Eminent Domain

121
1. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950 THE CT! OF M"NL", plainti-appellant, vs. THE "RREL"NO L"# COLLEGES, NC., defendant-appellee. City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa for appell Emmanuel Pelaez for appellee. TU"SON, J. $ Section 1 of Republic Act No. !" p#ovides$ Cities and %unicipalities a#e autho#i&ed to cont#act loans f#o% the Reconst 'inance Co#po#ation, the Philippine National Ban(, and)o# othe# entit* o# p the #ate of inte#est not e+ceedin ei ht pe# cent annu% fo# the pu#pose of pu#chasin o# e+p#op#iatin ho%esites ithin thei# #espective te##ito#ial and #esellin the% at cost to #esidents of the said cities and %unicipalit /he cou#t belo #uled that this p#ovision e%po e#s cities to pu#chase but not e+p#op#iate lands fo# the pu#pose of subdivision and #esale, and so dis%issed t action, hich see(s to conde%n, fo# the pu#pose ust stated, seve#al pa#cels of havin a co%bined a#ea of ", "0 s ua#e %ete#s and situated on 2e a#da St#eet, C Manila. 3n the cases of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration 45. R. No. 2- 0678 1 and Commonwealt of te Pilippines vs. !e "or#a 45. R. No. 2-197!8, e discussed at #eat len th the e+tent of the Philippine 5ove#n%ent:s po e# to c p#ivate p#ope#t* fo# #esale. A%on othe# thin s, e said$ 3t has been t#ul* said that the asse#tion of the #i ht on the pa#t of the ta(e the p#ope#t* of one citi&en and t#ansfe# it to anothe#, even fo# a ful co%pensation, hen the public inte#est is not p#o%oted the#eb*, is clai%in despotic po e#, and one inconsistent ith eve#* ust p#inciple and funda% %a+i% of a f#ee ove#n%ent. 4 7 C. ;. S., 6 0.8 3n a b#oad sense, e+p#op#iation of la# e estates, t#usts in pe#petuit*, an e%b#aces a hole to n, o# la# e section of a to n o# cit*, bea#s di#ect the public elfa#e. /he si&e of the land e+p#op#iated, the la# e nu%be# of bene<ted, and the e+tent of social and econo%ic #efo#% secu#ed b* the conde%nation, clothes the e+p#op#iation ith public inte#est and public us e+p#op#iation in such cases tends to abolish econo%ic slave#*, feudalistic p#actices, endless con=icts bet een landlo#ds and tenants, and othe# evils to co%%unit* p#ospe#it* and content%ent and public peace and o#de#. Althou cou#ts a#e not in a #ee%ent as to the tests to applied in dete#%inin he use is public o# not, so%e o so fa# in the di#ection of a libe#al const#u hold that public use is s*non*%ous ith public bene<t, public utilit*, o# advanta e, and to autho#i&e the e+e#cise of the po e# of e%inent do%ain to p#o%ote such public bene<t, etc., especiall* he#e the inte#est involved a conside#able %a nitude. 4 7 C. ;. S.> 6 ?, 6 9> see also People of Pue#to R Easte#n Su a# Associate et al., 1@! 'ed. d , ?1!.8 3n so%e instances, sl have been ac ui#ed b* conde%nation. /he hi hest cou#t of Ne o#( State h

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Transcript of Eminent Domain

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950THE CITY OF MANILA,plaintiff-appellant,vs.THE ARRELANO LAW COLLEGES, INC.,defendant-appellee.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Naawa for appellant.Emmanuel Pelaez for appellee.TUASON,J.:Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 provides:

Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or other entity or person at the rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and municipalities.

The court below ruled that this provision empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action, which seeks to condemn, for the purpose just stated, several parcels of land having a combined area of 7,270 square meters and situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.

In the cases ofGuido vs. Rural Progress Administration(G. R. No. L-2089)1andCommonwealth of the Philippines vs. De Borja(G. R. No. L-1496),2we discussed at great length the extent of the Philippine Government's power to condemn private property for resale. Among other things, we said:

It has been truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (29 C. J. S., 820.)

In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, endless conflicts between landlords and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interest involved are of considerable magnitude. (29 C. J. S.; 823, 824; see also People of Puerto Rico vs. Eastern Sugar Associate et al., 156 Fed. [2d], 316.) In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by condemnation. The highest court of New York State has ruled that slum clearance and erection of houses for low-income families were public purpose for which New York City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. and this decision was followed by similar ones in other states. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and unsanitary dwellings diminished the potentialities of epidemics, crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities, and promote the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray et al. vs. La Guardia, 52 N. e. [2d], 884; General Development Coop. vs. City of Detroit, 33 N. W. [2d], 919; Weizner vs. Stichman, 64 N. Y. S. [2d], 50.) But it will be noted that in all these cases and of similar nature extensive areas were involved and numerous people and the general public benefited by the action taken.

The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not insure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifices for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.

No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can made; each case has to be judged according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. to make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing and area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupations or those who want to build thereon.

We are inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for homesites. The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of only meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted in the decisions above cited. The National Government may not confer its instrumentalities authority which itself may not exercise. A stream can not run higher than its source.

Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is weaker for the condemnor. In the first place, the land that is the subject of the present expropriation is only one-third of the land sought to be taken in the Guido case, and about two-thirds of that involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding. In the second place, the Arellano Colleges' land is situated in a highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons who are not bona fide tenants. Lastly, this land was brought by the defendant for a university site to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for schools of higher learning.

