Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s...

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Effects of Disability-Based Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s University ARIA Annual Meeting August 7, 2006, Washington D.C.

Transcript of Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s...

Page 1: Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s University ARIA Annual Meeting August 7, 2006, Washington.

Effects of Disability-Based Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions Underwriting Prohibitions

on the Labor Marketon the Labor Market

Ping WangSt John’s University

ARIA Annual MeetingAugust 7, 2006, Washington D.C.

Page 2: Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s University ARIA Annual Meeting August 7, 2006, Washington.

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Sources of Health Insurance Coverage

For Non-elderly Americans

1995 1996 1997 1998 2002

Employment-based

coverage 63.8% 64.0% 64.2% 64.9% 65.0%

Individually purchased

6.9 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.6

Public coverage

16.6 16.0 14.8 14.3 16.2

No health insurance

17.4 17.7 18.3 18.4 17.3

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Variation Across Firms

• Large firms are more likely to self-insure

• Small firms buy insurance

• Risk Underwriting– Large firms: almost none

– Small firms: common

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Group Coverage and Group Size

Workers of firms with 500+ employees

Workers of firms with 25- employees

Offered health insurance 91.6% 52.1%

Covered by employer-plan >67% 33.8%

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Questions of Interest

• Consequences of Underwriting

• Underwriting Prohibitions • Effects on Health Insurance Market (Browne

and Frees 2004)

• Effects on Labor Market ??

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Effects of Health Insurance on Labor Market

• Moffitt and Wolfe (1990)

• Gruber and Krueger (1991)

• Kaestner and Simon (2002)

• Kapur (2003, 2004)

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Disability Regulation and Labor Market

DeLeire (2000) finds that

ADA (American with Disability Act)

is associated with– Lower employment rate of disabled men– No change in wages of disabled male workers

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Current Project

The effects of underwriting prohibitions on

• Likelihood of employment

• Firm size when full-time employed

• Wages of small firm employees

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Sources of Data

• Current Population Survey (CPS) Sample: single-person households

16-64 years old, unmarried.

Period: 1991-1996

• State Statutes

• Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)

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Small Group Disability-Based Underwriting Regulations State Year of Effect

Florida 1994-*

Kentucky 1995-

Maine 1993-

Maryland 1994-

Massachusetts 1992-

Minnesota 1995-

New Hampshire 1995-

New Jersey 1992-

New York 1993-

South Carolina 1995-

Vermont 1992-

Washington 1993-

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Models and Fitted Responses

•Firm size: Small - fewer than 10 workers.

Medium - 10 to 24.

Large - 25 and more.

Table 1 Summary of Models Test Employment Firm size Wage Model Multinomial Logistic Multinomial Logistic Mixed GLM Fitted Response

Pr(unemployed)/Pr(full-time) Pr(part-time)/Pr(full-time)

Pr(large)/Pr(small) Pr(medium)/Pr(small)

Log(wage)

Sample Data Unmarried, single-person households

Full-time employed Workers of small firms

Observations 82,083 59,824 12,913 Years 1991-1996 1991-1996 1991-1996

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Figure 1Rate of Full-time Employed Among the Disabled

0.20

0.22

0.24

0.26

0.28

0.30

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Ra

te

Disability Law not in Effect Disability Law in Effect

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Table 8. Employment Status of the Sample, by disability restriction, for selected groups. Data: 1991-1996, Unmarried Single-Person Households, 82,083 observations.

Selected Subgroups

Disability Restriction in Effect

Number Percent

Unemployed Percent

Full-time

Odds-comparing Full-time to Unemployed

Odds Ratio

Able-bodied No 60,329 8.6 78.6 9.140 Able-bodied Yes 12,783 10.3 79.1 7.680 0.840 Disabled No 7,437 59.9 26.2 0.437 Disabled Yes 1,534 64.0 23.6 0.369 0.844 Disa’d Female No 3,722 62.3 23.5 0.377 Disa’d Female Yes 786 66.2 20.1 0.304 0.805 Disabled Male No 3,715 57.6 28.9 0.502 Disabled Male Yes 748 61.6 27.3 0.443 0.883 Age<50 No 53,848 9.9 76.8 7.758 Age<50 Yes 11,179 11.7 77.3 6.607 0.852 Age>=50 No 13,918 31.1 57.3 1.842 Age>=50 Yes 3,138 31.5 58.7 1.863 1.011

