EISS 2011 Washington Final Report
-
Upload
salesgroup-international -
Category
Documents
-
view
215 -
download
1
description
Transcript of EISS 2011 Washington Final Report
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
April 11-12, 2011
The Capitol Building, US Congress,
and the Fairmont, Washington D.C.
EISS U M M I T
ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY SUMMIT
Washington DC
SUMMARYREPORT
II
3
ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY SUMMIT - WASHINGTON D.C.
REPORT: THE SECOND ANNUAL WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY SUMMIT
On Monday and Tuesday, April 11-12, 2011, the 2nd Electric
Infrastructure Security (EIS) Summit took place in the U.S.
Capitol Building and the Fairmont Washington D.C.
Government representatives of twenty four nations took
part in the briefings and deliberations, with representation
from North and South America, Europe, the Middle East and
Asia.
Following the inaugural EIS Summit in London in 2010,
this new government / NGO partnership has become an
effective framework, both within the U.S. government
and internationally, for cooperation and coordination in
addressing severe electromagnetic risks to critical national
infrastructures.
4
Mission
EISS Washington D.C. was focused on enhancing communication
and coordination among energy sector stakeholders: concerned
U.S. government departments and agencies, allied governments and
international corporate leaders. Given the remarkably large field of critical
players in the energy marketplace in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere, the
EIS Summit process is designed to help foster the mix of education,
collaboration and public and private partnerships that will be essential
to protect our critical infrastructures, and assure societal health and
continuity.
Conclusion
As in the founding summit in London in 2010, a common theme expressed
by many speakers was the importance of international coordination in
addressing severe electromagnetic threats. In EISS Washington D.C.
this theme was expanded, with a special focus on bringing together the
many concerned U.S. government organizations. The summit included
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Defense, the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Energy, senior management
from FERC, the Director of NOAA, members of Congress and many other
organizations. U.S. government representatives joined their international
counterparts in pointing to the importance of the EIS Summit process as
a critical forum to help support national and international efforts toward
providing critical infrastructure protection against electromagnetic
threats.
5
EIS Summit PresentationsEISS Washington D.C. was co-chaired by U.S. Congressman
Trent Franks and U.S. Congresswoman Yvette Clarke and the Rt.
Hon. James Arbuthnot MP, Chair of the U.K. House of Commons
Defence Select Committee. Senator Jon Kyl and Congressman
Dan Lungren were Honorary Co-Chairs.
Congressman Franks opened the summit, referring to the unique
gathering of senior international government and corporate
delegates as a historic moment. He called on the delegates “to
put aside any differences we have on other issues,” to “make a
critical difference … to the national security of the United States
of America, to your own home countries, and indeed to the
peace and security of the entire human family.”
While ubiquitous, instantly available power has brought our
societies an unprecedented standard of living, “we have also
grown profoundly dependent upon electricity,” he said, and “we
now find among our strengths an unsettling vulnerability.”
“Here’s the grim truth,” he said, quoting Brink Lindsey. “We
are only one act of madness away from a social cataclysm
unlike anything our country has ever known.” Referring to his
membership on the Congressional Strategic Forces Committee,
the Congressman explained that, of all the threat briefings he
receives, the threat of nuclear EMP “is the one that frightens me
the most.”
“The first purpose of any government,” Congressman Franks
continued, “is to ensure and protect the lives and constitutional
rights of its citizens. If we fail that test, then it doesn’t really matter
what else we do right.” Congressman Franks went on to outline
his sponsorship of the Shield Act, intended to encourage electric
grid protection against natural and malicious EMP threats.
6
Morning Keynote Speakers: The United States Department of Defense and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency
EISS Summit delegates were addressed in the morning
Keynote Session by Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Paul
Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense Sharon Burke, Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense Dorothy Robyn, and DoD Principal
Deputy General Counsel Bob Taylor, and by Dr. Jane Lubchenco,
Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and
Director of NOAA.
“The Department of Defense,” Assistant Secretary
Stockton explained, “depends for 99% of our electric
power on the private sector. We’re utterly dependent on
the flow of this electric power to be able to execute our core
responsibilities to the nation, and yet in the Department of
Defense, we don’t own the electric power generation.” This
situation creates, Dr. Stockton explained, a
serious vulnerability. “Long-term outages
of electricity for the Department of Defense
would not only disrupt our ability to conduct
operations abroad, severely disrupt them,
but we would be in a different world here at
home.”
With long term outages due to natural
causes or an EMP weapon, Dr. Stockton
said “we would be facing a public safety, a
public health environment, a requirement to
provide support to our citizens that would be
unprecedented.” The most immediate societal crisis, in his view,
would be water. “When you lose electricity for a long-term power
outage,” he pointed out, “the first thing that you’re going to lose
is municipal water systems around the nation.”
For the Pentagon, Assistant Secretary Stockton explained, the
key will be to “partner with Congress,” to work together with
all the responsible government agencies and, especially, to
“work very, very closely” with the private sector.” The Assistant
Secretary made it clear that, while this subject is mission critical,
DoD understands it is a complex problem. “As we move forward
to address these very serious challenges,” he said, “ … to be
candid, we’re not far along.”
These thoughts were amplified by the other senior DoD speakers.
Deputy Undersecretary Dorothy Robyn, agreeing that “the
security of the grid, is a real concern to the Department of
Defense,” called for active involvement of the Pentagon in helping
partner with other government agencies and departments to
resolve this vulnerability. “I think we can be a significant part of
the solution,” she explained.
Session 1
“We would be facing a public safety, a public health environment, a requirement to provide support to our citizens that would be unprecedented.”
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton
7
Assistant Secretary Sharon Burke, focusing on today’s reality
– with all critical societal infrastructures tied together in a common
vulnerability – spoke of the need for resilience in these systems. “We
have to be able to build resilience from the ground up,” she told the
delegates, “from the little things that don’t sound like they’re important
but that can make all the difference, to having … a military operational
capability that can function and that’s safe from day-to-day.” Resilience
and continuity of operations, she continued, must start “in the day-to-
day business of our bases and go all the way up to the greatest threat
level.”
Principal Deputy General Counsel Bob Taylor focused on the
need to broaden awareness of the issue. “One very important role
for the Department of Defense is to help articulate how we would be
affected.” This issue, he said, “is critically important … to national
security, but also critically important to day-to-day life. As Dr. Stockton
indicated, an outage of the grid would have enormous real-world
consequences,” making life “virtually unsustainable for a large part of
the American people.” Echoing a reference by Congressman Franks
to his children, Mr. Taylor focused on his own children. “I look to their
future with passion and concern. And I think we all owe it to the future
and to our own generation as well to address this problem forthrightly
and with great commitment and understanding of the role of science,
but also understanding the critical role of the private sector.”
“Government and the private sector together must address this
problem. Promptly,” he concluded.
NOAA Director and Undersecretary of Commerce Dr. Jane
Lubchenco brought a space weather perspective to the morning
keynote session. “In just ten years,” she pointed out, looking back
to the previous peak in the twelve year solar cycle, ”the world has
changed dramatically. And it has become significantly more vulnerable
to disruption by the Sun’s moods.”
“Severe geomagnetic storms can result
in global impact that will require a global
response,” she said. Referring to a recent
letter in the New York Times authored by
the Science Advisors of the U.S. President
and the U.K. Prime Minister, she highlighted
their recommendation that the two nations
“undertake tangible and substantive steps to
anticipate space weather storms; to develop
mitigation strategies to protect our critical
infrastructure; and to ensure that the power
grid and other essential assets will weather
and recover quickly from the next major space
weather storm.”
“I believe,” the Undersecretary concluded,
“that a significant space weather storm is not a matter of if, but of
when.”
“In just ten years the world has changed dramatically. And it has become significantly more vulnerable to disruption by the Sun’s moods.”
Dr. Jane Lubchenco, NOAA Director, Undersecretary of Commerce
8
Problem and Impact – Severe Space Weather and EMPCongresswoman Yvette Clarke opened the second
session of the summit, covering a wide range of subjects
in her comments. A Co-Chair of the EIS Summit, she began
her remarks with a reference to last-year’s Congressional
Hearings on these threats. As then-chair of the Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats, Cyber Security, Science and Technology
(Homeland Security Committee), Rep. Clarke recalled that
“members of the committee, particularly
Mr. Lungren and I, were very alarmed
by what the witnesses told us; we as
a nation have virtually no protection of
our electric grid against electromagnetic
threats, and very little against cyber
attacks.” “Protecting the electric grid
from EMP,” she continued, “will require
the best efforts of both government and
industry.”
“The likelihood of a geomagnetic event
capable of crippling our electric grid is
one hundred percent,” Congresswoman
Clarke explained. “Electromagnetic
weapons such as an intense microwave
and radiofrequency devices are both
commercially available and easy to
construct. Rogue states continue to try
to develop nuclear weapons which could
be used to generate electromagnetic
pulses. To protect our civil societies
in the face of these mounting threats
requires the hardening of our grids, and
we have to do it now.” She concluded:
“The consequences of such an event
could literally alter, disrupt, or destroy our
current societies.”
Addressing the need for grid protection,
the Congresswoman told the delegates
“time is not on our side,” and went on to
express her concern that, with current
efforts limited to “a relatively slow-moving consensus process,”
these efforts “may still be working at trying to decide if solar
storms pose a threat when the next one hits us.”
Rep. Clarke also gave the delegates an overview of the most
recent U.S. government activity in this area, including the recently
published severe space weather article by the White House and
“We as a nation have virtually no protection of our electric grid against electromagnetic threats.”
Rep. Yvette Clarke
“The likelihood of a geomagnetic event capable of crippling our electric grid is one hundred percent.”
“Electromagnetic weapons … are both commercially available and easy to construct. Rogue states continue to try to develop nuclear weapons which could be used to generate electromagnetic pulses.”
“The consequences of such an event could literally alter, disrupt, or destroy our current societies.”
