Emergence Identity

7/30/2019 Emergence Identity

1/23

75Mead

Emergence and identityGeorge Herbert Mead (with an introduction by Jeffrey A. Goldstein, AdelphiUniversity, US)

The past is not what it used to be:An introduction to G. H. Meads radical

emergentism

Introduction

G eorge Herbert Mead, besides having been an undisputed pioneer in thedevelopment of sociology and social-psychology, was also, in the words of his col-league and friend John Dewey, ...the most original mind in philosophy in America of the last generation who took the doctrine of emergence much more fundamentally than

most of those who have played with the idea(Dewey quoted in El-Hani & Pihlstrm, 2002:29). Yet, Meads highly original and even radi-cal speculations on emergence are little knownamong complexity afcionados. That is why weare including in this issue of E:CO the secondchapter of Meads posthumously publishedThe Philosophy of the Present where he laid out his views on both the emergence of the self out of social interactions and the intimate relation between emergence and temporality.

In America, the rise of the movement known as Emergent Evolutionism was roughlyhistorically coincident with the rise of the con-cept of sociality as a major motif in philosophy,in particular the philosophical sociology pro-pounded at the University of Chicago whereDewey and Mead were prominent membersof the faculty. In his doctoral dissertation onMeads emergentism, Martin Monroe Jones(1969), makes an impressive case for how thor-

Classic paper: Emergence and identityE:CO Issue Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96

oughly the concept of emergence was woventhroughout Meads socially based philosophy.

Jones pointed out that Meads embrace of theidea of emergence in conjunction with his ac-tive engagement in various sciences of his daysuch as the theory of evolution, the early daysof quantum physics, and the theory of relativ-ity, prompted his extremely inventive attempt to reconcile the deterministic inclination of modern science with an individuals experi-ence of novelty, the very same dilemma that had earlier incited such emergentist precursorsas Henri Bergson and William James. Unlike

Bergson and James, however, Mead didnt re-strict emergent novelty to experience alone, but instead considered it a fundamental featureof nature as a whole 1.

Meads rigorous speculations on howthe self emerges out of social interactions hasalso been of great importance to the work of the highly esteemed contemporary Germanphilosopher Jrgen Habermas who has in al-most countless ways expressed the indebted-ness of his philosophy to Meads much earlierwork. In particular, Habermas has pointed tohis own understanding of the social consti-tution of human subjectivity which takes itsdeparture from the more socially isolated con-ception of subjectivity found in earlier Germanidealism and ensconced in the hermetically

1. By contrast, another early emergentist WilliamMcDougal held that emergence only took place inmental synthesis and not in the physical realm (see Jones, 1969, for a discussion of McDougalls workModern Materialism and Emergent Evolution ).

Classical

Classic paper section

Originally published as Mead, G. H. (1932). Chapter 2: Emergence and Identity, in The Philoso- phy of the Present , London, England: Open Court Publishing Company, pp. 32-46. Reprinted withkind permission.


2/23

76 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96

closed Dasein of Heidegger. Habermas haspraised Meads work as: The only promisingattempt to grasp the entire signi cance of so -cial individualization in concepts... and, I seethe more far-reaching contribution of Mead inhis having taken up themes that can be foundin Humboldt and Kierkegaard: individuation ispictured not as the self-realization of an inde-pendently acting subject carried out in isolationand freedom, but as a linguistically mediatedprocess of socialization and the simultaneousconstitution of a life-history that is consciousof itself, and G. H. Mead was the rst to havethought through this inter-subjective model of the socially produced ego (Habermas, 1992:151, 152, 153, 170). Indeed, a careful read-ing of Habermass theory of inter-subjectivitycannot fail to see the imprint of Meads emer-

gentist ideas throughout.

