Education in the Wake of Natural Disaster · of Education; David Ferriero, ... Education in the...

Education in the Wake of Natural Disaster

Paul Vallas with tressa PankoVits

Edited and with an Introduction by elizabeth white

Program on America and the Global Economy

www.wilsoncenter.org/page


paul Vallas with tressa pankoVits


Available from :

Program on America and the Global EconomyWoodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsOne Woodrow Wilson Plaza1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NWWashington, DC 20004-3027

www.wilsoncenter.org/page

Cover Photo: Earthquake ravaged primary school in central Port-au-Prince, April, 2010

ISBN: 978-1-938027-29-1

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Contents

1 Introduction elizabeth white

6 Education in the Wake of Natural Disaster

paul Vallas with tressa pankoVits

57 Notes

67 Glossary

69 Biographies

v

“ Educational opportunity is a fundamental human right that parents in every corner of the globe, on every socio-economic rung of the ladder, should demand for their children.”

—PAUL VALLAS, WoRLD-RENoWNED EDUCATIoN REFoRM ExPERT

First Lady Elisabeth Preval and Haitian artist Philippe Dodard present a piece of children’s art to Paul Vallas.1

IntroductionELIzaBEtH E. WHItE

although education Varies throughout the world, there are many lessons countries can draw on from each other to implement a streamlined, coherent national education plan to ensure that every child receives the educa-tion that they deserve. Each country has its own history, culture, and unique problems which have a substantial impact on what percentage of the population receives an education, what they learn, and how it is conveyed. All of these fac-tors must be taken into consideration in how the country faces the challenges of education when developing a new structure. Despite these differences, it can be agreed upon that all children, regardless of their nationality or socio-economic status, deserve the right to a free and quality education. The current publication is part of the Program on America and the Global Economy’s focus on educa-tion as a key element in long-term growth, opportunity, and national strength.

Education reform expert Paul Vallas has served as a key advisor to the government of Haiti in developing its national education plan, and as an advisor to the government of Chile on an important nationwide curriculum and school leadership initiative for the primary grades. In both cases, the goal was to ensure that a quality education is accessible to every child. In addition to his international work, Vallas has also led reforms in the school systems in Chicago, Philadelphia, New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, and currently Bridgeport, Connecticut. As in his earlier essay, Vallas worked closely with attorney and education reformer, Tressa Pankovits.

In February of 2013, the Wilson Center hosted the Haitian Minister of Education, Vanneur Pierre, and Paul Vallas to discuss efforts to reform Haiti’s education system. Minister Pierre and Vallas seemed confident that education in Haiti would see profound progress with the continued sup-port of the international community and the IMF, and the commitment of the Ministry of Education to implement their national plan. Paul Vallas and the Government of Haiti are working to establish and implement a well-designed national plan for education. The event at the Wilson Center

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demonstrated the successes of this partnership and prompted the writing of Education in the Wake of Natural Disaster.

We are pleased to have Distinguished Wilson Center Scholar, Paul Vallas, writing his second paper on education reform for the Wilson Center. In the current essay, he discusses the plan for Haiti in more detail. Vallas’ first publication focused on education reform in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and looked at the broader challenges of education in the United States. The following paper explores the successes and challenges of education reform in Haiti, before and after the earthquake that devastated the nation in 2010. The essay describes the improvements made in other parts of the world distraught by natural disasters. He explores how lessons learned could be adapted and emulated in a country like Haiti that is des-perate for reform, with over 50 percent of its population under the age of 18. Vallas describes two examples of success in systems impacted by natural disasters: post-earthquake Chile and post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans.

Vallas begins with a relevant background on Haiti essential to understand-ing its challenges with education given the history of political instability, pov-erty and mismanagement. He adds the challenge posed by a United Nations mandate, which called for an accountable, democratically-elected government. U.S. trade preferences for Haitian textile exports and financial assistance from the international community helped. At the same time, Haiti has been held back by a multitude of unfortunate external events which have hindered its economic development such as increasing world food prices, the global reces-sion, a widespread cholera epidemic, and numerous natural disasters.

The amount of poverty in Haiti is staggering. Haiti’s economy is the least developed in the Western Hemisphere. Roughly 80 percent of Haiti’s population lives below the poverty line. Widespread unemployment plagues the country, with more than two-thirds of the labor force lacking formal jobs. Remittances represent a substantial 20 percent of GDP and half of the national budget comes from outside sources.2

Problems with Haiti’s education system begin with its foundational structure. The Ministry of National Education and Training (“MENFP”), which is responsible for regulating the education system, is overextended and under-resourced. The MENFP does not provide funding for the majority of the schools, and therefore has little control over them. With regard to pri-vate schools, few teachers have any training in education and many of these schools operate without a license from the MENFP. These schools are out of

Introduction

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reach to the vast majority of Haitians who live below the poverty line. Non-profit schools, many funded by religious organizations, also have uneven quality and many are limited to grades K-4. Public schools are of extremely poor quality and despite the constitution’s mandate that the government provide a free education to children for nine years, students end up paying for books and materials. Higher education in Haiti is yet another level of dysfunction, reaching only one percent of the population.

Reforms to education in Haiti began back in the late 1970s but proved un-successful as a result of delays in implementation and a lack of infrastructure. Since then, the government has attempted other plans to reform the national education system, including the drafting of the Presidential Commission on Education and Training (“GTEF”) in 2008, but as Vallas states, while these plans appeared to target the right issues, they have not been executed.

The most serious reform efforts to Haiti came as a result of the 2010 earthquake which destroyed most of its existing infrastructure. As devastat-ing as the earthquake was to Haiti, it provided the nation with the oppor-tunity to completely reconstruct the national education plan to address the most urgent needs of its children. Another unexpected development was the amount of support and aid the country received after the earthquake to help develop and cover the costs of these extensive reforms. The Haitian Ministry of Education estimates that 23 percent of schools were affected by the earthquake—almost a quarter of all the schools in Haiti. Of these, over three quarters were either damaged or destroyed, and therefore closed as a result of the earthquake. According to the Government of Haiti, 60 percent of government, administrative, and economic infrastructure was destroyed.

The main challenge Vallas notes facing education in Haiti before natural disaster shook the nation, and even today, is access to education and fund-ing. Several factors inhibit the number of lower-income students attending school: language, lack of public schools, and limited tuition subsidies. The use of French, as opposed to Creole (the common language of the nation) in the classroom further impedes learning. French is considered the language of the elite and only those individuals who can afford an education are the ones that speak it, thus perpetuating an education system that is limited to the upper class. The lower-income students who attend school are unable to excel in courses in an unfamiliar language and thus fall even more behind. Also, the lack of private school tuition subsidies for lower-income students inhibits the number of students attending these schools.

Elizabeth White

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One of the suggestions initially proposed in the Bernard Reform of 1978, Haiti’s first major attempt at education reform, and also recommended in the new plan is to change the language in early primary education from French to Creole, which would lessen the socio-economic divisions that occur in the classroom. The lack of public schools, which comprise only a tenth of all schools in Haiti, also perpetuates socio-economic differences. With the raging poverty faced by the nation, private schools are out of reach of the vast majority of the population.

Vallas points to several great strides in education made by Chile that could serve as lessons to Haiti. Starting in the 1980s, Chile began reforms to expand access and improve the quality of education. Management decentralization and a nationwide voucher program leveled access to education across varying socio-economic groups. In addition to financial support, the Chilean government has done other things to improve education. Chile began a nationwide publicity campaign to build respect for the teaching profession and to encourage more young people to become teachers. They also gave bonuses for teacher training and mandatory remediation and training for teachers with deficiencies.

Despite the advances made by Chile, Vallas acknowledges that there are still problems with the system. Public schools have different regulations than private schools and private schools can still set tuition rates and can be selec-tive in admission after the 6th grade, limiting poorer income families from receiving a quality education. Chile’s university system also faces many chal-lenges. Now that more individuals have access to primary and secondary education, more individuals are continuing on to college. The inequalities in higher education, similar to those previously faced by K-12 education, have yet to be addressed. Chile serves as an example to Haiti but reforms in higher education must follow the significant work done in other areas.

Vallas also points to the many lessons that Haiti can take from the reform process in New Orleans. He points out that both the Recovery School District in New Orleans and the MENFP lacked the necessary infrastructure and thus sought out the assistance of education reform or-ganizations. The subordinate, yet supportive, role of these outside part-ners in reconstructing the education system in New Orleans demonstrates confidence in the system and encourages sustainability. Self-governing schools and funding that follows the students promotes transparency, and equal accountability standards across the board provide a level playing field for students and educators.

Introduction

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The devastating earthquake in 2010 forced Haiti to re-focus priorities on reforms to the education system. The nation essentially had to start from scratch since the majority of its infrastructure was destroyed during the di-saster. It is hard to look at the devastating effects of the 2010 earthquake and see anything but ruin. Yet, it attracted more attention from the international community and prompted their involvement in education reform. Although the GTEF still faces many obstacles, it provides a concrete plan for a suc-cessful education system in Haiti. With financial assistance, and the unity of NGOs and the international community, along with Vallas’ suggested “working groups” to implement the plan; it is quite likely that Haiti will see rapid improvements with regard to its education system. Most important, however, is the continuation of outside funding for this endeavor, since the Government of Haiti cannot support the reformed system on its own.

The future of Haiti resides in its youngest citizens. Investing in education is essential to ensure that the country can overcome all of the hardships it has experienced throughout a history marked and marred by natural disasters, epi-demics, political unrest, and economic woes. Education can be the pathway to faster growth and a higher standard of living for its people. The support of the international aid community and substantial funding from IMF has had a significant impact on the country. With the sustained support of the interna-tional community and growing confidence in the Government of Haiti and the Ministry of Education, the nation will continue to make advances in education.

Vallas’ paper demonstrates that there is an attainable plan for education in a Haiti determined to create a quality, accessible, and affordable educa-tion for its population, the majority of which are of school-going age. By examining the successes and challenges of education reform in Chile and New Orleans, along with the history and culture of Haiti, Vallas provides a coherent blueprint for the future of education in Haiti.

NoteS

1. The program “Plas Timoun” was designed to help children synthesize and come to terms with the horrifying events they witnessed after the earthquake. The classes took place aboard new buses converted into classrooms, which were donated to Haiti by the First Lady of the Dominican Republic. Some of the art was exhibited at the Smithsonian. See: http://newsdesk.si.edu/releases/art-haitian-children-after-earthquake-opens-june-17-smithsonian

2. The World Factbook, Haiti. Central Intelligence Agency. Sept. 2013. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html

Elizabeth White

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Education in the Wake of Natural DisasterPauL VaLLas WItH trEssa PaNkoVIts

INtroductIoN

Haiti is arguably the most fragile country in the Western Hemisphere with a long history of social and economic distress, although its people are hopeful, resilient, and are remarkable for their will to persevere. Haiti’s challenges are a product of both centuries of inhumane exploita-tion on the part of outside countries,1* and decades of domestic authori-tarianism and oppression.2 It has experienced 32 coups in its 200-year history and, as recently as 2010, seven out of ten Haitians were living on less than US $2 per day.3 It is clear that various conditions have thwarted the healthy evolution of Haiti’s social, economic and political institutions, including the ability to educate its own population. Haiti has been trapped in a vicious cycle.

receNt HIStory

The devastating earthquake of 2010 tends to overshadow Haiti’s recent history, However, it is necessary to acknowledge that while the transition from dictatorship to democracy begun in the mid-1980’s has been slow and frequently violent, the periods just before and after the earthquake were marked by considerable planning and initiatives demonstrating a will to reform.

* Due to the challenges of data collection in Haiti and the multi-faceted nature of the international community, all made more complicated by the 2010 earthquake, it is difficult to obtain concrete statistics about the country.

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Part IThe Need to Evolve

orphans in Port-au-Prince, May 2010

Six years prior to the earthquake, allegations of drug trafficking had reached the highest echelons of Haiti’s government, elections were delayed and suspect, and anti-Aristide demonstrations had devolved into bloody armed conflict. The international community intervened amid expres-sions of concern that the political crisis had led the country to the brink of a humanitarian disaster. On June 1, 2004, following the forced exile of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide,4 the U.N. Security Council authorized the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (“MINUSTAH”)5, with the man-date that the peacekeeping force should “restore a secure and stable envi-ronment, promote the political process, strengthen Haiti’s governmental institutions and rule-of-law structures, and promote and protect human rights.”6 To encourage Haiti’s economic growth and development in support of that goal, the U.S. Congress in 2006 passed the “Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006” (“HOPE I”). HOPE I authorized trade exemptions giving Haitian produced textiles preferential access to the U.S. import market.7 “HOPE II,” passed in 2008, extended and expanded the act for ten additional years, while requiring Haiti to adhere to more stringent inspection policies, to ensure that its fac-tories met core human rights standards and occupational health and safety rules.8 The U.S. reasoned that providing Haiti unique access to the U.S. textiles market while encouraging humane conditions would encourage for-eign investment.9 Thus, the HOPE Acts represented an effort on the part of the U.S. to boost the Haitian economy.

During this same period, then-President René Préval acknowledged the importance of implementing institutional changes that could transform the Haitian government. To that end, he created a series of “Presidential Commissions” designed to develop strategic plans to strengthen Haiti’s in-stitutional capacity in order for the country to be able to provide critical services and supports needed to meet its citizens’ needs. Préval recognized the critical importance of education to Haiti’s development and social co-hesion. In 2007, he developed the Presidential Commission on Education and Training (“GTEF”) to create Haiti’s National Pact for Education and Training.10 The GTEF’s mandate was to empower the Ministry of National Education and Professional Training (“MENFP”) to provide free educa-tion for all children in Haiti. The government’s duty to provide free and compulsory education is a pillar of Haiti’s 1987 constitution. The over-arching goal was to ensure 100% enrollment for all school-age children.11


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Despite the optimism, opportunities, and investments during this period, Haiti was also subjected to a series of continuous “external shocks”12 beyond its control, which not only undermined its capacity to provide critical services and supports, but exacerbated poor living conditions.

In 2008, spiraling world food prices due to poor harvests and rising fuel prices caused Haitian food prices to increase 40−50%.13 Although hunger is no stranger to the majority of Haitian citizens, the severe shortages in 2008 forced many Haitians to survive on “mud cookies”14 and out-of-reach costs caused deadly rioting and unrest. This ultimately collapsed the government, ousted the Prime Minister, and for a time shut down all business activity.15

The “back story” of this crisis is equally distressing. As recently as the 1980’s, Haiti had produced 80% of its own food, and all of its own rice.16 By 2008, domestic food production had declined to just 45% of that consumed as: (1) Haiti shifted its economic strategy to one of promoting textile production and assembly-line manufacturing; and (2) the result of international pressure persuaded Haiti to cut import tariffs on rice from 50% to just 3%.17 Cheap, subsidized rice from the U.S. initially ben-efitted urban consumers but ultimately caused Haiti’s own rice produc-tion to plummet, harming farmers and driving more people to the cities. Haiti was forced to import 80% of the rice it consumed, just as world rice prices doubled.18 The world food market’s abrupt change devastated the nation, causing a severe impact on the Haitian poor who then con-stituted 90% of the population and had no disposable income. Out of the estimated 9.8 million Haitians, 5.1 million subsisted on less than US $1 per day, and 7.6 million on less than $2 per day.19 Only Somalia and Afghanistan have a higher per-day calorie deficit than Haiti.20 In April 2008, the National Committee for Food Security (“CNSA”) estimated that around 2.5 million Haitians were in dire need of assistance.”21 This tragedy came on top of a report in 2005 that roughly a quarter of all Haitian children under age five suffer from malnutrition.22 The U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization’s (“FAO”) 2007 data indicated that up to 47% of the population was undernourished.23

This dire situation was further aggravated by the 2008 global recession, which reduced remittances from the international Haitian diaspora by an estimated 12% in just one year.24 There is no source of foreign income as critical to Haiti as family remittances. In 2008, remittances accounted

Paul Vallas with Tressa Pankovits

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for 20% of the country’s entire GDP.25 Remittances in 2010 totaled $1.8 billion.26 Family remittances are hailed as the greatest contribution the di-aspora makes to its homeland, and the funds are literally of life and death importance to Haiti’s poor, who have no other means of survival.