“To protect our civil societies in the face of these mounting threats requires the hardening of our grids, and we have to do it now.” Rep. Yvette Clarke
Session II
9
U.K. Science Advisors, the 2010 electromagnetic threat study
the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy,
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and her current
efforts in Congress as co-sponsor of the Shield Act, designed to
provide regulatory authority to address these threats.
Rep. Clarke also spoke briefly about electric grid protection.
The Congressional EMP Commission, she said, “estimates
that equipment available today could protect high voltage
transformers in the U.S., the elements of the grid most vulnerable
to GIC for an estimated investment of only seventy-five to one-
hundred and fifty million dollars. That commission also estimated
that very robust protection of the grid, including transformers
but also generators, … control equipment, grid islanding and
simulation and training could be accomplished for $800 million
to $1.5 billion.
Mikael Odenberg, CEO of the National Electric Grid and
former Defense Minister of Sweden, concluded the
introduction to the “Problems and Impacts” Session.
“From a Swedish perspective, this international outreach is
extremely important. Homeland security or societal security,
which is a more European term, calls for international and …
Trans-Atlantic cooperation,“ he said. And speaking of priorities,
“to my mind, there are few emergency scenarios today that
require such a gross cooperation as this, which are threatening
our electric infrastructure: large serious space weather situation,
and electromagnetic pulse.”
Mr. Odenberg also offered the delegates some historical
perspective.
“Actually forty years ago, EMP -- nuclear induced EMP was a
concern, for example in our defense planning.”
“It is by the way a bit interesting that we are discussing EMP,
nuclear induced EMPs and we are discussing space weather
and geomagnetic storms as if this phenomenon were new.
EMP has been known since 1945, common knowledge since
the 1950s. And we had a severe geomagnetic storm hit in the
northern hemisphere 150 years ago, where you could see the
Northern Lights, the Aurora Borealis in Florida.”
“So the new thing,” Mr. Odenberg concluded, “is not the EMP.
The new thing is not the space weather. The new thing is the
vulnerability of modern society. The cause of outages is basically
irrelevant. We are heavily dependent on electricity and without
“The United States and Europe are interconnected in many ways, and … therefore we need to set ambitious goals for cooperation.”
Mikael Odenberg, CEO of the National Electric Grid and former Defense Minister, Sweden
10
electricity modern society collapses.”
In regard to consequences, Mr. Odenberg said, “Our basic infrastructure
can be totally wiped out with blackouts over huge areas and regions
in Europe and Northern America. And … the power grid recovery
process would be very complex, very difficult, and above all very lengthy
… months, perhaps years without electric power. And that will make
in the modern society urban life impossible … There would be no
supply of drinking water, no food, no gasoline, no transportation, no
communication, no medical care, financial transactions.”
Mikael Odenberg concluded with a call for practical measures
for international cooperation. “The United States and Europe are
interconnected in many ways, and …
therefore we need to set ambitious goals for
cooperation in the area of societal security
and also in the field of security research.”
“It is vital for protecting critical infrastructure
and key resources,” he continued, “that
we build and maintain trusted networks for
information sharing...”
“We have to work collaboratively on
improving protection and resiliency of critical
infrastructure. We also need to boost training
both on the national level but also [international]
joint training and education, including different
exercises. Forging operational ties requires
insights into how our differences interact …
In the event of a major geomagnetic storm to
Earth, I can promise you everyone that will be
hit will need assistance.
“So we need to work closely with responsible infrastructure providers
to develop resilience and prevention strategies against the risks posed
by space weather and EMPs. I think decision makers and stakeholders
have to be aware both of the potential threats to our infrastructure and
of the need for international collaboration and co-creation to beat those
threats.
“The new thing is not the EMP. The new thing is not the space weather. The new thing is the vulnerability of modern society.”
“Our basic infrastructure can be totally wiped out with blackouts over huge areas and regions in Europe and Northern America.”
Mikael Odenberg, CEO of the National Electric Grid and former Defense Minister, Sweden
11
Severe Space Weather: Understanding the Global Threat
The Severe Space Weather Panel began with a presentation
by Dr. Daniel Baker. As Chair of the NASA National Academy
of Sciences Severe Space Weather Study, Dr. Baker provided
insights into the report authored by the NASA / NAS study.
“We live,’ Dr. Baker, explained, “in the outer atmosphere of a highly
variable magnetic star… capable of producing huge outbursts of
energy. … when such clouds interact with the Earth’s protective
magnetic cocoon, these disturbances can lead to … powerful
auroral displays and huge geomagnetically induced currents.”
“I think it’s important to remember that our society is a complex
cyber-electric cocoon. We have the electrical power grid, we
have the communications systems, we have the satellites in orbit
around the Earth. All of these are interdependent and all of them
are vulnerable to the effects of space weather.” In particular, he
said, “the grid is becoming increasingly vulnerable to [a] space
weather event.”
To give these concerns a real-world context, Dr. Baker discussed
a dramatic geomagnetic storm that took place 150 years ago.
“In 1859, a very powerful storm was witnessed by British
astronomer Richard Carrington. … Fires broke out in telegraph
stations ... auroras were seen as far south as Cuba.” And it is
important to realize, he said, that “the Carrington event occurred
during a relatively modest sunspot maximum.”
“A storm of this magnitude,” he said, “… can knock out hundreds
of high -- extremely high voltage transformers, … [and] the
impacts of space weather on the electric power grid in particular
could be truly devastating.”
Joining Dr. Baker on the panel was John Kappenman,
Principal Investigator on the NAS Severe Space Weather
Study and the U.S. Congress EMP Commission.
Echoing Dr. Baker’s observations, Kappenman explained,
“something that could come really from just one violent active
region on the Sun can cause essentially continent wide, perhaps
even planetary scale impacts to our critical infrastructure.”
“We ran simulated scenarios on today’s power grid for a repeat
of storms like the Carrington event, like the 1921 storm event
and so forth, things that are probable within a one-in-thirty to
one-in-hundred year sort of scenario …. And you see we can be
looking at blackouts of unprecedented scale.”
Session IIPANEL
“Our society is a complex cyber-electric cocoon. We have the electrical power grid, we have the communications systems, we have the satellites in orbit around the Earth. All … are vulnerable to the effects of space weather.”
-Dr. Daniel Baker, Chair, NASA / NAS Severe Space Weather Study
12
John Kappenman also addressed the question, “how did we
get into this scenario?” One of the problems,” he explained,
“was that we did not really understand the extremes of the
environment. …. And if you take away electric power, virtually
every other critical infrastructure will either fail immediately or
within a matter of a few days after the loss of that electric power
… This is something that literally could put the lives of millions of
people at risk, could impact future generations of our society.”
“[In] the March 1989 geomagnetic storm,” following the province-
wide blackout in Quebec, “… we probably came very close to an
event that could have precipitated a blackout that would have
extended from ... the New England area, clear across to the
Pacific Northwest.” He went on to explain that, as an example,
the 1921 event is estimated at about
ten times the magnitude of this dramatic
1989 storm.
“We’ve also learned in the last decade,”
he said, “that it’s not just power grids at
high latitudes that need to be concerned
about this.” Depending on the magnitude
of an event, problems could also occur
at equatorial latitudes. “For example,”
he explained, “we measured very large
currents in southern Japan in the October
2003 storm. South Africa experienced
fifteen large high-voltage transformers
that failed during that October 2003
storm.”
Discussing the range of risks to key grid assets, John Kappenman
said that nuclear power plants are at particular risk. These plants
“have very large transformers, they have low resistance, … and
they have much higher exposure to geomagnetic storms than
most of the other transformers in the power grid. So that makes
them more vulnerable to damage and failure…” In terms of
risk due to nuclear EMP, “There are also things going on within
the nuclear plants that arguably make them more vulnerable to
EMP,” Kappenman said.
In summary, Mr. Kappenman said, “I think what we have to
understand is that we’ve had about a half century long failure to
understand the risk of space weather and especially how this risk
has inadvertently migrated into the electric grid infrastructures.”
“Something that could come really from just one violent active region on the Sun can cause essentially continent wide, perhaps even planetary scale impacts to our critical infrastructure.”
John Kappenman, Principal Investigator, NAS Severe Space Weather Study and U.S. Congress EMP Commission.
”We’ve had about a half century long failure to understand the risk of space weather and especially how this risk has inadvertently migrated into the electric grid infrastructures.”
John Kappenman, Principal Investigator, NAS Severe Space Weather Study and U.S. Congress EMP Commission.
13
Session Two concluded with a panel - EMP: Threat and
Impact - EMP Commission Perspective.
Dr. Robert Hermann, one of the Commissioners on the EMP
Commission, began by summarizing the commission’s
mandate from Congress: “The duties of the commission,”
he said, “were to assess the EMP threat to the United States;
the nature and magnitude of EMP threats within the next 15
years from all potentially hostile states or non-state actors;
assess the vulnerability of U.S. military and especially civilian
systems; the capability of the U.S. to repair and recover from
damage to military and civilian systems; the feasibility and cost
of EMP hardening select military and select civilian systems; and
represent protection steps that the U.S. should take. And we did
more or less all of that.”
Summarizing the Commission’s
conclusions briefly, he said, “… an
important point for this commission was
EMP is one of a small number of threats
that could hold at risk the continued
existence of U.S. civil society and can
disrupt our military forces and our ability
to project military power.”
Dr. Hermann also addressed the impact
of the changing geopolitical reality. “The
number of U.S. adversaries capable of
EMP attack is greater than during the
Cold War,” he said, pointing out that, as
opposed to the bi-polar political world
of the past, in today’s and tomorrow’s
world we have many possible enemies.
“Potential adversaries are quite aware of EMP as a strategic
weapon,” he continued, “and we think that neither the military or
civil structure is effectively dealing with the problem.”
