EMINT

S Y M P O S I U M

THE BIG IDEA THAT IS YET TO BE: TOWARD A MOREMOTIVATED, CONTEXTUAL, AND DYNAMIC MODEL OF

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

OSCAR YBARRAETHAN KROSS

JEFFREY SANCHEZ-BURKSUniversity of Michigan

The emotional intelligence construct has been the focus of enormous scrutiny overthe past 20 years (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Much of this interest is based on theso-called big idea that first brought widespread attention to itan idea popularizedby Golemans best-selling book Emotional Intelligence (1995), in which he claimedthat emotional intelligence (EI) can matter more than the intelligence quotient (IQ) inpredicting important life outcomes. Despite the appeal of this idea, recent meta-analyses indicate that emotional intelligence has not lived up to its promise. What arethe implications of these findings for emotional intelligence research and for peopleinterested in applying EI research to their organizations?We suggest that the predictivevalidity of emotional intelligence can be enhanced by refining the construct throughthe incorporation of three well-established principles of psychological processing: (a)dual-process principles that capture automatic and deliberate processing, (b) motiva-tional principles that highlight the importance of goals for processing social-emotionalinformation, and (c) person X situation principles that delineate how context influ-ences the way people think, feel, and behave. We discuss the implications of thisreconceptualization for emotional intelligence theory, research, and practice.

The concept of emotional intelligence has beenthe focus of much research over the past 20 years.What began as a proposed definition for a newconstruct, the ability to monitor ones own andothers feelings and emotions, to discriminateamong them and to use this information to guideones thinking and action (Salovey & Mayer, 1990,p. 189), has evolved into a thriving area of multi-disciplinary research and practice.The appeal of EI is based largely on the so-called

big idea that first brought widespread attention tothe constructan idea popularized by Golemansbest-selling book Emotional Intelligence (1995), inwhich he claimed that EI can matter more than IQand suggested a redefining of what it means to besmart. Although the hyperbole surrounding thisclaim has tempered with time, the basic bigidea remains influential. For example, Cherniss(2010) recently noted, This big idea is that suc-cess in work and life depends on more than just

the basic cognitive abilities typically measuredby IQ tests and related measures; it also dependson a number of personal qualities that involvethe perception, understanding, and regulation ofemotion (Cherniss, 2010, p. 184).These claims are largely based on findings in the

intelligence literature indicating that scores on in-telligence tests account for 20% to 25% of the vari-ance in work, school, and life outcomes (Goldstein,Zedeck, & Goldstein, 2002; Hunt, 2011; Hunter &Hunter, 1984; Neisser et al., 1996; Schmidt &Hunter, 2004). The remaining unexplained vari-ance invites conjectures regarding what other fac-tors might contribute to a persons success. This iswhere EI enters the equation.It is often assumed that EI accounts for a large

portion of this unexplained variance (e.g., Abra-ham, 1999; Cherniss, 2010; Goleman, 1995). How-ever, a critical examination of the EI literature in-dicates that this is not the case. Meta-analyses

The Academy of Management Perspectives2014, Vol. 28, No. 2, 93107.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amp.2012.0106

93

Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyright holders expresswritten permission. Users may print, download, or email articles for individual use only.

indicate that when cognitive ability and personal-ity measures are controlled for, the relationshipbetween EI measures and consequential work, aca-demic, and life outcomes is remarkably small, ex-plaining between 1% and 7% of the variance acrossthese domains (OBoyle, Humphrey, Pollack,Hawver, & Story, 2011; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran,2004). Contrary to the big idea motivating muchEI research, these findings indicate that EI actuallydoes little to explain how well people successfullynavigate their lives.What are the implications of these findings for EI

research, theory, and practice? Although they ap-pear to paint a glum picture, our goal in this articleis to offer a set of suggestions for how to refine theway EI is conceptualized to enhance its predictiveutility. Specifically, we suggest that building amodel of EI that takes into account (a) dual pro-cesses that characterize psychological phenomena,(b) motivation, and (c) interactionist principles thatgovern human behavior is critical to refining thisconstruct in ways that may yet allow the big ideabehind EI to come to fruition. In the followingsections we elaborate on these issues.

PRINCIPLE 1: DUAL PROCESSES GOVERNHUMAN THOUGHT, FEELING, AND BEHAVIOR

Most EI research adopts a conscious view ofhow people process emotional information. For ex-ample, participants are asked to report on theirfeelings and EI abilities, judge the effectiveness ofemotion management strategies illustrated in sce-narios, and identify faces or other emotion-evokingstimuli by attaching labels to them (e.g., Bar-On,1997; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002; Schutte etal., 1998; Tett, Fox, & Wang, 2005).1 Although EIresearchers acknowledge that mental processes canoperate outside of peoples awareness (e.g., Gole-man, 1995; Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2003),the distinction between automatic and conscious(or deliberate) processes and their potential inter-actions do not factor into leading EI models (for an

exception, see Fiori, 2009). From both a practicaland theoretical perspective this is problematic, asmuch research indicates that taking into accountsuch processes and their interactions is critical tounderstanding psychological phenomena (e.g.,Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Kahneman,2011; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Kross &Mischel, 2010; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Posner &Snyder, 1975; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster,2000; Stanovich & West, 2000).Taking seriously the distinction between con-

scious and automatic processes adds dynamismand context sensitivity to the concept of EI, and itsuggests novel hypotheses. To illustrate the impor-tance of this feature of our reconceptualization, wefocus on two abilities that are common to manyemotional intelligence models: emotion recogni-tion and emotion control. Emotion recognition in-volves being able to recognize the emotions that theself or someone else is experiencing. Emotion con-trol refers to the ability to manage emotions in theself and others, usually in the service of maintain-ing or creating positive affective states and elimi-nating or minimizing negative ones (e.g., Clark &Isen, 1982; Larsen, 2000).Abundant findings indicate that both emotion

recognition and control can and often do operateconsciously (e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 1997). A niceillustration of this is work showing how changes incognitive control capacitya constellation of pro-cesses that largely underlies conscious, delibera-tive processing of information (e.g., Feldman-Bar-rett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004)directly influenceemotion recognition. Research indicates that olderadults do worse than younger adults in recognizingemotions (for a review see Isaacowitz and col-leagues, 2007). Older adults also have worse cogni-tive functioning than younger adults (e.g., Park,2000), which is crucial for the deliberate processingof information (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Ofgreater interest, research indicates that controllingfor level of cognitive functioning reduces the emo-tion recognition differences found across agegroups (Orgeta & Phillips, 2008), suggesting thatemotion recognition relies on deliberate processes.Other research has shown that individuals whoperform poorly on tasks that assay cognitive re-sources, such as the Wisconsin card sorting task,also perform more poorly in recognizing othersemotional expressions (Bryson, Bell, & Lysaker,1997), and that sensory conflict, which requirescognitive resources to be resolved, influences emo-

1 Here we focus on measures specifically labeled asemotional intelligence. Other approaches to the study ofEIrelevant abilities exist (e.g., Banzinger, Grandjean, &Scherer, 2009; Izard et al., 2001; Matsumoto et al., 2000;OSullivan, 1982; Pitterman & Nowicki, 2004). However,most of the research assessing predictive validity (inmeta-analyses controlling for other important factors) hasfocused on specific measures of EI, whether as integratedEI abilities or self-report trait or mixed models.

