Effective Leadership International Organizations Report

7/21/2019 Effective Leadership International Organizations Report

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World Economic Forum2014 - All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced ortransmitted in any form or by any means, includingphotocopying and recording, or by any information

storage and retrieval system.

The views expressed are those of certain participants inthe discussion and do not necessarily reflect the viewsof all participants or of the World Economic Forum.

REF 211014


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3Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership

Contents

5 Executive Summary

6 1. The Effective Leadership Project

6 a. Global Governance in the 21st Century

6 b. Why Focus on Leadership?

7 c. Constrained Leadership

7 d. How Are Effective Leadership StructuresMeasured?

8 e. Methods for Assessing Organizations

8 f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering EffectiveLeadership Structures?

8 g. The Objectives of the Study

10 2. Emerging Good Practices

11 a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit

11 b. Managing Performance

11 c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards

12 d. Developing and Retaining Talent

12 e. Setting Strategic Priorities

13 f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders13 g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively

14 3. Appendix: Leadership Practices

14 a. African Development Bank Group

19 b. Asian Development Bank

24 c. European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment

28 d. Inter-American Development Bank

32 e. International Monetary Fund

38 f. International Organization for Migration

42 g. United Nations Development Programme

45 h. United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees

50 i. World Bank Group

58 j. World Health Organization

60 k. World Trade Organization

66 References


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4 Effective Leadership in International Organizations

Project Team

Ngaire Woods, Project Leader; Dean, Blavatnik School ofGovernment, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Saxena Kabra, Council Manager, Global AgendaCouncils, World Economic Forum, [email protected]

Nina Hall, Fellow in Global Governance, Hertie School ofGovernance, Germany, [email protected] Taranova, Researcher, Blavatnik School ofGovernment, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Kellerman, Researcher, Department of Politicsand International Relations, University of Oxford, UnitedKingdom, [email protected] Batten, Associate, McKinsey & Company, Australia,[email protected]

Members of the Global Agenda Council on

Institutional Governance SystemsErnesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, Chair; Director, YaleCenter for the Study of Globalization, Yale University, USARobert C. Orr, Vice-Chair; Assistant Secretary-General forStrategic Planning, United Nations, New YorkCyrus Ardalan, Vice-Chairman and Head, UK and EUPublic Policy and Government Relations, Barclays, UnitedKingdomAnn M. Florini, Professor, School of Social Sciences,Singapore Management University, SingaporeDavid Kennedy, Director, Institute for Global Law andPolicy, Harvard Law School, USA

Pascal Lamy, Chair (2012-2013); Honorary President,Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute, FranceJeffrey D. Lewis, Director, Economic Policy, Debt andTrade Department, Poverty Reduction and EconomicManagement Network, World Bank, Washington DCLin Jianhai, Secretary, International Monetary Fund,Washington DCEmmanuel E. Mbi, First Vice-President and Chief OperatingOfficer, African Development Bank, TunisiaRiyad Abdulrahman Al Mubarak, Chairman, Abu DhabiAccountability Authority, United Arab EmiratesArunma Oteh, Director-General, Securities and Exchange

Commission, NigeriaKatharina Pistor, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law,Columbia Law School, USAQu Bo, Associate Professor and Deputy Director, ChinaForeign Affairs University, Peoples Republic of ChinaGabriela I. Ramos Patio, Chief-of-Staff and OECD G20Sherpa, Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD), ParisNasser Saidi, President, Saidi & Associates, United ArabEmiratesJan Sturesson, Global Leader, Government and PublicServices and Partner, PwC, SwedenNgaire Woods, Vice-Chair (2012-2013); Dean, BlavatnikSchool of Government, University of Oxford, UnitedKingdom

Xue Lan, Dean, School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University, Peoples Republic of ChinaYu Keping, Director and Professor, China Center for GlobalGovernance and Development, Peoples Republic of ChinaZhang Haibin, Professor, School of International Studies,Peking University, Peoples Republic of China

Acknowledgements

The authors are particularly grateful to the World EconomicForum for providing inspiration and supporting this project,and the academic advisers, current and former officials whohave helped along the way. Conversations with severalleaders, who provided insights into the challenges facedby leaders of international organizations, were particularlyinspiring, including those with Pascal Lamy, Gus Speth,Takehiko Nakao, Helen Clark, Suma Chakrabati and DonaldKaberuka.

Sincere thanks go to the many officials from thefollowing organizations who answered questions:African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian DevelopmentBank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank(IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM), Organization for EconomicCo-operation and Development (OECD), MultilateralOrganisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN),United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and WorldTrade Organization (WTO). The authors would like tothank the following current and former officials from these

organizations: Bjorn Gillsater, Brian Gleeson, Kazu Sakai,Margret Thalwitz, Inge Kaul and Max Watson.

A number of academic experts generously offered theirinsights and feedback, which made this study possible:Michael Barnett (George Washington University), Sam Daws(University of Oxford), Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (University ofOxford), Michael Doyle (Columbia University), Tana Johnson(Duke University), Jrme Elie (Graduate Institute), MarthaFinnemore (George Washington University), Guy Goodwin-Gill (University of Oxford), Jane McAdam (University of NewSouth Wales), Craig Murphy (University of Massachusetts,

Boston), Catherine Weavers (University of Texas, Austin),and James Vreeland (Georgetown University).

Finally, the authors thank the Blavatnik School ofGovernment, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, andthe Hertie School of Governance, Germany, for providingresearch support for this report.


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Executive Summary

Good leadership in international organizations is necessary, but not sufficient, for their success. Structures supportingleadership vary enormously across global agencies. This report highlights some of the best practices across 11organizations that facilitate good leadership. It also underscores that international institutions could learn from each others

practices across seven domains: (1) selecting and re-electing leadership on merit, (2) managing performance, (3) settingand evaluating ethical standards, (4) developing and retaining talent, (5) setting strategic priorities, (6) engaging with a widerange of stakeholders, and (7) evaluating independently and effectively.


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1. The Effective LeadershipProject

a. Global Governance in the 21st Century

Over the last two decades, the world has suffered from aglobal governance deficit. This deficit comprises a lack of

the following:

Adequate mechanisms to deal with issues ofinternational peace and security

Satisfactory mechanisms to anticipate and counterglobal economic shocks

Effective instruments to ensure important global publicgoods, not least in critical areas such as climate changeand public health

In the early 2000s, it was expected that the internationalcommunity would embark on a comprehensive effort to

overhaul the multilateral system, with renewed rules andinstitutions to address the challenges posed by evolvinggeopolitical and economic circumstances. These ambitionsincluded reform of World Bank and IMF governance;creation of a new world environmental institution; andongoing attempts at United Nations (UN) Security Councilreform. Recent history suggests, however, that such acomprehensive overhaul will not take place anytime soon.

Almost every effort to significantly transform themechanisms for international cooperation and coordinationhas failed. The floundering of the 2005 UN World Summit,the collapse of the World Trade Organizations (WTO) Doha

Round, the disappointing progress on climate change,and the non-fulfilment of early and indispensable G20commitments all suggest that governments are not ready,or not willing, to close the growing governance gap, at leastwithin the next few years.

In other words, no transformative overhaul of internationalinstitutions should be expected in the foreseeable future.In no way should the pertinent players give up on existinginstitutions; rather, the only realistic alternative seems tobe incremental reform.1Scarce political capital shouldbe applied to improving the performance of multilateralinstitutions, as radical transformations of the existing overallframework cannot be counted on. Based on this notion,this project addresses one aspect where incremental reformseems not only necessary, but feasible: in the leadership ofinternational organizations (IOs).

b. Why Focus on Leadership?

Effective leadership in international agencies is crucial: theworld relies on these organizations to ease cooperation whether in ensuring pandemics are constrained, mail is

delivered to foreign countries, or citizens can fly safely toother countries.

