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A Report by

C Sear, M Hulme,N Adger and K Brown

March 2001

Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, Medway Campus, Chatham Maritime, Kent ME4 4TBTyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, University Plain, Norwich NR4 7TJ

The Impacts of Global Climate Changeon the UK Overseas Territories

Technical Report and Stakeholder Survey


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The Impacts of Global Climate Change on the UK Overseas Territories

C Sear**, M Hulme#, N Adger#, and K Brown#

A Report Commissioned by the DFID Overseas Territories Unit

Full Technical Report - Contents

0 Executive Summary 3

1 Introduction and Terms of Reference 4

2 Climate Futures 5Changing Our Climate 5Global Climate 5

Regional Climates 5TemperatureRainfall

Climate Variability and Extremes 7El Nino and related complicating factorsTropical storms

DroughtSummary

Changes in Sea Level 7

Uncertainties 8Conclusion 8

3 Climate Change Impacts 11Economic and Physical Vulnerability 11Environmental Services at Risk 13

i. Coral Reefs and Reef Systems 13Climate change impacts on coral reefs

Sea surface temperature increases

Sea level riseIncreased atmospheric concentration of CO2

Implications for coral reef management

Implications for associated coastal habitats: mangrove forests and seagrass bedsii. Water Resources 17iii. Storms and Coastal Protection 17

Hurricane Lenny 17

4 Livelihoods on Small Islands and UK Overseas Territories 19i. Fisheries 19ii. Tourism 20iii. Health 20

iv. Infrastructure 21v. Insurance 21vi. Migration and Remittances 22

Livelihoods, Vulnerability and Coping Strategies 22Summary 22Policy Intervention and Community Ownership 23

Integrated Coastal Zone Management 24Regional Initiatives and Toolbox Methods 24

Summary 25

5 Survey Responses 26


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6 Knowledge Gaps, Development Implications and Opportunities 28Background 28Knowledge Gaps 28

Implications for Development Projects 30Environmental management projectsEngineering and infrastructure projects

Waste management schemesCoastal and marine resources management schemesLand resources management projects

Disaster management projectsRecommendations 32Conclusion 33

7 References Cited 34

8 Acronym List 40

Annexes 41

I Stakeholder Questionnaire 42

II Stakeholders Approached and Responses Received 43

III Summary of Stakeholder Response Key Points, by Question Area, by Island 46

** Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich,Medway Campus, Chatham Maritime, Kent ME4 4TB

# Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research,

University of East Anglia, University Plain, Norwich NR4 7TJ


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0. Executive Summary

0.1 This analysis of the impacts of future climate change on the UK Overseas Territories (UK OTs) finds that theleastlikely future for any of the UK OTs is that they will experience the same weather characteristics as in the past 50years. We conclude that regional warming in the Caribbean could be as much as 60C by 2100 (slightly less in the South

Atlantic and Pitcairn). It could, however, be as little as 10C or less. A greater than 30C rise by 2100 is most likely in allthree regions but we advise planning for the worst case scenario of a 5 or 60C temperature rise.

0.2 The effects of climate change on key island coastal natural resources (beaches) and marine ecosystems (coralreefs, mangrove forests and sea grasses) will have the most important impacts on island livelihoods. These effects willcome through increasingly severe tropical storms and hurricanes in the Caribbean (with wind speed increases of up to 20%

greater than today) and likely increases in the severity and frequency of low rainfall events and droughts in all areas. Thereis a significant gap in knowledge about the relationship between El Nio Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and global warming- limiting confidence in projections for storms, rainfall and ocean temperature. We find that no useful guide exists to future

regional climate in the South Atlantic. Global sea level rise is now projected to be as much as 0.9m by 2100 (0.5 m is thecentral estimate). This will have little medium term direct impact on UK OTs as people adapt to such slow change. But,raised sea levels will exacerbate the effects of more severe storms and will directly affect coastal infrastructure and tourism.

Sea level rise, wind and ocean state changes might risk access to South Atlantic islands and Pitcairn.

0.3 Detailed analysis of the likely impacts of climate change on small island societies reveals that impacts will occur

through their fragile natural resource base and the environmental services it provides. These services sustain the

livelihoods of these economically vulnerable states through a very small number of critical choke points: primarilyTourism, Fisheries, Water Supply and Migration, with lesser impacts on Infrastructure, Health and Agriculture. Climate

change should be of immediate concern to UK OT decision-makers. It affects the environmental services on which theUK OT societies depend most. Analysis and the responses of island stakeholders to the survey we undertook confirmthatacute disasters are the highest priority to governments and public in the Wider Caribbean and that climate change is

of little current concern. Key knowledge gaps are currently in these local populations and the islands governmentsthemselves. Decision-makers are un-informed about likely climate changes and impacts. Also, global and regionalinitiatives are not yet adding value at island or local scales. We find that UK OT governments and the international

donor community are not able to factor climate changes into their planning and cannot begin to develop appropriate andsustainable adaptation strategies.

0.4 We find that efforts to improve regional co-operation in disaster preparedness and management are needed butthese should be targeted at empowerment of local communities and island governments that most urgently need support.

Specifically we find that:

Pitcairn requires basic information about possible climate changes in its region over coming decades

St Helena needs basic information about likely regional climate changes and how these may impact its water supply

Tristan da Cunha and St Helena need information about climate change impacts on fish stocks and fisheries

Turks and Caicos and Anguilla (and many other islands) need to know more about climate-tourism relationships

All the Caribbean UK OTs need better information about projected future storm climates and extremes because ofthe importance of storms to island disaster management and development

All the selected UK OTs and other small island states need to know more about the relationship between climatechange, livelihoods and migration.

0.5 Global warming is already happening and risks to island communities will increase. We find that there are clear

opportunities available to the international donor community. Our priority recommendations are to invest in:

Filling gaps in knowledge of regional climate futures, especially in the South Atlantic and South Pacific, through co-ordinated scientific effort and informed by the needs of UK OT societies

Research into the interaction between El Nio Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and global warming

Reviewing regional and global initiatives to determine how to improve their influence and contribution, including atnational level, in addressing the impacts and issues identified in this report

Reviewing weather-related design criteria for planned developments in the UK OTs and other islands

Supporting public awareness and information campaigns through local media and NGOs

Providing training at government and community levels; giving robust briefing and advice on climate trends and

uncertainties at senior level, to inform the development of appropriate adaptation strategies

Kick-starting development of action plans to cope with and adapt to climate changes through targeted strengtheningof ministries responsible for environment and planning on an island by island basis

Providing community-focused interventions with the support of strengthened local NGOs, to facilitate local planningadaptation to climate change and bearing in mind traditional strategies for coping with weather-related disasters

Understanding better the relationship between key coastal and marine environments and the livelihoods they serve,using a systems-orientated approach to integrated coastal zone management

Supporting pilot projects to plan for likely future climate changes in one or more UK OT.


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1. Introduction

1.1 According to Grove (1994), our very first notions that human activities might cause climate change on regionalscales came from British and French island colonies. The administrations of Tobago, St Vincent, St Helena andMauritius were persuaded in the 18th and early 19th centuries that deforestation was linked to declines in rainfall. This

lead to protection of island forest resources.

1.2 Two hundred years later most people now agree that humanity causes global climate change. Global climate

changes are happening and having a widespread and discernible impact according to the new Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change report (IPCC, 2001). The report goes on to state: The most widespread direct risk to humansettlements is flooding and landslides, driven by rainfall, sea-level rise and tropical storms. By only 2025, watershortages may affect up to 5 billion people (ibid.). While the UK Overseas Territories (UK OTs) do not contribute a

significant proportion of these 5 billion people, they have especially fragile environments and un-diversified economiesand their sustainability is of concern to the UK and the international donor community.

1.3 The DFID Overseas Territories Unit (OTU) commissioned this rapid review and stakeholder survey, better tounderstand the prospects for climate change during the next century and the likely impacts on selected UK OTs and other

small island states. The UK OTs selected were: Anguilla, Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands, St Helena, Tristanda Cunha and the Pitcairn Islands. We undertook a desk study to synthesise existing information and research on theimpacts of climate change on the societies and livelihoods of these islands, with particular reference to health,

infrastructure development and migration and other key sectors: for example, fisheries and tourism. A rapid stakeholder

survey was to be planned and executed, to include internal and external stakeholders, and most particularly as many localUK OT stakeholders as could be identified and contacted within the short time frame of the study. Finally and most

importantly, the study was to highlight gaps in knowledge, prioritise key issues relating to climate change and theenvironment for the selected OTs and their regions and outline their implications for the international donor community.

