Eduardo Bonilla-Silva -'This Is A White Country' -The Racial Ideology Of The Western Nations Of The...

“This is a White Country’”: The Racial Ideology of the Western Nations of the World-System

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, TexasA&M University

In this paper I argue that the racial ideology of the Western nations of the world- system has converged over the past twenty years. This new ideology or, as many analysts call it, the “new racism,” includes: (1) the notion of cultural rather than biological difference, (2) the abstract and decontextualized use of the discourse of liberalism and in- dividualism to rationalize racial inequality, and (3) a celebration of nationalism that at times acquires an ethnonational character. I contend that this ideological convergence re- flects the histories of racial imperialism of all these countries, the fact that they have all developed real-although different-racial structures that award systemic rewards to their “White” citizens, and the significant presence of the “Other” (Black, Arab, Turk, aboriginal people, etc.) in their midst. I use the cases of Germany, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand to illustrate my point.

A specter is haunting Europe as well as other Western nations,’ and this time, unlike in 1848, it is not the specter of communism. This time around it is the ghost of an old Western tradition, the tradition of racism that, as Mam once said about past collective history, “weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the l i~ ing .”~ In the words of Fernand Braudel, “It is an old problem, and it is still with us. It is the problem of otherness, that is, the feeling that a foreign presence is other, a challenge to one’s own self and identity” (Braudel 1990, p. 208). This problem of otherness affects today all Western nations and is signified in many ways. Newspaper reports in various Western nations refer to immigrants of color as “hordes,” “strangers,” “aliens,” and “1 ’invasion pacifique” (Layton-Henry 1994; Withol de Wenden 1991). In nations with historical racial minorities, such as the United States, New Zealand, Canada, England, and even South Africa, Whites characterize targeted programs to assist racial minorities as “reverse discrimination” or, in the case of the Netherlands, as “positive discrimination” (Cashmore 1987; Schutte 1995; Ter Wal, Verdan, and Westerbreek 1995). Racist violence is on the rise in the United States, Germany, France, England the Netherlands, and even Western nations usually perceived as tolerant, such as Spain and Italy (Calvo-Buezas 1993; Witte 1996). Politicians of all hues rou- tinely make inflammatory racial comments. For instance, in Germany Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said after his 1980 re-election that although the integration of immigrants was very important, “It’s not easy for Germans who live in an apart-

Sociological Inquiv, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 2000, 188-214 02000 by the University of Texas Press, PO. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819

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ment house and don’t like the smell of garlic to have to put with it and even to have a lamb slaughtered in the hallway” (Martin 1994, p. 206). Analogously, Margaret Thatcher said in 1979 that “Some people have felt swamped by immigrants . . . once a minority in a neighborhood gets very large, people do feel swamped. They feel their whole way of life has been changed” (Solomos 1989, p. 83). Jacques Chirac, France’s current president, made a public remark about the “smell” of immigrants (Tlati 1996). Finally, racist and fascist organizations and candidates are receiving substantial local and even national support in nations such as France, Austria, England, Germany, and the United States. More importantly, the anti-immigration and anti-minority stance of these groups has influenced “mainstream” parties and politicians to adopt racist viewpoints on many issues.

Although it is relatively easy to detect the above-mentioned extreme forms of the new racist discourse, I believe that most analysts miss the significance and the extent of the new racial ideology. Unlike many analysts, who contend that this new racism is limited to a small segment of the population, I argue that the new racial ideologpthe “new racism”-has become the norm for Whites all over the Western world. The central characteristics of this new racism are:

1. Unlike the old racism (nineteenth century to 1950s), which was centrally grounded in a discourse of biological racial superiority, the new racism is centrally rooted in a discourse of cultural difference or “differentialist racism,” as Pierre Andre Taguieff (1990) labels it (Bonilla-Silva and Lewis 1999; Essed 1996; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991).4 The face of the new racism is such that bigots such as Jean Marie Le Pen in France, Enoch Powell in England, and ex-Klan leader David Duke in the U.S. can contend that they are not racist since their main concern is the maintenance of the culture and values that have made their respective countries great nations. One example of this bizarre position is Steven Bossel, a member of the fascist Vlaams Block party in Belgium, who advocates a twisted version of the doctrine of cultural relativism: “We re- spect other people’s identity . . . We don’t say one people is better than other. We say that the only way to preserve people’s identity is to keep them apart” (Suarez-Orozco 1994, p. 256).

2. The new racism invokes the liberal and individualist ideology of the Enlightenment-ideological constructions that were not extended to racial minorities in the past-but with a twist. The twist is that notions of equality, fairness, reward by merit, and freedom are invoked in an abstract and decontextualized manner. Whereas Whites in the Western world defended their privileged status vis-a-vis minorities by exclusion, today they defend it by claiming to be for “equality” and “fairness” for

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everybody in the face of massive racial inequality.5 This new racism, alternatively labeled as “laissez faire racism” (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997), “competitive racism” (Essed 1996), or “color-blind racism” (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000), is a formidable rhetorical mine that allows Whites extreme argumentative flexibility on racial or racially perceived matters and enables them to raise liberal arguments to support andlor pursue illiberal ends (Wetherell and Potter 1992).

3. Finally, the new racism incorporates a discourse of nationalism that, at times and in some places, has acquired an ethnonational character that celebrates “cultural particularity, claims a spiritual charter, and grants membership by ascription-which is taken to ensure an especial deep emotional attachment” (Cameroff 1996, p. 175). This neonationalism colors the debate that has emerged in all Western nations about nationality and citizenship. The deep connections between this new version of nationalism and racism can be seen clearly in Jean Marie Le Pen’s 1987 statement about Arabs: “I love North Africans, but their place is in the Maghreb . . . I am not a racist, but a national . . . For a nation to be harmonious, it must have a certain ethnic and spiritual homogeneity (Taguieff 1990, p. 1 19).

Some analysts interpret this new racism, particularly its more extreme expressions, as the result of a psychological memory, “old bigotries and old hang- overs,” a relic of the Nazi past, or the legacy from slavery (Guibernau 1996). Others see it as the symbolic expression of anxieties over the status of the economy, social life, and the reorganization of the international order (Castles and Miller 1993; Fijalkowski 1996; Rubin 1994; Suarez-Orozco 1994; Layton-Henry 1994). Another group of analysts sees this new racism as the result of the machinations of political elites to keep labor divided or as an easy tool used by some politicians to get elected (Kaldor 1996; Loomis 1990). Lastly, some contend that “the third” of the population-those with less education and income, who experience tremendous social isolation and are fearful of the effects of global changes-are the prime culprits of the recent racial malaise afflicting Western nations (Mayer 1995).

