(CASE #6) LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ V. TERESITA V. SALVADOR [651 SCRA 429; June 08, 2011]

DEL CASTILLO, J. DOCTRINE: Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person alleging it.

FACTS:

Respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, against petitioners Lucia and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by her and that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest; and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.

In their Answer, petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent's predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.

MTC: there exists an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties.

Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal. RTC initially remanded the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing but upon motion for reconsideration, RTC affirmed the MTC Decision.

Respondent sought reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC thus elevating the case to the CA.

CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy relationship. The CA likewise gave no probative value to the affidavits of petitioners' witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to establish petitioners' status as agricultural tenants. If at all, the affidavits merely showed that petitioners occupied the subject land with the consent of the original owners. And since petitioners are occupying the subject land by mere tolerance, they are bound by an implied promise to vacate the same upon demand by the respondent. Failing to do so, petitioners are liable to pay damages.

In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. In her affidavit, petitioner Lucia declared that she and her late husband occupied the subject land with the consent and permission of the original owners and that their agreement was that she and her late husband would cultivate the subject land, devote it to agricultural production, share the harvest with the landowners on a 50-50 basis, and at the same time watch over the land. Witness Alejandro Arias attested in his affidavit that petitioner Lucia and her husband, Serapio, have been cultivating the subject land since 1960; that after the demise of Serapio, petitioner Lucia and her children continued to cultivate the subject land; and that when respondent's predecessors-in-interest were still alive, he would often see them and respondent get some of the harvest. The affidavit of witness Conseso stated, in essence, that petitioner Lucia has been in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property since 1960 and that the harvest was divided into two parts, ½ for the landowner and ½ for petitioner Lucia.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is agricultural tenancy in this case

RULING:

Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case. Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

The element of consent is lacking. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to show that respondent's predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is necessary.

Petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners.

Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.

(CASE #7) ALITA V. CA [G.R. No. 78517; February 27, 1989] PARAS, J. FACTS:

Two parcels of land were acquired by the Reyes' (respondents) predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

Respondents want to personally cultivate these lands, but petitioners (Atila et al.) refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

Respondents instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella, then Minister of Agrarian Reform, and Atila et al. for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.

Plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates.

The Court of Agrarian Relations (now RTC) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.

The RTC issued a decision 1) declaring PD No. 27 as inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law; 2) declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and 3) ejecting from the land the petitioners

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals sustained a similar judgement. ISSUE:

WON lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27 RULING: NO. P.D. 27 cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or

Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Homestead Act was enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The 1987 Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.

Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution: The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of

indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question.

Section 6. Retention Limits: Provided further, that original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still

own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

(CASE #8) REPUBLIC V. CA REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REP. BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND GREEN CITY ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [GR No. 139592; October 5, 2000]

GONZAGA-REYES, J. FACTS:

Private respondent acquired land by purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja vda. De Torres.

The five parcels of land in issue has a combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. M-45856, M-45857, M-45858, M-45859 and M-45860 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.

The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural.

On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).

On July 21, 1994, private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from agrarian reform, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994 and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990.

Administrative Order No. 6 provides the guidelines for exemption from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage while DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, authorizes the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA 6651 to non-agricultural uses effective June 15 1988.

ISSUE: Whether or not the five parcels of land in issue can be forcibly acquired RULING:

The court held that there is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration. The classification of the Board in said case was more recent than that of the tax declaration and was based on the present condition of the property and the community thereat. Another argument made by the OSG was that to be exempt from CARP, the land must have been classified as industrial/residential before June 15, 1988. Based on this premise, the OSG points out that no such classification was presented except the municipality’s alleged land use map showing that subject parcels of land fall within the municipality’s forest conservation zone. The OSG further argues that assuming that a change in the use of the subject properties in 1980 may justify their exemption from CARP, such land use of 1980 was repealed by HLURB. The plan of HLURB for Barangay Punta, where the parcels of land in issue are located, allegedly envision the development of the barangay into a progressive agricultural community with the limited allocation of only 51 hectares for residential use and none for commercial and forest conservation zone use. The Court however, disagrees with such assertion. It declared that the land use map is the more appropriate document to consider rather than the tax declaration. Moreover, the commissioner’s report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the properties are not wholly agricultural. The report showed that the land of private respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree slope. The finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides another cogent reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on this point when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act".

