EMOTIONAL JUSTIFICATION...affairs. For simplicity’s sake, we can refer to these entities as the...
Transcript of EMOTIONAL JUSTIFICATION...affairs. For simplicity’s sake, we can refer to these entities as the...
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EMOTIONALJUSTIFICATION
SantiagoEcheverri
UniversityofGeneva
Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under whichemotionsareepistemicallyjustifiedorunjustified.Imakethreecontributionsto this researchprogram. First, I show thatwe can generalize some familiarepistemologicalconceptsanddistinctionstoemotionalexperiences.Second,Iusetheseconceptsanddistinctionstodisplaythelimitsofthe‘simpleview’ofemotional justification.On this approach, the justification of emotions stemsonlyfromthecontentsofthementalstatestheyarebasedon,alsoknownastheir cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitivebasesandemotions(re)presenttheirobjectsandpropertiesindifferentways,thencognitivebasesarenotsufficienttojustifyemotions.Third,Iofferanovelsolutiontothegapproblembasedonemotionaldispositions.Thissolution(1)draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2)preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a formof valueskepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and(4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluativeproperties.Keywords: Epistemology of emotions; epistemology of value; epistemicjustification;evaluativeexperience
IfPat’sfearthatterroristswillattackNewYorkCityisbasedonCIA
intelligencereports,herfearisjustified.IfPeterisjealousofhiswifeonthebasis
ofamerehunch,hisjealousyisunjustified.IfYounahasheardfromareliable
witnessthatherfatherisinbetterhealth,sheisjustifiedinbeingelated(e.g.,
DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Greenspan1988;Huemer2001;Mulligan
1998;Pelser2014;Salmela2006).Emotionscanbeepistemicallyjustifiedor
unjustified.Atheoryofemotionaljustificationseekstospellouttheconditions
underwhichemotionsareepistemicallyjustifiedorunjustified.
Mostrecentworkontheepistemologyofemotionshasratherfocusedon
theircontributiontothejustificationofevaluativejudgments(e.g.,Brady2013;
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BrogaardandChudnoff2016;Brunetal.2008;Döring2003).Thisisunfortunate,
however,becauseemotionaljustificationraisesotherissuesofbroader
significancetoepistemology.Asanillustration,supposethatemotionscanbe
immediatelyjustifiedbymentalstatesdevoidofevaluativecontent.Ifthisviewis
correct,weshouldrevisethecommonideathatimmediatejustificationrequires
thattherepresentationalcontentofthejustifiermentalstatebeidenticaltothe
contentofthejustifiedmentalstate.Thispaperwillcastdoubtonthisassumption.1
Ishallmakethreecontributionstothetheoryofemotionaljustification.
1.Thereissomelackofclarityonwhatemotiontheoristsmeanby
epistemicjustification.Iwillarguethatwecanfruitfullyextendsomefamiliar
epistemologicalnotionstotheemotions:theconceptofjustificationasepistemic
permissibility,thecontrastbetweenpropositionalanddoxasticjustification,and
thedistinctionbetweenimmediateandmediatejustification.
2.The‘simpleview’ofemotionaljustificationholdsthatthejustificationof
emotionssupervenesonthecontentofthementalstatestheyarebasedon,also
knownastheir‘cognitivebases’(e.g.,DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;
Mulligan1998).Ishallusetheepistemologicaldistinctionsintroducedaboveto
displaysomelimitationsofthesimpleviewandformulatethe‘gapproblem’.The
gapproblemisroughlythis:Ifthereisadifferenceinthewayscognitivebasesand
emotions(re)presentobjectsandproperties,thencognitivebasesarenot
sufficienttojustifyemotionalresponses.2
1This‘samenessofcontentassumption’ispervasiveintworecentdebates:thedebatebetween‘liberal’and‘austere’theoriesofperceptualexperienceandthedebateonphenomenalconservatism.SeetheessaysinHawleyandMacpherson(2011)andTucker(2013).Millar(2000)andSilins(2013)havecriticizedthisassumption.2Iwillpresupposearepresentationaltheoryofcognitivebases.Thisiscontroversial,though.Asweshallsee,emotionscanbebasedonperceptualexperiences,whichsomephilosophersanalyzeasdevoidofrepresentationalcontent(e.g.,Brewer2011;Campbell2002).Still,myargumentscanbeeasilygeneralizedtonon-representationalconceptionsofcognitivebases.
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3.Iwillproposeasolutiontothegapproblemintermsofemotional
dispositions(alsocalled‘sentiments’).Iwilldefendthisviewintwosteps.First,
emotionaldispositionsenableustomakeroomforimmediateemotional
justificationwhilestickingtoabroadlycognitivistviewofemotions.Second,the
resultingviewshedsnewlightonthestructureofourepistemicaccessto
evaluativeproperties.
Thepaperhassixsections.Istartwithsomeremarksontheroleof
emotionsinourmentaleconomy(Section1)andthenclarifytheconceptof
epistemicjustification(Section2).InSection3,Iintroducethe‘simpleview’of
emotionaljustificationandformulatethegapproblem.Subsequently,Iexamine
somepossiblesolutionstothegapproblemandfindthemwanting(Section4).In
Section5,Ishowhowemotionaldispositionsenableustosolvethegapproblem
andshednewlightonthestructureofourepistemicaccesstoevaluative
properties.Iconcludewithobjectionsandreplies(Section6).
1. EmotionsinOurMentalLife
Itisdifficulttoprovideuncontroversialcriteriatodeterminewhethera
mentalepisodeisanemotion.Ishallcircumventthisproblembyrelyingon
paradigmaticexamplesofemotions.Theseincludeadmiration,amusement,anger,
disgust,embarrassment,envy,fear,jealousy,joy,pride,andshame.Thediscussion
willfocusonconscioustokensoftheseemotions.
Therearedifferenttheoriesofemotions.Iwillpresupposeabroadly
cognitivistconception.Thisinfluentialviewconceivesofemotionsasintentional
psychologicalepisodesthatprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluativepropertiesof
theirintentionalobjects.Thisconceptionistheconjunctionoftwoclaims:
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Intentionality:Emotionsareaboutobjects,situations,eventsorstatesof
affairs.Forsimplicity’ssake,wecanrefertotheseentitiesasthe‘intentional
objects’ofemotions.3
Toillustrate,ifPeterisangrywithPat,theintentionalobjectofPeter’s
angerisPat.Ifaratisafraidoftheimminentelectroshock,theintentionalobjectof
therat’sfearistheelectroshock.
EpistemicAccess:Emotionsprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluative
propertiesoftheirintentionalobjects.Followingalongtradition,wemay
termtheseevaluativeproperties‘formalobjects’(e.g.,DeSousa1987;
Kenny1963;Teroni2007).4
Asanillustration,theformalobjectofangeristheoffensive,theformal
objectofamusementisthefunny,theformalobjectoffearisthedangerous,the
formalobjectofgriefisloss,theformalobjectofprideisachievementbyoneselfor
someoneinasuitablerelationtooneself,andsoon.5
Aconsequenceoftheintentionalityandepistemicaccessclaimsisthat
emotionscanbeassessedascorrectorincorrect.AnemotionEiscorrectifanonly
ifitsintentionalobject,o,exemplifiestheformalobjectthatE(re)presentsoas
having.Itisincorrectotherwise.
3Myuseof‘intentionalobject’isintendedtobeontologicallyneutral.Thus,itdoesnotrequireanycommitmenttonon-existentobjects.4Sometheoristsrefertoformalobjectsas‘corerelationalthemes’(Prinz2004)or‘emotion-properproperties’(Goldie2004).5Thislistofformalobjectsisnotentirelyuncontroversial.Forinstance,onemightholdthattheformalobjectoffearisnotthedangerousbutthefearsome(e.g.,DeSousa1987;Salmela2006).Iwilltakenosidesinthisdisputebecausemyargumentsdonotrequireaspecificaccountofformalobjects.
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Therearedifferentwaysofdevelopingthecognitivistview.Onemayhold
thatemotionsarementalepisodesanalogoustojudgments(e.g.,Nussbaum2001;
Solomon1988).Alternatively,onemaycompareemotionstoperceptual
experiencesthatrepresentobjectsunderevaluativemodesofpresentation(e.g.,
BrogaardandChudnoff2016;DeSousa2004;Goldie2000,2004;Döring2003,
2007;McDowell1985;Roberts2003;Tappolet2011;Zagzebski2003).6More
recently,DeonnaandTeroni(2012,2014,2015)havedefendedtheclaimthat
emotionsaresuigenerismentalattitudesthathavecorrectnessconditionsbutdo
notexplicitlyrepresenttheirformalobjects.Sincemyargumentsapplytoanyof
theseviews,Iwillnotcommitmyselftoanyspecificcognitivisttheory.7
Mostcognitivistsrecognizethatemotionscanstandintwodifferent
dependencyrelationswithothermentalstatesorepisodes.
First,emotionsinherittheirintentionalobjectsfromothermentalstatesor
episodes,alsoknownas‘cognitivebases’.IfPeterisafraidatthesightofthedog,
hisfearofthedoginheritsitsintentionalobjectfromhisvisualexperienceofthe
dog.Emotionscanalsoinherittheirintentionalobjectsfromthoughtsorbeliefs.
Thus,Marycanbeexcitedatthethoughtofrunningforoffice(e.g.,Brogaardand
Chudnoff2016;DeonnaandTeroni2012,2014;Mulligan1998;Oliver-Skuse2016;
Wedgwood2001).Insum,emotionsrequirecognitivebases.Cognitivebasesare
thesubject-mattergiversofemotions.
6Johnston’s(2001)viewisoftenlistedasaperceptualtheory(e.g.,Brady2010,2013).Nevertheless,Johnston(2001:182n1)makesitclearthatheisinterestedinaprimitiveformofaffectiverelationtotheworldthatispriortotheemotions.Prinz(2004)isalsoclassifiedasaperceptualtheorist(e.g.,BrogaardandChudnoff2016).Inmyview,hisaccountisbestunderstoodasanelaborationofJames/Lange’sfeelingtheory.Theemotionisafeelingofbodilychangesthathavethefunctionofcarryinginformationoftheinstantiationofacorerelationaltheme.Ishallnotdiscussanyofthesetheorieshere.Butseefootnote29forabriefcomparisonofmyviewwithPrinz’s.7Emotiontheoristsoftenuse‘cognitivism’torefertojudgmentaccountsofemotions.Mylabelisclosertothefamiliarviewinmeta-ethicsaccordingtowhichevaluativestatementsexpresstruth-aptpropositions.
