PROJECT TITLE: Strengthening the Electoral Processes in Kenya Project (SEPK)

UNDAFOUTCOME:

Outcome 1.2: Democratic participation and human rights: electoral processes are free, fair, transparent and peaceful

EXPECTED PROJECT GOAL

Consolidated, strengthened and sustainable electoral institutions, systems and processes in Kenya

EXPECTED PROJECT

OUTCOMES

i) Strengthened legal and institutional framework for electionsii) Strengthened, more informed and inclusive participation in the electoral processiii) More efficient, transparent, and peaceful elections iv) Strengthened electoral justice

IMPLEMENTINGAGENCY

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

RESPONSIBLE PARTNERS: Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC),

COLLABORATING PARTNERS:

KLRC, Judiciary, Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), Civil Society, United Nations Agencies - UN Women, OHCHR, Media Council of Kenya

NAME SIGNATURE DATENational TreasuryCabinet Secretary

Mr. Henry Rotich

Independent Electoral and Boundaries CommissionChairman

Mr. Ahmed Issack

UNDPResident Representative

Ms. Nardos Bekele-Thomas

Brief DescriptionThis Strengthening the Electoral Processes in Kenya project is designed to consolidate and build on the gains made from the constitutional transition process and the 2013 elections to strengthen and develop sustainable and effective election institutions, systems and processes. This project grounds electoral assistance within the democratic governance framework and the electoral cycle. This project will tap on UN agency comparative advantages and reflect the UN delivering as one principles in its implementation as programmatic strengths of the various UN agencies will be leveraged for greater impact. UNDP is designated the implementing agency and close engagement with all collaborating partners including UN agencies (UNWomen, OHCHR amongst others) will be pursued. This approach envisages elections as a critical element of a much larger process, where issues with different stakeholders or in a different part of the process, directly affect the quality of the rest of the process. This project is sequenced and prioritized, starts in Years 1 and 2 with institutional and professional capacity building of EMBs, of completing the legal and regulatory frameworks, consolidating gains and strengthening key processes that were problematic in 2013. This includes strengthening the participation of women, youth and marginalized groups; the professionalism of electoral reporting; and the electoral security and dispute resolution processes. Year 3 focuses on support geared towards strengthening implementation and participation in the 2017 general elections, and Year 4 is then a year of reflection, dispute resolution including post-election mediation and support for any further reforms with an exit strategy that emphasizes sustainability and institutional capacity or strengthening needed for the next cycle of elections.

Key thematic areas integrated throughout SEPK are strengthened documentation and communications, increased institutional efficiency and compliance, inclusiveness especially of women, youth and disability, and accountability.

Programme Period: 2015 - 2018

Key Result Area (Strategic Plan) Democratic Governance

ATLAS: 2KEN014/235Project ID: 00093173Award ID: 00085584

Start date: 1 January 2015:End Date: 31 December 2018

Total resources required USD 24,013,800

Total allocated resources: _________ Regular UNDP USD 100,000

2015/16 Regular UNWUSD 100,000

2015/16 Regular OHCHR USD 100,000

2015/16 Other:

o Donor _________o Donor _________o Donor _________

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................................................................................................5

Overview...............................................................................................................................................7

1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................7

2. Situation Analysis..............................................................................................................................7

Constitutional and Legal Framework.................................................................................................8

Electoral Administration..................................................................................................................10

Post-Election Political Environment.................................................................................................11

Political Climate...............................................................................................................................11

Regional and National Security........................................................................................................11

Electoral Peace Campaigns..............................................................................................................11

Gender Representation...................................................................................................................12

Election Budgeting...........................................................................................................................13

3. Programme Strategy and Working Approaches..............................................................................13

3.1 UN Approach.............................................................................................................................13

3.2 Target groups.............................................................................................................................17

Table 1: Partners..................................................................................................................18

3.3 Management and Coordination Mechanisms............................................................................19

4. Results Framework..........................................................................................................................20

4.1. Outcomes, outputs and activities.............................................................................................20

4.2. Ownership and Sustainability of results....................................................................................25

5. Management arrangements............................................................................................................27

6. Monitoring and Evaluation.............................................................................................................30

7. Risk Management...........................................................................................................................31

ANNEXES..............................................................................................................................................33

1. Programme Management Organogram...................................................................................33

2. Risk Matrix..................................................................................................................................34

3. Results and Resources Framework.............................................................................................39

SEPK Draft Project Document April 2015

ABBREVIATIONS

AG Attorney GeneralAMISON African Union Mission to SomaliaAWP Annual WorkplanBRIDGE Building Resources in Democracy, Governance, and ElectionsBVR Biometric Voter RegistrationCEO Chief Executive OfficerCORD Coalition of Reforms and DemocracyCPD Country Programme DocumentCSO Civil Society OrganizationCTA Chief Technical AdvisorDG Donor GroupDPP Department of Public ProsecutionsDVD Digital Video DiskESAP Electoral Security Assistance ProgrammeEDG Electoral Donor GroupEDR Electoral Dispute ResolutionEISA Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in AfricaEMB Electoral Management BodyEU European UnionEVT Electronic Voter IdentificationEVID Electronic Voter Identification DeviceFBO Faith Based OrganizationGMS General Management SupportHQ HeadquartersHR Human ResourcesICC International Criminal CourtICT Information, Communications, TechnologyIDP Internally Displaced PersonIEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries CommissionIFES International Foundation for Electoral SystemsIIEC Interim Independent Electoral CommissionINGO International Non-Governmental Organization JOP Joint Operational PlanKANU Kenya African National UnionKLRC Kenya Law Reform CommissionKSHS Kenya ShillingsLTO Long Term ObserverM&E Monitoring and Evaluation MP Member of ParliamentNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationNDI National Democratic InstituteNIM National Implementation MechanismODM Orange Democratic Movement Party OHCHR UN Office of High Commissioner for Human RightsORPP Office of the Registrar of Political PartiesPAC Project Approval CommitteePMU Project Management UnitPPDT Political Party Disputes TribunalPPLC Political Parties Liaison CommitteePSA Public Service AnnouncementPST Project Support Team

SEPK Draft Project Document April 2015

PWD Persons with disabilitiesR&D Research and DevelopmentREC Regional Electoral CoordinatorRO Regional OfficersRTS Results Transmission SystemSEA Senior Elections AdviserSEPK Support to the Electoral Processes in Kenya ProjectSERP Support to Electoral Reform and Processes in Kenya ProjectSRG Stakeholder Reference GroupSTO Short-term observer TBC To be collectedTBD To be determinedTOT Trainer of TrainersUN United Nations UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the

Empowerment of WomenUSD US Dollar

SEPK Draft Project Document April 2015

Overview

1. Introduction

Kenya held peaceful general elections in 2013 within the context of a new constitution and a comprehensive reform of the legal and institutional framework governing elections. This followed the disputed 2007 elections that resulted in widespread post-election violence and led to the creation of an Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), following an Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC). The IEBC Commissioners were appointed in November 2011 and the IEBC had to undertake all of the essential elements of an electoral cycle within fifteen months. It oversaw the completion of boundaries delimitation; registration of voters; re-registration of political parties; enactment of consequential regulations; and execution of the necessary planning and electoral operations. The IEBC also introduced technology to support major aspects of electoral administration including Biometric Voter Registration (BVR); Electronic Voter Identification Devices (EVID); and the Result Transmission System (RTS).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, together with other development partners assisted the IIEC from 2009 - 2011 and the IEBC from 2012-2014. During this time, the IEBC created a professional secretariat, registered 14 million voters (49% women: 51% men), and achieved a turnout of 86% percent in the 2013 general elections. The UNDP played a proactive role managing the SERP project and basket fund, which coordinated donor funding and technical input to the IEBC and for other activities such as training for political party poll watchers.

The support to be provided follows a request by the Government of Kenya to the United Nations (UN) to provide electoral assistance. This follow-on project builds on the SERP project and takes into consideration the findings the SERP project evaluation, lessons learned by the IEBC, and recommendations from national and international observers. It follows a series of consultations with a broad range of stakeholders including the IEBC, the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), political parties, civil society, judiciary, donors, other electoral assistance providers, and stakeholders. The design of this project is also responsive to the IEBC Strategy Plan of 2011-2017 and areas identified by the IEBC, ORPP and others as needing support.

This project takes a development and electoral cycle approach that is sequenced and prioritised, focusing on consolidating the gains made since the democratic transition in the electoral framework; strengthening the legal framework and institutional and professional capacity of the electoral management bodies (EMBs) and other key stakeholders; supporting a more efficient implementation of the elections in 2017; and helping the IEBC and others to take stock and propose further improvements in the 2018 post-electoral period. The objective of this project is to consolidate those 2011-2013 gains, and to support the development of more efficient, accountable, and inclusive structures and systems in the electoral process so that the processes are more sustainable and credible, and the needs for donor support for the next cycle will be minimal.

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2. Situation AnalysisThe current electoral cycle comes at the back of the 2008 - 2013 constitutional and political transition period. It is a period of consolidation following a total governance transformation initiated by the enactment of a new Constitution in 2010. The last electoral cycle, saw Kenya undertake significant concurrent reforms within a constrained time frame in order to restore stability and its place as a regional political and economic leader. The current electoral cycle provides a unique opportunity for forward looking long-term reforms with the inescapable hindsight of the 2007 - 2008 post-election crisis. The following key factors have continuing implications on the political and electoral environment:

Implementation of the Constitution and the referendum debate; Completing the legal and institutional framework for elections; Post 2013 elections political environment; Issues of peace and national security in particular backdrop of electoral

violence in 2007/2008 and 2013.

Constitutional and Legal Framework

The constitutional structure is based on a strong bill of rights, respect for diversity and inclusion based on national values, devolution of power and responsible government. It refined the principle of separation of powers based on the presidential model with constitutional limitations. It enhanced parliamentary authority especially to provide oversight for the executive, oversee implementation of the devolved structures, and check presidential patronage in state appointments. With the 2007 General Elections seen as the most proximate trigger to the post-election crisis, electoral reform was deliberately among the top agenda issues of constitutional reform

The Constitution introduced extensive reforms in the governance sector. These included transformation of the Judiciary and substantial reforms in the security agencies. It provided for the replacement of the Chief Justice, reforms in the appointment procedure for judges and magistrates, increased resources for the judiciary through the Judicial Service Fund, and vetting of incumbent judicial officers. In the security sector, the Constitution provided for the overhaul of laws governing the police, transparent appointment process, and greater accountability through an oversight authority. These reforms have significant influence in guaranteeing credible elections.

The Constitution is focal to the electoral legal framework. The Constitution stipulates the principles, which govern the electoral process, establishes the IEBC, and provides for the criteria and process for delimitation of boundaries and the framework governing the regulations of political parties. The Constitution provides for the establishment political offices and widening the scope of the general elections. It sets the elections of the bicameral parliament, and the county government elections all on one date.

The Constitution establishes the framework for resolution of disputes. Under article 88 (4) (e) of the Constitution; the IEBC Commission is responsible for settling “electoral disputes, including disputes relating to or arising from nominations but excluding election petitions and disputes subsequent to the declaration of election results”. The current debate on the referendum to amend the constitution will have implication on the implementation of the Constitution. Of direct implication to elections, will be whether, in the event a referendum is held, the call by the Coalition of Reforms and Democracy (CORD) coalition to

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disband the Commission forms part of the final Referendum Bill. There are also proposals, which have substantial support in parliament to change the constitutional date for elections from the second Tuesday in August of the fifth year to December.

While most of the legislation envisaged by the Constitution was passed by the last parliament, significant amendments resulted in an election calendar with very constrained time frames thereby affecting the enforceability of the electoral law. Outstanding legislation included the Campaign Financing Act, which was passed in 2013, the legislation to implement the constitutional principle on gender proportions, and legislation on the inclusion of marginalised groups. The IEBC and other stakeholders are currently reviewing the legal framework and the 2013 post-election period provides the opportunity for legal reforms to be made before the process becomes further politicized as the 2017 elections or possible referendum gets closer. Key legislation for the electoral process includes:

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act, which governs the establishment and operations of the IEBC. It specifies the appointment process for the Commissioners, and lists the functions of the IEBC. It also implements Article 88 of the Constitution, which provides for the establishment of the IEBC. The Act needs to be reviewed with the experience of the 2013 elections. Of importance is clarifying the tenures of the IEBC Commissioners especially if the date of the election is changed from August to December 2017. Discussions on IEBC’s institutional structure, staggered appointments for Commissioners, and an IEBC Code of Conduct are relevant in considerations relating to the Act. The Fifth Schedule, which provided for review of boundaries in 2012, has also lapsed and requires a separate legislation or relevant amendments to the Elections Act to elaborate the boundaries delimitation process.

The Elections Act 2011 is the substantive legislation governing the electoral process. The Act provides for, among others, registration of voters, the management of the electoral process, provisions relating to the referendum, election offences and elections dispute resolution. Being the core legislation on election, the Elections Act will attract significant debate in relation to post-election law reform. Provisions relating to registration of voters, clarification and standards for nomination, dispute resolution, and management of the polling day and tallying of results will have implications, which may necessitate amendments to the Act and legislations under it. Clearer stipulations in respect to integration of technology have also been mooted to avoid the lack of clarity on the essence of information, communications, and technology (ICT).