I believe that all these explanations are wanting. Assuming that the new racism is a revival of the old racism does not explain why it has revived now and how it survived in the midst of the Western world for so long. Xf the new racism articulates anxieties about the present, why is it that immigrants and minorities are picked as candidates for scapegoating when there are so many Whites immi- grating into Western nations? More significantly, the anxieties of Whites may be somewhat illegitimate as well as misdirected since many of these countries (e.g., France, Germany, and Belgium) need immigrants to maintain their labor force

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due to low birth rates (Suarez-Orozco 1994). Finally, the notion that the new racism is either the product of political elites’ machinations or of workers’ racism misses the fact that in all Western nations, as I will show, the new dominant racial views and themes are expressed by the majority of the White population.

I explain the rise of the new racism as the product of the articulation ofpast racial ideology and contemporary racialization. I suggest, following the ideas of Ernest Ellis Cashmore, that “racism in modern society typically arises in defence of the established order of things against perceived challenges . . . and in this sense, it can be seen as logical response” (1987, p. 2). Immigrants “previously identified only as characters in Tarzan films” are perceived as a threat to Whites’ familiar way of life, their environments, and their “culture,” and thus, racism is the logical response. Historical racial minorities, who through struggles were able to improve their standing, secure anti-discrimination laws, and guarantee some minimal state intervention on their behalf, are now experiencing a backlash. My specific argument is that the new racism articulates (1) the long history-past and present-of colonialism and racialization of those countries which participated and still participate in the production and reproduction of the “West”; (2) the different but real and converging racial structures (racial practices at the political, social, and economic levels responsible for the maintenance of White supremacy) that exist in these countries; and (3) the contemporary international context of globalization that has interiorized “race” into countries such as Germany, France, and England that were until recently fundamentally White countries and has increased the size and diversity of racial minorities in historically multiracial countries such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Thus the ‘‘logic’’ of the new racism (racial ideology) in the Western world is Whites’ defense of their racial privilege or in Mills’s (1997) term the “racial contract.”

International Context: The Internationalization of the Economy and the Globalization of Race Relations

The national capitalist economies of the world have formed a “world- system” for over six hundred years (Braudel 1979; Wallerstein 1974; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996). The extension of that system into Africa, the Americas, and Asia in the sixteenth century involved the racialization of the peoples of the entire world (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Rodney 1981). In order to dominate the “new world,” European nations developed a structure of knowledge-meaning that created the notion of the “West” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996). This intellectual construction facilitated the expansion of the world-system by racial- izing (Omi and Winant 1994) the inhabitants of peripheral and core nations (Rodney 1981). The concept of the West crystallized a set of binary oppositions that defined the peoples of Western and of non-Western nations: humad


subhuman, developedunderdeveloped civilizedbarbarian, rationalhstinctive, Christidheathen, superiorhferior, and cleardunclean (Markus 1994). By defin- ing non-Western nations in this fashion, core nations were able to conquer, ex- ploit, and massacre Indian, African, and Asiatic peoples without much guilt and to use their natural resources to advance their own social, economic, and political interests-including the development of democratic regimes with extensive citizenship rights for all (White) citizens (Berkhoffer 1979; Gunder-Frank 1978; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996; Rodney 1981). In short, the creation of the West was the creation of White supremacy (herrenvolk) (for more on this, see Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in Charles W. Mills’s 1998 excellent Blackness Visible).

This Western discourse was not-and is not-just a set of ideas revolving in the heads of Europeans. This discourse was an essential component in the structuration of various kinds of social relations of domination and subordina- tion between “Western” and non-Western peoples, between Whites and non- Whites in the world-system (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991 ; Bonilla-Silva 1997; Spoonley 1988). Racism (racial ideology), as I have suggested elsewhere, is not a free-floating ideology. Racism is always anchored in real practices and it re- inforces social relations among racialized subjects in a social order, that is, it supports a racialized social structure (Bonilla-Silva 1997). Thus, for example, the racial ideology of Canada, Australia, and the United States is the direct product of their own racial situations. Even Western countries that did not have historical racial minorities, such as the Netherlands, France, or England, established racial structures in their colonies which have shaped the way in which they have dealt with “colonial immigrants” and other immigrants of color. For instance, although France had by 1930 the highest level of foreigners of any country in the world with 7 percent, Arabs, who were neither the largest immigrant group nor the last arrivals, were the object of the most severe antipathies and found themselves at the bottom of the occupational structure (Stora 1996).

Since the mid- 1960s, the capitalist world-system has experienced a systemic transformation or, properly speaking, a crisis, that has produced a dramatic restructuration, the famous “globalization” that we hear about almost every day (Amin 1992). The central features of this transformation are the “decline in the importance of territorially based mass production, the globalization of finance and technology, and the increased specialization and diversity of markets” (Kaldor 1996). Each of these elements is a result of the serious world-systemic crisis of accumulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s that produced drastic shifts in the loci of production (from center to peripheries), investment (from productive to financial), and the countries spending a significant portion of their GNP on military expenditures (by incorporating peripheral and semi-peripheral nation-states as central actors in the military race). Although advocates of capitalism interpret these various changes as progressive and speak of a “global vil-

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lage,” this new stage in the world-system should be characterized as “the empire of chaos” (Amin 1992).

The chaos produced by the restructuration of the world-system has had local (plant relocations), national (downsizing of the labor force of large multi- national companies in the core and “shock therapies” in the periphery), and international repercussions (NAFTA, new world-level economic and political arrangements, etc.). The dislocations caused by these changes and labor recruit- ment policies by some core nation-states have led to monumental migrations of people from developing nations into core states and the deterioration of the status of workers in the Western world (Cohen 1997).6 Although a substantial part of this migration is legal and even sponsored by the core states, increasingly since the 1970s the migration has been illegal (Wallerstein 1996).

This new international order has led to the globalization of race and race relations and the intensification and diversification of the numbers of racial Others in the Western world. Although race has fractured countries such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada since their inception, it was until recently a marginal social category in most Western nations. Today, as a direct result of the international movement of peoples, all Western nations have interiorized the Other, colonial and otherwise (Miles 1993; Winant 1994). In European nations such as Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, France, and Germany, the geographical distance between the “uncivilized” and the “civilized” has been “bridged” through what Balibar calls the “interiorization of the exterior” (Balibar 199 1).7 Accordingly, today immigrants and minorities of color in Europe constitute anywhere between 1.4 percent of the population, as in Italy, to 27.5 percent, as in Luxembourg (Castles and Miller 1993, p. 80).