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Second,emotionsarepsychologicalepisodesforwhichwecanhaveorlack
reasons(e.g.,Brady2013;DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Greenspan1988;
Mulligan1998;Salmela2006).Indeed,itisoftenmeaningfultoask‘why’-questions
inrelationtotheemotions.Theanswerstothosequestionsdonotalwaysconvey
merelycausalexplanations(DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Mulligan
1998).Ifasked:‘Whyareyouafraid?’,asubjectcouldnaturallyrespond:‘Because
thatdoghasbigteethandismovingerratically’.Thisanswerconveysanepistemic
reasonforfear.
Anaturalassumptionisthatsubjectsapprehendtheepistemicreasonsfor
theiremotionsviathecognitivebasesofthoseemotions.IfIamafraidatthesight
ofthedog,myvisualexperienceofthedogcandelivertheepistemicreasonfor
fear:Ivisuallyrepresentthedogashavingbigteethandmovingerratically.Itis
thereforeplausibletoholdthatcognitivebasesplaytworolesatonce:theyare
bothsubject-mattergiversandreasongivers.
Somephilosophershavebeenattractedbyamoreradicalclaim.Ontheir
view,theepistemicjustificationofemotionssupervenesonthecontentsoftheir
cognitivebasesalone(e.g.,DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Mulligan1998).
Letustermthisthe‘simpleview’ofemotionaljustification.Ishallsuggestthat
emotionaljustificationhasamorecomplexjustificatorystructure.BeforeIdefend
thisclaim,weneedtogetabetterunderstandingoftheconceptofepistemic
justification.
2. CorrectnessandJustification
SupposethatPeterhasmadeasexistjokeinJulia’spresence.Unfortunately,
youcouldnothelplaughingatthejoke.Wasyouramusementappropriate?The
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answertothisquestionwilldependonwhatismeantby‘appropriate’.Youmight
thinkthatitwasmorallybadtobeamusedbythejokebecauseitisplainlywrong
tolaughatsexistjokes.Additionally,youmightthinkthatitwasprudentiallybadto
beamusedbythejokebecauseJuliaisyourbossandshemightretaliate.Allthese
considerationsnotwithstanding,youmightstillthinkthatthejokewasreally
funny.Barringextremeformsofsubjectivismaboutvalues,wecoulddistinguish
twodifferentkindsofassessment.Itisonethingtoaskwhetherfeelinganemotion
ismorallyorprudentiallyappropriate;itisquiteanotherthingtoaskwhetherthe
emotionitselffitsitsintentionalobject(e.g.,D’ArmsandJacobson2000;McDowell
1987;Salmela2006;Tappolet2011;Wedgwood2001).Inwhatfollows,whenI
speakofcorrectness,Iwillhaveinmindthequestionwhethertheemotionfitsits
intentionalobject.
Mostdiscussionsofemotionaljustificationhavefocusedontheir
correctness,whichisroughlyanalogoustotruthoraccuracy.Thereishowever
anotherassessmentdimensionthatdeservestobefurtherscrutinized:epistemic
justification.Thisdimensionbecomesapparentwhenwetakeseriouslytheidea
thatemotionsarebasedonothermentalstatesorepisodes(Section1).Onthis
view,anemotioncanbecorrectbutbasedonbadreasonsorincorrectbutbased
ongoodreasons.Inthisrespect,emotionsbearsomesimilaritiestobeliefs.This
parallelismsuggeststhatthetheoryofemotionaljustificationcanbenefitfrom
generalepistemology.Inwhatfollows,Ishowhowwecangeneralizesome
familiarepistemologicalconceptsanddistinctionstotheemotions.
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2.1. JustificationasEpistemicPermissibility
Thereisnosingleuseoftheword‘justification’ingeneralepistemology.
Moreover,thereisalivelydebatebetweeninternalistandexternalistaccountsof
epistemicjustification.Thus,itisdifficulttotalkaboutemotionaljustification
withouttakingoncontroversialcommitments.Idonothaveanantidoteforthis
problem.Nevertheless,wecanmakeheadwayifweprovideanapproximate
paraphraseofthetechnicaladjective‘justified’.Thedominantviewholdsthata
beliefBisjustifiedforanagent,S,ifandonlyifformingBispermittedfroman
epistemicpointofview(e.g.,Goldman1986:59;Littlejohn2012:8;Pollockand
Cruz1999:123;Silva2017;Wedgwood2012:274).Wecandropthequalification
‘fromanepistemicpointofview’foreaseofexposition.Thus,wehavea
characterizationofepistemicjustificationaspermissibility:
EpistemicJustificationasPermissibility
Anagent,S,isjustifiedtobelievethatpifandonlyifSispermittedto
believethatp(=Sisnotrequirednottobelievethatp).
Anagent,S,isjustifiedtohaveanemotionEifandonlyifSispermittedto
haveE(=SisnotrequirednottohaveE).
Thischaracterizationaccommodatestheintuitionthat‘justified’denotesa
propertyotherthancorrectness,truthoraccuracy.Considertheinternalist
intuitionthatoneispermittedtotakethecontentofone’sperceptualexperiences
atfacevalueifoneisnotawareofanydefeater.Thus,onecanbeepistemically
justifiedinbelievingthatpeventhoughone’sexperienceasofpisillusoryor
hallucinatory(e.g.,Huemer2001;PollockandCruz1999;Pryor2000,2005).
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Crucially,wecandefendthesameconclusionwithoutpresupposinganinternalist
picture.Supposethatyouthinkthatonlytruepropositionscanbereasons.Still,
havingaveridicalexperienceasofpmaybeinsufficientforanagenttobejustified
inbelievingp.Imaginethatouragenthasaveridicalvisualexperienceasofpbut
alsothinksthattheilluminationconditionsareabnormal.Inthiscase,ouragent
oughttocheckbeforesheformsthecorrespondingbelief.Beforesheperformsthe
relevantcheck,sheisnotpermittedtobelievethatp.
Letusgeneralizetheseremarkstotheemotions.SupposethatYounahas
heardfromareliablewitnessthatherfatherisinbetterhealth.Inthiscase,Youna
ispermittedtobeelated.Crucially,somemightwanttoholdthatYounaisstill
justifiedinbeingelatedevenifthewitnesshappenstobewrong.Afterall,one
mightreasonablyholdthatYounaispermittedtotrusttestimonyintheabsenceof
defeaters.SupposenowthatCarlosisafraidofasmallspiderinthebathroom.Yet,
histherapisthastoldhimthatmostspidersinNewYorkCityareinoffensive.
Rememberingthispieceofadvice,Carlostellshimself:‘Ishouldnotbeafraidof
thatspider’.Yet,themantradoesnotworkandhekeepsshaking.Unbeknownstto
Carlos,however,thespiderisvenomous.Inthiscase,Carlos’fearofthesmall
spideriscorrectbutunjustified.
Recallthatatheoryofemotionaljustificationshouldspelloutthe
conditionsunderwhichanemotionisjustified.Ourcharacterizationprovidesa
usefultooltoevaluateaccountsofemotionaljustification.Foranycandidate
condition,C,wecanask:IsCnecessaryforanagenttobepermittedtohavean
emotionE?IsCsufficientforanagenttobepermittedtohaveanemotionE?These
questionswillproveusefulwhenweexaminethesimpleviewofemotional
justification(Section3).
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2.2. Propositionalvs.AttitudinalJustification
Theanalogybetweentheepistemicrolesofbeliefsandemotionssuggests
thatemotiontheoristsshouldexploitthedistinctionbetweenpropositionaland
doxasticjustification.Inthecaseofbelief,onecanaskwhetherthepropositional
contentofapotentialbeliefisjustifiedforanagent(propositionaljustification)or
whetheranagent’sbeliefiswellfounded(doxasticjustification).Propositional
justificationconcernswhatone’sevidenceorreasonssupport;one’sbeliefis
doxasticallyjustifiedifitisbasedonthatevidenceorreasonsintherightway.This
distinctionisimportantbecauseapropositionpcanbejustifiedforanagent,S,
eventhoughSformednobeliefthatp.Additionally,pcanbejustifiedforanagent,
S,eventhoughSformedthecorrespondingbeliefviaadeviantcausalchainoron
badreasons(e.g.,Firth1978;PollockandCruz1999;Turri2010).8
Supposethatemotionsrepresenttheirintentionalobjectsashavingsome
evaluativeproperties.Inthisframework,atheoryofpropositionaljustification
shouldelucidatetheconditionsunderwhichapotentialemotionalresponsewith
suchandsuchcontentwouldbejustified.Crucially,thisaccountwillbeneutralon
whetherthesubjectrespondsemotionallytotheintentionalobject.Supposethat
MaryhasoffendedPeter.However,Peterhasjustbeennotifiedthathislottery
ticketisthewinner.Beingoverwhelmedwithjoy,Petercannotbeangrywith
Mary.Still,angeratMaryispropositionallyjustifiedforPeter.
Letusintroducethephrase‘attitudinaljustification’asagenericterm
coveringdoxasticjustificationanditscounterpartformentalstatesorepisodes
8Itisanopenquestionwhetherpropositionaljustificationismorefundamentalthandoxasticjustification,orviceversa.Iaminclinedtofavortheclaimthatdoxasticjustificationisthemorefundamentalconcept.Icannotdefendthisclaimhere.Nevertheless,Iwillexploitaparallelviewforemotionaljustificationinmysolutiontothe‘gapproblem’.SeeSection5andfootnote26.
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otherthanbelief.Atheoryofdoxasticjustificationseekstoelucidatetheconditions
thatthefixationofbeliefshouldsatisfyfortheresultingbelieftobewellfounded.A
theoryofdoxasticjustificationshouldexcludesuchthingsasdeviantcauses.
Similarly,atheoryofattitudinaljustificationfortheemotionsshouldelucidatethe
conditionsthattheappraisalsinvolvedinemotionsshouldsatisfytoproducewell-
foundedemotionalresponses.9
2.3. Immediatevs.MediateJustification
Supposethatyouareattractedbyamoderatelyfoundationalist
epistemology.Onthisview,thereisadifferencebetweenbasicandnon-basic
beliefs(inthecaseofdoxasticjustification)andbasicandnon-basicpropositions
(inthecaseofpropositionaljustification).Acentraltaskforamoderately
foundationalistepistemologististodrawthesedistinctionsinaprincipledway.