Having concluded that EMP is “one of a handful of threats that
could be considered an existential threat to the United States,” the
commission was then asked to address the question of whether
an EMP event was likely. “In our judgment,” Dr. Hermann said,
“it was not a sensible question to ask, because how likely it was
depended a lot on what we did about it. I mean, if we actually
announced to the world we had a lethal flaw in our system, which
we were not going to do anything about, which could be easily
attacked by a … cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs, then
we’re inviting such a cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs.”
Concluding, Dr. Hermann offered an opinion on the best path
forward. Securing the national grid against electromagnetic
threats will require establishing “an accountable, responsible,
authorized authority to control and maintain that part of the
activity which you wish to secure,” he said.
“EMP is one of a small number of threats that could hold at risk the continued existence of U.S. civil society.“
Dr. Robert Hermann, Commissioner, U.S. Congress EMP Commission
“… if we actually announced to the world we had a lethal flaw in our system, which we were not going to do anything about, which could be easily attacked by a cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs, then we’re inviting such a cheap shot from a bunch of amateurs.”
Dr. Robert Hermann, Commissioner, U.S. Congress EMP Commission
14
Historically, John Kappenman pointed out, speaking on the EMP
Commission panel, investing in grid protection is not a new
subject. In addressing common threats, “the investment … the electric
power industry has made truly extends into billions of dollars” he said.
By contrast, with little experience with geomagnetic storms and virtually
none with EMP, the electric power industry today does not have hardware
or procedural protection to address severe events which “can literally be
planetary scale effects, and impact multiple transformers and portions of
the power grid all at the same time.”
However, there are important opportunities for synergistic protection
in this area, John Kappenman explained. Hardening the power grid
against geomagnetic storms “also provides protection
against the slow pulse or E-3 portion of an EMP
attack.” Similarly, hardening against the fast pulse of
EMP “helps diminish the threat from radio frequency
weapon attacks or the IEMI class,” protecting against
a range of non-nuclear EMP threats.
What are the options for protection?
“Methods for hardening infrastructures are known and
readily available. We do not see this any longer as being
a technology push,” Kappenman said. Approaches
include:
• GIC current blockers for transformer protection
• “Improved situational awareness” for non-grid
users to enable temporary off-grid operation, and
• A range of options for electronic protection against the fast (E1)
pulse of nuclear or non-nuclear EMP
In this latter case, for EMP “E1” pulse protection, a mix of old and new
technologies can provide a complete menu. Commercial companies
are already “providing consulting, guidelines, materials, and systems”
for protection of control and data lines. In other areas, such as shielding
electric power feeds, recent technology breakthroughs enable high
quality protection at modest cost. In some cases the natural upgrade
process, such as migration to fiber-optics data and control cables, offers
free protection against the full set of threats.
“Methods for hardening infrastructures are known and readily available. We do not see this any longer as being a technology push.”
John Kappenman, Principal Investigator, NAS Severe Space Weather Study and U.S. Congress EMP Commission.
15
Dr. Pry summarized the work of the Congressional EMP
Commission which he supported. “The commission,” he
explained, “had the power and had the support of all departments
and agencies of the United States,” including “the Department
of Defense, intelligence communities, the national laboratories,”
and also reached out to the private sector and industry. The
Commission looked at, for example, a nuclear explosion over
Cleveland Ohio, which could trigger power grid failures across
the entire eastern seaboard. “Our prediction was that the eastern
power grid from Canada to Florida would go down and not be
recoverable for months.”
The Congressional Commission’s conclusions?
After eight years of hearings, laboratory tests and analysis,
“the commission estimated that two-thirds to ninety percent of
the American people would perish in the aftermath of an EMP
attack.”
The commission concluded, Dr. Pry told the delegates, that “while
it is a technological Achilles heel if we don’t do anything about it,
… we know how to fix the problem.” He went on to explain that
technology is not the problem, following fifty years of Pentagon
investment in developing technologies to protect against EMP.
“Nor,” he continued, “is it that expensive.” Bounding the cost,
he said that at minimum, the 300 most important high voltage
transformers in the United States could be protected for as little
as $100 to $200 million, while on the high end, the commission
had projected that $10 to $20 billion invested over three to five
years would provide “robust protection.”
Dr. Pry also addressed the slow pace of implementing measures
to address this problem. “The real Achilles heel,” he said, both
nationally and internationally, is “bureaucratic and institutional.
The problem with EMP is that it cuts across so many segments
of society, it affects everything. And there is no one institution
responsible.”
“The commission estimated that two-thirds to ninety percent of the American people would perish in the aftermath of an EMP attack.”
Dr. Peter Pry, Senior Staff, Congressional EMP Commission
16
DOE and DHS perspectives on electromagnetic threats and energy and infrastructure policy.
Bruce Held, Director of the DOE Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, spoke of the strategic risk of nuclear
EMP. “We’ve known about the threat of electromagnetic pulse
to our critical infrastructure for many, many years, since the Cold
War,” he said. After the Cold War, “there was a general feeling that
this problem has gone away. That is a big mistake. The problem
is still very much here. Indeed, the
problem may be even greater today than
it was during the Cold War because we
are much more reliant on IT infrastructure,
for all aspects of our economy and our
economic wellbeing.”
Mr. Held defined three different EMP
threat scenarios, each with different areas
of concern.
“On terrorists – If they get their hands
on a nuclear weapon we must expect
that they will use it to kill members of our
community. We must deny them this
capability.”
“It’s going to be much more difficult for us to deny rogue states
the capability of nuclear weapons,” he continued, “but as hard as
it may be that is the best and first line of defense. We must keep
at that. A nuclear armed Iran will not be good for us …”
The risk of EMP from great powers is, he added, “in some ways
more complicated and some ways simpler. The capability is
there. It exists. It has existed for a long period of time.” Here, he
went on, “we have to really work on the intent side. Thankfully
our ability to work in a cooperative basis with some potential
peer adversaries, great power adversaries is greater today than
it was during the Cold War. “
“At the same time,” he cautioned, “the same steps that we
are taking to defend our critical infrastructure … to reduce the
gain and increase the consequence, the same theory the same
practice has to be applied to potential peer adversaries as well.”
Some of the discipline this implies has been lost since the cold
war, Held asserted. “We have to kind of re-instill that discipline
and I think the work of the Congressman has been great in
instilling that leadership.”
“The threat from an EMP attack is massive.”
Bruce Held, Director, DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Session III
“From a DOE perspective I would like to underscore the importance the Department of Energy places on a public/private partnership in addressing this threat at this time.”
Bruce Held, Director, DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
17
“The threat from an EMP attack is massive,” he concluded. “From
a DOE perspective I would like to underscore the importance the
Department of Energy places on a public/private partnership in
addressing this threat at this time. Neither the public sector nor
the private sector can do this on its own. We have to help each
other.”
DHS Assistant Secretary Douglas Smith opened his
remarks by outlining DHS’s concern, and summarizing
the challenges offered by severe space weather. About
60 years after the severe 1859 geomagnetic storm took place,
he said, “on May sixteenth, 1921, the great storm [took place]
which disrupted telegraph service, caused fires, and burned
out cables. These [geomagnetic] storms will occur every 100
years.” Our technology-dependent society is exposed to unique
new risks, and today, “our major threats do not necessarily derive
from the militaries of other nations.”
“Our electrical infrastructure is the backbone of the way we all
do business. Major disruptions are totally unacceptable and
need to be mitigated,” he said. How should such concerns be
addressed?
“DHS believes firmly in the shared responsibilities to handle these
issues,” he continued. “DHS’s responsibility to protect the nation’s
critical infrastructure was established in 2002 by the National
Strategy for Homeland Security and Homeland Security Act.”
However, he continued, “we have a long tradition in our country of
creating problem-solving partnerships between the government
and the private sector.” In this case, “the vast majority of this
critical infrastructure of the United States is privately owned and
operated, making public/private partnerships essential to protect
and boost the resilience of critical infrastructure and respond to
catastrophic events.”
“Our electrical infrastructure is the backbone of the way we all do business. Major disruptions are totally unacceptable”
DHS Assistant Secretary Douglas Smith
18
The Cause – Solar statistics, terrorists and rogue states, and the government challenge: Imagining the Unimaginable
The Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP chaired Session IV, exploring
the causes of malicious and natural EMP, and the challenges
they present to infrastructure protection.
Addressing the political challenges, James Arbuthnot
began by pointing out that, unfortunately, our critical
infrastructures today have little protection, and awareness
of this threat is minimal. This, he explained, defines the
challenge. “The extraordinary thing,” he said, “is that almost
nobody knows about it. You know about it. A few geeks out
there know about it. Wikipedia knows about it. The Iranian
leadership knows about it. But if you go to the British Ministry
of Defense or really parts of the Department of Defense here,
and you talk about an electromagnetic
pulse or solar flares, and if you say that
sort of thing to any man in any street in
virtually any country in the world, a blank
look will come across their faces, and it will
be somebody else’s department.”
This means education will be essential.
“What we’ve got to do is to bring to the
attention of the world what is potentially
the greatest catastrophe to have hit the
world for centuries,” he said. And this education process will be
complex. Public opinion, he pointed out, is cynical. “The world
believes something only if it is backed up by the very clearest
evidence and often it doesn’t believe it even then.”
The key difficulty however, he continued, is the remarkable
breadth of impact of this risk. This threat, he said, “cuts across
so many departmental responsibilities that actually it has become
the responsibility of nobody.”
His conclusion: “One of the most serious risks we face in the
issue of electric infrastructure [e-threat vulnerability] is that
nobody knows about it. And until this is a matter of common
discussion, in each of our countries, in the offices of those who
deal with our electricity supplies, with our hospitals, with our
water supply, with our financial transactions, with our transport
systems, with our communication systems, we shall still have
work to do. So let’s get to it.”
“What we’ve got to do is to bring to the attention of the world what is potentially the greatest catastrophe to have hit the world for centuries.”
Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP, Chair, U.K. Defence Select Committee
Session IV
“[EMP] cuts across so many departmental responsibilities that actually it has become the responsibility of nobody.”
Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP, Chair, U.K. Defence Select Committee
19
Addressing the subject of Session IV, “The Cause – Solar
statistics, terrorists and rogue states, and the government
challenge: Imagining the Unimaginable,” the panel continued
its discussions after the comments of EIS Summit Co-Chair
and Session Chair, Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot MP. The
second speaker, Congressman Dan Lungren, also a co-chair
of the summit, continued to focus on the specific panel topic,
“Understanding the Challenge.”
Congressman Dan Lungren, a member of the House
Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees, pointed
out the security implications of natural and malicious
electromagnetic threats to our critical infrastructures,
including the risk of an EMP strike by terrorists or a rogue
nation.
Addressing the legislative challenge, the congressman
characterized the e-threat as “one of the most
serious challenges facing this nation and facing this world.”
“I do not despair of leadership,” he said, referring to the
need for government and industry leadership in addressing
electromagnetic threats to vital infrastructures. However, while
EIS Summit delegates understand the problem, he continued,
echoing James Arbuthnot, “99.9% of the people do not. And so
we have a tremendous educational campaign to be engaged in.”
The Congressman felt it would be important to find a way to
effectively communicate the challenge, in a context that would
lead to positive action, and not to confusion or paralysis. “We do
need to find a language that makes it possible for us to reach the
public,” he said, “so that they on the one hand
will understand the urgency of the matter; on the other hand will
not be so overwhelmed that they are frozen or they are paralyzed
by the threat.”
20
Dr. Thomas J. Bogdan, Director of the Space Weather
Prediction Center of NOAA’s National Weather Service,
provided a more detailed look at severe space weather
and its impact. Everything we depend on, he said, for our
security, our lives and our livelihood, can be impacted by a severe
geomagnetic storm.
“Think of it,” he suggested, “as a hurricane
in space.” When that storm impacts our
magnetosphere, changes in the earth’s
magnetic field induce powerful currents
in the ground that are “picked up by giant
antennae such as the power grid.”
What is the probability of a catastrophic
storm? “The chance of it happening in our
children’s lifetimes … is not a bet I would
like to take,” Dr. Bogdan asserted. “As Dr.
Lubchenco said earlier, it’s not a question of
if, but it’s a question of when.”
Dr. Bogdan also provided some historical
context. “What has the Sun been capable
of doing? I list here a series of extreme solar
storms that date back to the 1859 event.”
He referred, for example, to the Easter Sunday storm in 1940,
“when a million messages were unable to make their way for
Easter greetings because of space weather. No,” he concluded,
“space weather is not new. It has been out there, but the impacts
of not being able to get an Easter message, and the impacts of
being without power for an extended period of time are very, very
different.”
The final speaker of the panel was Curtis Birnbach,
President and Chief Technology Officer of Advanced
Fusion Systems, and a noted expert in
high power electric systems. “Today,”
he began, “I’m going to talk about the non-
nuclear approach [to EMP].” He started
by describing a non-nuclear EMP weapon
he built into a van, from conventional
components acquired at retail stores. “This
is a device I built a couple of years ago.
This is an EMP level source. We tested
this in conjunction with the US army on a
government range because it’s obviously
too dangerous to test in my garage where I
built it. I built this for a trifling sum of money
… and the pulses from this unit blew right through the wall of the
test chamber.”
“Think of it as a hurricane in space. The chance of it happening in our children’s lifetimes … is not a bet I would like to take.”
“As Dr. Lubchenco said earlier, it’s not a question of if, but it’s a question of when.”
Dr. Thomas J. Bogdan, Director, NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center
That [range],” he said, “is large enough that you can really do a lot of damage and in a coordinated attack you could do extraordinary amounts of damage.
Curtis Birnbach, President and Chief Technology Officer of Advanced Fusion Systems
21
“The footprint of a non-nuclear EMP event,” he continued, “is
of necessity smaller,” referring to an area of influence measured
in miles or tens of miles, rather than the thousands of miles
typically quoted for the range of nuclear devices. “That [range],”
he said, “is large enough that you can really do a lot of damage
and in a coordinated attack you could do extraordinary amounts
of damage.” He concluded his presentation by discussing
different approaches for protection of transformers and sensitive
electronics against these threats.
Note: Dr. Peter Pry, Senior Staff for the EMP Commission,
commented later in the afternoon on this subject. “Non-nuclear
EMP [also known as radio frequency or RF weapons] weapons
are also actually used in the real world right now,” he said. “On
the ninth of March the U.S. and South Korean forces were
conducting a joint exercise. The North Koreans used a Russian
purchased radio frequency weapon to attack communications
and blackout communications in three South Korean cities.”
The fifth PANEL, “Rogue States and Trans-National Terror
Groups: Current and Future Threat vs Vulnerability,”
focused on the political history and future risks of an EMP
strike.
The first speaker was the Rt. Hon. Dr. Kim Howells,
former Chair, United Nations
Security Council; Former Chair,
UK Intelligence and Security
Committee; and Former Minister,
Counter Terrorism and Counter-
Proliferation, United Kingdom. Dr.
Howells, having spent most of his career
tracking trans-national terror groups
and other dangerous groups for the
United Kingdom, illustrated the ease
with which our most delicate and critical
infrastructures can be compromised.
Based on his own experience, Dr.
Howells said, a small group of intelligent,
highly motivated but otherwise ordinary
people were able to “figure out ways
that, without explosives,” the 400 kV
transmission lines across the UK could
be sabotaged.
Decades ago, he said, “we knew then
that the electricity supply infrastructure was vulnerable and as
we’ve heard today, it remains vulnerable. Not just in the United
Kingdom and the United States, but in all countries that consider
and define themselves as developed.”
“There are people,” he said, “whose motivations are so powerful that with hardly a second thought they kick aside the barriers”
Rt. Hon. Dr. Kim Howells
“In 2011, we can only ignore at our peril the potential for hugely damaging mischief to be wrought in our societies and our economies by individuals and elements who may be living among us and who understand the continuing vulnerability of our electricity infrastructures and supply systems.”
Rt. Hon. Dr. Kim Howells, former Chair, UN Sec. Council and UK Intelligence and Security Committee. Former UK Counter Terrorism Minister
22
“There are people,” he said, “whose motivations are so powerful that
with hardly a second thought they kick aside the barriers” and work to
find and implement catastrophic attacks on our critical infrastructures.
“They could be well educated people,” he said, “familiar with the subject
of nuclear and non-nuclear EMP. They may be engineers, craftsmen,
experts in the civil use of explosives and detonators. They will certainly
know full well that our economies, our services, and our homes are
hungrier than ever for electricity.”
Today, he went on, we can no longer assume that saboteurs will be
restrained by concern for the human cost of their actions. “That’s no
longer the case amongst potential saboteurs in 2011. Nor is it the
position of the planners and strategists in rogue states. It’s not the
position amongst terrorist groups financed and sustained by rogue
governments, renegade agencies, and wealthy patrons. I doubt also
that it’s the position of some mainstream governments and corporations
that may harbor malignant plans for furthering their own political and
commercial interests.”
In his ministerial roles, he said, “I knew from my long ministerial
involvement in counter terrorism and intelligence and security that there
are in all of our societies many dangerous individuals and groups.”
The difference, he went on, between today’s groups and the potential
saboteurs of the ‘80s is that, today, “these individuals and groups
are immensely more sophisticated, and better equipped in terms of
intelligence and communications... In 2011, we can only ignore at our
peril the potential for hugely damaging mischief to be wrought in our
societies and our economies by individuals and elements who may be
living among us and who understand the continuing vulnerability of our
electricity infrastructures and supply systems.”
“A British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, once observed that most
governments find themselves having to respond, not to the commitments
they made in their election manifestos, but as he put it, ‘to events, dear
boy, events.’ Because of its centrality, in any advanced economy, I feel
that our electricity generation and its supply infrastructure will find it
impossible to escape the kinds of events that force governments to take
extraordinary actions. Indeed in the next decade, the very reputation
of governments may be determined by their success or their failure in
ensuring that the lights stay on.”
“That’s why no government … can delay carrying out its duties, not
merely to identify the threats to the continuing security of our electricity
23
supply systems, but also to ensure that adequate measures are
taken to safeguard and strengthen that security.”
Patrick Miller, CEO of EnergySec and Principal Investigator
of DOE’s National Electric Sector Cybersecurity
Organization Project, spoke about both cybersecurity
threats to the power grid, and areas of overlap with
EMP. The challenges posed by our increasingly vulnerable
infrastructures, he pointed out, are growing fast. “As we move
forward,” he said, “we have nothing but a digital landscape in
front of us. Every single blip, every mountain, every hill, every
valley will be digital.” And both the critical controllers of our
infrastructures and the devices that could be used to attack
them are shrinking in size, and growing in scope and impact. In
short, “we’re putting more and more of our eggs in smaller and
smaller baskets.”
Vulnerability, he said, is growing due to both the explosive spread
of digital control systems, and cascading impacts. “We have
widespread connectivity of all these things, so not only are
we using more and more technology, more and more of it is
getting embedded deeper and deeper. We’re connecting it to
everything.”
The consequence – rapidly growing vulnerability. “These threats
are certainly real,” he said. “There’s no doubt about it. My
organization, we deal with the actual frontlines of this battle.”
How does cyber relate to EMP? While Patrick Miller sees “a
greater risk for widespread issues with EMP or even weaponized
magnetic pulses,” cyber threats would be launched at the
same time. “It [cyber] will be used as a force multiplier,” he
said, “to make the problem far worse than you could have
possibly imagined otherwise.” An enemy intent on bringing our
infrastructures down would use both, together. “It comes along
for the ride no matter what. It’s just part of the package.”
Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former Director, Central
Intelligence Agency and Chairman of Woolsey Partners,
LLC, spoke of the nation’s EMP vulnerability to rogue
states or trans-national terror groups. “We have 18 critical
infrastructures in the United States: water, sewage, food, etc.