Although many analysts conceive these immigrants as basically workers who have been racialized as an “underclass” (Castles and Miller 1993; Cohen 1997; Loomis 1990; Miles 1982; Spoonley 1996), I contend that the racialized character of their experience is deeper and in line with five hundred years of Western history (Potts 1990; Jayasuriya 1996). For example, in England, although European (White) workers were viewed as easily assimilatable, a clear stigma was attached to Caribbean workers whose absorption into the social body was deemed “very difficult” (Royal Commission 1949, as cited by Layton-Henry 1994, p. 284). In France, even before the development of the fascist National Front Party, French workers had racist views and feelings toward “Black” (Algerian and Caribbean) workers and were among the first to oppose immigration (Grill0 1991). Finally, since immigration is not a new phenomenon in these countries, and in many a substantial proportion of the immigrants are White (two-thirds of those in Europe and most of those in England), the “immigrants” that matter are those defined as “Black,” “non-Western,” “unchristian.” Accordingly, for example, although Belgium has over half a million French and


Italian “foreigners,” it targets its 250,000 Arabs and the “Blacks” as the objects of scapegoating. It is also significant that studies of the various “immigrants” show that darker immigrants (Caribbeans, Arabs, and southern Europeans) are viewed and treated much worse than White immigrants (Castles and Kosack 1984, pp. 443-46). In England, although immigration restrictions were imposed on all groups, political leaders have said that immigration from “Canada, Australia, and New Zealand formed no part of the [immigration] problem” (Saggar 1991, p. 105) and that earlier migrations of Irish, in contrast to those of Jews and Blacks (nineteenth century until 1960), did not produce major reac- tions from the body politic (Solomos 1989).

Despite the different legal status of these people of color in Western nations (guest workers, asylum seekers, “aliens,” or “citizens”), they have a number of similarities. First, in economic terms all experience a racialized class status characterized by segmented labor market experiences-even segmentation in middle- class occupations, overrepresentation in manual and “underclass” locations in the class structure, and significantly higher levels of unemployment (Berrier 1985; Castles and Miller 1993; Loomis 1990). They also experience very little occupational mobility even among second-generation “immigrants” (Castles and Kosack 1984; Mehrlander 1985). Second, they tend to live in ethnic quarters or ghettos and are more likely to rent rather than to own their houses (Castles and Kosack 1984; Loomis 1990). This is partly due to discrimination in the housing markets (Loomis 1990; Massey and Denton 1993; Suarez-Orozco 1994). Finally, all people of color in Europe (Turks, Arabs, Native peoples, Blacks from the Caribbean and Afhca, etc.), whether immigrant or not, experience what SuArez- Orozco has termed as “expressive exploitation” or the psychological aspects of depreciation-derogatory attitudes, stereotyping and related behavior, and racially motivated violence. In short, people of color in the historically White countries of the West are treated as second-class citizens (Layton-Henry 1994), a status that resembles that of the historical racial minorities in Western nations such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

National Contexts: Contemporary Racialization in Western Societies

Stuart Hall (1980) argues convincingly for the existence of a plurality of racisms in the Western world. Yet the new racial ideology of Western nations is unified by its common historical ideological root, the significant presence of the Other through immigration, and by the impact of global “Western” culture- often conceived of as “American”-that binds Western nations in an “informal imperialism” (dominance without empire) which defends the cultural distinc- tiveness (in the minds of Whites, the “superiority”) of Western nations over peripheral nations. Thus, as I stated in the introduction, the racism peculiar to all Western nations today exhibits a common macroracial discourse. Since a de-

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tailed historical analysis of each Western social formation is beyond the scope of this paper, I will highlight below in a very schematic fashion some of the central elements of the racialized makeup of Germany, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. These countries provide a nice mix of diverse histories of racialization (internal and external minorities), of colonialism, of the subjects of colonial or internal colonial domination, and of traditions of tolerance (from Germany’s fascism to the liberalism of the Netherlands) that should help clarify why the racial ideologies of all Western nations are converging.

Germany

Because Germany was not a military power and lacked national unity during the so-called “Age of Exploration” (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), it was not able to establish at the time formal colonies as Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and England did. Nevertheless, German intellectuals absorbed-and further developed-and popularized the racial ethos of the “West.” Eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century German philosophers (e.g., Kant and Hegel), poets (e.g., Goethe and the romantics Herder, Novalis, Fichte, and Schelling), folk- lorists (e.g., the G r i m brothers), musicians (e.g., Bach and Haydn), and other intellectuals (e.g., economists such as Friedrich List and historians such as Barthold Georg Niebuuhr), developed a kultur (civilization) harmonious with Western aesthetics and taxonomies, that is, permeated with White supremacy (see Gilman 1982; Snyder 1978). For instance, Kant’s moral rationalism did not extend to Blacks, whom he regarded as mentally inferior, ugly, and “so talkative that they must be driven apart from each other by thrashings” (as cited in Goldberg 1993, p. 32), and Hegel’s dialectics were not conceivable for Blacks, whom he regarded as childlike, as a people that “never achieve the sense of human personality-their spirit sleeps, remains sunk in itself, makes no ad- vances and thus parallels the compact, undifferentiated mass of the African continent’’ (as cited by Gilman 1982, p. 94).

Thus, not surprisingly, as the “Germanies” began their process of political consolidation in the first part of the nineteenth century, German colonists began seeding imperial beach fronts in Africa, South America, and Australia (Townsend 1930). Yet the beginning of formal German imperialism came with Bismarck and his state-sponsored colonial policies in the 1880s, by which Germany acquired vast territories in Africa and the Pacific, and became the third largest imperial power behind England and France (Passant 1959). With Bismarck, Germany finthered its strong sense of nationalism and the eighteenth- century obsession of German romantic nationalists with ethnic purity, perfection, and superiority.’ Hitler’s Nazism thus was not an anomaly but a culmination of German enlightened nationalism (Bauman 199 1). After the Holocaust, Germany struggled to develop a tradition of liberal democracy and to teach its population


to be committed to the principles of liberalism and egalitarianism. Analysts con- cur that by the late 1960s and early 1970s, a democratic political culture had sup- planted the authoritarian one (Munch 1996), although as O’Brien points out, it was a “technocratic liberal” political culture (O’Brien 1 996).9 This liberalism collapsed somewhat in the 1970s as the economy experienced a recession. Foreign workers (5% of the population in the mid-seventies and today about 8%), vital to the German economic miracle of the post-War era, became the targets of animosity. Although the Germans implemented an integrationist policy in the 1980s, this policy is predicated on the belief that immigrants are “backward people living in a modem industrial society” (O’Brien 1996, p. 62).

