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G.R. No. 191938 July 2, 2010

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES, and ORLANDO R. BALBON,JR., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

The minimum requirement under our Constitution1 and election laws2 for the candidatesresidency in the political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to be an emptyformalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] ornewcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community" from seekingelective offices in that community.3

The requirement is rooted in the recognition that officials of districts or localities should not

only be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their constituencies; more importantly, theyshould know their constituencies and the unique circumstances of their constituents theirneeds, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital totheir common welfare. Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these circumstancescan only come with residency in the constituency to be represented.

The purpose of the residency requirement is "best met by individuals who have either hadactual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same areaeither by origin or by choice."4 At the same time, the constituents themselves can best knowand evaluate the candidates qualifications and fitness for office if these candidates havelived among them.5

Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily be appreciated as a requirementthat goes into the heart of our democratic system; it directly supports the purpose ofrepresentation electing those who can best serve the community because of theirknowledge and sensitivity to its needs. It likewise adds meaning and substance to the votersfreedom of choice in the electoral exercise that characterizes every democracy.

In the present case, the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled thecertificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedlymisrepresenting that he is a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawanwhere he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this Court to seek the reversal ofthe cancellation.6

The Antecedents

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra wasthe incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included,among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was electedRepresentative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislativedistrict for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.7

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On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative), PuertoPrincesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be acomponent city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new statuswas the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for electiveprovincial officials.8

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra appliedfor the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 ofBrgy. Sta.Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan,Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawanas a resident of Aborlan.9

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (therespondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.10They essentiallyargued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet establishedresidence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Mitrainsisted in his Answer that he has successfully abandoned Puerto Princesa City as hisdomicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008.11

The Parties Claims and Evidence

The respondents petition before the COMELEC claimed that Mitras COC should becancelled under the following factual premises: (a) Mitra bought, in June 2009, a parcel ofland in Aborlan where he began to construct a house, but up to the time of the filing of thepetition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC, the house had yet to be completed; (b)in the document of sale, Puerto Princesa City was stated as Mitras residence (attached asAnnex "J" of the Respondents Petition before the COMELEC);12 (c) Mitras Puerto PrincesaCity residence was similarly stated in his application for a building permit (attached as Annex"K" of the Respondents Petition before the COMELEC);13 and (d) Mitras community taxcertificate states that his residence was Puerto Princesa City (attached as Annex "M" of theRespondents Petition before the COMELEC).14 The respondents presented several affidavits

attesting to the non-completion of the construction of the house,15 and asserted that without afully constructed house, Mitra could not claim residence in Aborlan.

Mitra denied the respondents allegations in his Answer. He claimed that the respondentsmisled the COMELEC by presenting photographs of his unfinished house on the land hepurchased from a certain Rexter Temple. He claimed, on the contrary, that his residence islocated inside the premises of the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm (Maligaya Feedmill) whichthe owner, Carme Caspe, leased to him; and that he purchased a farm and presently has anexperimental pineapple plantation and a cock farm. The transfer of his residence, heclaimed, began in 2008.16

He submitted the following: (a) the Sinumpaang Salaysayof Ricardo Temple; Florame T.

Gabrillo, the Punong Barangayof Isaub, Aborlan; Marissa U. Zumarraga, Councilor ofAborlan; Virginia J. Agpao and Elsa M. Dalisay, both Sangguniang Barangaymembers ofIsaub, Aborlan, attesting that Mitra resides in their locality;17 (b) photographs of the residentialportion of the Maligaya Feedmill18 where he claims to reside, and of his Aborlan experimentalpineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm;19 (c) the lease contract over theMaligaya Feedmill;20(d) the community tax certificate he claims he himself secured, statingthat Aborlan is his residence;21and (e) an updated identification card issued by the House ofRepresentatives stating that Aborlan is his residence.22

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To refute Mitras claimed residence in Aborlan specifically, that he resides at the MaligayaFeedmill property the respondents additionally submitted: (a) the affidavits of the14 Punong Barangays of Aborlan and of six residents of Aborlan, all stating that Mitra is nota resident of Aborlan and has never been seen in that municipality; (b) a Certification fromthe BarangayCaptain of Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City stating that Mitra was a residentof that barangay as of November 16, 2009; (c) the affidavit of Commodore Nicanor