The Political Parties Act, 2011 provides for the process of registration and regulation of Political Parties. The Act superseded the initial legislation under similar title enacted in 2007. The legislation establishes the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties. Section 39 establishes the Political Parties Disputes Tribunal (PPDT), which is given powers to determine disputes between: (1) the members of a political party; (2) a member of a political party and a political party; (3) political parties; (4) an independent candidate and a political party; (5) and coalition partners. As a precondition to activating the jurisdiction of the PPDT, a party must have exhausted the internal dispute resolution mechanisms of their

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respective political parties before they are referred to the PDTT. The PPDT also hears appeals of decisions of the Registrar under this Act.

The Judiciary provided a ruling that the 2/3 gender principle in elections must be implemented by August 27th2015, which makes this a high priority.

Parliament is considering miscellaneous amendments, including clarifying the tenure of the current Registrar and the process of appointing a substantive holder of the office. Further issues will inevitably be revealed by the current evaluation and law reform processes. Greater clarity on party discipline and opportunity to circumvent provisions of the Act during nomination process by candidates’ defections should be addressed. Smaller parties have also criticized the criteria for public funding of political parties. Parties have consensus on the failure by Treasury to allocate adequate funds for public funding of political parties as envisaged by the Act. A broad based policy dialogue and visioning is needed to address the space of political parties, their internal organisation and management and in particular, clear deliberate policy in favour of national parties as the driving criteria for funding, nomination processes which are widely perceived as opaque, lack fairness and are inequitable.

Electoral Administration2013 General Election was generally endorsed as free and fair albeit with significant qualifications on the operational, technical and technology weaknesses. Observer reports noted significant errors, logistical lapses, and failures. The legal and institutional reforms, which preceded the elections, were accompanied by a substantial financial investment by the government and development partners. The election budget exceeded Kshs. 35 billion. The IEBC completed the boundaries delimitation process, and conducted fresh voter registration. The IEBC invested heavily in technology in voter registration, identification of voters on polling day and electronic transmission of results. Technology was seen as a way to increase efficiency, transparency, voter confidence in the process and assure the credibility of the electoral results.

These investments however did not generate the level of public confidence as expected as they were overshadowed by significant failures. The voter register was incomplete and inaccuracies necessitated the use of reference materials including the handwritten manual list of voters (Green Book). The Electronic Identification of Voters largely failed due to late procurement that led to logistical, training, and operational difficulties. The Result Transmission System conspicuously failed leading to a manual tally of results thereby founding criticisms and speculation of malpractice. A series of election petitions also revealed weaknesses in pollworker training and a general lack of consistency in administering the polling process, including errors in filling in polling station forms. Whereas the courts found errors to be largely the result of fatigue as opposed to bad faith, a greater investment in better planning and logistics is necessary to assure the level of competence expected.

At the institutional level, the IEBC requires increased investment in strategic and operational planning, and management framework that appreciates the reality of having full time Commissioners and high-level management staff. The structure envisages policy oriented commissioners complemented by a strong secretariat under the leadership of the IEBC Secretary as the Chief Executive

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Officer (CEO). The CEO is assisted by directors responsible for key outcome areas and managers with subject matter knowledge. The Commission currently has seventeen regional offices and constituency offices in every county. It is important to review the field structure as well as that at headquarters to ensure it is designed efficiently and effectively as some major responsibilities, such as voter education, cross departments instead of being contained within one department, and the communications office does not fill the expected spokesperson role and related responsibilities. In addition, operations need to be better aligned with the county level operations efforts.

The IEBC will need to ensure their timely replacement and a good orientation for new staff. The IEBC also lacks the formal spokesperson that works with the media and stakeholders and ensures an adequate flow of information and consistency of messages. The institution itself needs improved internal communications and intranet as some field offices reported relying on the news to get information on IEBC operations.

The ORPP is newly separated from the IEBC and needs to build its own structure, systems, and operations. It is currently at 43 staff and wants to be at 209 by 2017. The ORPP is headed by an Acting Registrar, who may- or may not - be replaced with the permanent Registrar before the 2017 elections. It regulates the over 50 registered political parties, some of which have entered into strategic alliances and coalitions. A key need noted by observers, is to strengthen party compliance with the legal and regulatory framework and to open their candidate nomination processes so they are more inclusive especially to women and democratic. The party nomination process generated over 1000 complaints in 2013. The nomination process in most cases is not safe to women candidates.

Post-Election Political EnvironmentThe 2013 election is considered as a major milestone. It marked a peaceful election and transition of power, which was important given the events in 2007 - 2008. It was also a critical milestone for the implementation of the 2010 Constitution and the National Vision 2030. The post-election period has been marked by the completion of the legislative agenda, establishment of key institutions and implementation of the devolved system of government. The inherent challenges include the necessary capacity building for the new devolved structures and division of functions and resources. These issues generated controversy and calls for constitutional amendments through a referendum.

Political Climate The 2013 elections manifested the cyclical weaknesses in Kenya’s social fabric where political mobilization is based primarily on ethnicity. The elections are fought by coalitions representing a delicate permutation of tribal blocks. There are also deeper issues of youth unemployment and historical inequity perpetuated through bad governance that is perceived to disproportionately reward regions that are perceived to align with the ruling party. Political alliances in 2017 are expected to continue to generally follow tribal lines and the fate of the current call for referendum.

Regional and National Security Kenya dispatched 200 troops across the border into Somalia on 16 October 2011 following a series of sporadic attacks by the Somali based terror group, Al Shaabab. The events also coincided with a spate of kidnappings of tourists and

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aid workers inside Kenya and increased acts of piracy in the Indian Ocean mostly by groups believed to be supported by Al Shaabab groups. The Kenyan forces were subsequently incorporated as part of African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The AMISOM presence in Somalia, which some Somalis’ consider as being underwritten by the West, is seen as a major factor in increased terrorist activity in Kenya. After several sustained attacks in churches, bus terminals and other public places, the largest attack so far happened on 22 September 2013 at the Westgate Shopping mall. This destroyed the mall and claimed about 70 lives and 200 casualties.

The Kenyan security environment is also influenced by illegal groups, which generally have influence in particular regions and assume greater influence during electoral periods. These groups are generally seen to facilitate violence emanating from political or historical controversy relating to land. During the 2013 elections violence erupted in the coastal region halting the elections in many polling stations by early afternoon thereby significantly disenfranchising voters in that region. For instance, in 2014, there was violence in Lamu Island in the coastal region and in Northern Kenya. Coupled with the ethnic tensions in other areas and the precedent of the post-electoral violence in 2013, issues of peace, youth empowerment, illegal militia groups, national unity, and security will need to be addressed for the 2017 electoral context. Increased insecurity limits safe spaces for elections, and women are the most affected.

Electoral Peace CampaignsA remarkable feature of the 2013 election was the campaign by government, civil society, private sector, faith movement, women movement, and the media for a peaceful election. Given the memory of the 2007/08 post-election violence, this concerted effort was necessary and played a significant role in assuring peaceful elections.

This effort had implications on aggressive political campaigns and media coverage. Peaceful elections and transition were necessarily projected as top and exclusive national priorities. Aggressive language and controversial comments on potentially inflammable issues such as land were generally discouraged. Candidates were expected to make common pre-commitments for peace and an unequivocal acceptance of the election results. While the police presence in opposition-dominated areas was criticized in 2007, in 2013 heavy presence by security officers during elections was seen as necessary and generally endorsed. The media was expected to approach electoral coverage, including operational and technical weaknesses with a soft touch.

It is unlikely that the peace effort will be as unified as it was in 2013 as those elections were generally peaceful and put the 2007-2008 experience behind them. However, given the uncertainties in the political environment, the continuing tension within some regions and the apparent diminishing of the ICC deterrent, care still needs to be taken to ensure elections security and a peaceful environment in which parties can campaign and voters can participate without fear or interruption. Peaceful environment is specifically enabling for women participating in elections. The role of the media in this process is also important. Amendments to the legal framework governing the media have attracted criticisms as it could affect the ability of the press to report freely and independently in 2017. Media reporting should make deliberate effort regarding gender related issues.

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Gender RepresentationWhile Kenya has had a robust civil society agitation for greater women representation in political leadership, the reality has been one of mixed success and generally weak in comparison to other countries in the region. The main factors include ideological culture based on patriarchy, male domination in politics, economic factors, lack of social capital due to a culture that perceives men as leaders and socio cultural factors, which stereotype women as homemakers as opposed to decision makers at the political level. Ethnicity and bad governance in political parties also consign women to the margins of political leadership. During the March 2013 General Elections, there was only one woman candidate for presidency. No woman was elected to the position of Governor or Senator. Of the possible 290 Parliamentary positions available through the direct single member constituencies, only 16 women won accounting to approximately 5.5 percent. At the County Assembly level, out of a possible 1,450 Members of County Assemblies, only 85 women won accounting to approximately 5.9 percent. Gender-based violence was wide-spread during elections and deterred women from participation as voters and candidates.

Kenya’s Constitution is progressive and aspirational in respect to women participation in political leadership. Kenya ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ratified on 24th August 1984. Kenya is the economic hub of the East African region, but lurks behind in women’s political representation. Currently, it stands at 9.8% against Rwanda’s 56.3%, South Africa 42.3%, Tanzania 36%, and Uganda 35%. Low representation of women in politics is attributed to cultural orientation, lack of internal democracy in political parties, influence of money in politics, which unduly disadvantages women, political violence, media that is weak on gender sensitive reporting, a weak and fragmented women movement, and poverty.

This project will work with the institutions concerned to take opportunities in the constitutional framework and facilitate processes required to enact necessary legislation, capacity building, and civic education. The immediate priority is to facilitate the implementation of the affirmative action agenda of the Constitution to secure the implementation of the measures required to ensure the two-thirds gender proportion in elective bodies in accordance with Articles 27(8) and 81(b). Under Article 27(b) the “The State shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.” In rendering its advisory opinion following a petition by the Attorney General, the Supreme Court stated that “legislative measures for giving effect to the one-third-to-two thirds gender principle under Article 81(b) of the Constitution and in relation to the national assembly and the Senate should be taken by 27th August 2015.”

Election BudgetingThe government has primarily funded Kenya’s election budget. The 2013 General Election was an extensive financial investment. The IEBC budget totalled over 30 Billion Kenya Shillings. This was due to the fact that the 2013 General Elections were transitional therefore necessitating large capital investments in infrastructure, security, and technology. Undertaking six elections on the same day also required increased spending on personnel,

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logistics, and operations. The government funded over 90% of the elections budget with fewer than 10% coming from support from development partners. This project is premised on continued funding of the recurring election budget and key strategic aspects by the government. The project therefore emphasises mainly technical assistance as opposed to budgetary support. The proposed budget is justifiable given the fact that the IEBC has only existed since 2011, and has only managed a single general election. As an EMB, the IEBC is in need of technical assistance to strengthen it.

3. Programme Strategy and Working Approaches

3.1 UN Approach

This project is grounded in UN’s integrated approach, which is now emphasising UN’s Delivering as One. This project will be implemented by the UNDP. As the Implementing Partner UNDP will be responsible and accountable for managing the project, including the monitoring and evaluation of project interventions, achieving project outputs, and for the effective use of designated resources. In the context of a paradigm shift in Kenya in the context of UN delivering as one and tapping on UN agency comparative advantages UNDP will enter into agreements with UN agencies and other organisations or entities towards successful delivery of project outputs. The project has also designated a number of responsible and collaborating parties or partners. These institutions will on the basis of written agreements carry out project activities and produce outputs geared towards successful implementation of the project. Under the project, UNDP, UN Women and Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights will implement activities related to the under UNDAF outcome 1.2.” Democratic Participation and human rights’ that this project contributes to. As part of this process, UN Women, which has the UN mandate to support gender equality and the empowerment of women, will implement the two SEPK outputs targeting the participation of women, specifically as voters and as candidates, engendering political parties, rolling out the women situation room that promotes safe spaces for women in elections, and ensuring the whole project implementation is gender mainstreamed. OHCHR will contribute to ensuring a human rights focus on all interventions.

The programme is informed by the Kenyan context and the lessons of the previous phases of UNDP’s and UN Women’s assistance to the electoral process in Kenya. The joint basket on elections managed by the UNDP proved useful on coordination, reduced transaction costs (Efficiency), and helped deliver deepened results. Some of the key results included roll out of civic and voter education mainly through media, successful registration of voters (49%women: 51% men); election security arrangement between National Police Services and IEBC and partially strengthening IEBC internal institutional capacity. UN Women helped improve gender responsiveness e.g. enhanced opportunities for women, youth, minorities, and persons with disabilities. The women situation room effectively responded to gender based violence, profiling and training of women candidates contributed to inclusivity, and engendering the civic education curricula improved quality of civic education. However, DPs engaged in elections late hence the project being time constrained and limited on institutional capacity building. The UN operated as separate entities (UNDP and UN Women) limiting coordination, and less effectiveness in monitoring and evaluation.

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UNDP’s electoral assistance is based on the normative values of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These affirm that the will of the people is the basis for government authority and they have the right to freely choose their representatives through genuine and regular elections.

Credible, regular, and inclusive elections provide the political legitimacy that underlies stable states and provide the mandates for governments to tackle the touch challenges of transformational development. Elections are also among the most important ways that citizens can participate in the decisions that affect their lives and hold their representatives accountable for results. This aligns with UNDP’s Strategic Plan: 2014 -17, Changing with the World, which aims to help countries eradicate poverty and significantly reduce inequalities and exclusion. A key pillar of this strategy is to build and strengthen inclusive and effective democratic governance, including organizing credible elections with an electoral cycle approach to systematically target key factors that contribute to social and political exclusion and disempowerment, with particular attention to opportunities for the active engagement of women, as voters, candidates and leaders.