Although Germany counts among its 6.5 million foreigners (1992 figure) Serbs, Croats, Italians, Greeks, Poles, and Spaniards, Turks (totaling 1.8 million in 1992) and Arabs have become the subjects of hate by the Germans, and their religion and non-Western culture have been used as markers of difference (Karakasoglu and Nonnemanl996). lo On this last point Schoenbaum and Pond comment that “‘foreigner,’ ‘Moslem’ and ‘Turk’ approached identity in German awareness, and ‘Turk’ and Gasterbeiter (hired, non-German labor) became virtu- ally interchangeable” (1996, p. 29). Poll after poll indicates the centrality of the “immigration problem” for Germans. For instance, a 1991 poll found that 78 percent of Germans regarded immigration as the most pressing national problem (Martin 1994, p. 189). This belief is translated into discriminatory actions against Turks in the housing and labor markets as well as in a variety of social settings and finds expression in one of the toughest naturalization laws among European nations, based on the ethnichacia1 notion of juis sanguinis-the law of blood (Del Fabbro 1995; Martin 1994; Yucel 1987). In addition, foreigners are not allowed to participate in the political process.

The hate of the Other in Germany has led to high levels of violence against immigrants (particularly Turks), refugees of color, Jews, and long-time residents who look “foreign.” Some official reports estimate the number of incidents in the 1990s to be anywhere between fifty and one hundred daily (Martin 1994; Lewis 1996). German reunification has opened the floodgates for German nationalism. Although it is not clear who is responsible for all the violence, it is safe to as- sume that the eighty-two fascist and neo-Nazi organizations in existence in Germany, as identified by police officials in 1992, have something to do with it (Lewis 1996). Groups and individuals such as the Republikaner Partei, led by an ex-SS sergeant, the revived National Democratic Party of Germany, the German People’s Union, “Redskins” and “Whiteskins” (two skinhead groups), and independent extremist politician Thomas Kreyssler,’ have been elected to local par- liaments and even to the national parliament and have joined an already broad spectrum of fascist organizations (Lewis 1996). Research on membership of these groups suggests that although disenfranchised Germans-unemployed, un-

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dereducated, bored youth, and vulnerable workers-are overrepresented in these organizations, school teachers, judges, police officers, and other middle-class Germans are represented in them (Lewis 1996). More significantly, as in other European countries, fascist and racist organizations and parties have helped to shift the political debate in Germany to the right and have legitimated German nationalism (Del Fabbro 1995).

Frame

France was one of the early empire builders in the fifteenth century, with vast colonial territories in North America and the Caribbean. In the nineteenth century, when a new imperialist spirit took over Europe, France was more than ready, and, with the support of a nationalist French public, it acquired control over almost a third of the African continent (the French Congo, Chad, Gabon, Niger, Cameroon, Sudan, Senegal, Gambia, Ivory Coast, French Guinea, Togo, Dahomey, Mauritania, the Gulf of Benin, Algeria, Tunisia, part of Morocco, and Madagascar), colonies in South America (French Guiana) and the Middle East (Syria), and Indochina (Vietnam) (Brunschwig 1966; Roberts 1963).

After the French empire began to crumble after World War 1,12 French “colonial subjects” began migrating to France. Thousands of Moroccans, Tunisians, and particularly Algerians immigrated to France (Stora 1996). Although some analysts believe that racism in France is a new phenomenon, Stora (1996) shows quite convincingly that racial discrimination against Arabs and other minorities of color has been widespread since the 1930s in all aspects of the lives of immigrants of color and that racism was practiced by all social classes. Stora, for example, shows how newspapers from the Right and the Left portrayed sidis (a sardonic slang term for North African meaning “master”) or the “rats” (used to characterize Arabs) as disorderly, dirty, drunk, oversexed, gambling, and prone to all kinds of criminal activities. As in other Western nations, although immigrants from European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Belgium, Germany, Russia, and Switzerland) greatly outnumbered immigrants of color (North African Arabs were 102,000 of the 2,890,000 immigrants in France in 1931),13 immigrants of color were the primary target of racial animosity. This animosity intensified in the 1950s and 1960s during the Algerian war of independence, illustrated by the ruttonudes (literally, rat hunts) of Arabs by the French populace (Witte 1996).

The immigration of colonial subjects from the Maghreb (mostly from Algeria but also from Morocco and Tunisia) and the Caribbean increased in significance after 1950 as France was in dire need of laborers (Castles and Miller 1993). Although France formally ended the migration of salaried workers from Algeria and other countries in 1974,14 and the proportion of “foreigners” has stabilized at about 7 percent, racist violence and anti-immigrant feelings have


endured (Berrier 1985). One reason for this is that, unlike in the 193Os, 43 percent of the immigrants in France today are Arabs (Ubbiali 1996). Even the so- cialist government of Mitterand in the 1980s, despite its initial progressive rhetoric on immigrants, “abandoned the claim for a right to vote for immigrants” and “went back in its own way to the traditional politics of mistrust towards immigrants (police surveillance, bureaucratic harassment, deportations), instru- mentally encouraging the rise of the extreme right in order to divide the right wing opposition” (Ubbiali 1996, p. 128; see also Witte 1996).

One of the most discussed expressions of contemporary French racism is the rise of Jean Marie Le Pen and his FN party. In the last fifteen years, it has become a major party in France, as demonstrated by its 1995 strong electoral showing where it captured 15% of the popular vote, with a program fundamentally shaped by ethnonationalist views well captured in its slogan “Put the French first” (Ubbiali 1996; Keeler and Schain 1996) and by influencing the agenda of various French conservative parties and the electorate at large. For example, polls in May 1995 showed that 33% of the electorate and 43% of those who voted for Chirac wanted that “the ideas of the National Front be taken into account more by the new president” (Keeler and Schain 1996, p. 9). In 1993 conservative Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua suggested amending the immigration code to make access to French citizenship even tougher than it was then (see Tlati 1996, pp. 292-393; for details, see Withol de Wenden 1994, p. 91). The same year, Philippe de Villiers, a member of the Union for a Democratic France party, proclaimed that immigrants formed “communities that are as cysts of unassimilatable foreigners” (Ubbiali 1996, p. 123).