Hernandez attesting that Mitra continues to reside in Puerto Princesa City; and (d) 24affidavits of former employees, workers, Aborlan residents and a customer of the MaligayaFeedmill attesting that they have never seen Mitra during the time he claimed to have livedthere and that the area where Mitra supposedly lives is, in fact, the office of the feedmill andis unlivable due to noise and pollution.23

The Ruling of the COMELECs First Division24

The Law. The First Division defined the governing law with the statement that residencemeans domicile under the Courts consistent rulings since 1928 in Nuval v. Guray.25Domicileimports not only the intent to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,coupled with conduct indicative of this intention.26

To acquire a new domicile a domicile by choice the following must concur: (1) residenceor bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention toabandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non revertendi withrespect to the old domicile, and an animus manendi at the domicile of choice. The intent toremain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time and the acts ofthe person must be consistent with this intent.27

The First Divisions Evaluation of the Parties Evidence. Based on its consideration of thesubmitted evidence (including various affidavits submitted by both parties and thephotographs of the room that Mitra claims to be his residence) and citing jurisprudence, theFirst Division granted the respondents petition to cancel Mitras COC.

To the First Division, Mitras submitted pictures are telling; they show a small, sparselyfurnished room that is evidently unlived in, located at the second floor of a structure thatappears to be a factory or a warehouse; the residence appears hastily set-up, cold, andutterly devoid of any indication of Mitras personality such as old family photographs andmemorabilia collected through the years. What the supposed residence lacks, in the FirstDivisions perception, are the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make itones residence; perhaps, at most, this small room could have served as Mitras resting areawhenever he visited the locality, but nothing more than this.28

These observations coupled with the statements from former employees and customers ofthe Maligaya Feedmill that the claimed residence is located in an unsavory location (for itsnoise and pollution), and that it had been in fact Maligaya Feedmills office just a few months

back militated against Mitras claim. These pieces of information made it clear, to the FirstDivision, that this room is not the home that a residence is supposed to be.29

A persons domicile of origin is not easily lost, the First Division further said. The fact thatMitra registered as a voter in Aborlan, has a cock farm, a farm, a rest house and anexperimental pineapple plantation in Maligaya Feedmill, was occasionally seen staying inAborlan, and held meetings with Aborlan constituents does not necessarily establish Mitrasstatus as an Aborlan resident, or prove his abandonment of his domicile of origin in PuertoPrincesa City. Mere absence from ones residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies,

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engage in business, or practice ones vocation is not sufficient to constitute abandonment orloss of domicile. Registration or voting in a place other than ones domicile does noteliminate an individuals animus revertendi to his domicile of origin; the natural desire andlonging of every person to return to the place of birth and his strong feeling of attachment tothis place can only be shown to have been overcome by a positive proof of abandonment ofthis place for another.30

Also, the First Division said that Mitras witnesses sworn statements appear to have beenprepared by the same person, as they use similar wordings, allegations, and contents; thus,putting into question the credibility of the statements. Furthermore, the lease contract overthe Maligaya Feedmill between Mitra and Carme Caspe is effective only up to February 28,2010, thus casting doubt on Mitras claim of residency in Aborlan.31

The COMELEC En Banc Ruling

The COMELEC en banc in a divided decision32 subsequently denied Mitras motion toreconsider the First Division ruling under the following outlined reasons.

First, registration as a voter of Aborlan is not sufficient evidence that Mitra has successfullyabandoned his domicile of origin.33

Second, mere intent cannot supplant the express requirement of the law; the "physicalpresence" required to establish domicile connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence ina given locality. The COMELEC en banc agreed with the First Divisions evidentiary findingson this point.34

Third, the First Divisions Resolution was based on a careful and judicious examination andconsideration of all evidence submitted by the parties. The summary nature of theproceedings is not necessarily offensive to a partys right to due process.35

Fourth, Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal36

is not on all fours withthe present case Fernandez stemmed from a quo warranto case while the present caseinvolves a petition to deny due course or cancel the COC. Likewise, Fernandez successfullyproved that his transfer to Sta. Rosa City, Laguna several years prior to his candidacy wasprompted by valid reasons, i.e., existence of his business in the area and the enrolment ofhis children at Sta. Rosa schools, thereby erasing doubts as to the bona fide nature of histransfer. In the present case, the COMELEC en banc found that Mitra admitted that histransfer to Aborlan in 2008 was prompted by his plans to run for governor in the 2010national and local elections. The COMELEC en banc also noted that Fernandez involved anindividual who had earned an overwhelming mandate from the electorate. The COMELECen bancs ruling on Mitras case, on the other hand, came before the 2010 elections; thus,the people had not then voted.37

