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Emerging Maritime Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region: Challenges and

Responses

Panel: The Impact of Asia and the Pacific on World Politics: International Relations and

Challenges in Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes: RC18.347

Author: Pragya Pandey

Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Relations

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi,-110067 India

Email: pragyapandey2@gmail.com

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Abstract

Perhaps no other Ocean is as geo-strategically located as Indian Ocean, as the centre of the

world‟s strategic and economic centre of gravity, flanked by some of the most important regions

of the world, able to seriously endanger international peace and security, but at the same time

also has the capability to contribute to the global prosperity. The region constitutes the lifeline to

drive the economic vibrancy in East Asia and Europe. Consequently security of the region is a

concern with the littorals as well as many extra regional powers. There are profound changes

taking place as far as the geostrategic environment of the Asia Pacific is concerned with the rise

of new power centers, China, India with their blue water navies, Japan, Australia and continuing

presence of USA. From cold war bipolarity and later post-cold war unipolarity kind of

multipolarity is emerging wherein great powers are jostling with each other. Also the Indian

Ocean Region is faced with several nontraditional threats to security in the form of piracy,

maritime trafficking, maritime terrorism and various others. It is thus a crucial stage that, unless

managed skillfully, can have debilitating effect on regional peace and security. Therefore the

central theme of the paper would be to scrutinize the challenges to the maritime security

environment in the Indian Ocean region from both traditional and nontraditional angle and

further, it would enumerate initiatives the countries of the region have taken and bilateral and

multilateral institutional mechanisms they have evolved to deal with the challenges.

Keywords

Indian Ocean, SLOC‟S, Non-Traditional Threats (NTS), India, China, US

The earth is fundamentally a water planet and 71% of the earth surface is covered with water,

almost 3, 50,000million sq km. The great mass of the oceans contains 97 percent of all the water

on the earth, which supports a majority of living being. It is irrefutable that oceans have been

principally responsible for the development of major ecosystems on the earth. Ocean provide

access to the all the parts of globe, around 85% of the nation states have coastline. 75% of the

world population lives in the littorals. 97% of the world trade is transported by the seas. Looking

at these facts and figures, we can assume the importance the seas posses for the humanity. From

time immemorial, oceans have played a very significant part in the development and sustenance

of the human race. It will not be an exaggeration to say that Oceans, as a means of mass

transportation were singularly responsible for the forging and nurturing of civilizational links;

the many voyages of discovery and trade in goods between different parts of the world was

carried over the waters of the great oceans. (Prakash:2010) That nearly three-fourths of the

earth‟s surface comprises waters and oceans provide access to all the parts of globe is well

appreciated but what is less known is the fact that more than three-fourths of this water surface is

beyond any legal regime, a kind of free for all, and hence poses huge challenge in the

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management of maritime security. This insecurity is further exacerbated because of ever

growing trade, that is mostly sea-borne and greater reliance on seas for human needs- both living

and non-living. Further, especially in Asia there is growing focus on oceans for economic,

strategic, commercial, and geopolitical reasons.

Importance of maritime security, in present scenario is not only in part of traditional

concept of security rather more earnest issues at hand are from non-state actors. The incidents

like 26/11has further brought focus to this idea. In the post cold war era, new concept of security

has developed out of critique of statism and state centric thinking on security. The focus has

shifted to other aspects like freedom from economic and other forms exploitation, energy

security, environmental security and others. The need is to recognize the fact that security is not

divisible either in military, social, economic, political dimensions or between national and

international aspects; these are trans-national issues with substantial security ramifications.

Therefore, central theme of the paper would be to scrutinize these challenges and evaluate the

measures to counter it. The study proposes to deal with the above aspects in detail. It is

particularly pertinent because so far no attempt has been made to evaluate this dimension.

Concept of Maritime Security

Maritime security refers to the freedom from threat at or from sea. Maritime security concept has

different meaning to different people. Maritime security has often been identified with as

UNCLOS defines “peaceful use of sea” and “peaceful purpose”. (Rehman: 2009) That all the

people should benefit from its use. Peace according to this view is not merely absence of war but

also of injustice. However this perspective has been criticized as political idealism.

(Rehman2009:31-32) Indian Maritime Doctrine 2004 defines maritime security as to protect our

vulnerability from actions of enemy. This includes physical security of its own forces, base, lines

of communication, command and control center etc. (Indian Maritime Doctrine: 2009). Over the

years dependence on the Indian Ocean as the major shipping lanes in the global shipping

network has grown, the safety, security of these sea lanes is vital concern for the countries

around the world. More than 60 oil tankers pass through the ocean daily which is expected to

increase up to 200 in a decade or so. While such optimism is a welcome sign the SLOC‟s are

being threatened from several directions. Any disruption of sea traffic through these choke points

would have catastrophic impact well beyond Indian Ocean for the whole international economy.

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Therefore any acts that threaten the SLOC‟s may by definition challenges the security. (Sakhuja:

2001).