To be effective, agencies need leaders who can identifyand deliver on organizational goals without the constraintof undue influence, by individual members or otherstakeholders. Yet, some IOs have not even defined theleaders role, let alone recruited or managed that personon the basis of particular knowledge, competence andexperience required to effectively lead the organization.In addition, democratic election processes and strongaccountability mechanisms are necessary to ensure that

the interests of executive management are aligned with theorganization.

While good leadership is not enough for successfulinternational cooperation, it is necessary for effectivegovernance. However, leadership performance inorganizations is often buried behind arguments about whichcountry should get the top job. The presumption is that,once appointed, leaders have their hands tied by memberstates, and will predominantly serve their patrons interests.Indeed, leaders performance is seldom rigorously testedor measured. Moreover, little attention has been paid tothe institutional features needed to promote effective andaccountable governance.

This project of the Global Agenda Council on InstitutionalGovernance Systems has taken up the challenge. First,the project has identified ways in which leadership makesa positive difference in the performance of internationalagencies. Second, the research team has investigateda sample of IOs, drawing out best (and other) practicesthat either illustrate or indicate a lack of high-performingleadership.

The reports seven sections cover the positive practices

emerging in IOs that support good leadership. Thisintroduction sets out the conception of leadership, as wellas the studys rationale, method and strategy.


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c. Constrained Leadership

Leaders influence their agencies operational and strategicdirection. They work with member states to identify prioritiesand set strategy, and translate this into operational goals,which in turn are monitored and evaluated as progress ismade towards them. Leaders direct a bureaucracy andsee that it has sufficient staffing, expertise and financing tocarry out mandated tasks. They also must consult and workwith other stakeholders. While their room for manoeuvringis limited (see Figure), their actions and behaviour are vitalto their organizations success. Finally, organizations thatdepend on ad-hoc funding also constrain their leaders.

In addition, the Council and team sought to captureinnovations in leadership across the organizational cases.

Not all of the important elements could be measured.In fact, it was difficult to find a metric to measure thedegree to which leadership structures permit resistanceagainst capture by a powerful state, private companiesor vested interests; and this despite that many instances

exist of undue influences undermining an organizationsperformance (an organizations leadership can play a keyrole in ensuring this does not happen, or at least that it isbrought to the publics attention). Some of this dimensionof leadership is covered in the reports reflections on ethicalstandards, setting strategic priorities (e.g. the proportion ofcore vs earmarked funds) and procedures for electing anadministrator, director-general (DG) or managing director(MD). Future research could investigate other measuresof organizational independence and impartiality, suchas whether heads of organizations should chair councilor governing body meetings, and how effectively theycan shape decision-making in these meetings to guard

against special interests. Studies could also examine ifan organizations leader is able to publish reports, policypositions or advice in the organizations name, without priorapproval of member states.2

Another important element of leadership is the speed ofrenewal and the capacity to adapt to changing externalenvironments. This was very difficult to measure or compareacross the 11 different organizations, given the variety ofenvironments and issue areas. In the future, studies couldlook at the extent to which IO heads can (and do) initiateprojects, pilots or discussions to address emerging issues,

and the leeway they have to shape these. Finally, theauthors believe leaders play an essential role in ensuringtheir organizations collaborate with others to delivercooperation and other public goods. Future research, it ishoped, will identify ways to track governance in this area.

The report reflects on practices from a pilot group ofinternational organizations. In some cases, good practiceseems relatively straightforward. For example, for theselection of an organizations head: do clear and publiclyavailable terms of reference (TOR) exist for both the positionand a high-quality, exhaustive search process? As forethical leadership, are leaders required to sign and adhereto the organizations ethical codes, and publicly declareany conflicts of interest and their financial assets? In somecases, good practices may vary enormously for instance,in how leaders attract and retain a diverse staff.This study benchmarks current practices and does not rankorganizations against each other, as significant differencesin the structure, size, nature and scope of IOs make rankingproblematic. However, some common principles andstructures could strengthen leadership possibilities in allorganizations.

Political

Leader

Governments

members of IOs

Bureau

cratic

IOsse

nior

man

agem

ent

Socialand

economic

forces

External

stakeholders

High performance in a leadership role has a major impact onan organizations ability to deliver on tasks requested by itsmember states. An IO with weak operational planning, highstaff turnover and vulnerability to special interests is unlikely

to perform effectively. Not only do leadership governanceand effectiveness need more attention in internationalorganizations; a striking need also exists for more practice-focused comparisons across organizations so they canlearn from each other.

An important caveat should be emphasized: improvingleadership in IOs is just one part of improving their overallperformance. Leaders are heavily constrained, relying onfinancing from the member states that select them. SomeIO boards monitor their leadership and organizationsarchitectures very closely, meeting weekly to discuss andprovide regular input to operational business, while othersmay only convene several times a year. The enormous

differences in the broader governance structures of IOs,which greatly influence their operations, are noted in thisreport.

d. How Are Effective Leadership Structures Measured?

Through extensive deliberations, the Council and projectteam have identified seven indicators of effective leadershipstructures:

1. Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit2. Managing performance3. Setting and evaluating ethical standards

4. Developing and retaining talent5. Setting strategic priorities6. Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders7. Evaluating independently and effectively

Figure:Types of Forces that Constrain Leadership


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e. Methods for Assessing Organizations

The Council identified seven indicators contributing toeffective leadership. The research team then determinedquestions for assessing IOs on each of the indicators andfor using as the basis for studies of leadership practicesin 11 organizations (see appendix): African DevelopmentBank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European

Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International MonetaryFund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM),United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WorldBank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World TradeOrganization (WTO).These organizations were selected because they covera broad range of issue areas (from health to migrationand development), vary in size, and include regional andinternational bodies. However, the selection was notintended to be representative of all intergovernmental

organizations, but rather to provide a basis for the pilotstudy of best practice in governance. Inclusion of otherorganizations in future studies is encouraged.

A research team initially conducted a desk-based study,looking for publicly available evidence of each indicator.Follow-up interviews with former and current senior officialsof the organization, as well as key stakeholders andacademic experts, were conducted. Their inputs were usedto identify additional documentation of formal processes,and to identify relevant informal practices. Although thereport is focused on the presence of formal processes

(documented officially, wherever possible, when sufficientevidence is available), the differences between formaland informal processes have also been captured. Theevidence included in the appendix is separated into twocolumns: published rules, based on official organizationaldocuments; and other factors, which draw on a rangeof sources including interviews with experts on theorganization and staff to gain more subjective insightsinto informal practice. Where possible, decoupling (whenformal rules are in place but are not to be implemented inpractice) is noted. While attempts were made to gather themost recent information for each organization, the studymay not capture all organizational practices, as many ofthe organizations were undergoing significant reforms. Asummary of good, formal leadership practices is shown inthe Table.

The data for each question across the 11 organizations wasanalysed to identify variations in practice. The objective wasnot to derive an ideal best practice, although managementand public administration studies were also consulted.The report is limited to practices in IOs from which otherorganizations could learn. Readers and organizations areinvited to contribute input3from practices and examples notdiscussed in this report.

f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective LeadershipStructures?

An organizations membership (represented on its board)and its senior management are collectively responsible forensuring effective processes are in place. The membershipor the board have responsibility for some criteria (electionand re-election procedures for heads); other indicators fallunder the scope of senior leadership (ethical codes, conflictsof interest), and some are shared (setting strategic priorities).In some organizations, a grey zone may exist, where itis not always clear who is responsible the leader, senior

management team, membership or board. By identifyingthese priority areas, organizations should be able to focusattention and clarify who will take the lead.

g. The Objectives of the Study

This study aims to inspire greater attention to leadership ininternational organizations, instigate learning across themand draw attention to good practice. Many organizations inthis study are already engaged in reforming their governancemechanisms, strategic frameworks or other organizationalprocesses. This study highlights leadership structures as

one element that should be taken into account.It is planned to share results with relevant forums, bringingtogether boards and committees in the UN system, andacross international financial institutions and developmentbanks. Apparently, a number of these organizations arealready sharing practices. It is hoped that the study willfoster a more systematic comparison and identification ofgood practice, thus enabling more direct learning.