The UNDP also seeks to increase accountability and integrity in public institutions, policies, and capacity for more effective governance, provide women with more leadership opportunities, and provide a stronger focus on women and youth for development. The electoral cycle approach also makes deliberate focus on grounding electoral assistance in the broader good governance democratic framework including ensuring an enabling environment free, fair and transparent elections, and adherence to the rule of law. This in turn contributes to more inclusive and effective democratic governance. The SEPK project is intended to contribute to all of these objectives.

The UNDP also seeks to build local capacities to sustain electoral institutions, processes, and systems in future elections. The deliberate focus of this programme is to build capacities of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP) and other enabling institutions on elections to provide them with the institutional, financial, and operational capacities to deliver on their mandate. The capacity and the institutional strengthening will be realized through the support of Technical Assistants (TAs). The Chief Technical Officer will be available to offer technical support to the IEBC and other key implementing partners. Further, in consultation with the Implementing Partners, the project will where relevant contract short term TAs who will be based at the IPs, office. The programmatic decision making of the project will be through the Project Steering Committee (PSC) which will be co-chaired by the IEBC and UNDP and bring together all the actors supporting IEBC in the elections project cycle. The Project Management Unit (PMU) will be based at building which is within close proximity to the IEBC to enable easy consultation and decision making and most importantly coordinated approach in activities implementation.

The UNDP programming is conflict sensitive, especially in protecting the rights of the vulnerable members of society like the women, disabled and marginal communities. Working closely with the security sector for example helped inculcate response to conflict before it happened. UN Women implemented the women situation room which was a quick response mechanism for detecting, highlighting and processing cases of electoral gender-based violence for further

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action by the relevant authorities. These institutional comparative advantages will further be enhanced within the delivering as one framework.

The SEPK will contribute to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2014 - 18. Specifically, to UNDAF Outcome 1.2: Democratic participation and human rights: electoral processes are free, fair, transparent and peaceful, and 1.2.3: The IEBC, other Constitutional Commissions and parliament have the technical, functional and financial capacity to ensure equitable representation, free, fair and credible, transparent and peaceful elections. It also contributes to the CPD Output 1.1.: National and county governments and the Constitutional Commission have the capacity for a coordinated and effective transition to the devolved system and to mainstream human rights and gender considerations in compliance with constitutional provisions and 1.2: Kenyan citizens and civil society meaningfully engage in democratic processes and re-empowered to demand responsible and accountable governance from elected office.

At specific UNDP agency results, SEPK will contribute to the objectives of UNDP’s Country Program Document (CPD 2014- 18). The UNDAF in Kenya takes an integrated approach to the electoral assistance programme. Building on the lessons learned from the 2013 elections it will draw from existing partnerships and UN agencies internal established well-developed strategies of assistance to address risks to a free, fair, and peaceful election in a holistic and synergistic manner. The UNDP expects to continue this approach for the 2017 elections, with its other programmes like Amkeni wa Kenya civil society strengthening programme containing an element for civil society support to the electoral process and voter education, and with its Peace building project including a component for peace messaging and mitigation for some of the potential triggers of electoral-related violence. The UN Women has a component supporting women’s movement, and a peace and security component that strengthens security sector. All these elements will be leveraged to provide an integrated support to elections processes.

SEPK will also contribute to Kenya’s Vision 2030 Second Medium Term Plan (2013 - 2017) which envisions Kenyans moving to the future as one nation, and the transformation of Kenya’s political governance across the electoral and political processes. It considers credible elections as a critical component of issue-based politics and seeks to ensure the Political Parties and Elections Acts are operationalized as well as for civic education to be provided on the electoral and political processes. It also seeks to develop a policy to regulate political campaigning. SEPK also directly contributes to the IEBC’s institutional vision of being an independent and credible electoral management body committed to strengthening democracy in Kenya and supporting its mission to conduct free and fair elections and to institutionalize sustainable electoral processes as detailed in its Strategic Plan 2011 - 2017.

UNDP’s assistance to the electoral process uses the electoral cycle approach. This approach is also reflected in this four-year programme. The approach sees elections as part of a continuous process within the larger democratic governance context. It divides the cycle into three main elements: the pre-electoral, electoral and the post-electoral periods, although there are no fixed starting or ending points as many elements, such as voter education, strengthening an EMB or providing support to political parties, cut across the entire cycle. Credible elections are also made up of many integrated

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components and stakeholders that interact and influence each other and the different parts of the process. Thus a problem in one part of the process, or with different stakeholders, may inevitably affect the entire cycle. The cycle also approaches elections as an important entry point for democratic development, with assistance strengthening such important elements as civil society, human rights including gender equity, the media, and political party development, and reinforcing the rule of law and justice.1

The lessons from UNDP’s previous projects are also incorporated throughout this programme design. That programme evaluation found that SERP helped the IEBC to deliver peaceful elections by addressing budget shortfalls and filling critical gaps for some immediate needs. However, the project’s capacity development and technical assistance elements were underutilized. Had they been used, the evaluation felt they could have helped the IEBC to avoid some of the pitfalls it encountered. The use of a common basket fund was found to have facilitated donor contributions and ensured key needs were met, but stronger management and a different implementation mechanism were needed as management issues had directly affected the project’s efficacy, relevance, and impact. The sustainability of SERP’s efforts was also questionable as the election costs are high over the electoral cycle and donor funds were used to cover shortfalls rather than to provide institutional development and capacity building.

In summary, what worked well in the 2013 elections support mainly through SERP included:

Coordinated basket that reduced transaction costs; Fairly well resourced basket of USD 41, 389, 740 that pooled resources of

12 donors; Effective sharing of responsibilities among development partners; Effective information sharing between IEBC and development partners; Building on lessons of 2007/2008, 2010 referendum elections; Effective political messaging and voicing; A well incorporated election security arrangement component; UN Women engendering the electoral process; Separate mechanisms supporting civil society and media; Ultimately achieving some of the key results like a peaceful election

outcome.

This project design also addresses some of the key issues identified by the IEBC in its Post-Election Evaluation Report on the March 4th 2013 General Elections and by domestic and international observers in their reporting. These areas included:

Gaps and discrepancies in the legal and regulatory frameworks including incoherence owing to piecemeal amendment and difficulties with compliance and the timely enactment of revisions;

Time and operational constraints which undermine planning and a more structured and continuous stakeholder engagement;

Institutional and operational weaknesses and the need to build IEBC institutional cohesion and capacity, and weaknesses identified regarding financial management and procurement;

1Joint EC-UNDP Task Force on Electoral Assistance, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance- Manual on Effective Electoral Assistance.

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Difficulties in enforcing political party regulations and potential problems under the new campaign financing Act 2013;

Under-representation of women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWD) in the voter registry and as candidates; and addressing the voting rights of the Diaspora;

Low levels of public and stakeholder information on the electoral process; and,

Lack of internal democracy in political parties’ governance and discordant candidate nomination processes.

As a result, the SEPK project continues the work started under SERP to support to the IEBC, but uses a longer-term institutional capacity development approach to consolidate its gains and to strengthen its capacity, as well as to support the efforts of other key stakeholders in the electoral process. This includes the ORPP, the Kenya Law Reform Commission (KLRC), and the PPDT. In addition, SEPK will support other parts of the electoral process, including training for the media to help ensure more balanced, engendered and timely electoral reporting, monitoring of the electoral process by political parties and civil society, and strengthening the enforcement and dispute resolution elements through the justice system.

The project is also designed to provide both proactive and reflective framework for implementation so that other activities can be added and/or expanded based on the need and availability of funds. This framework will also allow for better targeting of support on critical needs and priorities as well as enabling it to address emerging issues. There are many uncertainties moving towards 2017, including what will happen to the referendum efforts, process of achieving the 2/3 gender principle by 27th August 2015, the date for the 2017 elections, the possibility of a new IEBC named before those elections, and the outcome of the ICC process. Combined with issues of security and national cohesion, low levels of trust in the process and the continuing polarization between parties, the basket fund project will need to be able to adapt readily to the changing context and still ensure effective support. To support this effort and to maintain maximum flexibility, a contingency line item is included in the project budget to support SEPK’s ability to respond to unforeseen and urgent needs.

Assistance in several areas is loosely defined in the Project Document so that needs assessments can be undertaken first to inform the nature of the response. For instance, undertake thorough training needs assessments, to help identify and prioritize training needs and define training strategies. This will help ensure the development of a useful and effective training programme for the EMBs and ensures that donor funds are used for effective interventions that will contribute directly towards achievement of project goals. A needs assessment should also be done before any support to voter education. In addition, as recommended by the SERP evaluation, SEPK should support an impact and cost-effectiveness assessment of the large scale-donor investment made in the voter education and mass media programmes for the 2013 elections. This can be combined with the needs assessment, and they will provide the basic information needed to update the IEBC and civil society voter education strategies and ensure the best use of donor funds for this effort.

3.2 Target groupsThis project will target the institutions responsible for implementing, enforcing, and adjudicating the electoral framework as well as the key stakeholders within that framework. Specifically, SERP intends to partner with: 1) the IEBC for its

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electoral management constitutional mandate ; 2) the KLRC and IEBC, and their interactions with stakeholders and parliament for their legal reform roles; 3) the law enforcement and prosecution agencies for their electoral security and enforcement roles; 4) the judiciary for their electoral dispute resolution and adjudication roles;; 6) the media for their informational and watchdog roles; 7) civil society for their long term monitoring, information and inclusive participation efforts; and 8) UN agencies with comparative advantages in gender, human rights and other relevant elements.

Anticipated beneficiaries are all of the citizens of Kenya, and the target institutions. In particular, SEPK will target marginalized groups, women, youth, PWD, and others, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and out-of-country voters. Some of these groups are also the focus of other substantial assistance efforts, such as that anticipated by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). In those areas, SEPK assistance will be coordinated closely to avoid duplicating efforts and to ensure synergies between the different assistance efforts.

Table 1 provides the mandates for SEPK’s main partners in the electoral process.

Table 1 provides the mandates for SEPK’s main partners in the electoral process.

Table 1: PartnersInstitution Mandate

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

Manages, supervises elections including related functions of voter registration, boundaries delimitation, electoral dispute resolution and voter education. Regulates campaign financing, develops candidate/party code of conducts, and monitors compliance with legislation on nomination by parties.

Office of the Registrar of Political Parties

Registers and regulates political parties. Manages public funding of political parties through the political parties fund and ensures compliance by political parties with the relevant legal framework.

Kenya Law Reform Commission

Facilitates law reform conductive to social, economic, and political development. Will develop the bills submitted to Parliament for electoral legislative reforms.

Judiciary

Adjudicates electoral disputes in the pre- and post-election periods including disputes emanating from enforcement of the election offences, nomination process, conduct of election officials, and petitions challenging election results.

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Institution Mandate

Political Parties Disputes Tribunal

Resolves disputes between political parties and their members; among political parties; political parties in a coalition; and appeals challenging the decisions of the Registrar.

Director of Public Prosecutions

Prosecutes criminal offences and ensures effective administration of criminal justice system. Prosecutes election offences.

The Police Service

Provides security through enforcement of law and order; provides security personnel during election activities; investigates election offenses and collaborates with IEBC and the Department of Public Prosecution (DPP) on law enforcement.

National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)

Commission facilitates processes and policies that encourage elimination of all forms of ethnic discrimination irrespective of background, social circle, race, and ideological belief(s). The Commission is a key player in the coordination of efforts aimed at electoral peace campaigns.

Parliament

Enacts legislation and approves regulations relating to elections, political parties and campaign finance. Oversees the executive branch including all institutions mandated to undertake legal functions or enact secondary legislation.

Other government agencies including county governments

Government agencies will be relevant in budgeting, facilitating the work of the commission, enforcement of electoral law, and enhancing public participation.

Civil Society

Supports democratic development and electoral reform; combats corruption, works for women’s empowerment; rights for PWD and others; provides voter and civic education and promotes human rights; provides election observation and technical assistance.

Women Movement

Could be seen as part of civil society, but in this case highlighted as separate given the special need for Kenya to strengthen women participation in elections and democracy. Provides information on women in electoral spaces like political parties, holds players accountable on gender based violence, influences policies, and legislation, and educates the public on gender.

Media

Provides information and analysis on the electoral process and serves a public watchdog function; provides a campaign platform for political parties and candidates, and for voters to communicate concerns and opinions. Covers the elections and results process, and can set the agenda by what its reporting.

Development partners Provide development assistance, technical and policy support for the development of Kenya and

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Institution Mandateits people.

Voters and Kenyans

Beneficiaries of free and fair elections. Have extensive civic and political rights with corollary civic duties. Able to hold their elected officials accountable through the ballot box and can vote in representatives who will represent their interests and areas of concern.

3.3 Management and Coordination Mechanisms

This project will be implemented by the UNDP. As the Implementing Partner UNDP will be responsible and accountable for managing the project, including the monitoring and evaluation of project interventions, achieving project outputs, and for the effective use of designated resources. In the context of a paradigm shift for the UN in Kenya in the context of UN delivering as one and tapping on UN agency comparative advantages UNDP will enter into agreements with UN agencies and other organisations or entities towards successful delivery of specific project outputs. The project has also designated a number of responsible and collaborating parties or partners. These institutions will on the basis of written agreements carry out project activities and produce outputs geared towards successful implementation of the project. This programme will closely reflect the principles of the UN delivery as one model, with UNDP as the implementing partner and UN Women and OHCHR as the UN collaborating organizations with a view to enhancing a more integrated electoral cycle programme. These internal coordination and engagements mechanisms will also ensure that the programme is implemented efficiently addressing undue delays and rapid progression towards realization of results at different levels.