Letusfocusonpropositionaljustification.Thejustificationofsome
propositionsrequiresantecedentjustificationtobelieveotherpropositions.Ifyou
lookatthegasgaugeofyourcar,youmayhavejustificationtobelievethatyour
carisoutofgas.Yet,thisjustificationdependsonyourhavingantecedent
justificationtobelieveanotherproposition:thatthegasgaugeofyourcarreads
‘empty’(Pryor2005:182).Wecanthereforesaythatthepropositionthatthecaris
outofgasismediatelyjustifiedforyou.Ifthejustificationofthispropositiondid
notdependonyourjustificationtobelieveotherpropositions,itwouldbe9Ifoneholdsthatemotionsdonotexplicitlyrepresenttheirformalobjects,oneshouldformulatepropositionaljustificationinaslightlydifferentway.Anaccountofthepropositionaljustificationofemotionsshouldspellouttheconditionsunderwhichawould-beemotionwithsuchandsuchcorrectnessconditionsispermitted.Inthiscase,thepropositioninthephrase‘propositionaljustification’shouldbetakenasdescribingthosecorrectnessconditionsfromanexternalperspectivethatdoesnotcapturehowthosecorrectnessconditionsfigureinthewould-beemotion.SeeRoberts(2003),forthis‘external’useofpropositionsintheorizingontheemotions.
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immediatelyjustifiedforyou.Hereisaplausibleexampleofimmediate
justification:Ifyouhaveanexperienceasofalightinfrontofyou,theproposition
thatthereisalightinfrontofyouisjustifiedindependentlyofwhetherother
beliefsorpropositionsarealsojustifiedforyou(Pryor2000:537).
Somephilosophershaverejectedtheideaofimmediatejustification(e.g.,
Wright2007).Itisnotmyaimtorespondtothoseargumentsbutrathertousethe
conceptofimmediatejustificationtoassesssomeexistingtheoriesofemotional
justification.
Amoment’sreflectionsuggeststhatmostemotionscannotbeimmediately
justified.Considerpride,jealousy,guilt,andshame.Theseemotionsrelyonmoral
andculturalpresuppositions.Moreover,theyinvolvearathersophisticatedself-
concept.Thus,wehaveprimafaciereasonstobelievethattheirjustification
alwaysismediate.SupposethatIamproudoftheLamborghinithatisparkedin
frontofmyhouse.Ifmyprideisjustified,thentheproposition<theLamborghini
thatisparkedinfrontofmyhouseenablesmetobeseeninagoodlightbypeople
Icareabout>isjustifiedforme(cf.Roberts2003:275).Now,thejustificationof
thispropositionrequiresantecedentjustificationtobelieveatleastfourother
propositions:(1)<thereisaLamborghiniparkedinfrontofmyhouse>,(2)<Iown
theLamborghinithatisparkedinfrontofmyhouse>,(3)<OwningaLamborghini
isanachievement>,and(4)<Achievementsenabletheiragentstobeseeningood
lightbypeopletheycareabout>.Thus,itisreasonabletocountthisexampleasa
caseofmediatejustification.Theanalysiseasilygeneralizestoothersophisticated
emotionslikejealousy,guilt,andshame.
Isthereimmediateemotionaljustification?Themostplausiblecandidates
forimmediateemotionaljustificationarepsychologists’basicemotions.Theseare
evolutionarilyancientemotionsthatpromotephysicalsurvival.Theyarefast,
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short-term,andinvolvestereotypicalresponses.Theyarealsoprocessedin
subcorticalareasthatareinformationallyencapsulated.Examplesinclude(basic
formsof)fear,anger,disgust,joy,andsadness(e.g.,Ekman1992;LeDoux1996;
Griffiths1997).10
Ifwefollowthemodelofperception,itistemptingtothinkthateventhese
emotionscannotbeimmediatelyjustified.ConsideravariationofCarlos’fearof
thespiderinthebathroom.Inthiscase,heignoresthefactthatmostspidersin
NewYorkCityareinoffensive.IfCarlos’fearisjustified,theproposition<the
spiderthatisinthebathroomisdangerous>isjustifiedforhim.Now,the
justificationofthispropositionrequiresantecedentjustificationtobelieveatleast
threeotherpropositions:(1)<TheanimalIamlookingatisaspider>,(2)<That
spiderisvenomous>,and(3)<Venomousanimalsaredangerous>.Thestructure
ofthisexampleisanalogoustothestructureofthegasgaugeexampleabove.Thus,
ifyouhavetheintuitionthatthelatterisacaseofmediatejustification,youshould
alsoagreethatfearisacaseofmediatejustification.
Thiscursoryanalysissuggeststhatthejustificationofanyemotionwillbea
rathercomplexmatter.Nevertheless,thereisawayofdrawingadistinction
betweenmediateandimmediateemotionaljustification.Onthisapproach,the
distinctioniscomparative.Intuitively,somepropositionsaremoremediately
justifiedthantheothers.MyprideintheLamborghinithatisparkedinfrontofmy
houseismoremediatelyjustifiedthanCarlos’fearofthespiderinthebathroom.
Thereasonisstraightforward.ThejustificationofmyprideintheLamborghini
drawsonmoreepistemicsourcesthanCarlos’fearofthespider.Mypridedraws
onperceptualrecognition,severalculturalpresuppositionstransmittedby10Somepsychologistshavetriedtoexplainallemotionsintermsofbasicemotions.Myprojectismoremodest.Iwishtoaskwhetherthesebasicemotionsareplausiblecandidatesforimmediatejustification.Asweshallsee,thisisthemostpromisingstancefordefendersofthesimpleviewofemotionaljustification.
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testimony,andaself-ascription.Bycontrast,onemightplausiblyholdthatCarlos’
fearonlydrawsonperceptualrecognition.Andthisisindirectlysupportedbythe
claimthatbasicemotionsareprocessedinsubcorticalareasandare
informationallyencapsulated.
Inwhatfollows,Iwillexploretheclaimwhetherbasicemotionscanbe
immediatelyjustifiedintherelativesense.11Ourquestioniswhetherbasic
emotionscanborrowtheirjustificationfromasingleepistemicsource,asthe
spiderexamplesuggests.Asweshallsee,thisisthemostpromisinginterpretation
ofthesimpleviewofemotionaljustification.12
3. TheSimpleView
Wehaveseenthatemotionsbeartwokindsofrelationstoothermental
statesorepisodes:theyhavesubject-mattergiversandreasongivers(Section1).
Thissuggestsasimpleviewofemotionaljustification.Cognitivebasesprovidethe
subjectmatterofemotions.Whentheydoso,theyalsoprovidereasonsthatconfer
justificationonthoseemotions.Thus,emotionsborrowtheirjustificationfromthe
contentsoftheircognitivebasesalone.Letusdubthis‘thesimpleview’of
emotionaljustification.
PeterGoldieendorsesthesimpleview:11Hereafter,Idroptheadjective‘relative’.12Itmightbeobjectedthattheepistemologicalparallelismbetweenemotionsandbeliefsbreaksdownwhenweconsidertheroleofproportionalityinemotions.ConsideranexamplefromRoberts(2003:317):“AlisangryatBudforputtingafingerprintonthehoodofhis1924RollsRoyce.Theintensityofhisangerisincommensuratewiththeimportanceoftheoffense.(Heseestheoffenseasmoreimportantthanitis)”.Onthisview,emotionscanbeassessedforproportionality,whilebeliefscannot.
Idonotneedtoholdthattheanalogybetweentheepistemicrolesofemotionsandbeliefsisperfectinordertovindicatethepresentapproach.Nevertheless,itisnotclearthatproportionalityplaysnoroleinthejustificationofbeliefs.Indeed,onemightrequirethatone’sdegreeofbeliefinpbeproportionaltoone’sevidenceinfavorofp(WedgwoodMs.).
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[A]nemotionalexperiencetypicallyseemstoonetobereasonableorjustified.But
whatmakesit,infact,justified?[A]nemotion,ifitis,infact,justified,willbe
justifiedbysomethingelseexternaltotheemotionitselfandtheperception:itwill
bejustifiedbyreasons[…].Thusthefactthatthemeatismaggotinfestedisa
reasonthatjustifies[…]yourfeelingofdisgust(Goldie2004:97–8).
Inthesametext,Goldieexcludesotherelementsfromthefactorsthat
contributetothejustificationofdisgust.Thus,onGoldie’sview,thejustificationof
disgustatthemeatsupervenesonthesubject’s(awarenessof)thefactthatthe
meatismaggotinfested.
Inmorerecentwork,JulienDeonnaandFabriceTeroni(D&T)have
defendedasimilarclaim.Theywrite:
Anemotionisjustifiedif,andonlyif,inthesituationinwhichthesubjectfinds
herself,thepropertiessheis(orseemstobe)awareofandonwhichheremotion
isbasedconstitute(orwouldconstitute)anexemplificationoftheevaluative
propertythatfeaturesinthecorrectnessconditionsoftheemotionsheundergoes
(DeonnaandTeroni2012:97).
D&Tillustratetheirviewwithaconcreteexample:
Supposethatadogwithbigteeththatisbehavinginanimpulsivewayconstitutes,
giventhecircumstancesinwhichthesubjectfindsherself,adanger.Theideais
thatherfearisjustifiedifitisbasedonherawarenessofthisdog,itsbigteethand
impulsivebehavior(DeonnaandTeroni2012:97).
ThereisadifferencebetweenGoldie’sandD&T’saccounts.WhereasGoldie
spellsoutemotionaljustificationintermsoffacts,D&Taddthequalifications
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‘seemstobeaware’and‘wouldconstitute’,whichmakeroomforjustified
emotionsbasedonfalseorinaccuratecognitivebases.Giventhatmyarguments
areneutralonthesetwooptions,IproposetodropD&T’squalifications.The
readerisinvitedtoadjustmyargumentstotheirpreferredaccount.13
Letususethedistinctionsfromtheprevioussectiontointerpretthesimple
view.
First,neitherGoldienorD&Tmakeanyclaimaboutthewayemotionsare
formedonthebasisoftheircognitivebases.Thus,theiraccountsaremost
plausiblyinterpretedascontributionstoatheoryofpropositionaljustification.
Second,bothGoldieandD&Tformulatetheirviewsinrelationtoany
emotion.Thisisproblematic.Itseemsnaturaltoholdthatonlyafewemotionscan
bejustifiedonthesolebasisofthecontentsoftheircognitivebases.Thisis
indirectlyconfirmedbytheexampleofpridefromSection2.3andtheexamples
theygive,whichconcernbasicemotions.Goldiethinksthatone’sdisgustatthe
meatdependsonone’sjustificationforthepropositionthatthemeatismaggot
infestedandnothingelse.14Thus,hisviewisbestcashedoutasanaccountof
immediateemotionaljustification.D&Tsubmitthatone’sfearofthedogdepends
onone’sjustificationforthepropositionthatthedoghasbigteethandimpulsive
behaviorandnothingelse.15Thus,theirviewisbestcashedoutasanaccountof
immediateemotionaljustification.Othercasesarelikelytodisplayamorecomplex
13Someemotionsarefactive.Examplesincluderegrettingthatp,beinggladthatp,andbeinghappythatp.Somehavearguedthattheseemotionsentailknowledgethatp(Gordon1987:26),whileothershavesuggestedthattheyonlyrequirethatthesubjectbelievesthatsheknowsthatp(Roberts2003:94).Dependingonone’sviewsonthematter,oneshouldamendthesimpleviewaccordingly.Ishallbracketfactiveemotions.14ForGoldie,thepropositionthatthemeatismaggotinfestedisjustifiedformebecauseitisafactthatthemeatismaggotinfested.15D&Tdonotspellouttheconditionsunderwhichthepropositionthatthedoghasbigteethandimpulsivebehaviorisjustifiedforme.Presumably,theywanttheirviewtobecompatiblewithmanyepistemologicalaccounts.
