8/11/2019 Eight Years That Shook Vermont | Vanguard Press | Mar. 16, 1989

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What future for the Dems? P. age

VERMONT'S NEWS AND ARTS WEEKLYMARCH16-23,1989

FlPTYCENTS

Eight Yean That Shook Verm

, "9OO-OVO. LA ' NO. L9Nn~naWAn " l . d30SI VI ~3SA~v~aI I 3MOH A3I I V~

The 1JI I I I t l I o f Reform

W h e n P r o g r es s i v e s s u m u p t h e a c c o m p -

lishments of the past eighl years, theyinvariably list the innovative projects

andp r og r ams launchedb y the administration:

the Community Land Trust and Boathouse,p r o g r a m s f o r w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , Sister-City

It wasa holt from the blue, the longest issues. They have challenged the accepted at least as efflciently as their "old guard"of long shots. A t h ir d -p art y r ad ic al had r el at ion sh ip b e twe en c ommu n it ie s an d t be p re d ec e ssors-an d save some mon ey as we ll .turned a shoestring campaign into a real state and helped fuel a statewide progressive The intransigence of the Republicrats only

challenge of Burlington's five-term mayor, surge. fueled public discontent. In 1982, more Pro-~ordon Paque~te. B u t e ven on e le ct ion d ay, T h ey h ave e ven weat he r ed t h e storms of gressives replaced Democrats on the Boardaquette an d h is De moc rat ic c omrad es we re su cc ession str uggle , d e mon str ati ng t hat -i n of Al de r me n . B y Mar ch 1983 they were the

predictinga decisive victory. After a l l ,Ron al d S and e r' s word s- " It' sDotjusta one-man show, largest faction on the board. An d "Bernie"Reag~ h ad j us t b ee n e le ct ed p re si de nt i t' s a movement was more popular than ever re elected with a

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8-MARCH 16-2J.I989/VANGUARD PRESS

E1GHTYEARS< 4 continued from page 1.

bullied into reassessing its Grand List, even

threatened with loss oflunds wben local

officials tried to obstruct the building of the

southern connector bigbway. The legislature's

current attempt to strip local communities of

the power to choose alternatives to the prop-erty tax is only the most recent episode in8

struggle wbich began with Burlington's gross

receipts tax.

The bottom line. in financial matters, is

that the Sanders administration held the line

on taxes. Use of fees and an impressive set of

cost-saving reforms at least postponed in-

creases. BasicallY. what the Progressives badmanaged to do was "out-Republican theRepublicans."

1hlDe with Tnde-Olfa

S orne progressive initiatives- notably the

Land Trust and a short-lived proposal to

create a municipal cable TV service-did challenge the basic logic of capitalism.

Others simply provided benefits but left the

system unchanged.

A few initiatives. however. were reactionaryresponses mal contradicted the rhetoric of

the administration. Most Progressives agree,

for example,lhat the gross receipts tax, like

the recently defeated tax on alcohol andcigarettes to fund affordable childcare, is

actually regressive. Likewise, property re-

appnisal shilted the burden from businesses

to homeowners. The problem, explained

Sanders again and again. is that state and

federal policies severely limit the available

options.

Economic development presented especially

complex problems. Sanders had promised "real

change," yet faced a variety of obstacles.

Conservative opponents accused him of being

anti-business, while left-wing critics said he

was selling out to build the tax base.

The basic limitation, however, was the pro-

growth leanings of most residents. Tbus, it

was not surprising that most Progressivesagreed with Democrats and Republicans on

the need for "balanced growth." Tbe .... ulto fthese tensions was a development posturebaed on striking deals to extract some benefitsfor the public-a gentrified waterfront in

exchange for public amenities, the right to

build luxury bousing as long as "affordable"

units were aJso provided, and so on.

Inpractice.Iimits to growth were never set,

They simply changed with the terms of each

trade-off.

w ben it came to peace conversion,Sanders could not be swayed. Thetiming was wrong, be believed, an dthe movement could not avoid "blaming th eworkers" for producing rapid-fire G atling gunsat the General Electric plant.

Beginning in 1983.protests at GEproducedarguments on the left: protesters wanted a

city commitment to conversion: Sanders and

other Progressives wanted to tum the heat on

Congress instead. The fear was that protests,and particularly civil disobedience. would

AjIWoII . .. . 5oooIon.hIol . ._ t l t l o r y _ I o n l o . ' . . IItII ........ 19I1"force" unionized workers to the right.