To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. (29 C. J. S., 884-885.) In City of Manila vs. Manila Chinese Community (40 Phil., 349), this Court, citing American decision, laid done this rule:

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

And this passage in Blackstone's Commentaries on the English Law is cited in that decision: "So great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exist a very great necessity thereof."

Perhaps modern decisions are not so exigent. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary. does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such benefits. (29 C. J. S., 386.) But measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private character of the intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. The land in question has cost the owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they intend to borrow the money with a view to disposing of the property later for a profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only want to own their own homes, are plenty elsewhere. On the other hand, the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property but had the plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities. And again, while a handful of people stand to profits by the expropriation, the development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of a young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake. As the Rural Progress Administration, the national agency lands for resale as homesites and to which the petition to purchase the land in question on behalf of the occupants was referred by the President, turning down the occupants request after proper investigation, commented that "the necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a permanent site of its own is imperative not only because denial of the same would hamper the objectives of that educational institution, but it would likewise be taking a property intended already for public benefit." The Mayor of the City of Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep this land.

The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed without costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ.,concur.1. United States vs. Causby U.S. Supreme Court

UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

328 U.S. 256

UNITED STATESv.CAUSBY et ux.No. 630.

Argued May 1, 1946.Decided May 27, 1946.Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil Aeronautics Board where there are no army or navy regulations to the contrary.[328 U.S. 256, 257]Mr. Walter J. Cummings, Jr., of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. William E. Comer, of Greensboro, N.C., for respondent.

[328 U.S. 256, 258]

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a case of first impression. The problem presented is whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes. The Court of Claims held that there was a taking and entered judgment for respondent, one judge dissenting. 60 F.Supp. 751. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted becuase of the importance of the question presented.

Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the property-which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide angle1 approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority2 passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree.3The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease executed in May, 1942, for a term commencing June 1, 1942 and ending June 30, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six[328 U.S. 256, 259]months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is the earlier.

Various aircraft of the United States use this airport-bombers, transports and fighters. The direction of the prevailing wind determines when a particular runway is used. The north-west-southeast runway in question is used about four per cent of the time in taking off and about seven per cent of the time in landing. Since the United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over respondents' land buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane accidents on respondents' property, there have been several accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place. These are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims. On the basis of these facts, it found that respondents' property had depreciated in value. It held that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000.[328 U.S. 256, 260]I. The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 171 et seq., as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq., 49 U. S.C.A. 401 et seq. Under those statutes the United States has 'complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' over this country. 49 U.S.C. 176(a), 49 U.S.C.A. 176(a). They grant any citizen of the United States 'a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce4 through the navigable air space of the United States.' 49 U.S.C. 403, 49 U.S.C.A. 403. And 'navigable air space' is defined as 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 49 U.S.C. 180, 49 U.S.C.A. 180. And it is provided that 'such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation.' Id. It is, therefore, argued that since these flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which had been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of travel through the airspace. The United States concludes that when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. It says that at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air navigation. It also argues that the landowner does not own superadjacent airspace which he has not subjected to possession by the erection of structures or other occupancy. Moreover, it is argued that even if the United States took airspace owned by respondents, no compensable damage was shown. Any damages are said to be merely consequential for which no compensation may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.

It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe-Cujus[328 U.S. 256, 261]est solum ejus est usque ad coelum.5But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The ai is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.

But that general principle does not control the present case. For the United States conceded on oral argument that if the flights over respondents' property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken. United States v. Miller,317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 147 A.L. R. 55. Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery. Id. And that value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use. United States v. Powelson,319 U.S. 266, 275, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 1053, and cases cited. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete.6It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.

We agree that in those circumstances there would be a taking. Though it would be only an easement of flight[328 U.S. 256, 262]which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land-that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It would not be a case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,233 U.S. 546, 34 S.Ct. 654, L.R.A.1915A, 887. In that case property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like, incidental to the operations of the trains. In the supposed case the line of flight is over the land. And the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for the runways themselves.

There is no material difference between the supposed case and the present one, except that here enjoyment and use of the land are not completely destroyed. But that does not seem to us to be controlling. The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some value would remain. But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value.7That was the philosophy of Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.[328 U.S. 256, 263]United States,260 U.S. 327, 43 S.Ct. 135. In that case the petition alleged that the United States erected a fort on nearby land, established a battery and a fire control station there, and fired guns over petitioner's land. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, reversed the Court of Claims which dismissed the petition on a demurrer, olding that 'the specific facts set forth would warrant a finding that a servitude has been imposed.'8260 U.S. at page 330, 43 S.Ct. at page 137. And see Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245, 140 A.L.R. 1352. Cf. United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, D.C., 55 F.Supp. 461.

The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes was that approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority does not change the result. The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the public domain is 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 49 U.S.C. 180, 49 U.S.C.A. 180. If that agency prescribed 83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the question of the validity of the regulation. But nothing of the sort has been done. The path of glide governs the method of operating- of landing or taking off. The altitude required for that operation is not the minimum safe altitude of flight which is the downward reach of the navigable airspace. The minimum prescribed by the authority is 500 feet during the day and 1000 feet at night for air carriers (Civil Air Regulations, Pt. 61, 61.7400, 61.7401, Code Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., Tit. 14, ch. 1) and from 300 to 1000 feet for[328 U.S. 256, 264]other aircraft depending on the type of plane and the character of the terrain. Id., Pt. 60, 60.350-60.3505, Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., supra. Hence, the flights in question were not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed within the public domain. If any airspace needed for landing or taking off were included, flights which were so close to the land as to render it uninhabitable would be immune. But the United States concedes, as we have said, that in that event there would be a taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide is not the minimum safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the statute. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the power to prescribe air traffic rules. But Congress has defined navigable airspace only in terms of one of them-the minimum safe altitudes of flight.