In his Dissent,38 Commissioner Sarmiento points out that the following acts of Mitra, takencollectively, indubitably prove a change of domicile from Puerto Princesa to Aborlan:

(a) in January 2008, [Mitra] started a pineapple growing project in a rented farmlandnear Maligaya Feedmill and Farm located in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan;

(b) in February 2008, [Mitra] leased the residential portion of the said MaligayaFeedmill;

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(c) in March 2008, after the said residential portion has been refurbished andrenovated, [Mitra] started to occupy and reside in the said premises;

(d) in 2009, [Mitra] purchased his own farmland in the same barangaybut continuedthe lease involving the Maligaya Feedmill, the contract of which was even reneweduntil February 2010; and

(e) [Mitra] caused the construction of a house in the purchased lot which has beenrecently completed.39

The Petition

Mitra supports his petition with the following ARGUMENTS:

6.1 x x x COMELECs GRAVE ABUSE is most patent as IT forgets, wittingly orunwittingly that the solitary GROUND to deny due course to a COC isthe DELIBERATE false material representation to DECEIVE, and not the issue of thecandidates eligibility which should be resolved in an appropriate QUO WARRANTO

proceedings post election.40

6.2 Deny Due Course Petitions under Section 78 of the OEC, being SUMMARILYdecided and resolved, the same must be exercised most sparingly, with utmost careand extreme caution; and construed most strictly against the proponent/s, andliberally in favor of the candidate sought to be eliminated. When exercised otherwiseand with apparent biased in favor of the proponents, as in this instance, GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION necessarily sets in.41

6.3 The mandate to be extremely cautious and careful in the SUMMARY exercise ofthe awesome power to simplistically cancel [ones] candidacy x x x is further mademanifest by the availability of a QUO WARRANTO proceeding appropriately

prosecuted post election.42

6.4 Absent any formal HEARINGS and Presentation of Evidence; Lacking the actualinspection and verification; and without actual confrontation of affiants/allegedwitnesses ALL the "conclusions" of COMELEC on the RESIDENCE issue, wereindeed predicted (sic) on sheer SPECULATION[.]43

6.5 A grievous procedural flaw, FATAL in character. THE BURDEN OF PROOFMUST ALWAYS BE PLACED ON THE SHOULDERS OF THE PROPONENT/s. Notso in the present controversy, where COMELECs assailed decision/s were devotedexclusively to the alleged weakness of MITRAs submissions and COMELECsspeculative conclusions, rather than on the strength of proponents unverified andunconfirmed submissions and unconfronted sworn statements of supposedaffiants[.]44

The petition also asks for ancillary injunctive relief. We granted the application for injunctiverelief by issuing a status quo ante order, allowing Mitra to be voted upon in the May 10, 2010elections.45

The respondents Comment46states the following counter-arguments:

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a. Procedural Arguments:

II. THE INSTANT PETITION FAILED TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OFTHE MATERIAL PORTIONS OF THE RECORDS REFERRED TO THEREIN INGROSS CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 5 OF RULE 64 OF THE RULES OFCOURT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT MUST BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.

III. THE INSTANT PETITION RAISES MERE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT, WHICHARE OUTSIDE THIS HONORABLE COURTS CERTIORARI JURISDICTION.

b. Arguments on the Merits

I. XXX

B. THE LAW, IN IMPOSING A RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT, MANDATES NOTONLY FAMILIARITY WITH THE NEEDS AND CONDITIONS OF THE LOCALITY,BUT ALSO ACTUAL PHYSICAL, PERSONAL AND PERMANENT RESIDENCETHEREIN. PETITIONERS SUPPOSED FAMILIARITY WITH THE "NEEDS,

DIFFICULTIES, ASPIRATIONS, POTENTIALS (SIC) FOR GROWTH AND ALLMATTERS VITAL TO THE WELFARE OF HIS CONSTITUENCY WHICHCONSTITUTES ONE/THIRD OF THE WHOLE PROVINCE OF PALAWAN" AS ATHREE-TERM CONGRESSMAN ABSENT SUCH RESIDENCE DOES NOTSUFFICE TO MEET THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW.