It w as a disagreement on tactics, but theimplications went deeper. By opposing the

GE protests, was Sanders protecting the

corporation and the military-industrial com-

plex behind it?Did his position contradict thecity's strong pronouncements on intervention

in Central America?Sanden' commitment to an industrially-

based socialism bad collided with the com-munity-based peace movement's commitment

to ending foreign intervention. The casualtywa s some mutual trust.

U sua I1y , though, the working relationshipbetween city ball and the peace movement

wa s much smoother. The results were clearand often significant. Burlington developed,

aD d to a limited extent began to implement aforeign policy. A series of citywide votes

establisbedthelrameworlr.forlocalinitiatives-

cooperation and exchange with the SovietUnion, protests against intervention, people-

to-people programs. Designed to change

consciousness and challenge the dominant

anti-Communist logic, they did just that.Between 1981 and 1987, Burlington voted

to cut aid to ElSalvador, oppose crisis re-

location planning for nuclear war, freeze

nuclear weapons production, transfer military

funds tocivilian programs, condemn Contra

aid and divest from companies doing business

with apartheid South Africa. Buttressing the

efforts of the independent peace movement,

Sanders was a consistent and compeUing voice

for a new foreign policy.

Did such resolutions, statements and even

diplomatic links with Nicaragua pose a threat

lOcapitalist interests? Hardly. But they didcontribute to a profound change in attitudesand meshed weD with the efforts of other

activists around the state. By the late 1980s.most Vermont potiticians supported efforts

at disarmament and a non-interventionist

foreign poliey. Peace and, to a limited extent,

socialjustice,bad become "mainstream ..issues.

Itwas not so much that other questions were

ignored; the administration's record onyouthprograms, tenants' rights an d women's issueswas broad and impressive. Rather it was a

matter of priorities and focus. Issues affecting

women and the gay community, for example,sometimes took a back seat. Or they were

handled indirectly as mailers of civil rights

and economic justice.

Comparable worth, for instance, w a s aneconomic approach to sexual discrimination,

ambitious inintent and yet based on concernsabout equity discrimination, rather than sexual

oppression. The city's anti-discrimination

ordinance addressed the problems of gay men

and women as a matter of civil rights, yet

Sanders. among others, was not eager to carrythe banner of gay and lesbian rights. Most

reforms relating to sexual preference and

relations between the sexes did not originate

in city haJl. Normally, they received cautious

support at best.

One striking example was Sanders' response

jo questions from loeaJ feminists about his

support of proposals to prevent job discrimi-nation against gays "I will not make it a major

Movl.ng C.udously

T he thrust of reform efforts in Burlington

was primarily economic, driven by themayor's "redistribute the weaJth" logic .

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priority," he said bluntly.

The Sanders revolution helped to widen

the terms of debate about sexual relations,

but coul d not resol ve the dilem mas . The sam ecould also be said of its impact on perceptions

of taxation and development. Clearly, these

were matters no local community couldaddress on its own, even if a consensus couldbe established. Insome areas, even a consensusamong Progressives was missing.

Despite changes in local demographics andthe presence of a strong left-wing movement,

Burlington was not transformed into a post-

industrial Paris Commune. City hall power

was divided between the "old guard," which

dominated the city council and commissions,

and the "new guard" running the executive

branch. The community itself was diverse-

from the conservative North End (0theProgressive inner-city strongholds and main-

stream Democratic South End.

A majority of voters supported Sanders in

three re-election bids, but the reason was not

primarily his socialist sympathies. Rather itwas his anti-establishment style and ability to

"get things done." Burlingtonians had a popularleader, but not a clear direction. The Pro-

gressive program, to the extent that it existed

and could be implemented. was basically aset

of reforms glued together by fiery-yet

vague-speeches.

Idendry Crisis

T he Progressive Coalition was forced by

history to handle power before it even

began to organize itself. In a sense, it isremarkable that so many programs could have

been launched by such a loose collection of

activists and liberal professionals. Until 1986,

the only regular planning of Progressive

strategy occurred at the weekly Sunday meet-

ing of key administration and elected officials.

In an internal memo to coalition leaders in

1984,David Clavelle and Tim McKenzie, two

key organizers, noted that Progressives had

"been successful in creating effective campaign

organizations in some wards, yet unsuccessful

in maintaining some form of organization

between elections."