We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be run. The principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in case overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land.9The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as the can occupy or use in connection with the land. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 9 Cir., 84 F.2d 755. The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense-by the erection of buildings and the like-is not material. As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it. We would not doub that if the United States erected[328 U.S. 256, 265]an elevated railway over respondents' land at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even though none of the supports of the structure rested on the land.10The reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it. While the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is used. The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface.11

In this case, as in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, supra, the damages were not merely consequential. They were the product of a direct invasion of respondents' do-[328 U.S. 256, 266]main. As stated in United States v. Cress,243 U.S. 316, 328, 37 S.Ct. 380, 385, '... it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking.'

We said in United States v. Powelson, supra, 319 U.S. at page 279, 63 S.Ct. at page 1054, that while the meaning of 'property' as used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal question, 'it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law.' If we look to North Carolina law, we reach the same result. Sovereignty in the airspace rests in the State 'except where granted to and assumed by the United States.' Gen.Stats. 1943, 63-11. The flight of aircraft is lawful 'unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water beneath.' Id., 63-13. Subject to that right of flight, 'ownership of the space above the lands and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath.' Id. 63-12. Our holding that there was an invasion of respondents' property is thus not inconsistent with the local law governing a landowner's claim to the immediate reaches of the superadjacent airspace.

The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. We need not speculate on that phase of the present case. For the findings of the Court[328 U.S. 256, 267]of Claims plainly establish that there was a diminution in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level flights were the direct and immediate cause. We agree with the Court of Claims that a servitude has been imposed upon the land.

II. By 145(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 250(1), 28 U.S.C.A . 250(1), the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear and determine 'All claims (except for pensions) founded upon the Constitution of the United States or ... upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States.'

We need not decide whether repeated trespasses might give rise to an implied contract. Cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, supra. If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine. See Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co.,113 U.S. 59, 67, 5 S.Ct. 717, 721; Hurley v. Kincaid,285 U.S. 95, 104, 52 S.Ct. 267, 269; Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co.,309 U.S. 18, 21, 60 S.Ct. 413, 415. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in this case is clear.

III. The Court of Claims held, as we have noted, that an easement was taken. But the findings of fact contain no precise description as to its nature. It is not described in terms of frequency of flight, permissible altitude, or type of airplane. Nor is there a finding as to whether the easement taken was temporary or permanent. Yet an accurate description of the property taken is essential, since that interest vests in the United States. United States v. Cress, supra,243 U.S. 328, 329, 37 S.Ct. 385, 386, and cases cited. It is true that the Court of Claims stated in its opinion that the easement taken was permanent. But the deficiency in findings cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion. United States v. Esnault-Pelterie,299 U.S. 201, 205, 206 S., 57 S.Ct. 159, 161, 162; United States v. Seminole Nation,299 U.S. 417, 422, 57 S.Ct. 283, 287. Findings of fact on every 'material issue' are a statutory[328 U.S. 256, 268]requirement. 53 Stat. 752, 28 U.S.C. 288, 28 U.S.C.A. 288. The importance of findings of fact based on evidence is emphasized here by the Court of Claims' treatment of the nature of the easement. It stated in its opinion that the easement was permanent because the United States 'no doubt intended to make some sort of arrangement whereby it could use the airport for its military planes whenever it had occasion to do so.' (60 F. Supp. 758.) That sounds more like conjecture rather than a conclusion from evidence; and if so, it would not be a proper foundation for liability of the United States. We do not stop to examine the evidence to determine whether it would support such a finding, if made. For that is not our function. United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, supra, 299 U.S. at page 206, 57 S.Ct. at page 162.

Since on this record it is not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent or a temporary one, it would be premature for us to consider whether the amount of the award made by the Court of Claims was proper.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity with this opin on.

REVERSED.

Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.

The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property' shall not 'be taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Court holds today that the Government has 'taken' respondents' property by repeatedly flying Army bombers directly above respondents' land at a height of eighty-three feet where the light and noise from these planes caused respondents to lose sleep and their chickens to be killed. Since the effect of the Court's decision is[328 U.S. 256, 269]to limit, by the imposition of relatively absolute Constitutional barriers, possible future adjustments through legislation and regulation which might become necessary with the growth of air transportation, and since in my view the Constitution does not contain such barriers, I dissent.

The following is a brief statement of the background and of the events that the Court's opinion terms a 'taking' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment: Since 1928 there has been an airfield some eight miles from Greensboro, North Carolina. In April, 1942, this airport was taken over by the Greensboro-High Point Municipal Airport Authority and it has since then operated as a municipal airport. In 1942 the Government, by contract, obtained the right to use the field 'concurrently, jointly, and in common' with other users. Years before, in 1934, respondents had bought their property, located more than one-third of a mile from the airport. Private planes from the airport flew over their land and farm buildings from 1934 to 1942 and are still doing so. But though these planes disturbed respondents to some extent, Army bombers, which started to fly over the land in 1942 at a height of eighty-three feet, disturbed them more because they were larger, came over more frequently, made a louder noise, and at night a greater glare was caused by their lights. This noise and glare disturbed respondents' sleep, frightened them, and made them nervous. The noise and light also frightened respondents' chickens so much that many of them flew against buildings and were killed.