Decades of food insecurity and poverty have had another detrimental effect in Haiti, as failed farmers and others with no access to jobs or op-portunities to generate income have flocked to Port au Prince in hopes of securing, if not a livelihood, at least access to aid. The city’s population more than doubled in just 15 years, reaching 705,000 residents in 1997, according to a 2003 Government of Haiti (“GOH”) census.27 Today, the city itself is home to 1.5 million residents, with the larger metro area burst-ing with between 2.5−3 million people,28 many who live in violent, over-crowded slums such as Cité Soleil, Bel Air, and Martissant. This creates obvious health and sanitation issues in what is one of the world’s largest cities without an operational sewage and water treatment system.29 Crime is another challenge the country faces. The MINUSTAH must attempt to suppress gangs associated with drug trafficking, criminal networks, child soldier recruitment and “all manners of delinquency.”30 The overcrowding, with houses or shacks built with no adherence to any safety codes, often almost on top of each other, also tragically exacerbated the death and in-jury toll caused by the 2010 earthquake.

While the deadly 2010 earthquake has obviously received the most international attention, it should be noted that it struck only two short years after a series of hurricanes caused flooding and severe damage to Haiti’s infrastructure. During the same year as the food crisis, “Fay,” “Gustav,” “Hanna” and “Ike” all battered the island. Collectively, they caused nearly one thousand deaths and destroyed or damaged 100,000 homes.31 Crops were washed away, and the damage was equal to 5% of the nation’s GDP—a staggering loss in a country as poor as Haiti.

On January 12, 2010, the 7.3 magnitude earthquake struck 16 miles southwest of overcrowded, underprepared Port au Prince. The death toll is and likely always will be disputed, in part due to a “leaked” but un-released report by USAID.32 However, it is estimated that as many as 230,000 people died,33 while more than 350,000 others were injured. More than three million people—1.3 million children—were directly or indirectly affected. The Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”) estimated reconstruction costs at US $814 billion.34 According to the


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GOH, 60% of its government administrative and economic infrastruc-ture was destroyed, including parliamentary and judicial buildings.35 About 5,000 schools were destroyed, affecting nearly 23% of Haiti’s total schools and universities.36 Universities and vocational/technical schools, most of which are located near Port-au-Prince, were particularly impacted, with 87% of the universities gravely damaged or destroyed.37 The earthquake killed thousands of students of all ages, and hundreds of administrators. In 2011, nearly one million Haitians, the majority of them children, remained in crowded camps and in temporary shelters. At the end of 2012, nearly 400,000 still remained displaced in camps. The numbers were reduced in part only by forced evictions—some under threat of death—without corresponding relocation services pro-vided.38 These internally displaced persons live in extreme poverty. More than 60% reporting they eat one meal or less a day.39

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Haitian 2010 earth-quake was not only the worst disaster in Haitian history; it was the worst natural disaster in the history of the Western Hemisphere.40 Not only did this catastrophe hit the country that was least prepared or able to respond, it also created a situation where things only went from bad to worse. In the follow-ing months, the death toll rose and reconstruction efforts were impeded by Hurricane Tomas and then, in a country that had not recorded a single case of cholera in more than 150 years, by a cholera epidemic. The MINUSTAH, specifically the Nepalese troops, are blamed for carelessly spreading the wa-terborne disease.41 More than 650,000 people have been infected, with new cases still being reported in late 2013. Cholera has killed over 8,100 Haitians,42 more than the rest of the world combined in 2010−2011.43

Thus, the earthquake and its aftermath created a humanitarian emergency of such magnitude that three years later, its importance in the eyes of the international community has kept Haiti “on the radar screen.” In the interna-tional aid community the attitude has been that this is not an opportunity to simply restore Haiti, but to build a new Haiti. The phrase “Build back better!” attributed to President Bill Clinton, became the battle cry.44 Certainly, the reconstruction effort has been far from perfect, resources have been wasted, and those who have failed to rise to the challenge have been subjected to sig-nificant criticism.45 Yet recognition exists that refusing to accept defeat and keep working 46 is the only way to prevent a return to even greater political instability and a reignition of social disturbances. There is also a sense that


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while Haiti has frequently teetered on the brink of catastrophic social, eco-nomic, and political collapse. This time, if such collapse is allowed to occur, Haiti will likely require indefinite international intervention.

PreSSINg demograPHIc ISSueS

With its median population age at 21.9 years, and with 70% of its population under the age of 30,47 Haiti is a ticking demographic time bomb. Its ecologi-cal disaster is well underway with 98% deforestation, and based on the age of its population, with one-year-olds outnumbering 39-year-olds by a two to one margin, its troubles are poised to dramatically rage out of control. This, in spite of the continuous “brain drain” exodus by educated Haitians who choose to emigrate.48 A 2009 report by Oxford University called the unfolding effects of the demographic changes a “human tsunami” that is “accelerating the process of economic degradation.”49 If the per capita income in Haiti continues to de-cline, the already fragile country could experience a complete breakdown.

Some good NewS

Despite the dire facts and statistics that explain why Haiti is among the most fragile of countries, Haiti’s fundamentals are sound. As a threshold issue, it does not sit in a troubled region. The Caribbean, where Haiti is located, just 700 miles from Miami, is considered by most to be a peaceful and “laid back” region, and on the world scale, is reasonably prosperous.50 Haiti shares a border with only one neighbor, the Dominican Republic, which itself is peaceful, has a significant middle class population, and ranks 94th out of 184 countries based on wealth.51 In comparison, only 19 coun-tries are poorer than Haiti.52 The Dominican Republic harbors no territo-rial claims on Haiti. It is neither engaged in nor supporting any clandestine guerrilla activities or jihad conflicts such as those that further stress many poverty stricken states elsewhere in the world.53 While it has a robust and sometimes vicious political scene, Haiti is not too deeply divided ideologi-cally. On an island where Voodoo and Christianity exist side-by-side, reli-gious diversity is peaceful and, at present, Haiti has no military establish-ment inclined to exploitation or with its own delusions of power. And, as a huge bonus, Haiti sits on a beautiful tropical island, which officials recog-nize is ripe for developing a revenue-generating tourism industry.54


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Given this abundance of benefits, if the international community can-not manage to succeed in helping Haiti overcome its challenges, it’s hard to imagine it succeeding in any of the places on this planet to where agencies and governments regularly redistribute wealth. Plain common sense should instruct us that there cannot be significant and sustainable society-wide im-provement without the construction of a functioning and accessible school system. However, there is a point in which humanitarianism and goodwill become exhausted, and there are those who worry that post-earthquake Haiti is nearing that point. If such an unfortunate loss of goodwill were to occur, it would likely be caused by a lack of evidence of real progress, rather than an exhaustion of resources or compassion.

tHe PurPoSe of tHIS PaPer

The purpose of this paper is twofold. With regard to the education sector, the paper makes a case against giving up, because a viable plan for the construc-tion of a public, accessible, and high quality school system—so critical to Haiti’s future—does exist. Secondly, this paper makes the case that the plan for education reform in Haiti is one that can be operationalized. The plan is in many ways a product of the evolution of Haiti’s own previous and well-intentioned education reform efforts. It is a plan that respects Haiti’s history and experience. It considers the realities of both Haiti’s culture and traditions, and the limits of international humanitarianism. Equally important to the plan’s viability is the fact that Haiti has not only taken ownership of it; those in Haiti who have the authority to implement it have embraced it.

We will discuss two approaches to education reform that, from a pro-grammatic and operational perspective, can inform the work in Haiti, in-cluding reforms in Chile and post-Katrina New Orleans. Finally, the paper will discuss current reform efforts in Haiti, including implementation strat-egies and the supports needed to ensure success.

educatIoN IN HaItI: a BrIef outlINe of tHe SyStem aNd ItS HIStory

Theoretically speaking, by law, the GOH is required to provide every child born in Haiti with nine years of free education, without costs for books or other materials.55 Education in Haiti begins informally at pre-school and is


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formally followed by nine years of compulsory primary education, divided into three cycles. In theory, secondary education comprises four years of schooling with students having the option of undertaking vocational educa-tional programs or traditional academic college preparation. In reality, only 20% of Haitians attain any education past sixth grade.56 Higher education could range over various years based on the course of study. However, only 1% of the nation’s population ever reaches university, at home or abroad.57

Education in Haiti is governed by the aforementioned MENFP, which is overextended, underfunded, and understaffed. The MENFP is respon-sible for regulating the entire system, including the private sector, which it does not fund and thus, struggles to control. The MENFP is deeply chal-lenged. It is also unfairly criticized for failing to extract accountability from the institutions for which it is responsible, given that private schools in Haiti account for more than 90% of all student enrollment.58 Haiti has the second highest percentage of children attending private school in the world, surpassed only by Zimbabwe. Even in Zimbabwe, however, the government pays all private school teacher salaries, which is a substantial subsidy.59

Haiti’s private schools fall roughly into one of three categories:

1) For-Profit Schools: Education is a business in Haiti. Most for-profit schools are operated by private “entrepreneurs,” who often possess only the most basic education themselves. These operators proliferate because es-tablishing a school, regardless of one’s qualifications, is one of few reliable sources of income in a country where formal employment is difficult to at-tain.60 Thus, for-profit schools provide both the very best and the very worst that Haiti has to offer. At the top, there are a handful of private schools in Haiti, mainly in greater metro Port-au-Prince. Well-known names such as Lycée Français and Union School are accessible only to a small number of elites. The rest of the population calls schools such as these “lekol tét neg” or “big shot schools.”61 In these schools, perfecting the French language is a major focus, and some of their secondary level graduates even earn spots at prestigious U.S. and French universities. However, these schools are the exception and are far from the norm.

At the bottom, and sadly much more “the norm,” are the prolific small schools commonly known as “l’ecoles borlettes,” which translates to “lottery schools,” because the general perception is that it is only by chance that their students learn anything. These schools are, at best, of “uneven quality.”62 They


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survive because so many parents are themselves severely undereducated and financially constrained. When parents, through no fault of their own, are ill-equipped to make sound value judgments about the quality of education being offered, natural market forces do not quickly winnow out the incompe-tent providers as they would in developed nations.

Due to the lack of regulatory infrastructure, three-fourths of all private school operators operate with no certification or license from the MENFP.63 The MENFP simply lacks the manpower to force school operators to meet predetermined standards before hiring teachers or recruiting students. In many cases, schools hire “teachers” who have not graduated from any edu-cation college or experienced any teacher training. Approximately 80% of all Haitian teachers lack diplomas.64

Haiti’s extremely weak teacher workforce contributes to its low educa-tional attainment rates for both obvious and not-so-obvious reasons. For example, promotion is supposed to be automatic in most primary grades. However, the MENFP’s lack of control over the schools means that most schools require students to pass—and parents to pay for—end of year exams to move forward. When parents cannot pay or poorly taught students fail, parents unable to afford the luxury of allowing their children to repeat grades often just give up and discontinue schooling.65 This is one reason that 72% of students in Haiti are over-aged for their grade, sometimes by many years.66 Haiti’s private schools, in short, can be characterized as a chaotic, unregu-lated system of poor quality schools with very little accountability.

2) Non-Profit Schools: Religious or quasi-religious organizations op-erate most non-profit schools. Haiti signed a Concordat with the Vatican in 1860, which led to the arrival of Roman Catholic teachers in Haiti.67 Today, Catholic schools, many subsidized by the U.S. Church, account for 15% of all schools and 20% of all secondary schools. They are the “largest cohesive provider of educational services” in Haiti and often make provi-sions for marginalized families.68 However, Protestantism has been growing at an estimated 4% per year over the past decade, largely through the es-tablishment of schools, churches, and hospitals in rural areas.69 Significant numbers of Evangelicals, Pentecostals, Adventists and other faiths also op-erate schools in Haiti.70 Their numbers have increased since the earthquake, and it is alleged that some are more committed to battling Voodoo than teaching the “three R’s.”71 NGOs, especially small NGOs, contribute by


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operating many of the few schools that do exist in the rural areas, but they are severely challenged to find quality teachers. As a result, many of these schools operate in a single room and many are limited to grades K−4.72 Thus, the quality of non-profit schools is also uneven, ranging from some very good schools to others with extremely limited professional capabilities.

3) Public Schools: Public schools, financed by whatever means the local community can mobilize from the national and local governments, account for only 10% of Haiti’s schools and tend to be located in highly urbanized areas such as Port-au-Prince. In fact, some rural regions have no publicly sponsored education all.73 Rural children who are reliant on public schools have been documented to walk as far as two and a half hours each way, with the result that they spend part of the school day sleeping at their desks.74 Public schools are characterized by frequent teacher strikes, as the GOH frequently fails to pay teachers in a timely manner.75 In general, they are the poorest schools attended by the poorest students and, along with the fly-by-night l’ecoles borlettes, are considered the least effective of all primary schools. And, most public schools still charge parents significant fees for books and exams and other basics, without any recourse.76

HIgHer educatIoN

Haiti’s higher education system is an impossible dream to 99% of the pop-ulation. It consists of 14 public universities, including the State University of Haiti, which has multiple campuses and is its own independent self-gov-erning entity.77 There are 145 private universities, of which only 10 offer ac-credited education. The remaining 135 are unregulated and operate without government permission.78 In 2007, the MENFP estimated that fewer than 40,000 students were enrolled in university, with 70% in public universities and 30% attending private colleges.79

Additionally, the MENFP’s National Institute of Vocational Training (“INFP”), recognizes approximately 138 institutions which offer techni-cal or professional education.80 Of the 25% that are public or semi-pub-lic, the GOH Ministry that corresponds to the trade taught at the school (e.g., health, agriculture, tourism) supervises the school rather than the MENFP.81 This disjointed management structure is coupled with a lack of interaction with the professional world. As a result, there are gaps or


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overlaps in curriculum and students are frequently taught severely outdated skills. For the least educated females, there are about 100 “family centers” that teach domestic skills. Unregulated and often set up at temporary loca-tions, they operate with no equipment or support.82

In summation, Haiti’s vocational sector is poorly managed and out-dated. Its complete overhaul and modernization is a GOH priority.

HIStory

Haiti can be proud that its 1805 constitution was the first in the Western Hemisphere to promote universal education. But, it may be among the last to actually reach this goal. Haiti’s education system is extremely lim-ited to the poor, is far from free, and is generally of terrible quality by international and even regional standards. Out of the 67% of students who attend primary school, fewer than 30% will complete sixth grade.83 Only 20% will attend secondary school. Only 1% of the population will go on to university, and most of the university options are far inferior to international higher education standards.84 The literacy rate over the age of 13 is just 57%,85 and only six out of every 1,000 workers in the labor market possess a diploma or certification in any profession or trade.86 All told, it is estimated that 400,000 to one million children ages five to 15 are not enrolled in school at all.87

realItIeS of tHe PrIvate ScHool market IN HaItI

In general, advocates for greater school choice and a larger private sector role in K−12 education believe that competition improves the equity and efficiency of education.88 They argue that excess demand can better be ac-commodated privately, that competition will improve all schools, and that lower income parents who cannot afford private schools will benefit from the “freeing-up” of seats in public schools. However, this theory is only vi-able where there is both: (1) a significant middle class with the ability to in-vest in its children’s education without a significant diversion of disposable income; and (2) when there is, at very least, a competitive public system for those parents who lack the means to access private schooling.

As laid out above, this is clearly not the case in Haiti. Because 78% of Haiti’s population earns less than US $2 per day, it can be said that there is


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no measurable middle class.89 The income deficiency is even more dramatic in the rural areas where 60% of the population resides, where 86% of the population earns less than US $2 a day.90 With regard to a competitive to public education system as an alternative to private schools, one simply does not exist on any scale, with the rural areas most severely underserved. Rural Haiti, with 70% of the country’s population, receives only 20% of educational expenditures. In 2007, 145 communal sections were without any public schools, and 23 lacked any school at all.91

In the absence of public schools, Haitian parents have little choice but to turn to private schools where tuition rates, miniscule by U.S. economic standards, routinely consume a minimum of 15%—and in very poor fami-lies more than 50%—of every household’s disposable income.92 World Bank studies have identified that Haitian families are forced to allocate ap-proximately $109 annually for education—nearly three times the amount as similarly situated households in other low income countries.93

This well-documented marginal nature of the Haitian education system severely limits access and creates inequities for underprivileged families who are forced into a private system that is unaffordable and noted for its poor quality. A study conducted several years ago by the Haitian Foundation for Private Education (“FONHEP”) estimated that 85% of Haiti’s schools are housed in inappropriate facilities.94 The GOH’s own 2003 school survey found, “5% of schools are housed in a church or an open-air shaded area. Some 58% do not have toilets and 23% have no running water.”95 The 2010 earthquake has obviously exacerbated this problem.