(CASE #9) BUKLOD NG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS INC. V. EM RAMOS AND SONS INC. [G.R. No. 131481; MARCH 16, 2011]

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J. Doctrine: Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing character of the property and the structures thereon would completely negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality. Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only the rubber-stamping by the local legislature of the current use of the land. Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land by virtue of Resolution No. 29-A dated July 9, 1972, it is no longer agricultural land by the time the CARL took effect on June 15, 1988 and is, therefore, exempt from the CARP. To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. All similar actions as regards the land subsequently rendered by other government agencies shall merely serve as confirmation of the reclassification. never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

FACTS:

At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) which from part of a larger expanse with an area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Originally owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club, he property was aquired by the [herein repondent EMRASON] in 1965 for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes". Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise known as the "Loval Autonomy Act", enacteed Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No. 1, enitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof." In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development its aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, ataching to the apllication detailed development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity), approving [EMRASON's] application. Ordinance No. 29-A pertinently reads: "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the application for subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two (372) Hectares situated in Barrios Bocal and Langkaan, named as Traveller's Life Homes. Resolved that the Municipal Ordinance regarding subdivision regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by the subdivision ".

Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed with property development.

It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay owing to the confluence of events. Among these was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation. On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution. On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite addressed a letter to [EMRASON], stating in part, as follows: "In reply to your letter of June 2, 1988, we wish to clarify that the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite, has approved the development of your property situated in Barrios Bukal and Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with a total area of 3 72 hectares, more or less, into residential, industrial, commercial and golf course project. This conversion conforms with the approved Development Plan of the Municipality of Dasmariñas Cavite ". Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring property of the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be managed through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC property, with three (3) hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be insufficient for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject property of [EMRASON]. On August 29, 1990, then OAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest from [EMRASON]. All told, these notices covered 303.38545 hectares of land situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite owned by [EMRASON]. In the meantime, [EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices. Collectively docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92, these petitions were subsequently referred to the Office of the Regional Director, Region IV, which had jurisdiction thereon. In his referral action, the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV, through its Operations Division, to conduct a hearing and/or investigation lo determine whether or not the subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition. Forthwith, the DAR regional office conducted an on-site inspection of the subject property. In the course of the hearing, during which [EMRASON] offered Exhibits :'A" to "UU-2" as documentary evidence, [EMRASON] received another set of notices of acquisition. As lo be expected, [EMRASON] again protested. On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as follows; ''WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing x x x, considering that the notices of acquisition dated August 29, 1990 relative to the 39 hectares partly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19298; notices of acquisition all dated April 3, 1991 relative to the 131.41975 hectares partly covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. x x x; notices of acquisition all dated August 28, 1991 relative lo the 56.9201 hectares covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. x x x; and notices of acquisition all dated May 15, 1992 relative to the 76.0456 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. xx, all located at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite and owned by petitioner EM RAMOS and SONS, INC. are null and void on the ground that the

subject properties are exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, therefore, the aforesaid notices of acquisition be cancelled and revoked. " The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP. On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Office of

the Agrarian Reform Secretary, it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to the department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine hectares x x x".

On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)]

issued an order, the decretal portion of which partly reads: "WHEREFORE, in the interest of law and justice, an order is hereby rendered: 1. Affirming the Notices of Acquisition dated August 29, 1990, April 3, 1991, August 28, 1991 and May 15, 1992 covering 303.38545 hectares of the property owned by the E.M. RAMOS & SONS, INC, located at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite x x x; x x x x 3. Directing the OAR field officials concerned to pursue (he coverage under RA 6657 of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for which subject Notices of Acquisition had been issued. SO ORDERED". Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied by the [DAR Secretary Garilao] in his subsequent order of January 6, 1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the President where the recourse was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5461.

On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona [(Deputy Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision x x x, dismissing [EMRASON's] appeal on the strength of the following observation: "To recapitulate, this Office holds that [EMRASON's] property has remained AGRICULTURAL in classification and therefore falls within the coverage of the CARP, on the basis of the following: [EMRASON] failed to comply with the mandatory requirements and conditions of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, specifically, among others, the need for approval of the National Planning Commission through the Highway District Engineer, and the Bureau of Lands before final submission to the Municipal Council and Municipal Mayor; [EMRASON] failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 152, dated December 16, 1968, and The certification of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) in 1981 and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB) in 1992 that the property of [EMRASON] is agricultural".