IV. FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES SUCH AS THE COMELEC, AREACCORDED GREAT RESPECT, IF NOT FINALITY BY THE COURTS, ESPECIALLY IFSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. BECAUSE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OFTHE COMELEC IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BYSUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY NOT REVERSE SUCHFINDINGS.

V. THE COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONAMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILEDRESOLUTION DATED 04 MAY 2010.

A. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS REGISTRATIONAS A VOTER IN ABORLAN, PALAWAN IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT HEHAS SUCCESSFULLY ABANDONED HIS DOMICILE OF ORIGIN AT PUERTOPRINCESA CITY, PALAWAN.

B. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS MERE INTENT TOTRANSFER RESIDENCE TO ABORLAN, PALAWAN, ABSENT ACTUAL,FACTUAL, AND BONA FIDE RESIDENCE THEREIN DOES NOT SUFFICE TOPROVE HIS TRANSFER OF RESIDENCE FROM PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWANTO ABORLAN, PALAWAN.

C. THE COMELEC THOROUGHLY EVALUATED THE EVIDENCE, ANDCORRECTLY ARRIVED AT THE ASSAILED DECISION ONLY AFTER MUCHDELIBERATION AND CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE, ALBEITTHROUGH SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS PARTICIPATED IN ACTIVELY BYPETITIONER. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY DID NOT GIVE CREDENCE TO THE

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TESTIMONIES OF PETITIONERS WITNESSES FOR BEING INCREDIBLE ANDCONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, ESPECIALLY PERTAINING TO HISALLEGED RESIDENCE AT THE FEEDMILL PROPERTY.

D. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER HAS NOTTRANSFERRED HIS RESIDENCE FROM PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN TO

ABORLAN, PALAWAN.

E. THE ALLEGED LEASE OF THE RESIDENTIAL PORTION OF THE FEEDMILLPROPERTY IS A SHAM.

VI. GIVEN HIS STATURE AS A MEMBER OF THE PROMINENT MITRA CLAN OFPALAWAN, AND AS A 3-TERM CONGRESSMAN, IT IS HIGHLY INCREDIBLE THAT ASMALL ROOM IN A FEEDMILL HAS SERVED AS HIS RESIDENCE SINCE 2008.

VII. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER MAY NOT INVOKE THECASE OF FERNANDEZ V. HRET AS PETITIONER IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED ASDAN FERNANDEZ.

VIII. THE MATERIAL STATEMENT IN PETITIONERS COC RESPECTING HISRESIDENCE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE FALSE. BY MAKING SUCH FALSESTATEMENT, PETITIONER DELIBERATELY TRIED TO MISLEAD AND TO MISINFORMTHE ELECTORATE AS TO HIS ACTUAL RESIDENCE. HENCE, HIS COC WASCORRECTLY DENIED DUE COURSE AND CANCELED.

In the recently concluded elections of May 10, 2010, Mitra obtained the most number ofvotes for Governor and was accordingly proclaimed winner of the Palawan gubernatorialcontest.47

We required the respondents and the COMELEC to comment on the petition.48 They

complied on May 6, 201049

and June 2, 2010, respectively.50

On May 17, 2010, the petitionerfiled a "Supplemental Petition."51

On May 26, 2010, the respondents filed a "Supplemental Comment (with Omnibus Motion toAnnul Proclamation and for Early Resolution)" to the petitioners "SupplementalPetition."52 We deemed the case ready for resolution on the basis of these submissions.

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

The Limited Review in Certiorari Petitions under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court

A preliminary matter before us is the respondents jurisdictional objection based on theissues raised in the present petition. The respondents assert that the questions Mitra broughtto us are beyond our certiorari jurisdiction. Specifically, the respondents contend that Mitraspetition merely seeks to correct errors of the COMELEC in appreciating the parties evidence

a question we cannot entertain under our limited certiorari jurisdiction.

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Mitra brought his case before us pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt.53Our review, therefore, is based on a very limited ground the jurisdictional issue ofwhether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether the COMELEC, by law, has jurisdiction over a case or matter brought to it is

resolved by considering the black-letter provisions of the Constitution and pertinent electionlaws, and we see no disputed issue on this point. Other than the respondents proceduralobjections which we will fully discuss below, the present case rests on the allegation of graveabuse of discretion an issue that generally is not as simple to resolve.

