http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1939/nov1939/gr_l-46863_1939.html

G.R. No. L-46863 November 18, 1939

IRINEO MOYA, petitioner, vs.AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.

Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.Claro M. Recto for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above entitled casedeclaring the respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor of themunicipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes over his rival, IrineoMoya. In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were contending candidatesfor the aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal council of Paracale, acting as board ofcanvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the elected mayor of said municipality with a majority of 102votes. On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance ofCamarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment hereinbefore mentionedwhich is sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the errors alleged to have beencommitted by the Court of Appeals:

1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary tothe controlling decisions of this Honorable Court.

2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."

3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."

4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."

Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots now tobe mentioned. (1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have beeninadvertently admitted in favor of the respondent, such inadvertence raises a question of fact which couldhave been corrected by the Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a position to determine in thisproceeding for review by certiorari. Upon the other hand, if the error attributed to the Court of Appealsconsisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead of the ballot bearing the samenumber corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly appears admissible for the respondentbecause the name written on the space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error istechnical and deserves but scanty consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was erroneouslyadmitted for the respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name written on the space for mayor being "G.T.Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears; but theintention of the elector is rendered vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperlycounted for the respondent. As to this ballot, the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot ExhibitF-77 in precinct No. 2 should also have been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The ballot bears thedistinguishing mark "O. K." placed after the name "M. Lopis" written on space for vice-mayor. Thecontention of the petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 wasproperly admitted for respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor the name of

Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial board and wrote the respondent's name immediately belowthe line for mayor but immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by him for vice-mayor. The intentionof the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of the mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5)Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also properly counted for the respondent. On this ballot the elector wrotethe respondent's name on the space for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake, he placed anarrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed on the left side of theballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus evident, in theabsence of proof showing that the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 isadmissible for the respondent and the Court of Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating. Although thename of the respondent is written on the first space for member of the provincial board, said name isfollowed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in the next line by word"consehal" and the name of a candidate for this position. The intention of the elector to vote for therespondent for the office of mayor being manifest, the objection of the petitioner to the admission of thisballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for the respondent. On this ballot the Christianname of the respondent was written on the second space for member of the provincial board, but hissurname was written on the proper space for mayor with no other accompanying name or names. Theintention of the elector being manifest, the same should be given effect in favor of the respondent. (8) BallotF-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the proper space, is valid for therespondent. In his certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." Theconclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and"Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not without justification and, by liberal construction, the ballot inquestion was properly admitted for the respondent.

The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct No. 1Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to be amongthe 75 ballots found by the Court of Appeals as acceptable for the respondent on the ground that the initialletter "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy ofthe respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and not "P". Even if we could reverse thisfinding, we do not feel justified in doing so after examining the photostatic copies of these ballots attachedto the herein petition for certiorari. The second assignment of error is accordingly overruled.

Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the judgment of the Court ofAppeals in adjudicating to the respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for theoffice of mayor. We are of the opinion that the position taken by the Court of Appeals is correct. There wasno other candidate for the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar name and, as the respondentwas districtly identified by his surname on these ballots, the intention of the voters in preparing the samewas undoubtedly to vote for the respondent of the office for which he was a candidate. lawphi1.net

The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the office ofmayor, and it is the contention of the petitioner that said ballots should not have been counted by the Courtof Appeals in favor of the respondent. For the identical reason indicated under the discussion of petitioner'ssecond assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a namementioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we hold that there was no error in the action ofthe Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to the respondent.

With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit F-77 inprecinct No. 2, we are inclined to accept the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent not only for thespecific reasons already given but also and principally for the more fundamental reason now to be stated.As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the

modality and form devised, must continue to be the manes by which the great reservoir of power must beemptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest ofgood government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of arepresentative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popularsovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government andwhenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, isthe reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable,liberality. Counsel for both parties have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down bythis Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to engage in thetask of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no twocases will be found to be exactly the same in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe,however, in this connection that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no technicalrule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from theballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system.Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation ofballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).

It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been erroneously admitted bythe Court of Appeals for the respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In view whereof it becomesunnecessary to consider the counter-assignment of errors of the respondent.

With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is herebydismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/feb1969/gr_l-29333_1969.html

G.R. No. L-29333 February 27, 1969

MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant, vs.CAMILO P. CABILI, protegee-appellee.

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G.R. No. L-29334 February 27, 1969

BONIFACIO P. LEGASPI and CECILlO T. BARAZON protestants-appellants, vs.FELIX Z. ACTUB, PROVIDENCIO P. ABRAGAN, MANUEL F. CELDRAN, CASIMERO P. CABIGON and BENITO ONG, protestees-appellees.

Bonifacio P. Legaspi for and in his own behalf. Camilo P. Cabili. Gerardo B. Padilla and Ignacio Espaol and Voltaire I. Roviro for protestees-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City, after the Nov. 14,1967 elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory provisions of theElection Code, to be more specifically set forth hereafter, were dismissed in a single order by the Court ofFirst Instance of Lanao del Norte, the Honorable Teodulo C. Tandayag presiding. The cases are now before

us on appeal.

In one of them, 1 the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, wascontested by protestant, now appellant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, 2 the protestants are the nowappellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along with the five protestees 3 were amongthose who were registered candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of Iligan, with theprotestees being credited with the five highest number of votes, with protestants Legaspi and Barazonobtaining sixth and seventh places, respectively.

In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part ofelection officers were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence of an allegationthat they would change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees, thatsuch irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the protestees knew ofor participated in the commission thereof. For the lower court then, the lack of a cause of action was ratherevident.

Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought to be fortified by the invocation of thedoctrines that voters should not be deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of the electionofficials to comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the right of suffrage and that the rules andregulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory before the voting should be considered directorythereafter. The validity of such order of dismissal is now to be inquired into by us in this appeal.

In the petition of protestant Badelles, dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received the next day by theClerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, it was stated that bothhe and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the Office of City Mayor of IliganCity, both having filed their respective certificates of candidacy in accordance with law and as suchcandidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged that the Board of Canvassers,on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected protestee for having obtained 11,310 votes while protestantwas credited with 8,966 votes. Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were"flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections ...." in that more than200 voters were registered per precinct contrary to the provision limiting such number of 200 only and thatno publication of the list of voters for each precinct was made up to the election day itself, enabling personswho under the law could not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of such alleged "flagrant violations ofthe laws relation to or governing elections" around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally.