94 MayThe Academy of Management Perspectives

tion recognition (Keeley-Dyreson, Bailey, & Bur-goon, 1991).Emotion control refers to the modulation of emo-

tional reactions and expressions. It is considered acritical challenge as people mature (Posner, 2012)and is many times carried out through the imple-mentation of conscious processes. When over-whelmed with anger, for example, some peopledeliberately try to control their emotions by dis-tracting, reappraising, or distancing themselves(e.g., Bushman, 2002; Gross, 1998; Kross & Ayduk,2011; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Such de-liberately implemented skills are critical for help-ing people interact effectively. However, the con-trol of emotion is restricted in part by a personslevel of cognitive resources. This is evident in in-fants, as distressing situations are more likely togive rise to negative emotions in infants to thedegree they are unable to control their attention(Rothbart, Posner, & Boylan, 1990). Research withadults has also shown that continuous attempts tocontrol ones emotions paradoxically reduces cog-nitive resources, leaving people vulnerable to inef-ficient emotion control in the future (Schmeichel,2007). As a whole, this research suggests that emo-tion control can occur through a deliberate processthat relies on cognitive resources, and that a lack ofcognitive resources can diminish deliberate at-tempts at emotion control.Fortunately, emotion recognition and control

also can operate automatically through processesthat are more immune to cognitive resource avail-ability (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000). People, forexample, can recognize emotion expressions un-der cognitive load, even self-conscious emotions(Tracy & Robins, 2008). People also recognize thevalence of faces (positive, negative) even whenthe faces are presented too fast to engage higher-level cognitive skills (e.g., Clark, Winkielman, &McIntosh, 2008; Whalen et al., 1998; Winkiel-man, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005).Recent findings also suggest that some elements

of emotion control can occur efficiently with littledeliberation (for reviews see Bargh & Williams,2007; Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). In one study,researchers primed individuals with words relatedto controlling or expressing their emotions to acti-vate emotion controlrelated goals. These individ-uals were then led to experience anger and subse-quently rated how they felt. The findings indicatedthat individuals with the emotion control goalexpressed less anger after the anger induction thanindividuals for whom the emotion expression

goal was activated (Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007,Experiment 1). This was the case even though par-ticipants were unaware of the goal concepts thathad been activated. Such findings provide evi-dence for an efficient, automatic type of emotion-control process.Other work that has documented the operation of

efficient, automatic processes comes from researchon theory of mind and how people understandothers psychological states, preferences, and inten-tions behind actions (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, &Frith, 1985; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Un-derstanding emotions in others is intertwined withthe perception of others psychological states andbehaviors. Comparative and developmental ap-proaches to theory of mind have shown that per-ceivers can immediately grasp the meaning of oth-ers acts or aspects of their mental states withoutthinking extensively about the available informa-tion (e.g., Iacoboni et al., 2005; Moll & Tomasello,2006; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Qureshi, Ap-perly, & Samson, 2010).Although EI can occur efficiently through auto-

matic processing, that does not mean this type ofprocessing will always be effective or that all emo-tion recognition and control processes will haveoccasion to become automatic.2 In terms of theformer, a person who has been part of an overlycompetitive organizational environment could bementally prepared to see interpersonal threats at anew job even when there are no threats, or to un-derestimate others good intentions. Basing finaljudgments on such initial inferences and forecastscould create a host of interpersonal problems. Incases such as these, conscious and deliberate pro-cesses are useful to unlearn potentially ineffectiveways of relating to others, or for controlling andmodulating initial assessments of others to correctfor inaccurate inferences.In addition, although automatic processes are

critical for effective functioning, there may not beenough occasions for EI processes to become prac-ticed and automatic. That is, emotion knowledgeand understanding are often tied to specific con-texts (Barrett, 2006), but if a person does not con-sistently and frequently encounter such contexts

2 Most skills, given enough practice, follow the path ofexplicit practice to automaticity, from being deliberate tobecoming more automatic. This is not to say that skillacquisition cannot occur implicitly and with little aware-ness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Lewicki, Hill, & Czyze-wska, 1992).

2014 95Ybarra, Kross, and Sanchez-Burks

core factors determining automaticity (Bargh,Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988)EI-related processeswill not become automatic, and deliberate EI pro-cesses will continue to be necessary to achieveeffective EI, given requisite cognitive resources.By not measuring how emotion recognition and

control, as well as a host of other processes relatedto EI, operate both automatically and deliberately,and by not explicitly factoring the distinction be-tween automatic and deliberate processes into EImodels, the field loses out on a potentially largepiece of the EI puzzle. It is well established thatautomatic and deliberate processes often do notcorrelate, such as when a perceiver consciouslyreports positive emotions or attitudes toward a per-son, but at an automatic or implicit level readilyascribes negative characteristics to them (for a re-view see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). There-fore, understanding where a person stands on bothof these dimensions for any given EI process seemsessential to enhancing the validity and predictiveutility of this construct.

Dual Psychological Processes in EI: FutureResearch Questions

An important question raised by this analysisconcerns whether certain aspects of current EI as-sessments are affected by changes in cognitive load.Do people who score high on some or all aspects ofthe MSCEIT3 (Mayer et al., 2002), for example,score similarly when their attention is divided?What if individuals are led to become cognitivelyfatigued and then their EI is assessed? It stands toreason that processes that are deliberate will beaffected more than those that are more automatic.Research investigating fluid intelligence (i.e., howpeople reason through and solve novel problems)and executive function has shown that only whenpeople are cognitively stressed do performance dif-ferences emerge between those high and low influid intelligence (Conway, Kane, & Engle (2003).Thus, researchers may obtain additional variationin performance by taking into account cognitiveload in different situations and the availability ofcognitive resources.It also would be useful to know how individuals

differ in their sensitivity to emotion-related infor-mation that has been activated outside of consciousawareness and how this sensitivity relates not only

to performance on an immediate task relevant tothat priming, but also to tasks that are more distantfrom the priming episode. We described earlier re-search by Mauss and colleagues in which conceptswere primed, and then the investigators assessedthe primes effect on the ability to control an emo-tion induced in a different context (Mauss et al.,2007). What is not known is whether individualsdiffered in their sensitivity to the information thatwas activated in the first part of the study.One possibility is that two different individuals

could show different levels of sensitivity to someactivated concepts or feelings (e.g., one person be-comes aware why he or she is feeling upset; anotherdoes not). In rendering a subsequent judgment in anovel situation, one individual, due to his lack ofawareness, might then transfer the activated feel-ings to judgments of a stranger and judge thestranger more negatively, whereas the other indi-vidual who was more aware of the activated feel-ings might not. Given that the stranger had nothingto do with the earlier activated emotional experi-ence, high EI then would also have to do withpeoples assessments of whether the activated feel-ings or concepts are appropriate in the new con-text (Higgins, 1996).Finally, can we develop measures that assay au-

tomatic emotion recognition and control processes,as well as other processes relevant to EI? The an-swer is yes. In fact, available EI measures in con-junction with easy-to-implement changes in thetesting environment could be used to suggestwhose EI abilities are more practiced or automatic.For example, even though the conscious and delib-erate processes likely captured by current EI assess-ments might become impaired under time pressureor cognitive strain, as we discussed above, therewill likely be individual differences in perfor-mance, meaning some individuals will be affectedsignificantly more than others. So simple interven-tions, such as dividing peoples attention by havingthem retain information in memory (e.g., a string ofnumbers to be recalled later), could be imple-mented easily during the testing procedures. Beingable to carry out the EI tasks even under cognitivestrain would suggest that individuals possess someEI processes that are efficient and likely to operateautomatically.Other assessments could also be adopted to assay

the nonconscious elements of emotion recognitionand control. For example, in terms of recognizingemotions, individuals could be presented with pic-tures on a computer, and the pictures could display3 The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso emotional intelligence test.