Of those private schools that have been tested, only 7% earned passing grades, with “passing” measured by at least 50% of students performing at grade level. Further, Haiti’s privately dominated system has produced literacy rates of about 53%, in a region where average literacy rates hover around 85%.96 Yet, Haiti’s shoddy private school market survives, reflect-ing the realities of the MENFP’s lack of infrastructure. Educational op-portunity is a fundamental human right that parents in every corner of the globe, on every socio-economic rung of the ladder, should demand for their children.97 In the absence of a significant public school presence, the private market expands in response. In the absence of an accountability system with financial or other incentives, consequences, or technical support, what the market produces is proven to be of very poor quality.


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refuSal—or INaBIlIty—to eNter tHe marketPlace

The GOH’s failure to invest in expanding the public education sector is the root cause of Haiti’s current dilemma. However, to fairly put this into context, one must gain at least a basic understanding of the evolution of Haiti itself.

France’s 1659−1803 colonization of Saint-Domingue, the area known as present day Haiti, was arguably among the world’s most brutal colonies with regard to slavery. More than 80% of the population was enslaved. The slave-plantation colony, which in the mid-18th century produced 40% of Europe’s cotton and 75% of its coffee, worked many slaves to death.98 The Code Noir ruled the island and obviously, education was prohibited, with the exception of limited private schooling for planters, “petit blancs,” and the small minority of “free persons of color” who would eventually become Haiti’s ruling elites.99

After defeating France in the world’s only successful slave revolt, the Republic of Haiti declared independence on January 1, 1804. The new country was financially broken, ostracized, and utterly devoid of any foun-dational education system. Ten years of war left the country decimated, with a relatively unproductive agricultural sector and no industry. However, perhaps the most bitter legacy of Haiti’s colonization was the crushing fi-nancial debt imposed by France. After Haiti’s declaration of independence, France imposed a punitive trade embargo against Haiti. This prevented Haiti from exporting the sugar, coffee, cocoa and tropical produce that was its only source of revenue. The United States, sixty years prior to its own Civil War and with its own slave holding states uncomfortably close to the newly freed black nation, was not inclined to assist. In 1825, as a condition for lifting the embargo and recognizing Haiti as a sovereign nation, France compelled Haiti, allegedly at gunpoint, to pay 150 million francs (US $21 billion current value) for the loss of the colony and slaves, who were now free Haitian citizens. The astounding figure was equivalent to the entire French national budget for one year, or 10 years of Haiti’s national revenue. In order to meet the terms of this agreement, Haiti was forced to borrow from other nations at usurious interest rates. The crushing loan repayment terms impeded the country’s ability to invest in infrastructure, economic development, and education through the mid-20th century. Repayment amounted to a diversion of 80% of Haiti’s GDP until 1947.100


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The brutal financial terms reinforced the overriding lesson that colonial-ism taught the revolutionaries and Haiti’s ruling class, i.e., “violence and elitism are the most effective means to obtain what you want.”101 Decades of domestic authoritarian rule and corruption periodically followed in Haiti, impeding development and undermining investment in public education. During periods of dictatorial rule, civil unrest and coups, universities were frequently hotbeds of dissent and opposition. Political leaders and those vying for power periodically targeted and suppressed professors, teach-ers, students, and community leaders. For example, François “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s Tonton Macoutes in 1959 imprisoned and abused students who had supported a secondary school teachers’ strike, while in 2003 Aristide’s chimeres (“ghost” gang) attacked the State University during anti-govern-ment protests.102 Due to the violent political oppression that characterized most of the 20th century, many educated teachers, professors, and other Haitian professionals emigrated, further inhibiting the development of a responsive educational system. Today, the World Bank estimates that eight in 10 Haitians who have a university degree live outside of Haiti.103

The U.S. Marines occupation of Haiti from 1915 until 1934 also con-tributed to the dysfunction. The occupation focused on stability and order at the expense of development and growth. Many Haitians per-ceived American educational policies as racist and classist. Specifically, the American preference for technical and agricultural education rather than liberal arts was widely believed to be a strategy to keep Haitians academi-cally inferior to their American counterparts while teaching them skills to be a source of cheap labor.104 Haitians also resented the United States’ ten-dency to contribute fewer education dollars to Haiti than it did to countries such Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other non-black nations.

As a result of these issues, education in Haiti has regressed rather than progressed. For example, between 1960−1971, the government built only 158 new public schools. Thus, it is it no surprise that between 1965−2010, the percentage of children enrolled in private schools rose from 26% to nearly 90%.105 However, while public education investment has not his-torically been a priority for Haiti’s rulers, attitudes have changed. Over the past 35 years, the government has attempted a number of initiatives concerning public education.


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tHe BerNard reform of 1978

The first quasi-serious effort at education reform in Haiti was the “Bernard Reform,” initiated in 1978. It represented an attempt to modernize the Haitian education system to improve efficiency and relevancy. The Bernard Reform included the development of a new curriculum, a new school struc-ture aligned to labor market demands and an attempt to populate technical and vocational-educational classes in secondary schools. The school-restruc-turing element split secondary school curriculum into separate academic and vocational tracks, and designated Kreyòl (Creole) as the language of instruction in the first four grades of primary school.

The Bernard Reform made few real gains for a number of reasons, includ-ing delayed curriculum implementation, inadequate resources, and insuffi-cient infrastructure to support changes. There was also a failure to educate parents as to the credibility of the vocational track, which led to parental resistance to their children being tracked to “low prestige institutions.”

tHe NatIoNal PlaN oN educatIoN aNd traININg (“NPet”) of 1997

The NPET reform of 1997 marked a departure from the French education model characterized by an authoritarian, teacher-centric design, monitored by a highly centralized bureaucracy that treated students as passive learners. The NPET also shifted to a model of education aimed at developing civic knowledge and attitudes that would promote national unity and provide a foundation for a Haitian national identity.106

Education authorities demonstrated determination and commitment to reaching the goals of the NPET, even if they did not realize those goals on a large scale. Efforts were hindered by the lack of MENFP modernization and decentralization, resulting in fragmentation and social polarization.

tHe SuPPort Program to StreNgtHeN QualIty educatIoN IN HaItI 2003 (“ParQue”)

Pursuant to the 1997 NPET and with an initial €28 million commitment from the European Union and others, the MENFP in 2003 embarked upon a three-year joint project, titled, Support Program to Strengthen Quality


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Education (“PARQUE”). Its mandate was to establish the Fundamental Application Schools and Pedagogical Application Centers, or commonly, “EFACAPs”107 PARQUE established 17 EFACAPs in Haiti’s North, Grande’Anse, South, and Center “departments” (administrative regions). EFACAPs were designed as both model schools and teacher-training cen-ters. Each supported about 20 additional schools in its zone. Still in opera-tion at of the time of the earthquake, PARQUE claimed that it had trained 3,000 teachers and rehabilitated or built 450 schools, significantly improv-ing the quality of education for more than 100,000 children.108 However, some of the centers are reportedly struggling financially as the initial finan-cial commitments run out.109

meNfP reformS of 2008

Educational governance in Haiti has always been tightly centralized and highly politicized, with patronage and political ideology driving many ap-pointments. The MENFP remained the primary agent of policy planning in school matters, playing the significant role of determining the curricu-lum, validating degrees and conducting inspections. With 25% of the rural areas fully lacking schools and only 20% of educational resources reach-ing rural areas, a decentralized approach was clearly needed.110 The 2008 Reforms presented a new structure and organization for the MENFP to bring about a meaningful decentralization of the system. It included the establishment of a MENFP presence in all 10 departments. This formally granted limited local authority for education policies and plans, recruitment and management of school staff and the supervision of schools for the first time in Haiti’s history. Further, the initiative declared that the MENFP would henceforth be responsible for initiating, developing, implementing, and supervising education policies and programs in all areas of the country.

Summary

In summary, the GOH’s efforts to make education improvement a national priority over the past 35 years has reflected astute priorities and focus, even when execution has fallen dismally short. The GOH has recognized that the country needs:


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• MENFP decentralization through the establishment satellite offices in all 10 departments;

• Education improvement supports extended beyond Port-au-Prince into all departments;

• A shift away from the highly centralized, bureaucratic, and rote French education model;

• A shift to a new paradigm of education, including exposure to civic education and attitudes to advance democracy and promote unity as a foundation for a national identity;

• Curriculum modernization and the introduction of vocational train-ing programs to allow the school structure to be matched with labor market demands;

• Creole as the language of early primary grade instruction;111

• Expansion of the EFACAP schools/education support centers to serve as model schools and to facilitate teacher training.

Despite the earnestness of these education reform efforts and the rel-evancy of the modernization initiatives, they were largely doomed to fail because the public sector has remained marginalized and MENFP con-trol over the private sector remains negligible. It is impossible to achieve system-wide reform when the reforms reach only 10% of the schools in the country. The MENFP’s infrastructure weaknesses coupled with the domination of the private, largely for-profit school operators would ensure that any efforts that included accountability measures would yield a mar-ginal impact. This unfortunate reality set the stage for President Préval to authorize his commission for education reform (“GTEF”) in 2007.

tHe PreSIdeNtIal commISSIoN oN educatIoN aNd traININg (“gtef”)

The GTEF’s goal was to create a solid plan that would modernize the education


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system and build MENFP capacity to “rein in” ineffective private schools and ultimately end the marginalization of the public education system. Thus, the plan that emerged, the Operational Plan for Rebuilding the Education System (“the plan”), embraced a strategy for awarding in-centives and financial supports in exchange for substantive “end-user” improvements. The result is projected to be a system with both greater accessibility and improved student learning outcomes, inline with inter-national standards.

In 2008, under the leadership of Quisqueya University Rector and Haitian national treasure M. Jacky Lumarque, the GTEF began working on its recommendations for a blueprint to fulfill the constitutional man-date for free education for all school-age children, to modernize and im-prove schools in all 10 departments with a renewed focus on the underserved rural regions, and to implement the public-private educational partnership legislation, “l’Office National de Partenariat en Education” (“ONAPE”). Implementing ONAPE was critical to the MENFP. Its proper employ would: (1) end the public school sector’s marginalization by expanding the number of traditional public schools; and (2) re-introduce the concept, after decades of shrinkage and deterioration, that wider access and better quality will be provided by a publicly funded school system in Haiti.112 The GOH may then concentrate its efforts on quality assurance, accountability and compensatory functions, rather than direct day-to-day school management, which it is ill equipped to execute in its current capacity.

Partnership for Revitalization of Education in the Americas (“PREAL”), along with Haitian education leaders, have been advocating for this model since at least 2008, using the popular catch phrase: “Le gouvernement doit faire faire!” or, “The government should make things happen!” 113 The MENFP would actively promote the development of high quality public and private education, through “the carrot” of financial incentives plus technical support and “the stick” of new accountability measures with real teeth. Under this scheme, the GOH would partially subsidize all schools (not just public schools) that are willing to abate tuition to some extent and meet certain academic and financial accountability standards.

According to PREAL’s research, if Haiti could accomplish this, it would be joining a group of diverse nations, for example: Netherlands and Lesotho, who have successfully implemented the model:


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“Based on recent global experience, there does not have to be a “dichotomy” between public and private provision of education. In many of the world’s most successful education systems, public institu-tions increasingly have greater autonomy and parents have more choice. Often, public institutions compete with each other and with private institutions for students and funding. Government’s role, whether in the public or private sphere, ought to be to establish and enforce minimum standards, assess quality, increase access and equity, collect and disseminate information so that parents and students know what they are getting, and seek the most cost-effective use of public funds to achieve public goals.114

While the GTEF worked earnestly leading up to the shocking earth-quake, the plan remained in draft form on January 12, 2010 when the earthquake struck. The unprecedented humanitarian emergency and the resulting aid and donor attention to rebuilding unexpectedly presented President Préval and M. Lumarque with a rare opportunity to expand their vision for an even more comprehensive plan to improve education in Haiti.

In May 2010, after some tension between various NGO’s working in Haiti’s education sector, Préval awarded IDB the “lead” role in education reconstruction and mandated that IDB interface with the GTEF to both revise and expand the plan and guide the implementation of a much more ambitious operational plan to remake the system.115

tHe race to comPlete tHe PlaN—2010 forward

The GTEF, with external consulting assistance, raced throughout the sum-mer of 2010 and into 2011 to complete the plan while the eyes and hearts of the world were still focused on post-earthquake Haiti. In making its final determinations, plan architects drew on the lessons of two major educa-tion experiments that achieved impressive gains in places that had also seen natural disasters: earthquake stricken Chile and post-Katrina New Orleans.

cHIle

Since the 1990’s, Chile has produced some of the world’s most impressive gains in public education.116 It has dramatically expanded K-12 access,


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while simultaneously improving school quality. Chile’s sweeping market-oriented educational reforms in the 1980’s, including school management decentralization and a nationwide “scholarship” (voucher) program, pro-duced dramatic increases in access to education in Chile for students of all economic status.117 The initiatives ushered in an era of unprecedented equity for many poorer students, who previously could have only dreamed of gaining entrance to thousands of private schools. The Chilean govern-ment established a flat “per student” subsidy for private schools. Happily, all but 7% of Chile’s private schools—which constitute approximately half of all the schools in the country—elected to participate in the scholarship program.118 In 2008, Chile increased the subsidy by 15% and differentiated scholarships by socio-economic status, with more assistance given to low income families, further expanding access. Chile also undertook efforts to: (1) prohibit primary grade schools from being selective in their admissions with regard to subsidy-dependent students; (2) require that every school receiving subsidies permit students to repeat grades as needed; and (3) make it more difficult to expel students for low academic performance.119

The Chilean government also wisely augmented its tuition subsidy pro-gram with efforts to provide all schools with nonfinancial support while increasing accountability measures. On the support side, it sought improve teaching quality by: (1) embarking on a national publicity campaign to ap-plaud teachers in an effort to encourage the “best and the brightest” to enter the profession; (2) enacting a scholarship program to encourage more col-lege students to enroll in colleges of education; and (3) enacting the “Statute on Educational Professionals,” which exempts teachers from provisions of the general labor code covering private-sector workers and brings them under special rules in keeping with their employment conditions, including substantially increased compensation, bonuses and allowances, and greater employment security.120 The bonus program provided incentives for per-formance and subject mastery; knowledge measured through testing; and willingness to accept assignments in challenging school environments.121 The government also embarked upon an alternative teacher certification pathway similar to “Teach for America.” Chilean schools also gained the opportunity to earn bonuses for prescribed teacher training and monitor-ing, accompanied by mandatory remediation and training for deficient teachers. The new bonus opportunities were made available to all certified teachers, public and private alike.122


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Chile is clearly a country taking teaching and learning very seriously, and its impressive initiatives provided an inspiration to those who studied the model while working on Haiti’s plan. Chile does, however, have a few remaining challenges.

For example, public schools are required to adhere to different regula-tions than private schools. Private schools, after the sixth grade, are per-mitted to deny admittance to lower income or lower performing students. Private schools are still permitted to set tuition rates and some remote re-gions are still underserved or populated with tiny, inadequate schools with just a handful of students at various grade levels in a single room.123 While the large number of private schools participating in the scholarship program has attracted more middle class families, the remaining tuition charges still limit private school choices for children from the poorest families.

Regardless of these unfortunate and hopefully short-lived inequities, Chile’s educational reforms, using the free-market accountability concept of subsidized public and private schools, have catapulted Chile’s elementary and secondary education system into one of the highest performing systems in the hemisphere. In fact, the highly publicized student protests that have periodically preoccupied the country since 2011 (and which are underway again as Chile’s presidential election looms124) are in some ways a product of Chile’s K-12 success. The protests, largely focused on Chile’s higher edu-cation system, make the point that new and dramatically expanded access and affordability at the elementary and secondary level isn’t being matched by similar reforms at the university level. Private universities remain fi-nancially out of reach for too many families. This is fueling frustrations of evermore lower and middle class students who, due to the revolutionary changes to the K−12 education system, are eligible to attend but cannot af-ford to do so.125 And, because university tuition subsidies are “loans” rather than the K-12 voucher model, enrollment for low-income students is either impeded or triggers a firestorm when the loans are due.

Chile’s lack of widespread alternatives to four-year universities may also be fueling the discontent. In more than 1,500 U.S. communities, students who are not academically prepared for university or who cannot immedi-ately afford tuition have access to 2-year community colleges. They feature open enrollment, meaning anyone with a high school diploma or GED can attend, regardless of grade point average or test scores, and they are rela-tively inexpensive. In Chile, where university acceptance depends almost


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exclusively on one high stakes entrance exam, the lack of a reliable second-ary higher education system is particularly striking. Community colleges could provide a second opportunity for Chilean students who, on the dif-ficult and determinative university entrance exam, did not qualify on the first pass. In the United States, students initially not ready for university have the opportunity to undertake remedial courses or to prove themselves ready to transfer to a four-year institution. Currently, Chile offers only a tertiary system for students to develop vocational or technical skills and to obtain certifications. In some cases graduates from these schools do attempt to go on to a university, but it is much more limited than the American community college-to-university pipeline, and Chilean students still can-not escape the determinative university entrance exam. Wealthy parents often spend small fortunes on tutors for this test, while middle and lower class students must rely solely on what they have learned in the classroom.