1.4 We take as our starting point for consideration of the prospects for and impacts of climate change on theUK OTs, aPressure-State-Impacts-Response framework (see, for example, Turner, 1998). We apply the PSIR conceptto the interaction between climate change (pressure), environmentalstate, impacts on environmental services and

through these to impacts on livelihood assets and capital and thus on sustainability of livelihoods; and on theresponse of

policy- and local decision-making. This enables us to provide a simplified, yet systematic view of a most complex webof interactivity between climate change and society on these islands.

1.8 We explain in some detail in Section 4 the critical livelihood implications of future climate change by

considering the sectors of society that we find are most critical to UK OT livelihoods and those that will likely requiresignificant mitigation and adaptation strategies in response to predicted climate change.

1.9 Section 5 summarises the results of the stakeholder survey undertaken as a major component of this work. Thequestions we asked are included as Annex I. Annex II is a table listing all the stakeholders approached and highlightingthose who have responded by the time of writing. Annex III is a summary table of the key points of the responses

received.

1.10 Finally, in Section 6, we draw together the results of the desk study and stakeholder survey by considering

knowledge gaps from climate science to local information on adaptation strategies. We consider the implications offuture climate changes for donor interventions and we make ten specific recommendations.

1.5 A simple view

- from environment todecision - is shownright. Livelihood

sustainability is firmly

at the centre.

1.6 In this report, webegin by considering climate

futures, globally. Then wehome in on the regions andislands under consideration

(Section 2).

1.7 In Section 3 we

detail some of the complexinteractions between climate,environmental and natural

resources and environmental

services on these and similarislands.


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2. Climate Futures1

Changing Our Climate

2.1. Evidence for global warming over the last 100 years is now overwhelming. Instrumental climate data accurately

indicate changing mean surface air temperatures since 1856. These data show a global warming at the surface of about

0.6C, with the six warmest years all occurring in the last decade, since 1990. For most land areas the recent warminghas been greater at night than during the day, partly reflecting increased cloudiness over land. Warming over the oceans

has been somewhat less than this global average (though still significant) and tropical sea surface temperatures have risenover the past fifty years. In 1998 sea temperatures in the tropics reached record highs during an El Nio. Evidence forthe most recent warming is seen not only in climate observations but also in physical and biological indicators of

environmental change. These include rising sea level,retreating glaciers and ice-shelves, thinner and less extensive polarsea-ice and longer growing seasons in middle latitudes, not to mention recent severe impacts on tropical coral reefsystems (Reaser et al., 2000).

2.2 The science community and many policy makers are increasingly confident that many of the patterns associatedwith this warming betray the fingerprint of human causation, amongst other climate controls such as fluctuations in the

suns output (IPCC, 2001). Based on the current scientific consensus, it is now probable that in the next one hundredyears we will fashion a climate system that will make the Earth warmer than at any time in human history. Much of thisman-made climate change is already unstoppable.

Global Climate

2.3 Predicting future climates and sea-levels requires:1) adoption of one or more scenarios of future global greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere and2) quantified assessment of how changes in our emissions will alter global and regional climates

2.4 Since the future is inherently unpredictable, most analysts start by adopting a range of emissions scenarios thatreflect a variety of assumptions about how the world economy, demography and energy technology may evolve. The

most recent set of scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] (IPCC, 2000, 2001) includeforty such quantified descriptions of the future. These descriptions range from a low emissions scenario with about 5GtC2 emitted annually by 2100, to a high emissions scenario of around 29 GtC per annum. Current energy-related

emissions are about 6.8 GtC pa. When translated into atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations these equate to arange from 540 to 970 ppmv3 by 2001. Current concentration is about 370 ppmv. Since pre-industrial carbon dioxideconcentration was around 275 ppmv, reaching 570 ppmv is akin to an approximate doubling of normal CO2. Current

emissions scenarios indicate that humans will cause such a doubling to occur as soon as 2045 or as late as 2120.

2.5 The second stage in climate prediction takes these emissions futures and models the response of the climate

system to such additional human forcing, first considering near-surface air temperature. The newly approved ThirdAssessment Reportof the IPCC (IPCC 2001) presents a range of future increase of global air temperature by 2100 of 1.4to 5.80C from 1990 values (Figure 2.1). We have already seen 0.20C warming during the 1980s and 1990s. The IPCC

assessment represents a future decadal warming rate of between approximately 0.15 and 0.60C. Thus, by the year 2015,the range of additional warming predicted is between 0.2 and 0.90C. To assess the likelihood of possible regional futureclimates, climate models (now essentially the same as those used to forecast tomorrows weather patterns but with

oceans, ice and vegetation included) are developed, tested and used (for example, Zweirs and Kharin, 1998). From these,assessment can be made of long term changes in patterns of land and ocean temperatures, pressure, precipitation andmajor weather features, such as major storm tracks - though not individual storms (for example, Emanuel, 1997) and high

pressure belts. Current and future sea level changes are mainly the result of global ocean temperature changes as warmerwater expands in volume, together with the less important but direct results of ice sheet and glacier melt.

Regional Climates

Temperature

2.6 The above changes are for globally-averaged surface air temperature. We know that changes in temperature arelikely to be higher in high latitudes than in lower latitudes and higher over continents than over oceans. What are the

expected temperature increases in the Caribbean, South Atlantic and South Pacific and on and around the selectedUK OTs? Because they are small islands and generally in low latitudes, rates of warming here are likely to be slower

1

The term Climate Futures represents the set of scenarios generated by the climate science community whichcharacterise likely global, regional and local climates as they change through the 21 st century.2GtC - Gigatonnes of Carbon3 ppmv - parts per million by volume


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than the global average. In Table 2.1 we provide temperature estimates based on regional scaling of recent global climatemodel experiments using techniques described in Hulme et al., 2000. This is our basic temperature forecast for the three

regions and the selected UK OTs.

2.7 So, for example, the latest IPCC-endorsed range of global warming (1.4 to 5.80C by 2100) equates to between

0.8 and 5.80C for the eastern Caribbean over the current century and slightly less for the Atlantic and South Pacificislands. Figure 2.2 shows clearly a strong warming trend in St Helena air temperature, even after a first pass to factor outeffects caused by changes in instrumentation and site. This trend is stronger than we expected, based on the

aforementioned recent modelling experiments and warrants further investigation. Table 2.1 is also valid for sea surfacetemperature around the coasts of small islands over the next century. However, changes in ocean currents and up-wellingregimes may lead to variations we cannot yet predict and might directly impact sensitive marine ecosystems.

UK Overseas Territory Regional Annual Temperature

Scaling Factor (0C)

Warming Range by 2100 (0C)

Eastern Caribbean* 0.8 0.2 0.8 to 5.8

St Helena 0.7 0.2 0.7 to 5.2

Tristan da Cunha 0.7 0.2 0.7 to 5.2

Pitcairn Island 0.6 0.2 0.6 to 4.6* Eastern Caribbean includes Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands and Anguilla

Table 2.1: Scaling factors for the selected UK OTs to be applied to projections of global temperature change for annualtemperature. Global warming range is from 1.4 to 5.80C. (Based on the methods described in Hulme et al., 2000).

Rainfall

2.8 New et al., 2001 analyse recent global and regional changes in precipitation. They find that the most recent

warming has been accompanied by somewhat less rainfall in St Helena and the southern and eastern Caribbean, wetterconditions in the northern Caribbean and Bahamian islands, a slight fall around Pitcairn Island and no change aroundTristan da Cunha. Figure 2.3 shows some indication of rainfall variability on Pitcairn Island, confirming a recent slight

reduction - but the record is short. A similar analysis of the St Helena record (not shown) indicates no definitive recenttrends. New et al. also find that for all the selected UK OTs, the dominant control of seasonal rainfall is El Nio

Southern Oscillation (ENSO) variation. A key conclusion, therefore, is that ENSO variability now, and in future as it

interacts with global warming in the future, is of prime concern to the UK OT environments and their societies.

2.9 As the world continues to warm, it also becomes wetter overall with global precipitation increasing by between1 and 3% for each degree of global warming (Hulme et al., 1998). Thus, temperature projections indicate a global

average rainfall increase of between 1.4 and 17.4%. This is clearly a wide range, from essentially no change to asignificant increase. Regional differences in the changes in precipitation are much greater than for temperature and also

vary by season. So, predicting just what regional changes are likely using current climate models is an uncertain science.Nevertheless, we can provide estimates following Hulme et al., 2000 (see Table 2.2). No clear signal emerges for any of

the relevant UK OTs with regard to annual precipitation totals, but there is some indication for changes in seasonal

distribution. For example, in the eastern Caribbean, projected increases in December - February rainfall are offset bydecreases in June - August rainfall. These changes will impact on local agricultural practices and possibly on tourism.