The Court's opinion seems to indicate that the mere flying of planes through the column of air directly above respondents' land does not constitute a 'taking'. Consequently, it appears to be noise and glare, to the extent and under the circumstances shown here, which make the government a seizer of private property. But the allegation[328 U.S. 256, 270]of noise and glare resulting in damages, constitutes at best an action in tort where there might be recovery if the noise and light constituted a nuisance, a violation of a statute,1 or were the result of negligence.2But the Government has not consented to be sued in the Court of Claims except in actions based on express or implied contract. And there is no implied contract here, unless by reason of the noise and glare caused by the bombers the Government can be said to have 'taken' respondents' property in a Constitutional sense. The concept of taking property as used in the Constitution has heretofore never been given so sweeping a meaning. The Court's opinion presents no case where a man who makes noise or shines light onto his neighbor's property has been ejected from that property for wrongfully taking possession of it. Nor would anyone take seriously a claim that noisy automobiles passing on a highway are taking wrongful possession of the homes located thereon, or that a city elevated train which greatly interferes with the sleep of those who live next to it wrongfully takes their property. Even the one case in this Court which in considering the sufficiency of a complaint gave the most elastic meaning to the phrase 'private property be taken' as used in the Fifth Amendment, did not go so far. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.[328 U.S. 256, 271]327, 43 S.Ct. 135. I am not willing, nor do I think the Constitution and the decisions authorize me to extend that phrase so as to guarantee an absolute Constitutional right to relief not subject to legislative change, which is based on averments that at best show mere torts committed by Government agents while flying over land. The future adjustment of the rights and remedies of property owners, which might be found necessary because of the flight of planes at safe altitudes, should, especially in view of the imminent expansion of air navigation, be left where I think the Constitution left it, with Congress.

Nor do I reach a different conclusion because of the fact that the particular circumstance which under the Court's opinion makes the tort here absolutely actionable, is the passing of planes through a column of air at an elevation of eighty-three feet directly over respondents' property. It is inconceivable to me that the Constitution guarantees that the airspace of this Nation needed for air navigation, is owned by the particular persons who happen to own the land beneath to the same degree as they own the surface below.3No rigid Constitutional rule, in my judgment, commands that the air must be considered as marked off into separate compartments by imaginary metes and bounds in order to synchronize air ownership with land ownership. I think that the Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to control all navigable airspace. Congress has already acted under that power. It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that 'the United States of America is ... to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the[328 U.S. 256, 272]air space (over) the United States.' This was done under the assumption that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution gave Congress the same plenary power to control navigable airspace as its plenary power over navigable waters. H. Rep. No. 572, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10; H. Rep. No. 1162, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14; United States v. Commodore Park, Inc.,324 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 803. To make sure that the airspace used for air navigation would remain free, Congress further declared that 'navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation,' and finally stated emphatically that there exists 'a public right of freedom of transit ... through the navigable airspace of the United States.' Congress thus declared that the air is free, not subject to private ownership, and not subject to delimitation by the courts. Congress and those acting under its authority were the only ones who had power to control and regulate the flight of planes. 'Navigable air-space' was defined as 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 49 U.S.C. 180, 49 U.S.C.A. 180. Thus, Congress has given the Civil Aeronautics Authority exclusive power to determine what is navigable airspace subject to its exclusive control. This power derives specifically from the Section which authorizes the Authority to prescribe 'air traffic rules governing the flight of, and for the navigation, protection, and identification of, aircraft, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collisions between aircraft, and between aircraft and land or water vehicles.' 49 U.S.C.A. 551. Here there was no showing that the bombers flying over respondents' land violated any rule or regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Yet, unless we hold the Act unconstitutional, at least such a showing would be necessary before the courts could act without interfering with the exclusive authority which Congress gave to the administrative agency. Not even a[328 U.S. 256, 273]showing that the Authority has not acted at all would be sufficient. For in that event, were the courts to have any authority to act in this case at all, they should stay their hand till the Authority has acted.

The broad provisions of the Congressional statute cannot properly be circumscribed by making a distinction as the Court's opinion does between rules of safe altitude of flight while on the level of cross-country flight and rules of safe altitude during landing and taking off. First, such a distinction can not be maintained from the practical standpoint. It is unlikely that Congress intended that the Authority prescribe safe altitudes for planes making cross-country flights, while at the same time it left the more hazardous landing and take-off operations unregulated. The legislative history, moreover, clearly shows that the Authority's power to prescribe air traffic rules includes the power to make rules governing landing and take-off. Nor is the Court justified in ignoring that history by labeling rules of safe altitude while on the level of cross-country flight as rules prescribing the safe altitude proper and rules governing take-off and landing as rules of operation. For the Conference Report explicitly states that such distinctions were purposely eliminated from the original House Bill in order that the Section on air traffic rules 'might be given the broadest construction by the ... ( Civil Aeronautics Authority) ... and the courts.'4In construing the statute narrowly the Court[328 U.S. 256, 274]thwarts the intent of Congress. A proper broad construction, such as Congress commanded, would not permit the Court to decide what it has today without declaring the Act of Congress unconstitutional. I think the Act given the broad construction intended is constitutional.