It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise their right ofsuffrage in view of their failure, without any fault on their part, to have the proper identification cards or thenon-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was stated further that even in the case of those individualsprovided with identification cards with their names included in the list of voters, they could not availthemselves of their right of suffrage as their applications for registration could not be found. Mention wasalso made of the fact that the final lists of voters and the applications for registration were delivered to theirrespective precincts late on election day itself thus preventing them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so itwas alleged, was caused by the excessive number of voters being listed and many having been assignedto precincts other than the correct ones.

What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so, numbering8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were duly registered with the Commission onElections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the above circumstances. The proclamation then could nothave reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the mayor elected, as the majority of protesteeCabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes.

The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for electivepositions in the City of Iligan being set aside and declared null and void, protestant pleading further that hebe granted other such relief as may be warranted in law and equity.

The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon in the other case against protestees 4 wasin substance similarly worded. The prayer was for the setting aside and declaring null and void theproclamation of protestees with protestants seeking such other relief which should be theirs according tolaw and to equity.

In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: "1. That theprotest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election Code; 2. That [the lowercourt] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, the Commission on Elections beingthe proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states no cause of action." 5 This very samegrounds were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by protestees Actub and Cabigon, filed in the other suit.

As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests were dismissed, thelower court being of the opinion that neither petition alleged a cause of action "to justify [it] to try the same."The first ground of the motion to dismiss to the effect that the protests in both cases were filed beyond thereglementary period was rejected. The claim as to lack of jurisdiction was likewise held to be without merit.The single order of dismissal in both cases as indicated was based on the lack of a cause of action.

The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there was no cause ofaction, proceeded along these lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election officers whichdo not tend to affect the result of the elections are not of themselves either ground for contest or for propermatters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest that the alleged irregularities committed by theelection officers would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against theprotestees. There is no allegation in the petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters ofprotestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the protestees. There is, therefore, no legal andpractical justification for the court to inquire into the irregularities committed by the election officials, asalleged in the petition, for it would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will bedeclared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City." 6

It was further stated in such order of dismissal: "There is no allegation in the petition that the irregularitiescommitted by the election officials have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast. There is noallegation in the petition that the non-compliance of the election officials of the provisions of the electionlaws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their part for the purpose of committing fraudsfor the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that because of the allegedirregularities committed by the election officials in not following the provisions of the election laws regardingthe registration of voters and the distribution of the precincts, that all the votes cast during said electionsare illegal, nor is there an allegation in the protests that the irregularities committed by the election officialswould affect the election in favor of the protestees." 7

A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have admonished the lower court from asserting in anuncompromising tone the absence of an allegation that the protestants in both cases failed to allege that ifthe facts pleaded by them were proved the result would not have been different. It is true the complaintscould have been more explicitly worded, but as they stood, the absence of such a claim could not be soconfidently asserted.

To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility attaching to theline of reasoning thus pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the undeniable fact that both

petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting or precision in their terminology. Nonetheless theseriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections conducted freely and honestly, withsuch irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly electedofficials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value for the purposeof determining whether there is a cause of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypotheticaladmission of facts thus pleaded. We cannot in law and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.

Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of a swornduty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds ofsuch character. Accordingly, we reverse.

Abes v. Commission on Elections 8 points the way, but the lower court was apparently impervious to itsteaching. It may not be controlling, but it furnishes more than a hint. It would seem, though, that for thecourt below, its message did not ring out loud and clear.

The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: "Petitioner's cry for relief, so theirpetition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free, orderly, and honest elections. Specifically,they list a number of repressible acts." Among those mentioned were that blank official registration formswere taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Register several weeks before election day,November 14, 1967; that active campaigning within the polling places by Nacionalista leaders orsympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed; that voters were permitted to vote on meremimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista candidates; that voters were compelled to fill their officialballots on open tables, desks and in many precincts outside the polling places; that thousands of voterssympathetic to the Nacionalista candidates were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed bylaw; that identification cards were delivered by partisan leaders of respondents Nacionalista candidates,and those who did not signify their preference for Nacionalista candidates were not given such cards; thatthe precinct books of voters were not sealed within the deadline fixed by law; and that the resulting effect ofirregularities was to prevent full fifty-one per cent of the registered voters from voting.

One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the Commission on Elections could annul theaforesaid election in Quezon City on the above allegations of fraud, terrorism and other illegal practicescommitted before and during the election. The petition did not prosper; it was dismissed. The remedy, weheld, lay not with the Commission on Elections but with the courts of justice in an election protest.

In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec may nottread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek annulment of anelection based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle emphasized in decisions of thisCourt." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 9 assuming that there be afailure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resultingevil" did not rest with the Commission on Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." Morespecifically, with reference to provincial and municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to thecourts." Then came this express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily includesthe power to determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants." .

As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor retreat from theforegoing pronouncement." After which came the following: "The ratiocination advanced that there wasfailure of election due to rampancy of terrorism, frauds, and other irregularities, before and during elections,such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters were not able to vote, will not carry the day forpetitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded upon bare assertions. Respondents contest thecorrectness thereof. And in the answer of respondents Amoranto, Mathay and others, they aver that out of

162,457 registered voters in Quezon City, 100,382 voters actually cast their votes about 62% of theregistered voters. But above all, as pointed out in City Board of Canvassers vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of anelection for municipal officials should be determined in a petition contesting the election of municipalofficers-elect to be filed before the Court of First Instance."

Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether irregularitiesor serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly and succinctlyexplained in the Moscoso decision above cited, the opinion coming from Justice Makalintal. 10 Thus: "Thequestion of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities in the 1959elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to section 174 of theElection Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the electionreturns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices."

It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the flagrantviolations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.

That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again, 11 we have stressed theimportance of preserving inviolate the right of suffrage. If that right be disregarded or frittered away, thenpopular sovereignty becomes a myth.

As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved andsafeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means bywhich the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the peoplethrough their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in sofar as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchisedcitizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." 12

A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the people,consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can theybe really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to haveofficials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring afree, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularitiesshould not be permitted to taint the electoral process.

It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to observethe mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless. Under the law as itstands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves that purpose. lawphi1.nt

It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from entirelysatisfactory manner. Than itself is no reason for the courts to slam the door against any opportunity forredress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of dismissal complained of were not set aside.

Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be misinterpreted however. Allthat it directs is that the protetees in both cases be required to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely,there be a denial of the serious imputations made as to the alleged irregularities, the lower court couldproperly inquire into what actually transpired. After the facts are thus ascertained in accordance with theaccepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied.