The emergent social self

A lthough other early emergentist think-ers, such as the entomologist W. M. Wheeler, speculated about emergent super-organisms like ant colonies, Meadfocused his own emergentist speculations onhow the personal self emerged out of a socialnexi of interactions within the human com-munity. For Mead, sociality was the prin-

ciple and form of emergence (Mead quotedin Jones, 1969: 124), a foundational principlede ning the transition from a lower to a highertype of existence. Moreover, this novel, higheremergent level effectuated a new organizationwhich took-up the lower substrate into itself and in the process rede ned the lower level.This process occurred throughout nature, forthe emergent level was ... only the culminationof that sociality which is found throughout theuniverse, its culmination lying in the fact that

the organism, by occupying the attitudes of others, can occupy its own attitude in the roleof the other (Mead, 1932: 86). The critical juncture of lower and higher levels functionedreciprocally for Mead, a double movement inwhich the lower level attributes of the individ-ual were shaped by the higher level, emergent social whole and, simultaneously, the lowerlevel attributes of the individuals were built-up the from the higher level social whole (seeReck, 1964: 84).

For Mead, the emergent event itself wasunderstood as the experiential manifestationof the novel quality of the temporally present,an experience undergone by a self fundamen-tally social in its constitution. No other earlyemergentist thinker, neither Roy Wood Sell-ars, C. L. Morgan nor Samuel Alexander hadgone as far as Mead in not only placing human beingness into such a key position at the foun-dation of emergence, but in understanding hu-man experience as primarily social. Mead ap-propriated Deweys sociality and elaboratedit into a general theory of natural processes aswell as human culture and its history, all cen-tered on the notion of emergence (Schneider,1963). But by placing emergence into sucha key conceptual role, Mead was not simplysaying individuals were the lower, antecedent

components with the social grouping being theconsequent emergent phase. Rather, he careful-ly examined the reciprocal relations that wouldneed to hold between emergent sociality andthe individual members of that sociality. As,Habermas has pointed out, Mead can explainthe phenomenon and emergence of consciouslife only after he has given up Deweys modelof an isolated actors instrumental dealing withthings and events and has made the transitionto the model of several actors interactive deal-

ings with each other (p. 174).Clearly not timid when it came to theo-rizing, Mead took on no less a daunting topicthan consciousness itself, understanding it as are ective internalization of the social. That iswhy he held that any attempt at developing anadequate psychology of the self which neglect-ed its social core would have to fall far short of an adequate theory. According to the contem-porary philosopher George Cronks (2005)interpretation of Meads point of view, Theworld in which the self lives, then, is an inter-subjective and interactive world a populatedworld containing, not only the individualself, but also other persons. Inter-subjectivityis to be explained in terms of that meeting of minds which occurs in conversation, learning,reading, and thinking. This conceptualizationof a social self emerging out of inter-subjectiv-ity can be clearly seen in Meads famous dis-cussion on the difference between the sense of


3/23

77Mead

I and me (see Campbell, 1992). The mereferred to that aspect of self-identity havingto do with ones social self, the introjected so-cial representations arising in the developingchild through the mediation of family, friends,neighborhoods, and society at large. It was theme which enabled social empathy and wasorganized according to the attitude of thewhole community or the generalized other.In terms of emergence, the me was the indi-vidual re ection of emergent sociality itself.

The I, though, referred to the reac -tion of the organism to the ideas, values, andso forth of the generalized other. That is,whereas the me emerged out of the gener-alized other, the I came out of the reactionto the generalized other. By the way, it is in-teresting to note all of this discourse having to

do with the other took place way before it became expressed in the thought of EmmanuelLevinas which has had such a large impact onpostmodernism. For Mead, the I includedthat sense of ef cacy or agency which a matureperson possesses. However, because the Iand the me were so intimately interrelated ina creative balance, personal and social noveltycould emerge as the I acted in society and inso doing reconstructed it (Mead, 1956). Thus,the individual self as a conscious, experiencing

entity was not to be thought of as a mere pas-sive recipient of a social wholes downwardin uence on the individual member, but, rath -er an active shaper of what that very emergent sociality was and could become. This meant that even though logically the individual as alower level entity and the social as a higherlevel collective occupied distinct realms, in thereality of conscious experience this distinctionwas mostly confounded in the ongoing actionsof a persons life.