In the traditional view of security, the main instrument is military and the only security

referent is the state. (Arase 2010:812) Of late nature of threat to the maritime peace and security

has assumed a new dimension. Earlier the threats were due to act of the state actors, the disputes

used to involve the recognized sovereign independent countries. These used to be resolved by the

recognized rules and laws dealing with the maritime warfare. Today, we have come to live in an

era characterized by the rise of sinister non state forces which have redefined security responses

the world over. More earnest issues at hand are non-military in nature, from non-state actors.

Safer Shipping in Indian Ocean is vulnerable to various such threats that range from piracy,

maritime terrorism, climate change, natural disasters, smuggling of persons, drug trafficking,

gunrunning and other forms of transnational crime. They are transnational in scope; they arise at

very short notice and are transmitted rapidly as a result of globalization and the communication

revolution; they cannot be prevented entirely, but can be mitigated through coping mechanisms;

national solutions are often inadequate, and thus regional and multilateral cooperation is

essential; and finally object of security is no longer state but people, their survival, wellbeing and

dignity. Transnational maritime crime has substantial security ramifications. It is costly in human

terms and is a major drain on national resources. Furthermore, it has a synergetic effect that

exacerbates interstate conflict and non-state political violence. Failure to address these issues on

a cooperative basis essentially inhibits the development of a stable maritime security

environment in the region. (Bateman: 2003)

Buzan talked about the applicability of comprehensive and cooperative security to the

realm of maritime security as the threats like terrorist activities do not respect „lines or

boundaries‟ in water and often exploit complex and disputed arrangements to their advantage.

The CSCAP memorandum, „Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation‟, explicitly states

that “issues of ocean management are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole,”

and that “a comprehensive concept of regional maritime security requires a multidisciplinary

approach, necessitating cooperation and coordination among all interested bodies and activities.”

(Rehman2009:43) The International Maritime Council uses the term maritime security to cover

the risks associated with drug smuggling, piracy, and armed robbery against ships, human

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smuggling, illegal fishing stop ways, migrant smuggling, threat to sea lanes of communication

(SLOC‟s), environmental security threats and the threat of terrorism and offences against the

marine environment. None is independent from the other failure in one leads to the failure in

other. (Bateman 2010:7-9) Indian Ocean Region is also faced with such major menaces.

Indian Ocean: Area of emerging geostrategic importance

Indian Ocean is going is going hog the limelight in coming century which is as many

would say going to be Asian century. One third of the world population lives in the region,

including one quarter of the UN members and most of the third world countries. Geographically,

Indian Ocean with an area of 68.56 sq. km is the third largest water body on the earth, washing

the shores of 3 continents India, Australia and Africa, and covering around 2% of the earth‟s

surface. Indian Ocean contains a great degree of wealth in the form of abundance of oil, natural

gas, minerals. The littorals contain more than 2/3 oil reserves, 35% of world‟s gas reserves and

60% of uranium and 40% of gold and 80% of diamond deposits and large variety of other

mineral substances, oil, iron ore, tin, bauxite, gold, diamond, manganese, uranium, and

chromium. (Dowdy and Troad 1983:432-458). More than 80% of the hydrocarbon requirements

of the global economic powerhouses like China, Japan, South Korea and India are met from the

imports from the Middle East which traverses through the Indian Ocean. Interestingly while 40%

of the global trade passes through the Indian Ocean only 20% is conducted among the littorals

while 80% is carried out by the extra regional countries. (Walker: 2008)

The great Indian peninsular landmass jutting out for a thousand miles characterizes the

Indian Ocean and lends it its name. Thus if India‟s location with respect to the Ocean offers it

unique advantage it also has a daunting task of tackling a variety of security threats. In the

ancient Sanskrit literature the Indian Ocean is known as „Ratnakara‟ meaning "the maker

(creator) of jewels." The real relevance of this name is being understood in this twenty-first

century, as the high strategic value of this vast ocean is making it a theatre of maritime

dominance of the Asian powers. (Bashar: 2011)

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Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: "Indian Ocean Maps", University of Texas at Austin,

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/indianoceanarea.jpg in

Peter Lehr (2002), “The Challenge of Security in the Indian Ocean in the 21st Century: Plus ça change…?” Working

Paper No. 13, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, p2

There are important gulfs, bays, straits and seas in the Indian Ocean; The Ocean is closed

by land rim on three sides, with maritime access only through seven established gateways or

chokepoints, linking the Indian Ocean to the other important water bodies on the globe. To the

east, straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok connect Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. To the

West strait of Hormutz is important which connects the Indian Ocean to Persian Gulf. So, there

are seven important waterways and chokepoints in Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), critical for

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international trade and commerce. (Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009:56)

In total there are an

estimated 46 countries and 1234 islands. The countries in the region are certainly not a cohesive

group and have lot of differences in terms of their development, ideologies, political system,

religion; language etc (Bateman and McPherson 1998:412) the region is beset with the

diversities of various kinds and is like a melting pot of age old civilizations. (Banerjee 1984:3)