The remaining challenges Chile’s education sector faces are likely only growing pains inherent in its evolution as a system of ever expanding acces-sibility and quality. Chile’s decision to concentrate on quality assurance and compensatory functions may still be considered a resounding success and is a model to examine, adapt, and emulate.

leSSoNS from New orleaNS

Chile’s success with market-oriented reforms to expand educational accessi-bility, increase equity, and improve educational quality is further supported by the post-Katrina education reform experience in New Orleans. Thus, the New Orleans experience offers Haiti other lessons to draw upon in the implementation phase of its plan. Foremost among these is the importance of creating an organizational structure to ensure that critical external part-ners (including, with regard to Haiti, foreign governments and NGOs) sub-ordinate their own priorities and expenditures to the Haiti’s reform plan, and not vice versa.

leSSoN oNe from New orleaNS: “BuIld a SyStem of ScHoolS aNd Not a ScHool SyStem.”

Like Chile, the immediate post-Katrina era Recovery School District of Louisiana and New Orleans (“RSD”) developed a “free-market” approach


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to education. The RSD is an extension of the Louisiana Department of Education. It was created to be a “school improvement organization,” responsible for providing models, subsidies and technical support to promote good-quality, publicly funded schools, whether traditional or private/charter.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Parish School Board (“OPSB”) governed New Orleans public schools. OPSB was the poorest performing big-city school district in the state and considered among the worst—or even the worst—performing school district in the nation. Test scores were abysmal, the system experienced constant financial crisis, and its dilapi-dated school buildings and facilities were in deplorable condition. Adding to the system’s instability, eight superintendents passed through OPSB in the eight years prior to Katrina. Corruption was so rampant that the FBI established a satellite office inside the district’s central office to speed its investigation of a multitude of fraud cases.126 Ultimately, 31 school district employees were indicted and the school board president actually served time in prison. Associated Press reporter Adam Nossiter observed in 2005, “In the dismal gallery of failing [U.S.] urban school systems, New Orleans may be the biggest horror of all.”127

These conditions persisted right up until the monster hurricane, even though two years earlier the state had approved a constitutional amend-ment creating the state-operated RSD.128 The amendment authorized the new RSD to take over and transform failing schools. The RSD was sel-dom utilized prior to Katrina, which demolished New Orleans shortly after school opened in August 2005, virtually wiping out the school sys-tem. More than 100 of OPSB’s 127 buildings were destroyed or so severely damaged that they could not be reoccupied. Students and teachers were evacuated or migrated to other cities and states. As a result, OPSB, already financially strapped and with no students to serve, terminated its contracts with all teachers and school employees before the year’s end.

Three months later, with OPSB in disarray and ill equipped to reopen schools, the state legislature passed “Act 35.” Act 35 authorized the RSD to take over all failing or near failing schools in New Orleans.129 One hundred schools were immediately transferred to the RSD, which was given the mandate to build a new, high quality school system, employing the following strategies:


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• Establishing a system of schools—rather than a school system—with the traditional “top-down” management model replaced by a model that supported autonomous self-governing schools, whether operated by the RSD or by a charter provider. Funding would follow the child to any eligible school, regardless of the management model or operator;

• Creating and enforcing an accountability system to hold all subsidized schools, whether managed by the district or by a charter provider, to the same rigorous accountability standards. This included tuition-free enrollment, prohibited selective enrollment, and required compliance with special education and academic performance mandates;

• Transforming failing schools by withdrawing financial support and technical assistance from those schools. These schools would be closed and reopened under the direction of new school operators, with the re-quirement that no students would be displaced by the transformation;

• Expanding high-performing schools by supporting the expansion, replication, or franchising of those successful school models. Tasks in this arena included identifying, recruiting, and incubating highly competent school providers;

• Expanding school choice for families by permitting them to select their preferred school facility, whether charter or district-managed, with funding following students to their schools of choice;

• Encouraging school choice for educators by freeing them to seek employment in any RSD school based on qualifications, without the false barriers of seniority and tenure as a filter.

These strategies explain how the RSD assumed the role of a school im-provement organization rather than a school management organization. In this “system of schools” the playing field was leveled for students and educators. Individual schools, regardless of the nature of their manage-ment model, were to be treated as if each was its own Local Education Agency (“LEA”). In other words, each school was funded as if it were its own individual school district with regard to the average daily attendance


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per-pupil funding formula. The state, via the RSD, assumed responsibility for providing additional valuable resources such as selecting superior school models and incubating local quality school operators. While most districts do not offer facilities to charter schools, the RSD’s unique, depopulated post-storm circumstances allowed it to provide buildings to many nonprofit school providers. In determining who would occupy newly reconstituted schools in hurricane damaged or destroyed schools and which buildings to renovate or to rebuild and in what order of priority, the RSD made its decisions without consideration of the school management type. In its de-liberations, the RSD remained agnostic as to the school provider or the school model type, with the determinative factor resting solely on quality. The RSD judged each provider and model solely on a demonstrated ability to achieve results for the students’ benefit.

The post-Katrina RSD, which grew from fewer than ten schools to 107 virtually overnight, was similar in some regards to Haiti’s post-earthquake MENFP in that it did not possess the infrastructure to provide devastated New Orleans with all urgently needed supports. Thus, the RSD sought out partnerships and received support from education reform organiza-tions. These organizations assisted with recruiting and training high quality teacher and principal candidates for all RSD schools, as well as with the identification and recruitment of new school operators. Those alliances pro-vided significant and urgently needed resources that the RSD alone would have been hard-pressed to provide in time to meet its mandates. The con-centrated outpouring of support for all schools was a critical factor of the success in New Orleans. Similar external supports are needed and must be appropriately channeled for success in Haiti.

The net effect of the New Orleans reforms resulted in a 100% school choice system, with a central office agnostic as to the school type, operator, or provider. The RSD’s goal of increasing student access to quality schools was furthered by recruiting, promoting, and supporting good schools, whether operated directly by the RSD or by nonprofit charter providers. This system created the dynamic that continues today, in which good schools are supported, top-performing schools are expanded or duplicated, and underperforming schools are phased out. It is a system of expanding the good and winnowing out the underperforming based on clear account-ability standards, rather than any philosophical or ideological preferences concerning public vs. private vs. charter school models.


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leSSoN two from New orleaNS: “orgaNIzINg a maSSIve recoNStructIoN PlaN.”

Among New Orleans’ greatest reconstruction challenges was simply orga-nizing the effort. Given Katrina’s unprecedented swath of destruction, all levels of government were ill prepared for the massive relief and reconstruc-tion operations. Because the disaster triggered a flood of responses from various government agencies and an army of independent organizations, the greatest challenge was coordinating effective aid deployment to prevent squandering resources.

With regard to education rebuilding, it was an easy decision to develop a vision for a brand new school system, rather than reconstruct the failure the storm washed away. Creating an organizational structure to support the im-plementation of that vision was much more difficult, and has been in Haiti as well. Just as New Orleans was initially paralyzed and the struggle to organize the rebuilding effort flawed, Haiti has experienced similar issues. However, the unique and arguably unacceptable challenge facing Haiti, three years after the earthquake, is the need—still—to persuade and motivate supporters to dispense resources solely on priorities dedicated to implementing the plan. In this context, New Orleans provides two relevant lessons on the need and the challenge to harness both government and foundations.

goverNmeNt

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), as the federal government’s “insurance agency,” was responsible for assessing damages and allocating funding to repair or to replace school district property de-stroyed by Katrina. However, FEMA guidelines require that funding dis-pensed to replace damaged or destroyed property is used to replace or re-pair that precise property. For example, if a district documented the loss of 6,000 erasers, FEMA would likely reimburse the district for 6,000 erasers, but the district would be technically prohibited from using that money for anything but the purchase of those 6,000 new erasers. This policy may be effective in emergencies of limited scope and damage, but it is ineffective in major catastrophes.

Thus, New Orleans’ dilemma with regard to FEMA guidelines was that while the hurricane destroyed valuable property, specifically 120 buildings


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and their contents, OPSB had experienced years of underpopulation. New Orleans simply had more schools than it could fill with students. While it had legitimate claims for 120 damaged or destroyed buildings, there was no need to rebuild all 120 schools. The RSD, in electing to build back a smaller school system that reflected realistic enrollment projections and anticipated growth, determined it required just 80−90 buildings. RSD therefore re-quested that FEMA, rather than simply paying outright reimbursements, play the role of a “redevelopment financier” to fund a reconstruction plan to create an appropriately smaller school district, using funds from the claims of the much larger ruined district. Federal agencies are not known for their ability to pivot on a dime. Thus, the RSD-FEMA settlement negotiations took five years of perseverance, but as a result, today New Orleans is in the midst of the largest school construction plan in Louisiana state history, funded by a $1.8 billion FEMA grant, which will result in a new network of world-class schools that will fit the population it serves.130

fouNdatIoNS

Given the magnitude of Katrina’s destruction, a multitude of NGOs also deployed, and were welcomed, to assist with the massive reconstruction. As the RSD’s strategy was to create a system of schools and not a school system, its urgent initial focus was on identifying and recruiting high per-forming school operators, in order to get schools open and operating. To help achieve this objective and focus nongovernmental resources on this endeavor, education advocates created “New Schools for New Orleans” (“NSNO”) in association with prominent nationally recognized school reform organizations.131 NSNO’s work organizing national funders and education reform groups allowed the RSD to concentrate its energy and attention on directing resources to the overall strategic plan for the district. NSNO efficiently harnessed various post-Katrina donors. Because each came with their own mission, expertise, and priorities, NSNO’s manage-ment minimized the confusion over priorities and preferences, competition for projects, and duplication of efforts. The GOH has experienced similar phenomena with the myriad of NGOs operating in post-earthquake Haiti.

NSNO greatly accelerated the RSD’s rebuilding efforts and success. For example, in 2005, 63% of New Orleans schools did not meet state stan-dards. Today, more than 90% are meeting standards. The RSD’s test score


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growth since 2005 has more than doubled statewide average growth, with growth in some RSD grades and subjects between four to seven times the average growth statewide.132 At the time of Katrina, the state as a whole was performing 26% better than New Orleans. That performance gap has nar-rowed to just 6%, putting New Orleans on the verge of becoming one of the few large cities in the nation to outperform its statewide average. High school graduation rates for African American students in New Orleans are now outpacing the national average.133

In summary, the important lessons from New Orleans to consider when implementing the plan in Haiti are: (1) the importance of adher-ing to a detailed plan for implementing the reconstruction to fit Haiti’s needs; (2) the importance of organizing and managing efforts to ensure that both governmental and nongovernmental donors direct their precious resources to the plan’s priorities; and (3) the importance of ensuring that the primary government entity (in New Orleans, the RSD; in Haiti, the MENFP) is the primary agent of accountability.

oPeratIoNalIzINg tHe gtef PlaN

As mentioned above, the GOH’s post-earthquake plan goes far beyond the original tuition-subsidy plan that was based upon the ONAPE legislation. The post-earthquake Operational Plan includes plans for new MENFP in-frastructure and governance structures, a revamped national standardized curriculum and corresponding instructional models, greatly enhanced and accelerated professional development/teacher training, university and voca-tional training, adult literacy, and public-private partnerships. The plan as drafted in 2010−2011 details each functional area with both short-term and long-term goals, with specific timelines and, in all regards, emphasizes in-stitutional capacity building. The MENFP expected the international com-munity to subordinate its programs and resource allocation to the plan’s priorities. In May 2010, IDB was designated the lead role of working with the MENFP to support the plan’s implementation, so as to ensure all enti-ties and aid organizations would be working in concert.

While the plan’s detail, scope and ambitious timeline is unprece-dented for Haiti, at the plan’s heart remains the public-private partnership (ONAPE) and the student tuition subsidy for all schools. The plan’s time-line provided that all of Haiti’s children up to the sixth grade level would be


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subsidized and enrolled in school by the 2014 school year and by 2020, the program would expand to include all children up to the ninth grade level. The strategy is essentially a swap: the government would at least partially subsidize existing private schools, including payments to assist with teacher and administrator salaries, in return for the schools partially abating tu-ition. It is envisioned that the subsidies and the abatements will continue to increase, commiserate with the government’s financial ability to expand the program. Schools entering into a contract to receive the subsidy are, in theory, required to meet certain academic and financial accountability standards. They include adoption of the new curriculum, participation in teacher training programs and facility improvement programs. With re-gard to the new standards, the plan’s architects emphasized the need to redevelop what currently passes for a national curriculum to provide cor-responding instructional training in the delivery of the new curriculum and to create a MENFP-managed school facilities commission. The latter will allow the MENFP to take the reins and control decisions as to when and where schools should be built or rebuilt, much as the RSD did post-Katrina. Additionally, planners did not focus exclusively on primary and secondary education but presented initiatives and timelines to rebuild the tertiary sys-tem, strengthen the university system, and address adult literacy challenges.

oBStacleS to ImPlemeNtINg tHe New PlaN

Financial: It is estimated that full nationwide implementation of the plan would require an expenditure of as much as US $4.2 billion over five years, or more than US $800 million per year. This would cover one-time capital investments in facilities, institutional modernization, and operations, in-cluding the dramatic expansion of the school subsidy. Maintaining the in-frastructure, financing operations, and continuing to build upon the plan’s reforms would cost an estimated $450−500 million annually thereafter, not adjusted or inflation. These expenses obviously far exceed both Haiti’s fi-nancial capacity and the capacity of international goodwill. The percentage of Haiti’s national budget dedicated to education dropped from a peak of 22% annually in FY 1994−1995, to 10% in FY 2010−2011. Funding at that level provides less than 10% of the amount needed annually to implement the plan, and less than one−sixth of the ongoing operational costs. To put into context, Haiti spends less than 2.5% of its GDP on education, which


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is far below the regional average that sees neighboring countries spending about 4% on educating its citizens.134

Developmental Balkanization: Haiti’s history of corruption, inefficien-cies, and tendency to use resources to maintain the power structure in place has caused donors to steer clear of channeling precious resources through the GOH while sound transparency systems are lacking. Over time, and given the obvious dire needs of its severely undereducated population, a number of foreign governments and NGOs of all sizes and with a variety of pri-orities have engaged in various humanitarian undertakings to fill the void left by the GOH. Generations of Haitian leaders welcomed the financial support of NGOs, which have provided its social welfare needs, allowing them to set aside responsibility in favor of focusing on political objectives. As a result, today there are more than three thousand NGOs of various sizes and missions in Haiti.135 Justifiable lack of confidence in the GOH, coupled with competing or conflicting priorities within the Government of Haiti has led to a “balkanization”136 of development, resulting in the inefficient use of limited and often one-time resources. The unfortunate dynamic has under-mined the GOH’s ability to build capacity providing critical services on its own, although it contemplates achieving that status.

Most NGOs have a natural interest in their programs for idealistic rea-sons and priorities rooted in their own missions and charters. In some cases their own operating expenses are dependent on a percentage of the contri-butions they receive for humanitarian causes such as their work in Haiti. Thus, it has been observed that—whether deliberate or not—there is, in some cases, not much urgency invested in changing the status quo as there could be. This also undermines accountability across the board and im-pedes the GOH’s ability to implement any comprehensive master plan for reform. This balkanization has been apparent in the education sector.

The MENFP’s infrastructure and technical deficiencies, significant be-fore the earthquake, were only exacerbated when the earthquake destroyed the MENFP’s headquarters, killing many of its most experienced per-sonnel. The MENFP’s lack of a financial management system, a student and school information system, a social services delivery system, and the Ministry’s very real technological shortcomings impedes the understaffed agency’s ability to guide education reform, let alone control and manage it.


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creatINg tHe INfraStructure to ImPlemeNt tHe PlaN

Critical to the success of the education reform strategy is the development of an organizational infrastructure with the ability to implement and insti-tutionalize the reforms. The plan’s architects settled on creating a series of operational “working groups” to accomplish the following:

• Provide the MENFP with the temporary infrastructure needed to implement programs and policies;

• Provide protocols to ensure that both efforts and dollars are ex-pended only on the functional areas critical to building a viable educational system;

• Minimize any current inefficiency of the balkanized developmental efforts by grouping lead agencies and NGOs into specific working groups matched to their missions, expertise and capacity.