2.10 Under the highest of the global temperature projections (5.80C by 2100), these seasonal changes in rainfall may

amount to as much as 40%. The large uncertainty in these regional and seasonal rainfall changes is shown by theranges in Table 2.2. Nevertheless, such changes are out of the range of recent experience and thus the possibility of their

occurrence should be of significant concern to the UK OTs. We comment on rainfall intensities in the section below.

UK Overseas

Territory

Estimated % Change in Rainfall

per 10C of Global Warming

Estimated % Change in Rainfall

by 2100

ANNUAL DJF#

JJA ANNUAL DJF JJA

Eastern Caribbean* -1 3 +3 6 -4 6 -23 to +12 -17 to +52 -58 to +12

St Helena -1 3 -2 6 -4 6 -23 to +12 -46 to +23 -58 to +12

Tristan da Cunha 0 3 -2 6 -1 6 -17 to +17 -46 to +23 -41 to +29

Pitcairn Island 0 3 +1 6 +1 6 -17 to +17 -29 to +41 -29 to +41

* Eastern Caribbean includes Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Anguilla;

#

DJF=Dec+Jan+Feb/3;

#

JJA=Jun+Jul+Aug/3

Table 2.2: Scaling factors for the UK OTs to be applied to projections of global precipitation change for annual andseasonal rainfall. (Based on the methods described in Hulme et al., 2000).


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Climate Variability and Extremes

El Nio and related complicating factors

2.11 As noted above, in the regions in question El Nio Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is the major determinant of

year-to-year climate variations and it is now thought that changes in global temperature will alter the characteristics ofENSO behaviour and its effects on, for example, storminess (Elsner et al., 1999). Exactly what these changes will be is

not yet well determined, although a number of studies suggest at least a small increase in the amplitude of El Nio events

over the next 100 years (IPCC, 2001). Notwithstanding this uncertainty, global warming is likely to lead to greaterextremes of drought and heavy rainfall and flooding that occur with El Nio and La Nia events in many regions (IPCC,2001). For example, ENSO-related droughts in the eastern Caribbean might become more intense as might the frequency

of tropical storms during La Nia episodes. It is also likely that with background warming of the tropical oceans, thefrequency of given high sea surface temperature thresholds being exceeded during El Nio events will increase. Thismay well have implications for coral bleaching and other direct environmental impacts as we describe in Section 3.

Tropical storms

2.12 Changes in tropical cyclone behaviour as the world warms are now considered probable, though again thedetails of these changes are not yet well known (Lighthill et al., 1994). Research in the 1980s and early 1990s suggested

that tropical storms would be more frequent in a warmer Caribbean (for example, see Gable and Aubrey, 1990;Gable et al., 1990; and Gray, 1993). This may still be the public perception in the Caribbean and still accepted by many

decision-makers in the region. But in the late 1990s, more careful modelling has shown that the numbers of storms maynot, after all, increase, nor their regional or local distributions change. However, this research indicates that increases in

peak wind and peak precipitation intensities of up to between 10 and 20% may well be associated with tropical cyclonesin a warmer world (Bergtsson, 1996; Henderson-Sellers et al., 1998; Knutson et al., 1998; Landsea et al., 1999 and

IPCC, 2001). Of the selected UK OTs, those in the Caribbean are well known to be especially vulnerable to damage

from tropical storms and hurricanes and increases in rainfall and wind speed associated with these storms must be ofconcern.

Drought

2.13 For many societies lack of rainfall is a major (if not the critical) constraint on livelihood sustainability. In some

of the target UK OTs, high-profile and more acute climate-related disasters, such as tropical storms, are clearly importantbut future drought may also impact on sustainability and development. This is especially the case where water resources

are limited, such as in St Helena and Anguilla. Our analysis (Table 2.2) forecasts (with large uncertainty) that increasedseasonality of rainfall would result in a higher frequency of drought through the next decades, especially but notexclusively, in the Eastern Caribbean. So, improved forecasts of regional climates are needed to provide more reliableestimates of future rainfall and likelihood of drought.

Summary

In summary, the most likely scenario for climate extremes affecting the selected UK OTs, is:

the same long term tropical storm frequency as now, modulated by ENSO variations

storms will be more intense, with more rain, up to 20% stronger winds and higher storm surges

as the world warms, regional rainfall climates will change, with an increased risk of droughts, but

current forecast uncertainty is large, so

while we can be confident of trends, we cannot yet be sure of magnitudes of change.

Changes in Sea Level

2.14 Global average sea level has been rising at the rate of about 1.5 cm / decade during the twentieth century. The

majority of this increase is directly related to rising temperatures - as ocean water warms its volume increases. The restis due to indirect effects - melting glaciers and ice. The IPCC projections for future sea-level, consistent with those forglobal temperature cited above, suggest rises in average sea-level during the coming century of between 0.9 and 8.8 cm /

decade (IPCC, 2001). This represents an acceleration in the rate of sea level rise and although there are likely to be someregional differences in the rate of increase these differences are relatively small and not easily quantified. Under a worstcase scenario therefore, small islands will need to adapt to a rise in sea level over the next 100 years of up to nearly one

metre (with rises of 1 cm / year on average).

2.15 Changes in ice sheet mass balance and ocean thermal expansion will take several centuries to adjust to the

current increase in global temperature. This means that even if efforts to mitigate climate change are successful andglobal temperature stabilises later this century, future generations will see continued increases in sea level for at leastanother 1,000 years. Depending on the precise behaviour of the ice sheets and the eventual temperature at which global


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climate stabilises, sea-level rise over the next millennium could range from 3 m to over 10 m (IPCC, 2001). Consideringhow many human beings and what proportion of the flora and fauna of the Earth live close to or rely on coastal

environments, it hardly needs stating that this very long term scenario might have dire consequences for human kindand the Earth as we now know it.

Uncertainties

2.16 The future is, of course, uncertain and climate futures are no exception. There are two generic sources of

uncertainty in climate prediction: uncertainty concerning future world development, affecting how greenhouse gas emissions will change

uncertainty associated with modelling of the Earths climate system and the accuracy of climate models.

2.17 The first source of uncertainty will not be resolved by improvements in climate science. The second source ofuncertainty is, in principle, partly resolvable given adequate investment in the science base and continued expansion of

computing power (Hulme and Carter, 1999). However, it is generally accepted that complexity and chaotic nature of theclimate system will always preclude forecasting perfection.

2.18 The range ofglobal warming: 1.4 to 5.8degC by 2100; is a function of both sources of uncertainty:

between 25 and 40% of the range is due to unknown future emissions

60 to 75% is due to imperfect modelling.

2.19 So, as much more than half the uncertainty is tractable, we expect intensive climate system-oriented research tomake significant inroads into the overall prediction uncertainty over the next decades.

2.20 For sea-level rise: between a 9cm and a 88cm rise by 2100; nearly all the range arises from our imperfectunderstanding and modelling of ice-sheet dynamics and ocean circulation. In other words, future rises in sea-level are

less sensitive to different emissions growth curves than are rises in global temperature and thus the current projectionrange is reliable. But, again, near-future intensive research may significantly reduce the current large uncertainty.

2.21 Given the current state of our understanding, it is useful to summarise relative levels of confidence we have inthe components of future global change predictions. These are summarised in Table 2.3.

Prediction Statement Confidence Level

Atmospheric CO2 concentration increase Very High

Global sea-level rise Very High

Global temperature increase High

Regional temperature increase Moderate

Increase in hurricane intensity Moderate / Low

Increased amplitude of ENSO events Moderate / Low

Regional precipitation change Low

Table 2.3: Confidence levels for changes associated with global warming. (Adapted from IPCC, 2001).

2.22 Notwithstanding these different levels of confidence, it is safe to conclude that:

The least likely future for any of the UK OTs is to experience the same weather characteristics as in the past 50 years

2.23 Medium to long-term strategic planning in sectors that are clearly climate sensitive is well advised to adopt oneor more scenarios of climate change rather than use design criteria that rely upon historical weather statistics.

Assimilating uncertainty about future climates into such strategic planning is a significant challenge to modern society.