Immigrants of color and historical French minorities from the Caribbean and Africa have internalized colonialism into France (Braudel 1990). Braudel points out that immigrants are used “as cheap labour” and “do the most thank- less tasks, or those thought to be such, which are in nine cases out of ten shunned by the ‘French’ workforce” (Braudel 1990, p. 206). In the case of migrants from the French departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique, their status is not much better than that of Arabs. Despite being “nationals,” they are twice as likely as the average French worker to be unemployed, are heavily concentrated in the lower echelons of the occupational structure, and suffer from racial discrimination (Anselin 1995). The overall climate for people of color in France may well be summarized with the results of a 1989 poll in which 68% of the French stated that “the limit of absorption” had been reached (Ubbiali 1996).15

The Netherlands

When we think of imperial powers, we think of large states such as England, Spain, the United States, Russia, France, and Germany. However, small states such as Belgium and the Netherlands participated in the conquest of the non-

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Western world and maintained formal colonies until 1945. After the Netherlands became consolidated as a country during the Eighty Years’ War with Spain (1568-1648), it became a powerful naval and merchant nation-state that grew very wealthy from international commerce (Riemens 1944). The Dutch East India and West India Companies were “the mighty instruments of national expansion” (Riemens 1944, p. 178). The East India Company colonized the “Spice Islands” (Java, Sumatra, and Bali [Indonesia], the Moluccas, Borneo, New Guinea, and Ceylon), and South Africa. The West India Company settled the Dutch Caribbean (Surinam, Curacao, Bonaire, Aruba, Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Martin) and the New Netherlands (New Jersey, New York, and Delaware), and established over thirty fortresses, lodges, and factories in many parts of West Africa (the Gold Coast, Guinea, and Benin) (Goslinga 1985; Kuitenbrower 1 99 1 ; Riemens 1944).

Although Dutch apologists write about their benign colonial rule (Riemens 1944), the fact is that the Dutch, like other imperial powers, participated in the slave trade, developed plantation economies that worked as “total institutions,” established hierarchical race relations regulated by Black (for Africans) and Red (for Indians) codes, and took part in genocidal campaigns against Indians in their colonies (Golsinga 1985). Some write about the Pax Neerlandica, established by the Dutch in its colonies, but in fact the Netherlands simply prolonged colonialism longer than other European powers. The Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, which contended with numerous rebellions, ended in 1945; Suriname attained its independence in 1975; Aruba obtained the so-called “Status Aparte” in 1986; and the remaining Netherlands Antilles have formed a confederation (that is, they have become neocolonies of the Netherlands) since 1954 (Croes and Alam 1990; Sedoc-Dahlberg 1990; Zainu’ddin 1968).

Even though the Netherlands and its capital, Amsterdam, have a reputation for tolerance, that tolerance seems to be dissipating as the proportion of the Other (immigrant workers and colonial subjects) has increased, reaching 6 percent overall and 20 percent in Amsterdam in 1993 (Essed 1990). Since the 1970s, fascist and racist parties have had relative success. From the Nenderlandse Glks Unie in 1971 to the more recent Centrumpartij and the Centrumdemocraten, such parties seem to be gaining popularity as evidenced in their electoral success by the 1980s and 1990s. Interestingly, Dutch who vote for these parties are not significantly different to the average voter, suggesting that they are not lunatics, marginalized people, or workers projecting their feelings and anxieties onto foreigners (Ter Wal, Verdan, and Westerbreek 1995). Furthermore, as in other Western nations, these extreme parties have driven the public debate on immigration, asylum, and integration to the right, a point that became evident with the election of the liberal Right (VVD) in 1995 even after its leader, Frits Bolkestein, made some racist remarks during the campaign.


The groups receiving the wrath of racial intolerance in the Netherlands are, in descending order, Arabs and Turks, colonial migrants from the Dutch Antilles and Suriname, and Indonesians. The status of immigrants of color in the Netherlands, according to a 1989 report, is worse than in any other European Union country (Ter Wal, Verdan, and Westerbreek 1995, p. 233). Philomena Essed (1990; 1991; 1996), for example, shows in her works that Surinamese women experience “everyday racism” in all social realms, and concludes that they are treated as inferior, are kept at a social distance, and confront social ag- gression (1990, p. 142). Although the Dutch government liberalized its naturalization law in 1992, allowing for plural nationalities-a policy change that should have improved the status of “foreigners”-interviews with almost six hundred people originating in Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Cape Verde (half who had naturalized and half who had not) revealed that they regarded the ac- quisition of Dutch nationality as a “defensive option,” a finding that underscores the fact that they still feel treated as “foreigners” (van den Beden 1994).

New ZealandI6

Europeans had known about New Zealand’s existence since the Dutch ex- plorer Abel Janszoon Tansman “discovered” it in 1642. Yet it was not until Captain James Cook’s intrusion in 1769, during his famous circumnavigation of the Pacific, that they recognized any possibilities for the islands (Sinclair 1980). The British first established settlements there in 1788 and began exploiting resources such as “flax, timber, sealing, whaling, and even tattooed heads” (Price 1950, p. 152). Although many Europeans mistreated the Maoris (native New Zealanders) and even kidnapped many of them, others settled in relative harmony and even intermarried with the natives (Price 1950; Sinclair 1980). This may have been due to the fact that most of these “Europeans” (French, British, and even some Americans were among the first settlers) were “beachcombers” (whalers, sealers, traders, pirates, etc.) and did not depend or care for the support of any European power (Johnston, Paul, Strong, and Thompson 1983; Price 1950). Nevertheless, the Maori contact with “Pakehas” (Europeans) per se brought deleterious demographic and cultural changes from the usual sources: disease, alcohol, firearms, and religion (Price 1950).

This initial state of affairs worsened rapidly in the nineteenth century with the immigration of a large number of White settlersI7 thirsty for land to grow crops and graze stock and missionaries searching for savage souls to convert to the “path of Christian virtue” (Johnston et al. 1983, p. 84). The pressure caused by these forces (e.g., by 1840 Pakehas claimed ownership of 70% of the land), combined with intertribal Maori warfare, facilitated England’s annexation of New Zealand in 1840 through the Treaty of Waitangi. The settlers’ zeal for land continued with little regard for the well-being of the Maoris (the Maori popula-

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tion declined from 114,000 in 1842 to 45,000 in 1858) and led to the Settler Wars of the 1860s (or, as the Maoris called them, “White Man’s Anger”), fo- cused on the rising nationalism symbolized by the Maori King Movement’* and the specific resistance of chief Wiremu Kingi to a land deal in 1859 (Howe 1977; Johnston et al. 1983; Moon 1993; Sinclair 1980; Stevens 1989). After the Pakeha victory and the final “pacification” of the Maoris, the process of Maori land appropriation intensified, facilitated by the enactment of a privatization policy and numerous land laws that created “a legal jungle within which the Maoris lost themselves and were preyed on by its natural denizens, the land speculators or their agents and shyster lawyers” (Sinclair 1980, p. 146). Although New Zealand’s government” introduced a series of educational and political reforms in the latter part of the nineteenth century to accelerate the “civilization” or “amalgamation” of the Maoris, akin to the policies enacted by other settler colonies, their intent was to normalize their supremacy over the Maori land and people. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, land appropriation continued and the status of the Maoris improved at a snail’s pace. Although through progressive legislation, fundamentally enacted by the Labor governments in the 1930s and 1940s and pressured by Maori political agitation, the status of Maoris improved throughout the twentieth century, as the Hunn Report documented in 1969, relative to Pakeha standards, Maoris were a long way behind.