Source: 3Vice Adm (Retd) GM Hiranandan, (2012) “External Naval presence in Indian Ocean”

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/external-naval-presence-in-indian-ocean/

The rivalry of great powers in the Indian Ocean region is nothing new, it has been there

for quite a long time only players have changed from time to time. History seems to be repeating

itself at least in case of Indian Ocean, as the Ocean seems to be regaining its influence in

international politics. Given the peculiarities of the region, the issue of peace and security of the

region have become acute concern not just among littorals but among certain extra-regional

major powers as well. The Ocean has been major means of communication between the western

and eastern parts of Asia. Some of the significant sea routes lie across it. That is why most often

it is called „Ocean of Commerce‟. J.C. Caldwell pointed out that “for millennia Indian Ocean

probably witnessed more maritime activity than any other Ocean”. (Bateman and Bergin

2001:117-125) For thousands of years much of the commerce and civilization religious contact

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in the Indian Ocean were facilitated by Hindus, Chinese, Muslims traders Romans, Arabs and

Greeks before Columbus crossed the Atlantic. The ruins of Lothal in Kathiawar peninsula

indicate the existence of oldest port in the world from where representatives of proto-Indian

civilizations sailed through Arabian Sea.

Emerging Power-Politics in the IOR: Implications for the Security of the Region

Indian Ocean in current scenario is characterized by insecurity and instability. Geopolitics of

the region will further complicate security environment. This emerging power politics account

for a traditional security threat to the region. Traditional security refers to realist „state centric‟

approach to inter-state military conflict. As the Indian Ocean‟s role as a conduit of vital

resources grows, so does the propensity of regional and extra-regional powers to exert their

influence in this area.(Ho 2012:3) According to Admiral ZunWalt “the Indian Ocean has become

an area with the potential to produce majority shifts in global power balance over the next

decade”. (House 1984:6) Hence, naturally it has become a major area of traditional security

challenges such as great power competition and rapidly changing balance of power.

Historically, naval powers emerged in 10th

and 11th

century, to secure influence and access to

this mammoth maritime commerce and its important trade routes. This included Buddhist

kingdom of Sri Vijaya in Sumatra, Hindu Chola Tamil kingdom of South India. Chinese,

Ottoman, Persian and Mugals also developed navies though these were largely confined within

Indian Ocean to protect their interest. (De Silva- Ranasinghe 2010) European navigators reached

it in 15th

century, in search of new markets attracted European powers particularly after the

Voyage of Portuguese explorer Vosco de Gama in 1497, followed by Dutch, French and British.

The ocean witnessed vigorous maritime activity and western rivalry in the region reached its

acme by the end of 17th

century. But for over 150 years after Congress of Vienna, Indian Ocean

was essentially a „British lake‟. Britain held all the most important strategic points and tied them

together with Royal Navy. After II World War new processes started dominating the region. The

expansion of nationalist sentiments precipitated the decolonization process after II World War,

beginning with the Partition of India in 1947. These events gradually led to the decline of

traditional extra regional powers. The end of 1971 marked the end of the era of British

hegemony in the Indian Ocean. But keeping in view the importance of transportation and

communication facilities, British maintained their control over Seychelles and Chagos

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archipelago in which small islet of Diego Garcia is situated. With the Anglo-American Accord of

1966, $19million naval communication station was set up on the island for joint use for 50 years;

US entered the region as the major power. (Raghvan: 1996)

During Cold War, the Indian Ocean and countries around it were gradually becoming

independent entities, most of the states around the Ocean were often newly independent,

economically unstable and socially incoherent and did not present Indian Ocean region as a unit.

Yet ironically it was the threat to peace and security arising from the escalating superpower

naval presence in the Ocean which eventually prompted littorals to present the first UN

sponsored peace zone proposal, a sense of collective Indian Ocean identity developed in

subsequent years, nonetheless the dissentions and diversities never vanished fully. (House

1984:5-10) India took up the issue at Lusaka summit of NAM in 1970 and later to General

Assembly in 1971 along with Sri Lanka, later participated in Ad-hoc Committee on IOZP,

appointed by UN. Throughout the Cold War Indian Ocean was the principle theater of

superpower rivalry.