The MENFP’s Director General would supervise the working groups. The Director General reports directly to the Minister of Education and is tasked with the day-to-day responsibilities of managing MENFP pro-grams. With regard to operationalizing and effectively managing the work-ing groups, a committee of internationally recruited technical support staff would back the Director General. The Director General would establish the mission, rules and responsibilities for the working groups; assign spe-cific short-term and long-term tasks; approve staffing and resource requests; and set and enforce timelines. Leadership and accountability for the plan’s implementation would fall to the Director General.

For maximum efficiency, the architects determined that the operational working groups should be organized along the following functional areas:

• Governance

• Facilities (including school buildings and equipment)

• Technology and Information Systems


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• Curriculum, Instruction and Assessments

• Professional Development

• Public-Private Partnerships (ONAPE) and Finance

• Vocational/Technical Education

• Special Education

• Higher Education

• Adult Literacy and Education

Each operational working group would develop a clear and precise work plan to implement the goals and objectives of the education plan within its specific area of focus and responsibility. Jumpstarting the proj-ect would include identifying available resources and supports needed for the working groups to begin the work. Implicit in the work plan of each working group must be internal MENFP capacity building to ensure re-forms are sustained.

This working group structure would enable Haiti and its partners to quickly build capacity to begin implementing components of the educa-tion reform plan. In effect, it would provide the MENFP with “instant infrastructure” and well defined objectives for each year based on realistic assumptions, which, if achieved, would have a positive impact nationwide. Gaining traction and demonstrating tangible results will create momentum, increasing both domestic and international support for the Haitian educa-tion reform efforts. The desired effect is for each year’s initiatives to build upon previous year’s accomplishments. Under the scenario, the MENFP could begin building its infrastructure step-by-step, implementing reforms in a practical, logical and sequential manner. This could be compared to building a house one floor at time, ensuring that each floor was built on a solid foundation before moving on to the next level.

The Operational Plan as adopted after the earthquake called for a “quick-start” strategy to: (1) get the working groups up and running; (2) to begin implementing the basic infrastructure initiatives needed to facilitate


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critical long-term reforms; and (3) to positively impact large numbers of students. Such “quick start” education strategies would include:

• Expanding the tuition subsidy to significantly increase primary school enrollment and to set the stage for increased enrollment each following year;

• Creating a reliable and transparent financial management system to institutionalize the tuition subsidy and the accuracy of its delivery, with the equally important goal of gaining the confidence of donors and the public;

• Creating a comprehensive student and school information system to ensure MENFP decisions are based on accurate information regard-ing students and conditions within the schools;

• Creating a foundation to begin a funding stream from the diaspora and other friends of Haiti;

• Phasing in a national, high quality reading and math curriculum in the primary grades;

• Expanding the use of distance learning via radio, to provide increased educational access and instructional support;

• Establishing a national teacher-training network;

• Establishing an office dedicated to higher education within the MENFP. This office would be tasked with: (1) coordinating Haiti’s loosely orga-nized higher education system; and (2) building partnerships between Haitian universities and international higher education institutions;

• Creating an effective management system for the vocational/techni-cal education and training sector (TVET) with significant private sector participation. Critical to this initiative would be the alignment of TVET programs with emerging labor markets and modernizing vocational training programs to make them relevant;


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• Creating a school facilities authority, with the initial mission of completing school mapping and quality surveys. This is needed to identify and accelerate building in severely underserved regions.

fINaNcINg StrategIeS

Contributing to the operational and institutional challenges obstruct-ing the plan’s implementation are the obvious financial constraints. The cost of the comprehensive plan has been estimated at $4.2 billion over five years, which under any scheme far exceeds available resources. Furthermore, the burden of sustaining the system in the long term, which is estimated at $450−500 million annually (not adjusted for inflation), will depend heavily on Haiti’s own capacity to generate revenues, whether earned or solicited. Thus, the financial realities facing this project require a multi-pronged strategy. Concurrent with efforts to secure the initial in-vestments needed for start-up costs is the need for serious consideration for generating repetitive funding streams going forward, perhaps even for decades to come.

Thus, until the GOH modernizes itself and begins generating sufficient tax revenues, considerable support will be required from the international community outside of the already considerable support provided by in-ternational developmental agencies such as USAID, CIDA, World Bank, IDB, etc. Therefore, the plan contemplates the creation of a new institu-tion designed to raise funds consistently to help sustain a publicly funded school system. Strategies for this new institution are threefold: (1) Secure and prioritize the onetime funds promised by the international community. (2)Increase GOH contributions to Haiti’s educational system. (3)Create a mechanism for securing sustainable funding from the international com-munity through personal and individual contributions, with the Haitian diaspora serving as the backbone of this fundraising effort.

SecurINg aNd PrIorItIzINg oNe tIme doNatIoNS PromISed By tHe INterNatIoNal commuNIty

The plan sought to secure a commitment of US $2.6 billion from the in-ternational community through the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (“IHRC”), which recommended worthy projects to the Haitian


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Reconstruction Fund for funding.137 The majority of the one-time funds the MENFP requested were sought for the education infrastructure proj-ects as discussed in this paper, which would serve as the needed building blocks to remake the system as a whole nationwide. Finally, one-time funds would also be used to expand the tuition subsidy program and strengthen its management and delivery. Reinforcing Haiti’s Program for Universal Free and Obligatory Education (“PSUGO”) would not only increase the number of children in school, it would also put more dispos-able income into the community by freeing up family dollars no longer dedicated to school tuition, and gain the confidence of all stakeholders. It was hoped that being able to demonstrate tangible results with the tuition subsidy would build both momentum and confidence in the education reform work. The IHRC did not fulfill the MENFP’s request, or a similar rebuilding request from the State University of Haiti, before its disband-ment in October 2011.138

Thus far, the IDB, Haiti’s leading source of multilateral aid,139 has been the lead agency in providing rebuilding funds for Haiti’s education sector. Shortly after the disaster, IDB forgave Haiti’s $484 million debt and authorized, in addition to initiatives in other non-education sec-tors, an education grant of $250 million over five years for direct fund-ing of MENFP initiatives. IDB also expressed the intent to raise funds to match its own contribution, with the intent that the grant would “fund the building of new schools, tuition-free primary education, stu-dent health programs, and strengthen the MENFP and its executing agencies.”140 Additionally, it committed to building twenty new public schools to benefit 8,200 children from preschool through grade nine.141

The MENFP has welcomed IDB’s generous and laudable contribu-tion, although the majority of larger one-time funds Haiti had hoped to secure from the international community were sought for infrastruc-ture investments. MENFP priorities include the creation of a facilities authority, reinforcing the country’s curriculum and instruction, wide-spread professional development and training, modernization of the MENFP through the implementation of a system to create an accurate student and school information database, and the creation of a financial accountability system to effectively and transparently manage funds.


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INcreaSe goH coNtrIButIoNS to HaItI’S educatIoN SyStem

The GOH committed to dramatically increasing the percentage of the na-tional budget dedicated to education from 7% to 25% over a five-year period. To subsidize this increase President Martelly in 2011 levied new transaction taxes and fees on international telecommunications, money wire transfers, specifically, a five-cent fee on all incoming international phone calls and $1.50 on all incoming wire funds transfers.142 This 25% allocation would bring the GOH education contribution (as a percentage of GDP) to regional standards and increase the GOH’s share to approxi-mately $225 million annually. The new taxes and fees alone were projected to raise as much as $60−$70 million a year once fully implemented.

SuStaINaBle fuNdINg from tHe INterNatIoNal commuNIty

The plan contemplates the creation of a new fundraising foundation that would be jointly governed by appointees from GOH, the Haitian Diaspora and the international community at large. The foundation would employ a number of strategies to secure a permanent revenue stream from the international community. Using the international ef-forts led by the Jewish diaspora to support Israel after its creation in 1948 as its model, Haiti’s efforts would similarly be driven largely by the international Haitian diaspora and would employ a variety of techniques to raise funds. These might include outright contributions, a “Friends of Haiti” rewards credit card, “Haiti bonds,” and a voluntary educational tithing program targeting the diaspora, a simple “donor match” program which would match specific needs of individual schools with specific donor interest. It is also hoped that countries with historic ties to Haiti and/or with large Haitian diasporas, such as France, the United States, Canada, and other supportive nations such as Venezuela, would become permanent contributors to the foundation.

This foundation should become Haiti’s single most important school subsidy funding vehicle until the GOH generates a sufficient tax base to assume the funding burden. The plan’s goal is for the foundation to, at the very least, raise enough money to annually match what the GOH will


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contribute. The hope for the foundation is, by year five, to generate enough monies to match the GOH contribution, as supported by its new taxes and fees. This would enable Haiti to provide a subsidy of 80% of the tuition needs for 80% of its student population, sustain needed curriculum and instruction materials, help finance expand investments in universities and vocational/technical centers, and finance the construction of at least 100 new schools a year.

wHat HaPPeNed?

The GOH and IHRC formally unveiled the education plan in August 2010.143 It was endorsed by President Clinton and approved by the inter-national community. Since that time, while progress has been made in ex-panding the tuition subsidy, progress on the comprehensive infrastructure initiatives has lagged, leading to the question, “What happened?”

Natural aNd maNmade dISaSter

There are a number of factors that have slowed and undermined the implemen-tation of the plan. On top of the crippling earthquake, the double whammy of Hurricane Tomas in November 2010 and the onset of the tragic cholera epidemic paralyzed the country, requiring both attention and resources, and forcing a change in immediate priorities. This understandably cooled the ini-tial momentum that energized the sector upon the plan’s approval.

PolItIcS

Also, in November 2010, the already delayed presidential elections dis-tracted from education and other rebuilding efforts. The election’s disputed and delayed outcome contributed to the confusion and inertia. The interna-tional donor community became reluctant to release earthquake aid in the face of political instability.

When President Michel Martelly was inaugurated in May of 2011, it marked the first time in Haitian history that an incumbent president peacefully transferred power to a member of the opposition.144 However, Martelly assumed office with a Parliament dominated by members of former President Préval’s Unity Party.145 In the face of opposition he was


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unable to seat his first or second choice for Prime Minister, requiring President Clinton to finally broker approval of a compromise candidate, in order for the government to begin functioning.146 That appointee lasted just five months, with the political drama repeating itself during the two-month effort to seat the current Prime Minister, Laurent Lamothe. Since that time, the administration has seen three cabinet “reshuffles.”147 The most recent in-cluded the resignation of the Finance Minister who, according to published reports, was frustrated by his inability to force austerity measures on the government, and the dismissal of the Communication Minister, who only lasted a few months in the job.148

In spite of the political upheavals, President Martelly and Prime Minister Lamothe have vocally embraced the education plan. Martelly campaigned on education as “one of his top four priorities.” Upon assuming office he im-mediately created the National Fund for Education (Fonds National Pour l’ éducation, “FNE”). FNE’s mandate is to channel funds to PSUGO with a guarantee of tuition-free classroom seats for 1.5 million Haitian children for five years. In an attempt to quickly fund FNE to expand the tuition subsidy for children grades one through six, President Martelly imposed new fees on international phone calls and wire funds transfers. However, while the lower house of Haiti’s parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, approved the tax and the new levies began immediately, Haiti’s Senate has never approved the mea-sure and as of September of 2013, the monies are still blocked.

mISmaNagemeNt

While the administration claims that the program has placed as many as one million new students in school, that number is disputed. In 2012, a presidential education advisor conceded that as many as 54 % of the chil-dren included in that statistic had already been attending public school.149 Additionally, PSUGO has been fraught with problems, accused of misman-agement and a lack of transparency. Just months after FNE’s creation, there were charges of missing funds and external demands for an audit.150 A sepa-rate two-month investigation by Haiti Grassroots Watch pointed out that the GOH’s own figures concerning the amount of money collected have been all over the board.151 FNE’s Haitian regulator, the National Council for Telecommunications (“CONATEL”) reported in August 2012 that $58 million had been collected from the phone call surcharge, but noted that


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it had only received a partial accounting from Haiti’s Central Bank with regard to the fees on the wire transfers, and projected that the number should likely have been closer to $78 million.152 Finally, in March 2013, CONATEL announced that according to “unofficial statistics” the fund held about $100 million, none of which could yet be expended on tuition for students due to the impasse in Parliament.153

As a result of the MENFP’s inability to access these ready funds, schools have complained of teachers resigning because of government failure to reimburse newly subsidized schools for tuition revenues lost by PSUGO’s required abatement in a timely manner, leaving them unable to pay teach-ers for months on end. For the same reason, teachers routinely complain of jobs made more difficult because of the lack of books, teaching materials and funds for such basic necessities as printing report cards or maintaining child nutrition programs. For the third year in a row, the opening of schools has been delayed until October.154

corruPtIoN IN tHe ScHoolS

Some PSUGO schools have themselves contributed to the problem and con-fusion surrounding the launch of the well-intentioned FNE/PSUGO initia-tive. After declaring, “Fighting corruption is a crusade that must involve all Haitians,”155 Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe established the Unit for Combating Corruption (“ULCC”) to fight tax fraud, customs smuggling, money laundering and corruption. The ULCC accused 766 schools of falsi-fying student population records to misappropriate PSUGO funds.156 More than $2.6 million was reportedly retrieved and returned to the treasury.157 To shore up the anti-corruption crusade, USAID funded a three-year part-nership with the GOH to establish a 24-hour anti-corruption hotline, which encourages citizens to report abuse of public funds and to improve the accountability of NGO aid programs.158 It is widely advertised on radio and television in Haiti. In August 2013, as a further demonstration of its commitment to fight corruption, the administration drafted Haiti’s first “whistleblower protection law,” expanded funding and logistical support for the country’s anti-corruption office, and advised its Director to “inves-tigate and report against anyone involved with corruption, without any ex-ception, including in their own offices.”159 Prime Minister Lamothe reiter-ated his commitment to the anticorruption campaign for the dignity of the


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people of Haiti, to eradicate the nation’s extreme poverty, and to inform the world that it can confidently invest in Haiti’s future.160 As of September 2013, the anticorruption efforts have led to 63 indictments, mostly in the education sector.161

mISalIgNed PrIorItIeS

In the face of all of these challenges, other reform initiatives languished as the organizational strategy for operationalizing the plan was only mini-mally implemented. Aid is ongoing and more children are attending school and more teachers are being trained, but in many regards it is a continua-tion of the status quo that follows the “hand out” rather than a “hand up” model. If anything it highlights the weakness of the Ministry while empha-sizing the need for the implementation of the plan as Haiti’s real hope for internal institutional capacity building.

For example, according to the World Bank, its 2012 12-month Haitian “Phase II EFA” strategy increased access to primary education for poor children aged 6−12, benefitting 175,000 Haitian children.162 Specifically, in urban areas, the project provided 100,000 students with the oppor-tunity to attend school free of charge, with 75,000 children receiving a hot meal in school every day. There is no doubt that the World Bank is responding to a very real and severe need. However, the MENFP has stated time and again that badly underserved rural areas must be a major priority because only 50% of rural children have the opportunity to at-tend school as opposed to closer to 75% in urban areas.163 Yet, the proj-ect’s community-based approach was projected to reach just 6,250 rural students.164 On paper at least, it is difficult to understand the frequent apparent misalignment between the MENFP’s stated priorities and the actions of the international community. The MENFP often feels that its relationships with NGOs are unequal, and that the GOH’s attempts to drive reform and exercise self-determination are not prioritized. In spite of this, in a “blame the victim mentality,” Haiti is regularly assigned respon-sibility for its failure to make significant progress.

Consider: The Associated Press reported that less than a penny of every earthquake aid dollar went to the GOH. It documented that 33 cents went back to Washington, D.C. to reimburse the U.S. military for emergency


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rescue operations, while forty-two cents went to non-Haitian NGO’s.165 Additionally, the Center for Economic and Policy Research reported that as of January 2013, the value of all USAID contracts awarded since the 2010 earthquake amounted to $485 million, with just 1.2% of those contracts going to local Haitian companies and 67.6% going to firms inside the belt-way (D.C., Maryland and Virginia).166 In June 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that detailed how USAID had spent just 31%, or $204 million, of its Haiti allocation and complained that “Congress lacks information to track spending and the progress of recon-struction programs…”167 Yet, in January 2012, Elizabeth Hogan, Director of Haiti Task Team for USAID, told GlobalPost, “Fixing Haiti is not some-thing that can be done in the short term. It requires Haitians to take owner-ship of fixing their own country and their own problems with the support of the international community…”168

In light of this mentality, it is not surprising that the GOH’s compre-hensive, long-term plan for building a functioning education system, with its heavy focus on internal capacity building and local governance has lan-guished for three years since its approval by the international community.169

recommeNdatIoNS

Haiti needs a catalyst to jumpstart a serious effort to build an adequate, functional and publicly-funded education system. While the enumeration above of the many challenges facing the plan is discouraging, there are also indications that the timing may finally be right for Haiti and the inter-national community to rise to meet those challenges. The country has a young, intelligent Prime Minister and a popular President, each of whom is dynamic in his own right, who have both repeatedly committed to educa-tion reform. They have also indicated, based on recent anticorruption ini-tiatives, that they take the problem seriously and are willing to make tough decisions in its regard. While the accounting of relief monies “seems to have a sliding scale that can move hundreds of millions of dollars one way or another,”170 we at least know that there are still pledges of aid that have not been tapped out and that could be made available given the right leadership and an organizational structure with timelines and deliverables designed to engender donor confidence. However, the clock is ticking. Elections are an issue. Goodwill is waning and frustration is building.


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geNeral Strategy

Having played a significant role in the immediate post-earthquake phase of the plan’s development, we may be somewhat biased in this regard, but we, along with the Haitian educational leaders with whom we have been privileged to work, firmly believe that this is a plan that will greatly improve educational opportunities in Haiti. The strategy for operationalizing this plan is sound and manageable in its simplicity:

1. Create the operational working groups, organized along the critical func-tional areas required to build an accessible, quality education system, and designate support to the MENFP’s Director General to coordinate them.

2. Designate appropriate international aid agencies or nations to lead vari-ous working groups based on their strengths, organizational mandates and expertise.

3. Designate other contributing NGOs to support the various working groups using this same principle, transforming the balkanization that exists into an advantage.

goverNaNce aNd tecHNIcal SuPPort

The original strategy to operationalize the plan called for the MENEFP’s Director General to coordinate the working groups and to set priorities and annual goals. Unfortunately, the Director General’s office lacks suf-ficient resources to perform this critical role. It has thus become beholden to NGOs to provide it with infrastructure. This equation defeats the abil-ity of the MENFP to drive reform and to strengthen its own capacity to manage the system. Thus, it is critical that the MENFP’s Director General be provided with the human resources and expertise to confidently and ag-gressively exercise its authority to make decisions regarding priorities and timelines and enacting accountability measures with regard to deliverables.

This can be addressed by strengthening the Director General’s staff, in tandem with embedding in its office a small team of experts who possess both the requisite experience; and the confidence of MENFP leaders, the President and Prime Minister, and donors. This team should also include


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the Director of PSUGO or its designate and the education counselors to the Prime Minister and President, to ensure synergy to avoid duplication and/or the enactment of policies that may be at cross-purposes. Also appropri-ate for inclusion is a representative from University Pennsylvania, which has a signed MOU with the MENFP to assist it with strengthening the Ministry’s governance as a whole.

Ultimately, all implementation strategies will fail without the founda-tion advocated for in this recommendation; as without it, the effort will remain rudderless and disjointed.

• The first step pursuant to this recommendation is to formalize this council and to provide the Director General’s office with at least the minimal internal staffing it needs.

• Second, as agreed at the December 2011 meeting in Haiti, the council would convene with the Director General to solidify and reestablish or refocus the working groups, including the solicitation and assignment of international leads and members.

• Third, is a thoughtful assignment of annual goals and objectives and approval of resource allocations.

crItIcal goalS aNd PrIorItIeS

There are five critical goals and priorities the MENFP and the international community need to embrace to make up for lost time and to establish the bedrock on which the new Haitian school system will be based.

1. accouNtaBILIty

A tiered accountability system for schools in receipt of the PSUGO tuition subsidy is an immediate priority to create the structure under which well-run schools are expanded, struggling schools can be improved and poorly performing or corrupt schools and school administrators can be eased out of the system. In a nutshell, the tiered system would categorize Haitian schools into three tiers based on performance and compliance with the financial accountability provisions of PSUGO.


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Such a system would allow for the identification of high performing schools that are in compliance with PSUGO.

• Tier 1 schools are the best schools. They would become candidates for expansion and replication, creating more seats for students to at-tend quality institutions.

• Tier 2 schools are characterized as schools that are struggling academically but that are in compliance or sincerely attempting to comply with the rules and regulations required for receipt of the subsidy pursuant to PSUGO. These schools would be eligible for additional support to assist with raising their academic per-formance. This could be done under a probationary period with definite timelines for improvements.

• Tier 3 schools are schools out of compliance both academically and financially and thus would become ineligible for PSUGO. This would force the very “bad” schools to close or force new management.

To create this system, the MENFP needs to be provided with the one-time investment for creating or greatly improving the data capabilities for a student information system to track students and school accountability profiles.

2. currIcuLuM

Haiti needs to construct a standardized curriculum in the core subject areas, K-12. Some would argue that components of a national curriculum are already in use, but they are not uniformly available or applied. There has also been quality work done by international entities in the area of curriculum development in Haiti, including, among others, USAID and the Catholic schools. All of these various curriculum pieces, in parts or in a theoretical whole, must be identified, gathered, and assessed to en-sure that the resulting national curriculum meets international standards and includes critically needed models for differentiated instruction and tiered interventions. A base model for this national curriculum must be constructed. The one-time investment needed for this curriculum development work is not cost prohibitive and is the same whether for 100


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schools or for 10,000 schools. With competent management this could be completed within a year.

The additional and perhaps more significant costs then come with the dis-tribution of the corresponding instructional materials to the schools, and could be aggressively rolled out as funding becomes available. In fact, the existence of such a model and the simple need for its companion instructional materials to bring it to scale across Haiti creates a goal for ongoing fundraising, and is an objective that would inspire donor confidence in the education sector. In effect, it offers donors a concrete and tangible place to put their money.

3. tEacHEr traINING

Many entities either are, have in the past, or hope to in the future become involved in teacher training in Haiti. The various work and programs of in-ternational universities, NGOs and organizations such as FONHEP should be documented, assessed, and then coordinated into a teacher-training pro-gram that could be taken to scale across Haiti. The critical element here is establishing meaningful certification of Haiti’s current loose professional development network. For efficiency and effectiveness, the teacher training efforts should be required to become aligned to the national curriculum. Aligning teacher training to the national curriculum has several benefits. First, it forces the training to be more efficient and cost effective. Second, Haiti’s teachers must be trained to deliver Haiti’s curriculum in order for student learning to improve. As we know there will always be some weak teachers, training in the delivery of the curriculum will ensure that students get the best possible pedagogy in an imperfect system.

4. FacILItIEs autHorIty

A school construction/renovation authority must be established. The model has already been developed and embraced by the MENFP.

Currently, the MENFP’s request to fund projects must be approved by the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (“FAES”), which is an inde-pendent public financial authority under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (“MEF”). It has the discretion to release fund-ing for various projects, through various development programs, mainly using resources from major donors with occasional direct support from the


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GOH. It is predictably bureaucratic and lacks flexibility and nimbleness. Due to the utter lack of a MENFP-controlled facilities authority; construc-tion, repair and equipment priorities are being set almost unilaterally by the international community. There is inadequate input from the MENFP, which is then required to manage all schools, even those that it did not build or that do not reflect the priorities in the Operational Plan.

Currently, the MENFP has no authority to hold FAES accountable. In the interest of accountability, the new authority would be governed by a commission that would include the Minister of Education, the Minister of Public Works, and representatives from one or more international agen-cies, to ensure transparency. This authority’s responsibilities would include mapping, securing property, development of pre-designed school and class-room blueprints that can withstand hurricanes and earthquakes, program management, and pre-qualification of construction providers. The goal is not only for the MENFP, with the appropriate checks and balances, to gain self determination over the undertaking of school construction projects, but also to provide a coherent and linear process for the award and execution of each project throughout the various regional departments.

5. FuNDraIsING

The creation of a “Friends of Haiti Foundation” (working title only) must strive to become a vehicle for consistently, year in and year out, generating revenue to support the education initiatives. The foundation would identify funders who, given the right circumstances, would be willing to commit to providing long term financial support and would work to build relationships and bring cohesion to the active but disjointed U.S. Haitian diaspora.171 The diaspora is frequently characterized by those close to the community as “fragmented” by social and political tensions172 and the immigration experience itself.

There is no question that the U.S.-based Haitian diaspora gives, and gives generously, “as reflected in the continuing commitment to support families as well as communities both in host country and country of origin.”173 It also donates time, expertise and direct services. However, the IDB also found:

“…[M]any of the specific [diaspora] projects now underway will not prove to be sustainable… More specifically, very few projects work on, promote, or achieve community empowerment (human and social


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capital) and infrastructural development. Not enough organizations engage local participation in decision-making and planning.”174

In other words, “…while many [U.S. diaspora] associations build schools and often pay for books, supplies, uniforms, and free meals in schools, fewer associations display interest in underwriting teacher training or adult literacy programs.”175 Diaspora engagement strategies frequently rely on na-tionalistic appeal and do not fully account for the fact that most Haitian diaspora organizations are focused on their local communities at home.176 Most immigrants want to give back, but primarily to their own local com-munities where family and friends will benefit, rather than just to Haiti in general. This is perhaps why the United Nation’s Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (“TOKTEN”), and USAID’s Economic Development for a Sustainable Environment (“DEED”), diaspora engage-ments programs have been criticized as less than effective strategies.177

To be successful, this new foundation must seriously strategize its engage-ment tactics. It must be a process-oriented, inclusive strategy to educate the di-aspora as to the value of the operational, implementable education reform plan. It should inform of set objectives that also meet the diaspora’s priorities. That is to say, it must be demonstrated to the diaspora that its role in supporting the growth of Haiti’s education sector is not only critical, or perhaps even determi-native, but that it is also mutually beneficial to the diaspora itself.178 Included in this careful strategy must be an evaluation of not only diaspora resources, but also a displayed willingness to learn from the diaspora and to consider and seize upon its competencies and interests. In this regard, the foundation could take a page from Canada’s playbook, as the IDB study also noted:

“…Canada has more consistently asked diaspora organizations to consolidate their multiple small projects, on grounds that develop-ment efforts would be more effectively served by larger scale efforts. This type of approach has occurred in the United States minimally.”179

Naysayers protest that the diaspora will never lend the education plan the support that it needs. We disagree, and posit that with the right ap-proach, the diaspora will more than rise to the occasion if its confidence is cultivated and its energies are channeled. When there is a common objec-tive or issue, the diaspora has in the past proven extremely powerful. For


53

example, on April 20, 1990, 100,000 Haitians—or one-third of the dias-pora then residing in the New York metropolitan area—marched across the Brooklyn Bridge, shutting it down to traffic, into downtown Manhattan to protest an offensive ruling by the Centers for Disease control. To the shock of the police and business community, the orderly but insistent crowd para-lyzed the United States’ largest city for hours.180

The foundation would work to tap into this passion for Haiti’s wellbe-ing by engaging various diaspora groups. Promoting mutual respect and unity would be an underlying strategy for the common beneficial goal of achieving a functioning education system that would benefit all Haitians of every socio-economic class, from children of the poor to domestic busi-ness leaders and the GOH itself. This would include approaching the net-work of Home Town Associations, professional associations and churches. The foundation must work to hard to encourage them to more confidently interact with development in Haiti.181 Concurrent with this engagement effort, if the MENFP were able to operationalize the working groups and generate publicity about progress made on implementation of the plan, the diaspora would be reassured a return on its investment. Under this scenario, the support could actually surpass expectations.

The foundation should be directed by a diversified board with inter-national representation and must be co-chaired by the most prominent member the Haitian diaspora who would be willing to serve and drive the foundation to meet the following goals:

• Generate a revenue stream to supplement the tuition subsidy and help subsidize curriculum and instruction, teacher training and school construction initiatives.

• Create a donor match system, as advocated by President Clinton, to link funders with appropriate capabilities or whose missions “match” specific projects and needs.

• Lastly, but most critically, launch a “New Schools Haiti” initiative. Currently the newly enacted subsidy (PSUGO) only supports students until the sixth grade. Thus, very soon, there will be a wave of newly (or better) educated students matriculating sixth grade and seeking secondary school options in greater numbers than at any time in the


54

recent decades. Yet, there currently are very few secondary school op-tions for students who cannot pay tuition. This is a situation that must be addressed and for which planning must begin immediately. It is simply counterproductive to go to such great lengths to invest in the subsidy until sixth grade and then fail to create any opportunities for newly educated students to progress into institutions that will permit them to either develop skills to become able to earn a livable wage, or to contemplate higher education. The New Schools Haiti Foundation could be a vehicle for establishing a tuition subsidy for eligible second-ary school students and increased secondary school seats. This is un-derstood to be a priority of the Prime Minister’s education counselors.

coNcluSIoN

In conclusion, if Haiti is to become self-sufficient in the long term, to gain the self-determination to which every nation is entitled, and to become true to its own constitution, it must provide its citizens with a functioning, publicly funded education system. There have been prolific discussions and disagree-ments on both the causes of the failure of the massive amounts development aid to make significant progress in Haiti, and the root causes of Haiti’s prob-lems. The topics are sensitive, complex, and include historical, socio-political, and cultural analysis. However, if substantive, measurable progress is going to occur in the education sector, which is critical for securing international and diaspora support, certain steps must happen now. It must begin with strengthening the Director General’s office, developing the national cur-riculum, coordinating and aligning teacher training, establishing a facilities authority, and creating the international fundraising entity. With adequate investment in just these five areas alone, coupled with guidance and tech-nical support from politically neutral yet skilled actors, significant progress in Haiti’s education sector is all but guaranteed. In an effort to share “with all the world” the progress that is being made in Haiti, the Prime Minister recently shared on his blog a list of the “surging” reconstruction projects in Haiti.182 The building of schools is on that list, and that is hopeful news. What is even better news is that the GOH has in hand the plan it needs to build its entire education system, and the international community will not lose if it closes ranks around Haiti’s plan and puts it in motion.


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First Ladies Michelle obama and Elisabeth Preval and Dr. Jill Biden visit a new school in Haiti

Notes

1. Spain ceded what would become Haiti, the western portion of the island of Hispaniola, to France under the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick. An important exporter of coffee and sugar, Haiti was a wholly oppressed French slave colony until, after a brutal and protracted revolutionary struggle in 1804, it became only the second country in the Americas to declare independence. It is the world’s oldest black republic, although it was denied international diplomatic recognition for decades. Countries that refused to recognize Haiti included the United States, which only recognized Haiti in 1862, after its own southern slave-holding states had seceded from the Union. See, inter alia, The American Historical Review, Vol. 105, No. 1, Feb., 2000, Oxford University Press.

2. See, inter alia, Richard A. Haggerty, Haiti: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, (1989). http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html#ht0038

3. Didier Revol, The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2006_2/10-11.html

4. The legality of President Aristide’s removal from office, and the role of the international community in his resignation and exile remains the subject of debate. See, e.g., Paul Farmer, “Who Removed Aristide?” London Review of Books, Vol 26:8, (15 April 2004) p. 28-31, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n08/paul-farmer/who-removed-aristide

5. U.N. See, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1542, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/

6. U.N. MINUSTAH, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/mandate.shtml

7. J.F. Hornbeck, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, Congressional Research Service, RL64837, June 24, 2010. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145132.pdf

8. Ibid (The Act was again amended and extended following the 2010 earthquake, renamed as the “Haitian Economic Lift Program” (“HELP”)).

9. Ibid. 10. Foundation Qhasuq (Canada), http://www.qhasuq.org/manifeste/index_en.php11. Ibid.12. Paul Collier, Report to the Sec. Gen. of the U.N.: Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe

to Economic Security (Jan. 2009) http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiticollier.pdf13. Orla Ryan, “Food Riots Grip Haiti,” The Guardian, 9 April 2008 http://www.

theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/09/1114. Jonathan Katz, “Poor Haitians Resort to Eating Dirt,” Associated Press, 30 Jan. 2008.