Conclusion

2.24 Global climate has changed significantly in the last 150 years. Currently, temperature increase is acceleratingand will have direct and indirect, regional and local impacts. Some of the most severe impacts will be on small island

states (IPCC, 2001), including the selected UK OTs. On balance, we can expect higher temperatures in coming decades(up to 60C higher by 2100) and increasingly severe storms (especially in the Wider Caribbean). It is likely that rainfallpatterns will change but exactly how, we do not yet know (especially in the Wider Caribbean and South Atlantic). The

latest projections suggest that rainfall is more likely to be higher than lower in the Eastern Caribbean in winter(December to February) and more likely to be lower than higher in the summer (June-August) but we indicate that ourconfidence in this is low. In the South Atlantic lower rainfall might occur in both seasons (again, a low confidence


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forecast) but annual totals could be higher, lower or unchanged. As Maunder et al., (1995) put it: St Helena has a

remarkably stable sub-tropical climate. So stable in fact that, even though older islanders were convinced that

climate changes had occurred in their lifetimes, a scientific analysis could find no evidence of any significant change.Our brief analysis indicates a possible vindication of the local view - we find a first indication of a strong 2 0C warmingover 60 years. Changes in the seasonal distribution of rainfall would affect water availability on St Helena especially and

elsewhere amongst the selected UK OTs with possible increased frequency and /or severity of droughts. This, togetherwith increases in the severity of tropical storms, would have significant implications for several sectors from agricultureand construction to infrastructure and tourism.

2.25 More research is needed to consolidate the prediction of increasingly severe tropical storms and the linkagebetween global warming and ENSO variations. We contend that overall warming and slow sea level rises may not pose a

great threat to small islands as populations gradually assimilate change, as does Hay (2000). Rather, local extremeweather events will dominate slow changes. As Hay puts it: localised extreme events whose relationship with climatechange is not yet well understood are likely to be of far greater significance.

Figure 2.1: A synthesis of current projections of global surface air temperatures in the 21st

Century from the IPCC,including current best estimates and error bars for global temperature during the past millennium (IPCC, 2001). Notethat even the most conservative estimate of 21st Century temperature change far exceeds any variations during the past1000 years.


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Figure 2.2: Annual mean temperature anomaly (C) for St Helena, 1893 to 1999; relative to the 1951 to 1980 reference

period and based on the record of station 619010 and from the Climate Research Unit data archive. (P. D. Jones,pers. comm., 2001). Note the strong warming trend of around 20C in the record since 1930 (10 since 1970). Further notethat this record has been adjusted for changes to the specific location of the St Helena climate station, 619010.

Figure 2.3: Annual total precipitation anomaly (%) for Pitcairn, 1940 to 1999; relative to a 1954 to 1980 referenceperiod and based on the record of station 919600 and from the Climate Research Unit data archive. (P. D. Jones,

pers. comm., 2001). Note the three years of poor rains from 1976 to 1978 and again from 1996 to 1998.

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

C

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

%


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UK OT Population

(1998)

Major

Export

Land

areakm2

Visitors

(1997)**

Unemploy-

ment Rate

Port

Usabledays

Air-

port(y/n)

Fish

Caught

Anguilla 11,915 fishing 90 7% 365 Y 300 to 500

tonnes

Montserrat 4,500 villa-

tourism

102 6% not all-

weather

heli-

portPitcairn Islands 54 postage

stamps54 subsistence

economynot all-weather

N

St Helena 5,000 fishing

licences,overseas

remittance

122 8,698 15% not all-

weather

N

Tristan da Cunha 297 crayfish,

overseasremittance

98 negligible 60 to 70 N

Turks and Caicos 20,000 tourism,offshore

finance

500 100,000 10% nocruise

facility

Y $3 millionsales of

lobster,

conch andother

British Virgin

Islands (forcomparison)

19,107 tourism,

financialservices

153 365,668 3.3% 365## Y

Table 3.2: Selected socio-economic indicators for the selected UK Overseas Territories (adapted from DFID, 1999).** Overnight + cruise ship visitors

## Two cruise ship passenger terminals were built in 1998.

3.5 The selected UK OTs rely heavily on external markets for both finance and trade:

having un-diversified economies

relying on exporting few traded goods (for example, bananas, sugar, lobsters, stamps) relying increasingly on tourism earnings and overseas aid.

3.6 They are economically remote as measured by high transport costs of traded goods. Several are also especiallyprone to acute natural disasters (for example, volcanic eruptions and tropical storms) which can cause infrastructural and

economic disruption and loss of exports as well as risk to life and of forced migration. A summary of major issues facingeach island are shown in Table 3.3.

3.7 Thus, the selected UK OTs are already vulnerable. Future climate change may exacerbate vulnerability andinteract with weather extremes to increase the significance of weather-related events. Previous IPCC reports (forexample, Bijlsma et al., 1996) and literature reviewed for this study have identified common threats to small islands from

climate change. These are threats to terrestrial and marine environments on which the societies and economies aredirectly or indirectly, uniquely dependent (for example, see Alm et al., 1993; Snedaker, 1993; Vincente et al., 1993;

Cronk, 1997; Ellison et al., 1997; Bergstrom et al., 1999; Rnnbck, 1999). Threats include increased intensity oftropical cyclones, increased seasonal rainfall variability, altitudinal shifts in vegetation zones (affecting mountainousislands such as St Helena, Tristan da Cunha and Montserrat and threatening conservation of biodiversity), impacts oftemperature and rainfall changes on coastal environments (Nicholls et al., 1999; Oldfield and Sheppard, 1997), soil

fertility and on disease vectors. There are also wide-ranging and long term impacts of sea level rise on replacement andmaintenance of coastal infrastructure (Hendry, 1993) and on agriculture, through salination (Singh, 1997). These impactsare potentially important for the selected UK OTs.

3.8 In the inshore marine environment, coral reefs, sea grass and mangroves are threatened. Because these systemsprovide buffers to storm damage, direct and indirect impacts on beaches and beach-dependent tourism are expected as

climates changes, as well as directly on fish stocks and inshore artisanal fisheries. Again, these impacts are especiallyrelevant to the selected UK OTs.

3.9 These threats were assessed by the IPCC to be exacerbated by the economic vulnerability parameters(Pearce et al., 1996), especially relevant to the UK OTs.


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UK OT Significant Issues

Anguilla low-lying coralline island, limited natural resource base, limited water resources

small populationover-fishing of inshore stocksgrowing dependence on tourism (mostly from the US) and financial services

Montserrat (pre-eruptions) increasing tourism dependencesmall population, limited land (50% devastated by eruptions)(post-eruption) depend on UK aid for re-building

(post-eruptions) migration

Pitcairn Islands rain-limited subsistence agriculture, tiny population (non-viable)no airstrip only one vulnerable access point (small bay with jetty)dependent on declining cruise ship tourism for sales of handicrafts and stamps

no airport, very isolated, total dependence on UK aid

St Helena limited water resources, environmental degradationsmall population, un-diversified economydependent on revenues from fishing licences

no airport, non-continuous sea access, dependent on UK aid, strategic location

Tristan da

Cunha

potential natural hazard (active volcano last eruption: 1961)

very small population, small un-diversified economyno airport, non-continuous sea access

reliant on overseas remittances, dependent on UK aid, strategic location

Turks andCaicos Islands

very low lying atoll, potential threat from sea level risesmall populationdependent on tourism and financial services

problems with Haitian refugees

British VirginIslands (forcomparison)

very small domestic marketshigh costs associated with inter-island transportagriculture and manufacturing account for less than 5% of GDP

growing dependence on tourism and offshore financial services

Table 3.3: Summary of significant issues for selected UK Overseas Territories.

3.10 In summary, the selected UK OTs, like other small island states, are dominated by coastal and marine systemsand their economies and the livelihoods of their residents are dependent on a few vital resources and environmentalservices, serving local populations and large numbers of tourists. A critical constraint on economic development and

human habitation on many small islands is water supply. This is potentially a limiting factor, particularly on Pitcairn,St Helena and Anguilla. Below, we examine in more detail future climate change on the UK OTs with reference to theseimportant natural resource systems, coastal resources and environments and water resources.

Environmental Services At Risk

3.11 Of all the natural resource systems in the coastal zone that provide environmental or ecological services to thelivelihoods of habitants of several selected UK OTs and many other tropical and sub-tropical small islands, coral reefs

are considered the most important. Yet, they are arguably the most fragile natural systems and the most at risk fromclimate changes. Recent coral bleaching on reefs world-wide (for example, Sheppard, 1999), on top of pollution andother stresses, has made them currently the highest profile natural resource relevant to the tropical UK OTs.

i. Coral Reefs and Reef Systems

3.12 Coral reefs are important coastal ecosystem components, providing a range of valuable economic, social and

environmental services at the local, national and regional levels for small-island developing states. Hence they contributeto the sustainability of livelihoods on several UK OTs. Healthy coral reef systems are also considered to be of globalimportance because they are highly bio-diverse. There is now a wide literature concerning reef environments,

conservation and services and the importance of reefs for protecting coastal systems from storm damage and indeed,much of the literature surveyed for this study are concerned with reef systems.