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Table:Good Leadership Practices among the 11 Selected Organizations

Indicators Examples of Formal Practice

Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit

1. Organizations should search for candidates withspecific, relevant competencies, and test these againstclearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustiveprocess.

Criteria/TOR for leadership are published online

Selection process updates are available online

Passport blind selection of candidates is done

Other candidates are always considered in re-elections

Performance is given formal consideration in re-elections

Managing performance

2. Organizations should have clear expectations ofperformance, which are transparent and consistent withtheir goals, and facilitate leadership accountability.

Leaders are expected to set performance expectations ininaugural speech

Boards conduct regular individual performance appraisals

Setting and evaluating ethical standards

3. Leadership should comply with clearly defined ethicalstandards. Leaders are obliged to disclose financial assets andconflicts of interest

Leaders are obliged to adhere to a published code ofethics

Compliance with the code of ethics is enforced

Developing and retaining talent

4. Leadership should attract, retain and developtalent throughout the organization.

Leaders carry out regular global staff surveys

Leaders ensure survey results are monitored and utilized

Leaders are obliged to participate in formal trainingprogrammes for their own professional development

Setting strategic priorities

5. Leadership should have the authority and mechanismsto shift strategic priorities due to changingcircumstances.

Strategic documents include measurable objectives

Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders

6. Organizations should have structures that encouragemanagement to engage with a wide range ofstakeholders.

Meetings between stakeholder organizations and a diverserange of civil society actors occur on a regular, establishedbasis

Evaluating independently and effectively

7. Organizations should have structures that encouragemanagement to engage with internal and externalevaluations.

Evaluation office reports directly to the boardManagement must respond to evaluations

Source:Authors


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2. Emerging Good Practices

a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit

Many international organizations have no selection processthat clearly searches for and tests candidates on relevant(and much-needed) leadership competencies in their

domain. Often, leaders are selected in a political bargainingprocess. However, some changes are under way.

The review of leadership selection revealed four importantpractices, each of which is being used in at least oneinternational agency: (1) the leadership role is clearly defined,(2) the competencies and experience needed to take upthe role are clearly stated, (3) the role and competenciesare openly advertised, and (4) the selection process istransparent and clear.

WHO, for example, set out a code of conduct in 2011 to

ensure ethical and transparent nomination and electionof leadership. It specifically notes that every candidate isexpected to provide supporting evidence to match each ofthe published criteria for the Director General position. Theexecutive board shortlists those candidates matching thecriteria.4

In its selection process, theWTOactively seeks to reflectits memberships diversity. An official WTO document(WT/L/509, published in 2002 and available online) invitesnominations from across all regions and stipulates that,in the case of equally meritorious candidates for DGappointments, the diversity of WTO membership shall be

taken into account.5The document also gives the clear timeframe for the process to start nine months before, and becompleted 3 months prior to, the end of the incumbentsterm. The recent election of the WTO DG was a role modelof transparency: all stages were well documented andexposed through a special page on the WTO website.

Although selecting its president remains non-exhaustive andwithout a clear formal process, the EBRDis introducinggreater rigour at the vice-president (VP) level. For example,EBRD conducted an exhaustive review from over 850applicants for the position of VP of banking operations (a

post traditionally held by an American). The search waspassport-blind, and included psychometric testing andmultiple interviews.6

The IMFhas been opening up its processes. In 2011, itpublished its first comprehensive terms of appointmentfor its Managing Director.7In addition to its Articles ofAgreement and By-Laws, which contain a standardizedjob description for executive directors, the IMF published

complete terms of reference in the same year for the ethicsadvisor,8ombudsperson9and director of the IndependentEvaluation Office.10The IMF already instituted a rigorousprocess of candidate profiling in 2007, making available fulljob descriptions, and the desired qualities and experienceof candidates. The executive board set out a timetable andinvited nominations from executive directors for the postof MD, interviewing those that did apply.11However, theIMFs good formalpractice is undermined by theinformalconvention that the organizations European members, inconsultation with the other members, ultimately select aEuropean as MD.

In the WTO, all decisions, including selection of the DG,are made by consensus of all members. If a consensuscannot be reached in the appointed time, a provisionallows for a vote by the General Council.12In the 2012 DGselection process, WTO members officially nominated ninecandidates, each of whom presented their vision for theWTO at a council meeting in January 2013. In the final twomonths of the process, the council chair consulted withmembers to build a consensus. The selection processconcluded with a council meeting in May, where thedecision to appoint the new DG was taken.Practices for re-election or reappointment are not particularlystrong across organizations. Performance can be difficult toassess, as few international organizations have objectivesfor their leadership on this measure. WHO stands out in thisregard. During the re-election of its DG in May 2012, theincumbent wrote a self-assessment that evaluated her first-term performance on the priorities she had set out; this wascaptured in a document and taken into account through there-nomination process. TheAfDBnow considers a range ofcandidates alongside the incumbent for re-election, as doesthe EBRD, where Sir Suma Chakrabarti was selected overthe incumbent president in 2012.The more exhaustive, inclusive and meritocratic the process,

the better the chance of not only the best candidatebeing chosen or reappointed, but also of full membershipbeing engaged to hold that candidate accountable forperformance.


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b. Managing Performance

Governments expect that heads of internationalorganizations, once appointed, will deliver on their mandatedgoals. However, individual states often have divergent viewson organizational priorities and the role of leaders, andsome states have greater influence over leadership selectionand subsequent decision-making. It is thus critical that the

membership and the leader agree together on performanceexpectations, particularly at the start of a new tenure.Furthermore, the leaders responsibilities with respectto vision, goals and implementation need to be carefullydifferentiated from those of the board. Otherwise, lines ofaccountability and responsibility are blurred, and the boardcan no longer evaluate the leaders performance withoutevaluating its own.13Setting performance expectationscan help prevent organizational capture (when the leaderbecomes the instrument of a few states) and enableperformance management.

Despite the proliferation of results-based management,

no organization in this study had an openly publishedformal procedure for setting performance expectationsfor the leader. However, all leaders were expected toreport regularly to member states on overall organizationalperformance at board, council and other equivalentmeetings.14

In some international organizations, incoming presidents ordirectors are expected to deliver a statement to the boardor general council, setting out a vision and objectives forthe organization during their tenure. Such a procedure, forexample, took place at the WTO in 2009.15In recent years,

the president-elect of the AfDB also delivered a working planat the swearing-in ceremony.16

If performance objectives are set, boards can conductregular performance appraisals to give feedback on aleaders successes and failures. Regular managementof leaders performance is standard across the privateand public sectors. A formal, annual process to evaluatechief executive officer performance exists in 80% of USnon-profit boards and 96% of Standard and Poors 500companies.17However, very few international organizationshave institutionalized annual performance appraisals oftheir leaders. One study found that none of the majorinternational financial institutions conducted individualperformance appraisals in 2008.18

More recently, some organizations have sought toaddress this deficit. Since 2009, the MD of the IMF hasbeen evaluated annually by the board, based on agreedperformance objectives. As part of the feedback, theMD also assesses the executive boards performance.The framework is tailored by job position and based onthe IMFs annual performance review template. Annualsalary adjustments for IMF management are linked to theconsumer price index, and allow for performance-based

merit increases.

In 2008, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, establishedSenior Managers Compacts for many senior UNofficials.These compacts outline the roles of UN department heads,although they do not cover UNHCR or UNDP. Headsmust report if they are spending their budgets accordingto programme objectives.19In addition, they are reviewedon how well they promote gender diversity and followgeographic distribution requirements. The UN Secretariats

Management Performance Board uses the compacts toassess senior UN leaders annually.20

c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards

In recent years, a number of heads of major internationalorganizations have resigned because of questions abouttheir ethical conduct.21Three sets of practices areassociated with upholding ethical standards: (1) an ethicscode; (2) a clear authority in charge of monitoring andenforcing it, and dealing with non-compliance; and (3) formaldeclarations of any conflicts of interest and financial assetsof senior leaders.