This confoundedness was also evident in Meads complexity theory-sounding em-ployment of the word system in contrast toa mere aggregate so that emergence signi edthe presence of things in two or more coinci-dent systems with the presence in one systemchanging the character in earlier systems. Thephilosopher William Desmonde (1967) un-derstood Meads emergent sociality in thissense as directly tied into the latters perspec-

tivalism involving the crucial notion of a frameof reference. Although that which may beviewed from one persons perspective can bequite different than that of anothers perspec-tive, the integration of these various perspec-tives, or their being grounded in an inter-subjectivity, was what made-up an emergent socialwhole for Mead. As Desmonde put it, societyis the ability to be in more than one system at a time, to take more than one perspective si-multaneously... This phenomenon occurs inemergence, for here an object in the processof becoming something new passes from onesystem to another, and in the passage is in twosystems at the same time. During this transi-tion, or transmutation, the emergent entity ex-ists on two levels of nature concomitantly (p.232, p. 233). This was tied into, as the histori -

an of American philosophy Herbert Schneider(1963) once indicated, in the temporal experi-ence, the reconstruction of the interpretationof the past as the present shifts from one per-spective to another (p. 522). This connection between the emergence and time will be dis-cussed below.

To continue about Meads emergent perspectivalism, sociality had to do with howthe novel event is in both the old order andthe new which its advent heralds. Sociality is

the capacity for being several things at once orthe occupation of two or more systems by thesame objects (Mead quoted in Jones, 1969:6). Jones points out that sociality, in this sense,represents the manifold relations of the present emergent to all other members of the systemto which it belongs, and, in this manner alsorepresented the potentialities the system hasfor future actualization. Thus, it was emergent sociality, according to Mead, which organizedthe various clashing systems and perspectives, just as a particular society was the organizationof diverse individuals so that sociality could besaid to have a synthesizing function. Socialitythen, operating according to a seeming paradoxencompassed both permanence and change byallowing a process of adjustment made neces-sary by the new relations characterizing theemergent event. According to Jones (1969),society could do this through its dual capacity:

rst, to unite in a circularly reinforcing fashion


4/23

78 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96

the individual with her society of which shewas a member; and, second, to allow for the in-dividual qua individual to actually express thesocial as its collective.

Mead on emergence and time

In Meads Philosophy of the Present, pub-lished posthumously, he laid out a radical,even mind-bending understanding of tem-

porality which, along with his idea of the emer-gent self, served as the two linchpins of his ap-proach to emergence. It is unfortunate that hisemergentist take on time has been neglected,for the most part, not only by later emergen-tist thinkers but, also within the wider scope of modern philosophy in general. In uenced byBergsons idea of dure, James idea of the spe-cious present, Deweys construal of eventsand acts, and responding to Whiteheadsemergentist ideas on time, Mead held his ownview of time was the one most natural to thescientist even though reductionist scientistscontinually made the mistake of pigeonholingtime into an arti cial distinction between past,present, and future, a distinction which Mead believed compacted the emerging present toa mere vanishing point: A present, then, ascontrasted with the abstraction of mere pas-sage, is not a piece cut out anywhere from the

temporal dimension of uniformly passing real-ity. Its chief reference is to the emergent event,that is, to the occurrence of something which ismore than the processes that have led up to it,and which by its change, continuance, or disap-pearance, adds to later passages a content theywould not otherwise have possessed (Mead,1932: 105).

Mead further elaborated of the present emergent event as that which gave structure totime. Note that Mead claimed emergence gave

structure to time and not the other way aroundwhich is what other emergence-oriented think-ers had held. That is, he emphasized that emer -gence didnt come about as the result of timespassage, an implication of Bergson and White-head and in more recent times of Prigogine(2003). We can posit Meads stipulation on therelation of emergence and time in a Husserlianfashion: the emergent event establishes its own

temporal horizon 2. In so doing, emergence in-verts the traditional picture of time so that thepresent determines the past! That is, the past

ows out of the emergent present, or in Meadsown words, ...there has never been present inexperience a past which has not changed withthe passing generations. The pasts that we areinvolved in are both irrevocable and revocable(Mead, 1932: 2).

I offer here two ways to aid in under-standing Meads highly idiosyncratic interpre-tation of time. The rst involves an appeal toMcTaggarts (1908) famous A and B series of temporality. The second has to do with usingMeads own idea of reconstruction. But rst,in McTaggarts A-Series, time is imagined asa lineal sequence with the past on the left ashaving already taken place before the present,

the present is in the middle as what is takingplace now, and the future is on the right as tak-ing place after the present. In the A-Series, anevents position is always changing in that it is rst future, then moves to the left into thepresent, then farther to the left into the past (and continuing to recede further and furtherinto the past on the left) (Le Poidevin, 2003).By contrast, in the B-Series, temporal sequenceis set-up in terms of an earlier than (or beforethan ) relation and a later than (or after than )

relation. In the B-series, the temporal loca-tions of events do not change since if an event i is earlier than an event j , i will always remainearlier than j .

Meads scenario of temporality, though,was different than either the A-Series or the B-Series. To see how, imagine Meads emergent present as that cutting through the water bythe prow of a boat. The water being cut by theprow is the emergent present event, a moment that continues as long as the bow keeps cuttingthrough the water. The body of water up aheadinto which the prow moves is the future whichis not yet present, and the wake made by the boat is the past. Since the wake (i.e., the past) is2. Mead explicitly contrasted his position of timeand emergence with the temporal landscapeof past, present, and future laid out by Sir ArthurEddington in his description of Einsteins theoryof relativity which Mead believed correspondedtoo closely to the deterministic block universe sodecried by William James.


5/23

79Mead

generated by the boat cutting through the wa-ter, that is, the present, this implies the past is being generated out of the present. In this viewof time, the past as the wake occurs, not beforethe present as it does in Series-A, but insteadcomes after the present emergent event. More-over, just as the prow keeps cutting into novelwater on ahead, the wake of the boat or the past is also always novel by constantly being gener-ated anew. In addition, the future as what is yet to come occurs before the present and not af-ter it as again the A-Series would have it. Con-cerning the B-Series, the earlier than relation isassumed to be what happened in the past be-

fore the present event in question, and the later than relation becomes a before than relationsince, again, the past as wake takes place laterthan the present. Thus, in Meads emergentist

event take on temporality, the earlier than orbefore than actually becomes after than , thethan being the present and the later than orafter than becomes before than .

We can also approach Meads under-standing of time in terms of constructingevents or what Mead referred to as recon-structive adapting this term from Dewey. Theemergent present, as the ongoing cutting of theprow in the water, constructs the past. That is,the temporal dimensions of past and future

are somehow reconstructed out of the present emergent event. We can say that the present emergent event is the site of a set of construc-tional operations which render the past andthe future by, in Meads terms, condition-ing the relationship of the emergent event toits situation, that is, from the vantage point of the present as the constructional locus of tem-porarily: The past as it appears with the pres -ent and future, is the relation of the emergent event to the situation out of which it arose, andit is the event that de nes that situation.... Past,present and future belong to a passage whichattains temporal structure through the event...the past and the future are the boundaries of what we term the present, and are determined by the conditioning relationships of the event to its situation (Mead, 1932: 23, 24). He evenwent so far as to postulate that ... the materialsout of which that past is constructed lie in thepresent (Mead, 1929: 351).

To be sure, Mead was here irting withoutright paradox by interpreting the present emergent event as constructing itself out of the past while at the same time changing thepast as it did so. Far more radical than Deweysreconstruction, for Mead, the futures nov-elty demanded a novel past as well! Indeed, thevery potency of emergence lies in its havingmade a different world through its appear-ances (Mead, 1932: 42). Somehow, emer-gence includes both continuity with the past plus novelty with respect to that same past andthe way it could do both was for the emergent present to construct itself out of the past whichwas constructing it. In Meads view there is akind of circularity or even impredicativity inthat the emergent event appears as an event determined by the past only when it is placed

within the context of the reconstructed past but because the past is that which was recon-structed out of the perspective of the emergent event, the emergent event itself in the present is a determining event.

I said above Meads speculations onthe relation of emergence to time were mind- bending. Yet what serious thinking about timeand its mysteries does not at some point tip overinto seeming paradox, as St. Augustine real-ized 1500 yeas ago? In commenting on Meads

emergence inspired, paradoxical soundingmeditations on time, Cronk (2005) put it thisway: Experience begins with the problematic.Continuity itself cannot be experienced unlessit is broken; that is, continuity is not an object of awareness unless it becomes problematic,and continuity becomes problematic as a re-sult of the emergence of discontinuous events.Hence, continuity and discontinuity (emer-gence) are not contradictories, but dialecticalpolarities (mutually dependent levels of real-ity) that generate experience itself.

Furthermore, for Mead, the force of theirrevocability of the past lay in the degree towhich, through reconstituting it by means of emergent novelty in the present, we are thenable to project something necessarily about thefuture. This indeed was a strange twist about temporality that again put the onus on thepresent, for it is only from the present that wecould anticipate any kind of future at all wheth-


6/23

80 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96

er one there is merely a possibility or one that is a necessity. For Mead, the present emergent event itself was unpredictable although para-doxically at the same time it was determined.

Trying to get a conceptual handle ontime has way-laid many a thinker from timeimmemorial and Mead was certainly no excep-tion. An alternative approach to a metaphys-ics of emergent systems which downplayedthe signi cance of temporality was proposed by the American philosopher Justus Buchler(1990) with his notion of a natural complex.Buchler pointed out that early emergentist thinkers like Whitehead (and I would add, byimplication, Mead as well) got caught on thehorns of a intractable dilemma by trying toexplain the relation of their fundamental onto-logical categories to time. Buchler emphasized,

though, that temporality need not play such acrucial role in explicating the nature of complexsystems as such it all depended on the pre-sumptions with which one approached the na-ture and dynamics of a system. Buchlers workis even less well-known in complexity circlesthan Meads which is quite an unfortunate fact given the richness of Buchlers insights intosystems and their dynamics.

Conclusion

To appreciate what Mead was trying toaccomplish with his irtation with par -adox about time, it is critical to keep in

mind that Mead saw the task of his philosophyof emergence to be a matter of reconciling thedeterministic assumptions of modern sciencewith what he held to be two indubitable factsabout the world, namely, the emergence of thenovel in nature and the emergence of the novelwithin human experience, about both of whichscience was supposed to increase our knowl-

edge. But science, according to Mead, had set about this by resorting to a rationalizing pro-cess as soon as novelty emerged which inevi-tably rendered novelty a mere product of what preceded its occurrence. What was required inorder to remedy this situation was an appre-ciation for and study of the emergent noveltyas that which takes explanatory precedencewhatever past or antecedent had a role in lead-ing to the emergent event in the present.

Ultimately what Mead was conceptu-ally wrestling with is a common theme thread-ed throughout the discourse on emergencefor the past hundred years. This is the issueof how we are to get a conceptual handle on afundamental claim made by emergentists of various persuasions, notably, that processesof emergence amount to genuine new starts innature, culture, and human experience. Howdo we reconcile the possibility of genuinelynew starts in a scienti cally de ned determin -istic universe. These new starts need not onlyinvolve the momentous events of life emerg-ing from the inert or consciousness emergingfrom the merely sentient. These are innumer -able other examples of new starts like the con-struction of a beavers dam, or a termites hill,or a persons house, or baking a cake, or even

taking a new route to work. In Meads under-standing of emergence, we can say that eachnew start constructs its own temporal scheme,or to use the loftier language of phenomenol-ogy, its own temporal horizon since the emer-gent event is the simultaneous emergence of a new temporal scheme and a new temporalhorizon. Because of its very novelty, though,each new start is independent from any kind of absolutely grounded temporal ordering, Meadwas here, like Alexander and Whitehead, try-

ing to maintain his fealty to insights of generaland special relativity having to do with theabrogation of Newtons absolute time and theemergence of novelty in the world. But if thereis no absolute time, there is no absolute pas-sage as a background against which the emer-gent event takes place. Instead, emergence it-self is the marker of a new beginning and hencea new temporal horizon. The temporality of each emergent event is unique in a manner ex-pressed in the famous jazz lyrics immortalized by Eddie Harris and Les McKann in the title of their song, Compared to What?