3.13 Coral reefs usually occur and survive within a narrow range of environments, limited by salinity, temperatureand by nutrient and sediment loads. Extremes for survival are within 3.3% and 3.6% (salinity) and between 18o and 36oC


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(Hubbard, 1997). Coral reefs also require some degree of wave energy to pass nutrients and waste through the systemsand reef structures require light penetration to enable the symbiotic algae to photosynthesise to create the coral skeleton.

3.14 Diverse economic goods come from reef systems, including: seafood products, raw materials for medicines, fishfor the aquarium trade, coral blocks and mineral oil and gas. Reefs also provide beneficial indirect environmental

services as they support recreation, provide aesthetic value and support community livelihoods. They also provide arange of environmental services, grouped under physical structure, biotic, bio-geochemical and informational services.

3.15 Physically, coral reefs provide shoreline protection, promote growth of mangroves and sea grasses and generatecoral sand. Biotic services include maintenance of habitats, maintenance of bio-diversity and a genetic library, regulationof ecosystem processes and functions, and maintenance of biological resilience (see for example, Maul, 1993; Milliman,

1993; Moberg and Folke, 1999; Souter and Linden, 2000; Gaudian and Medley, 2000; Gell and Watson, 2000 and manyothers).

3.16 As sea temperatures rise or turbidity and nutrient levels change, ambient conditions may move outside a coralsnormal range. Other impacts of climate change on coral reefs and on the livelihoods they support depend on interactionswith other environmental stresses. Coral reef resilience can be reduced through human activities:

on land via agricultural pollution (Rawlins et al., 1998), and poorly treated sewage (Hunter and Evans, 1995)

in the coastal zone through inefficient fisheries management, including trap-fishing (Knaap, 1993) and over-fishing(Russ and Alcala, 1989)

indirectly through land development or clearance (Nowlis et al., 1997)

through natural hazards, such as tropical storms, sea temperature and sea level changes (Lugo, 2000)

3.17 Natural impacts come from storm damage (for example, Lugo et al., 2000) and freshwater inputs from floods or

heavy rains. In the Caribbean, dust blown across the Atlantic from Africa can smother coral reefs or bring disease (Shinnet al., 2000). Recently, overwhelming evidence has accrued that global climate change is seriously affecting coral reefs

throughout the tropics (Sheppard, 1999). The impact of climate change on sea surface temperature has already been feltand the consequent mass coral reef mortality that resulted, through coral bleaching (when the symbiotic algae die, leavingwhite and dead coral exoskeletons). This has been experienced around the world (Reaser et al., 2000). Overly warm

water has caused bleaching and major kills on many reef systems, such as in the Maldives, Chagos Islands, BritishIndian Ocean Territory (Sheppard, 1999), Caribbean (for example, Singh, 1997) and elsewhere. The current state ofcoral reefs in selected island states is summarised in Table 3.4 below.

Climate change impacts on coral reefs

3.18 Global warming will have several major impacts on coral reefs (Done, 1999; Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999 andWestmacott et al., 2000), through:

1. sea surface temperature increase

2. sea level rise3. atmospheric CO2 increases, leading to reduced calcification rates.

3.19 These and other critical environmental changes may result from altered ocean circulation patterns. These mayaffect any of the above as well as nutrient supply and sunlight - through changes in water turbidity. It is also likely thatincreased intensity or frequency of severe weather events will alter the environment in which corals currently grow and

change the composition of coral reefs of the future. Below, we look a little more closely at the major impacts of rises intemperature, sea level and CO2.

Sea surface temperature increases

3.20 As noted above, many fragile reef systems have already been dramatically affected by global warming and / orENSO events over the last decade. If ambient ocean temperatures move outside a limited range coral bleaching occurs

and usually results in coral death. As tropical sea surface temperatures have risen over the past few decades, so coralreefs around the world have suffered, especially in the warmest year (1998), which saw the most severe bleaching onrecord (Wilkinson, 2000). Recent high sea surface temperatures leading to bleaching have been encouraged by extreme

ENSO events (Renwick, 1998). This re-emphasises the need for further information on probable interactions betweenglobal warming and ENSO. Though large scale bleaching episodes are usually attributable to high sea surfacetemperatures, small scale bleaching is more like to result from direct human impacts, such as increasing turbidity and

pollution. It is now widely accepted that coral reef systems are especially at risk when regional sea surface temperaturesreach or exceed those expected during the warmest months of the year (Goreau and Hayes, 1994; Reaser et al., 2000).

3.21 Even widespread bleaching is not always terminal and the reef ecosystems can recover quickly in certaincircumstances (Brown et al., 2000) and may prove more resilient than we currently expect. But, increasing evidence

suggests that corals weakened by stress may be more susceptible to bleaching events (Brown, 1997).


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UK OT Predominant Reef

Types

State of the Reefs Prevalence of Disease /

Bleaching

Fish

Diversity

Anguilla Fringing reefs 17kmlong off south-east

coast and longer tonorth side

In good condition recovered fromhurricane damage in the 1960s

No information Not known

Montserrat Small patch reefsclose to shore.

Few patch reefs indeeper water

High energy, erosion pronecoastline (naturally). In 1995, 37

hard coral spp., 20 to 45% live coralcover

No informationcollected since 1995

eruptions

Turks andCaicos

Islands

Fringing reefs (1-2km offshore).

Shallow patch aroundall 40 cays

Popular locations: low cover on reeftop (


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resilience of the worlds coral reefs. Now it is widely accepted that global climate change is of enormous significance,

especially as it is out of the control of local resource managers or national policy makers in the affected small islands.

3.25 Table 3.4 summaries the state of the coral reefs of six UK OTs. They represent an important resource for these

states. For some reef systems Wilkinson (2000) considers the main threats to be from sewage and sedimentation,associated with population and tourism growth and shoreline development, leading also to rapid growth in marineactivities (yachting, diving and snorkelling). The Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) are a significant exporter of lobster and

conch, which are critically dependent on the health of coral reef systems.

3.26 In summary, the consequences of climate changes on reef environments are significant. Human activities and

climate change interact significantly to impact on reef resilience (Nystrm et al., 2000), feeding through to fishing andtourism (see later). Prior to recent bleaching events there was little research into medium and long term effects of climatechange and little or no systematic synthesis of direct evidence. Fishing yields will decline as reef viability decreases and

as reef ecosystems become less productive there will be knock-on effects on other coastal environments and on birds andmarine animals, although the size of these impacts remains to be determined (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999). The impact ofthese changes on protein sources for small islands that depend on reefs for their subsistence is likely to be severe, as is

the impact on bio-diverse coastal environments and coastal tourism that demands accessible, diverse and high qualitycoral reef resources (Honey, 1999).

Implications for associated coastal habitats: mangrove forests and seagrass beds

3.27 Mangroves provide an important set of services and functions in terms of protecting island coastlines against

storms, as nutrient sinks, and in providing a habitat for wildlife and valuable products for humans (see, for example,Gable et al., 1990; Hendry, 1993; and Rnnbck, 1999). According to Gable et al., (1990) mangrove forests are, onaverage, 19 times more productive than the open ocean and 2 5 times more productive that agricultural land an

important ecological resource that supports fisheries, tourism and provides coastal storm buffers to many islands,including some selected UK OTs. But, in protecting Jamaicas beaches from Hurricane Gilbert, 60% of the countrysmangrove forest was lost to this one storm. Without mangroves to protect the coast, a storm following soon afterwards

could have been catastrophic. There is much historical evidence of similar impacts on other Caribbean islands, includingthe selected UK OTs.

3.28 The resilience of mangroves to sea level rise varies according to the composition and status of the stand andfactors such as tidal range and sediment supply. In some instances (for example, where sediment supply is low) accretion

of mangroves may not be able to keep up with sea level rises, whereas in some protected coastal settings inundation oflow lying coastal land may promote the expansion of mangrove with rising sea level.

3.29 According to Hendry (1993), most mangrove forests should be able to keep pace with sea level rises of up to

1 cm / year (at about the limit of projections) but will be stressed or die back at greater rates. Overall, what evidencethere is, points to some loss of mangroves on small islands as a result of sea level rise and this will further exacerbate theimpacts of storms and has other deleterious effects on the ecology and stability of coastal systems and of beaches and

local fisheries. Vincente (1993) and Snedaker (1993) both considered that mangroves may be more at risk fromreductions in rainfall and freshwater inputs than from temperature or sea level rise and as we have seen, changes inregional and local rainfall are currently extremely difficult to resolve. Clearly, further work is urgently needed to

determine probable impacts of climate change on mangrove resources.