Every international organization examined in this studyobliges all staff and heads to adhere to a code of ethics.However, not all codes are public, and not all are formallyenforced. The EBRD has a defined formal code of conduct(updated in 2012), which is overseen by a chief complianceofficer who reports directly to the president. The WorldBank Grouphas its Office of Ethics and Business Conduct,an ethics helpline, a code of conduct for staff (2003) andthe Code of Conduct for Board Officials, which focuses ondisclosure policies.22With womens accession at the Group,the documents have recently been refined to include sexual

harassment. Meanwhile, the WTOs code of core values isonly circulated internally. All UN staff are obliged to follow itscode of conduct, and many UN agencies, such as UNHCR,have set their own codes of conduct.23

Some organizations require disclosures of conflictsof interest and financial assets. Declarations are filedannually at the AfDB, which also has an organization-widewhistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraudframework (2006) and an office to investigate disclosures.This was a product of a joint anti-corruption task force(2006) of international financial institutions.24In the UNsystem, all senior officers must file an annual financialdisclosure statement with the UN ethics office.25Thosewho do not are charged and may be penalized by the UNsDepartment for Administration and Management.26TheUNDPadministrator and the UNHCR high commissionerhave voluntarily disclosed their financial assets publicly, andmade them available online.27However, these organizationsare exceptions: most leaders do not publicly disclose theirfinancial assets.


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d. Developing and Retaining Talent

A core responsibility of leaders at IOs is to attract, developand retain outstanding staff. Leaders can thus help toensure their workforces have the capacity and diversityto deliver on the organizations vision and strategy,while proactively addressing gaps in capability.28Thisis a challenge for international organizations, where it is

understood that particular countries should hold certainpositions, and staff selection is seen as requiring a balanceof national diversity and merit. At worst, leaders may facepressure from states to hire particular individuals for high-level posts.

IOs can attract, develop and retain talent in many ways for example, through policies for fair and transparent staffselection, and by ensuring diversity of staff at all levels.However, when trying to study staff diversity in genderand nationality across the 11 organizations, it was difficultto get accurate, comparable data for all organizations.For this reason, the use of staff surveys, while a limited

measure, was seen as evidence of senior managementsinterest in staff welfare. Such surveys, as well as staffliaison organizations, are used by some organizationsto monitor staff progression and ensure that it is, and isperceived to be, based on merit. UNHCR conducts staffsurveys every three years, and has done so since 2006. Theagency has a committee dedicated to carrying out surveyrecommendations and developing action plans.29The HighCommissioner has tasked the Deputy High Commissionerwith following up recommendations from this committeesdeliberations. Responses to UNHCRs staff survey haveguided human resources reform and resulted in changes

to the agencys postings and promotions procedures.30

UNDPs annual global staff surveys are conducted by anexternal independent organization. The EBRDhas recentlyreprioritized staff surveys, conducting them annually ratherthan every three years.31As yet, none of the internationalorganizations examined makes staff survey results availableonline.

Heads of organizations mentor, support and coach theirstaff. While few formal processes exist for this, evidencedoes show widespread informal practices in manyorganizations. For example, IOMs director-general makesit a priority to open the training of new chiefs of mission,outlines the organizations vision and invites open dialoguewith staff.32

Finally, leadership training that ensures the strengthening ofnecessary senior management skills is occurring in a fewagencies. The IMF has recently progressed with leadershiptraining programmes. Most leaders are supported with andtrained in organizational rules by their executive office staffand/or their chief of staff when they arrive. For instance,UNHCRs chief of staff provides informal on-the-job trainingin UN rules and protocols to new high commissioners.UNHCRs Global Learning Centre in Budapest has

consolidated the agencys learning activities andprogrammes, and has a position dedicated to developingand delivering training programmes for senior management.Many organizations are prioritizing senior staff development.The EBRD, for example, has a learning and development

team that works closely with the evaluation departmentto design measures addressing current weaknesses inprogramme delivery.

e. Setting Strategic Priorities

Most organizations have a mission statement and strategicgoals that identify the raison dtre and ultimate objectives.

To deliver on these, the organizations heads must translatethe overarching organizational mission into a clear, detailedand measurable operational plan, and evaluate progresson a regular basis. International organizations vary greatlyin their ability to do this. Some organizations have verybroad strategic documents, with weak strategic direction,no measurable objectives and no mechanism to evaluateprogress. Others have developed more detailed andmeasurable strategies, with timelines and budgets. Boardmembers most often work with executive leadership to setstrategic frameworks and evaluate progress towards them.Yet, their input varies greatly in some cases, memberstates may lead on formulating strategic goals (e.g. IOMs

12-point plan), and in others, the executive director will takethe lead (for instance, the UNDP).

UNHCR and UNDP are committed to producing well-developed strategic documents. UNHCR details objectivesin its Global Strategic Priorities, and evaluates progresstowards them in global annual reports and strategic reviews.The priorities set out operational, support and managementgoals, and include specific impact indicators to evaluateprogress.33The agency has also established the GlobalManagement Accountability Framework (GMAF), whichcomprehensively maps accountabilities, responsibilitiesand authorities across the organization and relates them to

the corresponding management policies and guidance.34

It works at country, regional and global levels to clarify thelines of accountability, responsibilities and functions. Inaddition, UNHCR has Focus, a software that integrates itsresults-based management at country and internationallevels. UNDP has a series of regular strategic plans coveringabout four years, and reports in depth on how it willimplement, finance, measure and review progress towardsthese goals.35

In recent years, the IMF produced the Global Policy Agenda,the MDs vision of the institutions strategic priorities andactions. It serves as the basis for the biannual InternationalMonetary and Financial Committee ministerial meetings thatreview and set the IMFs broad goals, which the executiveboards work programme subsequently operationalizes. Thishelps the IMF to respond swiftly to changing circumstances.Similarly, with its president setting priorities, the EBRD hasrapidly expanded lending to North African clients in need ofgreater assistance in their transition to democracy and freemarkets. TheADBs 2008 report, Strategy2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank2008-2020, provided a 12-year framework, with measurableorganizational objectives, to guide the organization. Amidterm review of the banks performance, presented atthe board of governors annual meeting in 2013, found that80% of ADBs operations in 2008-2012 were conducted in

the five core areas outlined in the original strategic agenda:infrastructure, environment, regional cooperation, financialsector development and education.


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An international organizations flexibility is also influencedby its funding model. Providing discretionary, orearmarked, funding can rapidly spur specific activitiesand innovations. Discretionary and other tied funds fromprivate institutions, other multilaterals or trust funds mayenable leaders to expand into new areas and adapt tochanging circumstances when they are explicitly soughtfor this purpose. However, because discretionary funds are

tied to specific tasks, leaders may have little flexibility toredeploy these funds with changing external circumstances.Organizations with a small core budget, and highly reliant ondiscretionary financing, would be expected to respond moredirectly to donor demands to ensure their survival.

Most organizations studied had a high percentage offunds earmarked for specific issues or projects, implyingthat leadership has less flexibility and discretion in settingpriorities. Over 97% of IOMs financing is from non-corecontributions.36However, the organizations director-general has actively lobbied states for an increase inIOMs core funding, and has also established an audit and

oversight committee.37Similar numbers are seen in otherorganizations: in 2012, only 2% of UNHCRs financingcame from the UN regular budget, and 98% percent wasvoluntary; for WHO, 76% of financing was voluntary.38

WHO, as part of its extensive programme reform, haslaunched the Financing Dialogue initiative, spearheadedby Director-General Margaret Chan. Among otherthings, it aims to ensure that member states and otherfunders commit to fully aligning fund allocation to theapproved programme budget. Funders should make theircontributions public to increase transparency, and ensure

the predictability and flexibility of their funds.39

f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders

Every multilateral organization engages in some waywith its members and a wider group of stakeholders,including beneficiaries, private-sector organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil societygroups. Some do this more effectively than others. Thebenefits from positive, well-structured engagement includebetter information, better-quality collaboration, heightenedresponsiveness, sharing responsibility, and better publicunderstanding and cooperation with the agency.Most organizations have formal and informal mechanismsto engage with stakeholders joint projects with NGOs andother multilateral organizations, discussions and dialoguesat conferences, and structured forums to interact withleaders of academia and civil society. But as no establishedmost effective way exists to conduct these engagements,the challenge is in measuring or attempting to report bestpractice. Evidence, however, points to the importanceof regular, formal meetings between organizations anda diverse range of civil society actors. It becomes moredifficult for civil society to have an impact when meetings areinformal or irregular.

g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively

In recent years, most international organizations haverecognized that independent evaluations can provide timely,useful and robust information on their work.40The WorldBank created the Operations Evaluation Unit in the 1970sunder its president, Robert McNamara (1968-1981), andrenamed it as the Independent Evaluation Group in 2001.The same year, the IMF created an evaluation group, which

it has subsequently and independently audited on twooccasions.41

Besides serving as external appraisals, evaluations arealso another way to ensure that members are aware of thegovernance, effectiveness, impact and use of their funds.The independence of these evaluations is critical andimportant to maintain, as are the channels through whichevaluators findings are considered.

At the IMF, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) isindependent from management and reports to the board. Asindicated in the IEOs terms of reference, the office engageswith executive management, the board and staff when theyrespond to relevant parts of the evaluation.42

At the World Bank and EBRD, independent evaluationteams report directly to the board of directors. TheIndependent Evaluation Group (IEG) at the World Bankconducted a client survey in 2012 to determine bothwhether the bank was meeting clients needs and howclients perceived its impact, as one of the ways of engagingwith the organization. At EBRD, engagement is donethrough links with key people, i.e. the chief complianceofficer reports directly to the president, as does the internalaudit team. The vice-president for risk also sits on theexecutive committee.

The AfDB has recently tried to strengthen independentinternal and external evaluations. The Quality Assurance andResults department has established a round-table reviewmechanism that brings together management from variousrelevant departments to review evaluations and set out,where necessary, action to address them.

The ADB has internal and external reviews. The internalcompliance review panel investigates alleged non-compliance by the bank in its operational policies andprocedures. It does not, however, investigate borrowingcountries, the executing agency or private-sector clients,unless they are relevant to non-compliance. Externally, theMultilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network(MOPAN) regularly evaluates the institution and individualmembers, especially large donors such as the UnitedKingdom and Australia, and conducts regular assessmentsto ensure their money is being spent safely and effectively.

Some organizations have recently taken steps to make surethey follow best practice. The UNDP, for example, revisedits evaluation policy in 2011 to establish the EvaluationOffices independence and ensure that all evaluations havea response from management. The offices head reportsdirectly and independently to the executive board. Theadministrator, however, is briefed before an evaluation

is presented to the board, and the administrators officeprepares a management response to evaluations. Theadministrator has the right to reply to evaluations, anddiscusses follow-up actions with the board.


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2

DoestheMO/IOhaveprocesses

thatfacilitateimplementationofnew

stra

tegicpriorities?

Yes.

Forexample,

theResultsMa

nagementFrameworkwillm

onitor

implementationofthenewStrategyfor2013-2022overthe

3-yearplanninghorizonreflected

intherollingplanandassessthe

developmenteffectivenessofthe

institution.

3

Whatpercentageofresourcesareset

asid

eforspecialinitiativesdecidedby

and

controlledbyasubsetofthefull

membership?

TheFundhasavailableresources

entrustedtoitunderArticle8

ofthefoundingAgreement(1963

),whichempowerstheFundto

receiveotherresourcesincluding

grantsfromStateParticipants,

non-participatingcountries,andfromanypublicorprivatebodyor

bodies.5

6T

herehasbeenanincre

aseintrustfundscapitalin2010

73%

comparedto2009thattriggeredatrustfundsreform.5

7

Asof2012,

theBankmobilizeda

totalof$127.7millionfromdonors

toreplenishtheexistingthematic

($130million)andbilateral($22.6

million)TrustFunds.

Bytheendof2012,

theAfricanD

evelopmentBankhadmade

substantialprogressunderitsTrustFundReformpolicybymoving

awayfromtiedbilateralfundstomulti-donorTrustFundsmostof

whicharethematicinnature(forexample,

South-SouthCooperation

TrustFundwithBrazil($6million)

approvedbytheBoardinMarch

2011).

VI.

The

leaderisexpectedtoattract,reta

inanddeveloptalentthrough-ou

ttheorganization

1

Doestheorganizationtakestaff

surveystoassessstaffsatisfaction

and

performanceanddoleaders

utilizetheresultsofthesesurveys?

Yes.

Thefirststaffsurveywasconductedin2007.

In2010President

Kaberukacommittedtoaregular

corporateaccountabilityexercise,

involvingbothclientsurveyanda

staffsurvey.58T

hemostrecentsta

ff

surveywascompletedinDecember2013withresultsexpectedtob

e

publishedinFebruary2014.

Therehavebeenanumberof

staffsurveysinthe

pastandweareplanningtoin

stitutionalizethe

processandincluderesults(s

taffengagement

survey)aspartofourResultsMeasurement

Frameworkthefundamentalbenchmarkagainst

whichweassessourownper

formance.

Oneof

the2013-2022Strategy59g

oa

lsis:toputfocuson

performancepriorities,

talent

managementand

successionplanning.60

2

Istheleaderassessedonmentoring

and

coachingofsubordinatestaff?

Noevidence.


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VII.

MO/IOhasstructuresthatencourageleadershiptoengagewithdiverserangeofstakeholders

No.

AccordingtotheFrameworkforEnhancedEngagementwithCivilSocietyOrganizations(2012),theBan

k

has

nomechanismstoensuresystematicCSOsengagement,butaimsa

tstrengtheningandinstitutionalizin

g

it.61

Thedocumentencouragesthesta

ff(managementincluded)toengag

ewithstakeholders.6

2

Com

plianceReviewandMediationUn

it(CRMU)administersIndependentReviewMechanism(IRM)through

whichpeopleadverselyaffectedbyaprojectfinancedbytheAfDBcanrequesttheBanktocomplywithits

ownpoliciesandprocedures.

VIII.

MO/IOhasstructuresthatengagelead

ershipthoroughlywithinternal/externalevaluations

The

Bankhasstructurestodealwithb

othinternal/independentandexternalevaluations.6

3

For

independentevaluationsthereisa

ManagementResponseandaManagementActionRecord(MAR)that

isp

ublishedanddiscussedwiththeBoard.

TheMARsetsouttime-boundactionstheBankwill(

orwilln

ot)

takeinresponsetoRecommendationsmadebyIndependentEvaluators.

ManagementandEvaluatorsthen

jointlytrackimplementationoftheseM

anagementCommitments.

Forext

ernalEvaluations(e.g.

UKMultilateral

Aid

Review,

AustralianMultilateralAidRevieworMOPAN)theBankprepa

resManagementResponses(thou

gh

not

usuallyanMAR).

Qua

lityAssuranceandResultsDepartmenthasestablishedaRoundtable

ReviewMechanismthatbrings

togethermanagementfromvariousrelevantdepartmentstoreviewtheevaluationsandsetout,where

nec

essary,actiontoaddressthem.


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Indicator

Publishedrules

Otherfactors

I.

The

leadershipselectionprocessse

archesandtestsforspecific,relevantcompetenciesagainstclearlydefinedcriteriathroughaninclusive,

exhaustiveprocess

1

DoestheMO/IOpublishthecriteria/

term

sofreferenceforleadership

online?

Noevidence.

2

Whatpercentageofthemembership

isin

volvedinleadershipselectionand

re-e

lectioninpractice?

Formally,

fullmembership.

(a)Eac

hGovernorcannominatea

candidate.

(b)Eachmembercountryhasonevote.

ThePresidentis

electedbyasimplemajorityofGovernorsrepresentingnolessthan

a

majorityoftotalvotingpowerofa

llmembers.7

7F

urther,thePresiden

t

mustbeanationalofaregionalm

embercountry(e.g.,

therecannot

be

anAmericanPresident).7

8

MuchliketheWorldBankstraditionofselecting

anAmericanPresident,theADBiscommonly

understoodtooperateundertheinformal

conventionthatthePresident

isselectedbyJapan

(Yasutomo1993,

1995;Wan1995;Kilby2006,

2011;Lim&Vreeland2013).EveryPresidenthas

beenJapanese,andmosthavecomedirectlyfrom

theFinanceMinistryofJapan.7

9L

im&Vreeland

(2013)writethatinadditionto

itslargeformalvoting

power,Japanexertsinformalinfluencethroughits

defactoappointmentoftheA

DBpresident.80A

DB

DirectorofStrategyKazuSakaistronglydisagreed

withthenotionthatJapande

factoappointsthe

President.Heremindedviainterviewthatevery

regionalmembercanputforw

ardacandidate,and

thatnoothercandidatedoes

notmeantherewas

noelection;therewas[still]an

electionandvoting.

Numerousacademicsandobserversmaintain,

however,thatthestronginformalinfluenceandlarge

monetarycontributionofJapa

nallowsittopick

thePresidentuncontested.8

1ButasSakaicorrectly

notes,

thereisnoformalevide

ncethatwould

confirmsuchaninformalarrangement,asidefrom

thefactthattherehasneverb

eenanon-Japanese

candidateproposedbyanym

ember.

3

Isthereatime-bound,published,

exh

austiveprocessforleadership

sele

ctionthatweighscompetence

aga

instthepublishedcriteria?

Noevidence.


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d.Inter-A

mericanDevelopmentBan

k(IDB)

Organization

Foundedin

1959asapartnershipbetweenLa

tinAmericancountriesandthe

UnitedStates,

theIDBsupportsclientgovernments,privateentitiesandnon-

profitsecto

rswithcapitalfordevelopmentoperations.

TheInter-American

Developme

ntBankGroup(IADB)iscomposedoftheIDB,

theInter-American

Investment

Corporation(IIC)andtheMultilateralInvestmentFund(MIF),thelatter

beingadministeredbytheIDB.

Thegroupish

eadquarteredintheUnitedStates

(Washingto

nDC).

Governance

TheIADBisheadedbyaboardofgovernors,

whichdelegatesoversightofbank

operations

toaboardofexecutivedirectors(representativesfrom48countries).

Themanag

ementteamrunsday-to-dayoperations.

Electedbytheboardof

governors,

thepresidentchairsthemeetingsoftheboardofexecutivedirectors,

buthasno

vote.

Lengthofleadershipmandate

Fiveyears;

canbere-elected.

Income

$11.4

billioninlendingwasapprovedin2012.

ThesubscribedcapitaltotheIDB,

aftertheninthgeneralcapitalincrease,willam

ountto$170.9

billion.

Numberofstaff

About2,00

0.

Historyofleadership

Thethreepriorpresidents

servedseveralterms:FelipeHerrera(fromChile,

1960-

1971);AntonioOrtizMena

(Mexico,

1971-1988)andEnrique

V.Iglesias(Uruguay,

1988-2005).

Thecurrentpresident,LuisAlbertoMoreno(Colombia;2005-present),

hasalso

servedmorethanoneterm.

Inthe1970elections,

bothArgentinaandVenezuelanominateddifferent

candidates,

buton27November,Ortizreceivedthemajority

ofvotes.

DavidM.

Kennedy,USsecretaryof

thetreasury,reportedtoPresident

RichardNixonthatthe

electionhadbeenconten

tious.125

TheAndeanDevelopmentCorporation(CAF)fundedmoreLatinAmerican

infrastructureprojectsin2

012thantheIADBandWorldBankcombined.1

26

AccordingtoHumphreya

ndMichaelowa(2013),theattractivenessofCAFvis--vis

theIADBisitsfastproces

singtimesandlowsocietalandenvironmentalstandards.

Suchadvantages,

theauthorsargue,areperhapsmadepos

siblebyCAFslackof

non-regionalmembers.1

27

Currenttrajectory

SinceMorenoassumedth

epresidencyinOctober2005,

the

bankhasundergonea

majorreshapingofitsorganizationalstructure,andhasestab

lishedareformagenda

linkedtotheninthgeneralincreaseinresourcesmandate.


29/86


Indicator

Publishedrules

Otherfactors

I.

The

leadershipselectionprocessse

archesandtestsforspecific,relevantcompetenciesagainstclearlydefinedcriteriathroughaninclusive,

exhaustiveprocess

1

Doe

stheMO/IOpublishthecriteria/

term

sofreferenceforleadership

online?

No.

TheChairmansubmitsthete

rmsofthecontractforemploymen

t

forthePresidenttotheBoardofGovernorsinaconfidentialmanner.1

28

Someobserverscelebratethe

IADBsgovernance

structure,arguingthatitbetterpreservesthe

interestsofregionalmembers

thanothermultilateral

institutions.

NancyBirdsall(20

14),forexample,

notesthatintheIADBregiona

lmembershold

amajorityofthevotingpower,whereasnon-

borrowingmemberscollective

lyholdamajorityin

theWorldBank.1

29N

umerous

authorshavewarned,

however,thatvotingweightis

aninsufficient

measureofpowerandinfluencewithinan

organization(Schotter1981;H

osli1996).130S

trand

(2003),employingtheJohnsto

nvotingpowerindex,

calculatestheactualdistributionofvotingpower

intheIADBbasedonindividualcountriesvoting

powerwithincoalitiongroups

andthepowerofthe

coalitiongroupitself.Accordin

gtothiscalculation,

theUnitedStatesholds80%ofvotingpowerwithin

theIADB.1

31F

urther,asBirdsa

ll(2014)notesherself,

theUS,viaitsdefactovetopower,controlsthe

selectionoftheIADBsExecutiveVice-President

(EVP).Thisissignificantgiven

thattheEVPchairs

theLoanCommitteethatmus

tapproveanyproject

beforeitreachestheBoardof

Governorsforfinal

approval.132

2

Whatpercentageofthemembership

isin

volvedinleadershipelectionand

re-e

lectioninpractice?

Fullmembership.

(a)EachGovernorcannominateacandidate.

(b)

Eachmembercountryhasequal

amountofvotes(135)plusonevote

foreachshareofordinarycapital(

OC)stockoftheBank.

Themajority

oftotalvotingpowerofmembercountrieselectsthePresident,

includinganabsolutemajorityofgovernorsofregionalmembers.1

33

VotingpoweramongmembercountriesoftheIDBisasfollows:Latin

AmericanandtheCaribbeanhave50.0

15%,

UnitedStates30.0

06%

,

Canada4.0

01%

andthenon-reg

ionalmembers15.9

79%.

3

Isthereatime-bound,published,

exh

austiveprocessforleadership

elec

tionthatweighscompetence

aga

instthepublishedcriteria?

Yes.

Thecomprehensivesetofregulations134t

ogetherwiththe

agreementestablishingtheBank135is

publishedonline.


30/86


II.

The

leaderhasclearperformanceexpectationswhicharetransparenta

ndconsistentwithMO/IOsoverarchinggoalsandwhichfacilitatesac

countability

1

Do

theleaderssetclearperformance

exp

ectationsforthemselves,which

are

transparentandconsistent?