Undaunted, [EMRASON] interposed a motion for reconsideration, followed later by another motion whereunder it invited attention to legal doctrines involving land conversion recently enunciated by no less than the Office of the President itself.

On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out with his second challenged issuance denying [EMRASON's] aforementioned motion for reconsideration x x x. From the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by the OP, EMRASON filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40950.

On July 3, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which enjoined then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao and Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona from implementing the OP Decision of February 7, 1996 and Resolution of May 14, 1996 until further orders from the court. On September 17, 1996, the appellate court issued a Resolution granting the prayer of EMRASON for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The writ of preliminary injunction was actually issued on September 30, 1996 after EMRASON posted the required bond of P500,000,00. The DAR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 17, 1996 of the Court of Appeals, with the prayer that the writ of preliminary injunction already issued be lifted, recalled and/or dissolved. At this juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to intervene as an indispensable party in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950; that the writ of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved, having been issued in violation of Section 55 of the CARL; and that the Petition for Review of EMRASON be dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On March 26, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of the CARL. DAR’S CONTENTION: DAR asserts that the subject property could be compulsorily acquired by the State from EMRASON and distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP since it was still agricultural land when the CARL became effective on June 15, 1988. Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, approved by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 13, 1971 and July 9, 1972, respectively, did not reclassify the subject property from agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to reclassify lands is an inherent power of the National Legislature under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended, which, absent a specific delegation, could not be exercised by any local government unit (LGU). The Local Autonomy Act of 1959 - in effect when the Municipality of Dasmariñas approved Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A - merely delegated to cities and municipalities zoning authority, to be understood as the regulation of the uses of property in accordance with the existing character of the land and structures. It was only Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which extended to cities and municipalities limited authority to reclassify agricultural lands. BUKLOD’S CONTENTION: Buklod contends that EMRASON failed to comply with Section 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which provided that the conversion of land should be implemented within one year, otherwise, the conversion is deemed in bad faith. Given the failure of EMRASON to comply with many other requirements for a valid conversion, the subject property has remained agricultural. Simply put, no compliance means no conversion. In fact, Buklod points out, the subject property is still declared as "agricultural" for real estate tax purposes. Consequently, EMRASON is now estopped from insisting that the subject property is actually "residential." EMRASON’S CONTENTION: EMRASON, on the other hand, echoes the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the subject property is exempt from CARP because it had already been reclassified as residential with the approval of Ordinance No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 9, 1972. EMRASON cites Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co. (Ortigas case) where this Court ruled that a municipal council is empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959.

Still relying on the Ortigas case, EMRASON avows that the Municipality of Dasmariñas, taking into account

the conditions prevailing in the area, could validly zone and reclassify the subject property in the exercise of its police power in order to safeguard the health, safety, peace, good order, and general welfare of the people in the locality. EMRASON describes the whole area surrounding the subject property as residential subdivisions (i.e., Don Gregorio, Metro Gate, Vine Village, and Cityland Greenbreeze 1 and 2 Subdivisions) and industrial estates (i.e., Reynolds Aluminum Philippines, Inc. factory; NDC-Marubeni industrial complex, San Miguel Corporation-Monterey cattle and piggery farm and slaughterhouse), traversed by national highways (i.e., Emilio Aguinaldo National Highway, Trece Martirez, Puerto Azul Road, and Governor's Drive). EMRASON mentions that on March 25, 1988, theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite passed Resolution No. 105 which declared the area where subject property is located as "industrial-residential-institutional mix." EMRASON further maintains that Ordinance No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas is valid. Ordinance No. 29-A is complete in itself, and there is no more need to comply with the alleged requisites which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon. EMRASON quotes from Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals (Patalinghug case)

that "once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail." ISSUE: Whether the subject property could be placed under the CARP RULING: NO. The subject property could not be placed under the CARP coverage. CARP coverage is limited to

agricultural lands. The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to said date. Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its approval on July 9, 1972, immediately effected the zoning and reclassifying of the subject property for residential use. Since July 9, 1972, upon approval of Resolution No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmarinas, the subject property had been reclassified from agricultural to residential. The tax declarations covering the subject property, classifying the same as agricultural, cannot prevail over Resolution No. 29-A. The following pronouncements of the Court in the Patalinghug case are of particular relevance herein: - tax declaration is not conclusive of (he nature of the property for zoning purposes. - once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail.