No greater confusion could be brought about in the coming age of air transportation than that which would result were courts by Constitutional interpretation to hamper Congress in its efforts to keep the air free. Old concepts of private ownership of land should not be introduced into the field of air regulation. I have no doubt that Congress will, if not handicapped by judicial interpretations of the Constitution, preserve the freedom of the air, and at the same time, satisfy the just claims of aggrieved persons. The noise of newer, larger, and more powerful planes may grow louder and louder and disturb people more and more. But the solution of the problems precipitated by these technological advances and new ways of living cannot come about through the application of rigid Constitutional restraints formulated and enforced by the courts. What adjustments may have to be made, only the future can reveal. It seems certain, however,[328 U.S. 256, 275]the courts do not possess the techniques or the personnel to consider and act upon the complex combinations of factors entering into the problems. The contribution of courts must be made through the awarding of damages for injuries suffered from the flying of planes, or by the granting of injunctions to prohibit their flying. When these two simple remedial devices are elevated to a Constitutional level under the Fifth Amendment, as the Court today seems to have done, they can stand as obstacles to better adapted techniques that might be offered by experienced experts and accepted by Congress. Today's opinion is, I fear, an opening wedge for an unwarranted judicial interference with the power of Congress to develop solutions for new and vital and national problems. In my opinion this case should be reversed on the ground that there has been no 'taking' in the Constitutional sense.

Mr. Justice BURTON joins in this dissent.2. G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.

Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.REYES, J. B. L.,J.:Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.

SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)

Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.

A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity,per selawful, is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primiciasvs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)

The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it others; to refuse the application of one landowner or lessee and to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for precisely the same privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under our government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.

As was said inCity of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180: "It seems from the foregoing authorities to be well established that municipal ordinances placing restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid, specify the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or business; and must admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens alike who will comply with such rules and conditions; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal authorities between citizens who will so comply. (Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d), pp. 394-395).

It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Taitvs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance whichpermanentlyso restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co.vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlumvs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eatonvs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylorvs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).

Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice.If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis supplied.)

The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c), of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:

SEC. 2243.Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

x x x x x x x x x

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.

Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.

We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costsde oficio. So ordered.3. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914)Richards v. Washington Terminal CompanyNo. 52Argued November 7, 1913Decided May 4, 1914233 U.S. 546ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALSOF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIASyllabusAlthough in England, Parliament, being omnipotent, may authorize the taking of private property for public use without compensation, the English courts decline to place an unjust construction on its acts, and, unless so clear as not to admit any other meaning, do not interpret them as interfering with rights of private property.

Legislation of Congress is different from that of Parliament, as it must be construed in the light of that provision of the Fifth Amendment which forbids the taking of private property for public use without compensation.

While Congress may legalize, within the sphere of its jurisdiction, what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public use.

While the owners of a railroad constructed and operated for the public use, although with private property for private gain, are not, in the absence of negligence, subject to action in behalf of owners of neighboring private property for the ordinary damages attributable to the operation of the railroad, a property owner may be entitled to compensation for such special damages as devolve exclusively upon his property and not equally upon all the neighboring property.

In this case,heldthat an owner of property near the portal of a tunnel in the District of Columbia constructed under authority of Congress, while not entitled to compensation for damages caused by the usual gases and smoke emitted from the tunnel by reason of the proper operation of the railroad, is entitled to compensation for such direct, peculiar and substantial damages as specially affect his property and diminish its value.

37 App.D.C. 289 reversed.

The facts, which involve the right, under the Fifth Amendment, of an owner to be compensated for special and peculiar damages to his property by reason of the operation of a railroad near the premises, are stated in the opinion.

Page 233 U. S. 548

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, commenced this action in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to recover for the damage to his property resulting from the maintenance of an alleged nuisance by defendant by means of the operation of a railroad and tunnel upon its own lands near to, but not adjoining, those of plaintiff. Defendant having pleaded not guilty, the issue came on for trial by jury, and, at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, a verdict was directed in favor of defendant. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment (37 App.D.C. 289), and a writ of error brings the controversy under the review of this Court.

An agreed abridgment of the evidence upon which the ruling of the trial justice was based is embodied in the bill of exceptions. From this it appears that plaintiff is and has been since the year 1901 the owner of Lot 34 in Square 693 in the City of Washington, having a frontage of 20 ft. upon the westerly side of New Jersey Avenue, Southeast, and an average depth of 81 ft., with improvements thereon consisting of a three-story and basement brick dwelling house containing ten rooms, known as No. 415 New Jersey Avenue. The rear windows upon all the floors of the house open in the direction of the railroad tracks that lead from defendant's tunnel. The south portal of this tunnel opens within Square 693, and near its Northeasterly corner, and the tunnel extends thence in a northeasterly direction, passing under the Capitol and Library grounds and First Street N.E. to the Union Station at Massachusetts Avenue. There are two sets of railroad tracks in the tunnel and leading from it, and as these emerge from the south portal, they extend in a general southwesterly direction up an incline or grade across the central portion of Square 693 on to an elevated structure which carries the tracks over and beyond South Capitol Street. The tunnel and these tracks are used for the passage of trains running both northwardly and southwardly, about thirty each day, all of them being passenger trains with the exception of an occasional shifting engine. The trains frequently pass in and out of the tunnel without stopping, but trains also very often stop at or near a switch tower that is situate near the center of Square 693. From the nearest portion of plaintiff's house to the center of the south portal, the distance in a straight line is about 114 ft., there being three intervening dwelling houses, two of which have been purchased and are now owned by defendant? From the rear end of plaintiff's lot to the middle of the tracks southwestwardly from the portal the distance in a straight line is about 90 ft. Plaintiff's property has been damaged by the volumes of dense black or gray smoke, and also by dust and dirt, cinders and gases, emitted from the trains while passing over the tracks and in or out of the tunnel, or standing upon the tracks near the signal tower. There is a fanning system installed in the tunnel which causes the gases and smoke emitted from engines while in the tunnel to be forced out of the south portal, and these gases and smoke contaminate the air, and also add to the inconvenience suffered by plaintiff in the occupation of his property. His house was pleasant and comfortable for purposes of occupation before the construction of the tunnel and tracks, but since then it has not only depreciated in value, but the tenant removed therefrom, and plaintiff was obliged to occupy the house himself by reason of his inability to rent it. The property has depreciated from a value of about $5,500 to about $4,000, and the rental value from $30 per month to $20 per month. The furniture and other belongings in the house have been depreciated from a value of $1,200 to $600, all of which depreciation is due to the presence of smoke, cinders, and gases emitted from passing trains and from the mouth of the tunnel, which smoke, cinders, and gases enter the dwelling house and settle upon the furniture and other personal property contained in it, contaminating the air and rendering the house objectionable as a habitation. The house has also been damaged by vibrations caused by the movement of trains on the track or in the tunnel, resulting in cracking the walls and wallpaper, breaking glass in the windows, and disturbing the peace and slumber of the occupants.