The SEPK Project Management Unit (PMU) will be staffed by UNDP and may incorporate technical advisors and thematic specialists (such as those on Gender) seconded by the other agencies as appropriate. The UNDP will ensure that there is reasonable balance between the national and international staff. An internal UN coordinating mechanism on SEPK, will be established to project the UN Delivering as One Paradigm Shift for Kenya, and regularly guided by the UN Country Team that is spearheading the paradigm shift.

UNDP is part of the Democracy and Governance Donor Coordination groups, which brings together all development partners as a consultative forum for assistance in the sector. For the purposes of elections the development partners established the Elections Donor Group (in which UNDP is a member), which is part of the Democratic Governance Donor Group to oversee consultations among development partners whether involved in the basket or not.

At the technical level, SEPK will continue to coordinate closely with IFES, EISA, NDI, and local civil society organisations. IFES expects to implement a robust electoral support project for 2017, which includes institutional capacity building, ICT, and technical support to the IEBC and to other stakeholders. SEPK was designed in coordination with IFES to ensure synergies of efforts and avoid duplication. SEPK will also continue its close coordination with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) which supported the political party poll watcher training under SERP, and Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) which continue to provide support to IEBC, the

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PPDT political parties and other actors, and with other international and national NGOs working to strengthen Kenyan democracy and electoral processes.

4. Results Framework

The goal of this project is to consolidate the gains achieved in the 2013 General Elections and strengthen the electoral process through more efficient and accountable EMB structures and systems, more inclusive and informed participation, and increase accountability and adherence to the electoral framework by political parties, candidates, and stakeholders. It will also work to rebuild trust in the electoral process and the electoral institutions, and to maintain a peaceful electoral process. The focus is on building institutional and professional capacity to ensure a credible and genuine electoral process and sustainable change. The project will focus on the following areas:

4.1. Outcomes, outputs and activities

Outcome 1: Strengthened legal and institutional framework for electionsSEPK Project will support the ongoing review of the legal and regulatory framework for elections, building on the lessons learned from the 2013 electoral process to help ensure a complete and more harmonized legal framework. It will work with the IEBC, KLRC, and relevant stakeholders to strengthen legislative and regulatory drafting and to support more timely enactments than was the case in 2013. It will also support the review and restructuring processes within the IEBC and ORPP to strengthen their institutional structures, systems, and staff for a more efficient, transparent and accountable administration of the electoral process and events. Anticipated outputs are:

Output 1.1: Strengthened legal framework for the electoral process: through supporting stakeholder forums and legislative drafting done by the KLRC and IEBC on the legal reforms, and through the IEBC for the new/revised regulations. IEBC support includes technical assistance for the development of procedural manuals on the new regulations and support for policy level advocacy with Parliament on reforms. The SEPK Project will work with the IEBC and the Office of the Attorney General to facilitate consultations and legislative development required to implement Article 100 of the Constitution and facilitate realisation of the 2/3 Gender rule and increased representation of marginalised groups. A post-election review of the revised legal framework will be supported in 2018.

Output 1.2: More efficient and accountable EMB structures, procedures and systems: through supporting the IEBC institutional review and restructuring, development of key managerial and communications systems, and supporting strategic and operational planning. It will also support the operationalization of an autonomous ORPP with its institutional visioning and the establishment of its institutional structures.

Output 1.3: Strengthened institutional capacity and professionalism of EMB institutions: institutional strengthening is a primary focus of this the SEPK programme. The programme recognises the efficiency and accountability challenges and seeks to support the

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IEBC and related institutions to build effective frameworks with long term visioning. This will facilitate sustainability and exit strategies particularly relating to core areas of electoral management.

Through the embedded TA and other thematic consultants, facilitating corporate governance and leadership training, training needs assessment, establishment of the Kenya Electoral Institute, training of key departments and trainer of trainers (TOT) for replication of training within the IEBC.. Key IEBC areas include communications, research including capacity on gender-disaggregated data, human resources (HR), and ICT use within the institution, procurement including rolling out the 30% quota to women and youth; and the development of an Electoral Institute to facilitate sustainable training. The raining areas will include: TOT for training on nomination rules, and electoral dispute resolution (EDR) in addition to strengthening capacity of core staff to enforce the nomination regulations.

Outcome 2: Strengthened, secured, and more informed participation in the electoral process In 2012, IEBC registered a remarkable 14.4 million voters (49% women and 51% men), which was almost 80% of the expected 18 million eligible voters. There was an impressive 86% voter turnout for the 2013 elections. However, this was highly influenced by the national efforts for peaceful elections and the very high turnout of presidential candidate supporters in their strongholds. The technical failures and lower levels of confidence in the IEBC could lead to voter apathy and a lower registration rate and voter turnout for 2017. Voters also need to better understand the why of voting and the importance of making an informed choice.

SEPK will support a more consistent and timely flow of information on the electoral process and issues so citizens are able to make more informed decisions and can participate more effectively. SEPK will support the IEBC to strengthen the official voter information programme; work through UN Women to target women voters and candidates; and, with the media for more professional, engendered, and balanced electoral reporting. SEPK will also work to support more transparent and inclusive participation (especially by women) by parties in their nomination processes and increase their professionalism in monitoring the electoral reforms and preparations processes. SEPK will help in consolidating the gains in electoral observation by complementing the efforts of civil society organisations in undertaking long term and election period observation. Anticipated outputs are:

Output 2.1. More informed and knowledgeable voter participation through identification of and support for the most effective voter education programmes, and supporting the development of a more collaborative framework for voter education with civil society, the media, parties, and others. This will start with an impact assessment of the 2013 IEBC voter education efforts, done in conjunction with a needs assessment for voter information for 2017. The findings of this assessment will inform the development and deployment of a comprehensive voter education strategy under Outputs 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. SEPK will then assist the IEBC to update its strategic plans, including methods for delivery and key messages. TA will support IEBC’s early negotiations for public service announcements (PSA) and to reduce the cost for mass media campaigns, and facilitate the development and

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dissemination of materials/messages. With SEPK’s development focus, complementary activities under Output 1.3 will support the development of EMB budgets that include the costs for message delivery. However, as a contingency, a line item to cover portions of this are included in the budget.

Output 2.2. Increased participation of women voters through UN Women with the National Gender and Equality Commission and other local civil society organizations. They will work to mainstream gender in IEBC’s voter education strategy and messaging, and support the development of informational campaigns on women’s right to participate in the electoral process, run for office and serve if elected. The project will help build capacity in reporting of election data in order to facilitate evidenced based monitoring and public education. The project will facilitate and build capacity in development of women situation rooms in public offices and police gender desks and facilitate training of security personnel.

Output 2.3. Increased participation of youth, persons with disabilities and marginalized groups by working with the IEBC to develop specific strategies and outreach to youth, PWD, IDPs, and other marginalized groups to increase access and to address issues of under-representation. It also anticipates support for a national youth campaign on voter registration and to increase youth participation; facilitate an assessment on access issues for IDPs and others, and integrating its findings into electoral planning and budgeting. With regard to ethnic minorities, the project will focus on civic/voter education campaigns and advocacy. Such a campaign will allow such communities to exercise their political rights through voter registration and participation in politics. These activities will complement existing advocacy activities by the civil society organizations. This output as well as 2.1 and 2.2 will work closely with IFES, which is focusing on women, youth, and PWD in its voter education and voter registration assistance.

Output 2.4. More equitable participation by women political actors in the electoral process: The immediate priority is to support the measures required to give effect to the two-thirds gender principle. The Supreme Court advisory opinion ruled that legislative measures envisaged under Article 27 of the Constitution should be enacted by 27th

August 2015, by supporting the efforts of UN Women, local civil society organizations, political parties, and candidates to facilitate their increased participation. The project will support enactment of legislation to implement the two third gender rule and facilitate training of women candidates and political parties. This will include an updated gender assessment of the status of women in the electoral process and audits of political party policies and nomination practices regarding women; support for the development of gender strategies for IEBC to increase the number of female candidates; networking and leadership training for potential female candidates; and, communications and campaign training for female candidates.

Outcome 3: More efficient, transparent, and peaceful elections

SEPK will build on the work done under SERP and focus on strengthening several key steps in the operational process. This will emphasize enhancing

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efficiency and transparency as mutually enforcing principles on aspects such as voter registration, operational training, candidate nomination, and e-day/result processes and integration of technology. This assistance will closely coordinate with IFES, EISA and other relevant organisations. The support to the establishment of National Electoral Institute and a framework for documentation and publication of electoral information will help in ensuring sustainability and accountability. SEPK will also strengthen the capacity building for and supervision of electoral operation workers. The activities of the Electoral Security Arrangements Project (ESAP) started under SERP will be sustained and enhanced to help ensure a peaceful electoral campaign and elections period. Anticipated outputs are:

Output 3.1. Improved voter registration and increased gender and youth representation: SEPK notes the remarkable progress in voter registration and the remaining weaknesses relating to accuracy, late publication of the register, less optimal representation of women and youth. The Programme will support the training of registration officers, in particular by developing a certificated e-course through the Electoral Institute. Dialogue between the IEBC and National Registration Bureau will be facilitated to improve the process for the updating of and cleaning of the voter registry. SERP will also support strategies for voter education for the Diaspora on where and how they can register to vote.

Output 3.2. Strengthened electoral operations and logistics: SEPK will support the development of a comprehensive electoral operation master plan, assist in the reviewing the candidate nomination process and supporting the standardization of procedures (done in collaboration with Output 2.5), provide technical support for developing training materials and training for results transmission system, providing a senior peer reviewer to the Commission for periodic consultations on the progress of the implementation of the electoral operational plan in addition to its institutional strengthening done under Output 1.2. The contingency line item could help support a referendum if this occurs.

Output 3.3. Elections security and risk management that enhances security of specifically women and of people with disability. SEPK will continue the work started by the ESAP programme by facilitating ongoing risk analysis through an expanded early warning mechanism, updating materials, continuing training for security forces, updating the early warning system and re-engaging the coordination mechanisms for early warning and mitigation. It will support the deepening of the women situation room that was rated successful in 2013 in reducing and responding to gender based violence in elections. It will also support development of a joint operational plan for peaceful elections of the IEBC, security forces and other concerned government bodies and stakeholders and provide TOT training for key IEBC headquarters and field staff on conflict management and mitigation. SEPK will coordinate closely with UNDP’s Peace building programme, the UN Women’s peace and security programme and other similar efforts. An after-action review of the 2017 efforts will be undertaken in 2018.

Outcome 4: Strengthened electoral justice

One of the key areas that require particular focus going forward is to strengthen the enforcement aspects of the electoral process. This involves

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ensuring the accountability of EMBs and stakeholders, compliance with the legal framework, the timely and just adjudication of disputes and court cases, and in turn builds confidence necessary to prevent violence. In addition to the institutional strengthening activities done under Output 1.2, this outcome will strengthen the dispute resolution mechanism of the IEBC, PPDT and judiciary; the investigative and prosecution for electoral crimes; and the long term observation (LTO) of compliance by civil society. This LTO support will reinforce the bilaterally funded domestic observation efforts expected for any referendum and the 2017 elections as well as for other CSO observation work supported through other mechanisms, such as Amkeni. LTO will dovetail with and complement the support to short term electoral observation (STO). While STO will primarily be undertaken by the CSOs outside the SEPK, the programme will support capacity building and facilitate close coordination with the IEBC and other institutions.

Output 4.1. Increased capacity for just and timely disputes that are sensitive to special gender needs: by working with three key institutions- the IEBC, PPDT, and the Judiciary - to strengthen their capacity to resolve electoral disputes and enforce the legal and regulatory requirements for participation and contestation of the elections. Key areas will be training, developing case management systems, bench books, and stocktaking in the post-electoral period. In addition, a regional conference on electoral justice is anticipated for the judiciary and relevant stakeholders.

Output 4.2. Strengthened enforcement of electoral laws and regulations through strengthening interagency investigation, enforcement strategies, and information sharing; capacity building on investigation and prosecution of criminal offences and wide distribution of information on electoral law enforcement efforts and results. SEPK will facilitate inter-agency coordination comprising the IEBC, the Police Service, and the DPP to develop joint strategies and to implement effective operational plans for the enforcement of election law and criminal justice process during elections. The systems will be gender sensitive and conducive to women justice.

Output 4.3. Strengthening civil society monitoring of the electoral process: Through the previous electoral cycles, Kenya has built reliable capacity among local civil society to monitor the electoral process. The remaining challenges are to sustain the efforts, build increased capacity for electoral cycle based observation, and greater coordination of short term observation during the election period. Initially, SEPK will support the long term observation on key themes including legal reform, institutional strengthening, gender representation, security preparedness and operational efficiently, and effective participation including political party reforms. SEPK will focus on capacity development, reporting and facilitating implementation of recommendations by duty bearers. Coordination of reporting frameworks are expected to inform the SEPK stakeholders on concerns as they arise so that corrective action and/or mitigation measures can be taken before the problems become major issues. The women’s movement will specifically be supported to enhance coordination and effectiveness on gender issues.

Outcome 5: Effective mechanism established for technical assistance and programme management

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The main approach of this programme is to build inherent capacities of Kenyan institutions. SEPK will establish a PMU staffed appropriately as provided for under this project. The PMU may include specialists on Gender to consistently ensure that gender and human rights were being mainstreamed in the implementation stage of the project. The UN principles of Delivering as One will be further advanced by the PMU at the operational level. For the PMU, it will be led by a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), who will be recruited to provide technical and programmatic oversight for the project and inject continuous expertise to the EMBs, other partners, and donors. The PMU will ensure the project’s monitoring, reporting, procurement and recruitment functions are carried out and in this respect, develop a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework to track project progress and results. The PMU will ensure adherence to project implementation requirements, donor and stakeholder coordination and timely project reporting.