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction"; theabuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive dutyor a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passionand hostility.54Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.55We have held, too,that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a

decision-makers action with grave abuse of discretion.

56

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5,Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported bysubstantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degreeof evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.57

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in acertiorari case the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by theCOMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELECs action on the appreciation andevaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grosslyunreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty tointervene.58 When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the graveabuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.59

Our reading of the petition shows that it is sufficient in form with respect to the requisiteallegation of jurisdictional error. Mitra clearly alleged the COMELEC acts that weresupposedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, we do not agree with therespondents contention that the petition on its face raises mere errors of judgment that areoutside our certiorari jurisdiction. Whether the allegations of "grave abuse" are dulysupported and substantiated is another matter and is the subject of the discussions below.

Nature of the Case under Review:

COC Denial/Cancellation Proceedings

The present petition arose from a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. Thisis the context of and take-off point for our review. From this perspective, the nature andrequisites of the COC cancellation proceedings are primary considerations in resolving thepresent petition.60

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attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible forthe position of Governor of Palawan.

Under the evidentiary situation of the case, there is clearly no basis for the conclusion thatMitra deliberately attempted to mislead the Palawan electorate.

From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from Puerto PrincesaCity to Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement of a candidate for an electiveprovincial office. Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,does not abhor this intended transfer of residence, as its Section 39 merely requires anelective local official to be a resident of the local government unit where he intends to run forat least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. In other words, the lawitself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposesonly the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of course, asa continuing requirement or qualification, the elected official must remain a resident there forthe rest of his term.

Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor

in light of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a componentcity to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials hehad to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local government unitwhere he intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile ofchoice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following:

(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and

(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.63

The contentious issues in Mitras case relate to his bodily presence, or the lack of it, inAborlan, and the declaration he made on this point. The respondents anchor their cause ofaction on the alleged falsity of Mitras statement that he is a resident of Aborlan. To supportthis contention, the respondents claim that the construction of the supposed Mitra residenceor house, other than the leased premises in Maligaya Feedmill, has yet to be completed,leaving Mitra with no habitable place in Aborlan. When Mitra successfully refuted this originalclaim, the respondents presented sworn statements of Aborlan residents contradictingMitras claimed physical residence at the Maligaya Feedmill building in Aborlan. Theylikewise point out, by sworn statements, that this alleged residence could not be considereda house that Mitra could properly consider his residence, on the view that the feedmill placeis beneath what Mitra a three-term congressman and a member of the Mitra political clanof Palawan would occupy.

Mitra, on the other hand, presented sworn statements of various persons (including the sellerof the land he purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay ofthe site of his residence) attesting to his physical residence in Aborlan; photographs of theresidential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of his experimental pineappleplantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill;and the deed of sale of the lot where he has started constructing his house. He clarified, too,that he does not claim residence in Aborlan at the house then under construction; his actualresidence is the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.

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Faced with the seemingly directly contradictory evidence, the COMELEC apparently grosslymisread its import and, because it used wrong considerations, was led into its faultyconclusion.

The seeming contradictions arose from the sworn statements of some Aborlan residentsattesting that they never saw Mitra in Aborlan; these are controverted by similar sworn

statements by other Aborlan residents that Mitra physically resides in Aborlan. The numberof witnesses and their conflicting claims for and against Mitras residency appear to havesidetracked the COMELEC. Substantial evidence, however, is not a simple question ofnumber; reason demands that the focus be on what these differing statements say.

For example, the sworn statements that Mitra has never been seen in Aborlan border on theunbelievable and loudly speak of their inherent weakness as evidence.

Mitra has established business interests in Aborlan, a fact which the respondents have neverdisputed. He was then the incumbent three-term Representative who, as early as 2008,already entertained thoughts of running for Governor in 2010. It is not disputed, too, thatMitra has started the construction of a house on a lot he bought from Rexter Temple; the site

is very near the Maligaya Feedmill that he leased from its owner, Carme Caspe.

While Mitra might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009because his office and activities as a Representative were in Manila, it is hardly credible thathe would not be seen in Aborlan. In this regard, the sworn statement of the PunongBarangay of Isaub, Aborlan should carry a lot more weight than the statements of punongbarangay officials elsewhere since it is the business of a punong barangay to know who theresidents are in his own barangay. The COMELEC apparently missed all these because itwas fixated on the perceived coldness and impersonality of Mitras dwelling.