3.30 Sea grasses are also associated with the shallow inter-tidal zone. They are often a major component of reef

ecosystems in the shallow, sheltered habitats that fringing reefs encourage and are thought to be important habitats formarine fish. In some places they provide nursery areas for valuable fish species (Moberg and Folke, 1999; Gaudian andMedley, 2000). Sea grasses are important to Anguilla, TCI and to a lesser degree, Montserrat. Sea grasses are thought to

be sensitive to changes in water temperature and to changes in dissolved CO2 (Short and Neckles, 1999). Furthermore,suspended sediment in water may adversely affect sea grass productivity in comparison to other species, such as algae(Moberg and Folke, 1999). The impacts of climate change on sea grasses has not been widely studied but needs to be.

Summary

3.31 In summary, many tropical small island states, including the Caribbean UK OTs have important reef systemswith associated mangrove forests and sea grass beds. Little integrated research has been undertaken on the impacts onclimate change on these vital natural resources. Much more work is needed and this should take a systems approach, as

these resources and the environmental services they provide, are intimately interconnected within the islands coastal

ecosystems. We suggest later that local integrated coastal zone management should address these concerns.


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ii. Water Resources

3.32 The availability of water is often a limiting factor for the economic and social development of small islands,many of which rely on a single source: groundwater, rainwater, surface reservoirs or even rivers. The situation is

especially critical in the low limestone islands of the Eastern Caribbean, where water supplies depend on seasonalrainfall. Year to year and season to season rainfall variations in these and other tropical and sub-tropical small islands arestrongly associated with ENSO events (Dai and Wigley, 2000). In the Caribbean, especially towards the north, droughts

are generally more frequent in El Nio years with wetter conditions in La Nia years. Future changes to rainfall regimes,as suggested in Section 2, would put Anguilla particularly at risk from seasonal drought, variable water supply anddiminishing water resources. Such environmental change would increase the vulnerability of Anguilla communities and

might constrain sustainable development over the next few decades, unless adaptive measures are taken now.

3.33 Unfortunately, modelled future patterns of rainfall are uncertain (see Section 2). The risk of increased frequency

or severity of seasonal droughts associated with ENSO phenomena and linkage between ENSO strength and globalwarming are even more poorly understood. These areas of climate change science require further examination before ourforecast of water availability in the UK OTs can be firmer. Other threats to water resources are increased flood risks and

impeded drainage and elevated water tables, which may pose particular engineering problems. With sea level rise andrising water tables, increased salination of coastal water supplies is likely and may exacerbate salinity problems alreadyexperienced on some small islands.

3.34 Options available to small islands for reducing adverse effects of climate change on water supply appear limited.The imperative is to develop better systems of water resource management and allocation, water harvesting and

conservation methods. Desalination may be a feasible option for some islands.

iii. Storms and Coastal Protection

3.35 Increases in the intensity of tropical storms are now thought likely in the coming decades (though not certainlyfor the South Atlantic and eastern South Pacific). Vincente (1993) suggested that soil erosion, landslides and mudslides

will be perhaps the most significant risk to livelihoods and lives on Antillean Caribbean islands (like Anguilla) as rainfallintensity increases; especially where increasingly dense populations extend habitats, infrastructure and agricultural landsonto increasingly steep slopes at the expense of forests. The devastation that Hurricane Mitch dealt to several Central

American countries in 1998 should be a clear warning to many of these societies.

3.36 Long term sea level rise over coming decades will change the size and distribution of coastal wetlands andincrease the risk of coastal flooding (Wall, 1998; Nicholls et al., 1999). This will have both positive and negative

impacts on small islands, especially TCI (40% of the land area of the Bahamian atolls is classified as wetland accordingto Oldfield and Sheppard, 1997). Sea level rises will also increase the risk of storm-generated coastal and beach erosion

and will increase the risk of salination of rivers and estuarine environments and salt water intrusions into coastal groundwaters, jeopardising agricultural production in and around coastal communities of the UK OTs, notably Anguilla andTCI.

Hurricane Lenny

3.37 To emphasise the pre-dominance of tropical storms and hurricanes as a dynamic agent for changing the coastalenvironments of several UK OTs, we list below some salient facts about Hurricane Lenny, the most recent storm ofsignificance to a UK OT, which hammered the Antillean islands, including Anguilla, in November 1999.

Hurricane Lenny developed late in the Caribbean hurricane season, in mid-November It developed inside the Caribbean itself, it did not develop outside and enter from the east a rare event It took a easterly or north-easterly track a rare event (unprecedented in 113 years of record)

The last two characteristics ensured that it struck islands west coasts, as opposed to east coasts, as is normal

Lenny struck the Antillean islands only one month after Hurricane Jose.

At its peak, Lenny was a Category 4 hurricane (on a severity scale of 1 to 5; there were only five Category 5Caribbean hurricanes in the 20th Century)

Maximum wind speeds reached 150 mph

Lenny struck Anguillas tourist centres and beaches

According to some reports, some beaches were little damaged, and

Anguilla hotels were not flooded (Anguilla News , 28 / 11 / 1999)

According to other reports, 4 m waves badly eroded Anguillas tourist beaches

500 mm (20) rain fell on Anguilla in 2 days, causing widespread flooding (http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1999/lenny ).


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3.38 The force of the wind is proportional to the square of the wind speed. Current IPCC predictions for 10 to 20%

higher wind speeds and thus more intense tropical storms during coming decades, if proved correct, indicate that moreCategory 4 and 5 hurricanes will occur in the Caribbean than have in the past century. This would lead to significantlymore short term devastation and damage to small island coastal environments and the livelihoods that depend on them.

To assess the impacts of climate change as directed through increasingly severe storms, the effects and impacts onsustainability of the very worst of past storms should be further studied.

3.39 Societies want to protect their assets. What has been done to protect the coasts of small island states? In generaland historically, coastal protection has meant hard engineering schemes but these can have well documented negativeimpacts on coastal environments. Just one example is that sea walls often protect property in the short term but

accelerate beach sand loss. It hardly needs stating that the beach is what draws many tourists and that losing it could bedisastrous for local livelihoods in coastal communities, quite apart from the long term environmental implications ofbeach loss in reducing natural protection to coastlines. Hendry (1993), quoting a 1990 IPCC report Climate Change:

IPCC response strategies, listed the dollar costs (1990 money) and proportion of GDP of Wider Caribbean coastlinedefence. The IPCC has not updated these figures but it is clear that the cost (% of GDP) of coastal defences to Anguillaand TCI is larger than any other islands in the region. So, in expectation of more intense (more-severe) storms and

assuming that adaptation strategies are put in place, we are confident that: the cost of sea defences in the region will likely escalate, risking sustainability of development future costs of protecting the coasts of both Anguilla and TCI will be an increasing proportion of GDP a significant investment in soft engineering schemes is required to ensure long term (if dynamic) protection.

Island Coastal Defence Cost (%GDP)

Cost ($ million)

Anguilla 10 83

Antigua 1 152

Bahamas 3 2565

Belize 3 527

British Virgin Islands 1 93

US Virgin IslandsI 0.3 230

Cayman Islands 1 228Haiti 0.1 124

Jamaica 0.1 462

Martinque 0.1 192

Montserrat 0.1 3

St Kitts and Nevis 2 140

St Lucia 0.8 123

St Vincent and the Grenadines 0.6 55

Trinidad and Tobago 0.2 1720

Turks and Caicos Islands 8 223

Table 3.5: Approximate costs of coastal defence for Wider Caribbean small islands in 1990. Adapted from Hendry

(1993), from original data from the IPCC.


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4. Livelihoods on Small Islands and UK Overseas Territories

4.1 A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for means of living. A livelihood is

sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities andassets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base (based on the definition of Carney,1998). Sources of most or all forms of capital can be limited on small islands, including the selected UK OTs. Risk and

vulnerability are most important in influencing livelihood assets themselves and how different livelihood strategies,structures and processes influence the sustainability. We have seen that island climates are changing and will changefurther during the next few decades and we have outlined some of the effects this might have on critical natural resources

and the environmental services. This is why climate change has the potential to cause significant damage to island andUK OT livelihoods.