Output 5.1. Efficient and effective PMU established and functioning: UNDP will recruit high calibre staff to the PMU. Internal coordination approaches within the UN will ensure that expertise necessary to effectively and efficiently support the implementation of the project is in place. The projected PMU’s staff will bear both technical and operation skills and will include: the CTA, Project Manager, Electoral Security Specialist, Gender Advisor, Human Rights Advisor, Programme Officers and M&E Officer and Procurement Officers amongst others. UNDP will arrange for the fast tracking of procurement to better accommodate the tight timelines of an electoral calendar. The PMU will manage the project, ensure timely and regular reporting, and provide management support to partners.

Output 5.2. Effective technical assistance provided to EMBs and other institutions: The PMU will ensure well qualified electoral experts are available, as needed for the technical assistance requirements of the project, as well as trainers and TOT. It will also use UNDP’s electoral procurement office in Copenhagen to advise EMBs on electoral procurement if requested. The PMU will also ensure the programmatic assets in UNDP, UNWomen, OHCHR, and other bilateral programmes are leveraged for synergistic programming in areas such as electoral security, peace-building, and voter education.

Output 5.3. Donor coordination and reporting providing on the process and project: IEBC and UNDP will co-chair the project’s PSC, which will make policy decisions on the project. The CTA will provide regular updates and analysis to the group on the project, the electoral process, electoral climate, and preparations. UNDP and the CTA will also participate in the broader electoral donor coordination meetings, and will chair the Stakeholder Reference Group of national partners and basket-fund donors. UN Women and OHCHR are members of the PSC.

Output 5.4. M&E framework development and implementation:This will track project progress and measure its results. The PMU will develop a comprehensive M&E framework for SEPK and will work with partners to develop reporting systems on their activities and achievement of outputs. This will feed into the regular project reporting and monitoring systems that will also identify problem areas and ensure

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that corrective action is taken. In addition to regular and timely project reporting on the programmatic and financial aspects of the project, the PMU will contract annual audits, independent mid-term, and final performance evaluations of SEPK. The project will present unified progress reports at the defined periodicity.

Output 5.5. Internal UN coordination effectively implemented: The UNDP, UN Women, and OHCHR will establish effective internal coordination mechanisms that will ensure that the principles of the UN Delivering as one framework and the requisite programming paradigm shift are effectively realised. While the project is implemented by UNDP, agency comparative advantages in respect to collaboration will be critical in successfully implementing this project with guidance from the United Nations Country Team and the global norms for UN electoral support programmes at the Country level. The internal mechanisms will therefore operationalize external and internal stakeholder engagement including in resource mobilization, communication, and implementation of project activities. Important lessons will be drawn from similar interventions globally and the collaboration lessons emanating from the implementation of the project locally will raise important lessons for replication nationally.

4.2. Ownership and Sustainability of results

Ownership The SEPK project is predicated on strong local ownership of results and leadership by the EMB and local partners. The cycle approach to electoral assistance is built upon the premise that elections are comprised of a totality of interacting elements where a wide range of legal, technical and organisational aspects which are mutually reinforcing and must be considered in tandem. It called for the use of a rolling methodological framework that emphasizes development of appreciation of local contexts and development of capacity to ensure sustainable management of elections.

A cyclical approach to electoral assistance is essential in ensuring sustainability. The success of this approach also depends, to some extent, on development partners maintaining interest in electoral assistance through local elections and between elections, recognizing of course that the primary responsibility for funding and supporting electoral institutions and processes lies with the Member State itself” (UN Secretary - General report of August 2007 to the UN General Assembly).

This project document notes that an integral aim of the Electoral Cycle approach is the minimization of the EMBs’ reliance on external contributions and resources. At stake is to make international electoral assistance redundant by building locally owned capacity and by making EMBs and electoral processes and practices sustainable in the long term.

“The proper handling of the very complex and delicate set of interactions among EMBs, electoral assistance providers, multilateral - bilateral development agencies, and partner country governments, CSOs, political parties and vendors. The appreciation of the sensitivity of this delicate set of relationships requires the development of specific skills that go well beyond the pure technical advice. These relationships go beyond electoral assistance per se and thus impact on democratic development in a much broader sense...”

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SustainabilityThis project integrates concepts of sustainable development throughout its design. It uses the electoral cycle approach which addresses electoral assistance as part of the longer-term process of democratic development rather than as support for a one-off electoral event. It also addresses the different elements of the cycle that affect the quality of the electoral process and the credibility of its events. By starting two years before the anticipated election, it has time to support legal reform that can make changes permanent, and undertake the institutional strengthening needed to make more efficient and effective institutions.

The cost of the elections in Kenya is high in comparative terms. Although the EMBs have a sizeable election budget, some essential elements, such as training costs and delivery of voter education messages, are not fully covered by the government. Historically this has been covered by the international community, which has provided about 8 - 10% of the electoral budget. This approach is not sustainable as there are many competing priorities for donor funding in Kenya, and essential electoral budget items, such as training and voter education, should be covered by the national budget. SEPK approached assistance from 2015 through 2018, with a sustainable development perspective.

Instead of seeking to cover anticipated budget shortfalls, it focuses on capacity building and professional development, and the building of more efficient and cost-effective national systems. It will provide technical assistance to the EMBs to help them develop more efficient and cost-effective systems, which can reduce the overall costs of the elections. It will also work to strengthen IEBC advocacy skills at the policy level so it can justify its electoral budgets with parliament and ensure recurrent electoral costs are covered.

SEPK will also support needs assessments before strategy and operational planning is done, so that strategies are evidence based and can anticipate problems before they become costly mistakes. This leads to the development of more sustainable and cost-effective solutions. Currently EMB knowledge lies in its individuals rather than with the institution. When they leave, the knowledge leaves with them. SEPK will support the development of institutional knowledge center, support documentation and the development of standardized procedural manuals, which can be used for training in 2015 and 2016 and as a reference in the elections to come.

Better targeting of activities will also strengthen sustainable outcomes. SEPK support to the voter education effort will be predicated on the findings of an impact assessment of the USD 15 million investment made by donors in 2013 as well as a needs assessment for 2017. This will allow for the design of a more effective effort for 2017 that can make a more sustainable difference in increasing the knowledge and understanding of voters and stakeholders.

At the same time, to ensure relevance of the project and in case of critical need, contingency line items are included within the SEPK budget to cover some of the training and voter education delivery costs-- if this is found to be a critical need and is earmarked by SEPK donors to be covered under the project.

These elements should provide more strategic and sustainable outcomes, however it also assumes that the electoral partners and stakeholders are open

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to the development aspects of the project and that the process itself is not derailed by the political situation or other incident beyond the control of the EMBs.

In any electoral process, a key element of sustainability is maintaining the democratic quality of the electoral competition and political system. Most of those elements are also beyond the capacity of a project such as SEPK, but the provision of a CTA, and the continuation of the EASP electoral security component, can provide national and international partners with expert advice and analysis on the electoral situation and help identify potential problems and spoilers which partners can also address through their technical means and policy channels.

The programme will develop local capacity and facilitate the establishment of the National Election Training Institute to consolidate and sustain the gains of the programme thereby facilitating smooth exit of support to core aspects of electoral management. The programme will develop the capacity of the IEBC and other collaborating organisations. UNDP election Procurement Support Office (PSO) based in Copenhagen will be called upon to provide coaching and capacity building to the IEBC.

At end of the programme, the following will be indications of sustainability:

IEBC has internal capacity improved on strategic planning, delivery, leadership and management, financial systems and management, procurement including roll out of 30% quota for women and youth, logistics, ICT application and storage;

An electoral training institute established and retains capacity to continue with capacity building of stakes on elections;

Political dispute resolution and justice systems improved; Legal framework is stronger and more facilitative of elections; Media is more balanced, professional and gender sensitive in reporting

on elections; Civil society including the women’s movement is more robust in holding

leadership accountable on elections; Citizens more engaged in elections; Overall, the electoral process is rated free, fair, peaceful, and credible.

5. Management arrangements

This project will be implemented by the UNDP through the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM), with key focus of building internal capacity of IEBC, ORPP and other Kenyan institutions in the electoral process. Essentially, the mechanism proposed is a DIM mechanism with a strong emphasis on local ownership of results, institutional strengthening through capacity building and advancing south-to-south collaboration, and learning. This responds aptly to the recommendations of the external evaluation by the IEBC. This approach is committed to building local institutional capacity for greater programmatic and administrative control in the long run.

Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) insulates the EMB from the perception that it is controlling the assistance to other agencies and stakeholders, such as civil society or political parties that is provided through a multilateral basket fund. UNDP has the political impartiality needed to execute an electoral assistance project within a sensitive political environment and has access to

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international knowledge networks, specialized technical expertise, and to experienced electoral procurement through its electoral procurement office in Copenhagen.

This DIM mechanism also provides the flexibility this electoral cycle based project requires and will allow for rapid adjustments in programming as needed by the context. It also provides for the most advantageous combination of implementation strengths among different stakeholders

The UNDP will provide the technical and administrative capacity to assume the responsibility for mobilizing and applying required inputs. The IEBC and local partners will take leadership in programme planning, delivery and ownership of results, and overall ownership of outcomes. UNDP assumes programme management responsibility through a process that facilitates broad accountability for project implementation. TA and the PMU will work with the IEBC to build local capacity on efficiency and coordination of donor efforts in order to support greater ownership by local institutions in the long run. Accordingly, UNDP must document and follow all policies and procedures established for its own operations. All Policies and Procedures applicable to UNDP operations apply (i.e. procurement of goods and services, recruitment of project personnel).

Project Management Unit (PMU)The UNDP will recruit a Chief Technical Adviser who will provide the overall technical guidance, oversee programme management, and ensure programmatic coherence for the project. The CTA is part of the PMU recruited and managed by UNDP. The PMU will include a Project Manager who will assist the CTA in overseeing the day-to-day management of the project and staff including managing the overall conduct of the project; implementing activities by mobilizing goods and services; checking on progress and watch for plan deviations; ensuring that changes are controlled and problems addressed; monitoring progress and risks; reporting on progress including measures to address challenges and opportunities.

The Project will also recruit a Gender Advisor in consultation with UN women, an electoral Security Specialist, and a Human Rights Advisor. Programme Officers who will manage implementation and ensure coordination of the key outcome areas, and an M&E Officer who will ensure the systematic collection and reporting on project progress and results. All technical experts are expected to work closely to support the IEBC and others to build capacity, transfer knowledge, and help them to improve their systems and electoral performance. Support and administrative staff remain a critical part of the PMU now even more considering the Direct Implementation Modality. The PMU itself will be based within an office of the UNDP but its staff will also be available to provide advisory services and mentoring to partners on the use of project resources and reporting as needed.

Project Quality AssuranceProject assurance will be provided by the UNDP. Project assurance will follow UNDP programming systems, tools and procedures and feed directly to the Project Steering Committee and the Stakeholder Reference Group. Assurance will also be an important part of internal coordination mechanisms within the UN system especially in sharing information and advancing programming priorities. The project will organize regular meetings and consultations at both the policy decision making i.e. Project Steering Committee co-chaired by the

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IEBC and UNDP and at the PMU level chaired by the CTA. The PMU will ensure routine liaison between the project and partners at all levels. This will ensure project management milestones are managed and completed and that corrective actions anticipated, discussed and decisions are taken as required.

Project Steering Committee (PSC)The PSC is a policy decision-making body for the project and it comprises of UNDP, UN Women, OHCHR, the IEBC, the ORPP, Kenya Law Reform Commission, Judiciary, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Political Parties Disputes Tribunal, representatives of the Civil Society, the European Union, and other donors that contribute to the basket fund and other collaborating parties. The PSC is co-chaired by the UNDP Country Director and CEO of the IEBC. The PSC will meet quarterly to discuss and approve Implementation of the Project work plan, project performance and risk analysis and mitigation. PSCs for the project may be convened more regularly as critical project management decisions may be required. The PMU will provide the Secretariat for the PSC.

Donors Group (DG)This group brings together the development partners who contributed to the basked fund and UNDP. The IEBC, other partners, and representatives of the civil society may participate in meetings of the DG on invitation. It will meet quarterly or as needed to approve policy level decisions for project funding, such as the annual work plan, and review project progress. It also provides technical advice to the UN agencies on project issues, helps to identify risk and mitigation measures. The DG members are also represented in other donor coordination mechanisms, such as the Electoral Donors Group (EDG) and can therefore raise issues at policy levels if needed.

Stakeholder Reference Group (SRG)

The SRG is a consultative level framework comprising UNDP, UN Women, OHCHR, IEBC, ORPP, KLRC, and DPP, the Police, Judiciary, and representatives of the Civil Society Organisations, Elections Donor Group, Faith-Based Organisations, and Women Movement organisations. The PMU and DG are also members of the group. The SRG serves as a strategic think tank for the SEPK and has an important role in enhancing coordination and information sharing amongst key stakeholders, but does not make decisions on the programme.

Project start up

This project is expected to start in January 2015. UNDP will undertake consultations with its SERP development partners and the IEBC to agree on modalities for the transfer to the SERK project of SERP project assets and any balance of funds, according to the various legal agreements and UNDP procedures.