It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or lack of it, ofeither protest. That would be premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases remanded to the

lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion and the law. Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and Teehankee,JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur whole-heartedly in everything contained in the ably written opinion of our distinguished colleague,Mr. Justice Fernando, including, of course, the disposition he makes therein of these cases before Us. Itmay not be amiss, nonetheless, to add a few words which I consider appropriate, in the light of myexperience in handling some election cases before my appointment as Solicitor General.

The thing that has struck me most in these two cases, both denominated as election protests, is that theprayers of the two petitions therein are identical in that they do not ask for the seating of the petitioners,who call themselves protestants, in the places of the protestees-respondents. What they ask in the main isthat "the proclamation of the protegees as duly elected (mayor and councilors) be set aside and declarednull and void". This sole principal prayer was precisely what gave appellees in both cases cause to contendthat (1) the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it beingallegedly the Commission on Elections that has such jurisdiction, and (2) neither of the petitions state anycause of action. Of course, the trial court properly overruled the first ground. It is, however, best for allconcerned that the observations and arguments adduced by the trial judge in disposing of the secondground are placed in proper light.

Ruling on the first ground above-stated, His Honor held thus:

Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect theresult of the elections are not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters ofinquiry... There is no allegation in the protest that the alleged irregularities committed by the electionofficers would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against theprotestees. There is no allegation in the petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were allvoters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the protetees. There is,therefore, no legal and practical justification for the court to inquire into the irregularities committedby the election officials, as alleged in the petition, for it would not give any benefit in favor of theprotestants to the end that they will be declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively,of this City.

The failure of election of officers to obey the mandatory provisions of a statute relating to theconduct of the election and designed to secure the secrecy and integrity of the ballot mayso taint the votes with irregularity as to cause the rejection of the entire votes of the district.It should be remembered, however, that all statutes tending to limit the citizen in theexercise of the right of suffrage are to be construed liberally in his favor, and that the courtsare loath to disfranchise voters who are wholly innocent of wrongdoing. As a consequence,it is a firmly established general rule that voters will not be rejected, even though electionofficers fail to comply with the directory provisions of a statute, if there is no fraud or otherirregularity and failure to comply is unintentional; nor is it material in this connection that the

failure of the election officers to perform their duty subjects them to penalties. Likewise, thecourts will not permit the will of the voters to be defeated by fraud on the part of electionofficers if it is possible to avoid such a result. In short, a fair election and an honest returnshould be considered as paramount in importance to minor requirements which prescribethe formal steps to reach that end, and the law should be so construed as to remedy theevils against which its provisions are directed and at the same time not to disfranchisevoters further than is necessary to attain that object. In case of a violation of the law on thepart of an election officer, punishment may be provided therefor, and in this way the law canbe rendered effectual without going to the extent of depriving a voter of his right to have hisvote counted in consequence of such violation. It may, therefore, be stated as a general rulethat if ballots are cast by voters who are, at the time, qualified to cast them and who havedone all on their part that the law requires of voters to make their voting effective, anerroneous or even unlawful handling of the ballots by the election officers, charged withsuch responsibility will not be held to disfranchise such voters by throwing out their votes onaccount of erroneous procedure had sorely by the election officers, provided the votes arelegal votes in their inception and are still capable of being given proper effect as such. Norwill an election be set aside because of regularities on the part of the election officialsunless it appears that such irregularities affect the results. (18 Am. Jur. Sec. 225, pp. 331-332, cited on pp. 621-622, Revised Election Code by Francisco).

There is no allegation in the petition that the irregularities committed by the election officials havedestroyed the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that thenon-compliance of the election officials of the provisions of the election laws regarding theregistration of voters were intentional on their part for the purpose of committing frauds for thebenefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that because of the allegedirregularities committed by the election officials in not following the provisions of the election lawsregarding the registration of voters and the distribution of the precincts, that all the votes cast duringsaid elections are illegal, nor is there an allegation in the protests that the irregularities committedby the election officials would affect the election in favor of protestees.

A misconduct or irregularity committed by an election official is not a sufficient ground toannul the votes cast in the precincts where the person elected neither knew of norparticipated in the misconduct and it is not shown that any elector who voted or the personselected either participated in such misconduct. (18 Am. Jur. Sec. 228, p. 333, cited on page622, Revised Election Code by Francisco).

While this ruling is, on the whole, correct, His Honor failed to emphasize that the cases before him wereprecisely ones for the annulment and setting aside of the election for Mayor and Councilors in the City ofIligan and that, therefore, the only question that should be resolved is whether or not the facts alleged inthe petitions in question constitute sufficient grounds for such relief. Instead, the trial court made as may beseen above, a long discourse on the thesis that "the purpose of an election contest is to correct thecanvass," and that "the general rule is that whatever may be the cause of an election contest, the truegravamen of the case is to determine who receives the highest number of votes, etc." (pp. 5-8, Order inquestion) and then held that there was no allegation in both petitions that "would give any benefit in favor ofthe protestants to the end that they will be declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, ofthis City" ergo, the said petitions do not state any cause of action. More specifically, the trial court looked invain for allegations to the effect that "the alleged irregularities committed by the elections in favor of theprotestants and against the protestees." (p. 7, id.) For example, His Honor reasoned out that "there is no

allegation ... that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegalvoters who voted were for the protetees." (id.).

I am afraid that such discourse, if quite impressive as an exposition of considerable learning in election lawmatters, is rather irrelevant. I believe that what should be emphasized in these cases is that ruling in Ourdecision to the effect that in an election protest, (otherwise entitled at times, petition or complaint or motionof protest) it is not necessary to allege that the true results of the election in question would be in favor ofprotestant and against protestee on the basis of the legal votes, or that the proclaimed result would bechanged if the facts alleged are proven, when the sole ground of protest and the only purpose of theprotestant is to have the whole election in a precinct or municipality annulled and set aside. Indeed, aspointed out in the brief of appellants:

In the case G.R. No. L-29333, the prayer is for the annulment of the proclamation of protestee-appellee Camilo P. Cabili and of the local elections held in Iligan City on November 14, 1967, whilein case G.R. No. L-29334, the prayer is for the annulment of the proclamation of protestee-appellees Felix Z. Actub et al. and of the local elections held in Iligan City on November 14, 1967.

Section 177 of the Revised Election Code provides:

SEC. 177. Decision of the Contest. The court shall decide the protest ... and shall declare whoamong the parties has been elected, or in the proper case, that none of them has been legallyelected....

Under the above-quoted provision of law, the courts are authorized to declare that none of thecandidates has been legally elected, which in effect would mean that the elections are annulled.