A lot of things have changed in the past few decades. India and China with their

aspiration for great power status and their quest for the energy security, have historically been

continental powers are now gearing up to emerge as major maritime powers; this is along with

the continued presence of USA as a major power. China and India are the emerging powers of

the Asia, emerging as a major maritime power, competition is evident in their strategic

intentions, will be played out in Indian Ocean Region. The most dramatic geopolitical change in

the recent times has been emergence of China as the second largest economy in the world

overtaking Japan, accompanied by the military modernization and greater assertiveness in its

foreign policy, with noticeable presence in the far-flung areas like Indian Ocean. (Gupta 2011)

With India also rising economically and emerging as a major military power in the region

with the impressive naval presence in the region things have changed. As the logic of

globalization unfolded over the last two decades, Indian naval leadership began to invent a new

maritime strategy that is in tune with the changed circumstances. The phrases from „Aden to

Malacca‟ from „Suez to South China Sea‟ were injected into national discourse. (Scott: 2006)

India is not only the largest power named after it but is also largest navy and coast guard

presence in the Ocean. India‟s policy towards the region has been shaped by the twin objective

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of contributing to the world peace and securing its own vital interests in the region. The

geographical location of the country at the centre of the ocean makes its security, commerce and

trade all dependent on the preservation of stability in the region. India is a country with rich

maritime tradition spanning over 4,000 years. (Indian Maritime Doctrine: 2009) India is rapidly

enlarging its navy. Three key acquisitions by Indian navy are long range aircraft, aircraft carriers

and nuclear submarines, makes India a formidable force in Indian Ocean. (Bonnor: 2001) Like

other globalizing economies India‟s economic growth is heavily dependent on free flow of goods

through SLOC‟s, especially as 90% of India‟s growing reliance on merchant shipping. (Indian

Maritime Doctrine 2004:56) Any disruption in shipping across the important trade routes in

Indian Ocean, especially those passing through chokepoints like Strait of Malacca, Suez Canal,

Strait of Hormutz and Gulf of Aden, can have catastrophic impact on India‟s economy and

societal stability and for the global economy as well.

During the last decade or so, China has been expanding its reach southwards particularly

noticeable in South China Sea. Chinese government under the „strings of pearls‟ strategy (which

is setting up of a series of ports in friendly countries along with Ocean‟s northern seaboard), is

building a large naval base at Gwadar in Pakistan and a fueling station on the Southern coast of

Sri Lanka and such other bases in the different countries in the region. This strategy has caused

insecurity in Indian minds (though it is open to debate). By 2020 China aims to have „blue water‟

naval capability with global reach. All of this is unnerving Indian government because China‟s

naval capabilities and doctrine have direct bearing on the area which is strategically important to

India. All of this has prompted India to setup a full naval command in Andaman Islands. On the

other hand China is anxious of growing link between India, US and Japanese navy and feels that

it is being strategically contained by such growing links. In 2007, the annual India-US Malabar

naval exercise was transformed into large-scale multilateral exercises in the Bay of Bengal

involving the United States, India, Japan, Australia and Singapore. China felt apprehensive about

the move and regarded it as a balancing or containing act against rising China. (Brewster: 2010)

Many traditional notions of what constitute the region are bound to alter in coming year,

says C. Raja Mohan with India and China seeking to recapture their past centrality and strategic

influence in Asia. (Mohan: 2007) Approximately 2/3 of the world‟s oil shipment passes through

the Indian Ocean and 1/3 of the bulk cargo. Around 40% of the seaborne crude oil passes

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through the Hormutz at the one end and 50% of the world‟s merchant fleet capacity via Strait of

Malacca at the other end making the Indian Ocean home to the busiest sea lanes of the world.

(Kaplan: 2010) In an age of globalization Indian Ocean contain massive half of the world‟s

container traffic. The world energy needs are likely to increase by 50% by 2030 and almost half

of that will come from India and China. By 2050 India is likely to overtake Japan as the third

largest consumer of energy. And then there is China whose crude oil demand is going to be

doubled in next decade or two which is at present a massive 7.3 million barrels daily, which

comes through Strait of Malacca and China is desperate for alternative energy route to Pacific.

Therefore, Indian Ocean is going to be the region where possible rivalry between China and

India might be played out in future. (Kaplan: 2010) This reliance creates a sense of vulnerability

among the countries in the region and has brought about the focus on maritime and naval

security as it is important that sea lanes across the region are secure. As each state attempts to

secure its interest by increased military presence, in future the stage is set for a possible power

politics, which is not in favour of any of states of the region.

On the hand there is USA, whose military rebalance towards Asia is marked by a profound

wariness of China‟s growing power and great enthusiasm to strengthen partnership with India.

US „pivot‟ back to Asia or what is called the „rebalancing‟ strategy of US. Beginning with 2011

Obama administration has issued series of announcements to expand and intensify the already

significant role of USA in Asia Pacific, identifying it as the region of geostrategic priority for

US. This represents a significant shift in US policy. (Sutter, Brown, Adamson, Mochizuki and

Ollapally: 2013) US‟s interest in the region is driven by the region‟s size and economic

dynamism but clearly another important factor has been rise of China in the region.

(Jennings:2003) Newly installed Chinese President Xi Jinping also said that in June 2013 that

there are “no fundamental, irreconcilable differences between the two countries”. (Sutter, Brown,

Adamson, Mochizuki and Ollapally: 2013) Beijing and Washington both want to develop

constructive relations and avoid Conflict. But their relationship will inevitably have a

competitive element.

China has been anxious about this rebalancing strategy, as many observers suggest that it is a

policy to contain China. USA is also concerned about the rising maritime presence of China and

India in the Indian Ocean. China is not an enemy of US but a competitor and India is a potential

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ally. The willingness on the part of US and Indian navies to collaborate (though this would be

odd coupling given their equation during Cold War) would create strong bottlenecks for China.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review by US Department of Defence sees India as a “net

provider of security in Indian Ocean and beyond”. (Quadrennial Defence Review: 2010) Japan,

too, may be willing to recognize a leading naval role for India in the Indian Ocean. Australia is

likely to be less willing to recognize any Indian claims of a „predominant‟ maritime role in the

Indian Ocean. As India‟s growing economic and strategic weight will increasingly influence the

balance of power within Asia. There is recognition in New Delhi that we have strategic interest

in the region apart from China. However New Delhi is highly cautious about any vague hints of

alliance which may be antagonistic to China, including Canberra‟s suggestion of Trilateral

Security Dialogue among India, Australia and US to parallel India, Japan and US. (Brewster:

2013)

Australia given its strategic location in the region would also be an important player.

Situation is rather complicated for Canberra, Australia has a strong alliance with US extending

over a period of 60 years, China is the largest export destination and India is the emerging

strategic partner of the country. In the current situation, Australia‟s interests lies in working with

both India and China, while maintain relations with US. In the coming years, Australia will need

to play a careful three-way juggling act between the United States, China and

India.(Brewster:2010)

So we are entering a phase of history where several nations will compete for dominance on

the high seas. While China seeks to counter US dominance an emerging India seeks to balance

China, but neither China nor India are in a position to supplant US. While other powers will have

a bearing, despite their massive difference in their naval capabilities this triangular dynamic

between Washington, New Delhi and Beijing would be most consequential in shaping the future

of Indo-Pacific”. (Kaplan 2009:3)

Therefore great strategic uncertainty prevails in the region and may produce fascinating

twists and turns in future. Although the emerging strategic environment will be largely shaped by

the relationship between US and rising China and emergings India in the long term but there are

other crucial influential Asian powers like Japan, Indonesia, and Republic of Korea. Therefore a

complex and competitive regional order is emerging.

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Some scholars suggest that rather we suggests we should talk about collective security

arrangements of major powers concerned to neutralize threats from pirates, smugglers, terrorists.

It is the time of structured discussion among these Asian power and other concerned littorals to

take place. Uncertainty in the international system is higher, stakes are greater. (Menon 2009:5)

The idea of collective security so deeply imbued in the minds of India‟s policy markers reflected

in India holding Asian Relations Conference, even before gaining independence. Nehru often

talked about „eastern federation‟. But amidst all the debate about the collective security and

multilateralism with the passage of time the real challenge now might be engineering a credible

Balance of Power (BOP). The stronger India gets more eager it will be to construct a new BOP

in the region. India‟s traditional resistance to external involvement in its immediate

neighborhood is slowly yielding place to form security cooperation with other major powers in

the region to manage the security challenges, to construct a new BOP in the region.

Apart from this ongoing tussle for influence and power there are certain nontraditional threats to

security in the IOR, which are well established and organic extensions of one another. While the

maritime environment in the Indian Ocean is faced with a plethora of threats, some of the critical

challenges which need to be addressed.

Piracy

Piracy has become a greatest nuisance for modern seafarer. It‟s the biggest scourge of modern

day shipping. International Maritime Bureau (IMB) however has tried to redefine the concept as

“any act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with intent to commit theft or any other

crime and with intent or capability to use force in furtherance of act”. According to international

law all the states have the right to arrest pirates on high seas and punish them according to their

own laws. Poverty and unemployment lead to piracy being seen as an alternative source of

income for the coastal fishing communities. Corruption among police, maritime officials and

shipping companies may also be a factor.

(http://www.jhuapl.edu/ourwork/nsa/papers/IOMSS_Proceedings09.pdf:26). Historically, Ocean

and seas have always provided the opportunities for the cheap transport of products and persons

and resulting movements of vulnerable assets have attracted from earliest times predators

globally called pirates.

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The pirates are becoming increasingly well equipped. They make use of speedboats,

modems, radars, satellite phones, Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, and modern weaponry,

machineguns, mortars and grenades launcher to take control of merchant ships. Hence,

transnational crime syndicates, who often commit other transnational crimes such as illegal drug

trafficking and human smuggling, have masterminded some attacks. These are totally new trends

and developments compared to what has been called „Asian piracy‟ in the past. (Lee: 2010)

Piracy in some form has been endemic in Indian Ocean, from the earliest times. According to the

International Maritime Organization report in 2002, the Malacca strait, South China Sea and

Indian Ocean are the areas that have been most affected by the piracy. It has a lot to do with the

geography in areas such as the African coast or the Malacca Strait, where either the authority of

the state is weak or heavy traffic, besides, the several shipwrecks and shallow areas, provides

cover for unlawful activities. These navigational and operational conditions provide the right

type of environment for pirates to perpetrate attacks as also manage a quick getaway. (Sakhuja:

2010)

Even though there has been considerable decrease in pirate attacks in recent times,

several recent piracy attacks on Indian craft and merchant vessels underline the need for the

Indian Navy to not just patrol, but also prevent piracy and, if required, interdict pirated vessels.

(India‟s Maritime Doctrine: 2009) The recent IMF report indicates that pirate attacks have gone

down to lowest in last 6 years. The downward trend the number of attacks in recent years may be

attributed to increased port security and harbor patrolling, private security forms. But the fact is

that the frequency of pirate attacks, though apparently not increasing, is already of dangerous

proportions. As. (Ussher: 2011) we need to look beyond statistics to understand why some ships

are successfully attacked and others are not. The problem of piracy would continue as long as

there are criminally inclined persons and maritime zones of ineffective law enforcement. Apart

from piracy there are other serious threats to safe shipping as well which needed to be tackled in

the region.

Maritime Terrorism

Maritime terrorism can be referred to as the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities: within the

marine environment; using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any

one of their passengers or personnel; and against coastal facilities or settlements, including

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tourist resorts, port areas, and port towns or cities. Maritime attacks offer terrorists an alternate

means of causing mass economic destabilization, Disrupting the mechanics of the contemporary

„just enough, just in time‟ cargo freight trading system could potentially trigger vast and

cascading fiscal effects. (Lee: 2010) Globalization and interdependence of trade has made the

world a one single market. While this has benefitted the economies world over, various terrorists

groups have also adopted the globalization phenomena to export their ideologies. Maritime

terrorism continues to haunt Indian Ocean Region. Two most notorious terrorist attacks on the

ships one on US ship Cole in 2000 and the other on French tanker MV Limburg in 2002, took

place in this region. The terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26/11 in 2008 showed that security of

coastal waters is important. Efforts have been made at bilateral and multilateral even at unilateral

levels to counter the threat from maritime terrorism like Malacca Strait Security Accord

(MSSA), International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS) etc. but much needed to be done.

Several Southeast Asian guerrilla and terrorist groups possess substantial maritime capabilities.

Since 2000, al-Qaida, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaff Group, Jemaah

Islamiyah, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, the Gerakan AcehMerdeka, and Laskar Jihad, Al-

Qa„Ida have all been suspected of planning or executing maritime attacks. Abu Sayyaff claims of

responsibility for the 26 February 2004 sinking of Superferry 14 near Manila, in which 116

people were killed. (Bradford: 2005) Seaborne terrorism could potentially cripple global trade

and have grave “knock-on effects” on developed economies. (Ho: 2006)

The Indian experience of cross‐border terrorism shows the complexity of what we are

dealing with. The 26/11 attacks on India were planned and organized in one country, where the

attackers were trained, the logistics and communications support chain extended over at least

seven countries, and the attack was carried out in our country. These facts remind us of the

common interest of littoral and other major powers in keeping these sea lanes open and free.

(Menon: 2010) Having said that, maritime terrorism remains a low-probability event, for

example, over the past three decades maritime terrorist attacks have constituted only 2% of all

terrorist attacks worldwide. Apart from a small number of hostage-taking incidents, none of

these has taken place in the Straits of Malacca.

Maritime Trafficking

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Though not constituting threats to sea-lines per se, other perils add up to the Indian Ocean‟s

catalog of maritime insecurities. Maritime trafficking including drug trafficking, human

trafficking and illicit weapon trade can seriously undermine the maritime security environment.

Drug trafficking leads to money laundering and funds from the sale of drugs are used to fuel

gunrunning, insurgent and terrorist activities. Added to these is the trans-national security

concern linked to human smuggling that has multiple effects, ranging from fuelling terrorism to

illegal immigration causing socio-political instability.(Khurrana: 2004)

Narco Terrorism

Narco-terrorism is a corollary of maritime terrorism, as the terrorists groups targeting the

region work hand in hand with drug cartels. Such is the geopolitical setting of the region that

World‟s two most illicit opium producing areas- Golden Triangle mainly in Myanmar and

northern Thailand and Golden Crescent in Afghanistan and Pakistan, are in the Indian Ocean

Region. Myanmar's heroin shipments pass through neighboring Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, China

and India. The ocean has emerged as an important transit route for the dispatch of large

consignments of narcotics to the Western world as also to the Far East. India's northeastern states

of Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya and Mizoram serve as an important and easy route for drug

carrying couriers. The LTTE is deeply involved in drug trafficking. Myanmar offers an

important base for the LTTE drug trafficking network. They have become an unlocking part of

the narcotic traffic around the world, the bulk of the drugs move through the sea-borne routes to

the US and Europe from Myanmar‟s ports. (Sakhuja: 2010)

Human Trafficking

Smuggling of humans beings is not a new phenomenon. Today, however, human

smuggling has emerged as a lucrative business. A large number of human smuggling syndicates

and gangs have mushroomed all over the world and are engaged in a highly profitable industry.