All 17 of the others depend on electricity. If the grid goes down,”
he said, “we are not back to 1970s pre-web, we’re back in the
1870s pre-electricity, and we don’t have enough plow horses or
enough pump handles.”
“We need to focus on a whole range of issues about the grid.
One of them certainly is cyber security because beginning a
decade plus ago … we transitioned a lot of our data systems
into operating across the web.”
24
Summarizing the nation’s EMP risk, he said he sees the key
issue as the vulnerability of the power grid. “The really tough
thing about the grid … is that it is so central and has such a
range of vulnerabilities.” As an example, he spoke of the 2003
blackout. “In August of 2003 a tree branch touched a power line
in Cleveland … and some 80 gigawatts of power went offline,
some of it for several days, 50 million Americans and Canadians
without electricity.
“The heart of the matter,” he continued,
“is that the Revolutionary Guards and
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda are a lot smarter
than tree branches and power lines.” And
the problem we face with a rogue nation
like Iran acquiring a capability for nuclear
EMP, he said, is that we cannot count on
the deterrent structures that have worked
for decades among the major powers. “If
all of a sudden the east coast just goes
dark because there was a fishing boat off
the east coast that launched something or
some other part of the United States or Europe, we have a real
problem in attribution and understanding what might be going
on.”
Speaking of missile defense, James Woolsey explained that,
while this could change in the future, current missile defense
systems could not engage a sea-launched, short range EMP
attack. For example, a “Hezbollah crude fishing boat carrying
a scud, so-called scud-in-the-bucket
threat.” In the near term, the other option
is to “build defenses into our grid,” he said.
Why is this urgent? “Iran,” he said, “is
different. It’s a sophisticated country with
sophisticated understanding of many
aspects of technology.” Most intelligence
agencies, he said, agree that Iran today
is one to three years away from having a
relatively primitive nuclear weapon. “That
puts us,” he continued, “in a very difficult
situation.” And with Iran, he suggested,
we cannot rely on mutual assured
destruction. “Mutual assured destruction
to Ahmadinejad is not a threat, but a
beckoning call.”
Speaking at some length about the
influence of radical religious thinkers on the Iranian government,
he explained that the traditional strategic deterrence that worked
well in a world of competing secular governments will not work
with Iran.
“We have 18 critical infrastructures in the United States: water, sewage, food, etc. All 17 of the others depend on electricity.”
- Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director
“If the grid goes down, we are not back to 1970s pre-web, we’re back in the 1870s pre-electricity, and we don’t have enough plow horses or enough pump handles.”
Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director
“The possibility of, within the next few years, the Iranian government being able to execute a scud-in-a-bucket EMP shot … cannot responsibly be discounted by the leadership of the United States and the West.”
Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director
25
“That world,” he said, “is gone. We’re now in the 21st century
at odds with, perhaps at war with religiously rooted totalitarians.
And that’s different. Under those circumstances the possibility
of, within the next few years, the Iranian government being able
to execute a scud-in-a-bucket EMP shot of
the type I described simply cannot responsibly
be discounted by the leadership of the United
States and the West.”
Responding to a question, James Woolsey
summarized his major concerns.
“The thing that worries me the most right now
is that Iran appears to have a couple of bombs
worth of light enriched uranium.” In practical
terms, he explained, that means they have
completed “about two-thirds or a little more
of the work necessary to enrich to 90% for a
weapon.”
“Second – the design of the weapon itself, if
you’re talking about something pretty primitive,
is not that hard, and is on the internet.” Iran, he
said, is far enough along that within a year or
two, “we could have … detonation of a simple
weapon up in the northern deserts of Iran. If
it has a mushroom cloud and some radiation and goes boom,
they are a nuclear power. And once they are a nuclear power
… you will have lots of countries getting into the fuel cycle and
enrichment, and I am afraid Iran will be a terrible gateway into a
quite unpleasant world.”
Once they [Iran] are a nuclear power … you will have lots of countries getting
into the fuel cycle and enrichment, and I am afraid Iran will be a
terrible gateway into a quite unpleasant world.”
Honorable R. James Woolsey Jr., Former CIA Director
26
The Solution:Policies and Approaches
Congressman Trent Franks chaired the fifth and final
session for the first day of the summit, as panelists
provided perspectives on the policies that will be needed
to protect the power grid.
Bill Bryan, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary, began by
summarizing DOE’s role, as a research and development
agency dedicated to supporting and advancing security
and resiliency of the energy system. DOE works to find
optimal, broadly based partnerships, he said, but there is
a downside. “The downside,” he explained, “is that good
partnerships take time, which is why sometimes you need
something else.”
“Electromagnetic disturbances,” Bill Bryan reiterated, “have
potentially significant impacts on the electric grid.” Given the
many different types of equipment, testing will be needed to
study different mitigation techniques. “We have to consider
the various types, the brands, the ages, and the configurations
of the equipment and do some required testing on the various
scenarios that are out there,” he said. Mitigation also includes
procedural steps, which in turn mean dependable space weather
forecasting. “It’s clear,” he said, referring to earlier comments
from Dr. Jane Lubchenco (NOAA Director) and Dr. Tom Bogdan
(NOAA Space Center Director), “that there’s a need for better
indication and warning.”
Similarly, “regarding the recovery options, we have to consider
the level of impact on the various systems.” This also means that
“we have to consider cost of recovery,” he continued, referring
to cost sharing as an option. The Deputy Assistant Secretary
had praise for companies that have already begun looking at
procedural changes that could offer some protection, and said
he was “very encouraged that some companies are taking steps
to retrofit their current systems.” He called for bringing these
companies forward, to share their experiences. “Let’s get them
in here,” he said. “Let’s learn what they’re doing. Let’s learn
what works. Let’s learn what kind of language they would need
that would help them continue to do that for the safety of the grid
and the security of the grid.” DOE, he said, can help, offering
Recovery Act funding as an example. “Through the Recovery
Act, our office received fifty million dollars that we could apply to
the states and cities to build reliability and resiliency plans in an
all hazard environment.”
He called for maintaining the momentum toward Congressional
legislation, while ensuring the legislation adds value, and “we
don’t tie anybody’s hands, that we don’t create bigger problems,”
inadvertently creating unintended negative consequences. “No
“If you’re a legislator, your solution is to legislate. If you’re a regulator, your solution is to regulate. If you’re a federal agency, your solution is to participate, or partnerships … But we’re not going to solve that problem unless we have a combination of all three.”
Bill Bryan, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary
Session V
27
legislation or regulation is perfect,” he said, “but we need to
make it as good as we can.”
Concluding, Bill Bryan called for inclusive solutions that arise
from coordinated planning by the many different government
stakeholders and industry, working together. “If you’re a
legislator, your solution is to legislate. If you’re a regulator, your
solution is to regulate. If you’re a federal agency, your solution is
to participate, or partnerships. And you know, we’re not going
to get there by any one of those by themselves. The threat is
real. I think the likelihood of an attack as we’ve heard today is
inevitable, not if but when. But we’re not going to solve that
problem unless we have a combination of all three.”
FERC Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur began by
summarizing the work of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. “FERC is an independent regulatory agency with
five commissioners appointed by the President, confirmed by the
Senate. We have jurisdiction over
interstate and wholesale electricity,
natural gas, and oil pipelines used
in interstate commerce.” The
Commissioner pointed to two
areas of FERC’s jurisdiction that
are relevant to electric infrastructure
security: Cost recovery, and reliability
standards.
Most of the Commissioner’s focus
was on beginning to think about
specifics. “There are steps we can
begin to take,” she said, “to begin to
address the issues we heard about
and make steady progress.”
What are those steps?
“There are really three categories of actions that I think we need
to collectively address to take this forward,” she said.
The first category: Equipment solutions.
The second: Preparation, planning and preventive actions, “such
as training our control room operators what to do when you
know a solar disturbance is coming.”
The third category: Supply chain preparation. “I really applaud
the efforts of DOE to get more of the transformers made in this
country.” The Commissioner also commented on work by Edison
Electric Institute and NERC on spare transformer programs,
“The 2004 EMP Commission report authors wrote ‘if we get started we can really tackle this problem in three years.’ So that means if we had gotten started, we would have been done in 2007.”
Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur“This is a classic case where we can’t let perfection be the enemy of the good. We have to figure out some prudent steps to take and just start taking them so we can tackle this.”
Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur
28
approved in 2006 by FERC. “That’s not the be-all and end-all,” she
said. “We’re never going to have enough spares if we lose two-thirds
of our system, but it’s a component of an overall strategy. And it’s an
important component.”
Referring to a full day FERC technical conference, Commissioner
LaFleur said she was pleased to see a sense of cooperative effort to
carry this subject forward. NERC, she said, has
formed a Geomagnetic Disturbance Taskforce, as
one of the important new initiatives beginning to
look at the space weather problem.
Looking forward, the Commissioner spoke about
the possibility of new legislation addressing
electromagnetic infrastructure vulnerability. “If
Congress chooses to give FERC more authority in
the Shield Act, or in any other piece of legislation,
particularly more authority over real-time threats
which is a gap in our legislation now, I can assure
you that we would use that authority conscientiously
and vigorously. But in the meantime, we’re not
waiting. We’re trying to use the authority we have
under the Federal Power Act to work with NERC
and the industry to get these codes and standards
in place, get the drills started, and just start to take
this forward.”
The Commissioner concluded with a pointed
reference to the need to get started. The authors of the 2004 EMP
Commission Report wrote ‘if we get started we can really tackle this
problem in three years.’ So that means if we had gotten started, we
would have been done in 2007. Instead, in 2008, an even fatter report
came out, the final report of the commission, and then last fall FERC and
DOE and DHS issued a 900 page report on this. We’ve done with the
studies. We have to start taking action, so we won’t be sitting here three
years from now saying if we’d started we could have done something in
three years. This is a classic case where we can’t let perfection be the
enemy of the good. We have to figure out some prudent steps to take
and just start taking them so we can tackle this.”