If it were not the intention of the lawmaker not to authorize the courts to annul an election, suchauthority would not have been provided in Section 177 of the Revised Election Code quoted above.

Francisco, in his book How to Try Election Cases, 1952 Edition, p. 82, citing as authorities thedecisions of this Honorable Court in Bustos vs. Moir and Fajardo 35 Phil. 16; and Manalo vs.Sevilla, 24 Phil. 609, states:

The court is authorized, in a proper case, not only to recount the ballots and reject thosewhich it considers illegal and accept those which it considers valid but it is also authorized,in a proper case, to annul the election completely.

It is therefore clear that the trial court erred in holding that the purpose of the protestants infiling these protest is not in accord with the purpose of the Revised Election Code inallowing a defeated candidate to file an election protest.

In other words, I like to make it very clear that an election protest may be filed not only for thepurpose of having the protestant declared elected, but even for the purpose alone of having theelection annulled. Otherwise stated, protestants may come to court, not necessarily to win anelection, but even if solely to have the court declare that no one has won because the election isvoid and that it is obvious and pure common sense that in the latter case, the protestant does nothave to allege the probability of his being the real victor, for in such a case, his prayer precisely is that it be declared, using the language of the law, "that none of them has been legally elected."Surely, the following ruling of the trial court:

An election contest is a summary proceeding the object of which is to expedite thesettlement of the controversy between candidates as to who received the majority of the

legal ballots (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. 522, 524). The purpose of an election contest isto correct the canvass of which the proclamation is a public manifestation and the powergranted by law to the court must agree with and be adequate to such an object. Hence, thecourt can directly declare which candidate is to be elected leaving the canvass made by theBoard null and void, and the candidate so declared elected may assume position of theoffice (Aquino vs. Calebia & Sahagun, 55 Phil. 984). It being the policy of the law to giveeffect to elections, the general rule is that whatever may be the cause of an election contest,the true gravamen of the case is to determine who receives the highest number of votes (20C.J. 217). In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all meanswithin its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. (Ibasco vs. Ilao,G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). Hence, only candidates have the right to file anelection protest. (Gil Hermanos vs. Hord, 10 Phil. 217).

From the foregoing authorities, it could be concluded that the purpose of the election law toallow a candidate to file an election protest is for the court to determine whether theprotestant or the protestee is the winner of the election under protest. In the present case,the object of the protestants in filing their protests based on the prayer of their petitions isnot to declare them the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City butmerely to declare null and void the proclamation and election of the protestees as well asthe elections held in Iligan City of November 14, 1967. The purpose, therefore of theprotestants in filing these protests is not in accord with the purpose of the Revised ElectionCode in allowing a defeated candidate to file an election protest.

must be emphatically denounced as a misreading by His Honor of the real import of the authorities cited byHim. Such proposition represents the most narrow concept of the judicial remedies in matters of election.No single precedent in extant jurisprudence whether here or in any other country can be found to support it.I am equally confident that no thesis in any of the existing legal publications can be referred to as upholdingsuch an illogical idea. To sanction such a ruling is to kill almost entirely all hopes for a clean, orderly andhonest suffrage in this country, which the Commission on Elections alone may not be able to achieve in allpossible cases. Indeed, as pointed out by appellants the trial court would have been right if it had onlyadhered to the decisions already rendered by this Court on the subject, cited by said appellants in theirbrief.

The real issue then in these cases is whether or not the facts alleged in the respective petitions ofappellants constitute sufficient ground or grounds for annulment of the election of Mayor and Councilors inIligan City, held in November, 1967. On this score, it has to be admitted that, indeed, the petitions ofappellants which appear to have been prepared by a single counsel are not as accurately and preciselyworded as to fit exactly into the pattern that may perhaps be most ideal in cases of this nature, but I cannotgo along with His Honor's ruling that the allegations in said petitions are legally inadequate to serve as abasis for the relief of annulment of the election therein prayed for. His Honor seemed to be more concernedwith what he considered the need for direct averments that the irregularities and violations of the electionlaw alleged by appellants resulted in the destruction of the "secrecy and integrity of the ballot cast," that "allthe votes cast in said elections are illegal" and that "the irregularities committed by the election officialswould affect the election in favor of the protestees." (p. 8, id.) I feel that His Honor was asking too muchand unnecessarily because, as they appear to me, these allegations as well as the others His Honorconsidered as indispensably required, are more in the nature of legal conclusions, not supposed to beaverred in the pleadings, rather than statements of ultimate facts. The truth of the matter is that, viewed asa whole, the petitions in question sufficiently lead to the conclusion that what appellants are complaining

about is that the elections held in Iligan City in November, 1967 were characterized by general and specificcircumstances, that leave rational doubt as to whether or not the true will of the people of said City could bereflected in the proclaimed results. In the more polished and inimitable language of Mr. Justice Fernando,"... the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections conducted freely and honestly,with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly electedofficials".

It is my considered opinion that while it is truly desirable that election protests should be discouraged wherethey have hardly any basis in fact or in law, the earlier to free from doubt the title to their respective officesof those chosen to direct the affairs of our government, whether national or local, thereby giving them thepeace of mind and freedom of action gravely needed in the formulation of policies and the implementationthereof, courts should also be careful in seeing to it that their doors are not untimely shut to complaintsregarding the commission of electoral frauds, irregularities and illegalities, the most despicable banes ofpopular suffrage, which though unhappily worded are fairly indicative of a situation wherein the will of theelectorate has not been freely and clearly expressed. To my mind, the rule foIlowed in an unbroken line ofdecisions of this Court, to the effect that the commission of irregularities by election officials, no matter howserious, and the actual discovery of frauds and violations of law by either candidates or voters, are not inthemselves sufficient to cause the annulment of an election unless so expressly provided by law, or that thefrauds, illegalities and irregularities are so rampant and diffusive as to place the result of such election ingrave doubt, is one that governs more the rendition of judgments in election cases and the evaluation ofthe circumstances surrounding the elections in question, as portrayed in the evidence already presentedbefore the court, rather than as a strict criterion for determining whether a complaint or petition or motion ofprotest sufficiently states a cause of action for annulment. Respecting contrary opinion others mayentertain on the matter, I regard it as a sound rule that pleadings in election cases, at least, should not besubjected to such minute examination as should be done to facts duly established after proper hearing, ifonly because facts are unerring manifestations of the truth, while allegations in pleadings often suffer fromthe common flaws in the means of human expressions as well as from the usual imperfection of humanlanguage. If words are but children of thoughts, parents and offsprings not always, as among men andanimals, look exactly alike. Pleadings in such cases must, therefore, be read with more liberality so as tomake it difficult, if not impossible for grievances against the suppression in one form or another of theexpression of the popular will, well-grounded in fact, may not be thrown out merely because of lack of skilland precision in the formulation of the corresponding protests. More importance should be given to thesubstantial matters sufficiently appearing in such pleadings as intended to be brought to the court for aremedy, than to the form, at times, ambiguous and often ungrammatically phrased, in which they areexpressed. In any event, in case of doubt as to which should be done, such doubt must be resolved ingiving due course to the protest, unless it is manifestly evident that the same has been filed for other thanlegitimate purposes.