The parties submitted documentary evidence likewise requires careful consideration for thecorrect appraisal of its evidentiary value. On the one hand, the document of sale of theTemple property, the building permit for the house under construction, and the communitytax certificate used in these transactions all stated that Mitras residence was PuertoPrincesa City. On the other hand, Mitra introduced a notarized contract of lease supportedby the sworn explanation of the lessor (Carme Caspe) showing that he indeed leasedMaligaya Feedmill. He submitted, too, a residence certificate showing Aborlan as hisresidence, and an identification card of the House of Representatives showing Aborlan ashis residence.

We cannot give full evidentiary weight to the contract of sale as evidence relating to Mitrasresidence for two reasons. First, it is a unilateral contract executed by the seller (RexterTemple); thus, his statement and belief as to Mitras personal circumstances cannot be takenas conclusive against the latter. Second, the sale involved several vendees, including Mitrasbrother (Ramon B. Mitra) and one Peter Winston T. Gonzales; his co-vendees still live in

Puerto Princesa City; hence, they were all loosely and collectively described to have theirresidence in Puerto Princesa City.64 Parenthetically, the document simply stated: "I, REXTERTEMPLE, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan, hereby bythese presents, x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY unto the said Vendees,ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, single; RAMON B. MITRA, married to Mary Ann Mitra;PETER WINSTON T. GONZALES, married to Florecita R. Gonzales, all of legal ages andresidents [of] Rancho Sta. Monica, Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, their heirs andassigns."65 Thus, the contract contained a mere general statement that loosely described the

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vendees as Puerto Princesa City residents. This general statement solely came from thevendor.

The building permit, on the other hand, was filed by Mitras representative, an architectnamed John Quillope, who apparently likewise filled the form. That Mitra only signed thebuilding permit form is readily discernible from an examination of the face of the form; even

the statement on his community tax certificate bearing a Puerto Princesa City residencedoes not appear in his handwriting.66 Significantly, Mitras secretary Lilia Camora attestedthat it was she who secured the community tax certificate for Mitra in February 2009 withoutthe latters knowledge.67Annex "M" of the respondents Petition before the COMELEC indeedshows that the community tax certificate did not bear the signature of Mitra.68 Mitra securedhis own certificate in Aborlan on March 18, 2009. This community tax certificate carries hisown signature.69 Parenthetically, per Carme Caspes statement, Mitra leased the feedmillresidence in February 2008 and started moving in his belongings in March 2008, confirmingthe veracity of his Aborlan presence at the time he secured his community tax certificate.70Inthese lights, the February 3, 2009 community tax certificate, if at all, carries very littleevidentiary value.

The respondents expectedly attacked the validity of the lease contract; they contended intheir Memorandum that the feedmill was situated in a forest land that cannot be leased, andthat the contract, while notarized, was not registered with the required notarial office of thecourt.71

The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us isthe question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or strictly forthe use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought,was under construction) and whether he indeed resided there. The notarys compliance withthe notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect not imputable to Mitra; whatis important is the parties affirmation before a notary public of the contracts genuinenessand due execution.

A sworn statement that has no counterpart in the respondents evidence in so far as itprovides details (particularly when read with the statement of Ricardo Temple)72is CarmeCaspes statement73 on how Mitras transfer of residence took place. Read together, thesestatements attest that the transfer of residence was accomplished, not in one single movebut, through an incremental process that started in early 2008 and was in place by March2009, although the house Mitra intended to be his permanent home was not yet thencompleted.74

In considering the residency issue, the COMELEC practically focused solely on itsconsideration of Mitras residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere photographs ofthe premises. In the COMELECs view (expressly voiced out by the Division and fullyconcurred in by the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitras

residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitras personality andthat it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it onesresidence.75This was the main reason that the COMELEC relied upon for its conclusion.

Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling asshown by and examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the COMELECthereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a persons residence based solely on verypersonal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards thatcan be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence i.e., the dwelling where a person

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permanently intends to return to and to remain76 his or her capacity or inclination todecorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.

Examined further, the COMELECs reasoning is not only intensely subjective but also flimsy,to the point of grave abuse of discretion when compared with the surrounding indicatorsshowing the Mitra has indeed been physically present in Aborlan for the required period with

every intent to settle there. Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC majority (but not on theDissent) that Mitra made definite, although incremental transfer moves, as shown by theundisputed business interests he has established in Aborlan in 2008; by the lease of adwelling where he established his base; by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; byhis transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house allviewed against the backdrop of a bachelor Representative who spent most of his workinghours in Manila, who had a whole congressional district to take care of, and who wasestablishing at the same time his significant presence in the whole Province of Palawan.

