.870.602.780.450.550.2352.09

Note. Mean s in a given row with different sub script s differ significantly atp


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3 GROSSTable 2Mean Change in Expressive Behavior During the Film and Postfilm Periods

BehavioralmeasureTargetvariablesOveralldisgustFilmPostfilmEmotional intensityFilmPostfilmOverall activityFilmPostfilmControl variableObscuresvisionFilmPostfilm

Reappraise

0.82a0 3 5

1.03.0.80a- 0 . 1 2 ,- 0 . 0 1 ,

0.43 ao o o a

S

1.110.921.051.070.660.68

1.580.00

Instructions

2.30bO.85h2.27h1.00a0.24b0 1 1 n

0.53ao o o a

WatchS

2 1 01.271.691.010.960.77

1.520.00

Suppress

0 3 50 1 3 a0.45c0.30b

- 0 . 1 2 ,- 0 . 1 0 ,

0 5 30.00a

S

1.000.400.900.520.560.69

3.160.00

Note. Means in a given row with different subscripts differ atp


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TWO FORMS OF EMOTION REGULATION 231Table 3Mean Change in Physiological Responding During the Film and Postfilm Periods

Physiological measureSympathetic activationFinger pulse amplitudeFilmPostfilmFinger temperatureFilmPostfilmSkin conductanceFilmPostfilmActivity and heart rateSomatic activityFilmPostfilmInterbeat intervalFilmPostfilm

ReappraiseM

- 2 . 7 0 a- 0 . 6 0 a- 0 . 4 9 a- 0 . 5 4 a

0 .13 .- 0 . 1 0 a

- 0 . 0 6 a0.03 a38.27a9.32B

SD

4.403.280.831.100.870.75

0.110.1144.8726.40

InstructionsWatch

M

- 3 . 2 5 a- 0 . 0 1 a- 0 . 1%- 0 . 4 5 a

0.34a0.10a

- 0 . 0 5 a0.05 a33.81 a12.07 ib

SD

4.773.821.001.351.280.90

0.180.2551.8329.43

SuppressM

- 6 . 0 8 b- 2 . 1 7 b- U 3 b- 1 . 4 7 b

0.79 b0 .21 .

-0 .08 fl- 0 . 0 2 a32.61fl30.68h

SD

4.713.820.791.310.890.82

0.250.2270.3856.73

Note. Means in a given row w ith different su bscripts differ from one another at p


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232 GROSS12 r

41 61 81 101 121 141Time s) 161 181 201 221 241Figure 3. Mean change in finger pulse amplitude during the amputation trial for the three instructionalgroups. Note that the ordinate's scale is such that increased sympathetic activation is upward.

els. This suggests that the specific effects of suppression onsomatic activity, and hence heart rate, w ill depend on the precisepattern of somatic activity generated by the target emotion in agiven setting (see Gross & Levenson, 1997).Implications for Psycho logical Health

The present research suggests that for negative emotions suchas disgust, antecedent-focused and response-focused emotionregulation may have quite different consequences. Reappraisalled to decreased feelings of disgust, even when this strategywas foisted on participants in the context of a potent emotion-eliciting film, where it might be thought there would be littleroom for such cognitive strategies. This suggests that reappraisalmight have m uch to recomm end it as an effective route to experi-encing less negative emotion, and it may well be reappraisaland other antecedent-focused emotion regulatory strategies thattheorists have in mind when espousing the positive conseque ncesof emotion regulation for psychological health (Thayer, New-man, & McClain, 1994). By contrast, inhibiting the outwardexpression of negative emotion fails to provide any relief fromthe subjective experience of negative emotion.These findings indicate that reappraisal may be preferable tosuppression as a route to psychological we ll-being. But anteced-ent-focused emotion regulation is not itself without costs. Forexample, inflexible or unrealistic reappraisals might lead oneto deny important features of one's environment, such as haz-

ards at work or abusive tendencies in a partner. In such cases,the short-term benefits of relief from negative emotion wouldalmost certainly be outweighed by the long-term costs of stiflingthe adaptive behavioral tendencies, such as flight, associatedwith negative emotions. In addition, there may be more generalcosts of any form of emotion regulation that diminishes emo-tion-expressive behavior. Theorists since Darwin (1872/ 1965)have argued that we rely on the emotional expressions of oursocial partners to give us information about their needs andpreferences. For example, if we inadvertently anger someone,their angry expression signals what has happened, and we areable to apologize. But if the person we have angered regulatesemotion in a way that diminishes expressive behavior, we maybe oblivious to the problem and do nothing to change our ac-tions. In this case, the person who is regulating is likely tocontinue to have emotional responses, perhaps at even greaterintensity levels.