“Instead, in 2008, an even fatter report came out, the final report of the commission, and then last fall FERC and DOE and DHS issued a 900 page report on this. We’re done with the studies. We have to start taking action, so we won’t be sitting here three years from now saying if we’d started we could have done something in three years.”
Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur
29
“The loss of these transformers would affect 130 million people. They would be out of power … the estimate would be four to 10 years.”
Joe McClelland, Director, FERC
The third speaker on the panel was Joe McClelland,
Director of the Office of Electric Reliability at the Federal
Regulatory Commission.
Joe McClelland began his remarks with a reference to the 2009-
2010 FERC-initiated study on severe electromagnetic threats to
the power grid and energy sector. The study, run by Oak Ridge
National Laboratory for FERC, DOE and DHS and monitored by
DOD and the White House OSTP, looked at the vulnerabilities
of the bulk power system: “What lines
were most susceptible and what pieces
of equipment on those lines were most
susceptible to failure? And this was not just
natural but also manmade EMP.”
“The results of this study,” the Director said,
“were sobering.” He referred to a study
projection of what the impact would be,
today, of a repeat of the 1921 geomagnetic
storm. “If the storm were centered over
Winnipeg, Manitoba, over 300 high voltage
bulk power system transformers would be
susceptible to damage or failure. To put that in perspective, … the
loss of these transformers would affect 130 million people. They
would be out of power.” How long? “A loss of this magnitude
would overwhelm the supply chain. But even if one could get
around the supply chain issues, the estimate would be four to 10
years to completely restore these transformers. And that’s not
an exaggeration. In fact, from my personal perspective, I find it
to be optimistic.”
This study estimate is not, the Director warned, an exaggeration.
In fact, “if the event were centered a little further south … over
1,000 transformers would be at risk for failure.”
How does it happen? Joe McClelland provided a functional
description of the risk to the grid from a severe geomagnetic
storm. “There are set points on the bulk power system. Load
and generation must be in balance.” If transformers fail, the
generators they serve will not be able to feed their power into the
grid. “What happens on the bulk power system in a grid … when
the loss of generation occurs?” If enough generation is lost, he
explained, “we could have grid collapse, and that grid collapse
could last for a very long period of time.”
Repeating a warning heard from the earlier speakers, he pointed
out that “Either a manmade or a natural EMP event is going
to happen. And when it does happen, if the countries are
unprepared … the restoration of services [could] take so long, it
could be civilization altering or even civilization ending.”
What are the solutions?
“On that basis, there are steps that we can put into place and
“Either a manmade or a natural EMP event is going to happen. And when it does happen, if the countries are unprepared … the restoration of services [could] take so long, it could be civilization altering or even civilization ending.”
Joe McClelland, Director, FERC Office of Electric Reliability
30
we need to move quickly to put into place. Commissioner LaFleur said
that the time for studying is nearing an end or maybe at its end. And
I agree. There have been many studies. Studies seem to converge.
We’ve had some peer comments, good peer comments on the work
that we’ve done, but they don’t substantively change the fundamental
conclusions.”
The Director spoke of using a tiered mitigation approach. “Pick out the
most critical bulk power system elements, let’s begin with mitigation
on those, and move out in concentric circles to less and less important
elements. And it can be done on the basis that I’ve got to maintain
service to these key military facilities,” or selected large
urban areas. Sensitive elements of the grid can be rated,
he said, with prioritized protection which could include
both “proactive and reactive mitigation strategies.”
Commercially available or prototype mitigation hardware
can be tested, followed by defining deployment plans and
timelines. “Begin staging implementation. Again, based
on what are the most critical elements to assure continuity
of service for important load centers.”
Finally, Joe McClelland offered an opinion on why industry
has not yet acted. “Part of the problem is it’s got to be
identified as a priority.” “Secondly, good development or
good solutions need to be proposed and put into place,”
with industry participating in developing effective solutions.
“And lastly,” he said, “cost recovery must be assured.”
Summing up, the Director concluded: “Let’s get the
solutions built, tested, and in place.”
[What should be done now?]
“Pick out the most critical bulk power system elements, let’s begin with mitigation on those, and move out in concentric circles to less and less important elements.”
Joe McClelland, Director, FERC Office of Electric Reliability
31
Wrapping up the panel, Avi Schnurr, Summit Coordinator and
CEO and Chairman of the EIS Council spoke about strategies for
reaching solutions.
“I think there’s always a danger when we talk about actually starting
down a solution path,” he warned. “And the danger is that different
people will always have different ideas about the direction that path
should take.” The alternative, however, is inaction. “If we can just sit
and comfortably talk about how bad the problem is, we can all agree it’s
a horrible problem. There will be no disagreement. But I think it is time,
and we do have to take the risk.”
It is important not to lose sight of our critical objectives, he said, and
lose momentum as we consider diverging details. What is the real
fundamental issue here? “Our cities are not designed or constructed
to allow them to support our lives and the lives of our society without
massive amounts of electrical power.”
Introducing the International Infrastructure Security Roadmap, Avi
Schnurr described it as one possible framework for a plan, which maps
out different, evolving paths. “Think of it,” he said, “as a path through a
construction site. There are constantly going to be changes, the path
will be moving and changing. But we have to start walking.”
Defining appropriate government and corporate milestones will be key,
and it will be essential that both corporate and government stakeholders
be involved in the process. There will also have to be ground rules. “First
of all, such a plan has to be grounded in the agendas, the objectives
of the United States government and allied governments. Secondly,
such a plan certainly has to be founded on the best available science
and technology. And thirdly, it’s just not going to be effective unless it is
responsive to input that comes from the energy industry.”
“And finally, I think there’s a government opportunity and that opportunity
is to help define clear and common goals for protection, common
across the entire energy industry and energy spectrum. But doing it in
such a way that the regulatory and legislative process is transparent and
reflects industry initiative.”
Avi Schnurr ended his remarks by summarizing some of key elements
of the draft roadmap. Any successful process, he said, will need to be
based on well-defined benchmarks, with detailed, interactive milestones.
It will need to include a toolbox with a full set of tools: automated
protection, optimized procedures, spares and recovery planning will
all play a role. It will need to have international applicability, and work
toward clear objectives. “The required end state that’s recommended
here,” he said, “is an electric grid which is highly resilient to severe space
weather and EMP.”
Concluding, he called for maintaining the momentum and the focus that
will be needed to resolve these risks. “I think it will happen,” he said, “if
all of us here today can maintain that focus and keep in mind the critical
goal:
“We must secure our critical infrastructures.”
“Think of it [the International Infrastructure Security Roadmap] as a path through a construction site. There are constantly going to be changes, the path will be moving and changing. But we have to start walking.”
Avi Schnurr, EIS Summit Coordinator
3232
EISS RoundtableApril 12, 2011
The Capitol Building,
United States Congress
3333
On the 2nd day of the summit, a special industry / government roundtable took
place in the U.S. Capitol Building.
A review of the natural and malicious electromagnetic threat summary was provided by
Commissioner Robert Hermann and John Kappenman, followed by a reprise of government
perspectives by Congresswoman Yvette Clarke and Congressman Trent Franks, FERC
Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur and FERC Office of Electric Reliability Director Joe McClelland,
Patrick Wilging from DOE, Miles Keogh, NARUC Director of Grants and Research and
Southern Carolina Public Service Commissioner Elizabeth (Liz) Fleming, with Michael Rutter
representing the United Kingdom’s Department of Energy and Climate Change as Head of
Energy Resilience.
The government speakers used the opportunity to go into more detail on their perspectives
on the issues, and to provide more time for interaction.
Congressman Franks, setting the tone, said that “in all of human history, the story is that
a few people sometimes get together and make all the difference.” Referring to his work
on the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, he said, “I get to hear a lot
of scary stuff,” with regular briefings on global security risks. “But this,” he said, “is the one
that frightens me the most.” He also spoke of the Shield Act, as one possible option for
legislative leadership to address this issue.
Chris Beck, Chief Science Adviser for the House Homeland Security Committee, talked
about the legislative status, and also focused on the importance of taking even tentative,
initial steps toward mitigating these problems. “If we have a complete blackout, if everything
goes down and we really do need to black start the United States, that’s really bad. But if
there’s a core, if there are some key components that are still operating somewhere, then a
bootstrapping process is possible.”
“That changes the game,” he said.
FERC Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur spoke about the need to begin taking practical
steps to resolving these risks. “[From] everything I’ve read, everything I’ve heard this
isn’t witchcraft. There are only a few kinds of simple solution sets that we can look to, to
help prepare for any of these threats.”
From Left: Rep. Trent Franks, Chris Beck
34
What is FERC’s role? “What FERC can do is first of all help get this paid for,” she said.
“Secondly is the more direct responsibility for the reliability standards.” Also, she added,
“under our existing authority, as Section 215, we’ve got plenty of
authority to get started on this.”
What should be done? The Commissioner argued for getting started
on practical steps. “There can be infinite reason[s] to always have
one more piece of data. At some point we have to say we’re going
to start.”
“This,” she said, “is the time, time to start.”
Joe McClelland began his remarks with a global, historic
perspective. “Whether from manmade or from natural causes, this
is going to happen. It is inevitable. It will be big. And if it is big … the
consequences would be devastating to any civilization that endures
the event but hasn’t prepared. History will judge us for how we proceed from here.”
Joe McClelland spoke in some detail about the grid’s evolution toward greater vulnerability,
such as the move away from EMP-protected electromechanical relays to today’s sensitive
digital relays, and the coming Smart Grid changes.
He concluded by concurring with Commissioner LaFleur’s assessment about the balance
between study and action. “I will echo Commissioner LeFleur’s comments that the time for
research is ending. I think we have very good convergence on the conclusions of the study.
Now it’s a matter of implementation.”
Speaking for the Department of Energy, Patrick Wilging also called for moving
forward. DOE’s focus, he said, can be summarized as four areas that will need to move
forward: Hazard mitigation, alerts and warnings, awareness and education, and testing
and evaluation.