Today New Zealanders proudly defend their harmonious race relations and even the multiracial basis of their nation.20 Yet, from a Maori and Pacific Islandell’ point of view, things are not so great. The Maoris are less than 13 percent of the population-a minority in their own country. In occupational terms, they are overrepresented in working-class jobs and severely underrepresented in professional and managerial ones (Howe 1977; Loomis 1990). In terms of unemployment, the Maoris and other Pacific Islanders typically experience a rate that is three to four times as high as that of Pakehas (Loomis 1990; Ongley 1996; Spoonley 1996). Maoris make up close to 60 percent of inmate population in prisons (Howe 1977; Tauri 1996). Although more than 70 percent of Maoris live in urban areas, they earn less, have a shorter life span, and are less educated than Pakehas and live in segregated areas (Howe 1977). Finally, behind the public curtain of racial harmony “lies a thick underlay of privately (and less commonly publicly) expressed prejudice ranging from jokes about Maoris . . , to outright disgust and avoidance” (Howe 1977, p. 76; for the L‘new racism” attitudes in New Zealand, see Wetherell and Potter 1992, and Chapter 11 in Sharp 1989).

As in other Western countries, during the recession of the 1970s restrictions on immigration from non-Western countries and an intensification of racist rhetoric against immigrants of color and the Maoris materialized and included police and immigration authorities’ raids of houses and factories and random checks in public places in order to find and repatriate illegal immigrants and


overstayers (Loomis 1990; Macpherson 1996; Ongley 1996). Although many of these restrictions were liberalized in the late 1980s as New Zealand proclaimed that one of its immigration objectives was “to enrich the multicultural social fab- ric of New Zealand society” (Ongley 1996), the policy is now a more direct tool of business interests. In terms of the long-standing debate over the land question, the Maoris today control four million acres or 6 percent of New Zealand’s land (Johnston et al. 1983). This issue, intrinsically related to the Maoris’ quest for self-detennination, has led to sustained Maori protests since the 1970s (Kelsey 1996). Although the Labor government of the 1980s supported a number of progressive policies (e.g., biculturalism, a bill of rights, expanding the powers of the Waitangi Tribunal of 1975) toward the Maoris, it wavered on the central issue of the times: Maori sovereignty (Kelsey 1996; Vasil 1990).

The confluence of events such as the growth of Pacific islander and, more recently, Asian immigration, the surge and intensification of the Maori protests in the 1970s and 198Os, the state’s minimal expansion of Maori rights in the 1980s, and the deleterious economic effects of globalization in New Zealand have created an environment ripe for White nationalism. Although the extent and scope of the New Right in New Zealand is smaller than in most Western nations, its ideological influence seems to be rising (Wetherell and Potter 1992). In the 1980s groups such as the New Force have formed to preserve New Zealand British (White) heritage (Novitz 1990). An example of this ethnonationalist trend is Stuart C. Scott’s (1995) recent book, The Travesty of Waitangi. Scott charac- terizes Maori culture before contact as “savage” and contemporary Maori culture as a “myth,” argues that the Anglo-Maori Wars of the 1860s were due to Maori “envy” and “jealousy” of the British settlers, and considers all Maori claims for land, fishing rights, and cultural independence ludicrous. Although Scott, as all modern neoracists, avoids directly racist epithets, he constantly resorts to culturalist arguments to justify social segregation (p. 84), refers to “Europeans” as the “vastly more sophisticated ethnic group” (p. 154), and uses inflammatory mili- taristic language (“invade,” “infiltrate,” etc.) to characterize Maori demands and victories in New Zealand.

Conclusions

In the postmodern world no one claims to be “racist” except for Nazis and neo-Nazis and members of White supremacist groups.22 Yet racial minorities and immigrants of color are experiencing a racial backlash all over the Western world. That backlash is evident in attacks on affirmative action-type policies, the growth in racial violence, the increase in electoral support for populist racist parties, and the move to the right by mainstream parties on racially perceived matters such as immigration. Faced with economic insecurity, restructuring, transnationalism, and new political alignments, Whites in the Western world are

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struggling-ideologically and practically-to maintain what they regard as their “rights” to cultural, social, political, economic, and psychological advantages as White, “civilized,” and “Christian” citizens over racial minorities, immigrants, or any representative of the Other.

The apparent contradiction between a racial backlash and a Western world that pretends to be cosmopolitan, multicultural, and raceless (Guibernau 1996) is explained by the fact that contemporary racial ideology combines abstract and technocratic liberalism with ethnonational and culturalist elements. Laissez faire racism, which ideologically equalizes the races (“We are all equal!”), although in fact they remain unequal, provides the ammunition for Whites to feel moral in- dignation, anger; resentment, and even hate toward minorities and the programs viewed as providing “preferential” treatment to them. Therefore, this new racial ideology allows Whites in the West to defend their racial privilege without ap- pearing to be “racist” (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Feagin and Vera 1995; Wetherell and Potter 1992). Contemporary racial struggle is waged with a new racial language and new racial ideas. Instead of the biologically based racism of the past, the new racial ideology allows even racists such as Enoch Powell to ex- press racial resentment-evident in statements such as the one below-in a way that is acceptable to most Whites in the West.

The spectacle which I cannot help seeing . . . is that of Britain which has lost, quite suddenly, in the space of less than a generation, all consciousness and conviction of being a nation: the web which binds it to its past has been tom asunder, and what has made the spectacle the more impressive has been the indifference, not to say levity, with which the change has been greeted. (Enoch Powell’s statement to The Guardian in 1981, cited in Saggar 1991, p. 176)

In this paper I argue that this new racism is not a hangover from the past, an articulation of the New Right, a simple case of scapegoating, or something affecting only workers. I suggest that the new racism is world-systemic and affects all Western nations, although its specific articulations vary by locality. The reason why racism in all Western nations has a similar macroracial discourse is because these nations share a history of racial imperialism and the notion of the West, have real but differing racial structures (Bonilla-Silva 1997), and have a significant presence of the Other, either through immigration, as in most European nations, or through their history of constitution as nations, as in New World nations.