Though Sanders is currently pusbing forthe formation of a new political party in

Vermont and across the country, he was less

than eager to see it happen while he was

mayor. Disillusioned by his years as a "minor

party" candidate under the Liberty Union

banner in the 1970.. be felt that America-

and even Burlington-wasn't ready for a third

party.

Even after the Progressive Coalition took

shape, his connection with it remained am-

biguous. Despite all the hoopla about Burling-

ton's "socialist" government, Sanders never

sought office as anything but an "Indepen-dent." His political choices, he felt, were best

made without submitting them to group

approval.

Working with aldermanic allies and top

appointees, he could act fast and. as he put it,

"boldly." But the atmosphere in city hall was

less than chummy. since the boss was a man

of gruff speech and limited tact. Most sup-

porters not intimate with the city hall group

heard little about decisions until after they

had been made.

What was efficient and bold, unfortunately.

was not always so democratic.

By the time the Progressive Coalition was

formally launched in 1986. some of those il

hoped to attract and represent had drifted in

other directions. Many women, while wel-

coming specific programs, found the "PC" to

be too much of a "boys club." Due to the

impact of tbe Jackson campaign and the

Rainbow Coalition,left-leaning Democrats

were returning to the party. Some peace

activists found the mayor unresponsive. And

the Greens had concluded that the admini-stration was part of the problem, offering no

solutions to emerging ecological threats.

Building a solid and broad-based coalition

while struggling to bold onto power proved a

demanding task. Increasingly. the leaders of

the coalition were also city officials; tbeir

day-to-day struggles determined most of theagenda. Ifa choice bad to be made between

the practical and the ideal, or between tbe

"winnable" and the "good" fight, the former

usually held sway.

Maldag 01 Legend

B y the mid-1980s, the vision that the left

might one day "take over" Vermont was

no longer a far-fetched fantasy. Itwasn'tactually "the left," however, but Sanders him-

self who was positioned for victory.

Party loyalty had been dropping for more

than a decade. Up to4 0 percent of Vermontvoters considered themselves Independents.

Even many party stalwarts crossed party lines

to vote for the most likeable, trustworthy or

competent person in a race. Sanders profited

from these shifting realities of electoral life.

Like many successful politicians, he had be-

come a political institution. He could com-

mand respect and votes without tying himself

to any concrete program or organization.

In1986, he chose to run for governor against

Vermont's first female governor, Democrat

Madeleine Kunin, despite warnings that it

was the wrong race at the wrong time. For

almost any other leftist. the result would have

been a disaster. But Sanders managed to win

15 percent of the vote even without solid

organizational support, scoring best in the

most conservative area of the state, the

Northeast Kingdom.For the Rainbow activists who struck with

him, it was a trying experience that demon-

strated Sanders' preference for winning votes

over organizing a movement. But that did not

prevent him from returning to tbe well two

years later. His 1988 run for Congress became

a triumph of profound importance. Without

party backing he raised about S300,ooo.donti-

nated the debate, eclipsed Democrat Paul

Poirier and came within 3 percentage points

of winning.

"What I have been saying over and over

again," Sanders explained after that election,"is that it is absolutely outrageous that you

have a handful of giant corporations and

wealthy individuals who have so much wealth

and so much power when most people are not

getting a fair shake. And you know what?

People accept that message. People under-

stand that. Tbey're not stupid."

As he had done four times at the local level,

Sanders bad also handed the Democrats a

demoralizing defeat. making it clear that they

might one day be the state's "third party."But whether they will be replaced by a

statewide Progressive party or a permanent

campaign machine is very much the question.

For all Sanders' talk about the need for an

alternative to the Republicrats, he has done

little to date except make himself the de factohead of whatever eventually may emerge.

What Re-m.,

B

efore Sanders and the Progressives,

Burlington was a cultural backwater run

by an aging generation, unresponsive to

the changing needs of the community. Ifyouattended an aldermanic meeting with a prob-

lem. the first question asked was, "How longhave you lived here?" Political competition

was the exception; clannish Democrats and

compliant Republicans made the rules.

As the eighties end, the Queen City is

nationally known for its radical mystique and

"livability." Ex-urbanites and counter-cultural-

ists have transformed it from a provincial

town into a sophisticated cultural mecca,

socially conscious and highly charged. Yet

the fundamental nature of the change remainsdifficult to pinpoint.