As already indicated, my vote is for the reversal of the appealed order sustaining the motion to dismiss filedby appellees in the court below, because I agree with the decision herein of Mr. Justice Fernando that thereare enough indications, within the four corners of the questioned petitions, of irregularities and illegalitieswhich, if proven, may result in the annulment of the elections prayed for by appellants.

Footnotes

1L-29333.

2L-29334.

3Felix Z. Actub, Providencio P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran, Casimero P. Cabigon, and Benito Ong.

4Felix Z. Actub, Providencio P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran, Casimero P. Cabigon, and Benito Ong.

5Motion to Dismiss of Protestee Cabili.

6Order of the lower court of March 23, 1968, pp. 6-7.

7Ibid, p. 8.

8L-28348, December 15, 1967.

985 Phil. 149 (1949).

10City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso, L-16365, September 30, 1963.

11Cf. Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521 (1914); Garchitorena v. Crescini, 39 Phil. 258 (1918); Caillesv. Gomez, 42 Phil. 496 (1921); Mandac v. Samonte, 49 Phil. 284 (1926); De Leon v. Cruz, 92 Phil.403 (1952); Ticao v. Nanawa L-17890, August 30, 1962; and City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso,L-16365, September 30, 1963.

12Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939).

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/148334_puno.htm

DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, J.:

The case at bar transcends the political fortunes of respondent SenatorGregorio B. Honasan. At issue is the right of the people to elect theirrepresentatives on the basis and only on the basis of an informedjudgment. The issue strikes at the heart of democracy and representativegovernment for without this right, the sovereignty of the people is a merechimera and the rule of the majority will be no more than mobocracy. To clarifyand sharpen the issue, 1 shall first unfurl the facts.

I. Facts

The facts are undisputed. In February 2001, a Senate seat for a termexpiring on June 30, 2004 was vacated with the appointment of then Senator

Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President of the Philippines. The Senate adoptedResolution No. 84 certifying the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and callingthe Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy throughelection to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001,and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number ofvotes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.Guingona, Jr. In the deliberations of the Senate on the resolution, the bodyagreed that the procedure it adopted for determining the winner in the specialelection was for the guidance and implementation of the COMELEC. TheCOMELEC had no discretion to alter the procedure.

Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to servethe unexpired three-year term in the special election. All the senatorialcandidates filed the certificates of candidacy for the twelve regular Senate seatsto be vacated on June 30, 2001 with a six-year term expiring on June 30,2007. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents such as the VoterInformation Sheet, List of Candidates and Sample Ballot. The List ofCandidates did not indicate a separate list of candidates for the specialelection. The Sample Ballot and the official ballots did not provide twodifferent categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely the twelve regular six-year term seats and the single three-year term seat. Nor did the ballots providea separate space for the candidate to be voted in the special election andinstead provided thirteen spaces for thirteen senatorial seats.

Without any COMELEC resolution or notice on the time, place and mannerof conduct of the special election, the special election for senator was held onthe scheduled May 14, 2001 regular elections. A single canvass of votes for asingle list of senatorial candidates was done. On June 5, 2001, respondentCOMELEC promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. NBC01-005, the dispositiveportion of which reads, viz:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting EnBanc as the National Board of Canvassers hereby proclaims the above-named thirteen (13) candidates as the duly elected Senators of the Philippines in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based on the Certificates of Canvass finally tabulated, the first twelve (12)

Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who was appointed Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof, as implemented under Republic Act No. 6645. (emphasis supplied)

On June 21, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court their petition for prohibitionto stop respondent COMELEC from proclaiming any senatorial candidate in theMay 14, 2001 election as having been elected for the lone senate seat for athree-year term. Copies of the petition were served on respondent COMELECtwice, first on June 20, 2001 by registered mail, and second on June 21, 2001,by personal delivery of petitioner Mojica. On June 26, 2001 the Court issued aResolution requiring respondent COMELEC to comment within ten days fromnotice. Even before filing its comment, respondent COMELEC issued ResolutionNo. NBC-01-006 on July 20, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers hereby DECLARES official and final the above ranking of the proclaimed 13 Senators of the Philippines in relation to NBC Resolution No. 01-005 promulgated June 5, 2001. Resolution No. NBC-01-006 indicates the following ranking of the 13 Senators with the corresponding votes they garnered as of June 20, 2001:

1. De Castro, Noli L. - 16,237,386

2. Flavier, Juan M. - 11,735,897

3. Osmea, Sergio II R. - 11,593,389

4. Drilon, Franklin M. - 11,301,700

5. Arroyo, Joker P. - 11,262,402

6. Magsaysay, Ramon Jr. B. - 11,250,677

7. Villar, Manuel Jr. B. - 11,187,375

8. Pangilinan, Francis N. - 10,971,896

9. Angara, Edgardo J. - 10,805,177

10. Lacson, Panfilo M. - 10,535,559

11. Ejercito-Estrada, Luisa P. - 10,524,130

12. Recto, Ralph - 10,498,940

13. Honasan, Gregorio - 10,454,527

On the day of its promulgation, respondent COMELEC forwarded ResolutionNo. NBC-01-006 to the President of the Senate. On July 23, 2001, the thirteensenators, inclusive of respondents Honasan and Recto, took their oaths of officebefore the Senate President.

With the turn of events after the filing of the petition on June 20, 2001, theCourt ordered petitioners on March 5, 2002 and September 17, 2002 to amendtheir petition. In their amended petition, petitioners assailed the manner bywhich the special election was conducted citing as precedents the 1951 and1955 special senatorial elections for a two-year term which were heldsimultaneously with the regular general elections for senators with six yearterms, viz:

(a) A vacancy in the Senate was created by the election of Senator Fernando Lopez as Vice-President in the 1949 elections. A special election was held in November 1951 to elect his successor to the vacated Senate position for a term to expire on 30 December 1953. Said special election was held simultaneously with the regular election of 1951. A separate space in the official ballot was provided for Senatorial candidates for the two year term; moreover, the candidates for the single Senate term for two years filed certificates of candidacy separate and distinct from those certificates of candidacy filed by the group of Senatorial candidates for the six year term.