If, as I have argued, different forms of emotion regulationhave different consequences, no one strategy is likely to proveuniformly superior to all others across all contexts. Thus, w hatis crucial is knowing how and when to use various emotionregulatory strategies (Tavris, 1984). Such knowledge may becommunicated in a variety of ways (Gross & Mufioz, 1995),and a more complete understanding of the costs and benefits ofdiverse regulatory processes promises to inform clinical inter-ventions designed to promote healthy forms of emotion regula-


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TWO FORMS OF EMOTION REGULATION

-3.5-r

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21 41 61 81 101 121 141Time s) 161 1 8 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 241Figure4. Mean changeinfinger temperature duringtheamputation trialfor thethree instructional groups.Note that the ordinate's scaleis such that increased sympathetic activation is upward.

tion that are well matched to situational demands. These inter-ventionsmaytarget individuals kno wnto be atelevated riskfordepression oranxiety,or those whose professions (e.g., airlinepersonnel and paramedics) require them to regularly manageintense emotions such asanger and disgust (Hochschild,1983;A.C.Smith & Kleinman, 1989; Sutton, 1991).Implications for Physical Health

The present resultsareconsistent withtheview that emotionregulation, particularly emotional suppression, mayplay a rolein physical health. Although the long-term health consequencesof acute emotional suppression werenotassessed in this study,the present resultsdoshow that each time emotionissuppressedrather than expressed, sympathetic tone will beelevated.Anyone response of increased intensity would be unlikely to havedeleterious consequences,but it is conceivable that if suchre-sponses were repeated many times there mightbeadverse healthconsequences (Krantz& Manuck, 1984). Extrapolating further,suppression might increasenotonlytheintensityofphysiologi-cal responses but also their frequency. As noted above, oneimportant function of emotions is to signal to others one'swishesandneeds.Ifthese signalsare systematically concealed,others may not know one's wishes. This would make it lesslikely that one's interactants wouldbeaccomm odatingandmorelikely that one would have intense and frequent negative-emo-tion-laden interactions.

Bu t how might these intense, frequent emotional responsesaffect physical health? One link between emotional suppressionand physical healthissuggested by the literature on cardiovascu-lar disease. Here, emotional suppression has been shown tobe associated with essential hypertension andcoronary arterydisease (Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987; Manuck &Krantz,1986;Roter & Ewart, 1992; Steptoe, 1993). One possible mech-anism underlying this associationmay be sustained physiologi-cal reactivity that is in excess of current metabolic demands(Steptoe, 1981; Williams, 1986). The evidence from the presentstudy is consistent with this possibility, showing that theacuteeffects of emotional suppression include increased sympatheticactivation of the cardiovascular system despite low levels ofsomatic activity.Itremainsto bedetermined,ofcourse, whetherrepeated episodes of this sortdo in fact affect theintegrityofthe cardiovascular system in vulnerable individuals.A second potential link between emotional suppression andhealth issuggestedby thestress tradition (Ursin Olff, 1993)and, more particularly, byresearchonstressand immune func-tioning (Kiecolt-GIaser & Glaser, 1991). Here, the suggestionis thatthe stress response (which involves both autonomicandneuroendocrine components) may lead to the selective inhibitionof certain aspectsof the immune response (Maier, Watkins,&Fleshner, 1994; Sapolsky, 1 99 4). Clearly, the links between vari-ous components of the stress responseand immune functioningare extremely complex (Dienstbier, 1989; O'Leary, 199 0).


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234 GROSS2.5 r

41 61 81 101 121 141Time s)

161 161 201 221 241

Figure 5. Mean change in skin conductance during the amputation trial for the three instructional groups.Note that the ordinate's scale is such that increased sympathetic activation is upward.

