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Edition 2January 2013

iv UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

1UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

Contents

2 Introduction

3 Commentary on 2012 developments

6 Table of cases

7 Cases in the second half of 2012

10 Cases in the first half of 2012

12 UK Bribery Digest cases — Edition 2, January 2013

15 Abbreviations

15 Contacts

2 UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

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Welcome to Edition 2 of our UK Bribery Digest, examining completed bribery and corruption cases. This edition covers cases and developments in 2012.

Now in its second year of publication, thank you to everyone who has been kind enough to provide their comment and feedback on our Edition 1 Digest and 1 July 2012 update.

It continues to be a point of debate and comment that there have been no corporate Bribery Act cases and only a handful of bribery and corruption prosecutions more widely. In the second half �� !�� "��!��#�$�� #

For 2012 as a whole, there were eight completed cases: four "��"%��& ��'��(��&'��!�� %�one private litigation.

The lack of prosecutions under the Bribery Act has led businesses to become more vocal in questioning the SFO’s appetite for enforcement. Eighteen months without a corporate prosecution has left a growing number saying privately that this is beginning to look like a phoney war and that the Act risks being undermined by a lack of action.

examining completed UK bribery and corruption cases

The SFO said in January 2012 however that it had 11 active bribery/corruption cases and a further 18 cases under consideration. It is our expectation that corporate Bribery Act cases will be brought into the public arena this year so organisations would be unwise to throttle back their compliance programmes.

Over the course of the year we have seen a change in leadership at the SFO accompanied by a change in style and emphasis, an announcement on Deferred Prosecution Agreements, and heightened activity from the Financial Services Authority on anti-corruption enforcement. We make comment on these issues in this edition together with a review of contrasting developments in the UK and US.

We hope you enjoy this new edition of the Bribery Digest and �� '� ��)#�!��'��anti-bribery and corruption leadership team listed on the back page if you would like to make comment.

Best regards,

Jonathan Middup Partner, UK Head of Anti-Bribery and Corruption Ernst & Young LLP

The change in regime at the SFO

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Commentary on #$%#��"��)��


Contrasting approaches in the UK and US

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��""��)��-��)��7� �� 80��,�))� ��9��"��"� �� a Resource Guide to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-� ��)�� %#$�� &�

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'��" �� )�� (��)�"��))��-��"��"��)��*�� )�")�� *+�� +��)� �� &�� -�� )�� )�"�� ;�� 7� ��!�<��:�� &�

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“I want to make it so that you do not want to be investigated by the Serious Fraud ��###+�� &��%�� is feared.”

David Green Director of the SFO, Economia Magazine December 2012

“I am investing very heavily in our intelligence capability...[including] using undercover agents ‘if appropriate’...”


“Mr Green criticised the previous guidance [withdrawn by the SFO in October 2012] as ‘unilateral gloss...It’s just not something, in my view, that a responsible prosecutor should be saying...We are not there to advise people.’ ”

David Green Director of the SFO quoted in The Times 14 November 2012

“Any [companies] that come to the [SFO’s] door to get advice will likely be sent away ��4��#5�

Nick Kochan, investigative journalist, Economia Magazine December 2012


Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs)

The introduction of DPAs in the UK took a further step in October 2012 with the publication by the Ministry of Justice of the Government’s response to the consultation that was in progress at the time of our last Bribery Digest. DPAs allow businesses to agree certain civil sanctions in exchange for a deferral of criminal prosecution and, upon meeting the agreed conditions for a ��"��%��#�6��7��'��9 ��&��"�� ;!<��a sensible and pragmatic means of identifying and penalising more corporate offences of economic crime.

The exact nature of DPA arrangements will be published in due �� %��"��"��&�� $�� '��)%��'�� %��!�� and they may involve:

?� Close scrutiny, oversight and agreement of each DPA by the judiciary

?� ! &��;!<��& ��'�� stages in the process

?� Financial penalties

?� Other stringent compliance undertakings

?� Independent monitoring and review of those compliance undertakings

?� No immunity from prosecution

Commentary on #$%#��"��)�� continued

“Some people say DPA gives companies an element of certainty. It certainly doesn’t. They may get prosecuted even if they self-report. You can co-operate but don’t think you are buying us off. Because in the right circumstances we will prosecute.”