(...the votes for the twenty (20) candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the eight Senate seats with six year terms were tallied and canvassed separately from the votes for the five candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the single Senate seat with a two year term...)

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Again, a vacancy was created in the Senate by the election of then Senator Carlos P. Garcia to the Vice Presidency in the 1953 presidential elections. A special election was held in November 1955 to elect his successor to the vacated Senatorial position for a two

year term expiring on 30 December 1957.

Said special election for one senator to fill the vacancy left by the Honorable Carlos Garcia was held in November 1955 simultaneously with the regular election for eight Senate seats with a six year term. Here, separate spaces were provided for in the official ballot for the single Senate seat for the two year term as differentiated from the eight Senate seats with six year terms. The results as recorded by Senate officialfiles show that votes for the candidates for the Senate seat with a two-year term were separately tallied from the votes for the candidates for the eight Senate seats with six-year term...[1] (emphases supplied)

Petitioners thus pray that the Court declare the following:

(a) that no special election was conducted by respondent COMELEC for the single Senateseat with a three year term in the 14 May 2001 election.

(b) null and void respondent COMELECs Resolutions No. NBC01-005 dated 5 June 2001and NBC01-006 dated 20 July 2001 for having been promulgated without any legalauthority at all insofar as said resolutions proclaim the Senatorial candidate whoobtained the thirteenth highest number of votes canvassed during the 14 May 2001election as a duly elected Senator.[2]

Respondents filed their respective comments averring the followingprocedural flaws: (1) the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition for quowarranto; (2) the petition is moot; and (3) the petitioners have no standing tolitigate. On the merits, they all defend the validity of the special election on theground that the COMELEC had discretion to determine the manner by which thespecial election should be conducted and that the electorate was aware of themethod the COMELEC had adopted. Moreover, they dismiss the deviations fromthe election laws with respect to the filing of certificates of candidacy for thespecial elections and the failure to provide in the official ballot a space for thespecial election vote separate from the twelve spaces for the regular senatorialelection votes as inconsequential. They claim that these laws are merelydirectory after the election.

II. Issues

The issues for resolution are procedural and substantive. I shall limit myhumble opinion to the substantive issue of whether a special election for thesingle Senate seat with a three-year term was validly held simultaneous with thegeneral elections on May 14, 2001.

III. Laws on the Calling of Special Elections

Section 9, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the filling of avacancy in the Senate and House of Representatives, viz:

Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, An Act Prescribing the Manner of Filling aVacancy in the Congress of the Philippines, to implement this constitutionalprovision. The law provides, viz:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence ofsuch vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If the Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things, the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.

SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial or City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings. (emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166 which provides inSection 4, viz:

SECTION 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Election. - The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members...

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and holda special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (emphases supplied)

IV. Democracy and Republicanism

The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. In this case offirst impression, however, the distance between existing jurisprudence and theresolution of the issue presented to the Court cannot be negotiated through astraight and direct line of reasoning. Rather, it is necessary to journey through ameandering path and unearth the root principles of democracy, republicanism,elections, suffrage, and freedom of information and discourse in an opensociety. As a first step in this indispensable journey, we should traverse thedemocratic and republican landscape to appreciate the importance of informedjudgment in elections.

A. Evolution of Democracy from Plato to Locke

to Jefferson and Contemporary United States of America

In the ancient days, democracy was dismissed by thoughtfulthinkers. Plato deprecated democracy as rule by the masses. He warned that ifall the people were allowed to rule, those of low quality would dominate the stateby mere numerical superiority. He feared that the more numerous masses wouldgovern with meanness and bring about a tyranny of the majority. Plato predictedthat democracies would be short-lived as the mob would inevitably surrender itspower to a single tyrant, and put an end to popular government. Less jaundicedthan Plato was Aristotles view towards democracy. Aristotle agreed that undercertain conditions, the will of the many could be equal to or even wiser than thejudgment of the few. When the many governed for the good of all, Aristotleadmitted that democracy is a good form of government. But still and all, Aristotlepreferred a rule of the upper class as against the rule of the lower class. Hebelieved that the upper class could best govern for they represent people of thegreatest refinement and quality.

In the Middle Ages, Europe plunged when the Roman Empire perished.Europe re-emerged from this catastrophe largely through reliance on thescientific method which ultimately ushered the Industrial Revolution. Materialsuccess became the engine which drove the people to search for solutions totheir social, political and economic problems. Using the scythe of science andreason, the thinkers of the time entertained an exaggerated notion ofindividualism. They bannered the idea that all people were equal; no one had agreater right to rule than another. Dynastical monarchy was taboo. As all wereessentially equal, no one enjoyed the moral right to govern anotherwithout the consent of the governed. The people therefore were the source oflegitimate legal and political authority. This theory of popularsovereignty revived an interest in democracy in the seventeenth century. Therefinements of the grant of power by the people to the government led tothe social contract theory: that is, the social contract is the act of peopleexercising their sovereignty and creating a government to which they

consent.[3]

Among the great political philosophers who spurred the evolution ofdemocratic thought was John Locke (1632-1704). In 1688, the English revoltedagainst the Catholic tyranny of James II, causing him to flee toFrance. This Glorious Revolution, called such because it was almostbloodless, put to rest the long struggle between King and Parliament inEngland. The revolution reshaped the English government and ultimatelybrought about democracy in England.

John Locke provided the philosophical phalanx to the GloriousRevolution. For this purpose, he wrote his Second Treatise ofGovernment, his work with the most political impact. In his monumentaltreatise, Locke asserted that the basis of political society is a contract wherebyindividuals consent to be bound by the laws of a common authority known ascivil government. The objective of this social contract is the protection of theindividuals natural rights to life, liberty and property which are inviolable andenjoyed by them in the state of nature before the formation of all social andpolitical arrangements.[4] Locke thus argues that legitimate political poweramounts to a form of trust, a contract among members of society anchored ontheir own consent, and seeks to preserve their lives, liberty andproperty. This trust or social contract makes government legitimate and clearlydefines the functions of government as concerned, above all, with thepreservation of the rights of the governed.