The CARL though does not specify which specific government agency should have done the reclassification. To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. All similar actions as regards the land subsequently rendered by other government agencies shall merely serve as confirmation of the reclassification.

Doctrines discussed in the case: ZONING CLASSIFICATION: Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of eminent

domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. CONVERSION V. RECLASSIFICATION

CONVERSION RECLASSIFICATION

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of

specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,

commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.

BINAY V. DOMINGO: ‘Police Power need not always be expressly delegated, it may also be inferred. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex" Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. AYOG V. CUSI JR. ON VESTED RIGHT: GENERAL RULE: A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest". It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy." "A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power."

EXPN: Protection of vested rights is not absolute and must yield to the exercise of police power: A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to Ihose already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.

(CASE #10) HEIRS OF JOSE DELESTE V. LBP, ET.AL [651 SCRA 352; July 8,2011] VELASCO, JR., J. Doctrine: Land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2) stages. The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its deemed owner. And the second stage is the issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary. FACTS:

Spouses Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin were owners of a parcel of agricultural land in Iligan City. They were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio by another woman. Gregorio died. Hilaria and Virgilio administered the said property and sold it to Dr. Jose Deleste, with a notarized deed of sale and registered in 1954. The tax declaration was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Deleste. Upon the death of Hilaria, Gregorio’s brother, Juan was appointed as a special administrator. Noel was appointed subsequently as the regular administrator. He filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of the sold property. Then pending the case, PD 27 was issued in 1972.The law mandates that the tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program. And awarded to farm-beneficiaries. This property was place under this program. However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified as the landowners. The notice was sent to them. The petitioners contend that they weren’t informed that DAR placed the property under the agrarian reform program and with that, their right to due process had been violated. In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the Zoning Regulation, reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential and was approved by HSURB in 1978 Then eventually, in 1984 DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to the tenants (herein respondents) who were the tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. The property was surveyed and a portion of the land was, designated as Lot No. 1407. In 1995, the court decided on the case filed by Noel, and held that the said property was originally a conjugal property of the late spouses. Hilaria could only sell ½ of her share. As a result, Deleste who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held as co-owners of the said property, with ½ interest each in it. Iligan City filed a complaint with the RTC for the expropriation of the portion of the said property. The expropriation was granted by the court. Considering that the real owner was not yet ascertained and not yet partitioned to the heirs, the compensation was deposited in trust of RTC Iligan. Thereafter, in 2001, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued in favor of the tenants. Delestes to filed a case for the nullification of the OCTs and Eps before DARAB in 2002. ISSUE:

1. WON the failure of DAR to inform through a written notice that the ascendant’s property is subject to PD 27, a violation of the heirs’ right to due process

2. Can the Deleste’s still seek for the nullification of the CLTs and Eps? 3. Is the subject property within the agrarian reform program?

RULING: 1. YES. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program

cannot be underrated. It is an essential requirement on administrative due process (Heirs of Jugalbot vs. CA).

The property was sold to Deleste and registered on 1954 with the tax declaration under Gregorio

cancelled and a new one was issued under Deleste’s name. This served as a constructive notice to

the whole world The issuance of PD 27 was only on 1992, so there’s no reason for DAR to feign

ignorance of the transfer of ownership of the said property.

DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that

the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name

of Deleste. Though tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless

good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying

taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.

2. YES. EPs and OCTs were issued on 2001 and the action for nullification was filed in 2002 so the

filing of the petition was well within the prescribed one year period, thus, barring the defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if the petition was filed before the DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as mandated by Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree,this should necessarily have the same effect, considering that DARABs jurisdiction extends to cases involving the cancellation of EPs, and even OCTs issued by virtue of a void EP.

The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform

beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of

agrarian laws, rules and regulations.

3. NO. The issue whether the subject property is exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative

determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary, not with the DARAB.

The subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment of City

Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an agricultural land. It was even

approved by the HSURB (HLURB predecessor).

The tenants contended that they were deemed owners of the land since 1972, that the vested right

had already accrued to interest which cannot just be taken away in virtue of the latter

reclassification. The court held that PD 27 does not automatically give them absolute ownership.

There are certain requirements that has to be complied first, these are payment of just

compensation and the full payment of the amortization.Until then, the title remains with the original

landowner.