The defendant, the Washington Terminal Company, is the owner of the tunnel and of the tracks therein, but its ownership of tracks ceases at the south portal. The tracks extending therefrom in a southwesterly direction are owned and used by other railroad companies, but the movement of the trains is controlled by defendant.

The tunnel and the tracks leading from it across Square 693 were located and constructed and are now maintained under the authority of Acts of Congress of February 12, 1901, and February 28, 1903, 31 Stat. 774, c. 354; 32 Stat. 909, c. 856, in accordance with plans and specifications approved by those acts. No claim is made by plaintiff that the tunnel, the tracks in Square 693, and the trains operated therein and thereon were constructed, operated, or maintained in a negligent manner, and it is conceded that the tunnel and tracks were built upon property acquired by purchase or condemnation proceedings, and were constructed under authority of the acts of Congress and of permits issued by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

Such being the essential facts to be deduced from the evidence, we have reached the conclusion, for reasons presently to be stated, that with respect to most of the elements of damage to which the plaintiff's property has been subjected, the courts below correctly held them to bedamnum absque injuria;but that with respect to such damage as is attributable to the gases and smoke emitted from locomotive engines while in the tunnel, and forced out of it by means of the fanning system through a portal located so near to plaintiff's property that these gases and smoke materially contribute to injure the furniture and to render the house less habitable than otherwise it would be, there is a right of recovery.

The acts of Congress referred to, followed by the construction of the tunnel and railroad tracks substantially in the mode prescribed, had the effect of legalizing the construction and operation of the railroad, so that its operation, while properly conducted and regulated, cannot be deemed to be a public nuisance. Yet it is sufficiently obvious that the acts done by defendant, if done without legislative sanction, would form the subject of an action by plaintiff to recover damages as for a private nuisance.

At the same time, there is no exclusive and permanent appropriation of any portion of plaintiff's land, which, indeed, does not even abut upon defendant's property. The acts of Congress do not in terms provide for the payment of compensation to property owners damnified through the construction and operation of the tunnel and railroad lines in question, except to those whose lands, or a portion thereof, were necessarily appropriated. For damages, whether direct or consequential, to noncontiguous parcels such as that of plaintiff, there is no express provision. But 9 of the Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 916, c. 856, authorizes the Terminal Company to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, "the lands and property necessary for all and every the purposes contemplated" by the several acts of Congress under which the tunnel and railroad were constructed and are operated. This grant of the power of condemnation is very broad, but it has not been acted upon by the company in the case of the present plaintiff. And since he is not wholly excluded from the use and enjoyment of his property, there has been no "taking" of the land in the ordinary sense.

The courts of England, in a series of decisions, have dealt with the general subject now under consideration.Rex v. Pease,4 Barn. & Ad. 30, 40, 1 Nev. & M. 690, 2 L.J. Mag. Cas. N.S. 26, 22 Eng. Rul. Cas. 71;Vaughan v. Taff Vale R. Co.,5 Hurl. & Nor. 679, 29 L.J. Exch. 247, 1 Eng.Rul.Cas. 296;Jones v. Festiniog Ry. Co.,L.R. 3 Q.B. 733;Hammersmith &c. Ry. Co. v. Brand,L.R. 4 H.L. 171, 38 L.J.Q.B. 265, 1 Eng.Rul.Cas. 623;Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill,L.R. 6 App.Cas. 193, 201, 203;London & Brighton Ry. Co. v. Truman,L.R. 11 App.Cas. 45. The rule to be deduced from these cases is that, while no action will lie for an invasion of private rights necessarily resulting from the establishment and operation of railways and other public works under the express sanction of an act of Parliament, yet that such acts are to be strictly construed so as not to impair private rights unless the legislative purpose to do so appears by express words or necessary implication. In short, Parliament, being omnipotent, may authorize the taking of private property for public use without compensation to the owner, but the courts decline to place an unjust construction upon its acts, and will not interpret them as interfering with rights of private property unless the language be so clear as to admit of no other meaning.