different emotional expressions. The person per-forming the assessment could vary the presentationto determine the minimal presentation times a par-ticular individual needs to recognize the emotions.Such a test would provide a gradient of efficiencyin recognizing the emotions (i.e., those who needshorter presentation times are more efficient). Inaddition, at the extremewhere presentation timesare only a few milliseconds and so rapid that noone can explicitly report on what was presentedthe ability to guess the emotional expression or itsvalence at levels significantly above chance couldbe taken to signal automatic emotion recognition(see Clark et al., 2008, for a possible paradigm fordoing this).Various other procedures could be adopted by

practitioners to better assess both the automaticand deliberate aspects of emotion recognition andcontrol (see Gawronski & Payne, 2010, for a reviewof implicit cognition methods). In addition (al-though this may not be practicable in the field itcould be of potential benefit to basic research), therecent proliferation of neural measures that canmonitor neural activity continuously with goodspatial (fMRI)4 and temporal (EEG)5 resolutioncould provide several promising vehicles for devel-oping tools to better assess both automatic anddeliberate aspects of EI, especially when such mea-sures are linked to performance on standard self-report and behavioral EI measures administeredunder different testing conditions (e.g., under highor low cognitive strain).

Summary

Principle 1 contends that two factors influence apersons emotional intelligence: (a) conscious ordeliberate mental processes that rely on rules forunderstanding and controlling emotionally rele-vant information and (b) automatic processes thatcan render some degree of emotional understand-ing and control when cognitive resources arescarce. Incorporating automatic processes into amodel of EI is critical because a large portion ofsocial and emotional life is regulated through thedeployment of such processes (Bargh & Chartrand,1999). However, the fact that an automatic processcan be executed efficiently does not imply appro-priateness, as such processes may be based on lim-

ited learning opportunities or a history of imperfectlearning and understanding, and they can be mis-applied (cf. Kahneman, 2011; March, 2010; Meehl,1986). In some cases it makes sense to more care-fully consider or shelve these inferences beforeacting on them. Many times the outcomes of auto-matic processes are proposed solutions that need tobe monitored for appropriateness by deliberate pro-cesses. An adaptive EI model thus necessitates bothtypes of processes to allow for the best emotionalunderstanding and control possible given the cir-cumstances and availability of cognitive resources.

PRINCIPLE 2: MOTIVATION IN SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Emotional facts are ambiguous and at times evennegotiable, meaning they can be as much a reflec-tion of the actual stimuli as the way people con-strue them (Kelly, 1955). People who are motivatedto compete, for example, pay more attention toothers competencies, whereas people motivated tocooperate attend more to others communal charac-teristics, even though the other type of informationis available for processing (Chan & Ybarra, 2002).Much of the basis for peoples attention and inter-pretation, then, rests not only on what might beconsidered an ability, as usually conceived in EI,but also on peoples motivationthat is, the extentto which they are engaged and willing to processthe available information (cf. Hunt, 2011). Thus,even though the automatic and deliberate processesdiscussed under Principle 1 can be applied to rel-evant EI, motivation directs the person to the so-cial-emotional information that is to be processedand the degree to which he or she engages with it.There are diverse ways to conceptualize motiva-

tional processes, and many levels of analyses canbe considered (e.g., biological to cognitive levels).For example, motivation can be approached fromthe perspective of value X expectancy (e.g., Weiner,1985), prevention and promotion (Higgins, 1998),wanting versus liking (Berridge, 2009), extrinsicversus intrinsic (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985), and mas-tery versus performance mindsets (Dweck, 1999).The motivational approach researchers pursue canhave different implications for the types of ques-tions they ask.In terms of value X expectancy, for example, a

person could value having positive interactionswith coworkers, but a competitive organizationalculture could lead them to expect that their col-leagues will not reciprocate such intentions, result-

4 Functional magnetic resonance imaging.5 Electroencephalography.


ing in reduced motivation to cooperate. In contrast,a researcher who takes an extrinsic versus intrinsicmotivation approach to EI might postulate that ex-ternal rewards might lead some individuals to fo-cus more on recognizing and managing the emo-tions of those with the power to provide externalrewards compared to paying attention to other or-ganizational members with less influence. Contem-plating these and other motivation frameworks gen-erates a host of hypotheses regarding when peopleare (and are not) likely to be emotionally intelli-gent. But doing so is beyond the scope of ourframework. Our goal in this section is to articulateat a general level why motivation is a critical com-ponent of emotional intelligence.

Motivation and Emotion Recognition

There are many occasions in life in which peopledo not have control over events, so they are depen-dent on others who can facilitate the outcomes theyseek. A good example is being dependent on an em-ployer for a job or a project leader for a good evalua-tion. The outcomes an individual seeks in such situ-ations will not be achieved without enlisting theother persons help. In fact, much of social life hasthis structure to it; we need others to get thingsdone. This is referred to as outcome dependency(Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976).Outcome dependency affects what people attend

to and the understandings they can extract aboutothers, so it helps demonstrate the implications ofmotivation for emotional intelligence. In one studydemonstrating such effects, individuals werebrought into a study to perform a task where theirchoices and monetary rewards from the gamewould depend on the other players choices (Vonk,1999). Before the game, individuals read an essaywritten by someone else. Half of the individualswere told that the essay, having to do with cooper-ative and pro-environmental behavior or beingcompetitive and less concerned with the environ-ment, was written by the person they would beplaying the game with; the other half were told theessay was from a different person. Also, half of theindividuals were told the author had freely chosento write the essay; the other half were told the essaytopic had been assigned by the researcher.Two findings from the study are of central im-

portance. When judging the authors attitude to-ward the environment, people generally attributedthe intentions behind the essay to the target. How-ever, when predicting the authors tendency to be

cooperative or competitive more generallyan as-sessment relevant to the game they would be play-ingthe judgments varied. Participants who wereoutcome dependent spent more time studying theessays from authors who had no choice in writingthe essays, suggesting they were trying to moreintensely uncover underlying intentions and atti-tudes. Also, the judgments about authors partici-pants would be dependent on, because of the up-coming game, were more nuanced than those ofauthors the participants would not meet later. So,once individuals outcome dependency was acti-vated, meaning they became highly motivated topredict the person on whom they were dependent,their willingness to process the available informa-tion was altered. They took in more informationand appeared more careful in considering thecauses of the other persons behavior.The lesson for emotional intelligence is straight-

forward: Motivation can alter the judgments aboutothers, whether it involves judgments about theiremotions, personalities, or behavioral tendencies.If a perceiver is not motivated he will miss muchsocial-emotional information others are providing.This same perceivers judgments, if viewed withoutconsideration for motivational influences, couldeven be taken to reflect lower EI.