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justificatorystructure.Culturallydependentemotionsandemotionsthatemerge
fromcomplexpatternsofreasoningwillintroduceothersourcesofjustification
(Section2.3).Hence,weshouldthinkofthesimpleviewasanaccountof
immediateemotionaljustification.
Third,neitherGoldienorD&Texplainwhattheymeanbyepistemic
justification.Giventhatjustificationhasbeenwidelycashedoutintermsof
permissibility,Iproposetoassesstheirviewsinthoseterms.Doesthesimpleview
providenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforpropositional-immediateemotional
justificationunderstoodasepistemicpermissibility?16
IfweuseD&T’saccountasatemplate,wecanrephrasethesimpleviewas
theconjunctionofanecessityandasufficiencyclaim:
NecessityClaim
Ifasubject’semotionisimmediatelyjustified,thesubjectisawareofthe
propertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationoftheformalobjectofthe
emotion.
SufficiencyClaim
Ifasubjectisawareofthepropertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationof
theformalobjectoftheemotion,thesubject’semotionisimmediately
justified.
Letusstartwiththenecessityclaim.ItisunclearwhetherGoldieandD&T
haveprovidedanexhaustivecharacterizationofthepropertiesthatconstitutethe
formalobjectsofdisgustandfearrespectively.Supposethatbasicformsofdisgust
trackpoisonousandinfectedfood.Thus,thepropertyofbeingmaggotinfestedis16Hereafter,whenIspeakaboutanemotionbeingjustified,Irefertopropositional-immediatejustification.
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notsufficienttoconstitutethepropertyofbeingdisgusting.Afterall,themeatis
disgustingrelativetohumanbeingsbutnottovultures.Therefore,thereissome
pressuretoincludesomepropertiesofhumanbeingsintothepropertiesthat
constitutethedisgustingcharacterofamaggot-infestedpieceofmeat.D&Tare
morecarefulthanGoldie.Theysuggestthatthedangerousnessofadogina
situationisalsoconstitutedbythefactthat“thesubjectismadeoffleshandblood
aswellassomespatialandotherrelationsbetweenherandtheanimal”(Deonna
andTeroni2012:95).17Butthisraisesaproblem.Ifweincluderelational
propertiesintothepropertiesthatconstituteformalobjects,thesimpleview
seemstopredictthatdisgustandfeararealmostneverjustified.Afterall,weare
nottypicallyawareoftheserelationalpropertieswhenweexperiencedisgustor
fear.18
Therearesomewaysofcircumventingthisproblem.Onemightfollow
Setiya(2012:40ff.)andstipulatethattheagentonlyneedstohavesomeevidence
oftheinstantiationofthepropertiesthatconstitutethecorrespondingformal
object.Anotheroptionwouldbetohypothesizethatweareunconsciouslyaware
ofthingsasstandinginrelevantrelationstousandthatthisunconscious
awarenessisallweneedforimmediateemotionaljustification.Alternatively,one
mightclaimthatasubjectdoesnotneedtobeawareofallthepropertiesthat
constitutedangerforherfeartobejustified.Thissolutionseemstobeimplicitin
D&T’sformulation.Theycouldreplythatsomeoftheseconstitutivepropertiesare
bestunderstoodasimplicitparametersofthesubject’ssituation.
17“[W]edonotsuggestthatthesuperveniencebaseforevaluativepropertiesonlycomprisesmonadicpropertiesoftherelevantobject.Thesuperveniencebasewilltypicallycompriserelationalpropertiesofthisobjectaswellassomepropertiesofthesubjectundergoingtheemotion”(DeonnaandTeroni2012:103n4).18SeealsoMcGrath(forthcoming)foradditionalworries.ShepresentsherobjectionstoSetiya’s(2012)inferentialtheoryofmoralknowledge.
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Letusassumethatoneofthesesolutionscouldbeworkedout.Hence,we
canratherfocusonthesufficiencyclaim:Isittruethatasubject’sawarenessofthe
propertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationoftheformalobjectofheremotionis
sufficientforimmediatejustificationofthatemotion?Myanswerisno.The
sufficiencyclaimleadstothe‘gapproblem’.Ontheplausibleassumptionthatthere
isadifferenceinthewayscognitivebasesrepresentobjectsandtheirproperties
andthewaysemotions(re)presentevaluativeproperties,itfollowsthatthe
cognitivebasesofemotionsarenotsufficienttojustifyemotionalresponses.To
understandthisproblem,weneedaworkingcharacterizationoftherelation
betweennon-evaluativeandevaluativepropertiesandnon-evaluativeand
evaluativerepresentationalcontents.
Therearereductiveandnon-reductiveconceptionsoftherelationbetween
non-evaluativeproperties(N-properties)andevaluativeproperties(E-properties):
Non-ReductiveConceptions.Ontheseviews,N-propertiesaredifferentfrom
E-properties.AnaturalwayofdevelopingthisideaistoholdthatE-propertiesare
higher-orderpropertiesofN-properties(e.g.,Oddie2005).
ReductiveConceptions.Ontheseviews,E-propertiesareidenticaltoN-
properties.
Goldieisnotexplicitonwhichontologicalconceptionheendorses.D&Tare
attractedbyareductiveview:
[I]fdangerisconstitutedbytheinstantiationofsomenon-evaluativeproperties,
thereisnofurtherfactofthematter,nothingmoretoaspecificdangerthanthe
instantiationofwhatmakesitadanger[…].Aspecificinstanceofdanger,loss,or
offensivenessisnotafurtherpropertyalongsidethosepropertiesthatconstituteit
(Dancy1993:75)(DeonnaandTeroni2012:97;emphasismine).
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Theargumentstofollowgeneralizetobothreductiveandnon-reductive
views.Moreover,theycanbeappliedtovariousconceptionsoftherelation
betweenN-propertiesandE-properties.Yet,wewillgaininclarityifwefocusona
singletypeofview.Iproposetofocusonreductiveaccountsthatexploitthe
constitutionrelation.
Anyonewhoendorsesareductiveaccountofevaluativepropertiesshould
accommodateaplatitude.EvenifanE-propertyisidenticaltoanN-property,one
canrunaMooreanOpenQuestionargumentforEandN:IsittruethatEisN?
(Moore1903).Itisunclearwhetherthisargumentenablesustodrawany
metaphysicalconclusionsabouttherelationbetweenE-propertiesandN-
properties.Yet,thisargumenthasanepistemicconsequence:Ifitmakessenseto
runaMooreanOpenQuestionargumentforEandN,itfollowsthatthesentence‘E
isN’isinformative.IntheFregeantradition(Frege1892),ifaninformative
identityisflankedbytwoco-extensionalexpressions,theextensionsofthese
expressionsarepresentedunderdifferentmodesofpresentation(MOPs).
TheMoore-Fregeinsightstronglysuggeststhatone’sawarenessofthe
instantiationoftheN-propertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationoftheformal
objectofagivenemotionEisnotsufficienttoconferimmediatepropositional
justificationonE.
Letusstartwithanexamplefromadifferentdomain.Intuitively,wateris
constitutedbyHydrogenandOxygen.Still,beingawarethatthisstuffisH2Oisnot
sufficientforanagenttobepermittedtoconcludethatthisstuffiswater.Ifour
agentweretodrawthatconclusion,shewouldbejumpingtoconclusions.
AlthoughwaterisinfactH2O,itisunreasonableforanagenttoconcludethatthis
stuffiswateronthesolebasisofherawarenessthatthisstuffisH2O.Ifanagentis
awarethatthisstuffisH2ObutignoresthatH2Oiswater,therationalthingforher
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todoistosuspendjudgmentwhensheispresentedwiththecontentexpressedby
‘ThisisH2O’(Frege1892).
Thesimpleviewofemotionaljustificationhasasimilarstructure.Goldie
andD&Tholdthatcognitivebasesenablesubjectstobeawareofobjectsashaving
someN-properties.IfcomplexesofN-propertiesarepresentedunderamodeof
presentationthatisdifferentfromthewayformalobjectsarepresentedin
emotionalexperiences,thentherationalthingtodowhenoneisawareofthese
complexesofN-propertiesistostaycoolandwithholdone’semotions.
Letusdevelopthispointinsomedetail.Wehavetwooptions:eitherthe
subjectisawareofN-propertiesasN-properties(i.e.,underanon-evaluativemode
ofpresentation–MOPn)orasE-properties(i.e.,underanevaluativemodeof
presentation–MOPe).Unfortunately,thetwooptionsleadtothesameresult.19
Non-EvaluativeModesofPresentation.IfthesubjectisawareoftheN-
propertiesunderanon-evaluativemodeofpresentation,sheshouldfindthe
followingquestionreasonable:‘Isittruethatthis(MOPn)isthesameas
that(MOPe)?Tobepermittedtorespondwithanemotion,oursubjectshouldknow
thattheanswertothisquestionis‘yes’.Still,itisunclearhowthesoleawarenessof
someN-propertiesunderanon-evaluativemodeofpresentationcoulddeliverthat
affirmativeanswer.Indeed,answering‘yes’tothisquestionbasedonlyonone’s
awarenessofsomeN-propertiesunderanon-evaluativemodeofpresentation
wouldleadouragenttojumptoconclusions.
Imagineanagentwhoseesadogwithbigteethandmovingerratically.Even
ifthesefeaturesdoinfactconstitutethedangerousnessofthedoginthecurrent
circumstances,theagent’ssoleawarenessofthedogashavingbigteethand19Oliver-Skuse(2016:Chapter2)reachedasimilarconclusionondifferentgrounds.McGrath(forthcoming)hasalsodevelopedasimilarargumentagainstSetiya’sinferentialaccountofmoralknowledge.Inthenextsection,Iarguethatherconsiderationsdonotlendsupporttoaperceptualtheoryofevaluativeexperience.