But the legislation we are dealing with must be construed in the light of the provision of the Fifth Amendment -- "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation" -- and is not to be given an effect inconsistent with its letter or spirit. The doctrine of the English cases has been generally accepted by the courts of this country, sometimes with scant regard for distinctions growing out of the constitutional restrictions upon legislative action under our system. Thus, it has been said that "a railroad authorized by law and lawfully operated cannot be deemed a private nuisance;" that "what the legislature has authorized to be done cannot be deemed unlawful," etc. These and similar expressions have at times been indiscriminately employed with respect to public and to private nuisances. We deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment, as under state constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that, while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public use.Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Angel,41 N.J.Eq. 316, 329;Costigan v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,54 N.J.L. 233;Cogswell v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co.,103 N.Y. 10;Garvey v. Long Island R. Co.,159 N.Y. 323;Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas Light Co.,122 N.Y. 18, 29;Sadlier v. City of New York,81 N.Y.S. 308.

But the question remains, in cases of the class now before us, what is to be deemed a private nuisance such as amounts to a taking of property? And, by a great and preponderant weight of judicial authority in those states whose constitutions contain a prohibition of the taking of private property for public use without compensation, substantially in the form employed in the Fifth Amendment, it has become established that railroads constructed and operated for the public use, although with private capital and for private gain, are not subject to actions in behalf of neighboring property owners for the ordinary damages attributable to the operation of the railroad, in the absence of negligence. Such roads are treated as public highways, and the proprietors as public servants, with the exemption normally enjoyed by such servants from liability to private suit, so far as concerns the incidental damages accruing to owners of nonadjacent land through the proper and skillful management and operation of the railways. Any diminution of the value of property not directly invaded nor peculiarly affected, but sharing in the common burden of incidental damages arising from the legalized nuisance, is held not to be a "taking" within the constitutional provision. The immunity is limited to such damages as naturally and unavoidably result from the proper conduct of the road and are shared generally by property owners whose lands lie within range of the inconveniences necessarily incident to proximity to a railroad. It includes the noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the normal and nonnegligent operation of a railroad.Transportation Co. v. Chicago,99 U. S. 635,99 U. S. 641;Beseman v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,50 N.J.L. 235, 240, 13 A. 164,aff'd,52 N.J.L. 221.

That the constitutional inhibition against the taking of private property for public use without compensation does not confer a right to compensation upon a landowner, no part of whose property has been actually appropriated and who has sustained only those consequential damages that are necessarily incident to proximity to the railroad, has been so generally recognized that in some of the states (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming are, we believe, among the number), constitutions have been established providing in substance that private property shall not be takenor damagedfor public use without compensation.

The immunity from liability for incidental injuries is attended with a considerable degree of hardship to the private landowner, and has not been adopted without some judicial protest. But, as pointed out by Chief Justice Beasley in theBesemancase, 50 N.J.L. at p. 238, if railroad companies were liable to suit for such damages upon the theory that, with respect to them, the company is a tortfeasor, the practical result would be to bring the operation of railroads to a standstill. And, on the whole, the doctrine has become so well established that it amounts to a rule of property, and should be modified, if at all, only by the lawmaking power.

But the doctrine, being founded upon necessity, is limited accordingly. This Court, in a leading case that we deem controlling upon the questions now at issue, had occasion to recognize this, and at the same time to apply the distinction between public and private nuisances with respect to the private right of action. InBaltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church,108 U. S. 317, the Court, while recognizing (p.108 U. S. 331) that the legislative authority for operating a railway carried with it an immunity from private actions based upon those incidental inconveniences that are unavoidably attendant upon the operation of a railroad, nevertheless sustained the right of action in a case where a building for housing and repairing locomotive engines was unnecessarily established in close proximity to a place of public worship, and so used that the noises of the shop and the rumbling of the locomotive engines passing in and out, the blowing off of steam, the ringing of bells, the sound of whistles, and the smoke from the chimneys, created a constant disturbance of the religious exercises. The Court (speaking by Mr. Justice Field) held that the authority of the company to construct such works as it might deem necessary and expedient for the completion and maintenance of its road did not authorize it to place them wherever it might think proper in the city, without reference to the property and rights of others, and that, whatever the extent of the authority conferred, it was accompanied with the implied qualification that the works should not be so placed as by their use to unreasonably interfere with and disturb the peaceful and comfortable enjoyment of others in their property. In the language of the opinion:

"Grants of privileges or powers to corporate bodies like those in question confer no license to use them in disregard of the private rights of others, and with immunity for their invasion."

The reasoning proceeded upon the ground (p.108 U. S. 332) that no authority conferred by Congress would justify an invasion of private property to an extent amounting to an entire deprivation of its use and enjoyment without compensation to the owner,

"nor could such authority be invoked to justify acts creating physical discomfort and annoyance to others in the use and enjoyment of their property, to a less extent than entire deprivation, if different places from those occupied could be used by the corporation for its purposes, without causing such discomfort and annoyance,"

and hence that the legislative authorization conferred exemption only from suit or prosecution for the public nuisance, and did not affect "any claim of a private citizen for damages for any special inconvenience and discomfort not experienced by the public at large."