None theless, the finding that inhibiting mo derate levels of emo-tional expressive behavior leads to increased sympathetic activa-tion of the cardiovascular system raises the possibility that sup-pression may activate some elements of the classic stress re-sponse, which in turn may influence the nature and course ofimmune responding (Esterling, Antoni, Kumar, & Schnei-derman, 1990; Felten & Felten, 1994; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Gla-ser, &Glaser, 1988).Directions for F uture R esearch

One direction for future researc h conce rns the generalizabilityof the present findings. For example, might the consequencesof emotion regulation vary according to whether the emotionbeing regulated is anger, disgust, sadness, or some other emo-tion? The lack of consensus as to whether each emotion callsforth emotion-specific physiological (e.g., Cacioppo, Klein,Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993; Levenson, 1992; Zajonc & Mcln-tosh, 1992) and behavioral (e.g., Ekman, 1994; Izard, 1994;Russell, 1994) response tendencies makes this question difficultto answer, but different emotions conc eivably might presen t dif-ferent emotion regulatory ch allenges. Note, however, that in thecontext of emotional suppression, results to date suggest thatcommonalities in the effects of suppression outweigh differ-ences (Gross & Levenson, 1997). A second form of generaliz-ability concerns participant characteristics. Over half of the par-ticipants in the present study w ere Asian American, and all werecollege-age. Given known differences in emotional experience,

expression, and control across ethnic groups (e.g., Gross &John, 1998) and age groups (e.g., Gross et al., 1997), it willbe important to assess whether these findings generalize to otherresearch pa rticipants. A third aspect of generalizability c oncernsrelations with other forms of em otion regulation, such as distrac-tion or exaggeration (see Ekman & Friesen, 1969). It also willbe important to test limits of generalizability by exa mining otherregulatory processes, such as negative mood regulation (Catan-zaro & Mearns, 19 90; Nolen-H oeksem a, Parker, & Larson, 199 4;Thayeretal . , 1994), thought suppression (Roemer& Borkovec,1994; Wegner, 1994), and even self-esteem regulation (Steele,Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). By tracing points of divergence andconvergence across different emotions, participant groups, andregulatory processes, a more differentiated view of emotionregulation will emergeone that avoids premature synthesisbut reveals interconnections among apparently diverse processes(e.g., Westen, 1994).

Future work also must consider emotion regulation in all itscomplexity outside the confines of the laboratory. Interview data(Gro ss et al., 1998; Tice & Baumeister, 1993) suggest thatindividuals use a rich variety of emotion regulation strategiesand that these may vary rapidly over the course of an interaction.Some of these would have been difficult to observe in a labora-tory paradigm such as the one used here. Examples includesituation selection and situation modification (primary controlstrategies in which a person m odifies a bothersome environment;see Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982), as well as strategies


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TWO FORMS OF EMOTION REGULATION 235that occur outside conscious awareness, such as repression(Brown et al., 1996; Weinberger, 1990). Laboratory-based stud-ies must be complemented with fieldwork, and the range ofdependent measures should be broadened to include a widerrange of cognitive, experiential, physiological, and behavioralmeasures.

In addition, it will be important to consider how individuals'emotion regulatory goals (e.g., King & Emmons, 1990; Swin-kels & Giuliano, 1995) and spontaneously chosen strategies(e.g., Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966) affect proximal intraindivid-ual and interpersonal functioning, as well as more distal psycho-logical and physical health outcomes. For example, does theeffect of reappraisal depend on whether someone habitually usesthis strategy? Or how, specifically, a person goes about tryingto reappraise a potentially emotion-eliciting situation? Comple-menting this idiographic approach, nomothetic analyses will beneeded to integrate broader but related constructs, such as theinternalizer-externalizer dimension (Buck, 1979; Cacioppo etal., 1992), diverse facets of emotional expressivity (Gross &John, 1997), emotional ambivalence (King & Emmons, 1990),and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Salovey, Hsee, &Mayer, 1993). By examining these personal and contextual fac-tors, we will learn whether some people are better suited cogni-tively and temperamentally to use some emotion regulatory strat-egies rather than others in particular situations (e.g., Engebret-son, Matthews, & Scheier, 1989; Rothbart & Ahadi, 1994).

SummaryIn the complex social world in which we live, strong emotions

occasionally may be unwelcome (e.g., when they compromisetask performance or betray secret preferences). At such times,we attempt to regulate our emotions, and I have suggested thatwe may do so in two quite different ways. The first is to reap-praise our circumstances so as to alter their emotional impact.This study has shown that such reappraisals decrease expressivebehavior and subjective experience. The second is to inhibitemotion-expressive behavior once the emotion is already underway. This study has shown that such emotional suppressiondecreases expressive behavior, but does not affect subjectiveexperience, and actually increases certain aspects of physiologi-cal responding. With these divergent consequences in mind, Ihave speculated that certain forms of antecedent-foe used emo-tion regulation (e.g., reappraisal) often may be better for one'shealth than certain forms of response-focused emotion regula-tion (e.g., suppression).

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Received September 6, 1996Revision received January 31, 1997Accepted February 3, 1997

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