Motivation and Emotion Control

In addition to having implications for emotionrecognition, motivation also influences emotioncontrol. For example, emotion regulation researchindicates that people high in agreeableness aremore motivated to control emotions than those lowin agreeableness (Tobin, Graziano, Vanman, & Tas-sinary, 2000). In this research (Tobin and col-leagues, 2000, Study 2), participants were pre-sented with slides they had to evaluate on valence.The slides had been selected to be affectively neg-ative and highly arousing. In addition, participantshad to communicate the content of the slides toanother person via video, and recordings weremade of these communications. These videos werelater coded by observers who were unaware of howthe participants had scored on agreeableness. Thefindings indicated that participants higher in agree-ableness reported engaging in more efforts to con-trol their emotions. In addition, these attempts atcontrol corresponded to observer ratings. The pointhere for emotional intelligence is that motivationmatters. For example, the investigators of this studysuggest that such differential motivation to control


emotions has implications for harmony in interper-sonal relationships (Tobin et al., 2000).Another example highlighting the role of motiva-

tion comes from a recent study by Job and col-leagues on ego depletion (Job, Dweck, & Walton,2010). The classic ego depletion literature indicatesthat exerting cognitive control undermines effortsto control thought and behavior on future tasks(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The control of emo-tions also has been shown to reduce cognitive re-sources (Schmeichel, 2007). However, Job and col-leagues found that cueing people to be moremotivated by leading them to assume that will-power is malleable led them to perform better onthe demanding tasks, thus undoing the classic de-pletion effect (Job et al., 2010).

Motivation and EI: Future Directions

By considering motivation, we will likely im-prove chances for EI assessments to predict out-comes of interest above and beyond intelligenceand personality. A recent meta-analysis studying EIand job performance, for example, not only con-firmed the low predictive validity of EI over IQ andpersonality, but also found that EI assessments of amixed nature showed relatively more validity inpredicting job performance (Joseph & Newman,2010). The authors conclude that this was due tothe mixed EIs inclusion of surplus motivationalconstructs and other sundry content that might beperformance relevant (Joseph & Newman, 2010,p. 6667). So there are empirical suggestions re-garding the importance of motivation for EIs pre-dictive validity.Additional factors that have to do with motiva-

tion can be considered to help elevate EIs predic-tive validity. One concerns the match between themotivational state that is typically activated whenthe EI assessments are made and the contexts inwhich EI is applied. This matching principle is amainstay in research dealing with attitudes and theprediction of behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980;Millar & Tesser, 1989). In one work role a personcould be motivated to read and try to understandanother party (e.g., ones manager or boss), but inanother role be less motivated to engage with theother party (e.g., dealing with a subordinate or adisliked colleague). If this individual happens toscore high on some EI assessment, and assumingthe assessment requires high motivation to do well,then EI performance should better match the for-mer than the latter role. Trying to predict across all

role situations might limit the strength of thosepredictive relationships.

Summary

Principle 2 contends that focusing on motivationhas the potential to inform the concept of emo-tional intelligence. Although some people mayscore high on emotional intelligence measures ofability (e.g., emotion recognition or control), priorresearch suggests that they will not implementthose skills unless they are motivated to do so.Under such circumstances, when people displaylow levels of emotional intelligence, the challengefor researchers is to discern whether such failuresare a result of poor motivation, lack of ability, orboth of these qualities. In addition, failing to pre-dict relevant outcomes from EI assessments mayalso depend on matching processes between themotivation required by the assessment and thetypes of outcomes to be predicted.

PRINCIPLE 3: CONTEXT MATTERS

As it stands now, the emotional intelligence fieldis dominated by the goal of assigning people somekind of scoredevoid of contextto try to quantifythe abilities underlying emotional intelligence. Ofcourse, assigning numbers to behavioral and men-tal phenomena allows for relationships to be tested,categorizations to be made, and predictions to beconsidered. However, scores about people can bemisused. Because explanations for peoples judg-ments and behaviors depend critically on informa-tion about the person and the situational context(e.g., Heider, 1944; Jones & Davis, 1965; Mischel,1968; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), such scores oftenmiss important information regarding the nuancesthat characterize the way people think, feel, andbehave in daily life in different contexts.Scores resulting from emotional intelligence tests

suggest that people can manage their own and oth-ers emotions and navigate social situations, assum-ing they received a high score. However, assigninga person an emotional intelligence score impartslittle explanation for understanding peoples pastdecisions and behaviors, as it collapses over timeand the many contexts those decisions and behav-iors are bound to. Hence, such scores can lead us toassume the tested persons decisions and behaviorshave been consistent across time and contexts andthat we know what a person with a certain emo-tional intelligence score is likely to do. However,


without appreciating how context affects the ex-pression of emotional intelligence (or vice versa),we forgo much understanding of how people makesense of social situations and others and also theinfluence situational forces play in emotionalintelligence.Focusing on context broadens the promise of

emotional intelligence, helping it address puzzlingquestions such as why otherwise emotionally intel-ligent individuals crumble when faced with temp-tation, such as President Clinton with MonicaLewinsky. President Clinton won two electionsachievements based in part on the careful naviga-tion of the perilous world of U.S. politics. But onecould argue that the Lewinsky debacle resultedfrom Clintons failure to appropriately control hisemotions. Usually, the explanation for such occur-rences is based on the big idea behind emotionalintelligence. As discussed earlier, the idea is thatsuccessful people with high IQs can falter, whichleaves room for other abilities such as emotionalintelligence to help explain such shortfallsmean-ing they must have been low on emotional intelli-gence or some aspect of it (Cherniss, 2010). How-ever, Clinton clearly demonstrated the capacity tobe emotionally intelligent in other contexts. Hewas adept, for example, at negotiating difficult trea-ties between opposing factions and when interact-ing with opposing parties in Congress.The resolution of such discrepancies necessitates

greater elaboration of the role context plays in emo-tional intelligence, as we attempt to accomplish inour framework. Fortunately, there already existmany models that explicitly address how contextand behavior intersect. For example, Tett and col-leagues have put forth the notion of trait relevanceand activation to argue that not all situations (e.g.,roles or aspects of a job) will provide behavioralcues relevant to a personality trait (Tett & Burnett,2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000). Another approach isput forth by the Cognitive Affective PersonalitySystem (CAPS) theory of personality that explicitlylooks at the interrelationship between persons, sit-uations, and behaviors (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). InCAPS, different situations acquire different mean-ings for the same person, or a situation could beinterpreted differently by different individuals.Consequently, the kinds of appraisals, expectationsand beliefs, affects, goals, and behavioral scriptsthat are likely to become activated in relation toparticular situations will vary in systematic ways.Theoretically as well as empirically, there is noreason to expect individuals to manifest similar