From these perspectives, we cannot but conclude that the COMELECs approach i.e., theapplication of subjective non-legal standards and the gross misappreciation of the evidence

is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as the COMELEC used wrong considerations and

grossly misread the evidence in arriving at its conclusion. In using subjective standards, theCOMELEC committed an act not otherwise within the contemplation of law on an evidentiarypoint that served as a major basis for its conclusion in the case.

With this analysis and conclusion in mind, we come to the critical question of whether Mitradeliberately misrepresented that his residence is in Aborlan to deceive and mislead thepeople of the Province of Palawan.

We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knewof his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out. From the evidentiaryperspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts inMitras favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go belowthe level of an equipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitras evidence of transfer and residence in

Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that he remained a PuertoPrincesa City resident. Under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannotconclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about hisresidence.

The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case thatthe COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitrasfeedmill residence. For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyondan ordinary error of judgment. By failing to take into account whether there had been adeliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse ofsimply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a materialrepresentation. In this case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully

considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the periodrequired by Section 74 of the OEC.

The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of usingsubjective norms, as they now argue that given his stature as a member of the prominentMitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a smallroom in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.77

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We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned theCOMELECs use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot beconsidered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence,specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City tomake him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in early2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent

home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to thepremises he leased pending the completion of his house. These incremental moves do notoffend reason at all, in the way that the COMELECs highly subjective non-legal standardsdo.

Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that therespondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidenceof effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on thispoint in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basisto conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was amisrepresentation.

Mitra has significant relationship with, and intimate knowledge of, the constituency he wishesto serve.

Citing jurisprudence, we began this ponencia with a discussion of the purpose of theresidency requirement under the law. By law, this residency can be anywhere within theProvince of Palawan, except for Puerto Princesa City because of its reclassification as ahighly urbanized city. Thus, residency in Aborlan is completely consistent with the purpose ofthe law, as Mitra thereby declared and proved his required physical presence in the Provinceof Palawan.

We also consider that even before his transfer of residence, he already had intimateknowledge of the Province of Palawan, particularly of the whole 2nd legislative district that herepresented for three terms. For that matter, even the respondents themselves impliedly

acknowledged that the Mitras, as a family, have been identified with elective public serviceand politics in the Province of Palawan.78 This means to us that Mitra grew up in the politicsof Palawan.

We can reasonably conclude from all these that Mitra is not oblivious to the needs,difficulties, aspirations, potential for growth and development, and all matters vital to thecommon welfare of the constituency he intends to serve. Mitra who is no stranger to Palawanhas merely been compelled after serving three terms as representative of thecongressional district that includes Puerto Princesa City and Aborlan by legaldevelopments to transfer his residence to Aborlan to qualify as a Province of Palawan voter.To put it differently, were it not for the reclassification of Puerto Princesa City from acomponent city to a highly urbanized city, Mitra would not have encountered any legal

obstacle to his intended gubernatorial bid based on his knowledge of and sensitivity to theneeds of the Palawan electorate.

This case, incidentally, is not the first that we have encountered where a former electiveofficial had to transfer residence in order to continue his public service in another politicalunit that he could not legally access, as a candidate, without a change of residence.

In Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC,79 former Governor Vicente Y. Emano re-occupied a house heowned and had leased out in Cagayan de Oro City to qualify as a candidate for the post of

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Mayor of that city (like Puerto Princesa City, a highly urbanized city whose residents cannotvote for and be voted upon as elective provincial officials). We said in that case that

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent inCagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayorand for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic,

academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple,practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.

In Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe-Aguirre,80 we also had occasion to rule on the residency andright to vote of former Congressman Luis A. Asistio who had been a congressman forCaloocan in 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2004, and, in the words of the Decision, "is known to beamong the prominent political families in Caloocan City."81 We recognized Asistios positionthat a mistake had been committed in his residency statement, and concluded that themistake is not "proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he hasestablished residence outside of Caloocan City." By this recognition, we confirmed thatAsistio has not committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his COC.