I presented a sketch of past and contemporary racialization in four Western countries-Germany, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Despite having different histories, racialized groups, and colonial experiences, these countries exhibit today this new racism, a fact that validates my claim (Essed 1996; O’Brien 1996; Taguieff 1990; van Dijk 1987; Wetherell and Potter 1992). Although I contend that all Western nations exhibit this new racism, some of


them, such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Finland, seem to have ‘‘less’’ of it, if any at all. This tolerance seems to be because “the numbers [of immigrants] are small and the central elements of what is perceived as ‘national culture’ are not yet put in question” (Nonneman 1996, p. 10). Yet as some of these countries (Spain and Italy in particular) are tenuously becoming “immigration countries,” public opinion has turned against the immigrants, and restrictions on immigration and naturalization have become the order of the day. Furthermore, fascist groups and racial violence have shown their ugly faces (Calavita 1994; Calvo- Buezas 1993; Cinar 1994; Cornelius 1994; Ellwood 1995; Rogers 1993).

Where does the United States stand in terms of this “new racism”? Although the United States, like many other Western countries, projects an international image of openness and cosmopolitanism, it is probably the best example of the new racial practices and ideology of the Western world. As various authors have documented (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bonilla-Silva and Lewis 1999; Brooks 1990; Smith 1995), the reproduction of racial inequality since the 1960s is no longer fundamentally centered around the formal exclusion of racial minorities from civil and political life and their subordinate incorpora- tion in the economy. Instead, in the post-civil rights era a series of practices that are mostly covert, informal, and yet institutional have replaced the overtly racist Jim Crow practices (for a documentation of these practices at all levels, see Bonilla-Silva and Lewis 1999). These new practices have led to the development of a new racial ideology-alternatively labeled as laissez-faire racism or color- blind racism-to justify the contemporary racial status quo. Color-blind racists “avoid direct hostility toward minority groups and affirm the principles of equal opportunity and egalitarianism but at the same time reject programs that attempt to ameliorate racial inequality in reality rather than in theory”(Bonil1a-Silva and Lewis 1999, p. 71). And since in the United States there is a massive racially based inequality in education (Kozol 199 1; Orfield and Eaton 1996), income and wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 1997), housing (Massey and Denton 1993; Yinger I995), political representation (Parker 1992), and other areas (Hacker 1995), liberal notions of equality and opportunity have become the modern Trojan horse for justifying racial inequality.

In post-civil rights “color-blind” America, nativism is growing against immigrants-mostly against immigrants of color, since illegal Canadian and European immigration is not even discussed-and the possibility of this country becoming a majority minority population by 2050 (for example, see Peter Brimelow’s AZien Nation [ 19961); interracial marriages have grown to 2.4 percent of all marriages-a very low rate compared to the interethnic marriage rate of Serbians and Bosnians of 30 percent before the war-but the rate between Whites and the Blacks is a paltry 0.5 percent (Bureau of the Census 1994); the English Only movement has succeeded in various states, making English the

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official language; anti-affirmative action legislation has passed in various states (notably in California and Texas); and racial violence, which had declined in the sixties and seventies, has been rising to alarming proportions in recent times (Novick 1995). While all this is happening, neoconservative and neoliberal voices alike have “normalized” racial inequality and exalt the greatness of the American “melting pot” in color-blind Panglossian words, “We live in the best of all possible worlds.”

Although antiracist organizations have surfaced in all Western nations (e.g., Lichterketten in Germany, SOS Racism in Britain, Race Traitor in the U.S., etc.), they have not been able to mount a counteroffensive rooted in the recognition of the materiality of racialized discourse and behavior. In too many places antiracist campaigns have been highly ritualistic (candlelight, commercials, etc.) or very narrowly defined (against certain fascist groups), with little concern for developing a broader political agenda (Baringhorst 1995). Unless antiracist organizations understand the centrality and meaning of race and the new racism, they will not be able to develop a progressive agenda around a reconceptualized notion of citizenship that includes both the idea of equality of rights and the equality of status (Ansell 1997; Jayasuriya 1996; Tlati 1996). Failure to do so, regardless of talks about racial reconciliation (as President Clinton has proposed in the United States), liberal views on “cosmopolitanism” (as many Europeans suggest), or programs based on an abstract liberal universalism will maintain people of color in the West as denizens.

ENDNOTES

‘This phrase was uttered by one of Lillian Rubin’s American subjects in her Families on the Fault Lines (1994) and by one of Ernest Ellis Cashmore’s British subjects in his The Logic ofRacism (1987).

’Although the “Western” world originated in the fifteenth century, it is in fact an imagined geopolitical community of nations that supposedly share a common history, traditions, religion, and racial heritage. As such, it is a project that has changed (expanded) since its inception in history. In the beginning the “West” was limited to Europe, but as some colonies became independent (e.g., Chile, Argentina, the US., Uruguay) or acquired commonwealth status (e.g., Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and Australia), they made successful claims for being regarded as “Western” nations. Today, new countries (e.g., Russia, Serbia, Armenia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Costa Rica) are making such claims with varying degrees of success. In this paper I examine the traditional “West” (Europe, Canada, the U.S., New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand) but am fully cognizant that countries such as Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, and Israel belong to the “West” and share many elements of the new discourse on racial matters.

‘As an assimilated German Jew, Marx adopted the “Western” projecVviews on non-European peoples (see Bauman 1991). Thus Man: had some serious racial nightmares affecting his own brain, as all nineteenth-century Europeans had, an4 not surprisingly, used the term “nigger” all the time;


when comparing the Mexicans to the Spaniards, he wrote: “the Spaniards are completely degenerated. But in the presence of a Mexican a degenerated Spaniard constitutes an ideal. They have all the vices, arrogance, thuggery and quixotism of the Spaniards to the third degree, but by no means all the solid things that they possess” (as cited by Larrain 1994, p. 20).

4Although racial discourse has incorporated cultural elements since the sixteenth century (Poole 1997) and has shown a “polyvalent mobility,” the ability to adapt old truths to new situations (Stoler 1997), my point here is that the new racism has shifted (in Foucault’s language, has produced an epistemic break) focus because of developments in the world-system; my point is that the hegemonic tropes of “postmodern” racial ideology are now cultural and moral rather than biological.