References

Buchler, J. (1990). Metaphysics of Natural Com- plexes, ISBN 9780791401835 .

Campbell, J. (1992). George Herbert Mead on socialfusion and the social critic, in R. Burch and H.Saatkamp (eds.), Frontiers in American Philosophy ,ISBN 9781585440023 .

Cronk, G. (2005). George Herbert Mead (1863-
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0791401839/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=1585440027/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=1585440027/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0791401839/welcometokurt-20


7/23

81Mead

1931), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ,http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mead.htm .

Desmonde. W. (1967). George Herbert Mead, inPaul Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Volume Five, ISBN 9780028646510 . pp. 231-233.

El-hani, C. N. and Pihlstrm, S. (2002). Emergencetheories and pragmatic realism, Essays in Phi-losophy , 3(2), ISSN 1526-0569, http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/pihlstrom.html .

Habermas, J. (1992). Postmetaphysical Thinking:Philosophical Essays , W. M. Hohengarten (trans.),ISBN 9780262082099 .

Jones, M. M. (1969). The Categorical Concept of Emergence in the Philosophy of George H. Mead ,PhD Dissertation, New Orleans, LA: TulaneUniversity.

Le Poidevin, R. (2003). Travels in Four Dimen- sions: The Enigmas of Space and Time , ISBN9780198752554 (2005).

McTaggart, J. M. (1908). The unreality of time,Mind, ISSN 0026-4423 , 17: 457-474.

Mead, G. H. (1956). On Social Psychology: Selected Papers , A. Strauss (ed.), Chicago, IL: Universityof Chicago Press.

Mead, G. H. (1938). The Philosophy of the Past , C .Morris (ed.), Chicago, IL: University of ChicagoPress.

Mead, G. H. (1932). The Philosophy of the Present ,London, England: Open Court Publishing Com-pany.

Mead, G. H. (1929). The nature of the past, in J.

Coss (ed.), Essays in Honor of John Dewey , New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., pp. 235-42.Miller, D. (1973). George Herbert Mead: Self, Lan-

guage, and the World , ISBN 9780226526133 .Reck, A. (1964). Recent American Philosophy: Stud-

ies of Ten Representative Thinkers , New York, NY:Pantheon Books.

Prigogine, I. (2003). Is Future Given? ISBN9789812385086 .

Schneider, H. (1963). History of American Philoso- phy , ISBN 9780231026451 .
http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mead.htmhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0028646517/welcometokurt-20http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/pihlstrom.htmlhttp://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/pihlstrom.htmlhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0262082098/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0198752555/welcometokurt-20http://journalseek.net/cgi-bin/journalseek/journalsearch.cgi?field=issn&query=0026-4423http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0226526135/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=9812385088/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0231026455/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0231026455/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=9812385088/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0226526135/welcometokurt-20http://journalseek.net/cgi-bin/journalseek/journalsearch.cgi?field=issn&query=0026-4423http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0198752555/welcometokurt-20http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0262082098/welcometokurt-20http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/pihlstrom.htmlhttp://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/pihlstrom.htmlhttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0028646517/welcometokurt-20http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mead.htm


8/23

82 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


9/23

83Mead


10/23

84 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


11/23

85Mead


12/23

86 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


13/23

87Mead


14/23

88 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


15/23

89Mead


16/23

90 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


17/23

91Mead


18/23

92 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


19/23

93Mead


20/23

94 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


21/23

95Mead


22/23

96 E:CO Vol. 9 No. 3 2007 pp. 75-96


23/23

Emergence Identity

Documents

Transcript of Emergence Identity