These cases are to be distinguished from the case of Velasco v. COMELEC82

where theCOMELEC cancelled the COC of Velasco, a mayoralty candidate, on the basis of hisundisputed knowledge, at the time he filed his COC, that his inclusion and registration as avoter had been denied. His failure to register as a voter was a material fact that he hadclearly withheld from the COMELEC; he knew of the denial of his application to register andyet concealed his non-voter status when he filed his COC. Thus, we affirmed theCOMELECs action in cancelling his COC.

If there is any similarity at all in Velasco and the present case, that similarity is in therecognition in both cases of the rule of law. In Velasco, we recognized based on the law that a basic defect existed prior to his candidacy, leading to his disqualification and the vice-mayor-elects assumption to the office. In the present case, we recognize the validity ofMitras COC, again on the basis of substantive and procedural law, and no occasion arises

for the vice-governor-elect to assume the gubernatorial post.

Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate ofthe electorate to serve

We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressedthrough the ballot must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must beinterpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.83 Thus, we have held that whileprovisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an establishedrule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions, requiring certainsteps before elections, will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to thewill of the people.84

Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified reading andapplication of this ruling, as it may carry dangerous significance to the rule of law and theintegrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a wayaround the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing theelectorate with the basic information for an informed choice about a candidates eligibility andfitness for office.85Short of adopting a clear cut standard, we thus made the followingclarification:

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We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by theclarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve materialmisrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatoryrequirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall havespoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of thepeople in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made,

thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault onthe will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice betweenprovisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of theelectorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choosethe electorate will.861avvphi1

Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC87provided the following test:

[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will inorder to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of areversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve theissues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound

public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority.To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearlydemonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legalprinciples that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of thepeople would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and

juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. [Emphasissupplied.]

With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, wesee no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will. We cannot deny,however, that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residencyqualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about theirverdict on Mitras qualifications.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and ANNUL theassailed COMELEC Resolutions in Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. v.Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (SPA No. 09-038 [C]). We DENY the respondents petition to cancelAbraham Kahlil Mitras Certificate of Candidacy. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DECASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that theconclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case wasassigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

G.R. No. 105436 June 2, 1994

EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY, MEDINA,MELENCIO CASTELO and GODOFREDO LIBAN, petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

Eugene V. Jurilla in his behalf and other petitioners.

Leonardo B. Palicte III for private-respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA,MELENCIO CASTELO, GODOFREDO LIBAN and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ were amongthe candidates in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections for the six (6) positions ofcouncilor for the Second District of Quezon City.

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On 23 March 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission onElections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats. In Item No. 6 of hiscertificate he gave as his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City." However,he did not indicate on the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and theparticular Barangay where he was a registered voter. 1His biodata submitted together withhis certificate of candidacy gave his address as "Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon

City,"2

which is part of the Fourth District of Quezon City.3

In other words, his certificate ofcandidacy and his biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly state that he was aregistered voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof withinthe purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides:

Sec. 39. Qualifications (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of thePhilippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or provinceor, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniangpanglunsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to beelected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding theday of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other locallanguage or dialect.

In view of the seeming deficiency in the certificate of candidacy of private respondent,petitioners herein challenged his qualification before public respondent COMELECexplaining however that since they became aware of the grounds for private respondentsqualification only after the elections, they chose to file their petition under Rule 25 of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at any day after the lastday for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. 4

On 2 June 1992, COMELEC promulgated its questioned resolution denying the petition fordisqualification for being filed outside the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA 6646,which pertains to nuisance candidates. 5Hence the instant petition forcertiorariimputinggrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC inissuing the assailed resolution of 2 June 1992.

It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must statein his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered.Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where heintends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office.

In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Numberis satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yetassigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He wasformerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the electionshe was already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second

District of Quezon City.

In his Petition for Inclusion in the Registry of Registered Voters of Second District, QuezonCity, private respondent explained that

. . . since 1990, he is a resident of Block 26, Lot 1, New Capitol Estates (formerlyCapitol Bliss), Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City; that he failed to register asa voter during the general registration held at Quezon City on March 14 and 15,1992 because he was sick of Acute Gastroenteritis as evidenced by the Medical

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While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise that private respondentHernandez should be treated as a "nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless itsconclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the candidacy of privaterespondent he being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, BarangayBatasan Hills, must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondentCommission on Elections in issuing its questioned resolution of 2 June 1992, the instantpetition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo,