Education Science Tachnology Arts Culture Sports

7/29/2019 Education Science Tachnology Arts Culture Sports

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA,EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf ofapplicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during theschool year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken orsuccessfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test(NMAT). petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S.GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the RegionalTrial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at

Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDESQUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OFMEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONALMEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicinefor the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did nottake or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test

(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the publicrespondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Centerfor Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgmentand Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order andPreliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretaryof Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education andthe Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring thetaking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securingcertificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with acceptingapplications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMATas scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on thepetition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied


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said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted andadministered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari withthis Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying thepetition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectivesin the following manner:

Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a)the standardization and regulation of medical education (b) theexamination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,

control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.(Underscoring supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of MedicalEducation which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education,Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, asChairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorizedrepresentative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his dulyauthorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board orhis duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the

Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College ofMedicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of theCouncil of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) arepresentative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, asmembers. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specifiedin Section 5 of the statute include the following:

(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into arecognized college of medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physicalfacilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals,equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating anddelivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used fordidactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;


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(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimumqualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;

(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculumleading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;

(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medicalcurriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty andinstrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum mayprescribe admission and graduation requirements other than thoseprescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shallbe enrolled in the experimental curriculum;

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical

school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and tocollect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos eachwhich shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of MedicalEducation;

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departmentsof the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specificphysical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and

(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and

regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.(Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants tomedical schools:

Admission requirements. The medical college may admit anystudent who has not been convicted by any court of competent

jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents(a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts;

(b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from theBoard of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral characterissued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d)birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit anycollege of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding,other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.


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x x x x x x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister ofEducation, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,established a uniform admission test called the National Medical

Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance ofa certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of thePhilippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Ordergoes on to state that:

2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument towardupgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medicalschools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical educationin the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based

on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by theBoard of Medical Education after consultation with the Association ofPhilippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant,together with the other admission requirements as presently called forunder existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the

prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medicalcolleges.

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education,each medical college may give other tests for applicants who have

been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for admission thatwill yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality tocomplement the information derived from the NMAT.

x x x x x x x x x

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility forAdmission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student inany medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without therequired NMAT qualification as called for under this Order.(Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondentCenter conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during theschool year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987,respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medicalcolleges during the school year 1987.1988. 1avvphi1


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Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminaryinjunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a)and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the

assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue asentirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that acourt would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when thepetitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out acase of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind ofthe judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing aclear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is ofcourse the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.

1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987

Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continuedimplementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, asamended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invokedread as follows:

(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of everyhuman person and guarantees full respect of human rights. "

(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of theyouth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,

moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate inthe youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage theirinvolvement in public and civic affairs."

(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education,science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotismand nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote totalhuman liberation and development. "

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote theright of all citizens to quality education at all levels and takeappropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "

(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select aprofession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable andequitable admission and academic requirements."


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Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain"State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue andpromote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken todemonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the

administrative order they assail collide with the State policiesembodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden isheavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relativelyspecific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral oroperational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavierwhere the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the secondportion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, ormore precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and thereforehighly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case,

even aprima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate andto imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned asunconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisionspointed to by the petitioners.

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we notethat once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statuteand regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On thecontrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra that thestatute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in factdesigned to promote "quality education" at the level of professionalschools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of

Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase ofSection 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is notreally enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to allwho might for any number of reasons wish to enrollin a professional school but rather merely to make such educationaccessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitableadmission and academic requirements. "

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against theconstitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation oflegislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to befollowed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. Thegeneral principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both


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flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separationand allocation of powers among the three great departments ofgovernment,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect ofstatutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as

obviously complex and technical as medical education and thepractice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurelstressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co.,Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle ofseparation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non

potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adoptedthis practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E.Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is

also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, givingrise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and Englandbut in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal andOsmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growingcomplexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects ofgovernmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administeringthe laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward thedelegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward theapproval of thepractice by the courts." 3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rulemaking authority by an administrative agency like the Board ofMedical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. Asexplained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, thenon-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not

have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policyand purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to beattained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth inSection 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and


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regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of thesame Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these consideredtogether are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS OrderNo. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitablerequirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again,petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of theNMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." Theyappear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessaryrequirement when added on top of the admission requirements setout in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admissionrequirements established by internal regulations of the various

medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appearto relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement.But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority:this Court has neither commission or competence to pass uponquestions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation oradministrative regulation. Those questions must be address to thepolitical departments of the government not to the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: thelegislative and administrative provisions impugned by themconstitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the policepower of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, isthe pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereignto secure and promote an the important interests and needs in aword, the public order of the general community.6 An importantcomponent of that public order is the health and physical safety andwell being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny isa legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whetherthere is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passingthe NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the onehand, and the securing of the health and safety of the generalcommunity, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefullyapproached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicinein all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method


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of protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power toregulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power toregulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practicemedicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative

regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to takeand pass medical board examinations have long ago beenrecognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, theestablishment of minimum medical educational requirements i.e.,the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustainedas a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10 Whatwe have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulationof access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as notedearlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the

improvement of the professional and technical quality of thegraduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of thoseadmitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgradingis sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivityconsisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those whoexhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies andeventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and thedifficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schoolsin general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of

our social and economic development, are widely known.We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admissiontest like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" andof "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Giventhe widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance,medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College

Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries withfar more developed educational resources than our own, and taking

into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt toprove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonablyrelated to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulationin this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of thepublic from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence andignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies andminds for disease or trauma.