4.2 It is clear that livelihoods are precarious in the selected UK OTs. As Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show, their economiesare poorly diversified. This means that there are limits to livelihood options. For example, employment opportunitiesare severely limited and concentrated on fisheries (Anguilla, St Helena, Tristan da Cunha) and / or tourism (Anguilla and

pre-eruption Montserrat). On Pitcairn, the subsistence economy is based on agriculture and fishing, with revenuegenerated from the sale of postage stamps. Remittances from family members who have migrated to other countries arean important source of income in most of the UK OTs (on Tristan da Cunha and St Helena especially). GDP per capita is

under $10,000 on all the selected UK OTs and only $5,000 on St Helena. For comparison, GDP per capita is over$28,000 on BVI.

4.3 Here we examine key issues that affect the livelihoods of residents of the UK OTs and discuss the implicationsof climate change on these. We consider the dominant areas: fisheries and tourism; that are directly and indirectlyimpacted by the stock and integrity of natural capital. We also look at other areas we consider climate change will

significantly affect. These include health, infrastructure, insurance and migration, which impact on island communitylivelihoods and which are relevant to development programmes and projects. Finally in this section, we outlineimplications of climate change for coping strategies and adaptation options.

i. Fisheries

4.4 Fisheries and potential impacts on them are extremely important for the small island states, as a source of

income but also as a significant proportion of protein intake. Fisheries in small island developing states are made up ofboth artisanal and small-scale commercial fisheries and this is the pattern in the selected UK OTs. Commercial andsubsistence fishing are crucial to the livelihoods of many inhabitants. Fish is a major export of Anguilla, St Helena and

Tristan da Cunha. In Turks and Caicos five fish processing plants process lobster and conch that generate $3 millioneach year (Finfish landings are mainly for local consumption). Fishing is generally artisanal and exploits primarilyinshore fisheries, although the small fleet of St Helena harvests migratory species such as tuna. Small scale sustainable

fisheries not only provide important dietary components to islanders but may be responsible for long term good returns,as on Tristan da Cunha (Cooper et al., 1992). The impact of climate change on fisheries is complex and interacts with

non-climate related stresses. Inshore fisheries are dependent on sustained coastal ecosystems, dominated by reefs and sea

grasses. The largely negative impacts of sea-level rise and sea surface temperature increases and consequent loss of livecoral cover represents a real and serious threat to near-shore fisheries in these small islands.

4.5 For many deep-sea fisheries, the interaction between El Nio Southern Oscillation phenomena and fisheriesproduction is a crucial area, particularly if increased frequency or severity of El Nio events are linked to globalwarming. For example, Pacific skipjack tuna stocks seem to be controlled largely by the periodicity of ENSO events(Lehodey et al., 1997).

4.6 The South Atlantic has supported a large-scale pelagic fishery since the 1940s associated with the Benguela

Current but is subject to interannual variations known as Benguela Nios. The fishery occasionally suffers markeddeclines in productivity and crashes in pilchard and anchovy stocks (Boyer et al., 2000). These are linked to anomalous

sea surface temperatures and often occur about a year after Pacific El Nios. There is increasing evidence that sea

surface temperature anomalies in this area are linked to red tide events that are deleterious effects to the Namibianfisheries sector, including to stock recruitment (Boyer et al., 2000). There is no evidence we can find of similar impacts

on the fisheries employed by the St Helena fleet. However, the influence on fisheries of ENSO and similar regional scale

ocean phenomena and changes to their frequency, extent and severity as global warming occurs, is a significant andgrowing cause for concern and is especially relevant to sustaining fishery-based livelihoods on several UK OTs.


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4.14 More generally, the human health consequences of climate change could be significant and far-reaching and

could impact on the sustainability of livelihoods in many societies (de Sylva, 1993). There is evidence that some insect-borne and water-borne diseases may become more prevalent in the future as temperatures increase and rainfall patternschange. Dengue fever, for example, is found in the island states of the Caribbean and its incidence may increase.

Evidence from the South Pacific suggests a strong correlation of dengue fever incidence with ENSO events (Hales et al.,1996). Thus, if thresholds of critical weather variables are exceeded more frequently in future, we can expect increasedincidence of this disease. Other diseases, including malaria, may increase their ranges to affect some of the UK OTs.

Other observed health impacts associated with ENSO events, such as fish poisoning (Hales et al., 1999), also pose threatsto the UK OTs in a warmer world.

4.15 The vulnerability of small island populations to epidemics as a result of climate change (Woodward et al., 1998)

clearly needs to be accounted for in health planning and policy. It is unclear to us what precisely the effects of climatechange might be on well documented and particular health problems within the populations of some of the UK OTs. It is

similarly unclear to us whether increases in overall air temperatures of between 1.5 and 60C will have any significantimpact on heat-stress related illness in the Wider Caribbean. We are confident, however, that such a problem will notoccur in the South Atlantic or on Pitcairn. Finally, it is possible that increasing sea temperatures will bring as yet

unforeseen health problems, from, for example, poisonous marine life and shark attack. We found no work on thesesubjects relevant to the UK OTs.

iv. Infrastructure

4.16 Physical capital includes basic infrastructure: transport and communications, shelter, water and sanitation and

energy. Each of these is likely to be impacted by climate change. Many island states, including several of the selectedUK OTs, are especially vulnerable because of their remoteness. For example, damage to port and harbour and airportstructures and facilities as a result of more intense storms or sea level rise could result in certain islands being cut off

completely. Table 3.2 shows that port use is already limited in Montserrat, Pitcairn Island, St Helena and Tristan deCunha. DFID (1999) indicates that St Helena has no safe anchorage in high seas and that Tristan da Cunhna can only beaccessed by sea for up to 70 days each year. Pitcairn is reliant on one small cove and jetty. Possible impacts of climate

change should be taken into account in planning any port upgrading in these islands. Unfortunately, our current state ofknowledge about possible climate futures in the South Atlantic and South-east Pacific is extremely limited, so we cannotyet say what changes are likely that might affect access.

4.17 Gable and Aubrey (1990) note that Barbados lost 6 m of beach from its west coast in the 30 years prior to 1990,

mainly because sand mining put beaches at risk from storms. Also, as we noted earlier, hard engineering for coastalprotection can be counter-productive in the long term. Climate change must now be taken into account by planners andcoastal defence engineers and we concluded earlier that soft or environmental engineering schemes may offersustainable alternatives for many small islands at risk from storms.

4.18 Putting aside the shoreline itself, the predicted changes in climate outlined earlier will have implications for thedesign and costs of housing, roads, bridges and other island infrastructure. Hurricane Hugo damaged over 90% and

destroyed 20% of houses in Montserrat and as we noted earlier, several recent hurricanes have famously causeddevastation to many countries in the region. If climate change increases the intensity of storms then each storm, onaverage, will cause more damage to property and roads. Likely increases in storm intensity and rainfall in coming years

must be taken into consideration in building roads and other infrastructure, for example ensuring that adequateprecautions are taken to prevent land slips and severe erosion on steep slopes and in designing bridges to take account ofincreased flood risk. Drainage systems must be designed to meet more severe storm surges and more intense rainfall

events. In summary, we recommend a review and revision of building and infrastructure design criteria on the UK OTs.

4.19 The legislative and planning systems of these islands need to take into account climate change impacts in

applying controls to development, especially but not only, right on the coast. Such controls might include regulating theexcavation of materials and clearance of vegetation, including mangroves and sea grasses, in designing appropriatecoastal defences, in regulating deforestation and agricultural practice that might encourage soil erosion and gullying, and

in regulating house-building programmes. This is already a problem on some of the UK OTs and we anticipate thatclimate change will further exacerbate this problem in the coming decades. We recommend urgent action to addressthese issues.

iv. Insurance

4.20 Development and maintenance of infrastructure can be threatened or delayed where insurance is unavailable orcostly. Small islands already suffer the costs of remoteness through, for example, high freight insurance. Insurancepremiums are sensitive to the size and frequency of hazards, including weather-related phenomena such as tropical

storms. Increased incidence or intensity of these events will trigger increases in insurance premiums. The IPCC Third


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Assessment Report will report that insurance costs have increased significantly in the Caribbean during the 1990s. Sohigh were the claims related to natural disasters in the region that some re-insurers withdrew from the market.

4.21 Such action will present serious problems in future as the UK OTs may not be able to acquire adequateinsurance cover for property, businesses and personal injury and death caused by natural hazards. This has consequences

for livelihoods, directly through increase costs for individuals and businesses and indirectly by acting as disincentives toinvestment and trade. Who will cover uninsurable losses in the UK OTs?

vi. Migration and Remittances

4.22 An important factor in many of the UK OTs has been the prevalence of migration and remittances as strategies to

enhance the sustainability of local livelihoods. Indeed, according to Marshall (1982) 150 years of migration from theeastern Caribbean (primarily for work) has made migration a characteristic of the region, part of its history and itssocial fabric. Most recently, some return migration to the Caribbean islands has occurred. These processes are extensive

in small island states and have conventionally been portrayed as having largely negative impacts, with pejorative labelssuch as the remittance economies applied to the Caribbean, and the MIRAB economies in the South Pacific.