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http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/01/080130-AP-haiti-eatin_2.html15. Joseph Guyler, “Haiti’s Government Falls After Food Riots,” Reuters,

U.S. Ed., 12 April 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/13/us-haiti-idUSN1228245020080413

16. Patralekha Chaterjee, “Haiti’s Forgotten Emergency,” The Lancet, Vo. 372, 23 Aug. 2008 615–618. http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(08)61259-3/fulltext

17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. ReliefWeb, “Haiti Food Crisis Report July 2008” 22 July 2008. http://reliefweb.

int/report/haiti/haiti-food-crisis-report-jul-200820. Kathie Klarreich, “Food Crisis Renews Haiti’s Agony,” Time Magazine, 9 April

2008. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1729150,00.html21. http://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-food-crisis-report-jul-2008 22. Ibid.23. U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, “FAO Initiative on Soaring Food

Prices.” http://www.fao.org/isfp/country-information/haiti/en/ 24. Manual Orozco, “Haiti’s Other Side: The Diaspora’s Solidarity and Realism.”

http://focal.ca/es/publications/focalpoint/229-march-2010-manuel-orozco25. PPI’s Trade & Global Markets Project, 25 Oct. 2006. http://www.dlc.org/

printc76a.html?contentid=25408926. Wendy Carlson, et al, “The Haitian Diaspora & Education Reform in Haiti:

Challenges and Recommendations,” Columbia University, School of Int’ l. and Pub. Affairs, May 2010, p. 7. http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/workshops/documents/SSRC.BureauofHaiti_Capstone.pdf

27. Beatrice Dumerie and Karen Hardee, “The Effects of a Very Young Age Structure on Haiti,” Population Action International, (New York 2010) http://populationaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/SOTC_Haiti.pdf

28. One World Nations Online, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/google_map_Port-au-Prince.htm

29. Richard Knox, “Port-au-Prince: City of Millions With No Sewer System,” National Public Radio, 13 April 2012, http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/29/150501695/port-au-prince-a-city-of-millions-with-no-sewer-system

30. Athena Kolbe and Robert Muggah, “Haiti’s Gangs Could Be a Force For Good,” Ottawa Citizen, 4 June 2014.http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2013/06/04/kolbe-and-muggah-haitis-gangs-could-be-a-force-for-good/

31. Jeffery Masters, Phd., “Hurricanes and Haiti: A Tragic History,” Weather Underground, 3 Sept. 2008. http://www.wunderground.com/resources/education/haiti.asp

32. See, e.g., Guy Adams, “The Rift Over the Real Cost of Haiti’s Earthquake,” The Independent, 1 June 2011. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-rift-over-the-real-cost-of-haitis-earthquake-2291471.html and Maura O’Connor, “Two Years later, Haiti Earthquake Death Toll in Dispute,” Columbia

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Journalism Review, 12 Jan. 2012. http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/one_year_later_haitian_earthqu.php?page=all

33. One year after the earthquake the GOH put its official figure at 316,000. See, e.g.: Tom Brown and Joseph Guyler Devla, “Haiti Revises Death Toll to 316,000,” Reuters, 12 Jan. 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/12/haiti-quake-toll-idUSN1223196420110112

34. Inter American Development Bank, “Haiti Reconstruction Could Cost $14 Billion, IDB Study Shows,” 16 Feb. 2010. http://www.iadb.org/en/news/webstories/2010-02-16/haiti-earthquake-reconstruction-could-hit-14-billion-idb,6528.html

35. U.N. Office of the Secretary General’s Special Advisor, “Key Statistics” (accessed Sept. 2013)http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/relief-and-recovery/key-statistics/

36. Ibid.37. Ibid.38. OXFAM, “Salt in the Wound: The Urgent Need to Stop Forced Evictions from

Camps in Haiti,” 10 Dec. 2012. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-forced-evictions-camps-haiti-101212-en.pdf

39. Ibid.40. Bernard Gwertzman, “Rebuilding Haiti: The Work of Decades,” Council

on Foreign Relations Daily News Brief, 19 Jan. 2010. htt://www.cfr.org/haiti/rebuilding-haiti-work-decades/

41. Rosalyn Chan, M.D., et al., “Peacekeeping Without Accountability, The U.N.’s Responsibility for the Haitian Cholera Epidemic, Yale University Press (New Haven 2013). http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics/Haiti_TDC_Final_Report.pdf

42. Centers for Disease Control, 4 Sept. 2013. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices/watch/haiti-cholera

43. Editorial Board, “The U.N.’s Duty in Haiti’s Cholera Outbreak,” Washington Post, 11 Aug. 2013. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-11/opinions/41299675_1_u-n-peacekeepers-united-nations-artibonite-river

44. Sen. William Frist, A Hand Out, Not a hand Up, Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund, 16 July 2012. http://www.clintonbushhaitifund.org/news/entry/helping-haiti-build-back-better/ and, “Build Back Better in Haiti, Los Angeles Times, 29 March 2010. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/29/opinion/la-ed-haiti30-2010mar30 and Paul Farmer, “Building Back Better,” Partners in Health, 17 Jan. 2010. http://www.pih.org/blog/building-back-better-op-ed

45. See, e.g.: http://www.grassrootsonline.org/news/blog/build-back-better-mantra-unfulfilled-haiti and http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/haiti-the-slow-road-to-reconstruction.

46. U.N., Nigel Fisher Press Release, Jan. 2012. http://www.onu-haiti.org/nigel-fisher-deputy-special-representative-of-the-secretary-general-humanitarian-coordinator-and-resident-coordinator-addresses-the-un-perss-court-in-new-york/ (accessed Sept. 2013).

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47. Dumerie and Hardee, Effects of a Young Age Structure, 5. http://populationaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/SOTC_Haiti.pdf

48. Henriette Lund, “Youth and Education in Haiti: Disincentives, Vulnerabilities and Constraints,” FAFO Institute for Applied International Studies, (Oslo 2008) 15. http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/10070/10070.pdf

49. Collier, “Catastrophe to Security.” http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiticollier.pdf 50. Ibid.51. Encyclopedia of Nations http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/

Americas/Dominican-Republic-POVERTY-AND-WEALTH.html 52. Ibid.53. Collier, “Catastrophe to Security.” http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiticollier.pdf 54. “Prime Minister in Ille-à-Vache for Supervision Visit, Haiti-Libre 20 Aug. 2013.

http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-9259-haiti-tourism-prime-minister-in-ile-a-vache-for-a-supervision-visit.html and Prospery Raymon, “Tourism Can Help Haiti Return to its Halcyon Days,” The Guardian Blog, 26 Jul. 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jul/26/haiti-tourism-caribbean-redevelopment

55. Lunde, “Youth and Education in Haiti,” 10. http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/10070/10070.pdf

56. Paul Franz, “Haiti’s Lost Children, Project Report with support from The Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting, (2013). http://www.haitiedstories.org/background/

57. Conor Bohan, H.E.L.P., http://uhelp.net/our-story/mission-vision/ 58. Lunde, “Youth and Education in Haiti,” p.11. http://www.fafo.no/pub/

rapp/10070/10070.pdf 59. René Bruemmer, “In Haiti, Schools Key to Recovery,” Montreal Gazette, 5

March 2011. http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/SOPUDEP and see: Salmi (200) p. 4. http://www.hopeforhaiti.com/uploads/world_bank.pdf

60. Lunde, “Youth and Education in Haiti.” http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/10070/10070.pdf pg. 14

61. Ibid.62. Kay Tikal, Independent Bogger, Cap-Haitian, Haiti, (3 Aug. 2013). “Meet Ti

François, a Haitian serial entrepreneur in Cap-Haitien whose past ventures include, among other things, a gas station, a dry cleaning business, and a private cemetery. A few years ago he opened Collège Nelson Mandela, a secondary school that enrolls thousands of students from grades 6 to 12 in two 5-hour shifts each day.” See: https://medium.com/medium-for-haiti/9c17febeb9dd

63. Franz, “Haiti’s Lost Children (2013). http://www.haitiedstories.org/background/ 64. Ibid.65. Lunde,“Youth and Education in Haiti,” 6. http://www.fafo.no/pub/

rapp/10070/10070.pdf 66. World Bank, http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/about-haiti/education/ 67. Mongabay Conservation & Environmental News http://www.mongabay.com/

history/haiti/haiti-education.html

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68. The Episcopal Commission for Catholic Education, “Final Report of National Schools Survey in Haiti,” Catholic Relief Services (University of Notre Dame, June 2012). See: http://ace.nd.edu/files/haiti/Consulting_HaitiForumReport.pdf

69. Yola Ménard-Saint Clair, “Causes of Conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism in Haiti and the role of Voudou after Conversion,” (2012).FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, Paper 757, 48. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1869&context=etd&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D10%26q%3Devangelism%2Bin%2Bhaiti%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C7#search=%22evangelism%20haiti%22

70. Jamil Salmi, “Equity and Quality in Private Education: The Haitian Paradox,” Technical Paper 6, p. 5. see: http://www.hopeforhaiti.com/uploads/world_bank.pdf

71. Kari Huus, “Haiti Awash in Christian Aid, Evangelism, NBC News/MSNBC.com 9 Feb. 2010 http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35262608/ns/world_news-haiti/t/haiti-awash-christian-aid-evangelism/#.UhK4tmR35Us. And see: Peter Wehner, “Pat Robertson’s Offense,” National Review Online, 14 Jan. 2010. http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/192781/pat-robertsons-offense/peter-wehner “Something happened a long time ago in Haiti …and ever since they have been cursed by one thing after the other, desperately poor.” Evangelist Pat Robertson, 700 Club, January 13, 2010.

72. Lunde,“Youth and Education in Haiti,” 14. http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/10070/10070.pdf

73. Franz, “Haiti’s Lost Children (2013). http://www.haitiedstories.org/background/ 74. Lunde,“Youth and Education in Haiti,” 17-18. http://www.fafo.no/pub/

rapp/10070/10070.pdf pg. 17-18.75. Ibid., 16.76. World Bank, http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/about-haiti/education/ 77. Ragas Nang-Yad et al., “The Challenge for Haitian Higher Education:

A Post-earthuake Assessment,” Internuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED) March 2010. http://inured.org/docs/TheChallengeforHaitianHigherEd_INUREDMarch2010.pdf

78. Ibid.79. Ibid.80. Eriko Suzuta, “Education in Haiti: An Overview of Trends, Issues and Plans,”

World Innovation Summit for Education (“WISE”) 2011. http://www.wise-qatar.org/sites/default/files/files/4851/eduoverview0921_draft_with_cover.pdf

81. Ibid.82. Ibid.83. UNESCO, see, Luke Metcalf, Mgr. “Nationmaster.com” (Sydney, AU) (accessed

Sept. 2013). http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ha-haiti/edu-education 84. Suzuta, “Education in Haiti,” http://inured.org/docs/

TheChallengeforHaitianHigherEd_INUREDMarch2010.pdf 85. World Bank, http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/about-haiti/education/ 86. Franz, “Haiti’s Lost Children (2013). http://www.haitiedstories.org/background/

Notes

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87. Ibid.88. See, e.g., “What We Stand For,” Stand For Children, http://standleadershipcenter.

org/what-we-stand-school-choice ; “School Choice = Options,” Democrats for Education Reform, http://www.dfer.org/blog/2013/01/school_choice_o.php

89. Anup Shah, Globalissues.com 1 Oct. 2010 http://www.globalissues.org/article/141/haiti see also, http://www.prb.org/DataFinder/Topic/Rankings.aspx?ind=26

90. http://project81haiti.org/?page_id=69 91. Ketty Luzincourt and Jennifer Gulbrandson, “Education and Conflict:

Rebuilding the Education Sector After the 2010 Earthquake” United States Institute for Peace Special Report August 2010, p. 5. “http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr245.pdf

92. U.S. Dept. Labor, http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/Advancing1/html/haiti.htm

93. World Bank, http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/about-haiti/education/ 94. http://www.fonhep.ht/ 95. Repulic of Haiti, Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Ministry of

Planning and External Cooperation, Nov. 2007, p. 22. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Haiti-PRSP(march-2008).pdf

96. U.S. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, “Country Profile: Haiti,” May 2006, p. 22. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Haiti.pdf

97. UNESCO, “Right to Education,” http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/right-to-education/

98. Girard, Philippe, “Paradise Lost: The Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation,” Palgrave MacMillan (New York 2005) pg. 33.

99. Bob Corbett, “The Haitian Revolution of 1791-1803: A Historical Essay,” http://www2.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/history/revolution/revolution1.htm

100. Haiti’s more recent debt did not originate in the 19th century, but can be traced to the Duvaliers’ dictatorships, especially from of Jean-Claude Duvalier (1972−1986). According to Transparency International, Duvalier likely embezzled between US $300 and 800 million during his dictatorship. It has been called one of the “best cases of odius debt in history.” The multilaterals finally caved to pressure and forgave it in 2009 and in 2010. See, e.g., http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/headline3-13-07.pdf http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/feb/11/we-should-beg-haitis-forgiveness

101. Luzincourt, “Education and Conflict,” p. 6.102. Ibid., pg. 7.103. Carlson, et al., “Haitian Diaspora and Education. http://www.sipa.columbia.

edu/academics/workshops/documents/SSRC.BureauofHaiti_Capstone.pdf 104. Luzincourt “Education and Conflict,” p. 7. 105. Salmi, Jamil. 2000. “Equity and Quality in Private Education: the Haitian

paradox.” A Journal of Comparative Education 30:163-178.106. Luzincourt, “Education and Conflict,” p. 5. 107. Ibid.

Notes

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108. European Commision, Voices & Views: Education After the Disaster Lessons From Haiti,” 26 Jan. 2011. http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/education-after-disaster-lessons-haiti

109. WISE Haiti Initiative, “Workshop: Rebuilding Education in Haiti: Sharing Success Stories and Global Experiences” (Port-au-Prince, 28-29 Sept. 2011). http://www.wise-qatar.org/sites/default/files/files/4851/en_efacap_de_kenscoff.pdf

110. Melika Edquist, “Overcoming Challenges to Local Development in Haiti,” State of Planet, Earth Institute 26 Feb. 2013 http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2013/02/26/haiti-dialogue-series-overcoming-historical-and-structural-challenges-to-local-development/

111. Leon Neyfakh, “The Power of Creole,” The Boston Globe, 24 Jul. 2011. http://www.boston.com/news/education/k_12/articles/2011/07/24/the_power_of_creole/?page=1 and Arika Okrent, “Haiti is Teaching Kids in the Wrong Language,” The Week, 8 Feb. 2013. http://theweek.com/article/index/239898/haiti-is-teaching-kids-in-the-wrong-language

112. Lawrence Wolf, “Education in Haiti: The Way Forward,” PREAL (Washington D.C. 2008) p. 10. http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Education%20in%20Haiti%20-%20The%20Way%20Forward%20-%20FINAL%20-%209-15-08.pdf

113. Ibid.114. Ibid., 10-11. 115. IDB Press Release, “Haiti Gives IDB Mandate to Promote Major Education

Reform,” 15 may 2010. http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2010-05-15/haiti-gives-idb-mandate-to-promote-major-education-reform,7150.html

116. Erik Hanushek, et al., “Achievement Growth: International and U.S. Trends in Student Performance,” Harvard Kennedy School, PEPG Report No.: 12-03, July 2012, p.4, fig. 1. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/PEPG12-03_CatchingUp.pdf

117. StateUniversity.com, http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/263/Chile-EDUCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW.html

118. Gregory Elacqua, et al, “Scaling Up in Chile,” Educationnext, Summer 2008, vol 8:3. 119. Jorge Fabrega, “Education Reform Three Year’s After Chile’s Penguin

Revolution,” Americas Quarterly, Fall 2009, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/982

120. José Pablo Arellano Marín, Minister of Education, Chile, 1996-2000, “Educational Reform in Chile,” CEPAL Review 73, p. 83-87. http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/3/19963/lcg2130i_Arellano.pdf

121. Ibid., p. 86. 122. Ibid. 123. Francisco Gallego, “The Political Economy of School Size: Chilean Rural

Schools,” Universidad Catolica de Chile, Versión electrónica ISSN: 0717-7593 (Santiago May 2010) p.6. http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/dt_375.pdf

124. Zachary Volkert and Clémence Douchez-Lortet, “Tens of Thousands March in Chile for Renewed Education Demands,” The Santiago Times, 5 Sept. 2013,

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http://www.santiagotimes.cl/chile/education 125. The Economist, “Progress and Its Discontents,” 14 April 2012. http://www.

economist.com/node/21552566 126. FBI Press Release, 11 March 2010. http://www.fbi.gov/neworleans/press-

releases/2010/no031110.htm 127. Katheryn Newmark and Veronique De Rugy, “Hope After Katrina: Will New

Orleans Become the New City of Choice?” EducationNext, Vol 6:4 Fall 2006. http://educationnext.org/hope-after-katrina/

128. Ibid.129. Ibid.130. Cindy Chang, “$1.8 Billion for Katrina Rebuilding is Worth the Wait,”

The Times Picayune, 26 Aug. 2010. http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2010/08/18_billion_from_fema_for_hurri.html

131. See, New Schools For New Orleans, http://www.newschoolsforneworleans.org/ 132. Louisiana Department of Education, “Louisiana’s Turnaround Zone: Answering

the Urgency of Now,” (Baton Rouge 2011). http://www.louisianaschools.net/lde/uploads/18099.pdf

133. See, Leslie Jacobs, Educate Now!, http://educatenow.net/resources/data-and-analysis/senior-graduation-rates/

134. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS135. United States Institute of Peace, “Haiti a Republic of NGOs?” Panel Discussion,

10 Sept. 2009. http://www.usip.org/events/haiti-republic-ngos 136. Merriam Webster Dictionary Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/balkanize 137. Government of Canada, “FAQ’s: Rebuilding Haiti After the Earthquake.” http://

www.canadainternational.gc.ca/haiti/highlights-faits/Faq-Foire-Reconstruction.aspx 138. Pascal Fletcher, “World Bank Grants $255 Million for Haiti’s Recovery,” Reuters,

1 Dec. 2011. http://www.trust.org/item/20111201232200-tk2vl?view=print 139. IDB, “IDB Actions After the Earthquake.” http://www.iadb.org/en/countries/

haiti/idb-actions-after-the-earthquake-in-haiti,1224.html 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid.142. Ilio Durandis (@Haiti2015), “Martelly’s Record in Haiti: Too Little But Not Too

Late,” 22 May 2013. https://medium.com/medium-for-haiti/547feb003904 143. Leslie Pitterson, “A Clean Slate? Questions Surround Plans for Educational

Reform as Haiti Rebuilds its Schools,” MediaGlobal News, 25 Aug. 2010. http://www.mediaglobal.org/2010/08/25/a-clean-slate-questions-surround-plans-for-educational-reform-as-haiti-rebuilds-its-schools/

144. Maureen Taft-Morales, “Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns,” Congressional Research Service 1 Aug. 2012.