Even then, Locke believed that the people should be governed by aparliament elected by citizens who owned property. Although he argued thatthe people were sovereign, he submitted that they should notrule directly. Members of parliament represent their constituents and shouldvote as their constituents wanted. The governments sole reason for being wasto serve the individual by protecting his rights and liberties. Although Lockesideas were liberal, they fell short of the ideals of democracy. He spoke of amiddle-class revolution at a time when the British government was controlled bythe aristocracy. While he claimed that all people were equally possessed ofnatural rights, he advocated that political power be devolved only to embracethe middle class by giving Parliament, which was controlled through the House

of Commons, the right to limit the monarchical power. He denied politicalpower to the poor; they were bereft of the right to elect members ofParliament.

Locke influenced Thomas Jefferson, the eminent statesman andphilosopher of the (American) revolution and of the first constitutional orderwhich free men were permitted to establish.[5]But although Jefferson espousedLockes version of the social contract and natural law, he had respect for thecommon people and participatory government. Jefferson believed that thepeople, including the ordinary folk, were the only competent guardians of theirown liberties, and should thus control their government. Discussing the role ofthe people in a republic, Jefferson wrote to Madison from France in 1787 thatthey are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberties.[6]

The wave of liberalism from Europe notwithstanding, a much moreconservative, less democratic, and more paternalistic system of governmentwas originally adopted in the United States.The nations founders created agovernment in which power was much more centralized than it had been underthe Articles of Confederation and they severely restricted popular controlover the government.[7] Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Conventionof 1787 adhered to Alexander Hamiltons view that democracy was little morethan legitimized mob rule, a constant threat to personal security, liberty andproperty. Thus, the framers sought to establish a constitutional republic, in whichpublic policy would be made by elected representatives but individual rightswere protected from the tyranny of transient majorities. With its several elitistelements and many limitations on majority rule, the framers Constitution hadundemocratic strands.

The next two centuries, however, saw the further democratization of thefederal Constitution.[8] The Bill of Rights was added to the AmericanConstitution and since its passage, America had gone through a series ofliberalizing eras that slowly relaxed the restraints imposed on the people by thenew political order. The changing social and economic milieu mothered byindustrialization required political democratization.[9] In 1787, propertyqualifications for voting existed and suffrage was granted only to white males. Atthe onset of Jacksonion democracy in the 1830s, property requirements quickly

diminished and virtually became a thing of the past by the time of the CivilWar. In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment theoretically extended the franchise toAfrican-Americans, although it took another century of struggle for theAmendment to become a reality. In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment removedsex as a qualification for voting. The Progressive Era also saw the SeventeenthAmendment of the Constitution to provide for direct election of United Statessenators[10] and established procedures for initiative, referendum and recall(otherwise known as direct democracy) in many states.[11] Poll taxes wereabolished as prerequisites for voting in federal elections through the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964. Finally, the voting age was lowered to eighteen withthe ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971.[12]

B. Constitutional History of Democracy

and Republicanism in the Philippines

The Malolos Constitution was promulgated on January 21, 1899 by theshort-lived Revolutionary Government headed by Emilio Aguinaldo after theDeclaration of Independence from Spain on June 12, 1898. Article 4 of theConstitution declared the Philippines a Republic, viz:

Art. 4. The government of the Republic is popular,representative, alternative, and responsible and is exercised by three distinct powers, which are denominated legislative,executive and judicial...

Shortly after the promulgation of the Malolos Constitution, the Philippines fellunder American rule. The Americans adopted the policy of gradually increasingthe autonomy of the Filipinos before granting their independence. [13] In 1934, theU.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Law xxx the last of theconstitutional landmarks studding the period of constitutional development of theFilipino people under the American regime before the final grant of Philippineindependence.[14] Under this law, the American government authorized theFilipino people to draft a constitution in 1934 with the requirement that theconstitution formulated and drafted shall be republican in form. In conformity

with this requirement,[15] Article II, Section 1 of the 1935 PhilippineConstitution was adopted, viz:

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention understood this form ofgovernment to be that defined by James Madison, viz:

We may define a republic to be a government which derives all its power directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it. It is sufficient for such government that the person administering it be appointed either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified.[16] (emphases supplied)

The 1973 Constitution adopted verbatim Article II, Section 1 of the 1935Constitution. So did the 1987 Constitution. The delegates to the 1986Constitutional Commission well understood the meaning of a republicangovernment. They adopted the explanation by Jose P. Laurel in his book, Breadand Freedom, The Essentials of Popular Government, viz:

When we refer to popular government or republican government or representative government, we refer to some system of popular representation where the powers of government are entrusted to those representatives chosen directly or indirectly by the people in their sovereign capacity.[17] (emphasis supplied)

An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of thedemocratic space giving the people greater power to exercise theirsovereignty. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the people can directlyexercise their sovereign authority through the following modes, namely: (1)elections; (2) plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and (5) referendum. Throughelections, the people choose the representatives to whom they will entrust theexercise of powers of government.[18] In a plebiscite, the people ratify anyamendment to or revision of the Constitution and may introduce amendments tothe constitution.[19] Indeed, the Constitution mandates Congress to provide for a

system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby thepeople can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any law or partthereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. . . It also directsCongress to enact a local government code which shall provide for effectivemechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.[20] Pursuant to this mandate,Congress enacted the Local Government Code of 1991 which defines localinitiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a localgovernment unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance throughan election called for the purpose. Recall is a method of removing a local officialfrom office before the expiration of his term because of loss of confidence. [21] Ina referendum, the people can approve or reject a law or an issue of nationalimportance.[22] Section 126 of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines alocal referendum as the legal process whereby the registered voters of the localgovernment units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted bythe sanggunian.

These Constitutional provisions on recall, initiative, and referenduminstitutionalized the peoples might made palpable in the 1986 People PowerRevolution.[23] To capture the spirit of People Power and to make it a principleupon which Philippine society may be founded, the Constitutional Commissionenunciated as a first principle in the Declaration of Principles and StatePolicies under Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that the Philippines isnot only a republican but also a democratic state.

The following excerpts from the Records of the Constitutional Commissionshow the intent of the Commissioners in emphasizing democratic in Section 1,Article II, in light of the provisions of the Constitution on initiative, recall,referendum and peoples organizations:

MR. SUAREZ. . . . May I call attention to Section 1. I wonder who among the members of the committee would like to clarify this question regarding the use of the word democratic in addition to the word republican. Can the honorable members of the committee give us the reason or reasons for introducing this additional expression? Would the committee not be satisfied with the use of the word republican? What prompted it to include the word democratic?