Factors vital to the successful implementation of this programme include; Formulation, implementation, and monitoring of annual work plans with

clearly spelt out timelines based on realistic and achievable activities and budgets.

Building synergy among key partners to create strategic networks, partnership and linkages with relevant government agencies and other stakeholders.

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Strengthened institutional capabilities for the relevant partners with clearly defined roles and accountabilities detailed in the Memorandums of Understanding with each partner.

Ensuring regular participation in project management meetings and developing an effective information sharing and feedback mechanism between partners.

Effective internal coordination and joint working by the three UN agencies.

Programme AlignmentThis project is expected to succeed on going SERP project. It is expected that UNDP will initiate immediate consultations with the development partners to agree on modalities of continuity. This will prevent losing relationships, which UN has developed with the IEBC and other institutions. The alignment process will involve consultations for change in implementation modalities, establishment of the project implementation approach under the SEPK, and transferring assets of current project to the new one.

At the programme level, UN will seek to sustain and build on-going activities in order to align them with the objectives and approach recommended under the SEPK. It is expected that initial steps will include engagement of the CTA and other PMU Personnel. It is also recommended that an effective monitoring and evaluation framework will be developed at the initial phase of the project.

Since this project is for a significantly longer period compared to the SERP, implementation progress reports will be reviewed periodically to inform policy priorities while emerging issues will form the basis for bi-annual and annual project reviews and forward planning. Issues emerging from project implementation including stakeholder concerns will be addressed within the organs of programme implementation and oversight.

Factors vital to the successful implementation of this programme include; Formulation, implementation, and monitoring of annual work plans

with clearly spelt out timelines based on realistic and achievable activities and budgets.

Building synergy among key partners to create strategic networks, partnership and linkages with relevant government agencies and other stakeholders.

Strengthened institutional capabilities or the relevant partners with clearly defined roles and accountability framework for all institutional organs appropriately empowered to make and implement decisions.

Develop and implement an information sharing and feedback mechanism.

6. Monitoring and Evaluation

To ensure project effectiveness and accountability, SEPK will develop a comprehensive M&E framework that will allow for the tracking of progress made towards outputs as well as higher level results. The project will be monitored through the daily activities of the PMU staff and those of the responsible parties.

At the start of the project, there will be a baseline study which will provide solid data with will be used to inform and or revise the indicators to be used during

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the project’s life and especially in the monitoring of the activities. Thereafter, a comprehensive M&E plan and framework will be developed by the PMU that includes the collection of data through regular activity and output reporting by the PMU and responsible partners and through the periodic use of other data collection methods, such as surveys that can track changes in the knowledge, attitude and practices (KAP) needed to measure impact. It will also use the quantitative and qualitative assessments provided through the reports of objective national and international observers to measure other changes in areas such as elections management, media coverage and stakeholder participation.

This M&E Framework is expected to be developed in the first quarter of the project. This will be based on the indicative indicators provided in Annex 2: Results and Resources Framework. The PMU will assist the responsible parties in setting up the M&E framework for their outputs and the systems needed to collect the activity and impact data. The PMU will also provide mentoring and training as needed for this effort. Regular reports will be required from responsible partners on their project activities, output, and impact, which the M&E/Reports Manager will consolidate, analyse, and report on. Issues will be flagged for attention within the PMU, with UNDP and relevant partners. Project progress information will be provided on a regular basis to UNDP, the DG, and SRG through its quarterly project reports and meetings. Urgent issues will be raised immediately with the relevant parties by the CTA and/or Project Manager depending on the issue.

The project is expected to provide the following M&E reports: Quarterly narrative and financial progress reports on project

implementation; Baseline and survey reports; Technical reports and assessments prepared under the project; Annual progress and financial reports; A midterm and a final external evaluation of the project; and, Final project report.

The project will also maintain and update an issue log of significant issues encountered under the project and track their resolution, as well maintaining and updating the risk log, and adjusting project implementation accordingly.

The UNDP will present one unified report.

7. Risk Management

The SEPK project design recognizes the risks inherent in the electoral process in Kenya and integrates the lessons learned and best practices in minimizing these risks into its project implementation, coordination of efforts and in the focus of its activities. Assessing and addressing risk during implementation is one of the key responsibilities of the CTA who will be assisted in this regard by the Project Manager and the Elections Security Specialist. The project will support strengthened risk analysis and management within the IEBC, and the updating of the IEBC’s early warning system. The project will also continue the Election Security Arrangements efforts supported under SERP, which should include support to the development of a Joint Operational Plan between the IEBC and security agencies for the 2017 General Elections and for any referendum held.

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SEPK also maintains a direct focus on some of the key elements of ensuring a peaceful election, such as strengthening EMB communications and interactions with stakeholders, including the political parties, to avoid misunderstandings and supporting the accurate and timely provision of information to the public through the media and voter education messaging efforts. SEPK will also support the long term monitoring of the process by stakeholders to acknowledge the progress being made and to inform the EMBs on issues before they become major problems. It also seeks to reduce the discordant parts of the process by addressing among others areas such as the party nomination process, strengthening the enforcement process, and building on the progress made on electoral dispute resolution. In addition, it will work to promote balanced reporting and implementation of the media code of conduct to reduce incidents of hate speech and incitement to violence.

Many of the risks inherent in an electoral process are beyond the control of an EMB and the Judiciary, but the coordination mechanisms of SEPK with stakeholder reference group and the donor group, can help build consensus at the policy levels for the required technical interventions. The project will also coordinate closely with other efforts in the peacebuilding and national reconciliation efforts, in particular with UNDP’s civil society project Amkeni that supports civil society efforts in this area, UN Women peace and security programme, UN Women’s women movement already supported as well as others, and with the UWIANO peace platform.

The following table summarizes the main risks, their probability and mitigation measures that SEPK intends to take.

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ANNEXES

1. Programme Management Organogram

STRENGTHENING ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN KENYA PROJECT (2015-2018) PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

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UNDP Direct Implementation

Programme Manager Gender Advisor Electoral Security Advisor Administrative Assistant (N) Finance Assistant (2N) Procurement Assistant (1N) Driver (1N)

PMU

Chief Technical Adviser (I)

Project Quality Assurance(UNDP Programme Officer)

Stakeholder Reference Group (SRG) Strategic consultation and advisory

role for project

Projects Steering Committee (PSC)(Strategic leadership and oversight)

UNDP, UN Women, OHCHR IEBC &Government Counterparts

Development Partners(Donors, CSOs, Others)

Civil Society Organizations KLRC, Judiciary, ODPP, NCIC, Media Council of Kenya

UNDPUNWomenONCHR(UN Delivering as One Coordination Mechanism)

IEBCORPPPPDT

2. Risk MatrixRisk Type and Impact Probability Mitigation

Continuing political polarization affects timing/ passage of legislation/ amendments

Political: HighAdverse effects on development of EMB procedures, manuals, training, and timelines for election preparations

HighCurrent situation unlikely to change given referendum movement and lack of political and/or national dialogue needed

Providing draft bills to parliament early before 2017 campaign rhetoric starts. UNDP promoting national dialogue through peacebuilding programme. Policy level advocacy for timely passage through EDG

IEBC does not regain confidence of all stakeholders, affects trust in 2017 general elections

Political: HighThe opposition is calling for IEBC’s replacement. This could be included in a referendum if held. This could potentially result in a new commission, which would affect timelines/preparations for the 2017 elections. If IEBC is not replaced, commissioners need to regain trust of opposition for results next election to be accepted.

Medium to HighCurrent IEBC enjoys the support of the ruling coalition and its mandate does not expire until 11/17. Regaining opposition trust and that of their supporters within this polarized environment will be difficult.

Demonstrating increased IEBC/ORPP efficiency, responsiveness, and accountability for all stakeholders. Increasing transparency of IEBC planning, operations and handling of complaints through improved structures/processes and through more regular communications with all stakeholders and parties.

Change of 2017 elections date

Political: MediumMembers of Parliament (MPs) are discussing changing the elections date from 8/17 to 11/17. IEBC Commissioner terms end 11/17. Changing commissioners 1 month

MediumThe change of date has bipartisan support as it extends the mandate of the current MPs. The governing coalition can be expected to extend the mandate of the current commissioners into

Developing succession plans and training programme for new commissioners. Institutionalize secretariat procedures/policies to minimize the effect of change of leadership at the operational level. Policy

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Risk Type and Impact Probability Mitigationbefore general elections would be disruptive to preparations and process.

2018, but this is likely to be highly contested by the opposition.

level advocacy through EDG for an early decision on the date, commission, and not changing commissioners in 2017.

Insecurity and electoral violence

Political: HighThe electoral process, which determines winners and losers in political competition, can be a trigger for violence. There is also potential for terrorist attacks given Kenya’s geopolitical position. Terrorism may also reignite historical grievances and armed militia groups in particular areas such at the Coast. EMBs, polling officials, candidates, party offices and supporters, and election events such as campaigning and polling, can be targeted by those with grievances or seeking to disrupt the process.

Medium to HighAlthough 2013 was peaceful and Kenya has undergone a constitutional transformation, some of the root causes for the violence in 2007-2008 remain. Much depends on whether there will be a referendum and its outcome. The referendum process aftermath will set the tone for 2017.

SEPK continues the electoral security component started under SERP that focuses on early warning, mitigation, and joint operational planning with security forces. SEPK will also coordinate with UNDP’s Peacebuilding project, the UWIANO peace platform and other efforts geared at reducing tensions and strengthening national cohesion. A broad based stakeholder dialogue at national policy level should be facilitated and sustained.

Outcomes of the Kenyan cases at the ICC

Political: HighConviction of 1 or more of the high level Kenyan’s indicted by the court could disrupt political and electoral processes.

LowProsecution has not brought strong cases and with witnesses recanting, it seems unlikely at this point, this will happen in the near future.

The ICC was seen as a deterrent to electoral violence in 2013. If this is no longer the case, ensuring a good early warning system is in place and functioning, and good

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Risk Type and Impact Probability MitigationEMB coordination with law enforcement and peace committees.

IEBC does not undertake the extent of restructuring and reform required

Organizational: HighThe IEBC require restructuring and a more coherent distribution of responsibilities between departments. Not restructuring, or only undertaking a partial restructuring, would perpetuate organization problems, high costs of election management and the elections and constrain a more effective and efficient fulfilment of their duties.

HighThe IEBC recognize the need for structural reforms but not all within recognize the extent of the reforms needed and blame other factors, such as ICT, for their problems. Without clear Commission leadership to rationalize the structure and better assign responsibilities between departments for more functional groupings, it is likely that split functions and working in a silo manner will continue.

The CTA and SEA will work to advise the Commission on ways to streamline their management and operations and improve their efficiencies and effectiveness. A senior level peer mentor for the Commission is also anticipated in SEPK who can advise the commission on needed reforms, among other issues, and to flag issues that still need to be addressed. The EDG should provide policy level advocacy and support for the IEBC on needed reforms

Large turnover of IEBC directors and staff

Organizational: HighIEBC retained strong management capacity from the IIEC. However, much of the technical and institutional memory is with individuals rather than the institution and any departure of experienced officers will affect IEBC’s operations and election

HighUp to 50 staff and directors expected to leave before 2017, many to contest those elections.

Developing succession, orientation and training plans and institutionalizing IEBC management and operations systems and procedures. Developing a framework for knowledge management and induction of new staff and requiring 6-month notice for demission in 2017.

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Risk Type and Impact Probability Mitigationadministration.

IEBC ICT issues are not resolved

Organizational: Medium

The failure of ICT in 2013 lowered the credibility of those elections and public confidence in the IEBC. Public expectations for improvements seem low.

MediumICT systems are still not compatible, some equipment is badly warehoused, and some equipment is not expected to be functioning by 2017. There are issues relating to limited internal capacity and knowledge owing to licensing arrangements. There could be a need to procure new equipment that may not be budgeted for and, if not done early enough, could result in similar problems as faced in 2013.

IFES is providing assistance to address IEBC elections technology with bilateral funding. Its current COP is an ICT technical expert. SEPK will support this process with training. It also contains a contingency line item that could be used, if decided, to cover some of the needed equipment replacement cost.

EMBs do not take advantage of technical assistance

Organizational: HighThe 2013 elections had many technical issues resulting from hastily organized structures and systems primarily due to time constraints, lack of EMB experience and increased number of elective positions required by the constitution. These have now become institutionalized through practice and impede the development of more

Medium to High

The EMBs took advantage of the financial support provided by SERP but under-utilized the expected TA. There is increased realization following 2013 of the need for TA, but some still do not recognize this need within their own areas.

Ensuring the CTA and SEA are seasoned professionals with a record of good collaboration and work with EMBs. Sharing CVs for TA with EMBS at an early stage for input and ensuring any TA provided has good inter-personal skills as well as being well qualified in the technical area.

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Risk Type and Impact Probability Mitigationefficient, effective, and cost-effective structures and systems.

Slow start up and implementation of project

Operational: MediumThe electoral calendar requires quick responses within a tight and unforgiving timeline. Slow implementation or procurement can directly and adversely affect the electoral process, as dates are not fungible. A slow start up would mean key elements to support the reform of the legal framework would be missed.

MediumThis project is envisioned to start up on 1 January 2015. The design process started late which makes the time between appraisal, approval, and funding of the project and the start-up time limited.

UNDP commits to fast tracking the consultation and approval process for the Project Document and can advance funds from its core funding to start the project. It will request fast track procurement authorization, which reduces the time needed to recruit personnel and procure equipment. UNDP should also negotiate the transfer of SERP project equipment to SEPK with the IEBC.

Fiduciary risks of assistance

Financial: High

The IEBC had financial and procurement issues in 2013 resulting in the firing of some staff and audit findings in the SERP project audit.

LowThis project uses a direct implementation modality, which reduces the financial risk for the project and operational burden on the IEBC.

A different project implementation mechanism is adopted for this project, which makes UNDP responsible for the implementation of the project. Capacity building for procurement and finance for the EMBs is also envisioned under SEPK.

Donor fatigue Financial: HighFunding from the donors is needed for this project to be able to provide the assistance envisioned. In

High

Donors expect to have much lower levels of funding available for the

This requires a much more targeted programme focused on building capacity and more efficient and effective systems. This

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Risk Type and Impact Probability Mitigationaddition, the EMBs expect donors to provide financial support to cover, among other things, some of the equipment set up of the ORPP, training costs, and delivering voter education messages. If this is not continued, and the EMBs are unable to reallocate or increase their budgets, this will leave them with a budget deficit that will leave these areas, or others, uncovered.

electoral process leading up to 2017 than they had for 2013 and are looking for value added rather than gap filling.

should generate cost savings and improved budgeting that can help EMBs cover items such as training costs. The project budget is flexible and includes line items that could cover some of these critical needs if required and are earmarked by a donor. UNDP will advocate with donors for sufficient funding for the project and the EDG can provide policy level lobbying for sufficient funds for the IEBC budget with Kenyan policymakers.

Duplication of efforts with other assistance efforts

Operational: High

Many donors are supporting the electoral process through different mechanisms and implementers. This can lead to duplication of efforts or mixed messages if not coordinated.

Low

Coordination between assistance providers is good, especially at the technical level, which has avoided duplicated efforts and helped ensure synergistic programming in previous elections.

This project was designed in consultations with donors and other electoral assistance providers to avoid duplication of activities in the design. Good coordination with donors and other electoral assistance providers is anticipated in project administration, and SEPK is designed flexibly enough that it can adapt to other programming and ensure synergies and avoid duplication.

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3. Results and Resources Framework

RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK (JANUARY 2015 - DECEMBER 2018UNDAF Outcome 1.2: Democratic participation and human rights: electoral processes are free, fair, transparent, and peaceful. 1.2.3: The IEBC, other Constitutional Commissions and parliament have the technical, functional and financial capacity to ensure equitable representation, free, fair, credible, transparent and peaceful electionsCPD Output 1.1: National and county governments and the Constitutional Commission have the capacity for a coordinated and effective transition to the devolved system and to mainstream human rights and gender considerations in compliance with constitutional provisions; and, 1.2: Kenyan citizens and civil society meaningfully engage in democratic processes and re-empowered to demand responsible and accountable governance from elected officials Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID): 00093173, Strengthening the Electoral Process in Kenya Project (SEPK)

Outcome Partner Indicative Activities

Timeframe Indicative Inputs

Budget USD1

516

17

18

Outcome 1: STRENGHTENED ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK Output 1.1 Legal framework strengthened

Indicators: Revised legislation

enacted for: IEBC Act; Elections Act; Political Party Act and Campaign Finance Act

Legislation enacted for Referendum

Chapter on Boundaries Delimitation included in Electoral Act and regulations enacted

Revised regulations done for Electoral Act; Referendum; Political

KLRC

For legislation and regulations that go through Parliament: support for:

Consolidation of recommendations

Stakeholder forums (2 national, 4 regional), validation workshop and peer review

Legal drafting assistance Develop and print popular

versions of laws

Advocacy with Parliamentary Committee

X X

TA/ comparative perspectives/ electoral advisers

20,000

Legislative drafting consultants

30,000

Facilitation for forums/drafting

100,000

IEBC Policy level advocacy with

Parliament and stakeholders on legislative

X XTA/comparative perspectives

100,000

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Parties Act New regulations

completed and published for Campaign Finance; Voter Registration; Party Nominations

- Rules of procedure for EDR revised and enacted

Procedural manuals developed for all acts/regulations

Baseline: Legislative package of

reforms expected to be with KLRC and AG by 1/15

Revised regulations not yet drafted

Targets: Legislative package of

reforms with Parliament by 6/15

Passage all legislative reforms in 2015

Adoption all regulations in 2015/2016

All IEBC handbooks completed for revised legislation and regulations by end 2016

Improved comments in

and regulatory revisions needed

Support for development and consultations on new/revised regulations for the Elections Act; campaign finance legislation; voter registration process, party nominations; referendums

Development of IEBC procedure manuals on new/revised regulations once adopted in coordination with IFES’s assistance to this area.

Facilitation for forums, advocacy and drafting

50,000

Printing

Review of legal framework post 2017 elections and identification of needed reforms

XStock taking 20,000

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observer reports on the quality of the legal framework for the 2017 Output 1.2. Institutional

framework strengthened

Output 1.2.1 More efficient and accountable EMB structures, procedures and systems

Indicators: Revised institutional

structures and systems Frameworks for

improved liaison with political parties, media, CSOs and citizens

Increased confidence in IEBC and ORPP

Increased compliance by EMBs, parties and candidates to legal framework

Reduced costs for elections

Baseline IEBC lacks institutional

cohesion and efficient systems; has limited

IEBC Support for review of IEBC structures, systems and procedures and development of corrective measures

Update of IEBC Strategic Plan 2014 - 2019

Support to develop comprehensive institutional operational plan and budgeting

Support for updating IEBC and HR policies and guidelines including induction plans for new staff and commissioners in coordination with IFES

Support to develop document management and archival policies and systems

Support for development of procedures for financial management, procurement and audit including procurement of relevant software

Strengthen internal and external institutional communications systems,

X XTechnical expertise

Consultancies

150,000

Facilitation internal/external consultative forums

250,000

Commodities (KCs)Software ERP

150,000

Communications 50,000

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internal/ external communications and is reactive rather than proactive

ORPP is newly established independent institution without optimal staffing, systems or vision, and perceived as not enforcing party regulations

Trust in IEBC at 60%2 Lack of internet

connectivity at constituency level significant issue 2013

structures and training Support to develop

Knowledge Centre at HQ and mini centres in Regional Offices

Update/publish electoral Stock taking and lessons

learned X Stock taking 20,000

ORPP

Institutional needs assessment and visioning

Update institutional strategic plan

Support development improved operational procedures and manuals including 30% quota on procurement

Support development of essential ICT support systems for ORPP work with parties

Support for development of internal communications policy and network

X X

Technical expertise

150,000Consultancies

Training 200,000

Internal communications/ ICT /Commodities

100,000

Stock taking and lessons learned

X Lessons learned

15,000

2 Polling data from NDI All-Country Survey, July 2014

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archival systems established by end 2015

KCs established at

Output 1.2.2. Strengthened institutional capacity and professionalism of EMB institutions

Indicators: Acceptance of elections Improved observation

reports on EMB administration and resolution of disputes for 2017

reduced number of complaints on party nomination process for 2017 compared to 2013

reduction in number of High Court cases arising from procedural problems in 2017

Baseline: 2013 observer reports

on IEBC, and PPDT performance

290 complaints on

IEBC Facilitate corporate governance and corporate governance leadership training

Support training needs assessment; development of a training strategy for professional development of IEBC HQ and field staff, and TOT for trainers/managers to implement their training strategies. Support for initial replication of that training institutionally (HQ and field).

Support for strategic and project management training including inter-departmental coordination, communications and reporting

Capacity development for communications, risk analysis, R&D, procurement, finance and compliance

Facilitate regular reviews

X X X Technical expertise/Mentoring Consultancies 180,000

Electoral Institute 500,000

Training assessments, training, capacity building

30,000

Exchanges 50,000

Materials/ printing

100,000

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party nomination process (2013)

90% of High Court cases 2013 from procedural issues (ELOG estimate)

Targets: Electoral Institute

created within IEBC by 2016 with certificated professional development courses created including those on gender, peace and security, and core electoral process courses for IEBC staff and temporary electoral workers

KCs established at IEBC HQ and 17 Regional Offices (2015) and used by EMB staff, political actors, CSOs, media and citizens (2016-2018

Acceptance of elections by stakeholders

of IEBC operational and strategic plans and M&E framework development

Operational level study tours/exchanges with partner EMBs as part of professional development plan if indicated in needs assessment.3

Support for development training materials, including e-materials, on IEBC Leadership forums

Training needs assessment and orientation courses for key staff5

Support of training for legal officers

TOT for training of political parties on nominations, public funding rules and on political rights and responsibilities (Political Parties Act)

X X X TA

Consultancies 50,000

Leadership/ training forums

165,000

TOT training for parties

120,000

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Training on scrutinizing party documents for EDR and monitoring internal party disputes mechanisms (contributes also to 4.1)

Capacity building on Total Budget Outcome 1 2,600,00

0

OUTCOME 2: STRENGTHENED AND MORE INFORMED PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS Output 2.1 Strengthened voter participation2.1. More informed voters

Indicators: improved levels of voter

knowledge especially women on and participation in the electoral process

more effective, engendered and cost-effective voter information effort for 2017 compared to

IEBC Impact assessment of 2013 IEBC voter education efforts in conjunction with needs assessment for 2107

Update voter education strategy and policy guidelines for 2017 voter education efforts

Support early negotiations with media houses for PSAs and reduced rates for media messages

X XTA/consultancies

100,000

Forums/stakeholder discussions

200,000

Surveys 100,000

3Starting with R&D and Communications (spokesperson)4for those department, committee heads, department managers and all ROs5If indicated by the needs assessment. Possible BRIDGE courses include Introduction to Electoral Administration; Political Financing (with PPLC); Electoral Contestants (with PPLC) and Electoral Dispute Resolution.

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2013turnout

Baseline: cost of 2013 IEBC

official voter information campaign

impact of 2013 campaign (TBD)

level of basic citizen knowledge of processes 2015 (TBD)

turnout 86% (2013) (65% to 94% at county levels)

Support development collaborative framework for voter information/education with media/CSO and other projects supporting voter education

Coordination with Facilitate material

development and dissemination (if earmarked by donors*)

Surveying done in coordination with IFES and NDI survey work

XVoter education delivery*

1,300,000

Lessons learned and impact assessment of 2017 efforts

x Assessment 30,000

2.2 Increased participation of women voters

Indicators: number of registered

female voters turnout for women

voters

UN Women with IEBCand others

Mainstream gender in IEBC’s voter education strategy and messages

Support development of educational campaign for voters on women’s right to participate in voter registration/

X X X TA/consultancy 50,000

Message development and facilitation meetings

200,000

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Baseline: 49.11% of the voter

registry was female (2012)

% of turnout for female voters 2013 (TBD)

elections, to run as candidates and serve in

Message delivery (if earmarked by donors* X X Message

delivery * 750,000

Assessment and lessons learned x Lessons

Learned 25,000

2.3 Increased participation of youth, and marginalized groups

Indicators: increased registration of

young voters improved access and

participation for marginalized groups, including IDPs per observer reports over 2013

% turnout for young voters

Baseline: % of youth registered

(2012) TBD Limited marginalized

voter strategy (2012)Targets:

% increase in young voters (TBD)

strategies in place for youth and marginalized groups by mid-2016

IEBC Facilitate development of specific strategies and messaging to reach youth and increase their participation;

Support for national youth campaign on voter registration and youth participation;

Facilitate assessment of voter access to the electoral process and integration of strategies into electoral planning and budgeting (in coordination with IFES on PWD/youth)

Capacity building for Research and Development Department in disaggregation and analysis of survey and electoral data

Message delivery (if earmarked by donors*)

X X X TA/consultancy and youth campaign meetings

350,000

Marginalized voters 60,000

Capacity development 30,000Message delivery*

Voter education campaigns

500,000

500,000

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Disaggregated participation data

Voter Education campaign for

2.4.More equitable participation by women political actors in the electoral processes

Indicators: status of women in the

electoral process # of parties with more

inclusive policies increased number of

female candidates and in elected office after 2017 elections

Baseline: 7 female candidates for

governor, 19 for senate, 697 for county assemblies (2.95%; 7.79% and 7.26% respectively).

6% county reps female, no women senators or governors, 16 women in National Assembly

Targets: fulfilment of one-third

gender rule for all elected offices by 2017

improved status for women in electoral process over baseline

UN Womenwith MPs, women’s networks, CSOs, IEBC, ORPP

Gender assessment of the status of women in the electoral processes including an audit of political party policies and nomination practices regarding women in 2015

Support for development of gender strategies for IEBC and for political parties for increasing numbers of female candidates

TOT training in gender for EMBs and parties

Networking, mentoring and leadership training for potential female candidates and female party leaders

Monitoring of one-third gender rule and percentage of public financing for parties going towards women

Campaign, communications and fund-raising training for female candidates

X X X X

Networking, training 500,000

Consultancies and assessments, TA

200,000

TOT training50,000

Monitoring 100,000

Support for leadership training/mentoring for newly elected women

x Post-election mentoring/training

200,000

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representatives Stock taking Evaluation of Output

2.2.1 Lessons and evaluation 40,000

2.5. More objective, balanced and gender sensitive reporting on electoral issues and processes

Indicators: More factual based,

gender sensitive reporting and objective analysis

public confidence in media outlets as objective watchdogs of electoral process

Baseline: Few journalists expert

on gender sensitive electoral issues and analysis

Quality of media coverage per observer reports.