’Modernity and racism are twins: Modernity, for example, brought forth the parameters, scien- tific ethos, and practices that led to the most atrocious example of racially inspired politics in modem history: the Holocaust (see Bauman 1991 and Goldberg 1993). My point here is that the grammar of modern racism has extended liberal notions to previously excluded subjects without altering the fundamental power differences between “Same” and “Other.” This postmodern racial operation helps maintain and justify the contemporary racial status quo.

6Although monumental transfers of labor power and of some workers (Africans) have occurred in the world-system since the sixteenth century, this is the first time that monumental transfers of workers from the periphery to the center are occurring (Potts 1990).

’It is important to point out that immigration did not cause racism in these Western nations. Older racial traditions allowed bringing in immigrants of color and assigning them to subordinate slots in these societies (Miles 1987, p. 165).

‘Before the mid-nineteenth century Germany was a thoroughly mixed country and considered itself as such. For instance, French Huguenots and Waldenses were invited to migrate to Prussia and Saxony. At the end of the nineteenth century, Poles, Ukrainians, Italians, and Dutch migrated and formed the “German” proletariat (Del Fabbro 1995). Another example of the mixed character of Germany is that for a long time the French word for Germany was plural: les Allemugnes (Mann 1968). Yet, central eighteenth-century figures in the German intelligentsia as well as evangelical and pietist authors-forerunners of nineteenth-century German nationalism-emphasized the need for the cultivation of Germanic Volkgeist, spirit of a people (for more on this, see Mosse 1978).

’German historian Golo Mann points out that the masses who lived through Hitler’s rule did not change much. However, he believes-he was writing in 1968-that the young generation was very tolerant and wanted to know about the Holocaust. Yet it is precisely German youth that has been more xenophobic and fascistic in recent times.

’‘Although Turks and Arabs are the main “minorities” in contemporary Germany, Afro- Germans have lived and suffered there since the early part of this century. For a fascinating account of the hardships suffered by Afro-Germans in Germany from the 1920s until today, see Oguntoye and Opitz (1 993).

“Fascist politicians in Germany are using a strategy similar to that of David Duke in the U.S. They are “cleaning up their acts” and using a populist rhetoric and agenda to get the support of the masses. Thus, fascist leaders such as Michael Huhnen and Manfred Roeder have been able to claim a legitimate political space in Germany since the early 1980s (see Chapter 2 in Lewis 1996).

In 1946 the French changed the status of its remaining colonies-Guadalupe, Martinique, and French Guiana-to departments. Nevertheless, these departments are, for all practical purposes, neocolonies of France.

I3French demographers and policymakers debated in the 1930s whom should be allowed to im- migrate to France and who was worthy of naturalization. As a general rule, immigrants from northern Europe or England were deemed as good, Italians, Poles, and Spaniards as lesser Europeans, and Arabs as elements likely to bastardize the population.

12

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’ I4In addition to stopping the importation of workers, Valery Giscard D’Estaing established in

1974 the politique du retour (policy of return) by which ten thousand francs were offered to “foreigners” as an incentive for their return to their native countries (Tlati 1996, p. 396).

”Although Arabs seem to have captured the popular imagination of the French, the Carib- bean French and Blacks from Africa suffer too from high levels of discrimination (Freeman 1987).

I6Unlike the first three cases, New Zealand is a case of a “settler colony.” As various researchers have pointed out, settler colonies emerged to satisfy the metropolises’ needs for markets (Wallerstein 1980), to provide areas for recreating economic opportunities for destitute Europeans (P6rez-Herrero 1992), or to solve geopolitical problems of Western powers as evident with the establishment of countries such as Taiwan, Israel, and Northern Ireland (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995). Although traditionally settler colonialism has been viewed as “a system of exploitation of the labor and resources of colonized peoples for the benefit of a racial minority transplanted from its homeland” (Utete 1979, p. lo), settler colonies developed along various paths. Settler colonies that “pushed” the natives off to the frontiers (e.g., Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, New Zealand, South Africa, and Australia) maintained a claim to the West and a national identity as (White) Western countries, whereas those that incorporated the natives or imported non-European laborers into the nation (e.g., Brazil, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, or Trinidad) had a tenuous claim to belonging to the West and adopted a mestizo national identity to maintain peace at home. Although in both types of settler societies, Europeans, White Latin Americans, or light-skinned mestizos maintain political and economic control by recreating a central aspect of White supremacy, settler countries that incorporated non-Whites in their nation-making process and national myth have not been able to make a credible pitch for consideration as Western nations and are not regarded as such by Western nations (for an analysis of how new world non-White countries recreate White supremacy standards, see Mills 1998).

I7England’s motivation to annex New Zealand was not to acquire direct wealth but to use it as a place to dump some of its surplus population (Stevens 1989). Thus, it is not surprising that from a small population of 2,000 in 1840, the White population had grown to 45,000 by 1856 (Price 1950, p. 160).

“This movement developed in the 1850s when a great council of chiefs decided in 1856 not to sell more land to Whites. The council demanded having their own king, a parliament, and village councils (Price 1950).

”Even though New Zealand became a sovereign nation in 1947, it had operated as an au- tonomous entity since the nineteenth century (see Sinclair 1980).

*‘Raj Vasil (1 990) remarks about Pakehas bragging about their treatment of Maoris in the following: “For the past 150 years the Pakeha have boasted about their treatment of the Maori people. They have been proud not that what they did was morally exemplary but that it was not as evil as the treatment meted out by other settler and colonial rulers elsewhere in the world. It is considered a matter of such special distinction that many Pakeha would like the Maori to acknowledge it, take it into consideration in their current dealings and disputed with them, and be eternally thankhl to them”

2’The British controlled the Cook Islands from 1888 until 1901, when it allowed New Zealand to annex the islands. New Zealand maintained them as a colony until 1965, and since then has kept them in a neocolonial relationship. Afier New Zealanders were the first to arrive in Samoa in World War I, they were granted a League of Nations mandate to govern Western Samoa and did so until 1962. Similar colonial ties existed with Nieu, Tokelau, and Niue. Thus, although the most important minority group in New Zealand is the Maoris, Pacific Islanders-mostly Cook Islanders but also Samoans, Tahitians, Polynesians, Tongans, Niueans, Tokelauans, and Fijians who came to New Zealand as migrant workers--constitute 3 percent of the population.

(P. 97).


”Jesse Daniels shows in her book White Lies (1 997) that this so-called “extremist” discourse is connected to mainstream racial discourse on a variety of issues and that it helps “liberal” White folks to maintain White supremacy without having to be personally invested in fighting racial others.

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