Commissioner Elizabeth (“Liz”) Fleming expressed her appreciation for the
increasing attention and visibility being paid to this critical issue. “All of this is really
bringing attention to this issue for state commissioners,” she said. Referring to her role as
Chair of NARUC’s Critical Infrastructure Committee, the commissioner spoke of a number
of traditional vulnerabilities the committee reviews. “Now,” she said, “we’re looking at these
electromagnetic impulses that could really do harm to our grids.”
“There can be infinite reason[s] to always have one more piece of data. At some point we have to say we’re going to start.”
“This is the time, time to start.”
FERC Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur
From Left: Patrick Wilging with Rep. Trent Franks, Commissioner Elizabeth Fleming, Deligates, Miles Keogh, Michael Rutter
35
One of the key issues, the Commissioner pointed out, is a history of poor communication
of this issue. “Most people in that group [the Critical Infrastructure Committee] who actually
are dealing with utilities on a day-to-day basis, this was all new information to them. And so
it is something that we really need to get out there and get the message out.”
What do the state regulatory commissions need? “What we need as regulators to help move
this forward is a realistic risk picture. We need to have the facts. We need to understand the
issue so that we can address it in a credible manner. We also need to have best practices
for the utilities so that we know when they come before us what questions we need to
be asking to make sure that what’s necessary is being done. And we need to have best
practices for us as regulators. Are we doing what all that needs to be done, make sure that
the right things are being accomplished?”
Miles Keogh echoed Commissioner Fleming’s comments on the importance of the
State Regulatory Commissions. “Understanding the issue for commissions is going to
be the key to being effective at making prudent decisions,” he said.
He also focused on priorities recommended by Joe McClelland as
particularly important. “Those three points of Joe’s were exactly right
on. Tier and prioritize, define the right actions, and then develop the
right kinds of cost recovery structures.”
Above all, he said, communication will be key. “We need to talk to
each other about what our best practices are, what works.”
Michael Rutter began by summarizing proactive policy decisions
that have recently been made by the government of the United
Kingdom. “In October last year, the U.K. government published its
National Security Strategy.” Quoting historic American writer Wendell
Phillips, he said, “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” This
awareness is the foundation of the National Security Strategy, and
the new document “identifies the risk of a complete shutdown of the
electricity network as something that we should be concerned about.
And it explicitly recognizes the related risks from severe space weather.”
“There’s a lot of work in progress in the U.K. to assess this risk and
understand what it means to power grids and other technologies.”
Michael Rutter also recalled significant problems that have already occurred from moderate
geomagnetic storms. “In 1989, significant GIC effects were experienced in the U.K. including
“[The United Kingdom’s new National Security Strategy] identifies the risk of a complete shutdown of the electricity network as something that we should be concerned about. And it explicitly recognizes the related risks from severe space weather.”
Michael Rutter, Head of Energy Resilience, U.K. Dept. of Energy and Climate Change
36
sudden voltage reductions, overload, changes in power flows, and standby generator
stops. Transformers on the electricity transmission system suffered internal damage. Two
transformers were damaged.”
“Increasingly,” he explained, “there is concern that periods of extreme space weather albeit
not experienced in recent decades could pose a potentially serious risk to electricity assets
and networks. And over the past few years, we are aware that it appears that the Sun is
undergoing a change of state and that future space weather conditions could be different to
those experienced over the past 50 years. We also need to take that into account.”
Finally, Michael Rutter went over a number of steps the government of the United Kingdom
is taking to address these issues. Summarizing, he said: “So we do have a milestone
driven plan that sets out what we will do to address the impact of severe space weather.
This involves government working closely with industry and with economic regulators within
the existing policy and regulatory framework to understand the risks and what needs to be
done to mitigate them.
“We’re not complacent,” he concluded. “We’re taking this forward quickly.”
A special session at the Roundtable called for industry perspectives. Gerry Cauley,
President and CEO of the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), was the first speaker.
NERC, he said, began looking at severe space weather issues in
2010. “The potential impacts on reliability of the power system
from a severe geomagnetic event were identified in a NERC report,
High Impact Low Frequency Report that we published jointly with
the Department of Energy in June of 2010.”
Although the 2010 report addresses both severe space weather
and EMP, currently NERC has no plans to address EMP. “We’ve
chosen to focus on geomagnetic disturbances more so than EMP
at this time because the GMD risks are better understood and
preventing EMP attacks in the homeland is at this time presumed
to be a responsibility of the government, not to say that that won’t
change over time as we get clarity on information. But right now
we think there’s the greatest benefit by focusing on the known quantity of solar magnetic
disturbances and we believe that there will be inherent benefits in hardening and being
prepared for solar magnetic disturbances to EMP events as well.”
“From a power system perspective, the most well-known geomagnetic disturbance in North America occurred on March 13th and 14th, 1989. Among other impacts, the storm led to the collapse of the grid in Hydro Quebec.”
Gerry Cauley, NERC President and CEO
From Left: Michael Rutter with Rep. Trent Franks, Gerry Cauley, Deligates
37
Gerry Cauley provided a perspective on the 1989 Geomagnetic Disturbance [GMD]. “From
a power system perspective, the most well-known geomagnetic disturbance in North
America occurred on March 13th and 14th, 1989. Among other impacts, the storm led to
the collapse of the grid in Hydro Quebec, in the early morning hours of March 13th, 1989.”
“The Earth’s magnetic field experienced a large impulse along the U.S./Canadian border,
and started a chain of events that only 92 seconds later resulted in the collapse of the
Quebec power system.” Given the speed of the GMD, there was little time for human
intervention. “The rapid manifestation of the storm and impacts
to the Quebec grid did not allow operators sufficient time to fully
assess the situation or provide any meaningful response.”
Although the grid was able to restart, he said, “there were two
large step-up transformers that were damaged due to over-voltage
conditions.” In addition, “there was also as we know, damage
to equipment at a nuclear plant in New Jersey as a result of this
event.”
“This storm proved,” he said, “that individual transformers can be
damaged from overheating, which results -- which can result in
long-term outages of key transformers in the network.”
What needs to be done? “While the electric sector made important
improvements after the March ’89 storm, more work is needed to evaluate new protections
and reliability considerations associated with future storms.”
“The one thing I think that’s new and challenging with these three risks,” he explained, “the
physical and cybersecurity and the geomagnetic, is the widespread nature of the potential
impacts. Normally impacts of the risk we face are either local or regional in impact.”
Gerry Cauley told the delegates that NERC has established a Geomagnetic Disturbance
Taskforce, “charged with analyzing the impact upon the bulk power system from a severe
geomagnetic disturbance and identifying mitigating actions that users, owners, and
operators can take to ensure the reliability of the grid.”
What is NERC’s vision? “For the long-term planning, we’re recommending improved
modeling capabilities for static and dynamic simulations; review of relaying such as negative
sequence current setting on transformers; assessing the inventory of vulnerable equipment
both in operation and as spares; and system design improvements such as adding
monitoring equipment and blocking resistors on transformers. These mitigating actions,” he
“This storm proved that individual transformers can be damaged from overheating, which results -- which can result in long-term outages of key transformers in the network.”
Gerry Cauley, NERC President and CEO
From Left: Rep. Yvette Clarke, John Houston with Rep. Trent Franks, Deligates, Mike Heyeck
38
said, “will not eliminate the risk from a large solar storm but will place the system in a more
protected posture.”
“My deepest concern as CEO of NERC,” he concluded, “whether an event is caused by a
solar storm or physical or cyber attack, is the situation in which there is widespread damage
to equipment with long recovery times.”
Echoing many other presenters, Gerry Cauley called for a collaborative process. “We need
government and industry to work together to resolve the basic policy question regarding
what level of equipment reserves are sufficient to meet the expectations for national security
and the wellbeing of our citizens. And how are these equipment reserves to be funded?”
Congresswoman Yvette Clarke, welcoming the delegates to Capitol Hill, went on
to comment briefly on Gerry Cauley’s presentation. “It gives me a bit more comfort to
know that we are being forward leaning when it comes to geomagnetic force and to EMP
because certainly in yesterday’s session, we learned of the value of doing so.”
And it is important, she continued, to find the answer to some of the questions Mr. Cauley
raised. “Where will we find the funding in a time of fiscal austerity to do what we know is
important for something that is imminent? And how much risk are we willing to maintain in
order to avoid applying that financial support that we need to make sure that we can be as
resilient and as prepared as possible?”
John Houston, Vice President of CenterPoint Energy, said that CenterPoint has
already taken significant steps to review their vulnerability, and look at protection
measures for both EMP and Severe Space Weather. “We didn’t study every substation,”
he said, “but we chose to study our control center and seven types of substations which we
own, and to study each and every one of our extra high voltage transformers.” The results,
he said, were mixed – and they now have a better defined understanding of where protective
measures will be needed.
John Houston called for additional testing data on hardware protective measures like current
blockers. “I don’t think we’re waiting for the perfect but I do think we’re waiting for the
proven. And to that end, we don’t have the ability to test these devices unless I choose to
install one and go ahead and lose my transformer.”
He also suggested new approaches are needed to allow users to better interpret space
weather warnings. What is needed, he said, are well-defined approaches “so that when
a [space weather] warning is coming forth it’s not a warning that something bad’s about
39
to happen, it’s a warning that says we’re expecting a storm of the level of 1989 or we’re
expecting one of the level halfway to 1921.”
John Houston also suggested that, while the electric energy sector is a critical, vulnerable
infrastructure, interactions with other infrastructures show that “we have a lot more work
to do than the electric industry.” For example, “Houston,” he said,
“produces 45% of the gasoline used in the United States. [In the
blackout in Houston from Hurricane Ike] we were getting calls from
the White House and from the DOE with regard to gasoline refineries
that needed to be brought back with the power, and in addition, …
the largest pipelines in the world that provide gasoline all the way
to New York originate in Houston, Texas, and the first two pumping
facilities are electric driven. Talk about interdependencies.” A long
term blackout in Houston alone, he explained, could mean “the east
coast could run out of gasoline in … five days.”