TheIDBhasaseriesofstrategies

toachieveitsinstitutional

mandates.1

36

2

Isthereanexpectationthatthe

lead

ertranslatesoverarchinggoalsof

organizationintoamanageableand

clea

rstrategy?

Itisunclearifthereisaspecific,formalexpectationthatthePresiden

t

doso.

However,PresidentLuisM

orenodidreleaseafive-yearplan

titledBuildingOpportunityforthe

Majorityin2006thatlistsanumbe

r

ofspecificstrategiesandgoalsfo

rthe2007-2012period.1

37

3

Istheleaderobligedtodisclose

con

flictsofinterest?

Yes.

AllIDBemployeesmustdisc

loseconflictofintereststoprevent

thesituationfromescalatingintoanallegationofMisconduct.138

4

Istheleaderobligedtoadheretoa

pub

lishedcodeofethics?

Yes.

AllIDBemployeesadhereto

strictethicalstandardslaidoutin

the2012CodeofEthicsandProfessionalConduct.139T

heBoardof

ExecutiveDirectorsissubjecttoitsownCode.

III.

The

leaderhasadefinedperformancemanagementprogrammeandre

ceivesannualfeedbackonperform

ance

1

Istheleadersubjectedtoannual

performanceappraisal?

Noevidence.

2

Isremunerationorbenefitstiedto

the

outcomesoftheperformance

managementprogramme?

No.

AsofDecember2012,

thePresidenthasafixedsalaryof

$440,7

98(doesnotincludeExecutiveAllowanceof$78,8

89).140

3

Istheleaderofferedcoachingand

dev

elopmentopportunitytoaddress

wea

knessesovertime?

Noevidence.

IV.

Lea

dershipre-electionisbasedontra

nsparentprocessesandmetrics

1

Are

performancemanagement

criteriaconsideredbythefull

membershipinthere-appointment

process?

Noevidence.

2

Are

otherqualifiedcandidates

con

sideredinthere-election

process?

Noevidence.


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III.

The



ance

1

Istheleadershipsubjectedtoannual


Yes.

TheExecutiveBoardconductsadirectAnnualPerformance

ReviewoftheManagingDirector

(andDMDs),duringwhichMD

providesfeedbackonherownas

sessmentandthatoftheBoardin

thesamecontext.166

Thisannualexercise,

introducedin2009,

isbasedonadefined

framework.

Eachyear,boththeB

oardandtheManagingDirector

specifyperformanceobjectivesfo

reachother,againstwhichan

assessmentisconductedinthefollowingyear.Inconductingthis

exercise,

theBoardeachyearappointsaworkinggroupoffive

ExecutiveDirectors(withgeograp

hicalrepresentation)tooverseethe

process.

Theprocesscomprises

severaliterationsandinvolvesall

ExecutiveDirectors.

2


the



ChristineLagardestermsofappointmentidentifyafixedsalaryof

$467,9

40perannum,whichisad

justedbytheincreaseinconsume

r

priceindexinthegreaterWashingtonarea.1

67

3

Istheleaderofferedcoachingand

dev

elopmentopportunitytoaddress

weaknessesovertime?

Yes.

IMForganizesmanagerialco

urses;themanagementteamhas

accesstothem.

IV.

Lea

dershipre-electionprocessisbasedontransparentprocessesand

metrics

1

Are

performancemanagementcriteria

con

sideredbythefullmembershipin

the

re-electionprocess?

Yes.

TheExecutiveBoard,

inconsultationwiththeentiremembership,

determineswhethertore-appointtheManagingDirector.Indoingso,

ittakesanaccountofMDsperfo

rmance.

AccordingtoIEO,

theBoardh

asthusfarplayed

onlyaproformaroleinselectingMDsandrenewing

theirappointments,withthea

ctualdecisionbeing

madebyasubsetofmember

countriesauthorities

throughanopaqueprocess.168

2

Are


con


process?

Yes.

Inconsideringanyre-appoin

tmentoftheManagingDirector,the

ExecutiveBoard,representingthemembership,considersalloptions.

AccordingtoIEO,

thereisnoformalprocessfor

searchingforcandidates.

The

conventionthatthe

governmentsoftheircountriesoforiginpropose

candidateshasinthepastres

ultedinsome

competentpossiblecandidate

snotbeingput

forwardforavarietyofreason

sincludingdomestic

politicalfactorsorlackofenth

usiasmbythenational

authorities.1

69


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III.

The



ance

1

Istheleadershipsubjectedtoannual


Yes,

butnottothesameextenta

stheregularstaff.

Theevaluation

oftheorganizationandthePresid

entareoneandthesameifthe

Presidentisheldresponsibleforitsperformance.InternalEvaluation

Group(IEG)EvaluationoftheWo

rldBanksOrganizational

Effectiveness305r

eportpublished

inApril2012includedaspectsof

leadership.

Thereareinformalprocessesthatinformthe

management.306

2


the



No,variationisverylimited.

Salariesfortopmanagementaredisclos

ed

inannualreports.3

07

3

Istheleaderofferedcoaching

and

developmentopportunitiesto

add

ressweaknessesovertime?

Onlyonanad-hocbasis.

DrKimhasapersonalcoachnamedMarshall

Goldsmith.3

08

IV.

Lea

dershipre-electionisbasedontra

nsparentprocessesandmetrics

1

Are


con


the

re-electionprocess?

Noevidence.

ThetwoBrettonWoodsorgan

izationsIMFand

WorldBankshowthatre-ap

pointmentisbased

ontwocriteria:(1)whethertheincumbentwishesto

stay;and(2)thedominantpolitics.3

09

2

Are


con


process?

Yes.

Inpractice,competingnon-Am

ericancandidates

havenotbeenconsideredunt

ilthe2011election

inwhichtwonon-UScandidateswereputforthfor

election.3

10

V.

The

leaderhastheauthorityandmech

anismstoshiftstrategicprioritiestomeetchangingcircumstances

1

Doe

stheleaderhavetheauthority

tos

hiftstrategicprioritiesinlightof

externalchanges?

Yes,

thePresidentcanrecommen

dshiftsofstrategythorough

deliveringreportsfortheDevelopmentCommittee.3

11T

hegovernors

approvetheproposals.

2

Doe

stheMO/IOhaveprocesses

thatfacilitateimplementationofnew

stra

tegicpriorities?

Unclear.Amongmechanismsthatpartlyfacilitateimplementation

ofnewstrategies:reportsoftheD

evelopmentCommittee;agenda

andsummariesofmeetings;App

raisalreports(InternalCompletion

Reports(ICR);ProjectCompletionReports(PCR)etc.);Internal

EvaluationGroup(IEG)reports(th

eunitreportstotheBoardof

Governors,notmanagementoftheBank);InternationalDevelopmen

t

Association(IDA)reports.

TheonlyconstraintsaretheA

rticlesof

Agreement.312


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3

Whatpercentageofresourcesareset

asid

eforspecialinitiativesdecidedby

and

controlledbyasubsetofthefull

membership?

Thereisarapidgrowthintrustfunds,non-discretionarybudget

thatisbeingearmarked.3

13I

deally

,trustfundswouldbecloselylinke

d

totheWorldBanksstrategy,processesandoversight.However,

sincetrustfundsadd25%tothe

Banksadministrativebudget,the

incentivestoalignareweak.

Inaddition,

thebiggestcontributo

rsin2012areUSandUK($4,5

bn,

morethanonethirdoftotal),whic

hincreasesriskofcapturebythes

e

twocountries.

Trustfundsinfluencebehaviou

rsandpriorities;

donorswantthis.

Italsodistra

ctsotherresources

(notonlyfinancial,butalsohumanresources,

for

example).AlsoconsiderReimbursableAdvisory

Serviceswhencountriesask

forextraservices

(management,forexample,R

AMPprogramme

whereforafeetheWorldBan

kundertakes

managementofassets).314

VI.