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movingerraticallywouldnotsufficetomakeitreasonableforhertofeelfearofthe
dog.Afterall,someinoffensivedogshavebigteeth,whileothersmoveerratically
outofjoy.Moregenerally:Ifjustificationiscashedoutintermsofepistemic
permissibility,anagent’sawarenessofsomeevaluativepropertiesundernon-
evaluativemodesofpresentationisnotsufficientforhertobepermittedto
respondwithanemotionwhoseformalobjectisconstitutedbythoseproperties.20
Somemightwonderwhetherthisargumentpresupposessomeformof
internalism(Oliver-Skuse2016:Chapter2).Iagreethatthislineofargumentwill
bemoreappealingtoaninternalistaboutepistemicjustification.Nevertheless,I
haveformulateditinsuchawaythatevenanexternalistshouldrecognizeitasa
problem.Indeed,externalistsshouldgrantthattherearecasesinwhichwearenot
permittedtojumptoconclusions.Thus,iftheexternalistseesnoproblemhere,she
owesusanexplanationofwhywearepermittedtojumptoconclusionsinthecase
ofemotionsbutnotinother,structurallysimilarcases.Beforethisexplanationis
provided,thegapproblemisstillwithus.21
D&Thaveinsistedthatemotionsdonotexplicitlyrepresentevaluative
properties(DeonnaandTeroni2012,2014,2015).Thus,onemightthinkthatthe
argumentdoesnotgeneralizetotheirview.IcannotevaluateD&T’sviewhere.
Still,thepreviousargumentdoesapplytoD&T’sview.D&Tendorsethecognitivist
claimthatemotionsprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluativepropertiesoftheir20Thegapproblemalsoarisesforthestrongerconceptofjustificationintermsofobligation.Ifsomeinoffensivedogshavebigteeth,whileothersmoveerraticallyoutofjoy,itisunclearwhyanagentoughttofeelfearofthatdog.
Thegapproblemalsogeneralizestonon-reductiveviewsofevaluativeproperties.Supposethatthepropertiesofhavingbigteethandmovingerraticallyareonlycorrelatedwiththepropertyofbeingdangerous.IftwopropertiesFandGaremerelycorrelated,asubjectisnotpermittedtoconcludethatGisinstantiatedjustbecauseshewasawareofF.Somethingismissing.21Indeed,theviewIwillrecommendiscompatiblewithexternalismunderstoodastheclaimthatsomeofthefactorsthatdeterminejustificationareexternal(inasuitablesenseof‘external’).SeeSection5.
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intentionalobjects(Section1).Inaddition,theyholdthatemotionshavea
phenomenalcharacterthatdistinguishesthemfromperception,memory,and
beliefs,whichinturnplaytheroleofcognitivebases.Hence,thereisabroadsense
inwhichcognitivebasesandemotionsprovidedifferentmodesofaccesstoformal
objects.Thus,evenifemotionsdonotexplicitlyrepresentformalobjectsunder
evaluativemodesofpresentation,D&T’sviewstillfacesthegapproblem.
EvaluativeModesofPresentation.Onthisview,thesubjectisawareoftheN-
propertiesthatconstitutetheformalobjectofheremotionEunderanevaluative
modeofpresentationMOPeandthisawarenessconfersjustificationonE.Iamnot
awareofanywell-workedoutconceptionalongtheselines.Yet,MichaelBrady’s
(2010,2013)recentworkcomesclosetothisview.AccordingtoBrady,emotions
motivateustosearchforconsiderationsthatbearontheaccuracyofour
emotionalappraisals.Emotionsperformthisfeatbydirectingourattentiontoward
significantfeaturesofthesituation.Supposethatyouaretryingtogettosleepand
hearanoisedownstairs.Youfeelfearandaremotivatedtoseekout
“considerationsthathaveabearingonwhetheryourinitialemotional‘take’onthe
situation,namelythatweareindanger,isaccurate.[You]strain[y]ourearstohear
otheranomalousnoises,orrack[yourbrain]tryingtothinkofpossiblenon-
threateningcausesforthenoise”.Bradysuggeststhat“itistheseconsiderations
thatprovideuswithinformationabouttheevaluativerealm”(Brady2010:124).
Subsequently,hepositstheexistenceofnon-emotionalcapacitiestorecognizethe
instantiationofevaluativepropertiesandclaimsthatthosecapacitiesarethe
sourcesofjustificationofemotions.
Brady’sanalysisisinsightfulinmanyways.Heisrighttostressthat
emotionsoftenmotivateustolookforreasons.Nevertheless,Brady’sapproach
doesnotprovideasatisfactorysolutiontothegapproblem.
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First,itisacentralcommitmentofcognitivisttheoriesthatemotions
provideepistemicaccesstotheevaluativepropertiesoftheirintentionalobjects
(Section1).IfweuseBrady’sviewtosolvethegapproblem,wemustrejectthe
cognitivistview.Ifwerejectit,however,wewillneedtoprovideadifferentstory
abouttheepistemicroleoftheemotions.
OnemightbetemptedbyBrady’scontentionthattheepistemicroleof
emotionsispreciselytodirectourattentiontosignificantfeaturesofthesituation.
Unfortunately,Brady’sargumentsforthisviewarenotconclusive.Aninitialworry
isthat‘significantfeatures’seemstobesynonymouswith‘evaluativeproperties’.
So,emotionscannotdirectourattentiontosignificantfeaturesunlesstheyare
somehowsensitivetoevaluativeproperties.Andbeingsensitivetoevaluative
propertiescomesveryclosetogivingaccesstoevaluativeproperties.Moreover,it
isperfectlyconsistenttoholdthatemotionsoftenmotivateustosearchfor
reasonswithoutendorsingthestrongerclaimthattheyalwaysdoso.Thisseems
particularlyclearinthecaseofbasicemotions.WhenIamafraidofthedogand
runaway,Ihavenotimetosearchforreasonsthatbearonthedangerousnessof
thedog.Still,itisreasonabletoholdthatfearprovidedmewithepistemicaccessto
thedangerousnessofthedogandthatthisaccessmotivatedmetoactinthewayI
did.Crucially,weareinterestedintheepistemicjustificationofbasicemotions.
Thus,anyalternativeaccountoftheepistemicroleofemotionsshouldgeneralize
tobasicemotions.
Third,evenifBradyisrighttopointoutthatemotionsarejustifiedbynon-
emotionalcapacitiestorecognizetheinstantiationofevaluativeproperties,this
wouldnotsolvethegapproblem.Toseewhy,itisimportanttorecallthe
H2O/waterexample.Thatexampleshowsthatonecangenerateanepistemicgap
outsidetheevaluativedomain.Intuitively,thereasonwhy‘H2O’and‘water’refer
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towaterunderdifferentmodesofpresentationisthatarationalsubjectwho
ignoresthat‘H2O’and‘water’areco-extensionalshouldsuspendjudgmentwhen
sheispresentedwiththeidentitysentence‘H2Oiswater’.Inotherwords,
suspendingjudgmentonthatidentitysentenceisthereasonablethingtodofor
thatsubject.ConsidernowBrady’sproposal.WemightthinkofBrady’sviewas
positingtwodifferentmodesofpresentation:non-emotionalmodesof
presentationofevaluativepropertiesandemotionalmodesofpresentationof
thoseevaluativeproperties.Giventhatthesemodesofpresentationaredifferent,a
subjectisnotpermittedtomovebackandforthfromonetotheotherunlessshe
hassomebackgroundinformationthatthesemodesofpresentationareinfactco-
extensional.Unfortunately,Bradyhasprovidednostoryaboutthesourcesofthis
backgroundinformation.
Tosumup,thesimpleviewholdsthatthecontentsofcognitivebasesare
sufficienttoconferimmediatepropositionaljustificationonbasicemotions.Ihave
exploredtwowaysinwhichcognitivebasescouldrepresentthepropertiesthat
constitutetheformalobjectsofemotions.Non-evaluativemodesofpresentation
introduceMoorean-Fregeaninformativeidentities.Thus,theypredictthatan
agentwhoisawaresolelyofthepropertiesthatconstitutetheformalobjectofher
would-beemotionisnotpermittedtorespondwiththatemotion.Evaluativemodes
ofpresentationfacethreeproblems:theyleadustorejectcognitivismabout
emotions;theydonotseemtoprovideageneralaccountofouraccessto
evaluativeproperties;andtheydonotsolvethegapproblem.22
22Otherphilosophershavepositednon-emotionalmodesofaccesstoevaluativeproperties.See,e.g.,Mulligan(2009)andthereferencestherein.Ihavetwoworriesinrelationtotheseproposals.First,Idonotfindthesenon-emotionalmodesofaccesstoevaluativepropertiesintelligible.Second,Iaminclinedtothinkthattheseviewsshouldbeintroducedonlyifwehavecompellingreasonstothinkthatthecognitivistviewcannotbepreserved.Oneofmyaimsistoshowthatthecognitivistviewcanbepreserved.
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4. Inferentialism,ValueSkepticism,andPerceptualism
Anobviousstrategytosolvethegapproblemistointroduceadditional
reasons.Considerananalogy.Intuitively,theproposition<John’sbestfriendis
comingtotheparty>isnotareasontobelievetheproposition<Patiscomingto
theparty>.IfItellyouthatJohn’sbestfriendiscomingtotheparty,youarenot
permittedtoconcludethatPatiscomingtotheparty.Ifyouweretodoso,you
wouldbejumpingtoconclusions.Still,theproposition<John’sbestfriendis
comingtotheparty>canbecomeyourreasontobelievetheproposition<Patis
comingtotheparty>ifyouaregivenanotherreasonthatbridgesthegap:<John’s
bestfriendisPat>.Thus,wemightwanttointroduceabridgepropositionthat
linksournon-emotionalaccesstoevaluativepropertiesviacognitivebasesandthe
formalobjectsastheyfigureinouremotionalresponses.Hence,wecouldsolvethe
gapproblemasfollows:
Premise1:Iamawareofanobject,o,ashavingN-propertiesF,G,H…
Premise2:N-propertiesF,G,H…constitutetheformalobjectofemotionEin
thecurrentcircumstances.
Conclusion:Therefore,emotionEispermittedformeinthecurrent
circumstances.
Thissolutionfacesamajorproblem:itleadstovalueskepticism.Suppose
thatinordertobepermittedtorespondwithemotionEtoanobject,o,anagent
needstohaveantecedentjustificationforpremise2.Thus,ouragentneedstohave
justificationforthepropositionthatN-propertiesF,G,H…constitutetheformal
objectofemotionEinthecurrentcircumstances.Butwheredoesthisjustification
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comefrom?Ifwedonotcomeupwithaplausibleexplanation,valueskepticism
follows.ThisjustificationcannotcomefromemotionE,forEonlyprovides
epistemicaccesstoitsownformalobject.Ifthisjustificationcomesfroma
differentsource,itseemsthatthereisawayofhavingepistemicaccesstothe
formalobjectofEthatdoesnotrequireE.Thus,itisatbestunclearwhyweshould
stillholdthecognitivistviewofemotions.
Itmightbethoughtthatthegapproblemandvalueskepticismonlyarisefor
thoseviewsthatconceiveoftheepistemicroleofemotionsonthemodelof
belief.23Thus,onemightwanttoavoidtheproblemssofarbyconceivingofthe
emotionsonthemodelofperceptualexperiences.Unfortunately,thegapproblem
stillarisesforthisfamilyofviewsinadifferentguise.
Herearetworepresentativeexamplesofperceptualtheories:
Iwillreserveexpressionsoftheform‘IseexasA,’whereAisathickaffective
concept,forthosecasesinwhichthethingIseeasAistheintentionalobjectofan
emotionalstate.SowhenIseesomethingasrudeIaminadistinctiveemotional
state.Anemotionisthereforeaunitarystatethathasbothacognitiveaspectand
anaffectiveaspectthatarenecessarilyconnected.Anemotionisastateoffeelinga
characteristicwayaboutsomethingseenasrude,aspitiful,ascontemptible,andso
on(Zagzebski2003:114).
Accordingtotheso-calledPerceptualAccount,emotionsareakindofperception:
theyrepresenttheirobjectsincertainways.Whatisspecificaboutemotionsisthat
theyrepresentthingsashavingcertainevaluativeproperties(Tappolet2011:120;
seealsoDöring2007;Goldie2000,2004).
Perceptualtheoriesofemotionsshareacoreperceptualclaim:
23ThisisakeyassumptionofMcGrath’s(forthcoming)defenseofmoralperception.Iftheargumentstofollowarecorrect,McGrath’sdiagnosisismistaken.
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CorePerceptualClaim
Emotionsareexperiencesthatrepresenttheirobjectsunderevaluative
modesofpresentation.Theseevaluativemodesofpresentation(partly)
explainthephenomenalcharacteroftheemotions,i.e.whatitisliketohave
them.
Onemightthinkthatnothingthatfallsshortofanemotional-evaluative
modeofpresentationcansufficetojustifybasicemotions.Inotherwords,weneed
topositanawarenessofformalobjectsunderevaluativemodesofpresentation
thatalsoexplainthephenomenalcharacterofemotions.Thismovesolvesour
problem,notbybridgingthegap,butbyeliminatingit.Italsoavoidsvalue
skepticismbypositingaperceptualmodeofaccesstoevaluativeproperties.
Oncloseinspection,however,perceptualtheoriesdonotsolvethegap
problem.Evenifweendorseaperceptualaccountofemotions,thereisstillasense
inwhichouremotionalexperiencesdonotprovideabasicmodeofaccesstothe
world.Evenperceptualtheoristshaverecognizedthispoint.Thus,McDowell
(1985)grantsthat,contrarytosensoryqualities,valuesdonotstandincausal
relationstous.Eveniftheydid,theircausalrelationtoouraffectivesystemsmust
beindirect.Thispointdovetailswiththeclaimthatemotionalresponsesare
groundedinournon-evaluativemodesofaccesstotheworld(Section1).Onthe
plausibleassumptionthatthisgroundingrelationisnotprimitive,weshould
elucidateit.24
Itisnaturaltothinkoftheemotionsonthemodelofhigh-levelperception.
Ifhigh-levelpropertiesareproperties“otherthancolor,shape,illumination,
motion,andtheirco-instantiationinobjects”(Siegel2006:481),evaluative
24Therearedifferentwaysofcashingouttheconceptofgrounding.Itwilldonoharmtoourdiscussionifweworkwithanintuitiveunderstandingofthisconcept.
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propertiesarehigh-levelproperties.Onthisapproach,emotionalexperiencesbear
structuralsimilaritiestotheexperiencesofexpertbirdwatcherswhenthey
visuallyrecognizebirds:theirvisualrecognitionofabirdasacanaryis
phenomenallyimmediate.Thetroublehereisthathigh-levelcontentssuchas
‘canary’arenotrepresentationallybasic.Indeed,whenweperceptuallyrepresent
ahigh-levelcontent,wedosoinvirtueofrepresentingmorebasiccontents(Pryor
2000:539).IfIvisuallyrepresentatomato,Idosoinvirtueofrepresentingits
shape,color,andtexture.Therefore,evenifthesubjectmaybeunabletotellwhich
low-levelpropertiesgroundherhigh-levelexperiences,perceptualtheoristsowe
usanaccountofhowhigh-levelemotionalmodesofpresentationcanbegrounded
inlow-levelcontentsandwhetherthistransitionfromlow-tohigh-levelcontents
canhaveadeleteriouseffectonepistemicjustification.
Anotherpopularideaistosaythatemotionalexperienceshaveastructure
analogoustowhatWittgenstein(1953)called‘seeingas’(Roberts2003;Zagzebski
2003).Considerthefamousduck-rabbitdiagram.Thisdiagramillustratesthe
claimthatonecanexperiencethesameentityindifferentways:asaduckorasa
rabbit.Similarly,onemightholdthat,whenIfeelangryatJohn’ssexistjoke,I‘see’
John’sjokeasoffensive.Yet,itwouldbeunsatisfactorytoleavethingsthere.We
stillneedanaccountofhowthisaspectualseeingisgroundedinamorebasic
representation.Ifweseeadiagramasarabbit,wemustexplainhowthiswayof
seeingthediagramisgroundedinourexperienceofitsgeometricalproperties.An
explanationmightgoasfollows:theelongatedshapesareliketheearsofrabbits,
itscommissureislikearabbit’smouth,thedotislikearabbit’seyeseenfromone
side,andsoon.Thesegeometricalconfigurationsimposelimitsonthepermissible
interpretations.Youseethefigureasarabbitbecauseyouarealreadyfamiliar
withtherelevantpropertiesofrabbitsandcanexploitthosesimilaritiestoseethe
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diagramasarabbit.IfemotionshavethesamestructureasWittgenstein’s‘seeing
as’,weshouldprovideanaccountofhowone’sawarenessofthelow-level
propertiesofthesituationconstrainthepermissibleemotionalresponses.Inour
exampleofbasicfear,weshouldexplainhowanagent’sawarenessoftheteethand
erraticbehaviorofthedogconstrainsthepermissibleemotionstowardthedog,so
thatfearisjustifiedwhilejoyisnot.
Insum,inferentialsolutionsleadeithertovalueskepticismortherejection
ofcognitivism,fortheyrelyonabridgepremisethatcannotbejustifiedby
cognitivistlights.Perceptualtheoriesofemotionscouldonlyavoidthisproblemif
theymanagedtoexplainhowourevaluativeperceptualexperiencesaregrounded
inrepresentationswithlow-levelcontents.25Inthenextsection,Iproposea
solutiontothegapproblemthatdoesnotfallpreytovalueskepticismand
dischargessomeoftheexplanatoryrequirementsofperceptualtheories.My
solutioncanbeintegratedwithinanybroadlycognitivisttheoryofemotions.
5. SolvingtheGapProblem
Thegapproblemhasthreeroots:
1) Theclaimthatemotionsprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluative
propertiesoftheirintentionalobjects.
2) Theclaimthatemotionsaregroundedinothermentalstatesorepisodes
thatrepresenttheintentionalobjectsofemotionsinanon-emotional
way.25Mypointisnotthattheaccountofhowemotionsaregroundedinrepresentationswithlow-levelcontentscannotbegiven;itisratherthatithasnotbeengiven.Itisonlyafterhavingprovidedtheaccountthatperceptualtheoristsmayclaimtohavesolvedthegapproblem.
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3) Theclaimthatsomeemotionsareimmediatelyjustifiedintheweak
senseofborrowingtheirjustificationfromtheircognitivebasesalone.
Onemightwanttorejectoneoftheseassumptions.Iwanttopreserve
cognitivismbecauseIamnotawareofanyalternativecharacterizationofthe
epistemicroleofemotionsthatisbothplausibleandwellworkedout.Ialsofindit
uncontroversialthatemotionsaregroundedinothermentalstatesorepisodes
thatrepresenttheintentionalobjectsofemotionsinanon-emotionalway.Thus,I
willmodifyassumption3:itistruethatsomeemotionsaremoreimmediately
justifiedthanothers.Thisclaimisparticularlyplausibleinthecaseofbasic
emotions,whichareprocessedinsubcorticalareasthatareinformationally
encapsulated.Nevertheless,itisamistaketoholdthatthoseemotionsborrow
theirjustificationfromtheircognitivebasesalone.Mysuggestionistorethinkthe
wayinwhichemotionsaregrounded.Roughly,emotionsaremanifestationsof
emotionaldispositions.Theseemotionaldispositionsarekeyedtosomenon-
evaluativepropertiesthataregiventousviathecognitivebasesofemotions.
Otherthingsbeingequal,iftheagentisawareoftheinstantiationofthesenon-
evaluativeproperties,shewillrespondemotionallytotheintentionalobject.Thus,
ourepistemicaccesstoevaluativepropertiesresultsfromtheinterplayof
cognitivebasesandemotionaldispositions.Emotionalresponsesarethesynthesis
ofthesetwosources.Myproposalisthatwecanexploitthispsychological
structuretocapturethedistinctionbetweenthejustificationofbasicemotionsand
thejustificationofmoresophisticatedemotions.26Crucially,theappealto
emotionaldispositionsdispelssomeofthemysterythatsurroundsourepistemic26Iwilltrytosolvetheproblemofpropositionalemotionaljustificationbyreflectingonthepsychologicalstructureofemotionalresponses.Thisviewisavailabletoanyonewhoholdsthatattitudinaljustificationismorefundamentalthanpropositionaljustification.Seefootnote8.
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accesstoevaluativeproperties.Thus,evenifoneisattractedbyaperceptual
account,oneoughttointroduceemotionaldispositionsintothestructureof
emotionaljustification.Iproposetodevelopthesetwopointsbyreflectingona
concreteexample.27
Considerthreedifferentsituations:
Situation1:Youareseeingagorillainthezoo.Believingthatitissafely
behindthebars,youformthejudgment:‘Thatgorillaisdangerous’.
Situation2:Yousuddenlyrealizethatthedoortothecagehasbeenleft
open.Thishasanimmediateimpactonyourevaluation.Youmovefromthe
initiallycoldevaluativejudgmenttofeelingfearofthegorilla.
Situation3:YourfriendPeterhasworkedinthezooformanyyears.Hefed
thegorillawhenitsmotherabandoneditandhasbeenfeedingitsincethen.