In another example of interdependency, Houston’s refineries – which
use large quantities of water – were also shut down due to power loss
at the regional water supply facility, prompting emergency measures.
Entergy, the company providing power to the water facility, “had
gone completely black, so they had not only no distribution but no
transmission, similar how they’d be in an EMP.”
“I’m suggesting there’s interdependencies that we’re needing to think
about and need that leadership, I think, from the folks here in Congress and possibly from
the Executive Branch of the government, to assist in that thinking through the process.”
Summing up, John Houston spoke positively about the energy industry’s resilience. But
for EMP and Severe Space Weather, he said, “I don’t think we have the solutions. I think
what we need is further support from the experts, from the Departments of Energy, from the
regulators at FERC and from NERC. I think we can work this together and resolve these
problems.”
Speaking next was Mike Heyeck, Senior Vice President of American Electric Power
(AEP). “I agree 100% with what John Houston said, that industry is willing to do this,” he
began. “It’s really a solvable problem.”
“We are the largest transmission owner in the United States,” he continued, and pointed out
that “AEP does own the highest voltage network in the country at 765 kV.” While most of
In regard to the Hurricane Ike blackout of Houston: “The largest pipelines in the world that provide gasoline all the way to New York originate in Houston, Texas, and the first two pumping facilities are electric driven. Talk about interdependencies ...”
John Houston, Vice President, CenterPoint Electric
40
From Left: Ian Gladng, Rep. Yvette Clarke with Chris Train
these transformers are nearing 40 years old, and will be replaced soon, “we do need more
standards on the transformers,” he said, suggesting modeling help would be useful to help
define some of the specifications that will be needed.
Mike Heyeck also suggested stakeholders try to ensure grid changes for EMP or Space
Weather protection will also provide other, synergistic benefits.
“What we do with protection systems will serve the reliability of the
grid, every day, every moment of every day, so it doesn’t have to
be just for the EMP event,” he said.
He also asserted that, if handled properly, the cost of these
changes should not be an issue. “If we invest 10 billion dollars
in the United States today, and you socialize that across every
meter, that’s only a postage stamp to an average customer per
month. So it is a solvable problem. And it is not a funding issue.
It’s really a time issue.” For example, in replacing high voltage
transformers, “it takes about a year to get an outage -- to get a
transformer out to replace it,” he explained.
However timing can, he pointed out, be made to work in our
favor. “About one-third of the grid is at or near life. As we replace these assets, why don’t
we replace them with capabilities that would withstand these events? And as the water
treatment plant replaces its motor controls, the same thing. So we’ve got to make sure that
if the grid’s sustainable, that those that plug into the grid are also sustainable.”
What will all of this mean for the future? “Given all the constraints we have with respect to
GMDs and EMPs, the EPA proposals and things like that, trying to figure our future out is
going to be very much harder now than it was five years ago.”
The final two industry representatives were both from the United Kingdom.
Chris Train, Director of Network Operations for the National Grid in the U.K.,
explained that the situation in the U.K. is somewhat different. As a result of damaged
transformers in the 1989 geomagnetic storm, some hardware and procedural changes
were made, including new GIC specs on transformers acquired after that event. In terms
of procedural changes, “operating strategy becomes absolutely crucial.” “We have a
document that sits within the control room environment so we know what we’re going to
do. People have tested on that.” Space weather warning information “has still got a fair
way to go,” he said, “but it is considerably better than it used to be.” How could it improve?
“We want accurate and reliable predictions of Sun spots, particularly times of arrival,” he
explained.
“If we invest $10 billion in the United States today, and you socialize that across every meter, that’s only a postage stamp to an average customer per month. So it is a solvable problem.
Mike Heyeck, Executive Vice President, AEP
41
Today, he told the delegates, following the first EIS Summit in London in 2010, work has
begun looking at vulnerability to a much more severe GMD than the 1989 storm.
In this process, National Grid, he explained, works closely with the Department of Energy and
Climate Change. “Working with our regulators, Michael who represents the Departments
of Energy is quite crucial to us in terms of understanding that risk and developing the policy
around that. But … once we get to a point of understanding whether there are any physical
mitigations that we need to put in place, we will work with our economic regulator.”
One key issue, he pointed out, is building motivation that these issues must be dealt with.
“The problem with high impact events,” he said, “is that people aren’t interested in it until it
has happened. Therefore we as the industry need a way of assessing that, without creating
the alarm but getting that right level of prioritization of the actions.”
Ironically, Chris Train pointed out, older technology hardware that has remained in the U.K.
grid may also be helpful, such as electromechanical relays that were replaced, in the U.S.,
by much more EMP sensitive digital relays.
Ian Glading, Global Continuity, CIO, IBM Corporation, was the last industry speaker.
“IBM’s interest in this topic is because obviously we have very, very large and complex IT
systems, he explained, “running around an infrastructure not only in the U.S. but globally.”
My function within IBM is working within the CIO division on IT risk management. I’m
responsible for IT resiliency and continuity policy globally for IBM and compliance deviation
sign off.”
Regarding EMP and Severe Space Weather, “IBM is recognizing this [electromagnetic risk]
is a valid fact.” In particular, he explained, IBM has begun to realize that EMP and Severe
Space Weather can be a serious concern for a global company. “We realized that it’s got
very, very serious implications and it goes on beyond normal disaster planning and continuity
planning, because in this particular case the difference in the footprint is so much, much
bigger.”
“Whether it’s an EMP event occupying a large regional area,” or, similarly, with a severe GMD
event, IBM’s global distribution of IT assets means the company would be affected. In fact,
based on projected EMP and space weather footprints, IBM is already
beginning to reexamine their geographic planning for data and service
“failover” backup planning.
Among the many issues IBM is now looking at to address these
risks, the human component is crucial. As another example,
“telecommunications ability post-event: What’s actually going to be
available for people to use and communicate about the event?”
In summary, “we definitely believe this is a global problem,” he said. “It
affects global enterprises and organizations like IBM. We are taking
this very, very seriously.”
“Going forward from now on, we’re taking this on board as a credible
threat,” he concluded. “An example of that is that we will be using geomagnetic storm as
part of a scenario tool kit for a very large scale disaster recovery exercise that IBM’s going to
do next year with some of its internal IT.”
“We definitely believe this is a global problem. It affects global enterprises and organizations like IBM. We are taking this very, very seriously.”
Ian Glading, Global Continuity, CIO, IBM Corporation.
42
General Discussion, and Closing CommentsAt the end of the summit, there was an opportunity for general discussion. Reviewing the
day and a half of meetings, there were a number of important comments.
Congresswoman Clarke said she now realizes that “the infrastructure I’ve been taking for
granted for so long was built by a generation that preceded me, and its shelf life is basically
expired.”
Along with others, she tried also to focus on what the next steps should entail. We need
to bring all available talent to identify the key interdependencies, she said. And not just
local talent. “We’re talking a global phenomenon, and so the conversation cannot just be
continental U.S.A.”
The important question that must now be asked, she said, is “How do we get those
conversations going in those regions of the world?” The key danger is that we might fail to
increasingly talk and think about addressing this problem. “It’s the one thing that we don’t
think of that becomes our ultimate vulnerability,” she concluded.
Michael Rutter also took the opportunity to sum up where we are, and where we need to
go.
We are starting with a key asset, he pointed out: “a shared commitment amongst policy
makers, amongst regulators, and amongst industry to understand this problem and do
something about it.”
In terms of what needs to be done – he pointed to two areas: “the need for better and earlier
forecasting of severe weather, severe space weather events,” and the need to characterize
interdependencies between critical national infrastructure sectors. “I don’t think we should
be under any illusions about how difficult these sorts of issues are to address, both within
government and I think across sectors. It’s certainly something the U.K. government has
really just started to try to get its head around. It’s not easy but it really is important and we
need to think very seriously about that.”
Finally, he said, “one of the critical matters is the resilience of transformers on the system.”
We need to understand what the risk is at events worse than 1989, and what the solutions
are.”
Avi Schnurr, commenting on preparations for the 2012 summit, asked that industry
executives begin thinking through what they will need to take concrete steps toward
protection of their infrastructure. More generally, in line with several of the earlier speakers,
he recommended delegates begin thinking through interdependencies – what standards
need to be met by infrastructure components that plug into the grid?
Commissioner LaFleur used her wrap-up comments to suggest stakeholders look at EISS
London 2012 as a milestone to review concrete accomplishments. “This has been a great
couple of days,” she said, “and I think I agree with almost all the suggestions we’ve heard:
the better forecasting, certainly the figuring out how to spec new transformers. We’ve seen
a tremendous investment in the grid right now, so we have an opportunity to at least start
building the future grid in a better way.”
“I had two suggestions for the future,” she said. “One is I’d like to suggest that when we get
together in London in March, everybody come prepared to talk about what they’ve done.”
The Commissioner also called for greater participation by some of the other countries in
attendance.
Congressman Trent Franks, closing the summit, urged delegates to work toward a
comprehensive goal, hardening the electric grid against the full set of electromagnetic
threats: EMP, GMD and tactical EMP. “I’m certainly hoping that whatever we decide to do
in terms of hardening, that we put aside any political differences.”
“Whether it gets knocked out by nuclear blast or an intentional electromagnetic interference
or GIC, it doesn’t matter,” he said.
“It still goes out.”
C O U N C I LIS
EIS Summit (EISS) is hosted as a government / NGO partnership. EISS Sponsors:
www.eiscouncil.org www.henryjacksonsociety.org
EISS U M M I T
The Electric Infrastructure Security Summit process is a first step in defining a new international security framework for coordination and cooperation in protecting our vital national electric infrastructures.
The 2nd EIS Summit took place April 11-12, 2011
in the Capitol Building, U.S. Congress, and the
Fairmont, Washington D.C.
For information, visit www.eissummit.com or write to [email protected]