145. Editorial: “Haiti’s President Martelly,” 20 May 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/opinion/21sat3.html?_r=0

146. Randal Archibald, “Haiti’s Prime Minister Quits After Four Months,” The New

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York Times, 24 Feb. 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/americas/garry-conille-resigns-as-haitis-prime-minister.html

147. Durandis, Martelly’s Mixed Record.” https://medium.com/medium-for-haiti/547feb003904

148. Ibid.149. Center for Economic and Policy Research, “Two Years Later:

Media Assesses Reconstruction in Haiti,” 12 Jan. 2012. http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/two-years-later-media-assess-the-state-of-reconstruction-in-haiti

150. Stephanie Strom, “A Billionaire Lends a Hand,” The New York Times, 6 Jan. 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/digicels-denis-obrien-helps-rebuild-haiti.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

151. Haiti Grassroots Watch, “The Government “Free Schools: A Victory?” 13 Feb. 2013. http://www.ayitikaleje.org/haiti-grassroots-watch-engli/2013/2/13/the-government-free-school-program-a-victory.html

152. Haiti Business Online, “CONATEL Reported $58,066,400.63 U.S. Dollars Collected in Tariffs From Phone Companies to National Fund for Education,” 17 Aug. 2013. http://haitianbusiness.com/conatel-reported-58066400-63-u-s-dollars-collected-in-tariffs-from-phone-companies-to-national-fund-for-education/

153. MetropoleHaiti.com, “Près de 100 Millions de Dollars pour le Programme de Scolarisation,” 11 March 2013. http://www.metropolehaiti.com/metropole/full_une_fr.php?id=21910

154. Editorial, “Haiti-Education: Postponement of the (sic) Back to School” Haiti Libre, 22 Aug. 2013. http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-9273-haiti-education-postponement-of-the-back-to-school.html

155. Laurent Lamothe, Citoyen Haïtian (Blog), “Fighting Corruption is a Crusade that Must Involve All Haitians,” 18 March 2013. http://www.laurentlamothe.com/fighting-corruption-is-a-crusade-that-must-involve-all-haitians/

156. Editorial, “Haiti-Economy: Fight Against Fraud, 116 million Gourdes Recovered,” Haiti Libre, 12 March 2013. http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-8079-haiti-economy-fight-against-fraud-116-million-gourdes-recovered.html

157. Ibid.158. Editorial: “Haiti-Economy, Anti-Corruption Hotline is Operational,” Haiti Libre

30 Jan. 2013. http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-7762-haiti-economy-the-anti-corruption-hotline-is-in-operation.html

159. Joe Colas, “Haiti Drafts Law to Protect Whistleblowers, Sets Up Anti-Corruption Hotline,” Caribbean News Now! 31 Aug. 2013. http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Haiti-drafts-law-to-protect-whistleblowers,-sets-up-anti-corruption-hotline-17469.html

160. Lamothe (Blog). http://www.laurentlamothe.com/fighting-corruption-is-a-crusade-that-must-involve-all-haitians/

161. Ibid.162. World Bank, “Press Release No:2012/177/LAC,” 1 Dec. 2011. http://web.

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worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23059532~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html

163. Lunde,“Youth and Education in Haiti,” p. 5. http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/10070/10070.pdf p

164. Ibid.165. Associated Press, “Haiti Gets a Penny of Each U.S. Aid Dollar,” 27 Jan. 2010.

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article24518.htm 166. Center for Economic and Policy Research, “Haiti by the Numbers,

Three Years Later,” 9 Jan 2013. http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/haiti-by-the-numbers-three-years-later

167. GAO, “Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and Face Sustainability Challenges,” GAO-13-558, 18 June 2013. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-558?source=ra and also, Randal Archibald, “Report Finds Lapses in United States Aid Efforts in Haiti,” The New York Times, 25 June 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/world/americas/report-finds-lapses-in-united-states-aid-efforts-in-haiti.html

168. Donovan Webster, “Haiti: Where Did the Money Go?” Salon.com 11 Jan. 2012. http://www.salon.com/2012/01/11/haiti_where_did_the_aid_go/

169. GOH educational accomplishments for the 2012 SY can be found on page 64-66 of the Prime Minster’s annual report to Parliament. See, http://www.scribd.com/doc/121891249/Le-Bilan-du-Gouvernement-de-Laurent-Lamothe-2012-2013

170. Ibid.171. Weiss Fagan, Patricia, et al., “Haitian Diaspora Associations and Their

Investments in Basic Social Services in Haiti,” (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2009), 1 March 2011. http://isim.georgetown.edu/publications/20090101_Haitian_Diaspora_Associations.pdf

172. Ibid. p. 66.173. Ibid. p. 8. 174. Ibid. p. 43. 175. Ibid. p.48. 176. Tatiana Wah, “Engaging the Haitian Diaspora,” The Cairo Review of Global

Affairs,” 22 April 2013. http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=333

177. Ibid. 178. Ibid.179. Weiss-Fagen, “Haitian Diaspora Associations,” p. 51. 180. Donatella Lorch, “F.D.A. Policy to Limit Blood is Protested,” The New York

Times, 21 April 1990. 181. Weiss Fagan, “Haitian Diaspora, 182. Lamothe (Blog) http://www.laurentlamothe.com/2013/08/

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Glossary

cida Canadian International Development Agency

conatel National Council for Telecommunications

csna National Committee for Food Security

deed Economic Development for a Sustainable Environment

efacap Fundamental Application Schools and Pedagogical Application Centers

faes Economic and Social Assistance Fund

fao United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

feMa Federal Emergency Management Agency

fne National Fund for Education

fonhep Foundation for Private Education

gao Government Accountability Office

goh Government of Haiti

gtef Presidential Commission on Education and Training

hope i Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006

hope ii Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008

idb Inter-American Development Bank

ihrc Interim Haiti Recovery Commission

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infp National Institute of Vocational Training

lea Local Education Agency

Mef Ministry of Economy and Finance

Menfp Ministry of National Education and Professional Training

Minustah United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

npet National Plan on Education and Training

nsno New Schools for New Orleans

onape National Office for Partnership in Education

opsb Orleans Parish School Board

parQue Support Program to Strengthen Quality Education

phase ii efa Phase II Education for All

preal Partnership for Revitalization of Education in the Americas

psugo Program for Universal Free and Obligatory Education

rsd Recovery School District

tokten Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals

tVet Vocational/Technical Education and Training Sector

ulcc Unit for Combating Corruption

usaid United States Agency for International Development

Glossary

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Biographies

paul g. Vallas is known within the education community as a turnaround expert. He has a history of reforming and rebuilding school districts in the wake of both natural and man made disasters. He re-cently completed his four year tenure as superintendent of the Recovery School District of Louisiana, where he played the critical leadership role in building a new public school system in the hurricane ravaged city and developing a statewide school intervention system to help turn around failing schools across the state. In addition to other projects, he is now engaged in turnaround in the largest school system in Connecticut, Bridgeport Public Schools, where high school graduation rates and other indicators lag far below national averages, and do not approach national or state standards.

In New Orleans, in the aftermath of Katrina, he led the creation of the nation’s first 100% school choice district where parents can select the school for their child and the first 100% site selection district, where local principals can recruit, and retain teachers and staff based on performance. He has also presided over the creation of the nation’s first majority charter school district while helping to secure the largest FEMA settlement for any school district in the nation’s history. The results are impressive. Test scores have improved in every grade in every year at growth rates that far exceed those of the state. Graduation rates have also improved every year; this in a district where more that 80% of the children live below the pov-erty level and 90% are minority. He also implemented the largest school construction program in the State of Louisiana history, and one of the largest ever in the nation.

Mr. Vallas’ success in New Orleans followed his similar successes in other troubled “take over” districts in Chicago and Philadelphia. In both districts test scores improved every year at rates that exceeded state test score growth, budget deficits were eliminated and record setting school construction programs were implemented.

69

Mr. Vallas’ success in turning around the United States’ most troubled school districts has brought him international attention and resulted in his recruitment to help countries to rebuild and strengthen their school system.

In 2010, concurrent with his responsibilities in New Orleans, Mr. Vallas was appointed to two large international projects. In the first, he was asked to serve as the lead education consultant to the Government of Haiti (“GOH”) in the wake of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank. Now, in 2013, he continues to advise the GOH as its Ministry of Education works toward the creation of a publicly a subsidized school system that will, for the first time ever, make education accessible to all of Haiti’s children, including the thousands of Haitian children who currently are not in any school at all. The plan also includes the development of a national curriculum, the re-training Haiti’s teaching workforce and the building of new earthquake and hurricane resistant schools. The plan is currently in the “working group” phase, with task forces of international experts organized along functional lines beginning to implement the plan, including creating a standardized national curriculum and instructional delivery system.

The second project came at the invitation of the Government of Chile, which has asked Mr. Vallas to assume responsibility for turning around and improving test scores in 1,100 of Chile’s lowest performing schools. Based on this invitation, and his work in Haiti, Mr. Vallas formed The Vallas Group, Inc. He has recruited a world class team of educational experts with specific expertise in all functional areas of education includ-ing curriculum and instruction, teacher training and re-training, stu-dent and teacher assessments and interventions, and organizational and finance management.

Mr. Vallas’ wide-ranging experience has led him to believe that any school system, whether a domestic district or an international nationwide system, can be reformed in spite of natural or manmade disaster, troubled finances, poorly trained teachers or political and community disunity.

Prior to Mr. Vallas’ work in the education sector, he has consider-able success as Director of the City of Chicago’s Office of Budget and Management, Mr. Vallas also served as the City’s Revenue Director,. He has also held a number of prominent positions in Illinois state govern-ment, including Executive Director of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission, principal policy advisor to the President of the Illinois

Biographies

70

State Senate and primary staff person assigned to the Elementary and Secondary Education and Appropriations Legislative Committee and the Illinois Senate Revenue Committee.

One of Mr. Vallas’ proudest achievements was the opportunity to serve 13 years in the Illinois National Guard, including three as a military in-structor at the Officer Candidates School at Camp Lincoln, Illinois. Two of his three sons are currently serving in the military, including his oldest son who recently returned from active duty in Afghanistan as a combat medic attached to the 1st Marine Division.

tressa pankoVits is a lawyer and former television/radio journalist who is currently a partner in the Vallas Group, Inc. Ms. Pankovits provides strategic and substantive support to Superintendent Paul Vallas re-garding his work in Haiti, Chile, and other locations, both domestic and in-ternational, where he and his team are invited to provide consulting services regarding the rebuilding and reformation of school systems. Ms. Pankovits coordinates all policy research, advocacy materials and document prepara-tion for the Vallas team’s presentations before governmental, NGO, and philanthropic audiences. Working daily with Superintendent Vallas over the past two years, Ms. Pankovits has become well versed in educational reform strategies and implementation of reform projects on a large scale. She additionally manages the operations, logistics, and deployment of the Vallas team in its educational rebuilding efforts.

Although she has never been an employee of the Recovery School District of Louisiana, she has been exposed to Mr. Vallas’ work there on a daily basis, and has become familiar with both the internal workings of the RSD and educational policies in general in Louisiana. Currently a resident of New Orleans, she has become passionate about the city and its people, particularly its children and is in the process of becoming more deeply in-volved in civic activities.

Prior to joining Paul Vallas’ team, Ms. Pankovits worked as an associ-ate at a commercial litigation law firm in Chicago, where she concentrated on contract litigation and drafting, land use issues, intellectual property and trade secrets, and municipal and administrative law. In 2006, she graduated with honors from the Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago Kent College of Law, where she served on the Law Review and Moot Court Honor Society.

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Prior to law school, Ms. Pankovits managed political campaigns, includ-ing campaigns in Illinois’ gubernatorial, Cook County State’s Attorney and various judicial contests. Ms. Pankovits worked as a journalist in television and radio for 12 years, holding positions with ABC, CBS and the Chicago Tribune. As a reporter she provided extensive coverage of the Chicago Public School system and state and local government, for which she was honored with several journalism awards. All of her positions have included advocacy for the public good.

Prior to attending law school, Ms. Pankovits worked as a journalist in televi-sion and radio, holding positions with ABC, CBS and Chicago Tribune-owned stations. As a reporter she provided extensive coverage of the Chicago Public School system and state and local government, for which she was honored with several journalism awards.

kent h. hughes is currently a public policy scholar and former director of the Program on America and the Global Economy (PAGE) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. As part of the PAGE agenda, he published a book, Building the Next American Century: The Past and Future of American Economic Competitiveness (Wilson Center Press 2005), which emphasizes the importance of innova-tion and education to America’s future. Prior to joining the Center, Dr. Hughes served as Associate Deputy Secretary at the U.S. Department of Commerce, president of the private sector Council on Competitiveness, and in a number of senior positions with the U.S. Congress. Prior to his congressional service, Dr. Hughes served as a staff attorney for the Urban Law Institute. He was also an International Legal Center Fellow and Latin American Teaching Fellow in Brazil where he worked on a reform of Brazilian legal education.

Dr. Hughes holds a Ph.D. in economics from Washington University, a LL.B. from Harvard Law School and a B.A. in Political and Economic Institutions from Yale University. He serves on the Executive Advisory Board of FIRST Robotics and is a member of the D.C. Bar, American Bar Association and the American Economic Association.

Biographies

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elizabeth e. white is a program assistant for the Global Women’s Leadership Initiative and former program assistant for the Program on America and the Global Economy. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Elizabeth served in the Peace Corps in El Salvador, where she worked in a local school, developed educational programs for a rural health clinic, and also served as an interpreter. Elizabeth previously worked as a campaign manager for Majority Leader Hugh Holliman in his campaign for re-election to the North Carolina State House of Representatives. She received a B.A. in Political Science with a double minor in Spanish and Latin American Studies from Wake Forest University.

Biographies

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The Program on America and the Global Economy

the program on america and the global economy (page) focused on key questions in globalization and innovation between its founding in 2001 and its closing in 2013. For over a decade, PAGE studied the evolving global economy and key trends in innovation and innovation systems. Combining its work on globalization, PAGE also explored the long-term future of the American economy.

PAGE’s interest in the long-run future of the United States led PAGE to conduct research, produce publications, and hold conferences on sub-jects ranging from strengthening the U.S. innovation system to renewing America’s manufacturing base to fostering a dramatic improvement in America’s education system.

With America’s economic future deeply tied to developments around the world, PAGE also focused on the development of an American for-eign economic policy for the 21st century. As part of this effort, PAGE examined the policies that contribute to a competitive economy and the international economic policies that will create competitive opportuni-ties for the United States.

After the closure of the PAGE program, PAGE director Kent Hughes has become a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center. As a public policy scholar, he plans to build on his work with PAGE and develop two complementary projects: The first explores the potential for a revival of the American economy and American politics. The second will work on a global economic strategy for an age where economic, political, and even, to some extent, military power is much more widely dispersed.

Elizabeth White, who has contributed so much to PAGE, its research, conferences, and publications, has become a program assistant with the Wilson Center’s Global Women’s Leadership Initiative.

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Paul Vallas with tressa PankoVits


Program on america and the global economy

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

One Woodrow Wilson Plaza

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20004-3027

www.wilsoncenter.org/Page

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