% of public confidence in media as objective watchdog for electoral process TBD

Targets: pool of analytical

reporters trained on electoral issues/coverage

Media,Editors Guild

Facilitate consultative sessions with IEBC

Professional training on electoral process for editors/owners and journalists in Nairobi and key regions

Taping of training and dissemination of DVDs to community radio networks, media related CSOs and media in other areas not covered by direct training

Support to update/disseminate/self-regulate media code of conduct for electoral processes

Support gender based reporting and public education through media through material development, IEC materials, procurement of media spots in TV, print and radio

Audit electronic reporting on elections.

Procure a consultant on digital media.

Audit and improve IEBC

X X X Technical assistance 500,000

Training

Taping/DVDs 500,000Facilitation of workshopsCode of Conduct, Monitoring

100,000

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code of conduct for media updated and disseminated by end 2016

increased accuracy and breadth of media coverage in 2017 over

website based on in-depth and gender sensitive reporting.

2.5.1 More timely and accurate electoral information provided to community radiosIndicators:

Regular information provided to radio networks on electoral process/preparations

increase in fact-based reporting on electoral preparations

Baseline: TBD

Targets: Regular electoral

reporting done by all of targeted community radios

More factually based reporting for 2017 elections

INGO/NGO with IEBC

Development of regular news spots for distribution through community radio networks with information on voter registration, voting, elections, and electoral issues. Target areas include counties with low voter registration and turnout in 2013.

Support for investigative reporting by community radio journalists on electoral process, and dissemination reports through networks (training on investigative reporting/ electoral observation/ electoral process and election

X X Production news spots 500,000

DVDs 10,000

Training 300,000

Evaluation 20,000

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technology) Evaluation of community

Total Budget Outcome 2: 7,215,000

OUTCOME 3: MORE EFFICIENT, TRANSPARENT AND PEACEFUL ELECTIONS

Output 3.1. Improved Voter Registration

Indicators: # of eligible youth,

women and marginalized persons registered

more equitable registration rates between regions

Disaggregated data on registration available

Baseline: 49.11% of the voter

registry was female (2012)

39% of youth aged 18 - 21 registered (2012)

14,352,545 voters registered

Targets increase in % of under-

represented populations registered before 2017 general elections

Voters list reaches a 50:50 ratio (M/F)

IEBC

Support for development of strategies to reach under-represented groups based on existing audits of the registry and findings of IFES studies in regions.

Support for TOT training for registrars

Support development of information campaign on registration (done under 2.1-2.3)

Facilitate regular stakeholder consultations

Facilitate dialogue with National Registration Bureau and improve the process for obtaining national ID cards and to update/clean the voter registry; Facilitate knowledge transfer and training

Support to develop strategies for voter education for the Diaspora on where and how to register

X X X X

TA, Audit Survey 50,000

TOT and training facilitation

300,000

Material development,Printing

200,000

Addressing Diaspora 60,000

Stock taking of voter registration with x Lessons 20,000

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recommendations for improvements

Output 3.2. Strengthened electoral operations and logistics

Indicators: More efficient and

transparent process for candidate nominations

Increased percentage of population seeing the elections as largely free and fair

Baseline Process seen as opaque

by stakeholders/observers

Chaotic nomination process (2013)

62% of population thought elections were largely free and fair (July 2014)

Lack of internet connectivity at constituency level significant issue for 2013

Targets Smoother process for

nomination of candidates for IEBC over 2013

30% decrease in number of complaints on nomination process

IEBC Support for review and updating of nomination procedures

Facilitation of stakeholder meetings with parties on standardizing nomination processes

Technical support for periodic senior peer review meetings on the progress made in implementing the operational plan

TOT for developing training materials and training on results transmission system

Assessment of ICT needs for RO and Constituency level offices

Support development strategies/plans to address issue of advance voting for electoral works, observers, and security personnel.

Facilitate establishment of 2017 Election Centres at HQ, constituencies and counties

Support for updating of EVID, telecom and VR equipment and providing samples (commodity procurement if earmarked

X XTechnical expertise and consultancies

50,000

Material development and meeting facilitation

300,000

Facilitation consultations 100,000

Consultations and Election Centres

300,000

Equipment*700,000

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All Constituency offices have internet access

by donor)3.3. Increased professionalism and capacity of temporary electoral workers

Indicators: More effective electoral

recruitment, training and monitoring of temporary employees

Reduced number of complaints on procedural errors for 2017 elections over 2013

increased levels of citizen trust in IEBC

Baseline: limited supervision of

poll worker performance

60% of population had trust in IEBC (July 2014)

# complaints on procedural issues during polling/count (TBC)

Targets: 15% increase in citizen

trust in IEBC Continual monitoring of

pollworker training and performance

Reduction in # of

IEBC

Support to develop recruiting and training plans for temporary electoral workers

Support to develop and deliver e-learning programme for poll workers on job responsibilities, simulation of voting/counting/consolidating /transmission results and ethics

Support to develop M&E framework to monitor training and performance of poll workers

TOT training on results transmission

Support for implementation of training if earmarked by donors*

X X

Technical expertise 50,000

E learning

TOT, material development 200,000

Training* 700,000

Stock taking and lessons on operations and performance of temporary workers

Ensuring 2017 field operations archived

X Stock taking 20,000

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procedural complaints 2017

Smoother transition of 3.4 Election security and risk management especially of women and disability

Indicators: # of security personnel

trained # of violent incidents

related to electoral processes especially women

level of interagency coordination/cooperation

Baseline: # of major incidents

reported especially by women(2013) (TBC)

Good security model developed for 2013 that is gender sensitive

Targets: updating of early

warning system by mid-2016

All police agents trained Joint Operations Plan

adopted by end 2016 reduced number of

violent incidents in 2017 compared to 2013

IEBC , DPP, NCIC and others

Support for continuation of EASP programme for 2017 process by updating materials, resuming training of security forces/IEBC/others, re-engaging inter-agency coordination mechanisms for early warning and mitigation of potential conflicts at least six months before date of elections through final announcement of results.

Joint review of security needs for 2017 elections

Development of Joint Operational Plan for peaceful elections with relevant stakeholders and security forces

TOT training for key HQ staff and ROs on conflict management and mitigation

Training in risk identification and electoral climate/political analysis for Risk Department and key IEBC managers/ROs.

Women situation room

X X X X Technical Expertise and consultancies

40,000

Training, material development, TOT

200,000

Facilitation meetings and forums, travel

300,000

Software

Women situation room

50,000

2,500,000

After Action Review

30,000

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implemented and deepened

After action review done Outcome 3: Total Budget 6,170,0

00OUTCOME 4: STRENGTHENED ELECTORAL JUSTICEOutput 4.1 Increased capacity for just and timely dispute resolution that protects all and especially women

Indicators: PPDT’s mandate

clarified and its structures strengthened to resolve disputes under the Political Parties Act and especially for women

IEBC’s capacity strengthened to resolve disputes arising from party nominations

% of dispute cases processed within legal guidelines

% of decisions overturned in appeals

Baseline:

IEBC

Support revision and publishing of the rules of procedures on resolution of disputes

Build EDR capacity of National EDR Committee , regional staff and legal department

Support training for Legal Department on case management

Support documentation and information sharing on IEBC rulings

X X X X

Technical advice 200,000Capacity building (Training)

200,000

Equipment, software

Materials, printing 250,000

PPDT

Facilitate legal review and proposals for PPDT jurisdiction

Support a structural review and updating of its strategic plan and communications strategy

Support for needs assessment and developing training plan

X X X

TA 20,000

Consultancies 100,000

Training and materials 100,000

Stakeholder forms 70,000

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Average time for disputes (2013) TBC

Number of decisions appealed and reversed on appeal (2013) TBC

Overlapping mandates IEBC and PPDT on resolution party disputes

Targets: - Mandates on dispute resolution clarified between IEBC and PPDT by end 2015

Reduced number of appeals and reversal of decisions made in 2017 over 2013 (TBD)

all cases processed within legal guidelines

for PPDT members and professional staff

Facilitate PPDT public information sharing on its mandate and decisions

Build PPDT capacity to monitor internal party dispute mechanisms

Exchanges

Stock taking and lessons learned X Stock taking 20,000

Judiciary

Support training needs assessment of judicial officers and staff and development of a training plan on electoral cases

Facilitate training of senior judiciary at the national level and subordinate courts at the regional level on handling electoral cases and issues

Facilitate a regional conference on electoral justice

Support improvement of its electoral case management systems

Bench books on electoral cases

X X X X TAConsultancies 20,000TOT, training 200,000Regional Conference 100,000Printing, materials

200,000

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Stock taking and lessons learned X Stock taking 30,000

Output 4.2 Strengthened enforcement for electoral laws and regulations

Indicators: % of electoral

complaints investigated # of cases prosecuted

especially those by women

% of cases resulting in conviction

Baseline: To be collected

Targets: increase in % of

complaints investigated (TBD)

increase in % cases prosecuted and resulting in sanctions over 2013 ( TBD)

DPA/Policewith IEBC

Support to develop interagency strategy and information sharing on electoral law enforcement

Strengthen investigation and prosecution of electoral offences with training, support for development procedures, handbooks and training materials

Support the training of prosecutors on electoral offences

Facilitate collection and dissemination of reports on electoral law enforcement

X X

Technical expertiseConsultancy 40,000

Training/ Workshops 150,000

Printing 100,000

Stock taking and lessons learned X Stock taking 20,000

Output 4.3. Support for CSO reporting on electoral process Indicators:

objective and analytical reporting done on key elements of the pre-electoral process

Baseline: reports in pre-electoral

process sporadicTargets:

Regular analytical

CSOs

Support for long term observation of process, in particular on legal framework, IEBC restructuring, balanced media reporting, party nomination process and campaign financing issues

LTO support could be increased if need and level of funding permit

X X X

Technical expertise 400,000

Grant LTOGrants for analysis specific issues

130,000

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reports provided on key elements of the pre-electoral process, such as status of electoral reforms, completion of the regulatory framework, party finance issues,

Total Budget for Outcome 4: 2,350,000

OUTCOME 5: EFECTIVE MECHANISM ESTABILISHED FOR TECHNIAL ASSISTANCE AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT Output 5.1 Effective PMU established and functioning Indicators:

Efficient and timely management of project

Unqualified audit reports

Baseline: SERP PSU audit

findings Slow set up of PSU

under SERPTargets:

Qualified project staff recruited and working Q1

SERP PSU equipment transferred to SEPK Q1

Engage and manage staff embedded at UNDP

Provide project management, monitoring and reporting for duration of project

Provide procurement Provide support to

partners for their use of the basket funded inputs

X X X X Staff 1,000,000

Equipment 100,000

Transport 300,000

Operating expenses

200,000

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Timely procurement of materials, services, contracts and experts

Output 5.2 Effective technical assistance provided to EMBs and other institutions

Indictors: Efficient and timely

recruitment of CTA and other experts

Qualifications and experience of experts

Technical experts used effectively by EMBs and partners

Baseline Technical experts/CTA

underutilized in SERP Slow recruitment under

SERPTargets:

CTA, SEA recruited Q1 and remain into 2018

Good use made of expertise by EMBs, partners, stakeholders and project

Ensure pool of qualified electoral experts for advisory services for EMB and others

Provide a CTA and EA for duration of project

Contract managerial, organizational and legal support as needed in Workplans

Contract TOT and BRIDGE Trainers

Provide procurement expertise as requested from UNDP Copenhagen’s electoral procurement office

Leverage other UNDP and bilateral programmes including Peacebuilding and AMKENI to provide synergistic programming in areas of election security, peacebuilding and voter education

X X X X

CTA, Technical experts, peer reviewer

1,600,000

Contracts and grants not included in outputs

400,000

Output 5.3 Donor coordination and reporting provided on electoral process Indicators:

Create Donors Group and Stakeholder Reference

Group and ensure regular and useful meetings and reporting on project to

X X X X

Meeting facilitation 50,000

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Regular EDG,SRG meetings held

CTA provides regular electoral updates to EDG

Baseline: Irregular SERP steering

committee meetings good donor coordination

mechanisms established good internal

donors and partners Facilitate and chair if

requested larger electoral donor group coordination meeting

Provide updates on project CTA provides updates and

analysis on electoral process, electoral climate and preparations

Output 5.4 M&E Framework developed and implementedIndicators

# of project and M&E reports, timeliness and usefulness

adoption and tracking of impact indicators

Baseline M&E plan late and

incomplete for SERP, lack of impact monitoring and reporting

Develop M&E Framework for project and reporting systems from all outputs/partners

Collection of data and monitoring of output delivery

Monitoring of performance indicators

Regular reporting on project progress

Provision of regular survey data to measure electoral process indicators and impact of

X X X XData collection and surveys

100,000

Evaluations and audits 100,000

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irregular reporting under SERP

Targets M&E framework

completed in Q1 All partners report

regularly on outputs/impact indicators

All Quarterly, annual

activities including voter education

Annual audits contracted Lessons learned report

included in Final Report

Output 5.5 Internal UN coordination effectively implemented. UNDP, UN Women, and OHCHR will establish effective internal coordination mechanisms that will ensure UN Delivery as one on this project is effectively applied. The UN will project one face to external donors, internal communications will be consultative, branding will be one UN, staffing of the PMU will be consultative and internal resource flows will be effective and smooth. The Directors of the three agencies will regularly consult and communicate. Similarly, the technical teams of the three agencies will regularly consult and communicate. Project monitoring and accountability will be joint.

50,000

Total budget Outcome 5 3,900,000

Total Project Budget 22,235,000

UNDP GMS (8%) 1,778,800

TOTAL PROJECT BUDGET 24,013,800

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