The

leaderisexpectedtoattract,reta

inanddeveloptalentthrough-ou

ttheorganization

1

Doe

stheorganizationtakestaff


and

performanceanddoleaders


Yes.

Thereare:(1)broadstaffsurveysconductedevery18months

torevealstaffsatisfactionwithma

nagers,

(2)360degreesexercise

whereonesolicitsinputsofsubordinatesand(3)amechanismofpe

er

reviewinplacetomakerecomme

ndationsforcorrection.

JimYong

Kimrecentlyconductedasurvey

ofits10,0

00employees.

Itrevealeda

cultureoffear,pervasivefearofriskandaterribleenvironmentfor

collaboration.3

15

Staffsurveyshavebeenplayin

gasurprisinglylarge

rolesinceKimcame.3

16

2

Isexecutivemanagementassessed

onmentoringandcoachingof

sub

ordinatestaff?

Noevidence.

Itisnotapriorityquestion.31

7


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j.WorldHealthOrganization(WHO)

Organization

WHO,

thedirectingandcoordinatingauthority

forhealthwithintheUnitedNation

s

system,isresponsibleforprovidingleadership

onglobalhealthmatters,shaping

thehealthresearchagendaandsettingnormsandstandards.

Headquartered

inGeneva,

Switzerland,

ithassixregionaloffices(Brazzaville,

theRepublicof

Congo;Wa

shingtonDC,

USA;NewDelhi,Ind

ia;Copenhagen,

Denmark;Cairo,

Egypt;and

Manila,

Philippines)and150countryoffices.

Governance

The194m

embercountriesgovernWHO,meetingannuallyattheWorldHealth

Assembly(WHA).Theassemblyappointsthe

director-general(DG),supervises

theorganiz

ationsfinancialpolicies,andreview

sandapprovestheproposed

programmebudget.TheWHAisadvisedbytheexecutiveboard(34members),

whoaretechnicallyqualifiedinthehealthfield

andareelectedforathree-year

term.

Lengthof

leadershipmandate

Fiveyears.

Income

Theproposedbudgetfor2014-2015is$3.98

billion.

Numberofstaff

8,0

00,spreadoverheadquarters,regionaloffi

cesandcountries.

Historyof

leadership

Pastdirector-generalswere:B.

Chisholm(from

Canada,

1948-1953);M.G.

Candau(Brazil,1953-1973);H.

Mahler(Denm

ark,

1973-1988);H.

Nakajima

(Japan,

1988-1998);G.H.

Brundtland(Norway,1998-2003);LeeJong-wook

(Republico

fKorea,

2003-2006[diedinoffice])andAndersNordstrm(Sweden,

2006-2007

[actingDG,replacingLee]).

MargaretChan,

thecurrentDG,wasappointedon9November2006.

Therehavebeennooutwardscandalsregardinganyoftheleaders.

Currenttrajectory

UnderChansleadership,

WHOhasundertakenmajorfinanc

ial,managerialand

governance-relatedreform

,layingoutitsprojectedtimeline,intermediatecheck-in

pointsandguidelines.

Thisreformhasbeenbothinternalandexternal-facing,

the

lattercoveringWHOsactivitieswithexternalstakeholders,in

cludingcountriesand

non-stateentities.


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3

Wh

atpercentageofresourcesareset

asideforspecialinitiativesdecidedby

andcontrolledbyasubsetofthefull

me

mbership?

76%ofWHOsfundsarevoluntarycontributionswithmostofthem

beinghighlyspecifiedastowhichdepartmentorhealthintervention

theyshouldbeusedfor.(http://w

hqlibdoc.w

ho.in

t/pb/2012-2013/

PB_

2012%E2%80%932013_en

g.p

df)

TheDirectorGeneralistrying

toensureafully-

financedbudget,throughthe

FinancingDialogue

Initiative.

Currently,somepar

tsofthebudgetare

over-fundedandsomeareun

der-funded.

According

toIanSmith,

ExecutiveDirector,DirectorGenerals

Office,

thecriticalelementsto

afinancedbudgetis

predictabilityandalignment.Itisessentialthatwe

knowhowmuchmoneyweh

ave,andwhenwe

willr

eceiveit.

Additionally,

itisimportantthatthe

resourcesarealignedwiththeorganizationswork,

withtheregions,staffingand

activities.

TheWHO

isdevelopingaportalwhichwillb

etransparent,

showingalltheresources,wh

eretheyhavebeen

spentandtowhattheyhave

beendedicatedto.

Thisisnotauniqueidea(UNDPhasamulti-donor

trustfundwebsiteasanexam

ple),butwillb

e

somethingnewforWHO.

VI.

Theleaderisexpectedtoattract,retainanddeveloptalentthrough-outtheorganization

1

Do

estheorganizationtakestaff


andperformanceanddoleaders


Yes,

theorganizationconductsa

ndpublishesastakeholdersurvey

whichincludesbothexternalstakeholdersandinternalstaff.

The

resultsarepublishedinareport,

availableonthewebsite.

Itseems

thatfromthe2012survey,oneo

fthekeyfindingswasthat21%

ofexternaland25%ofinternalrespondentshavedoubtsregarding

WHOsabilitytotakethenecessarymeasurestoensurethe

independenceofitspublichealth

experts,similarproportionsvoiced

concernsaboutWHOsindependencefrominappropriateindustry

influence.

Thefullreportwiththesurveyfindingsisalsoonthe

website.

(http://www.w

ho.in

t/about/who_

perception_

survey_2012.pdf)

Thereisanothersurveycalled

thePerception

SurveythatisledbytheDep

artmentof

Communications,

ledbyane

xternalagency.

Itis

sharedwidelyinternallyandw

idelydiscussedby

theAssistantDirectorGenera

lsandtheRegional

Directors.

2

Istheleaderassessedonmentoring

andcoachingofsubordinatestaff?

Thisispartoftheperformanc

emanagementsystem

(PMDS)andistakenintoacc

ountinformally.


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VII.

MO

/IOhasstructuresthatencourage

managementtoengagewithdiv

erserangeofstakeholders

WHOisfairlyconservativeinthismatter.Thereis

anongoingprocessofreform

forengaginginnon-

stateactors.

Thecategoriesofengagementare

thefollowing:1)Governance

(wherestakeholders

canengageingovernancem

attersofWHO),2)

Collaboration(jointwork-plan

,projects,official

relationswithNGOsetc.),

3)Consultation(moread-

hoc,

due-diligence,conflictofinterest,development

ofstandards,sharingofinformation,expertiseand

know-how),4)Finance(non-stateactorscanmake

acontributiontoWHO),5)Contractsgiventothe

privatesectorforcarryingoutspecificpiecesof

work.

VIII.

MO

/IOhasstructuresthatengageexecutivemanagementthoroughlywithinternal/externalevaluations

WHOiscommittedtoaprogramofregular

evaluations,maintainingindependence,and

engaginginindependentevaluations.

theExecutive

Boardwillc

onductandevaluatethesefortheWHO.


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3

Istheleaderofferedcoaching

and

developmentopportunitiesto

add

ressweaknessesovertime?

Yes,uponrequest.350

Coachingandexecutivemanagementsessionsby

externalcoachesareofferedt

oseniormanagement

uponrequest.SeniorExecutiv

eRetreats(for

DG;DDGsandDirectors)havebeenintroduced

todiscussopenlyandcollectivelytheWTOs

performancemanagementprogrammeand

developmentfeedback.3

51

IV.

Lea

dershipre-electionisbasedontransparentprocessesandmetrics

1

Are


con


the

re-electionprocess?

Noevidence.

2

Are


con


process?

Yes,

ifnewcandidatesarenominated.

Inpractice,attheendofthen

ominationperiodin

2009,

PascalLamywastheo

nlycandidateandwas

re-appointed.

V.

The

leaderhastheauthorityandmech

anismstoshiftstrategicprioritiestomeetchangingcircumstances


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