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think as a lawyer, the Commissioner knows that one of the manifestations of republicanism is the existence of the Bill of Rights and periodic elections, which already indicates that we are a democratic state. Therefore, the addition of democratic is what we call pardonable redundancy the purpose being to emphasize that our country is republican and democratic at the same time. . . In the 1935and 1973 Constitutions, democratic does not appear. I hope the Commissioner has no objection to that word.

MR. SUAREZ. No, I would not die for that. If it is redundant in character but it is for emphasis of the peoples rights, I would have no objection. I am only trying to clarify the matter.[24] (emphasis supplied)

In other portions of the Records, Commissioner Nolledo explains thesignificance of the word democratic, viz:

MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word democratic because of the provisions that we are now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through peoples organizations . . .[25]

xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE. The Committee added the word democratic to republican, and, therefore, the first sentence states: The Philippines is a republican and democratic state.

May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word democratic to republican? The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with republican. Was this done merely lor the sake of emphasis?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that question has been asked several times, but being the proponent of this amendment, I would like the Commissioner to know that democratic was added because of the need to emphasize people power and the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall, peoples organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in certain circumstances.

MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need. . .

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, democracy here is understood as participatory democracy.[26] (emphasis supplied)

The following exchange between Commissioners Sarmiento and Azcuna isof the same import:

MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to representative democracy?

MR. AZCUNA. That is right.

MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used the words republican state because republican state would refer to a democratic state where people choose their representatives?

MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.

MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept republican state, we are stressing the participation of the people. . . So the word republican will suffice to cover popular representation.

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word democratic to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people would act directly, and not through their representatives.[27] (emphasis supplied)

V. Elections and the Right to Vote

A. Theory

The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republicanframework because it is through the act of voting that government by consent issecured.[28] Through the ballot, people express their will on the defining issues of

the day and they are able to choose their leaders [29] in accordance with thefundamental principle of representative democracy that the people should electwhom they please to govern them.[30] Voting has an important instrumental valuein preserving the viability of constitutional democracy. [31] It has traditionally beentaken as a prime indicator of democratic participation.[32]

The right to vote or of suffrage is an important political right appertaining tocitizenship. Each individual qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty.[33] In People v. Corral,[34] we held that (t)he modern conception of suffrage isthat voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right butit is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to suchpersons as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. The existence ofthe right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment ofall other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts ofthe constitution.[35] In Geronimo v. Ramos, et al.,[36] we held that the right isamong the most important and sacred of the freedoms inherent in a democraticsociety and one which must be most vigilantly guarded if a people desires tomaintain through self-government for themselves and their posterity a genuinelyfunctioning democracy in which the individual may, in accordance with law, havea voice in the form of his government and in the choice of the people who willrun that government for him.[37] The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Yick Wov. Hopkins[38] that voting is a fundamental political right, because [itis] preservative of all rights. In Wesberry v. Sanders,[39] the U.S. SupremeCourt held that no right is more precious in a free country than that of havinga voice in the election of those who make the laws, under which, as goodcitizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if theright to vote is undermined. Voting makes government more responsive tocommunity and individual needs and desires. Especially for those who feeldisempowered and marginalized or that government is not responsive to them,meaningful access to the ballot box can be one of the few counterbalances intheir arsenal.[40]

Thus, elections are substantially regulated for them to be fair and honest, fororder rather than chaos to accompany the democratic processes.[41] This Courthas consistently ruled from as early as the oft-cited 1914 case of Gardiner v.

Romulo[42] that the purpose of election laws is to safeguard the will of thepeople, the purity of elections being one of the most important and fundamentalrequisites of popular government. We have consistently made it clear that wefrown upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in anyway not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election butalso the correct ascertainment of the results.[43] To preserve the purity ofelections, comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes are enacted,each provision of which - whether it governs the registration and qualifications ofvoters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself -inevitably affects the individuals right to vote. [44] As the right to vote in a free andunimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, ChiefJustice Warren, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds v.Sims[45] cautioned that any alleged infringement of the right of citizens tovote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. It was to promote free,orderly and honest elections and to preserve the sanctity of the right to vote thatthe Commission on Elections was created.[46] The 1987 Constitution mandatesthe COMELEC to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.[47]

B. History of Suffrage in the Philippines

In primitive times, the choice of who will govern the people was not based ondemocratic principles. Even then, birth or strength was not the only basis forchoosing the chief of the tribe. When an old chief has failed his office orcommitted wrong or has aged and can no longer function, the members of thetribe could replace him and choose another leader.[48] Among the Muslims, acouncil or ruma bechara chooses the sultan. An old sultan may appoint hissuccessor, but his decision is not absolute. Among the criteria for choosing asultan were age, blood, wealth, fidelity to Islamic faith and exemplary characteror personality.[49] In times of crises, the community may choose its leadervoluntarily, irrespective of social status. By consensus of the community, a serfor slave may be voted the chief on account of his ability.

As far back as the Spanish regime, the Filipinos did not have a general right

of suffrage.[50] It was only in the Malolos Constitution of 1899 that the right ofsuffrage was recognized;[51] it was a by-product of the Filipinos struggle againstthe Spanish colonial government and an offshoot of Western liberal ideas oncivil government and individual rights.[52] The life of the Malolos Constitution was,however, cut short by the onset of the American regime in the Philippines. Butthe right of suffrage was reiterated in the Philippine Bill of 1902. [53] The firstgeneral elections were held in 1907 [54] under the first Philippine Election Law, AciNo. 1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907. This law was elitist anddiscriminatory against women. The right of suffrage was carried into the JonesLaw of 1916.[55] Whereas previously, the right was granted only by the PhilippineLegislature and thus subject to its control, the 1935 Constitution elevatedsuffrage to a constitutional right.[56] It also provided for a plebiscite on the issueof whether the right of suffrage should be extended to women. On April 30,1937, the plebiscite was held and the people voted affirmatively. In the 1973Constitution,[57] suffrage was recognized not only as a right, but was imposed asa duty to broaden the electoral base and make democracy a reality throughincreased popular participation in government. The voting age was lowered, theliteracy requirement abolished, and absentee voting was legalized. [58] The 1987Constitution likewise enshrines the right of suffrage in Article V, but unlike the1973 Constitution, it is now no longer imposed as a duty. [59] The 1948 UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights[60] and the 1976 Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights[61] also protect the right of suffrage.

VI. Voter Information:

Prerequisite to a Meaningful Vole in a Genuinely Free,

Orderly and Honest Elections in a Working Democracy

A. Democracy, information and discourse on public matters

1. U.S. jurisdiction

For the right of suffrage to h