behavior in relation to different psychological sit-uations unless they are functionally equivalent inmeaning.Applied to emotional intelligence, this model

suggests that being able to predict whether personX is going to behave in an emotionally intelligentway in situation Y requires researchers to take intoaccount the situation and its meaning for the indi-vidual (e.g., Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Magnusson &Endler, 1977; Mischel, 1973; Mischel & Shoda,1995). Identifying these contingencies is critical, inour view, to developing an integrative model ofemotional intelligence that is capable of accuratelypredicting behavior.To illustrate concretely how this analysis might

apply to emotional intelligence, consider Darleyand Batsons (1973) classic study on helping. Dar-ley and Batson were interested in studying thepower of context in helping. Their participants in-volved seminary students who, depending on thecondition they were randomly assigned to, had thegoal of delivering a talk on the parable of the GoodSamaritan or on a non-helping topic. In addition,these individuals were randomly assigned either toa condition in which they thought they had enoughtime to get to where they would deliver their talk orto a different condition in which they were toldthey were late. On their way to deliver the talk theseminary students were presented with a powerfulevent that was directly relevant to their goal butalso conflicted with it; as they were making theirway to give the talk they encountered a manslumped in an alleyway in need of help. What didthe results show?The findings were striking and indicated that

the seminary students were more likely to helpwhen not in a hurry to give their talk (again, on theGood Samaritan!). Some hurried students literallystepped over the person in the alleyway. So hereyou have a group of people undertaking what mightbe considered intensive emotional intelligencetraining in the sense that they were honing theirskills in attending to others and being more emo-tionally attuned. They also were off to give a talk onhelping. But when presented with the opportunityto read a potentially problematic event in which aperson needed help, many of them faltered. Tyingthis example back to CAPS, it can be argued thatthe different conditions (contexts) activated dis-tinct EI-relevant knowledge (perceptions, beliefs)and thus different psychological situations for theindividuals involved. Thus, for the individuals in ahurry, their context made them focus on being late


to give the presentation, which likely impeded theactivation of knowledge and responses relevant todealing with the emotional cues with which theywere presented.Another example that highlights the power of

context in emotional intelligence can be found instudies that examine variation in how attuned peo-ple are to social-emotional cues across differentcontexts (for a review see Sanchez-Burks, 2005).This work shows that individuals, particularlywithin certain cultural regions, exhibit substan-tially lower levels of emotional intelligence in workcontexts relative to non-work contexts. For exam-ple, when involved in a work-related project, indi-viduals are less able to detect emotional cues inspoken language than when they are involved inprojects not carried out in a work context (Sanchez-Burks, 2002).Other relevant findings deal with the extent to

which the occupational context involves emo-tional labor, or the extent to which a job requiresthe regulation of feelings and emotional expres-sions (Grandey, 2000). Jobs that involve frequentinteraction with customers require more emotionallabor, for example. A study in which occupationalcontexts were categorized as involving high or lowemotional labor found that EI played a more prom-inent role in performance outcomes when the jobinvolved more emotional labor (Joseph & Newman,2010). Relating these general findings to the CAPSmodel, it is likely that jobs with high compared tolow emotional labor are more likely to providepeople with emotional and social cues that canactivate EI abilities and processes to the extent theindividual possesses a high level of EI.6

These findings illustrate how contextually em-bedded emotional intelligence is. Moreover, thefindings support the notion that abilities held

are not necessarily abilities that are deployed, asthis depends to a large extent on the expectationsindividuals hold about different situationalcontexts.

Context and EI: Future Directions

A more explicit emphasis on how context influ-ences EI is likely to improve the ability of EI assess-ments to predict outcomes of interest. We alreadymentioned the importance of the matching princi-ple to help align predictors and outcomes (Ajzen &Fishbein, 1980; Millar & Tesser, 1989), and thiswould apply to context as well. It also might beuseful to provide profiles of peoples emotion rec-ognition and control abilities across different con-texts and roles, assessed with both implicit andmore conscious measures. Such a focus couldalso introduce different ways of defining levels ofemotional intelligence, as some individuals mayscore very high in a few specific contexts, whereasother individuals may score moderately well acrossa wider range of contexts.

Summary

Principle 3 of our analysis suggests that an ex-plicit consideration of context is needed to enhancecurrent conceptions of emotional intelligence. Wecould all be interested in or even immersed inemotional intelligence training, but if the situationswe find ourselves in activate other goals or beliefs,conflict may occur and our best intentions to think,feel, and behave in emotionally intelligent waysmay come undone. Other contexts may not provideenough emotion-related cues to activate EI-relevantknowledge and beliefs, even though an individualmight score high on some EI assessment. Thus, abetter understanding and appreciation of contextcan help explain why people considered emotion-ally intelligent can be socially ineffective at times,and why EI assessments at times might have lim-ited predictive validity above and beyond person-ality and IQ.

INTERACTIONS AMONG THE THREEPRINCIPLES

We organized this article by considering threedistinct principles separately, but the value addedby the present conceptualization also comes fromconsidering how these principles interact, as theymay produce a wide range of emotional intelli-

6 However, one potential caveat is that some emotion-ally intense roles can over time become burdensome anddistressing for individuals, not too different from situa-tions in which people are dealing with other types oftraumatic experiences. This would suggest that for someroles people might begin to use available social cues toengage emotion control abilities, such as suppression,that have been associated with poorer social outcomes(Gross & John, 2003). Nevertheless, it is important to keepin mind that for some emotional experiencessuch asthose involving little personal controlsuppression hasbeen shown not to produce negative outcomes and toactually be beneficial for the distressed individuals (Bo-nanno, Keltner, Holen, & Horowitz, 1995).


gencerelated outcomes. For example, in terms ofPrinciple 1 (dual psychological processes) andPrinciple 3 (context), often cognitive capacity canbe influenced by context. For example, researchindicates that stress due to the fear of being evalu-ated by others can lead to a reduction in cognitiveresources (cf. Schmader & Johns, 2003), and re-search indicates that stress can influence emotionrecognition (Hnggi, 2004). Thus, context and thestress it can give rise to (e.g., being evaluated by amanager or coworker, noise, crowding) can reducethe availability of cognitive resources as peopleattempt to manage stress (see Muraven & Baumeis-ter, 2000, for a review), which then negatively af-fects deliberate aspects of emotion recognition. Inaddition, deliberate processes are more likely to bedeployed not only when people have the requisitecognitive resources, but also when they are moti-vated to engage with the available, emotionally rel-evant information (Principle 2). EI aspects that aremore automatic, though, are less likely to be af-fected by low levels of motivation (Smith & De-Coster, 2000).In addition, many of the examples we have re-

ferred to in this review can be used to highlight theinteractions among the three principles. For exam-ple, regarding automatic and deliberate processes(Principle 1), we discussed work on theory of mindor how people understand psychological states inothers, which is important in helping determineemotional assessments (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al.,1985; Wellman et al., 2001). Some of this researchwith adults has shown that when people performtheory of mindrelated tasks under cognitive load,they can still carry out simple calculations to arriveat some understanding of others (e.g., Onishi &Baillargeon, 2005; Qureshi et al., 2010).In day-to-day life, different contexts (Principle 3)

can give rise to time pressure or to different moti-vations, such as not wanting to be in the companyof a certain individual or feeling bored at a meeting(Principle 2). The time pressure in the former caseand the lack of motivation in the latter could actu-ally reduce the extent to which people attend tothose around them, thus limiting deliberate pro-cessing related to emotional intelligence. Thisdoes not mean perceivers in these situations wouldfail to achieve any understanding, but that emo-tional understanding is likely to be of a more sim-ple and generic quality. Further, if the person whomakes you uncomfortable actually acts in positiveand kind ways, the lack of deliberate processingmay preclude considering the initial judgments

and revising them. Work by Berscheid and col-leagues (1976) has shown that for people not withinones motivational purview, impressions of themare likely to be simple, incoherent, and lessmemorable.The study of seminary students (Darley & Batson,