WhenPetersuddenlyrealizesthatthedoortothecagehasbeenleftopen,
hestayscalmbutrushestocloseit.‘Thegorillaisdangerous…someone
mightbeinjured’,hethinks.28
Goldiehasusedsimilarexamplestodefendtheclaimthatemotions
representobjectsunderdesemodesofpresentation.Wecanuseourexamplesto
defendadifferentclaim.Inthethreesituations,thecognitivebasis(visual
perception)providesthesubjectmatterofalltheevaluations.Alltheseevaluations
areaboutthegorilla.Nevertheless,therearecrucialdifferences.Whereasyouare
27Dispositionshavealsofiguredintheworkofsomeperceptualtheorists,includingD’ArmsandJacobson(2010),Goldie(2007),Jacobson(2005),McDowell(1985,1987),andRoberts(2003).Theyeitherinvokethemasexistenceconditionsofemotionsoraspartsofatheoryofevaluativejudgment.Mycontributionistheintroductionofdispositionstosolvethegapproblem,whicharisesforemotionaljustification.28ThecasesareinspiredfromGoldie(2000:61),whodevelopedthemonthebasisofsimilarexamplesfromPerry(1979).SeealsoDöring(2007:373).
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disposedtofeelfearofthegorilla(Situation2),yourfriendisnotdisposedtofeel
fearofthegorilla(Situation3).Situations1and2aredifferenttoo.Your
dispositiontofeelfearofthegorillaiskeyedtosomefeaturesofthesituation.In
thiscase,yournoticingthatthedoortothecagehasbeenleftopentriggersthe
fearexperience.
Iproposetothinkofourepistemicaccesstoevaluativepropertiesonthe
modelofSituation2.Situation2lendscredibilitytotheclaimthattheemotional
responseisgroundedinitscognitivebasisandanemotionaldisposition.The
emotionaldispositionexplainswhyyoudonotfeelfearinSituation1.Inthatcase,
youdidnotrepresentatriggeringconditionofyourdispositiontofeelfearof
gorillas.ThisalsoexplainsthedifferencebetweenyouandPeter.Peterhasa
slightlydifferentemotionaldisposition;thatiswhyhecanissueacoldevaluation.
Crucially,theproposedviewdispelssomeofthemysterylurkinginouraccessto
evaluativeproperties.Youremotionaldispositionisnotdirectlytriggeredbythe
perceptionofdanger,asifyouhadanarcanesensethatisputintooperationbythe
detectionofinstancesofdanger.Youremotionaldispositionisrathertriggeredby
anon-evaluativepropertyofthedoor(beingleftopen).Thereisnoinherent
difficultyinunderstandinghowwecouldhaveepistemicaccesstothatproperty.
Thus,theproposedapproachalsoindicateshowwecanimproveuponperceptual
accountsofemotions.Theproperty<Thedoortothecagebeingleftopen>signals
thedangerousnessofthegorillainthatsituation.Thus,emotionsstandinatleast
twosortsofgroundingrelationswiththeircognitivebases.First,cognitivebases
providetheemotionswiththeirintentionalobjects.Second,theydeliver
representationsofpropertiesthatsignaltheinstantiationoftheevaluative
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propertiesthatfigureinthecorrectnessconditionsofthecorresponding
emotions.29
Considernowtheconceptofjustificationaspermissibility.Thegapproblem
reliesontheintuitionthatwearenotpermittedtojumptoconclusions.Thisgapis
absentfromdeductivetransitions.Whyisthetransitionfromp,<ifp,thenq>toq
permitted?Partoftheansweristhatqseemsfollowfrompand<ifp,thenq>.In
otherwords,qseemstobecontainedinpand<ifp,thenq>.Wecannotavail
ourselvesoftheconceptoflogicalconsequenceinthecontextofampliative
transitions,i.e.transitionswherethecontentoftheendstategoesbeyondthe
contentoftheinitialstate.Nevertheless,wehavesomethingsimilaratour
disposal.Considerthecaseofperceptualrecognition.Intuitively,expertiseisaway
ofachievingphenomenologicallyseamlesstransitions,i.e.transitionsthatstrikeus
as‘obvious’fromthefirst-personperspective.Theperceptualjudgment‘thisisa
canary’isreasonablebytheornithologist’slightsbecauseshecanseamlesslymove
fromthedetectionofthelow-levelpropertiesofsomebirdstotherecognitionof
thosebirdsascanaries.Fortheornithologist,abirdwithsuchandsuchlow-level
propertiesisacanary.Theverysametransitiondoesnotseemobvioustome.
SinceIcannottellafinchfromacanary,Iamawareofagapbetweenmy
perceptionofthosesamelow-levelpropertiesanddifferentpossible
categorizationsofthebird.Thus,Iwouldhavetomakeaguessorinferenceto
categorizethebird.Thesuggestionisthatthesephenomenologicalconsiderations
29TheproposedviewdiffersfromPrinz’s(2004),whothinksofemotionsasbodilyfeelingsthathavethefunctionofindicatingtheinstantiationofcorerelationalthemes.Inmyview,itisnotbodilyfeelingsbutratherpropertiesofthesituationthatsignaltheinstantiationofformalobjects.Thesepropertiesshouldbearsomesalientrelationtotheintentionalobject.Inthecaseathand,Iamafraidofthegorilla.MyfearisdirectedatthegorillabecauseIdetectedapropertythatbearsacloserelationtoit:thedoortoitscagebeingleftopen.Iamthereforecompelledtoascribeadifferentroletobodilyfeelings.Myhypothesisisthatbodilyfeelingsenableustoregulateouremotionsandself-ascribethem.
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arenotaccidental.Expertbirdwatchershaveachievedhighreliabilityinbird
recognition.Thishighreliabilityisreflectedinthephenomenologyofperceptual
recognition,i.e.inhowexpertbirdwatchersexperiencethetransitionfromthe
representationoflow-levelpropertiestotherepresentationofhigh-level
properties.30
Somethingsimilaroccursinourmostbasicemotionalresponses.
Presumably,ourbasicemotionaldispositionshavebeendevelopedthroughlong
evolutionaryprocessesinrelativelystableenvironments.Someoftheseemotional
dispositionscanalsobeshapedandmodifiedthroughlearning,therapyorhabit
(asinSituation3).Onceweareendowedwiththerelevantdispositions,the
emotionalresponsestheygroundarepermittedfromthefirst-personperspective.
Ifyouhavetheemotionaldispositionthatgroundsyourfear,youcannotevenraise
theMooreanquestion:‘Butisittruethatthegorillaisdangerous?’Thereisno
phenomenalgapbetweenyourawarenessofthegorillainanon-emotionalway
andyourawarenessofthegorillainanemotionalway.Youseamlesslymovefrom
yourperceptualrepresentationofthegorillatoanemotionalexperienceoffearof
thegorilla.Youseamlesslymovefromperceptiontotheactiontendenciesthat
characterizefear.DeonnaandTeroni(2012:80)capturethispointinaninsightful
way:“[you]feeltheway[your]bodyispoisedtoactinawaythatwillcontributeto
theneutralizationofwhatprovokesthefear”.Similarly,whenyoufindthejoke
funny,youcannothelplaughingatit.Yourrepresentationofthesituation
describedbythejokeseamlesslyleadstoamusementatthejoke.Ifyoucouldstop30Thereisalivelydebateonhowexactlytoaccountforthephenomenologyofexpertperceptualrecognition.Althoughallpartiesagreethatexpertiseleadstoachangeintheoverallphenomenalcharacterofone’svisualexperience,itisnotentirelyclearhowbesttoexplainthisoverallphenomenalchange(Siegel2010).Mytalkabout‘seamlesstransitions’isintendedtocapturetheuncontroversialclaimthatthewaywemovefromperceptiontorecognitionchangeswithexpertise.Expertsexperiencethosetransitionsasphenomenallyseamless;thosesamemovesstrikethenon-expertsashavinggapsthatmustbesewntogetherbybridgeprinciples.
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somewhereinbetween,youdidnotgetthejokeorwerenotepistemically
permittedtolaughatit.
Theseremarkssuggestanewpictureofthewayemotionsprovideuswith
epistemicaccesstoevaluativeproperties.Itisamistaketotrytoassignthe
responsibilityforthisaccesstoasingleentity,eitherthecognitivebasisorthe
emotion.Instead,thatepistemicaccessisajointendeavor.Itisachievedwhenthe
agentmovesfromthedetectionofthetriggeroftheemotionaldispositiontosome
actiontendencies.Thus,accessinganevaluativepropertyisnotpassively
recognizingapropertyoftheintentionalobject.Itisratheratransitionfroma
cognitivebasistoanactualizationofanemotionaldisposition.
Ihavedevelopedthesesuggestionsbyreflectingontheprocessesthatlead
tospecificemotionalresponses.Thismightseemtocontradicttheoriginalaimof
dealingwithpropositionaljustification.Yet,theproblemisjustapparent.Indeed,
somephilosophersholdthatattitudinaljustificationismorefundamentalthan
propositionaljustification(seeGoldman1986,forthepriorityofdoxastic
justificationoverpropositionaljustification).Wecanthereforegeneralizethese
lessonstopropositionaljustificationbyformulatingacounterfactualanalysis.We
cansolvethegapproblemasfollows:
BasicEmotionalJustification
IfasubjectS’sbasicemotionEaboutanobject,o,isjustified,then:
-Sis(orseemstobe)awareofoashavingsomeN-propertiesF,G,H…
-Shasasetofemotionaldispositionsthat,otherthingsbeingequal,would
leadhertomovefromthedetectionofF,G,H…tothecorresponding
emotionE.
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-Iftheemotionalresponseweretooccur,Swouldexperiencethetransition
fromthecognitivebasistotheemotionasaphenomenologicallyseamless
transition.
Itisworthmakingtworemarksonthisanalysis.First,Ihavenotoffered
sufficientconditionsforemotionaljustification.Thereasonisthatacomplete
accountofemotionaljustificationshouldbesupplementedwithatheoryof
emotionaldispositions.Thistheoryshouldbefurthertestedbyitscapacitytodeal
withdefeaters,‘barn’cases,andsimilarscenariosthathavebeendiscussedinthe
epistemologicalliterature.Iwillsaysomethingaboutthisprograminthenext
section.Second,DeonnaandTeroni(2012:104–17)haveofferedabatteryof
argumentstotheeffectthatdispositionssuchasmoods,sentiments,andcharacter
traitsdonotpositivelycontributetothejustificationofemotions.Thesearguments
deservetobeexamined.Unfortunately,Idonothavesufficientspacetodiscuss
themhere.Iwillratherspendsometimerespondingtosomespecificobjectionsto
thecurrentapproach.
6. ObjectionsandReplies
Objection1:Itcouldbeobjectedthatthedispositionalviewisnotan
alternativetoinferentialismbutratheraversionofit.Indeed,onemightclaimthat,
evenifanemotionalresponseisgroundedinacorrespondingemotional
disposition,thesubjectstillneedsantecedentjustificationtobelieveabridge
propositionoftheform:N-propertiesF,G,H…constitutetheformalobjectof
emotionEinthecurrentcircumstances.