In this case, the tenants only acquired the inchoate right on the said property on 1984 upon the

issuance of the CLTs. The reclassification took place on 1975 and approved by HSURB on 1978.

The EPs were issued only on 2001. No vested right has accrued prior to the reclassification and its

approval. The court held, the subject property is outside the agrarian reform program.

(CASE #11) CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. DARAB [215 SCRA 87; October 22, 1992] CAMPOS, JR., J. FACTS:

Petitioner Central Minadanao University is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the state located in the town of Musuan Bukidnon province.

President Garcia issued Proclamation no. 476 withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now known as CMU.

CMU approved Resolution no. 160 adopting a livelihood program called “Kilusang Sariling Sikap program” under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This agreement was covered by a written contract.

o Under this program, the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares if land for lowland rice project.

o It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees.

o Among the participants in this program were the complainants (Obrique et.al)

When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became president of CMU, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-business management and training project.

CMU launched launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP). o It would provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals

and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to CMU P100 as service fee and P1000 as land rental fee.

o It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the agreement.

Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees.

To cushion the impact of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.

Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To the CMU-Income Enhancement Program, a former employee would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees.

o It was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.

The one-year contracts expired. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.

The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint.

On the basis of the previously mentioned facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP.

At the same time, It ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the in their complaint filed with the DARAB, complainants Obrique, et al. and claimed that they are

tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondents Obrique and others can qualify as beneficiaries of CARP 2. Whether or not the 400 hectares ordered segregated by DARAB is covered by CARP

RULING:

1. NO. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU.

Private respondents claim that they are landless peasants. Obrique is not a landless peasant. The

facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position. Others may, at

the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of

origin. No proof appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.

Their entry into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of the owner, the

CMU, for a limited period and for a specific purpose. And after the expiration of their privilege to

occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their

settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority.

In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants,

cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.

2. NO. The 400 hectares ordered by DARAB to be segreagated cannot be covered by CARP because:

a) It is not alienable and disposable land of public domain; b) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress; c) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, CMU; d) It is exempt from coverage under section 10 RA 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and

exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot productin centers.

(CASE #12) DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS [426 SCRA 217; March 23, 2004]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Doctrine:

In order for a land for educational purposes to be exempt from the coverage of the CARP, (1) the land must be “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found necessary,” and (2) the purpose is “for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes.” –Sec 10 of RA 6657

CARP is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is a means towards viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: “landless farmers and farm workers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.

FACTS:

The lands in question in this case were donated by Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. The titles of the lands were also granted to the respondent. DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, and said lease were renewed for another 10 years. Albar and several others claimed to be permanent and regular farmworkers of the said lands. They filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program before the MARO. After investigation, the MARO issued a notice of coverage to DECS. MARO then submitted his report to OIC-PARO, who then recommended it to DAR Regional Director. The coverage of the said lands was approved. The respondent appealed before the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and the latter agreed with the decision of the regional director. Respondent appealed before the CA, and the decision of the Sec. Of DAR was set aside. ISSUE:

WON the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of CARL

RULING: NO. The lands in controversy are not exempted from the coverage of CARL.

As the SC ruled, the general policy of CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. It was believed, base on the facts, that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the donor and were donated to the respondent. When the respondent leased the land to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural. It was further ruled by the SC that there was no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of CARL, which classified the lands in question as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial lands. Clearly, the said lands fall under the category of lands of the public domain devoted or suitable for agriculture. The SC agreed with the petitioner that the lands in controversy were not “actually, directly, and exclusively used as school sites and campuses” as they were leased to AAC. This only means that said lands are not exempted from the CARP coverage.The respondent erred in citing the case of CMU v. DARAB because the

lands in question in this case fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands.