4.23 Maul (1993) presented migration as possibly the greatest climate change threat to Caribbean societies. ButConnell and Conway (2000) present a different perspective on the influences of migration and remittances. They contendthat migration and remittances are key to the welfare of people of many remote small islands and enable their populations

to adapt to the age of globalisation. Migration and remittances provide flexibility in livelihood options and return

migrants enrich the stocks of human, social and cultural capital of small islands, bringing with them links to trans-nationalnetworks. In contrast to the view that remittances fuel conspicuous consumption and undermine local economies, Connell

and Conway contend that, in fact, remittances encourage positive investments and savings and support investments inbasic needs and education.

4.24 Remittances foster further mobility in the populations of small islands. Importantly, migration and remittancesare critical in dealing with natural hazards as evidenced in many small island contexts (for example, Western Samoa, asdiscussed below) and various Caribbean islands in response to hurricane damage and in the case of Montserrat, to recent

volcanic eruptions. Migrants raise large amounts of money to fund recovery. Natural disasters also act as a significantpush factor for migration. In addition, the role of host countries is important and in the case of UK OTs, the UK will bethe most important host country, if possibly not the only one. The implications are extremely important for dealing with

likely impacts of climate change. We expect that increasingly severe or intense storms will be the aspect of future climatechange that most obviously pushes future migrations but further work on possible specific climate changes to the South

Atlantic islands is urgently needed before we can suggest downstream impacts on migration there. At this stage, changesin sea surface temperature and regional ocean current regimes and consequent deleterious effects on local fisheries appearto be the most likely reasons for out-migration from these islands. Other possible reasons include collapse of local touristindustries through storm damage to beaches and coastal habitats and severe water supply problems and significant

reductions in agricultural productivity, both caused by droughts.

Livelihoods, Vulnerability and Coping Strategies

4.25 Livelihood strategies in the selected UK OTs depend on the natural resources base and environmental servicesand / or they are related to migration. The key feature of UK OT livelihoods is not just that they rely more heavily on

fragile natural resources than many societies but that they rely on a very limited set of natural resources in coastal andmarine resource systems. Livelihoods are not greatly diversified; nor are there many opportunities for greaterdiversification (Ellis, 2000). This affects the ability of residents and communities to withstand shocks and variability and

compromises their ability to recover. That there are so few livelihood alternatives and means of diversification re-emphasises the vulnerability of local livelihoods to projected climate change and related disasters. In thesecircumstances, remittances from overseas become significant and may be a key feature in determining the ability of local

populations to cope with future climate change impacts.

Summary

4.26 Our review of climate change impacts on livelihoods has highlighted various development impacts. Theeconomic and social vulnerability of the UK OTs demands that the potentially significant impact of projected climate

change will require planned adaptation. Natural resources are critical to present and future vulnerability. Mostimportantly, populations are vulnerable to extreme weather events today and make adjustments to their livelihoodstrategies to cope with todays climate. So, climate change-related impacts on environmental services important to island

livelihoods are already occurring; for example, through increasing sea surface temperatures causing coral reef destruction.

These current changes have been neither expected and planned for, nor adequately coped with and adapted to.


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4.27 For example, Anguillas country profile in the UNDP ECLAC/CDCC internet report, based on Anguilla Ministry

of Home Affairs responses to a 1997 UNDP survey5 makes interesting reading:

. the government of Anguilla has neither developed nor upgraded national legislation to address climate

change issues.

and later on:

.a disaster emergency fund has not been proposed for Anguilla at this time, and disaster policy has not beenintegrated into the national development planning process.6

4.28 Does this indicate a genuine lack of interest, or a perception that the peoples of the small island UK OTs can dolittle or nothing either to prevent or to survive accelerating climate changes? Have policy makers opinions changed in thepast three or four years? These questions may be answered in part by the response to the survey of UK OT stakeholders

undertaken as part of this study.

4.29 We cannot directly cool huge swaths of ocean to stop coral kills and so remove this threat to the long term

sustainability of island livelihoods. Neither can we control the strength of storms. But, it is our contention that such largescale environmental change can be survived. Coping is acting to survive and adaptation involves changing theinstitutional arrangements and livelihood strategies to increase the probability of surviving disasters, whilst sustaining

development. Adaptation may need to include further diversification - developing alternative income sources, migration

or similar major changes, as well as direct interventions by local governments, the UK and the international donorcommunity.

Policy Intervention and Community Ownership

4.30 Recent analyses of resource dependent communities in other parts of the world have demonstrated thatunderlying vulnerability can be identified and alleviated through policy intervention. For example, in coastal South EastAsia, unsustainable resource extraction and inappropriate government response can exacerbate vulnerability, making

populations more at risk from both present day coastal flooding as well as long-term climate change (Nguyen Hoang Tri,et al., 1998; Adger, 1999). In seeking to understand processes of adaptation in their wider context, analysis is required to

highlight explicitly the stakeholders who will gain and those who will lose from predicted climate changes. It is vital that

on small islands, appropriate planning for climate change is undertaken now and that this includes real and effectiveparticipation of local community stakeholders. We strongly recommend that such analyses are undertaken.

4.31 Collective action for coping is an important element in social coping and the dangers of replacing traditional byformal social security are well known (see, for example, Platteau, 1991), perhaps leading to the development ofunsustainable dependency cultures. A present day example of the role of institutions in managing and mediating impacts

on a small island illustrates their importance in resource-dependent societies. The agricultural economy of WesternSamoa is dependent on cash crops such as pineapple and coconuts. These crops are susceptible to extreme weatherevents. Paulson (1993) and Paulson and Rogers (1997) considered local coping strategies and post-disaster recovery after

a major tropical storm hit the island. Despite a long term decline in the cultivation of some storm resistant crops andfamine food crops, non-monetary informal arrangements for social security persist in Western Samoa and the moraleconomy seems to be resilient to increased state and market involvement (Paulson, 1993). In this example, both

reciprocal collective action and migrant remittances enabled recovery and facilitated reconstruction.

4.32 Lugo (2000) notes that, depending on the strength of local community-based institutions, it can take decades for

a coastal community to recover from one Category 4 or 5 hurricane and that effective short-term migration and othercoping strategies can be critical to keeping recovery time to a minimum. He also advises strongly that a combination ofimproved construction methods, green infrastructure (soft defences) and appropriate hard defences can minimise storm

damage but must be undertaken in ways that do not harm livelihood-significant natural resources and those that conservebiodiversity7. Luttinger (1997) provides a useful example of successful community-based conservation efforts inHonduras. In an effort to accommodate a surge in nature tourism and un-supported by government, local communities

there created and managed marine protected areas. The St Helena Millennium Forest Project is another excellentexample, at national scale of an attempt to raise awareness of the importance of biodiversity and conservation and aims tofoster national pride in the islands endemic species. This and other examples (for example, from Western Samoa and

Tobago, and along many coastlines world-wide) provide strong support for our contention that national and communitynatural resource management capacity needs strengthening in the UK OTs.

5 http://www.sdnp.undp.org/~eclac/CARMIN/DOCS/anguilla.htm6 BVIs response was slightly more encouraging (http://www.sdnp.undp.org/~eclac/CARMIN/DOCS/bvi.htm)7 According to DFID (1999) marine biodiversity is Anguillas greatest asset.


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4.33 Sea level rise, like other climate change threats, need not always have a negative impact on livelihoods. Threeresponse options to sea level rise are often proposed (see, for example, Bijlsma et al., 1996, for the IPCC):

Planned Retreat emphasising abandoning land and structures in highly vulnerable areas

Accommodation (or soft defence) conservation, continued occupancy and adaptive management responses

Protection (or hard defence) - defending vulnerable areas, homes, economic activities and natural resources.

4.34 Each of these methods offers livelihood opportunities. The first requirement is for up-to-date information and

mapping of topography and bathymetry, natural resources, habitats and flora and fauna, human populations and socio-economic data. Joined-up thinking should be applied to sea level rises and other climate change threats, as part ofintegrated coastal zone management.

Integrated Coastal Zone Management

4.35 The selected UK OTs and other small island states rely heavily on their coastal resources. On an island-wide andregional scale, improved integrated coastal zone management systems (ICMs) will be crucial in limiting negative effectsof climate-related threats (Aston, 19998; Solomon and Forbes, 1999) and making the most of possible benefits. We

conclude that UK OT, small is

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