1973) provides another example of how the threefactors might interact. The seminary students whowere in a hurry were under a different motivationalstate (Principle 2) than those not in a hurry, andthis motivational state was determined by the con-text (Principle 3: different information receivedfrom instructors). Many people have experienceddeadlines and the threat of being late, whichchanges what they value and their prioritiesthatis, their motivation. For the seminary students whothought they were late, their goal caused many ofthem to disregard the person in need of help, whichcould have stemmed from various processes in-volving automatic and deliberate emotional intelli-gence (Principle 1). For example, one possibility isthat they just did not notice the person. Another isthat they noticed the person but categorized thesituation incorrectly. A third possibility is that thestudents accurately categorized the situation butoverrode the assessment through a deliberate pro-cess and decided they could not help due to thepressing and conflicting goal.Viewed without consideration for context the

first two outcomes might suggest to some observerslow levels of emotional intelligence, whereas thethird outcome might suggest coldness and lack ofcaring. On a different day the seminary studentsmight have been quite willing to help (like those inthe control group), which might lead some observ-ers to attribute high emotional intelligence to themfor being able to read the situation and for beinggenerous. Regardless of attribution, all three fac-torsdual mental processes, motivation, and con-textlikely conspired to create different decisionaland behavior paths for the seminary students in thedifferent conditions.Other possible interactions among the principles

may be derived from knowledge of how emotionscan influence information processing, which sug-gests that motivational processes can also be af-fected by the profile of different emotional states.Some positive emotional states, for example, canlead people to process information more simplyand to rely on prior knowledge (Bless et al.,1996), whereas others can make people thinkmore broadly or become more approach-oriented(Fredrickson, 2001; Gable & Harmon-Jones,


2008). A similar distinction has been made fornegative emotion states (Bodenhausen, Shep-pard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner & Keltner, 2001;Tiedens & Linton, 2001).In summary, the current discussion should help

demonstrate that the three principles we are pro-posing to help reconceptualize emotional intelli-gence are elements in an interactive mental system.The elements can interact and align in differentways, providing more nuanced explanations ofhow effective emotional intelligence emerges, help-ing explain why individuals thought to be high inemotional intelligence can enact ineffective behav-ior in some situations, and suggesting ideas forassessment and the alignment of predictors to out-comes to help improve EIs predictive validity.

CONCLUSION

For understanding many organizational behaviordynamics, emotional intelligence is an importantand relevant area of study. Its popular appealamong researchers and the public attests to this. Webelieve that those in the field face difficult ques-tions, as most researchers do, but this may alsostem from the use of conceptual frameworks thatare limited in scope. Available conceptual frame-works could be expanded, which could allow fornumerous new questions to be asked regardingemotional intelligence and the many twists andturns it can take. In this vein, we have proposedone approach that involves taking seriously thenotion that dual processes, motivation, and contexthave direct and substantial implications forwhether people think, feel, and behave in emotion-ally intelligent (or unintelligent) ways in organiza-tions. It is our hope that by delving deeper intothese processes researchers will have more guid-ance and knowledge at their disposal to pursuequestions and projects able to reveal interestingand novel insights about organizational life.

REFERENCES

Abraham, R. (1999). Emotional intelligence in organiza-tions: A conceptualization. Genetic, Social, and Gen-eral Psychology Monographs, 125, 209224.

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudesand predicting social behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall.

Bnziger, T., Grandjean, D., & Scherer, K. R. (2009). Emo-tion recognition from expressions in face, voice, and

body: The Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test(MERT). Emotion, 9(5), 691704.

Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearableautomaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54,462479.

Bargh, J. A., Lombardi, W. J., & Higgins, E. T. (1988).Automaticity of chronically accessible constructs inperson situation effects on person perception: Itsjust a matter of time. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 55(4), 599605.

Bargh, J. A., & Williams, L. E. (2007). The nonconsciousregulation of emotion. In J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook ofemotion regulation (pp. 429225). New York: Guil-ford Press.

Bar-On, R. (1997). Bar-On emotional quotient inventory:Technical manual. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems.

Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Doesthe autistic child have a theory of mind? Cogni-tion, 21(1), 3746.

Barrett, L. F. (2006). Solving the emotion paradox: Cate-gorization and the experience of emotion. Personal-ity and Social Psychology Review, 10(1), 2046.

Barrett, L. F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. W. (2004).Individual differences in working memory capacityand dual process theories of the mind. PsychologicalBulletin, 130(4), 553573.

Berridge, K. C. (2009). Wanting and liking: Observationsfrom the neuroscience and psychology laboratory.Inquiry, 52(4), 378398.

Berscheid, E., Graziano, W., Monson, T., & Dermer, M.(1976). Outcome dependency: Attention, attribution,and attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 34, 978989.

Bless, H., Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., Golisano, V., Rabe, C.,& Wlk, M. (1996). Mood and the use of scripts: Doesa happy mood really lead to mindlessness? Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 71(4), 665679.

Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L., & Kramer, G. P.(1994). Negative affect and social perception: Thedifferential impact of anger and sadness. EuropeanJournal of Social Psychology, 24, 4562.

Bonanno, G. A., Keltner, D., Holen, A., & Horowitz, M. J.(1995). When avoiding unpleasant emotions mightnot be such a bad thing: Verbal-autonomic responsedissociation and midlife conjugal bereavement. Jour-nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 975989.

Bryson, G., Bell, M., & Lysaker, P. (1997). Affect recogni-tion in schizophrenia: A function of global impair-ment or a specific cognitive deficit. Psychiatry Re-search, 71(2), 105113.


Bushman, B. J. (2002). Does venting anger feed or extin-guish the flame? Catharsis, rumination, distraction,anger, and aggressive responding. Personality andSocial Psychology Bulletin, 28, 724731.

Cervone, D., & Shoda, Y. (Eds.) (1999). The coherence ofpersonality: Social-cognitive bases of personalityconsistency, variability, and organization. NewYork: Guilford Publications.

Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual processtheories in social psychology. New York: GuilfordPress.

Chan, E., & Ybarra, O. (2002). Interaction goals and socialinformation processing: Underestimating ones part-ners but overestimating ones opponents. Social Cog-nition, 20, 409439.

Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1996). Automatic activa-tion of impression formation and memorizationgoals: Nonconscious goal priming reproduces effectsof explicit task instructions. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 71, 464478.

Cherniss, C. (2010). Emotional intelligence: New insightsand further clarifications. Industrial and Organiza-tional Psychology, 3, 183191.

Clark, M. S., & Isen, A. M. (1982). Toward understandingthe relationship between feeling states and socialbehavior. In A. Hastorf & A. M. Isen (Eds.), Cognitivesocial psychology (pp. 73108). New York: Elsevier.

Clark, T. F., Winkielman, P., & McIntosh, D. N. (2008).Autism and the extraction of emotion from brieflypresented facial expressions: Stumbling at the firststep of empathy. Emotion, 8(6), 803809.

Conway, A. R., Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Work-ing memory capacity and its relation to general in-telligence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(12), 547552.

Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973). From Jerusalem toJericho: A study of situational and dispositional vari-ables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 27, 100108.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation andself-determination in human behavior. New York:Plenum.

Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motiva-tion, personality and development. Philadelphia:Taylor and Francis/Psychology Press.

Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and thepsychodynamic unconscious. American Psycholo-gist, 49(8), 709724.

Fiori, M. (2009). A new look at emotional intelligence: Adual process framework. Personality and Social Psy-chology Review, 13(1), 2144.

Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions

in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build the-ory of positive emotions. American Psychologist,56(3), 218226.

Gable, P. A., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2008). Approach-moti-vated positive affect reduces breadth of attention.Psychological Science, 19(5), 476482.

Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2011). The asso-ciative-propositional evaluation model: Theory, evi-dence, and open questions. Advances in Experimen-tal Social Psychology, 44, 59127.

Gawronski, B., & Payne, K. B. (2010). Handbook of im-plicit social cognition: Measurement, theory and ap-plications. New York: Guilford Press.

Goldstein, H. W., Zedeck, S., & Goldstein, I. L. (2002). g:Is this your final answer? Human Performance, 15,123142.

Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence: Why it canmatter more than IQ. New York: Bantam.

Grandey, A. A. (2000). Emotional regulation in the work-place: A new way to conceptualize emotional labor.Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 5(1),95110.

Gross, J. J. (1998). Antecedent- and response-focusedemotion regulation: Divergent consequences for ex-perience, expression, and physiology. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 224237.

Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences intwo emotion regulation processes: Implications foraffect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 85(2), 348362.

Hnggi, Y. (2004). Stress and emotion recognition: Aninternet experiment using stress induction. SwissJournal of Psychology, 63, 113126.

Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenalcausality. Psychological Review, 51, 358374.

Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibil-ity, applicability, and salience. In E. T. Higgins &A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Hand-book of basic principles (pp. 133168). New York:Guilford Press.

Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regula-tory focus as a motivational principle. Advances inExperimental Social Psychology, 30, 146.

Hunt, E. (2011). Human intelligence. New York: Cam-bridge University Press.

Hunter, J. E., & Hunter, R. F. (1984). Validity and utilityof alternate predictors of job performance. Psycho-logical Bulletin, 96, 7298.

Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G.,Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Grasping theintentions of others with ones own mirror neuronsystem. PLOS Biology, 3, 529535.


Isaacowitz, D. M., Lckenhoff, C. E., Lane, R. D., Wright,R., Sechrest, L., Riedel, R., & Costa, P. T. (2007). Agedifferences in recognition of emotion in lexical stim-uli and facial expressions. Psychology and Aging,22(1), 147159.

Izard, C., Fine, S., Schultz, D., Mostow, A., Ackerman, B.,& Youngstrom, E. (2001). Emotion knowledge as apredictor of social behavior and academic compe-tence in children at risk. Psychological Science,12(1), 1823.

Job, V., Dweck, C. S., & Walton, G. M. (2010). Ego deple-tionIs it all in your head? Implicit theories aboutwillpower affect self-regulation. Psychological Sci-ence, 21(11), 16861693.

Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to disposi-tions: The attribution process in person perception.In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental so-cial psychology (Vol. 2pp. 220266). Washington,DC: Academic Press.

Joseph, D. L., & Newman, D. A. (2010). Emotional intel-ligence: An integrative meta-analysis and cascadingmodel. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95(1), 5478.

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. NewYork: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Keeley-Dyreson, M., Bailey, W., & Burgoon, J. K. (1991).The effects of stress and gender on nonverbal decod-ing accuracy in kinesic and vocalic channels. Hu-man Communication Research, 17, 584605.

Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal con-structs. New York: Norton.

Kross, E., & Ayduk, . (2011). Making meaning out ofnegative experiences by self-distancing. Current Di-rections in Psychological Science, 20, 187191.

Kross, E., & Mischel, W. (2010). From stimulus control toself-control. Towards an integrative understandingof the processes underlying willpower. In R. Hassin,K. Ochsner, & Y. Trope (Eds.), From society to brain:The new sciences of self-control (pp. 428446). NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Larsen, R. J. (2000). Toward a science of mood regulation.Psychological Inquiry, 11, 129141.

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(1),146159.

Lewicki, P., Hill, T., & Czyzewska, M. (1992). Noncon-scious acquisition of information. American Psy-chologist, 47(6), 796801.

Magnusson, D., & Endler, N. S. (1977). Interaction psy-chology: Present status and future prospects. In D.Magnusson & N. S. Endler (Eds.), Personality at thecrossroads: Current issues in interactional psychol-ogy (pp. 331). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

March, J. G. (2010). The ambiguities of experience.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Matsumoto, D., LeRoux, J., Wilson-Cohn, C., Raroque, J.,Kooken, K., Ekman, P. Yrizarry, N., Loewinger, S.,Uchida, H., & Yee, A. (2000). A new test to measureemotion recognition ability: Matsumoto and Ek-mans Japanese and Caucasian brief affect recogni-tion test (JACBART). Journal of Nonverbal Behavior,24, 179209.

Mauss, I. B., Bunge, S. A., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Automaticemotion regulation. Social and Personality Psychol-ogy Compass, 1, 146167.

Mauss, I. B., Cook, C., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Automaticemotion regulation during anger provocation. Jour-nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 698711.

Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotionalintelligence? In P. Salovey & D. Sluyter (Eds.), Emo-tional development and emotional intelligence: Ed-ucational implications (pp. 331). New York: Basic.

Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2002). TheMayer-Salovey-Caruso emotional intelligence test(MSCEIT), version 2.0. Toronto, Canada: MultiHealth Systems.

Meehl, P. E. (1986). Causes and effects of my disturbinglittle book. Journal of Personality Assessment, 50(3),370375.

Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-systemanalysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of will-power. Psychological Review, 106(1), 319.

Millar, M. G., & Tesser, A. (1989). The effects of affective-cognitive consistency and thought on the attitude-behavior relation. Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology, 25, 189202.

Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. NewYork: Wiley.

Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learningre-conceptualization of personality. PsychologicalReview, 80(4), 252283.

Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affectivesystem theory of personality: Reconceptualizing sit-uations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance inpersonality structure. Psychological Review, 102(2),246268.