(CASE #13) MILESTONE FARMS, INC. V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [G.R. No. 182332; February 23, 2011] NACHURA, J. Doctrine: It is the Department Agrarian Reform Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority

to exempt and/or exclude a property from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. FACTS: Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purposes of engaging in the raising of cattle, pigs and other livestock, breeding, raising and selling poultry and importing cattle, pigs and other livestock. On June 1988, a new agrarian reform law, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. However, on December 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in Luz Farms v. Sec. of Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry and/or swine raising are excluded from CARP. Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption of its 316.0422-hectare property. Meanwhile, on December 1993, DAR issued an order setting forth rules and regulations to govern exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry and swine raising from CARP coverage. Petitioner, in 1994, re-documented its application. Acting on said application, DAR’s Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner’s property and arrived at the conclusion that the propert be recommended for exemption from the coverage of CARP. DAR regional director Dalugug, exempted the same from CARP’s coverage. Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc. represented by Balajadia, Sr., moved for the reconsideration of the said order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Subsequently, the Pinugay Famrers filed a letter-appeal with the DAR secretary. Correlatively, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Teresa-Baras, Rizal. The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the Regional Trial Court. The case reached the CA, which reinstated MCTC’s ruling, ordering Balajadia and company to vacate portions of the property. In the meantime, in 1995, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881; private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of CARL. DAR conducted an actual headcount of the livestock population on the property. DAR SECRETARY’S RULING Secretary Garilao issued an order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exemptedby Director Dalugdug. Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that Certificated of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the name of petitioner’s president prior to June 15, 1988. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, submitting copies of Certificates of Transfer of Large Cattle and additional Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle issued to petitioner prior to June 15, 1988. However, Secretary Garilao denied the Motion. Aggrieved, petitioner filed its memorandum on appeal before the Office of the President. OP’S RULING OP reinstated Director Dalugdug’s Order and declared the entire property exempt from the coverage of CARP. However, on separate motions for reconsideration filed by farmer-groups, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution, setting aside its previous decision, and reinstating Secretary Garilao’s previous order. The OP held that when it comes to proof of ownership, the reference is the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA. CA’S RULING The property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR Administrative Order No. 9. CA also found that petitioner applied for

exclusion long before the effectivity of A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP coverage. Petitioner was held to have actually engaged in the said business on the property even before June 15, 1988. Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 2004, without the knowledge of the CA, DAR secretary Villa issued an order, granting petitioner’s application to convert portions of the property from agricultura l to residential and golf courses use. On the CA’s decision in 2005, Motions for reconsideration were filed by farmer-groups claiming that the CA should have accorded respect to the factual findings of the OP. DAR confirmed that the subject property was no longer devoted to cattle raising. The appellate court had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162. 7373 hectares. CA held that DAR A.O. No. 9 required that the subject property be subjected to continuing review and verification; hence, ordered the reversion of the property. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. DAR’s investigating team conducted another ocular inspection on the subject property on 2007. Because of the contentious factual issues and the conflicting averments of the parties, the CA set the case for hearing and reception of evidence. Finally, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by CA. It ratiocinated that the MARO Reports and the DAR’s Manifestation could not be disregarded simply because DAR A.O. No. 9 was declared unconstitutional. The Sutton ruling was premised on the fact that the Sutton property continued to operate as a livestock farm. Petitioner contends that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DAR’s jurisdiction. ISSUE:

Who has jurisdiction in the exclusion/ exemption of lands under the CARP? RULING:

It is established that issues of Exclusion and/or exemption are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation cases which are well within the DAR Secretary’s competence and jurisdiction. Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure provides: Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation of PA No. 6657 (CARL) and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances. Thus, the court cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR secretary of his legal mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over all ALI cases. Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt/exclude a property from CARP coverage based on factual circumstances and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. Albeit parenthetically, Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into residential and golf courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area originally claimed as exempt from CARP coverage because it was allegedly devoted to livestock production. There was no error in the assailed Amended Decision of the CA which would warrant the modification, much less the reversal, thereof.

(CASE #14) ARCHBISHOP V. SECRETARY [G.R. No. 139285; December 21, 2007] VELASCO, JR., J. FACTS:

Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur. Part of it was planted with rice and corn, the other with coconut trees.

In 1985, Archbishop filed several petitions for exemption of certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.

Two of these petitions were denied by the Regional Director of DAR, Region V, Juanito L. Lorena.[3]

Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres on the grounds, among others, that he is not the owner but a mere administrator of the subject property and that the same is used for charitable and religious purposes.

The appeal, as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Archbishop can claim more than one right of retention RULING: NO. There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per landowner. Neither PD 27 nor RA 6657

has a provision for a landowner to exercise more than one right of retention. The law is simple and clear as to the retention limits per landowner. PD 27 states, in all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it; while RA 6657 states:

SEC. 6. Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall the retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose

lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees

or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

Nothing in either law supports Archbishops claim to more than one right of retention on behalf of each cestui que trust. The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretation. There is only one right of retention per landowner, and no multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party.