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4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s.1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution.More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECSOrder which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores onthe NMAT, shall be determined every-yearby the Board of Medical11 Education after consultation with the Association of PhilippineMedical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in otherwords, that students seeking admission during a given school year,e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than thatestablished for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against

and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." Theforce of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoffscores for different school years may be dictated by differingconditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoffscore for a given year may be a function of such factors as thenumber of students who have reached the cutoff score establishedthe preceding year; the number of places available in medical schoolsduring the current year; the average score attained during the currentyear; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year,and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff scoreregardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wenresult in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECSOrder No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Boardof Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meetcircumstances as they change.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certainminimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medicalschools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional

imposition.WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and theOrder of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ ofpreliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.


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Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento andCortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v. Auditorgeneral, 15 SCRA 569 (1965).

2 70 Phil. 221 (1940).

3 70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied.

4 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

5 35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At this point, Mr. JusticeFernando dropped a useful footnote of the following tenor:

"This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare,"Municipality of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (I 917);"necessary in the interest of law and order," Rubi v. Provincial Board,39 Phil. 660 (1919); "public interest," People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.328 (1939); and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the

case," International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil.602 (1940). "

In People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice J.B. L.Reyes said:

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of lawsis a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority andpromulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and

effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds itimprac ticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for themultifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying thelaw into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should begermane to the objects and purposes of the law," that the regulationbe not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that thelaw prescribes-." (101 Phil. at 1129; underscoring supplied).


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6 E.G., U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Ermita-Malate Hotel andMotel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849(1967) and Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).

7 E.G., Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913); People vs. Witte,146 NE 178 (1925) and Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595(1927).

8 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 US 442, 98 L.Ed. 829, 74 SCT.650 (1954); Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Beatty,220 La. 1, 55 So2d. 761 (1951) and Reisinger v. Com., State Boardof Medical Education and Licensure, et al., 399 A2d 1160 (1979).

9 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9 SCt. 231 (1889);

State v. Bair, 112 Jowa 466,84 NW 532 (1900).10 People v. Love, 298 Ill 304, 131 NE 809, 16 ALR 703 (1921);Collins v. Texas, 223 US 288, 56 L.Ed. 439, 32 SCt. 286 (1912).

11 See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, et al., 92 Wash. 431, 598 P. 2d.707 (1979).


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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127930 December 15, 2000

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ,RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS,CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD GARYRENACIDO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

"Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injuriousto young readers," and devoid of all moral values."1 This was nowsome members of the Miriam College community allegedly describedthe contents of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14)of Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (AngMagasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho). The articles in the Chi-Rhoincluded:

. . . a story, clearly fiction, entitled 'Kaskas' written by one GeraldGarry Renacido . . . Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the

experience of a group of young, male, combo players who, oneevening, after their performance went to see a bold show in a placecalled "Flirtation". This was the way the author described the group'sexposure during that stage show:

"Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos . . . he! he! he! sambitng kanilang bokalistang kanina pa di maitago ang pagkahayok sakarneng babae na kanyang pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa,susog naman ang tropa.

". . . Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si 'Red Raven' ayon saemcee. Nakasuot lamang ng bikining pula na may palamuting dilawsa gilid-gilid at sa bandang utong. Nagsimula siya sa kanyang pag-giling nang tumugtog na ang unang tono ng "Goodbye" ng Air Supply.Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at mapang-akit na galawsa una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-parongpadapo-dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy o


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kumuha ng nektar, ngunit para ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak atang angkin nitong malansang nektar.

"Kaskas mo babe, sige . . . kaskas."

Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulangnatipuhan, dahil sa harap niya'y nagtagal. Nag-akmang mag-aalis ngpangitaas na kapirasong tela. Hindi nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sakanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati ang nasa gitna ng kanyang hita.

Ang mga mata niya'y namagnet sa kayamanang ngayo'y halos isangpulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga. Naputol-putol ang kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni 'Red Raven' angkanyang kanang hita. Lalo naghingalo siya nang kabayuhin ito ngdahan dahan . . . Pabilis ng pabilis.'

The author further described Mike's responses to the dancer asfollows (quoted in part):

. . . Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindinagpatalo ang ibong walang pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mikeat pinag-udyukan ang kanyang dibdib sa mukha nito.

"Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!"

Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ngbiglang halikan siya nito sa labi at iniwang bigla, upang kanyangmuniin ang naudlot niyang pagtikim ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niyamaanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo sa nangyaring sagupaan nglibog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata na siya."

After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalistadriving. A pedestrian happened to cross the street and the driverdeliberately hit him with these words:

"Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He!Sabad ng sabog nilang drayber/bokalista."

The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: . . ."Pare . . . trak!!! Put . . .!!!!

Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue, was in turn, given


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the cover title of "Libog at iba pang tula."

In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled "Foreplay", Jeromewrote: "Alam ko, nakakagulat ang aming pamagat." Jerome thenproceeded to write about previous reactions of readers to women-writers writing about matters erotic and to gay literature. He justifiedthe Magazine's erotic theme on the ground that many of the poemspassed on to the editors were about "sekswalidad at iba't ibangkaranasan nito." Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat . . .tungkol sa maselang usaping ito . . . at sa isang institusyon pangkatulad ng Miriam!"

Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled "Linggo" written by himself:

may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang -mga putang biyak na sa gitna,

'di na puwedeng paglabhan,

'di na maaaring pagbabaran . . ."

Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not "garapal" and"sa mga tulang ito namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-

sensasyonal) ng pamagat na "Libog at iba pang Tula." He finished"Foreplay" with these words: "Dahil para saan pa ang libog kung hindiilalabas?"

The cover title in question appears to have been taken from a poemwritten by Relly Carpio of the same title. The poem dealt on a womanand a man who met each other, gazed at each other, went up closeand "Naghalikan, Shockproof." The poem contained a backgrounddrawing of a woman with her two mammary and nipples exposed andwith a man behind embracing her with the woman in a pose of

passion-filled mien.

Another poem entitled 'Virgin Writes Erotic' was about a man havingfantasies in his sleep. The last verse said: "At zenith I pull it out andfind myself alone in this fantasy." Opposite the page where this poemappeared was a drawing of a man asleep and dreaming of a nakedwoman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed on her buttocks with


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her head up (as in a hospital bed with one end rolled up). Thewoman's right nipple can be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretchedup with her knees akimbo on the bed.

In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem entitled "Naisip ko Lang"by Belle Campanario. It was about a young student who has a love-selection problem: ". . . Kung sinong pipiliin: ang teacher kongpraning, o ang boyfriend kong bading." The word "praning" as thecourt understands it, refers to a paranoid person; while the word"bading" refers to a sward or "bakla" or "badidang". This poem alsohad an illustration behind it: of a young girl with large eyes andsloping hair cascading down her curves and holding a peeled bananawhose top the illustrator shaded up with downward-slanting strokes.In the poem, the girl wanted to eat banana topped by peanut butter.

In line with Jerome's "Foreplay" and by the way it was drawn thatbanana with peanut butter top was meant more likely than not, toevoke a spiritedly mundane, mental reaction from a young audience.

Another poem entitled "Malas ang Tatlo" by an unknown author wentlike this:

'Na picture mo na ba

no'ng magkatabi tayong dalawa

sa pantatluhang sofa -

ikaw, the legitimate asawa

at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?

tapos, tumabi siya, shit!

kumpleto na:

ikaw, ako at siya

kulang na lang, kamera."

A poem "Sa Gilid ng Itim" by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rhobroadsheet spoke of a fox (lobo) yearning for "karneng sariwa,


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karneng bata, karneng may kalambutan . . . isang bahid ng dugongdalaga, maamo't malasa, ipahid sa mga labing sakim sa romansa'and ended with 'hinog na para himukin bungang bibiyakin."2

Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, themembers of the editorial board,3 and Relly Carpio, author ofLibog, allstudents of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. AleliSevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee. The Letterdated 4 November 1994 stated:

This is to inform you that the letters of complain filed against you bymembers of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo gradefive student have been forwarded to the Discipline Committee forinquiry and investigation. Please find enclosed complaints.

As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in thestudent handbook specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n, andp, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a, page 37.

You are required to submit a written statement in answer to thecharge/s on or before the initial date of hearing to be held onNovember 15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSAConference Room.4

None of the students submitted their respective answers. Theyinstead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the RegionalOffice of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)which under Rule XII of DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992,supposedly had jurisdiction over the case.5

In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required thestudents to file their written answers.

In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students,submitted a letter6 to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients'position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. Accordingto Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was "trying to impose discipline onhis clients on account of their having written articles and poems intheir capacity as campus journalists." Hence, he argued that "whatapplies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its


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implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partialityof the members of said Committee who allegedly "had alreadyarticulated their position" against his clients.

The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte.Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the DisciplineCommittee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon thestudents, thus:

1. Jasper Briones Expulsion. Briones is the Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Ryear student;

2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on Febru4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995. Miss Ligon is a 4th

and could graduate as summa cum laude;5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges withheld, including diploma

Octoberian;7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on Febru8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given transfer credentials. He is a

student. He wrote the fiction story "Kaskas";9. Relly Carpio Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is i

wrote the poem "Libog";10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is i

wrote the foreword "Foreplay" to the questioned Poems; and

11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given transfer papers. He is a 2nd and art editor of Chi-Rho.7

The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorariwith preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the DisciplineBoard of Miriam College over them.

On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presidedby Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., issued an order denying the plaintiffs'prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. It held:

There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S. 1992 dated August 19,1992 that excludes school Administrators from exercising jurisdictionover cases of the nature involved in the instant petition. R.A. 7079


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also does not state anything on the matter of jurisdiction. The DECSundoubtedly cannot determine the extent of the nature of jurisdictionof schools over disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this Court reads thatDECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992, it merely prescribes for purposes of

internal administration which DECS officer or body shall hear casesarising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for resolution. Thesaid order never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction overcases falling under R.A. 707.8

The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion forReconsideration." The College followed with its Answer.

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues raised moot andacademic, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining thedefendants, including the officers and members of the DisciplinaryCommittee, the Disciplinary Board, or any similar body and theiragents, and the officers and members of the Security Department,Division, or Security Agency securing the premises and campus ofMiriam College Foundation, Inc. from:

1. Enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal

resolutions or orders complained of against herein plaintiffs (a)Jasper Briones; (b) Gerald Gary Renacido; (c) Relly Carpio; (d)Jerome Gomez; and (e) Jose Mari Ramos, but otherwise allowing thedefendants to impose lesser sanctions on aforementioned plaintiffs;and

2. Disallowing, refusing, barring or in any way preventing the hereinplaintiffs (all eleven of them) from taking tests or exams and enteringthe Miriam campus for such purpose as extended to all students ofMiriam College Foundation, Inc.; neither should their respectivecourse or subject teachers or professors withhold their grades,including final grades, if and when they meet the requirementssimilarly prescribed for all other students, this current 2nd Semesterof 1994-95.

The sanctions imposed on the other plaintiffs, namely, DeborahLigon, Imelda Hilario, Elizabeth Valdezco, Camille Portugal and


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Daphne Cowper, shall remain in force and shall not be covered bythis Injunction: Provided, that Camille Portugal now a graduate, shallhave the right to receive her diploma, but defendants are not herebyprevented from refusing her the privilege of walking on the graduation

stage so as to prevent any likely public tumults.The plaintiffs are required to post an injunction bond in the sum ofFour Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.

SO ORDERED.9

Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In anOrder dated 22 February 1995, the RTC dismissed the petition, thus:

4. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which hasjurisdiction, inasmuch as both parties do not want this court toassume jurisdiction here then this court will not be more popish thanthe Pope and in fact is glad that it will have one more case out of itsdocket.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED withoutprejudice to the parties going to another forum.

All orders heretofore issued here are hereby recalled and set aside.

SO ORDERED.10

The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and DaphneCowper, sought relief in this Court through a petition for certiorari andprohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining order11 questioning theOrders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995.

On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Courtof Appeals (CA) for disposition.12 On 19 May 1995, the CA issued a

resolution stating:

The respondents are hereby required to file comment on the instantpetition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunctionshould be issued, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, and thepetitioners may file reply thereto within five (5) days from receipt offormer's comment.


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In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a TemporaryRestraining Order be issued enjoining the public respondents fromenforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.

SO ORDERED.13

In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, respondent court grantedthe students' petition. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22February 1995, as well as the students' suspension and dismissal,void.

Hence, this petition by Miriam College.

We limit our decision to the resolution of the following issues:

(1) The alleged moot character of the case.

(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition forcertiorari filed by the students.

(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondentstudents.

(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the

students.We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, thepropriety of the penalty imposed or the manner of the impositionthereof. These issues, though touched upon by the parties in theproceedings below, were not fully ventilated therein.

I

Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals found the case moot thus:

While this petition may be considered moot and academic since morethan one year have passed since May 19, 1995 when this courtissued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents fromenforcing the dismissal and suspension on petitioners . . .14

Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases, petitioner argues that the


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CA should not have proceeded with the adjudication of the merits ofthe case.

We find that the case is not moot.

It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was atemporary restraining order, not a preliminary injunction. The recordsdo not show that the CA ever issued a preliminary injunction.

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action orproceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or acourt, agency or a person to perform to refrain from performing aparticular act or acts.15 As an extraordinary remedy, injunction iscalculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is

generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until themerits of the case can be heard.16 A preliminary injunction persistsuntil it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without thecourt issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is topreserve the status quo until the hearing of the application forpreliminary injunction.17 Under the former 5, Rule 58 of the Rules ofCourt, as amended by 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or

justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of

twenty days from date of issue.18 If before the expiration of the 20-dayperiod the application for preliminary injunction is denied, thetemporary order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. Ifno action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminaryinjunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining orderwould automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law,no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.19 In the instantcase, no such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TROearlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of

the Rules of Court.

20

This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining orderwas the rule prevailing when the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May1995.21 By that time respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and Joel Tanhad already served their respective suspensions. The TRO wasapplicable only to respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome Gomez, Relly


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Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary Renacido all of whomwere dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduationprivileges were withheld. The TRO, however, lost its effectivity uponthe lapse of the twenty days. It can hardly be said that in that short

span of time, these students had already graduated as to render thecase moot.

Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was effective throughoutthe pendency of the case or that what is issued was a preliminaryinjunction. In either case, it was error on the part of the CA to assumethat its order supposedly enjoining Miriam from enforcing thedismissal and suspension was complied with. A case becomes mootand academic when there is no more actual controversy between theparties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the

merits.22

To determine the moot character of a question before it, theappellate court may receive proof or take notice of facts appearingoutside the record.23 In the absence of such proof or notice of facts,the Court of Appeals should not have assumed that its TRO wasenforced, and that the case was rendered moot by the mere lapse oftime.

Indeed, private respondents in their Comment herein24 deny that thecase has become moot since Miriam refused them readmission inviolation of the TRO. This fact is unwittingly conceded by Miriam itselfwhen, to counter this allegation by the students, it says that privaterespondents never sought readmission after the restraining order wasissued.25 In truth, Miriam relied on legal technicalities to subvert theclear intent of said order, which states:

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a TemporaryRestraining Order be issued enjoining the public respondents fromenforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.

Petitioner says that the above order is "absurd" since the order"incorrectly directs public respondent, the Hon. Jaime Salazar,presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not todismiss or suspend the students."26

We do not agree. Padua vs. Robles27 lays down the rules inconstruing judgments. We find these rules to be applicable to court


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orders as well:

The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by itssubstance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legaleffects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legalimplications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, itsmeaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like anyother written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intent of thecourt as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation towhich it applies and attendant circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)

Tested by such standards, we find that the order was indeed intendedforprivate respondents (in the appellate court) Miriam College, et al.,and not public respondent Judge. In dismissing the case, the trial

judge recalled and set aside all orders it had previously issued,including the writ of preliminary injunction. In doing so, the trial courtallowed the dismissal and suspension of the students to remain inforce. Thus, it would indeed be absurd to construe the order as beingdirected to the RTC. Obviously, the TRO was intended for MiriamCollege.

True, respondent-students should have asked for a clarification of theabove order. They did not. Nevertheless, if Miriam College found theorder "absurd," then it should have sought a clarification itself so the

Court of Appeals could have cleared up any confusion. It chose notto. Instead, it took advantage of the supposed vagueness of the orderand used the same to justify its refusal to readmit the students.

As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA's ruling that thecase is moot has no basis. How then can Miriam argue in good faiththat the case had become moot when it knew all along that the factson which the purported moot character of the case were based didnot exist? Obviously, Miriam is clutching to the CA's wrongful

assumption that the TRO it issued was enforced to justify the reversalof the CA's decision.

Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot, Miriam's pretensionsto the contrary notwithstanding.

II


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"To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campuslevel and to promote the development and growth of campus

journalism as a means of strengthening ethical values, encouragingcritical and creative thinking, and developing moral character and

personal discipline of the Filipino youth,"

28

Congress enacted in 1991Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THEDEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS JOURNALISM

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"29 the law contains provisions for theselection of the editorial board30 and publication adviser,31 the fundingof the school publication,32 and the grant of exemption to donationsused actually, directly and exclusively for the promotion of campus

journalism from donor's or gift tax.33

Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to

the editorial board and its members. Thus, the second paragraph ofSection 4 states that "(o)nce the publication is established, itseditorial board shall freely determine its editorial policies and-managethe publication's funds."

Section 7, in particular, provides:

A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status asstudent in order to retain membership in the publication staff. Astudent shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of

articles he or she has written, or on the basis of the performance ofhis or her duties in the student publication.

Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to "promulgate the rulesand regulations necessary for the effective implementation of this

Act."34 Pursuant to said authority, then DECS Secretary ArmandFabella, issued DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, providing underRule XII that:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports(DECS) shall help ensure and facilitate the proper carrying out of theImplementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7079. Itshall also act on cases on appeal brought before it.

The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over


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cases as a result of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorialboard of a school within its area of administrative responsibility. Itshall conduct investigations and hearings on the these cases withinfifteen (15) days after the completion of the resolution of each case.

(Emphasis supplied.)The latter two provisions of law appear to be decisive of the presentcase.

It may be recalled that after the Miriam Disciplinary Board imposeddisciplinary sanctions upon the students, the latter filed a petition forcertiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court raising, asgrounds therefor, that:

IDEFENDANT'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND DISCIPLINARYBOARD OF DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAVE NO JURISDICTIONOVER THE CASE.35

II

DEFENDANT SCHOOL'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND THEDISCIPLINARY BOARD DO NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION OF

AN IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL ARBITER AND, THEREFORETHEIR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE AGAINSTPLAINTIFFS WILL DENY THE LATTER OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUEPROCESS.36

Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII ofthe Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079,the DECS Regional Office, and not the school, had jurisdiction overthem. The second ground, on the other hand, alleged lack ofimpartiality of the Miriam Disciplinary Board, which would thereby

deprive them of due process. This contention, if true, would constitutegrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionon the part of the trial court. These were the same grounds invokedby the students in their refusal to answer the charges against them.The issues were thus limited to the question of jurisdiction - aquestion purely legal in nature and well within the competence andthe jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is


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an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As the Court heldin Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova.37

Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, alegal question arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary thanfor an administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary

jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to acton the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such isthe case. That is to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to theapproach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy as towhether or not the legislative franchise could be so interpreted as toenable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on thematter. A jurisdictional question thus arises and calls for an answer.

However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsiderationcontended that the DECS Regional Office, not the RTC, hadjurisdiction, the trial court, refusing to "be more popish than thePope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could hardlycontain its glee over the fact that "it will have one more case out of itsdocket." We remind the trial court that a court having jurisdiction of acase has not only the right and the power or authority, but also theduty, to exercise that jurisdiction and to render a decision in a caseproperly submitted to it.38 Accordingly, the trial court should not havedismissed the petition without settling the issues presented before it.

III

Before we address the question of which between the DECSRegional Office and Miriam College has jurisdiction over thecomplaints against the students, we first delve into the power of eitherto impose disciplinary sanctions upon the students. Indeed, theresolution of the issue of jurisdiction would be reduced to anacademic exercise if neither the DECS Regional Office nor Miriam

College had the power to impose sanctions upon the students.Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that Section 7 of the CampusJournalism Act prohibits the expulsion or suspension of a studentsolely on the basis of articles he or she has written.

A.


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Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutionsof higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academicfreedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself,its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside

coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding publicwelfare calls for some restraint.39 The essential freedoms subsumedin the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom todetermine for itself on academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,

(3) How it shall be taught, and

(4) Who may be admitted to study.40

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent inthe third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainlycannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educationalinstitution requires rules and regulations necessary for themaintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of

an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules andregulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students,faculty, and property.41

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the studentdiscipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field oflearning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.

Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis inthe freedom "what to teach."

Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to developdiscipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism,foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of therole of national heroes in the historical development of the country,teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and


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spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific andtechnological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.42

InAngeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for theschool to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow anddevelop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of thecommunity."43

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to disciplinemore evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school hasthe freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it alsohas the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as uponwhom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the

withholding of graduation privileges.

Thus, in Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong,44 the Court upheld theexpulsion of students found guilty of hazing by petitioner therein,holding that:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediatereinstatement of respondent students who have been investigatedand found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioneruniversity's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine

the authority of the administration of the school. This we would bemost loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university'sacademic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 andthe present 1987 Constitution.45

Tracing the development of academic freedom, the Court continued:

Since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently

upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution ofhigher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being aprivilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under theEducation Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose theirfield of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their coursetherein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to theestablished academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the


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academic institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules andregulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students.This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents under a socialand moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, toassist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation andindispensable to the successful management of the college. Therules may include those governing student discipline." Going a stepfurther, the establishment of the rules governing university-studentrelations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may beregarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of

the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy inthe academic groves as collectively, the students demanded andplucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom theirown rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education"forgetting that, In Hohfeldian terms, they have the concomitant duty,and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.

. . . It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not

merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but toinculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; may, the development, orflowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sensethat the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarianor profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as therenowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is 'an educationwhich inculcates duty and reverence.' It appears that the particularbrand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de ManilaUniversity has been lost on the respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution asthe Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for theymay foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the studentscurrently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. 1avvphi1


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Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fahv. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conduciveand orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled, if,under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to

admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the studentbody." Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is butcongruent with the gravity of their misdeeds.46

B.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State'spower to regulate educational institution:

The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private

institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonablesupervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulateis subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, theConstitution allows merely the regulation and supervision ofeducational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.

C.

In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students tofree speech in school premises. In the landmark case ofMalabananvs. Ramento,47 students of the Gregorio Araneta UniversityFoundation, believing that the merger of the Institute of AnimalScience with the Institute of Agriculture would result in the increase intheir tuition, held a demonstration to protest the proposed merger.The rally however was held at a place other than that specified in theschool permit and continued longer than the time allowed. Theprotest, moreover, disturbed the classes and caused the stoppage ofthe work of non-academic personnel. For the illegal assembly, theuniversity suspended the students for one year. In affirming thestudents' rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, the Courtthrough Mr. Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, echoed the ruling of theUS Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.48

Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and freespeech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the


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citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate theirthoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held inthis case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas inTinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their

constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at theschoolhouse gate.' While, therefore, the authority of educationalinstitutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, itcannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On amore specific level there is persuasive force to this Fortas opinion."The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is toaccommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose ofcertain types of activities. Among those activities is personalintercommunication among the students. This is not only inevitablepart of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not

embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, oron the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, hemay express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like theconflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantiallyinterfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in theoperation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others.. . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for anyreason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior -materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or

invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by theconstitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.49

The Malabanan ruling was followed in Villar vs. TechnologicalInstitute of the Philippines,50Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta UniversityFoundation,51 and Non vs. Dames II.52

The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however,is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied inlight of the special characteristics of the school environment.53 Thus,

while we upheld the right of the students to free expression in thesecases, we did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for"conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - whichmaterially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder orinvasion of the rights of others."54 Thus, in Malabanan, we held:


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6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of thespeeches by the student leaders. That there would be a vigorouspresentation of view opposed to the proposed merger of the Instituteof Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected.

There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such amove as it confronted them with a serious problem ("isang malakingsuliranin.") They believed that such a merger would result in theincrease in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isana naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.") If in the course ofsuch demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,utterances extremely critical at times, even vitriolic, were let loose,that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid,different types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. Theywould be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and

judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympatheticaudience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fieryexhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion,the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth.They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with theactivity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime,no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This iswithout prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct,which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or

involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

55

It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the CampusJournalism Act. Provisions of law should be construed in harmonywith those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should beconstrued, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid theirconflicting with the fundamental law.56 A statute should not be given abroad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower one.57Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe uponthe school's right to discipline its students. At the same time,

however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrictthe right of the students to free speech. Consistent with

jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act tomean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on thebasis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articlematerially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder orinvasion of the rights of others.


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IV.

From the foregoing, the answer to the question of who has jurisdictionover the cases filed against respondent students becomes self-evident. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of itspower to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to theenforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safeand orderly educational environment conducive to learning.58 Thatpower, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of theacademic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by theConstitution. We therefore rule that Miriam College has the authorityto hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students. 1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Miriam College is ordered to READMITprivate respondent Joel Tan whose suspension has long lapsed.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1Rollo, p. 66.

2

CA Rollo, pp. 41-44.3 Jasper Briones, Editor-in-Chief; Jerome Gomez, Associate Editor,Deborah Ligon, Business Manager; Imelda Hilario, News EditorElizabeth Valdezco, Lay-Out Editor; Jose Mari Ramos, Art Editor;Camille Portugal, Asst. Art Editor; Joel Tan, Photo Editor; GeraldGary Renacido, a member of the literary staff; and Daphne Cowper,

Asst. Literary Editor.

4 CA Rollo, p. 59.

5Id., at 60.

6Id., at 62.

7Rollo, pp. 19-20.


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8 CA Rollo, p. 29.

9Id., at 48-49.

10Rollo, p. 89-90.

11 Docketed herein as G.R. No. 119027.

12 CA Rollo, p. 76.

13Id., at 78.

14Rollo, p. 24.

15 Golangco vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 493 (1997).

16 Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso., Inc. vs. Court ofAppeals, 254 SCRA 220 (1996).

17 Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 400(1992).

18 Carbungco vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 313 (1990).

19 Board of Transportation vs. Castro, 125 SCRA 411 (1983).

20 Johannesburg Packaging Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 216SCRA 439 (1992).

21 Under 5, Rule 58 of the present Rules of Court, a TRO issued bythe Court of Appeals or a member thereof shall be effective for sixty(60) days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.

22 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals and Romeo Barilea,291 SCRA 271 (1998).

23 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error 40.

24 Rollo, p. 125. In their Rejoinder, private respondents attached a"Joint Affidavit" stating:

xxx


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4. That the claim of the petitioner, that we have not employed theTRO issued by the Court of Appeals in filing for reinstatement orgaining entry into the campus premises, is completely false andmisleading. The truth of the matter being that members of our group

had initially tried to gain admittance into the school premises but werebarred from doing so by the guards who claimed it was for securityreasons, as mandated on them [sic] by the petitioners.

xxx

6. Except for the two [referring to Jose Mari Ramos and ElizabethValdezco], we have stopped schooling and we are waiting for thecase to be resolved to continue our studies and finish the courses westarted. We need only a year or two to do it.

xxx

8. We respectfully petition the court to admit this affidavit as proofagainst the petitioners [sic] false manifestation. We hope that thefacts we have provided will help clear the cloud of confusionintentionally raised by the petitioners through their allegations. Wealso hope that they be held in contempt of their attempt tointentionally mislead the honorable court. And we also pray that thecourt grant the speedy resolution of the case in our favor, thereby

facilitating in [sic] our long-awaited vindication.

On October 21, 1998, the Court resolved to require the petitioner tofile a Sur-Rejoinder within ten (10) days from notice, directing thepetitioner to address in particular the above statements of privaterespondents in their "Joint Affidavit." Petitioner, however, never filedthe required Sur-Rejoinder and we resolve to dispense with thesame.

25Id., at 157.

26 Reply, p. 2.

27 66 SCRA 485 (1975).

28 Section 2, Republic Act No. 7079.


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29 Also known as the "Campus Journalism Act of 1991." (Section 1,Id.)

30 Sec. 4. Student Publication.-- A student publication is published bythe student body through an editorial board and publication staffcomposed of students selected by fair and competitive examinations.

Once the publication is established, its editorial board shall freelydetermine its editorial policies and manage the publications funds.

31 Sec. 6 Publication Adviser.- The publication adviser shall beselected by the school administration from a list of recommendeessubmitted by the publication staff. The function of the adviser shall belimited to one of technical guidance.

32 Sec. 5. Funding of Student Publication.- Funding for the studentpublication may include the savings of the respective schoolsappropriations, student subscriptions, donations, and other sources offunds.

33 Sec. 10. The Tax Exemption.- Pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 4,Article XIV of the Constitution, all grants, endowments, donations, orcontributions used actually, directly and exclusively for the promotionof campus journalism as provided for in this Act shall be exempt from

donors or gift tax.34 Sec. 9.

35Id., at 95.

36Id., at 96-97.

37 100 SCRA 254 (1980).

38

20 Am Jur 2d, Courts 93.39 Tangonan vs. Pan, 137 SCRA 245, 256-257 (1985).

40 Isabelo, Jr. vs. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc. 227 SCRA591, 595 (1993), Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong, 222SCRA 643, 660 (1993), Garcia vs. the Faculty Admission Committee,


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Loyola School of Tehology, 68 SCRA 277, 285 (1975). The aboveformulation was made by Justice Felix Frankfurter in his concurringopinion is Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263.

41Angeles vs. Sison, 112 SCRA 26, 37 (1982).

42 Section 3 (2), Article XIV Constitution.

43Supra, at 37.

44 222 SCRA 643 (1993).

45Id., at 659-660.

46Id., at 663-665.

47 129 SCRA 359 (1984).

48 393 U.S. 503 (1968).

49Id., at 367-368.

50 135 SCRA 706 (1985).

51 137 SCRA 94 (1985).

52 185 SCRA 523 (1990).

53 Healy vs. James, 408 US 169, 33 L Ed 2d 266, 92 S Ct 2338, citingTinkervs. Des Moines, supra.

54 Malabanan vs. Ramento, supra, at 368. See also Arreza vs.Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, supra, at 97-98, and Non vs.Dames II, supra, at 535.

55Id., at 369; Underscoring supplied.

56 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, at 643 (1945).

57 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,350 US 198, 202, 100 L ed 199, 76Ct 273 (1955).


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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169391 October 10, 2012

GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO, Petitioners,vs. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO,REV. FR. JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDAand MA. TERESA SURATOS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing theDecision2 dated May 27, 2005 and the resolution3 dated August 18,2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80349. The CAdecision reversed and set aside the decision4 of the Regional TrialCourt (RTC') of Caloocan City, Branch 131, awarding civil damagesto the petitioners. The CA resolution denied the petitioners'subsequent motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners claim that respondents Colegio de San Juan de

Letran (Letran), Rev. Fr. Edwin Lao, Rev. Fr. Jose RhommelHernandez, Mr. Albert Rosarda and Ma. Teresa Suratos should beheld liable for moral, exemplary, and actual damages for unlawfullydismissing petitioner Emerson Chester Kim B. Go (Kim) from the rollsof the high school department of Letran. The respondents claim thatthey lawfully suspended Kim for violating the schools rule againstfraternity membership.

Factual Background

In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of Letrans AuxiliaryServices Department, received information that certain fraternitieswere recruiting new members among Letrans high school students.He also received a list of the students allegedly involved. Schoolauthorities started an investigation, including the conduct of medicalexaminations on the students whose names were on the list. OnNovember 20, 2002, Dr. Emmanuel Asuncion, the school physician,


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reported that six (6) students bore injuries, probable signs of blunttrauma of more than two weeks, on the posterior portions of theirthighs.5 Mr. Rosarda, the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferredwith the students and asked for their explanations in writing.

Four (4) students, namely: Raphael Jay Fulgencio, Nicolai Lacson,Carlos Parilla, and Isaac Gumba, admitted that they were neophytesof the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in a hazing rite heldon October 3, 2001 in the house of one Dulce in Tondo, Manila. Theyalso identified the senior members of the fraternity present at theirhazing. These included Kim, then a fourth year high school student.

In the meantime, Gerardo Manipon, Letrans security officer,prepared an incident report6 that the Tau Gamma Fraternity had

violated its covenant with Letran by recruiting members from its highschool department. Manipol had spoken to one of the fraternityneophytes and obtained a list of eighteen (18) members of thefraternity currently enrolled at the high school department. Kimsname was also in the list.

At the Parents-Teachers Conference held on November 23, 2001,Mr. Rosarda informed Kims mother, petitioner Mrs. Angelita Go (Mrs.Go), that students had positively identified Kim as a fraternitymember. Mrs. Go expressed disbelief as her son was supposedly

under his parents constant supervision.

Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to explain hisside. Kim responded through a written statement dated December 19,2001; he denied that he was a fraternity member. He stated that atthat time, he was at Dulces house to pick up a gift, and did not attendthe hazing of Rafael, Nicolai, Carlos, and Isaac.

On the same day, Mr. Rosarda requested Kims parents (by notice) toattend a conference on January 8, 2002 to address the issue of Kimsfraternity membership.7 Both Mrs. Go and petitioner Mr. Eugene Go(Mr. Go) did not attend the conference.

In time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of their students,including Kim, were fraternity members. The respondents foundsubstantial basis in the neophytes statements that Kim was a seniorfraternity member. Based on their disciplinary rules, the Father


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Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose RhommelHernandez) recommended the fraternity members dismissal from thehigh school department rolls; incidentally, this sanction was stated ina January 10, 2002 letter to Mr. and Mrs. Go.8 After a meeting with

the Rectors Council,

9

however, respondent Fr. Edwin Lao, FatherRector and President of Letran, rejected the recommendation to allowthe fourth year students to graduate from Letran. Students who werenot in their fourth year were allowed to finish the current school yearbut were barred from subsequent enrollment in Letran.

Mr. Rosarda conveyed to Mrs. Go and Kim, in their conference onJanuary 15, 2002, the decision to suspend Kim from January 16,2002 to February 18, 2002.10 Incidentally, Mr. Go did not attend thisconference.11

On even date, Mrs. Go submitted a request for the deferment ofKims suspension to January 21, 200212 so that he could take apreviously scheduled examination.13 The request was granted.14

On January 22, 2002, the respondents conferred with the parents ofthe sanctioned fourth year students to discuss the extension classesthe students would take (as arranged by the respondents) as make-up for classes missed during their suspension. These extensionclasses would enable the students to meet all academic requirements

for graduation from high school by the summer of 2002. Therespondents also proposed that the students and their parents sign a

pro-forma agreement to signify their conformity with their suspension.Mr. and Mrs. Go refused to sign.15 They also refused to accept therespondents finding that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewiseinsisted that due process had not been observed.

On January 28, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint16for damagesbefore the RTC of Caloocan City claiming that the respondents17 had

unlawfully dismissed Kim.

18

Mr. and Mrs. Go also soughtcompensation for the "business opportunity losses" they sufferedwhile personally attending to Kims disciplinary case.

The Ruling of the RTC

Mrs. Go19 and Mr. Go20 testified for the petitioners at the trial. Mr.Rosarda,21 Fr. Hernandez,22 and Fr. Lao23 testified for the


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respondents.

The RTC24 held that the respondents had failed to observe "the basicrequirement of due process" and that their evidence was "utterlyinsufficient" to prove that Kim was a fraternity member.25 It alsodeclared that Letran had no authority to dismiss students for theirfraternity membership. Accordingly, it awarded the petitioners moraland exemplary damages. The trial court also held that Mr. Go wasentitled to actual damages after finding that he had neglected hismanufacturing business when he personally attended to his sonsdisciplinary case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court rendersjudgment in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Eugene C. Go and Angelita B.

Go, together with their minor son Emerson Chester Kim B. Go, asagainst defendants Colegio De San Juan De Letran, Fr. Edwin Lao,Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez, Albert Rosarda and Ma. TeresaSuratos, and they are hereby ordered the following:

1. To pay plaintiff Eugene C. Go the amount of P 2,854,000.00 asactual damages;

2. To pay each plaintiff, Eugene C. Go and Angelita B. Go, theamount of P 2,000,000.00 for each defendant, or a total amount of P

20,000,000.00 as moral damages; and P 1,000,000.00 for eachdefendant, or a total amount of P 10,000,000.00 as exemplarydamages, or a grand total of P 30,000,000.00, to be paid solidarily byall liable defendants, plus prevailing legal interest thereon from thedate of filing until the same is fully paid;

3. To pay plaintiffs 20% of the total amount awarded, as attorneysfees, to be paid solidarily by all liable defendants; and

4. The cost of suit.26

The Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It held,among others, that the petitioners were not denied due process asthe petitioners had been given ample opportunity to be heard in Kimsdisciplinary case. The CA also found that there was no bad faith,


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malice, fraud, nor any improper and willful motive or conduct on thepart of the respondents to justify the award of damages. Accordingly,it dismissed the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. C-19938 forlack of merit.

The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but theCA denied the motion for lack of merit;27 hence, the present petitionfor review on certiorari.

The Issue

Based on the petitions assigned errors,28 the issue for our resolutionis whether the CA had erred in setting aside the decision of the RTCin Civil Case No. C-19938.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition and affirm the CA decision.

Preliminarily, we note that the disciplinary sanction the respondentsimposed on Kim was actually a suspension and not a "dismissal" asthe petitioners insist in their complaint. We agree with the CA that thepetitioners were well aware of this fact, as Mrs. Gos letter specificallyrequested that Kims suspension be deferred. That this request was

granted and that Kim was allowed to take the examination furthersupport the conclusion that Kim had not been dismissed.

Further, the RTCs statement that Letran, a private school, possessesno authority to impose a dismissal, or any disciplinary action for thatmatter, on students who violate its policy against fraternitymembership must be corrected. The RTC reasoned out that OrderNo. 20, series of 1991, of the then Department of Education, Culture,and Sports (DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991),29 which the respondentscite as legal basis for Letrans policy, only covered public high

schools and not private high schools such as Letran.

We disagree with the RTCs reasoning because it is a restrictiveinterpretation of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. True, the fourthparagraph of the order states:

4. EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER, FRATERNITIES


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AND SORORITIES ARE PROHIBITED IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARYAND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. PENALTY FOR NON-COMPLIANCEIS EXPULSION OF PUPILS/STUDENTS.

This paragraph seems to limit the scope of the orders prohibition topublic elementary and secondary schools. However, in ascertainingthe meaning of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, the entire order must betaken as a whole.30 It should be read, not in isolated parts, but withreference to every other part and every word and phrase inconnection with its context.31

Even a cursory perusal of the rest of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991reveals the education departments clear intent to apply theprohibition against fraternity membership forallelementary and high

school students, regardless of their school of enrollment.

The orders title, "Prohibition of Fraternities and Sororities inElementary and Secondary Schools," serves to clarify whateverambiguity may arise from its fourth paragraph.32 It is a straightforwardtitle. It directs the prohibition to elementary and secondary schools ingeneral, and does not distinguish between private and public schools.We also look at the orders

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