The present case, in the single particular already alluded to -- that is to say, with respect to so much of the damage as is attributable to the gases and smoke emitted from locomotive engines while in the tunnel, and forced out of it by the fanning system therein installed, and issuing from the portal located near to plaintiff's property in such manner as to materially contribute to render his property less habitable than otherwise it would be, and to depreciate it in value, and this without, so far as appears, any real necessity existing for such damage -- is, in our opinion, within the reason and authority of the decision just cited. This case differs from that of theBaptist Church in that there, the railroad company was free to select some other location for the repair shop and engine house, while here, the evidence shows that the location of the tunnel and its south portal was established pursuant to law, and not voluntarily chosen by defendant. This circumstance, however, does not, as we think, afford sufficient ground for a distinction affecting the result. The case shows that Congress has authorized, and in effect commanded, defendant to construct its tunnel with a portal located in the midst of an inhabited portion of the city. The authority, no doubt, includes the use of steam locomotive engines in the tunnel, with the inevitable concomitants of foul gases and smoke emitted from the engines. No question is made but that it includes the installation and operation of a fanning system for ridding the tunnel of this source of discomfort to those operating the trains and traveling upon them. All this being granted, the special and peculiar damage to the plaintiff as a property owner in close proximity to the portal is the necessary consequence, unless, at least, it be feasible to install ventilating shafts or other devices for preventing the outpouring of gases and smoke from the entire length of the tunnel at a single point upon the surface, as at present. Construing the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiff's property without compensation to him. If the damage is not preventable by the employment at reasonable expense of devices such as have been suggested, then plaintiff's property is "necessary for the purposes contemplated," and may be acquired by purchase or condemnation (32 Stat. 916, c. 856, 9), and, pending its acquisition, defendant is responsible. If the damage is readily preventable, the statute furnishes no excuse, and defendant's responsibility follows on general principles.

No doubt there will be some practical difficulty in distinguishing between that part of the damage which is attributable to the gases and smoke emitted from the locomotive engines while operated upon the railroad tracks adjacent to plaintiff's land, and with respect to which we hold there is no right of action, and damage that arises from the gases and smoke that issue from the tunnel, and with respect to which there appears to be a right of action. How this difficulty is to be solved in order to determine the damages that should be assessed in this action, or the compensation that should be awarded in case condemnation proceedings are resorted to, is a question not presented by this record, and upon which therefore no opinion is expressed.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the court of appeals, with directions to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District and remand the cause to that court with directions for a new trial, and for further proceedings in accordance with the views above expressed.MR. JUSTICE LURTON dissents.

4. G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellant,vs.CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

C.A. Mendoza & A. V. Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for defendant-appellees.ZALDIVAR,J.:pAppeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.

Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows:

A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo 23666. Bounded on the NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by national road; on the SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP reservation. Containing an area of 759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Pampanga ...;

and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo-Gozun over two parcels of land described as follows:

A parcel of land (Portion Lot Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd, 26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot 3, on the SE by Lot 3; on the SW by Lot 1-B, Blk. 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NW by AFP military reservation. Containing an area of 450,273 square meters, more or less and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. ..., and

A parcel of land (Portion of lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd 26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot No. 3, on the SE by school lot and national road, on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666), on the NW by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an area of 88,772 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, ....

In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.

On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10.

In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the land under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.

By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G. viuda de Gil, Paloma Castellvi, Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis Castellvi, Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi were allowed to intervene as parties defendants. Subsequently, Joaquin V. Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also allowed by the court to intervene as a party defendant.

After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10,1959.1In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged, among other things, that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion had already been set aside for expansion sites of the already completed subdivisions; that the fair market value of said lands was P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.

Intervenors Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi in their answer, filed on February 11, 1960, and also intervenor Joaquin Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, in his motion to dismiss, dated May 27, 1960, all alleged that the value of the lands sought to be expropriated was at the rate of P15.00 per square meter.

On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands.2On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation.3The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air Base, for the defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified themselves, proceeded to the performance of their duties.

On March 15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded.4The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case by defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter.5After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective memoranda, and the Republic, after several extensions of time, had adopted as its memorandum its objections to the report of the Commissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision6the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, taking into account all the foregoing circumstances, and that the lands are titled, ... the rising trend of land values ..., and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the court finds that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just.

xxx xxx xxx

The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands of defendant Toledo-Gozun since (sic) the amount deposited as provisional value from August 10, 1959 until full payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court.

In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the instant action had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional value thereof was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said (Castellvi) land as herein adjudged. The same rate of interest shall be paid from July 11, 1959 on the total value of the land herein adjudged minus the amount deposited as provisional value, or P151,859.80, such interest to run until full payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court. All the intervenors having failed to produce evidence in support of their respective interventions, said interventions are ordered dismissed.

The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff.

On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was against the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional newly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was denied by the court on July 12, 1961.

On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from the decision of May 26, 1961 and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant Castellvi also filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court.

The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on December 6, 1961.

Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to the approval of the Republic's record on appeal, but also a joint memorandum in support of their opposition. The Republic also filed a memorandum in support of its prayer for the approval of its record on appeal. On December 27, 1961 the trial court issued an order declaring both the record on appeal filed by the Republic, and the record on appeal filed by defendant Castellvi as having been filed out of time, thereby dismissing both appeals.

On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion the defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended.

Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.

The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun before this Court, but this Court denied the motion.

In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the provisional value of her land. The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's motion in a resolution dated October 2,1964.

The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6, 1969, praying that they be authorized to mortgage the lands subject of expropriation, was denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.

On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for the estate of the late Don Alfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation proceedings, filed a notice of attorney's lien, stating that as per agreement with the administrator of the estate of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall receive by way of attorney's fees, "the sum equivalent to ten per centum of whatever the court may finally decide as the expropriated price of the property subject matter of the case."

---------

Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred:

1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the instant proceedings as just compensation;

2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action;

3. In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest on the adjudged value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956;

4. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

In its brief, the Republic discusses the second error assigned as the first issue to be considered. We shall follow the sequence of the Republic's discussion.

1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national Security.7Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under t