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Reply:Thisobjectionwouldleadusbacktovalueskepticism(Section4).I
haveassumedthatvalueskepticismisnotadesirableposition.Still,mygoalwas
nottheambitiousoneofrefutingvalueskepticismbutratherthemodestoneof
sketchinganaccountofemotionaljustificationthatdoesnothaveskeptical
consequences.Andinferentialismhasskepticalconsequences.Thus,ourquestion
is:Aretherereasonablegroundstothinkthatthedispositionalaccountdoesnot
haveskepticalconsequences?Myansweris‘yes’.Indeed,ageneralizedformof
inferentialismwouldleadtoahighlyunstableposition.Tobeginwith,noticethat
thereareplentyofampliativetransitionsinourmentallifethatarenotplausibly
construedalonginferentiallines.Yet,wehavethestrongintuitionthatthose
ampliativetransitionsareepistemicallypermissible.Ifyouseearedsquareanda
bluecircle,yourvisualsystemmovedfromsensorystatesthatdetectredness,
squareness,blueness,andcircularitytoothersensorystatesthatrepresentared
squareandabluecircle.Thistransitionisampliativebecauseyourvisualsystem
hadtogobeyondthedeliverancesoffeaturedetectors.Afterall,thedetectionof
redness,squareness,blueness,andcircularitycouldcorrespondtoascene
containingabluesquareandaredcircleorascenecontainingfourscattered
properties.Still,thistransitionstrikesmostnon-skepticsasepistemically
permissible.Crucially,itisimplausibletoholdthattakingthebindingofthese
featuresatfacevalueisjustifiedbecausewehaveantecedentjustificationto
believeabackgroundproposition,astheinferentialmodelwouldpredict.Amore
plausiblehypothesisisthatweareendowedwithdispositionstobinddifferent
featuresintoobjectrepresentations.Ifwedonotpositthesedispositions,wewill
beledtothetroublingconclusionthatevenprimitiveperceptualpropositionssuch
as<Thisisaredsquare>cannotbeepistemicallyjustifiedbyperceptionalone.
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Afterall,itisunclearhowtheproposition<Thissquaregoestogetherwiththat
instanceofredness>couldbeepistemicallyjustified.
Mysuggestionisthatsomethingsimilarholdsforbasicemotions.Emotions
suchasfearhavecorrectnessconditionsthatfeatureformalobjects.Basic
emotionsarepartlyjustifiedbybasicdispositionstobindthoseformalobjectsto
theirintentionalobjects.Thesebasicdispositionsaretriggeredbynon-evaluative
propertiesthatbearsalientrelationstotheemotions’intentionalobject.31
Objection2:Somereadersmightprotestthatthedispositionalaccountfaces
acircularityproblem.Indeed,onemightcontendthatourunderstandingof
emotionaldispositionsisparasiticonourunderstandingofemotionalepisodes.To
illustrate,theemotionaldispositionthatgroundsfearistobeunderstoodasa
dispositiontofeelfearindangeroussituations.Thus,itisamistaketoholdthat
fearisgroundedinanemotionaldisposition.
Reply:Icangrantthatourunderstandingofemotionaldispositionsis
parasiticonourunderstandingofemotionalepisodes.Yet,thisdoesnotprevent
thedispositionalviewfromofferinganinformativeaccountofemotional
justification.Indeed,itispossibletocharacterizeemotionaldispositionsinways
thatgobeyondspecificemotionalepisodes,andthesecharacterizationsare
epistemicallysignificant.Thus,Mulligan(1998:163)suggeststhatsentiments“fix
therangeofvariationofasubject’s”emotionalresponses.32Similarly,Roberts
(2003:142)describesthebroadercategoryofaconcern“asaprincipleof
predilectionofarangeofwidelyvariousemotionalresponses”.Thus,onemight
thinkofemotionaldispositionsasprovidingtemplatesthatdeterminethewaysin
31Thisisaveryspecialkindofbinding.Inmyview,itisphenomenologicallyrealizedinourexperienceofactiontendencies.Ileavethisissueforanotheroccasion.32Mulligan(1998)doesnotconstruesentimentsasbasesofemotionsbutasbasesofintentionsandwantings.Thus,hisviewfacesthegapproblem.
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whichasubjectwouldreacttosometypesofeventsorsituations.An
epistemologicaltheoryofemotionaldispositionscouldthereforeexaminethe
conditionsunderwhichthesetemplatesareepistemicallygoodorbad.Itis
obviousthatsomeemotionaldispositionsareepistemicallybad.Loveoftenleads
tounwarrantedadmirationandbeingtimidoftenleadstofeelfearofinoffensive
objectsandsituations.Atheoryofemotionaljustificationcouldthereforeidentify
commonalitiesbetweenthesetemplatesandusethemtoidentifytheconditions
underwhichanemotionaldispositionisepistemicallygoodorbad.Itcouldalso
describesomegeneralfeaturesoftheacquisitionofemotionaldispositionsby
evolution,habitoreducation.Presumably,somemodesofacquisitionmay
negativelyorpositivelyaffectemotionaljustification.33
Objection3:Somereadersmightcomplainthatthedispositionalaccount
facesaproblemanalogoustoafamousproblemfacedbypsychological
behaviorism.Arguably,itisnotalwayspossibletospecifythetriggeringconditions
ofemotionaldispositionsinnon-evaluativeterms.
Reply:Idonotclaimthatthetriggeringconditionsofallemotional
dispositionscanbespecifiedinnon-evaluativeterms.Indeed,someofthemmay
bebasedonrepresentationswithevaluativecontents.Asanillustration,many
peoplehaveexperiencedindignationatDonaldTrump’selectionbecausethey
judgehimtobeunworthyofbeingtheUSpresident.Moregenerally,many
emotionscanbebasedonjudgmentsofvalue.Mypointisratherthatthetriggering
conditionsofseveralemotionaldispositionscanbespecifiedinnon-evaluative
terms.Thisisallweneedtoavoidvalueskepticismwhiledispellingsomeofthe
mysterythatsurroundsourepistemicaccesstoevaluativeproperties.Thecaseof
33Virtueepistemologywouldbeanaturalstartingpointtopursuetheseinquiries.Ithinkthatcurrentaccountsofepistemicandmoralvirtueswillbenefitfromacloserexaminationofemotionaljustification.
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thegorillaisarepresentativeexampleofthisidea.Oncewethinkaboutthe
structureofthiscase,itisnotdifficulttocomeupwithmanyotherexamples.A
rat’sfearofanimminentelectroshockcanbekeyedtoitshearingofabeep,which
isspecifiableinnon-evaluativeterms.Ananimal’sfearandavoidanceresponses
canbekeyedtothecolorsofpoisonoussubstances.Similarly,episodesofgriefand
longingcanbetriggeredbytheperceptualrecognitionofthebeloved’sbelongings,
whichdonotneedtobedescribedinevaluativeterms;theyarejusttightly
associatedwiththebelovedone.
7. ConcludingRemarks
Thesimpleviewofemotionaljustificationholdsthatthejustificationof
someemotionssupervenesonthecontentoftheircognitivebasesalone.I
introducedaseriesofepistemologicaldistinctionstoclarifythescopeofthesimple
view.Thesimpleviewismostplausiblyconstruedasanaccountofimmediate
propositionaljustificationunderstoodasepistemicpermissibility.Thisrestricted
thesisfacesthegapproblem:Ifthereisadifferenceinthewayscognitivebases
representobjectsandpropertiesandthewaystheemotions(re)presentthe
evaluativepropertiesofthoseobjects,thesimpleviewhasfailedtoprovide
sufficientconditionsforemotionaljustification.Iconsideredvariouswaysof
solvingthegapproblemandfoundthemwanting.Thepurportedsolutionseither
leadtovalueskepticism,orcontradictcognitivism,orarenotsufficiently
illuminating.
Onemightsolvethegapproblembyrejectingcognitivismortheclaimthat
emotionsaregroundedinothermentalstatesorepisodes.Iproposedamore
conservativeview.Ipreservedtheintuitionthatsomeemotionsaremore
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immediatelyjustifiedthanothersbyintroducingadispositionalmodelofour
accesstoevaluativeproperties.Onthisview,subjectshaveemotionaldispositions
that,inconjunctionwiththecontentsofemotions’cognitivebases,canconfer
immediateemotionaljustification.Emotionaldispositionsexplainhowonecan
haveepistemicaccesstoevaluativepropertieswithoutbeingabletoliterallydetect
thoseevaluativeproperties.Theyalsoexplainwhyemotionalresponsesseemto
bepermissiblefromthefirst-personperspective.
Itisanopenquestionhow,ontheproposedaccount,emotionscontributeto
thejustificationofevaluativejudgments.Thisisadifficultissuethatshouldbe
tackledbyanalyzingtherepresentationalstructureofemotions.Itisworth
stressing,however,thattheproposedaccountoffersacontributionofbroader
interesttoepistemology:itprovidesaseriesofcasesinwhichimmediate
justificationdoesnotrequirethattherepresentationalcontentofthejustifier
mentalstatebeidenticaltothecontentofthejustifiedmentalstateorepisode.
Thus,philosophersinterestedinthescopeofimmediatejustificationshouldpay
closerattentiontotheepistemologyofemotions.34
34IamextremelygratefultoJulienDeonnaandFabriceTeroniforhelpingmefindmywaythroughtheintricateliteratureonemotions.SpecialthanksareduetotheparticipantsattheworkshopExperience,Values,andJustification(Geneva,2-3June2016)fortheirprobingquestionsandremarks,especiallytoBeritBrogaard,ElijahChudnoff,DavidFaraci,KarenJones,FedericoLauria,MoritzMüller,andPeterRailton.IwouldalsoliketothankRichardDubforseveralstimulatingconversationsontheemotions,ArtursLoginsforadviceonepistemicmatters,andTristramOliver-Skuse,whokindlysentmehisexcellentdissertationandmadedetailedcommentsonanearlierdraft.IpresentedasubsequentversionofthisarticleattheInstitutJeanNicod(November9,2016).ManythankstoJöelleProust,PaulEgré,andtheirstudentsfortheirobjectionsandremarks.AnearlyfinalversionofthisarticlewasalsodiscussedatSusannaSchellenberg’sresearchseminaratRutgersUniversity.IamgratefultoSusannaandherstudentsfortheirsuggestionsofimprovement.Finally,IwouldliketothanktheSwissCenterforAffectiveSciences(NCCR)andThumos:TheGenevanResearchGrouponEmotions,Values,andNormsattheUniversityofGenevaforprovidinganidealresearchenvironmentwhileIwaspreparingthismanuscript.WorkonthisprojectwasfundedbyagenerousgrantfromtheSwissNationalScienceFoundation(FNS100012_150265/1).
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