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Employment Status Test: Base Model Table 14. Effects on Employment Status: Multinomial Logistic Regression with only Control Variables

(Year and State effects are included, although coefficients are not reported.) Data: 1991-1996, Unmarried Single-person households, 82,083 observations

Unemployed versus Full-Time Part-Time versus Full-Time Variable Estimate Odds

Ratio p-value Estimate Odds

Ratio p-value

INTER 12.1689 <0.0001 9.1214 <0.0001 AGE -5.8876 0.0028 <0.0001 -5.6011 0.0037 <0.0001 AGE SQUARED 1.0917 2.9793 <0.0001 1.0488 2.8542 <0.0001 AGE CUBED -0.0544 0.9471 <0.0001 -0.0583 0.9434 <0.0001 FEMALE 0.4498 1.5680 <0.0001 0.4900 1.6323 <0.0001 RACE_W -1.1331 0.3220 <0.0001 -0.3339 0.7161 <0.0001 RACE_B -0.3702 0.6906 <0.0001 -0.2471 0.7811 0.0004 DISABLE 2.9300 18.7276 <0.0001 1.4375 4.2102 <0.0001 INC_NW 0.0330 1.0336 <0.0001 0.0212 1.0214 <0.0001 EDUCN -0.1961 0.8219 <0.0001 -0.0677 0.9345 <0.0001 PCINCOME -0.7365 0.4788 0.0017 -0.7392 0.4775 0.0047 PCEMPLOY 0.0102 1.0103 0.8166 0.0219 1.0221 0.5820 BEFTRATIO -0.3758 0.6867 0.7479 1.7485 5.7460 0.1483 -2 Log Likelihood = 100,814.53

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Probabilities of Employment for Selected Subgroups

Probabilities

Subgroup Full-time Part-time Unemployed

Able-male 0.9123 0.0664 0.0214

Able-female 0.8655 0.1028 0.0318

Disabled male 0.6065 0.1671 0.2264

Disabled female 0.4914 0.2210 0.2876

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Employment Status Test: Models with Law Variables

Table 15. Effects on Employment Status: Comparison of Multinomial Logistic Regressions Data: 1991 ~ 1996, Unmarried single-person households, 82,083 observations.

Model -2 Log

Likelihood

Difference in -2 Log Likelihood

from the base model

Difference in the number of

parameters from the base model

p-value

Base 100,814.53 N/A N/A N/A Include Disable*Law and Able*Law

100,805.51 9.02 4 0.0606

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Employment Status Test: Estimates of Law Variables

Table 16. Effects on Employment Status: Estimated Logarithmic Odds Ratios. Multinomial Logit Models for Disability-Based Underwriting Restrictions.

Data: 1991-1996, Unmarried Single-person households. Unemployed versus Full-Time Part-Time versus Full-Time Interaction Terms

Estimate Odds Ratio p-value Estimate Odds Ratio p-value

Disable*law 0.0410 1.0419 0.6368 0.0518 1.0532 0.6117 Able*law 0.0823 1.0858 0.0920 -0.1063 0.8992 0.0235

Probabilities for Able-Male

Prohibition Law Full-time Part-time Unemployed

In Effect 0.9106 0.0659 0.0235

Not in Effect 0.9093 0.0680 0.0227

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Table 10. Firm Size of Full-Time Employees, by disability restriction, for selected groups. Data: 1991-1996, Full-time employed, 59,824 observations.

Selected Subgroups

Disability Restriction in Effect

Number Percent Small

Percent Large

Odds-comparing large to small

Odds Ratio

Able-bodied No 47,398 16.9 73.4 4.343 Able-bodied Yes 10,116 17.0 73.4 4.318 0.994 Disabled No 1,948 22.8 67.9 2.978 Disabled Yes 362 21.0 69.3 3.300 1.108 Disabled Female No 875 16.7 76.2 4.563 Disabled Female Yes 158 15.2 74.1 4.875 1.068 Disabled Male No 1,073 27.9 61.1 2.190 Disabled Male Yes 204 25.5 65.7 2.576 1.176 Age<50 No 41,370 16.7 73.4 4.395 Age<50 Yes 8,637 17.0 73.1 4.300 0.978 Age>=50 No 7,976 19.8 71.8 3.626 Age>=50 Yes 1,841 17.8 74.1 4.163 1.148

Table 9. Firm Size of Full-time Employees, by Law Variable, in percent Data: 1991-1996, Full-time employed, 59,824 observations.

Law Law In Effect

Number Small Medium Large Odds-Comparing

large to small Odds Ratio

Disability No 49,346 17.2 9.7 73.1 4.250 Yes 10,478 17.2 9.6 73.2 4.256 1.001

Firm Size Test: Descriptive

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Firm Size Test: Base Model

Table 17. Effects on Firm Size of Full-time Employed: Multinomial Logistic Regression with only Control Variables.

(Year and State effects are included, although coefficients are not reported.) Data: 1991-1996, Full-time employed, 59,824 observations

Large versus Small Medium versus Small Variable Estimate Odds

Ratio p-value Estimate Odds

Ratio p-value

INTER -2.6949 0.0675 0.0358 -3.3372 0.0355 0.0756 AGE 0.7029 2.0196 0.0440 0.0257 1.0260 0.9576 AGE SQUARED -0.2058 0.8140 0.0201 -0.0848 0.9187 0.5017 AGE CUBED 0.0168 1.0169 0.0191 0.0092 1.0092 0.3789 FEMALE 0.5287 1.6967 <0.0001 0.2702 1.3102 <0.0001 RACE_W -0.1466 0.8636 0.0177 -0.0035 0.9965 0.9690 RACE_B 0.4456 1.5614 <0.0001 0.0592 1.0610 0.5884 DISABLE -0.2390 0.7874 <0.0001 -0.2253 0.7983 0.0077 INC_NW -0.0053 0.9947 <0.0001 -0.0032 0.9968 0.0705 EDUCN 0.1007 1.1059 <0.0001 -0.0082 0.9918 0.2179 PCINCOME 0.2160 1.2411 0.3730 0.0117 1.0118 0.9753 PCEMPLOY 0.0024 1.0024 0.9559 0.0791 1.0823 0.1528 BEFTRATIO 1.7860 5.9655 0.0987 1.9542 7.0583 0.2787 -2 Log Likelihood = 88,369.56

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Firm Size Test: Estimates of Law Variables

Table 19. Effects on Firm Size of Full-time Employed: Estimated Logarithmic Odds Ratios. Multinomial Logit Models for The Underwriting Restriction

Data: 1991-1996, Full-time employed, 59,824 observations. Variable Large versus Small Medium versus Small Interaction Terms

Estimate Odds Ratio p-value Estimate Odds Ratio p-value

Disable*law 0.0267 1.0271 0.8432 -0.0607 0.9411 0.7766 Able*law -0.0957 0.9087 0.0363 -0.2109 0.8099 0.0053

Probabilities for Employed Able-Female

Prohibition Law Large Medium Small

In Effect 0.6316 0.0953 0.2731

Not in Effect 0.6386 0.1077 0.2537

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Wages Test: Descriptive

Table 12. Average of wage by level of explanatory variable (in $) Data: 1991-1996, small firm employees, 12,913 observations.

Explanatory variable Level of explanatory variable FEMALE RACE_B RACE_W DISABLE JOBSWITCH FULLTIME

0 20,894 19,032 16,428 19,559 20,987 9,347 1 15,344 16,377 15,191 9,808 12,345 21,552

Table 11. Correlation Coefficients

Data: 1991-1996, small firm employees, 12,913 observations.