Smuggling by sea is the cheapest and easiest form of illegal transportation of migrants. Illegal

trafficking and human smuggling by sea has increased in the Asia- Pacific region. The UN

Annual Report on Oceans and the Law of the Seas has described illegal trafficking in persons as

"a reckless exploitation of people in distress, and thus is a reprehensible form of international

terrorism". The International Maritime Organization has even adopted an instrument entitled

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"Interim Measures for the Combating of Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or

Transport of Migrants by Sea."(Sakhuja: 2010)

Illicit weapon trade and gunrunning

Coastal gunrunning is another manifestation of maritime terrorism and has gained

intensity. It is important to note here that seven tons of RDX and small arms landed on west

coast of India in 1993 and used in Mumbai blasts were inducted by sea (Indian Maritime

Doctrine: 2009). Gunrunning by sea is by far the safest means for transferring arms and

ammunitions around the world, while drug trafficking is most lucrative. The LITE has

established a very sophisticated network of gun running. Bangladesh‟s capture of several small

fishing craft laden with arms during the last few years has led to the conclusion that a lot of arms

also make their way from Thailand to the Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh. The other major pipeline

for Cambodian weapons is through Southern Thailand and from there across Malacca Straits to

Aceh. (Ghosh: 2004) Another related problem is that of money laundering. The proceeds of drug

sales are converted into gold and smuggled to Myanmar; this gold is then sold in the region,

disturbing the currency situation. (Sakhuja: 2010) There is a growing body of opinion that the

world may now be at a “proliferation tipping point”. A heavy influx of arms since the Cold War

has also left a legacy of arms smuggling in various sub-regions of the Indian Ocean. The fact IS

that addressing the illicit trade, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons

requires concerted action at the global, regional, sub-regional, national and local levels.

Environmental Security Challenges

An important category of challenges in any maritime environment is presented by Mother

Nature herself. The IOR is the locus of 70% of world‟s natural disasters demonstrated in the

disastrous tsunami of 2004 and cyclones that regularly hit our East Coast. There are more than

150 collisions at sea on a yearly basis due to poor visibility, non-serviceability of radars, hull

failure, boiler explosions and human errors. (Khurana: 2004) Added to the challenges of natural

disasters is the effect of global warming that could result in the melting of the polar ice and other

ice bodies, ultimately raising the mean sea level. This could not only be appalling for low lying

areas and island nations, but, due to the mass exodus which would follow, it could also trigger a

demographic upset and a resource crunch in neighboring regions. (Verma: 2010). The Asia-

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Pacific region contains one of the most complicated areas of maritime geography in the world.

The coastal waters of the Yellow and East China seas already suffer from heavy contamination

caused by dangerous cargo pollutants and from the fast growing industrial activities of the

coastal states. (Lee: 2010) Problems related to such as land degradation, water, fisheries, climate

change; nuclear waste, environmental refugees and urban explosion and deterioration if not

addressed, will lead to increase in human conflict and, ultimately, wide-scale disease, poverty

and death.

Energy Security and SLOC’s Vulnerability

Energy security is another matter of concern in the region. As the international energy

market is dependent on reliable transport, even the temporary blockage of a choke point can lead

to a substantial increase in total energy costs, as most of their energy lifelines are sea based. The

Strait of Hormuz leading out of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and

the Pacific Oceans are two of the world‟s most strategic choke points. Some of the primary items

transported are energy products, mainly oil and gas. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz practically

cuts off Gulf supplies to the East altogether and also affects the West considerably. Similarly, the

closure of the Strait of Malacca, through which nearly 9.4 million barrels of oil per day flow can

seriously threaten the economies of South East Asia and the energy-intensive economies of

China and Japan. (Hong: 2010) The importance of SLOC‟s will expand considerably in future

years. More than 80% of world oil production is transported by sea through the Indian Ocean.

Security of the Indian Ocean SLOCs is a paramount concern; maritime security is central to

energy security and global trade. (Cordner: 2010)

Countermeasures to Deal with Various NTS in the Region

Maritime security issues in Indian Ocean, especially safety, security and environmental

protection in the Straits of Malacca, have become the foremost of security issues driven by

concerns over piracy and terrorism linked to piracy. As a consequence the littoral states have

stepped up security measures in the strategic waterway and there has been a dramatic drop in the

incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2005 and to-date this year. There has been zero

incidence of terrorism in the area as well. It is obvious however that maritime security must

continue to be enhanced through close cooperation and consultation among the littoral states as

19

well as major user states. (Hassan: 2006) Most of the countries in the region are ill-equipped to

deal with such problems. Piracy is a parallel scenario that has resulted in the deployment of

several combat ships of regional and extra-regional powers whose commercial vessels are under

constant threat. All the countries affected including India and Australia, even countries outside

the region like US, Japan China which have an interest in the security of Malacca strait and other

shipping lanes have offered assistance to fight piracy. India has signed MoU‟s with the littorals

of Indian Ocean. Also India ratified the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy

and Armed Robbery (RECAAP) in June 2006. Using information from the International

Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre, INS Prahar, following a coastguard attempt, rescued

the vessel off Bombay after a chase of 300nm on 16 November. The crux of the solution was

effective information sharing, maritime cooperation and utilization of assets gained through

capacity building. (Ghosh: 2010) Counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden also provide a

very good example of how the diverse maritime forces of the world can operate towards a

common goal which is the protection of the globalised economic system upon which we all

depend. (Bradford: 2008)

The adoption of a statement for “Cooperation against Piracy and other Threats to

Maritime Security” by the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2001 and the establishment of the

ASEAN Defence Ministers‟ Meeting which was convened for the first time in Kuala Lumpur in

May 2006, to facilitate discussion on trans-boundary and transnational crimes at the ASEAN

level. Measures such as the “International Ship and Port Facility Security Code” introduced by

the IMO and the Container Security Initiative introduced by US Customs. The setting up of

SEARCCT in 2003, the Kuala Lumpur-based centre which organizes discussions and forums on

addressing terrorism in the region and promotes maritime capacity building measures among the

littoral nations to create a peaceful and stable environment in the strait. (Khalid: 2010) Also there

is a need to restructure and reorient IORA so that it can foster meaningful cooperation among the

members and can address broad range of issues. Navy to navy and Track II level interactions

should be improved. Countries with enhanced maritime capabilities like Indian, Australia, US

can help not only by cooperation among themselves but also by taking other littorals as a part of

multilateral efforts to maintain maritime order.

20

India has played its role by initiating various CBM‟s, conducting regular naval exercises

and goodwill visits with other regional navies, which have lot to gain from cooperation with

Indian Navy which has experience in dealing with transnational crimes and terrorism. India has

been spearheading the multinational MILAN exercises since 1995, which is a unique setting

comprising 13 navies of Eastern Indian Ocean and East Asia, basically to promote

interoperability, build confidence and deal with threats to maritime security. 2014 MILAN

Exercises were held in February, AT Port Blair, 16 countries participated in the exercises,

highest since its inception.( http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/India-16-Others-Take-

Part-in-Milan-2014-Naval-Exercise/2014/02/09/article2047375.ece) India hosted the Naval

Symposium in February 2008 to foster cooperation among the navies and coast guards of Indian

Ocean Region. This year IONS was hosted by Australia at Perth on 26 March 2014. Various

bilateral and multilateral exercises involving search and rescue drills, exchange of information

and anti terror tactics have been held between regional navies from time to time. But the fact is

that no institutionalized set up exists for Indian Ocean Navies including India and Australia,

multilateral arrangements that exist are weak. ARF is one such institution but by and large it has

been hesitant in addressing the security issues. There is nothing in Indian Ocean Region even

slightly comparable to APEC. Track II arrangements like CSCAP and Western Pacific Naval

Symposium (WPNS) have been hosting seminars and discussions but most states have yet to

incorporate those suggestions in their national policies. The need is to sustain the momentum of

such preventive measures.

Conclusion

In sum, in the 21st century the region has witnessed sweeping changes and considerable

turbulences, the Indian Ocean is now at the forefront of world geopolitics and global geo-

strategy, a situation that should continue for some time, taking into account the significance of its

strategic energy resources, the importance of its strategic shipping lanes, the „rise of India‟ as a

dominant regional player, the continued involvement of the United States in the region, and

China‟s entry onto the regional chessboard. In this context and considering that the region is

already very volatile, peace and security will remain a great challenge in the next few decades

for both the foreign powers with great interests in the region and the regional states. There is no

doubt that the Indian Ocean has now entered a period of rough seas, and what is happening there

21

cannot be neglected. Limited resources and limitless ambitions is the root cause of the problem.

The high seas form part of the global commons and provide us the opportunities to harness their

resources. They are also the best medium to carry out trade with other nations and enhance our

economic wellbeing. Yet, we have also seen that the very same waters present challenges that are

both economic and security related. (Menon: 2010)

Looking at the present scenario of threat perception in the Indian Ocean Region

especially from non-state actors, what is required is meaningful cooperation among the regional

navies, so that some form of multilateral forum could be established which can deal with the

challenges to the security in real sense of terms. The current scenario in the Indian Ocean Region

might bring India and other countries in the region as well in their efforts to deal with the crisis.

India being a consensual stakeholder in the region, cooperation with other countries of the region

is necessary to maintain a peaceful and secure environment in the region. As a central regional

power India has shown its willingness to help to secure major SLOC‟S in the region. India has

interests in harnessing the resources for the development and just progress of it people,

unimpeded by the omnipresent threat of war, regional conflicts and concomitant great power

rivalry. Transnational peace and security could be regarded as global public goods cannot be

accomplished single-handedly, cooperation is requisite, therefore the inevitability of

strengthening the cooperative organizational frameworks in engineering a credible balance of

power in the region.

22

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