Even a clear definition of the term "pro-

gressive" is elusive. At one time a progressivewas someone fighting for relief from the

devastating impact of a new industrial order.

Early in the 20th century Burlington had a

self-described progressive mayor named James

Burke, an Irish Catholic blacksmith who led a

pragmatic reform movement. In the 1960s,

when a new political alignment in Vermont

led to the election ofDemocrat Phil Hoff. the

forces behind the man also called themselves

progressive.

For Hoff and his allies, progressive meant

modernized state government. improved

schools and regionalized services. Twenty

years later the definition changed again,

incorporating tax reform, open government

and redistribution of wealth.

On any standard scale, the achievements of

the Sanders administration command high

marks. Since 1981. Burlington has clearly

become more dynamic, more open. The

unemployment rate is virtually the lowest in

the nation. The cultural forces set loose in the

eighties and nourished by local government

have made the urban core more a magnetthan ever.

But there are clouds on the horizon, some

new and others gathering force after years of

neglect. For Burlington, the price of success

isseen in traffic jams and high rents, toxic

dumps and a landfill crunch, the feminization

of poverty and the building boom.

In her 1989 race for mayor, Sandy Baird.

mounting a leftist challenge to the Progressives,

provided perhaps the most damning critique.

"The past and present administrations of our

city ," she charged, "are on a collision course

with both the natura! world and poor people."Clearly, the progressive movement of the

1980shas brought anew. expanded definition ofthe role of the city to Vermont. But unmet chal-

lenges remain, problems not yet solved or even

fully acknowledged by the new political estab-

lishment. Profound and crucial, tbey await

answers from another progressive wave.

Greg Guma ha s completed a book on Bur-lington and the Vermont progressive move-ment. Itwill be published in the fall by the

New Engkmd Press.

e-......T....h'''1-1888Bul i lng ton Vo tee Only

" " o rteat

B er ni e S en de . .. . I nd . 4 03 0 ( 43 %)

Gordon Pequette. Dem . 4020

Joseph McGreth. Ind. t 39

Richard Bove.lnd. t09t

1983

B er ni e S en de rs , I nd . 8 94 2 15 2' lb l

Judith Stephany, D e m . 4088James GIIeon . Rep. 2292

tll85

Bernie Send ..... Ind.

Brian Bums. Oem.

Oiene Gallagher. Ind.

William Murray, Ubert

Micheel Hacket t . NeutralRicherd Serlelle. I nd ,John Tatro. Ind_

t987

Bernie Sendera. Ind.

PeulLafayette. Oem.

t989

Pet er Cleve li e, Ind. 5917 C54%)

Nency Chioffi, Oem. 4824

Sendy Beird, Green 370

Michael Hackett , Tax Revolt 95

5780 C55%)

3275

1234

7220

34

17

890t C55'lbl

5594

Gov.mor

1988

Bernie Sanders, Ind.

Msdeleine Kunin, Oem .

Peter Smith, Rep.

Richerd Gottlieb, LU

3003 (21%)

7621

3333

16

Congressional RIle.

1988

Bernie Sanders, Ind.

Paul Poirier. Oem.

Peter Smith. Rep.

P e te r D i am o n d st on e . L UJim Hedbor, Uberl.

Morris Earle. Small ie

Beeutlful

8675 (50%)

3227

5014

52

169

32

NOTES1881; Richard Bova w a Democret running. . a n Ind.pendent _Iooing the DemocraticCaUCU8. Terry 8ouriciu8 w e . 81ao ehtctedalderman, the find Citizen. Ptlrty candidate.lected in the nation and S.nd ... first .11yon the boerd.

1983.JudithStephany.-tgnod from he.legislative 1 1 1to run. James GiIeon weB the1.lt Republicen to run for mayorin the 1910&

1985.DIane Gallaghor,.RopubllcM_ .._ranaaanlndopondant. __

wo fo r rnor Sandora ally. Brian Buma _ formar Democraltc __ .

1988:Sandara_15 __

Kuni n did not _50_ but_ '

confirmed by tile otateloglalatunl.

1887:Paul ~ _ _ 5aid_

t_Sandara_38_.lIIl11wlda.Pomerwaea'" leal.'ltCt'.Smilttwa eiectMt

witll., pereent.