Moll, G., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Level 1 perspective-taking at 24 months of age. British Journal of Devel-opmental Psychology, 24, 603613.

Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulationand depletion of limited resources. Does self-controlresemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126(2),247259.

Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T. J., Boykin, A. W.,Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., Halpern, D. F., Loehlin, J. C.,


Perloff, R., Sternberg, R. J., & Urbina, S. (1996). In-telligence: Knowns and unknowns. American Psy-chologist, 51, 77101.

Neuberg, S. L., & Fiske, S. T. (1987). Motivational influ-ences on impression formation: Outcome depen-dency, accuracy-driven attention, and individuatingprocesses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy, 53(3), 431444.

OBoyle, E. H., Humphrey, R. H., Pollack, J. M., Hawver,T. H., & Story, P. A. (2011). The relation betweenemotional intelligence and job performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 32,788818.

Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-oldinfants understand false beliefs? Science, 308(5719),255258.

Orgeta, V., & Phillips, L. H. (2008). Effects of age andemotional intensity on the recognition of facial emo-tion. Experimental Aging Research, 34(1), 6379.

OSullivan, M. (1982). Measuring the ability to recognizefacial expressions of emotion. In P. Ekman (Ed.),Emotion in the human face (pp. 281317). Cam-bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Park, D. C. (2000). The basic mechanism, accounting forage-related decline in cognitive function. In D. C.Park & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Cognitive aging: A primer(pp. 321). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Pitterman, H., & Nowicki, S. (2004). A test of the ability toidentify emotion in human standing and sitting pos-tures: The Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accura-cy-2 Posture Test (DANVA2-POS). Genetic, Social,and General Psychology Monographs, 130(2), 146162.

Plotkin, H. (2002). Intelligence as predisposed skepticalinduction engines. In R. J. Sternberg & J. C. Kaufman(Eds.), The evolution of intelligence (pp. 339358).Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Posner, M. I. (2012). Attention in a social world. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention andcognitive control. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Informationprocessing and cognition: The Loyola symposium.Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Qureshi, A. W., Apperly, I. A., & Samson, D. (2010).Executive function is necessary for perspective-se-lection, not level-1 visual perspective-calculation:Evidence from a dual-task study of adults. Cognition,117(2), 230236.

Rothbart, M. K., Posner, M. I., & Boylan, A. (1990). Reg-ulatory mechanisms in infant development. In J. T.Enns (Ed.), The development of attention: Researchand theory (pp. 4766). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Rusting, C. L., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). Regulating

responses to anger. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 74(3), 790803.

Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence.Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9, 185211.

Sanchez-Burks, J. (2002). Protestant relational ideologyand (in) attention to relational cues in work settings.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(4),919929.

Sanchez-Burks, J. (2005). Protestant relational ideology:The cognitive underpinnings and organizational im-plications of an American anomaly. Research in Or-ganizational Behavior, 26, 265305.

Schmader, T., & Johns, M. (2003). Converging evidencethat stereotype threat reduces working memory ca-pacity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,85(3), 440452.

Schmeichel, B. J. (2007). Attention control, memory up-dating, and emotion regulation temporarily reducethe capacity for executive control. Journal of Exper-imental Psychology: General, 136(2), 241255.

Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. (2004). General mental abilityin the world of work: Occupational attainment andjob performance. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 86(1), 162173.

Schutte, N., Malouff, J., Hall, L., Haggerty, D., Cooper, J.,Golden, C. & Dornheim, L. (1998). Development andvalidation of a measure of emotional intelligence.Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 167177.

Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systemsof reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 199, 322.

Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual process modelsin social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual inte-gration and links to underlying memory systems.Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 108131.

Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differ-ences in reasoning. Implications for the rationalitydebate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(5), 645726.

Tett, R. P., & Burnett, D. D. (2003). A personality trait-based interactionist model of job performance. Jour-nal of Applied Psychology, 88(3), 500517.

Tett, R. P., Fox, K. E., & Wang, A. (2005). Developmentand validation of a self-report measure of emotionalintelligence as a multidimensional trait domain. Per-sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(7), 859888.

Tett, R. P., & Guterman, H. A. (2000). Situation traitrelevance, trait expression, and cross-situationalconsistency: Testing a principle of trait activation.Journal of Research in Personality, 34, 397423.

Tiedens, L. Z., & Linton, S. (2001). Judgment under emo-


tional certainty and uncertainty: The effects of spe-cific emotions on information processing. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 81(6), 973988.

Tobin, R. M., Graziano, W. G., Vanman, E. J., & Tassinary,L. G. (2000). Personality, emotional experience, andefforts to control emotions. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 79(4), 656669.

Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008). The automaticity ofemotion recognition. Emotion, 8(1), 8195.

Van Rooy, D., & Viswesvaran, C. (2004). Emotional intel-ligence: A meta-analytic investigation of predictivevalidity and nomological net. Journal of VocationalBehavior, 65, 7195.

Vonk, R. (1999). Effects of outcome dependency on cor-respondence bias. Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin, 25, 382389.

Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achieve-ment motivation and emotion. Psychological Re-view, 92(4), 548573.

Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory of mind development: The truthabout false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655684.

Whalen, P. J., Rauch, S. L., Etcoff, N. L., McInerney, S. C.,Lee, M. B., & Jenike, M. A. (1998). Masked presenta-tions of emotional facial expressions modulateamygdala activity without explicit knowledge. Jour-nal of Neuroscience, 18(1), 411418.

Winkielman, P., Berridge, K. C., & Wilbarger, J. (2005).Emotion, behavior, and conscious experience: Oncemore without feeling. In L. F. Barrett, P. M. Nie-denthal, & P. Winkielman (Eds.), Emotion and con-sciousness (pp. 335362). New York: Guilford Press.

Zeidner, M., Matthews, G. M., & Roberts, R. D. (2003).Development of emotional intelligence: Towards amulti-level investment model.Human Development,46, 6996.

Oscar Ybarra ([email protected]) is a professor of psy-chology at the University of Michigan and directs theAdaptive Social Cognition Lab. He also is a faculty asso-ciate at the Research Center for Group Dynamics, Orga-nizational Studies, and the Center for Entrepreneurship.His research focuses on the interplay between decision-making/problem-solving and social-relational processes.See also www.oscarybarra.com.

Ethan Kross ([email protected]) is an assistant professorof psychology at the University of Michigan and directsthe Emotion and Self-Control Laboratory. He is also afaculty associate at the Research Center for Group Dy-namics and the Depression Research Center. His researchexamines the psychological processes that underlie self-control. See also selfcontrol.psych.lsa.umich.edu.

Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks ([email protected]) is an asso-ciate professor of management and organizations at theUniversity of Michigan Ross School of Business and afaculty associate at the Research Center for Group Dy-namics. His research focuses on the psychology ofideation, curation, and social-emotional and cross-cul-tural dynamics in organizations. See also www.jeffreysanchezburks.com.


Copyright of Academy of Management Perspectives is the property of Academy ofManagement and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to alistserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print,download, or email articles for individual use.

EMINT

Documents

Transcript of EMINT