Archbishop’s contention that he is merely an administrator of the donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the coverage of agrarian reform. Under PD 27, the coverage is lands devoted to rice and corn. Section 4 of RA 6657 states, The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. The lands in Archbishops name are agricultural lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall under the exemptions.

(CASE #15) ALEJANDRO DANAN ET AL. V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ESTRELLA ARRASTIA [GR No. 132759; October 25, 2005]

TINGA, J. FACTS:

Sometime in 1976, a certain Rustico Coronel leased the subject property from the Arrastia heirs for a period of twelve (12) years or until the crop year 1987 to 1988.

On September 27, 1986, persons claiming to be farmers and residents of Barangay Lourdes and Barangay San Rafael signed a joint resolution as members of the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura (AMA) to enter and lease the subject property from the Arrastia heirs.

Then Pampanga Governor Brien Guiao favorably endorsed the resolution to then Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Heherson Alvarez.

On the basis of said resolution but without the consent of the landowners, the AMA members, who are herein petitioners, entered the disputed land, cleared portions thereof and planted various crops thereon. This culminated in a violent confrontation on May 21, 1988 that led to the filing of criminal charges against AMA members.

On behalf of her co-heirs and co-owners, Arrastia instituted an action against private petitioners.

On November 29, 1989, private petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) against Arrastia, alleging that they were actual tenants of the disputed property who were forcibly evicted by Arrastia from their tenanted lots through the use of armed men.

Arrastia interposed the defense that the disputed land was not devoted to agriculture and that private petitioners were not tenants thereof.

After due hearing, the PARAD rendered a decision declaring that the subject property is covered by the CARP and that private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries of the program.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were eligible to become beneficiaries of CARP 2. Whether or not the land of Arrastia can be acquired for redistribution

RULING:

(1) A perusal of the decision in DARAB Case No. 1551 reveals that DARAB classified two (2) sets of farmworkers, i.e., those who cultivated the land and paid corresponding rentals, and those who occupied and cultivated portions of the disputed property since 1986 as certified by BARC officials. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these

requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. In the case at bar, it has not been sufficiently established that private petitioners’ occupation and cultivation of the disputed property was with the consent of the landowners.

(2) As borne by the case records, respondent Arrastia owns only 4.4630 hectares of the subject

property, which is below the retention limit under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 granting a right of retention of up to a maximum of five (5) hectares of agricultural land in favor of a landowner whose property may be acquired for distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of five (5) hectares. His land will not be covered at all by the operation land transfer program although all requisites for coverage are present.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which supplies the details for the exercise of a landowner's retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers. Therefore, there is no legal and practical basis to order the commencement of the administrative proceedings for the placement of respondent Arrastias land under the CARP since her propertys land area falls below the retention limit of five (5) hectares.

(CASE #16) DAEZ V. CA [G.R. No. 133507; February 17, 2000] DE LEON, JR., J. FACTS:

Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Soriente et. al. under a system of share-tenancy.

The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Thus, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) to private respondents as beneficiaries.

Private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers. Hence, Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents.

In an Affidavit, Eudosia Daez and her husband declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan.

DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.

Daez sought for reconsideration from Secretary Benjamin Leong but the latter just affirmed the subject order upon finding the private respondents to be bona fide tenants of the subject land.

Secretary Leong also disregarded the private respondent’s affidavit for having been executed under duress.

CA, as well as SC sustained the order issued by Secretary Leong.

DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Then, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).

Because her application for exemption from P.D. No. 27 was denied, Daez filed an application for retention of the subject Riceland under R.A. No. 6657.

The application was approved with the exclusion of her 8 children to retain 3 hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law.

Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR: DENIED. | MR=DENIED

They appealed to the Office of the President: GRANTED.

Private respondents then sought review from CA: decision of OP is REVERSED

Hence, this petition. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not exemption from agrarian reform coverage and the right of retention of landowners is one and the same

2. Whether or not the heirs of Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject land RULING:

1. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.

P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption.

If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed. Exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops. On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands". Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowners right of retention, are different. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other.

2. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685

riceland. The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657

defines the nature and incidents of a landowner’s right of retention. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner’s choice of the area to be retained, must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which supplies the details for the exercise of a landowners retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers. Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.