WAGE AGE EDUCN NON- WAGE

WEEKS

AGE 0.053 EDUCN 0.197 0.015* NONWAGE -0.035 0.155 0.158 WEEKS 0.486 0.039 0.119 -0.067 HOURS 0.397 -0.051 0.088 -0.074 0.337

Note: All coefficients are significant at 5% level except those denoted by a *.

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Table 20. Effects on Wages of Small-firm Workers

Variable Estimate p-value Race_w 0.4580 0.6141 Race_b -0.2510 0.8270 Age 1.5738 <0.0001 Female -6.3019 <0.0001 Disable -2.9949 0.0001 Educn 0.9884 <0.0001 Group 4.9851 <0.0001 Fulltime 1.1529 0.0639 Jobswitch -2.5521 <0.0001 Weeks 0.2537 <0.0001 Hours 0.2006 <0.0001 Disable*law 0.7240 0.7199 Able*law 2.0001 0.0161

Page 23: Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s University ARIA Annual Meeting August 7, 2006, Washington.

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Remark About Wage Test

• The able-bodied earns $2000 more if their state has the law in effect, the increase is in line with

• Average employer cost for offering health insurance was $2268

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Conclusions

• Disability-based underwriting prohibitions do affect the labor market

• Effects on able-bodied employees

-- they are more likely to work for small firms

-- they earn more

Page 25: Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s University ARIA Annual Meeting August 7, 2006, Washington.

Questions Questions and and Suggestions? Suggestions?

Thanks

Page 26: Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s University ARIA Annual Meeting August 7, 2006, Washington.

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Descriptive Statistics

Table 6. Average of Indicator Control Variables, in percent. Data: 1991-1996, Unmarried Single-person Household, 89,203 0bservations

FEMALE RACE_BLACK RACE_WHITE DISABLE 46.2 10.3 84.9 10.9

Table 7. Percentage of Dependent Variable by Law Variable

Data: 1991-1996, Unmarried Single-person Households, 82,083 observations.

Law Law In Effect

Number Unemployed Part-time Full-time Odds-Comparing

Full-time to Unemployed

Odds Ratio

Disability No 67,766 14.2 13.0 72.8 5.127 Yes 14,317 16.1 10.7 73.2 4.547 0.887

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Group Insurance Coverage versus Wage

Group Insurance Coverage vs Wage

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Wage (in thousand dollars)

Perc

en

tag

e o

f C

overa

ge

Page 28: Effects of Disability-Based Underwriting Prohibitions on the Labor Market Ping Wang St John’s University ARIA Annual Meeting August 7, 2006, Washington.

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Table 4 Comparison of Indicator Variables of Two Data Sets, in percent Indicator Variables

Data Set Observat

ions Race_b Race_w Disable Female Unemploy Part-time

Full- time

All9196 546,087 9.7 85.0 7.4 52.0 20.5 16.4 63.1 Single9196 82,083 10.3 84.9 10.9 46.2 14.6 12.6 72.9

Note: All9196 contains all observations for the period of 1991 through 1996, with the age of the individual between 16 and 64.

Single9196, a subset of all9196, consists of single-person households, providing that person is unmarried.

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Table 5 Comparison of Continuous Variables of Two Data Sets Data: All9196, 546,087 observations. Data: Single9196, 82,083 observations. Variable Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. Age 37.68 12.99 16.00 64.00 37.25 12.82 16.00 64.00 Educn 12.73 2.43 0.50 16.00 13.11 2.31 0.50 16.00 Wage $18,069 23,336 -9,999 576,372 $19,374 21,208 -9,999 576,372 Inc_nw $3,254 8,744 -19,998 331,772 $4,255 10,177 -10,099 331,772 PCEMploy 3.473 0.433 2.681 7.470 3.534 0.593 2.681 7.470 PCIncome $21,774 3,249 13,702 32,786 $22,013 3,266 13,702 32,786 Beftratio 0.360 0.050 0.251 0.528 0.360 0.050 0.251 0.528

Note: The means of state level variables are calculated using the number of observations in each state as the weight.