Financial Services Authority remains active

in anti-corruption enforcement

Following on from its thematic review of bribery and corruption compliance in insurance broking and investment banking, the ��"��< ��'��<�� review of the asset management industry. It is understood ��'��"��'�&��% ��=��report is due to be published in the third quarter of 2013. The earlier thematic reviews showed the FSA taking a stringent approach to compliance requirements, with compliance failings ��%��%��"��> ��#�

6��<��% ��> ��% ��appropriate policies, procedures and controls in order to prevent � ��"��&�%� �� purposes, for money laundering or by those on the sanctions list. Those that do not are in breach. In other words, the FSA is actively reviewing the “adequate procedures”, to use Bribery Act terminology, of its members without the need for any allegations of acts of bribery, money laundering or sanction breaches. In contrast, an SFO action must be prompted by a suspected fraud or bribe and adequate procedures become relevant only as a possible defence. As a result, businesses regulated by the FSA de facto have a higher standard to meet as regards corruption risk management than those businesses that are not.

A UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

Case name Case reference Date completed Page in Edition 1

;�B��;�9�-��")��-�;��))��! ��;��))��!)�� 21 Nov–11 D

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�:��"�F�)�� %D Apr–11 G

Mark Jessop %A Apr–11 %$

!��L��!"+=� ��P��8"+'�� 15 Feb–11 %$

;.��""��F�)�� 14 Feb–11 11

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13 Feb–11 11

BAE Systems plc 12 ��H%$ 12

.��"� 11 ��H%$ 14

7�"��; ��4:.��"�F�)��5 %$ ��H%$ 14

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G 7��H%$ 15

P��""�4�:��"�F�)��5 I !��H%$ 15

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Amec plc A ��H$G %D

;��7�� F�)�� 5 ��H$G %D

Aon Limited 4 7��H$G %D

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L�" �'�� !�� '�)�*��4,�PL5 2 ��H$I %G

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Covered in Edition 1 of the UK Bribery Digest

Case name Case reference Date completed Page

;��;� ��< #G Dec–12 G

!�� #I Nov–12 I

�0�� :� #D 7�"H%# D

!��-��0��7��;�"�) #A 7��H%# 11

��*��"��7��"" 25 May–12 11

7�) �;��-�.�""��)�;��* -�7��)��,��"��" 24 Mar–12 11

!��P��*-�P��"�� -�:��"��=�))��)�� 23 Jan–12 %$

;��8��4=�"�� 5�F�)�� 22 Jan–12 %$

Covered in this update

Table of cases

DUK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

,� �� "��#$%#

Cases referenced 1 to 21 are set out in Edition 1 of the Bribery Digest.1

27.��0�� :� ��9 �'��

+�7�'��%��&'�?��$�)�"��%��@��Q"��'�!��Q!��&��&��'� of irregular tendering practices involving its education business in East Africa, conducted through wholly owned subsidiaries ��@��! &��%�R��!R�� in Oxford. OUP acted immediately to investigate the matter, instructing independent lawyers and forensic accountants to undertake a detailed investigation.

As a result of the investigation, in November 2011 OUP voluntarily reported certain concerns in relation to contracts arising from a number of tenders which its Kenyan and Tanzanian subsidiaries had entered into between the years 2007 and 2010. The SFO required OUP to follow a procedure based on the guidance contained within its published protocol document “The Serious �� =��<��;��%��"�� 5�� &��> ��'��#

Because two of the tenders were funded by the World Bank, OUP also voluntarily reported on a potential breach of the World Bank’s Procurement Guidelines to the World Bank.

6��%��Q!=��"��%��?��$�)�to believe that Kenyan and Tanzanian subsidiaries of OPL had offered and made payments, directly and through agents, intended to induce the recipients to award competitive tenders and/or publishing contracts for schoolbooks to them.

The basis of the Civil Recovery Order for some £1.9 million obtained by the SFO against OPL is explained in the SFO Press Release as follows. As wholly owned subsidiaries, the Kenyan and Tanzanian subsidiaries pay dividends and certain fees to OPL. Accordingly, OPL has and would receive revenue that had been derived from unlawful conduct, namely bribery and/or corruption. ��%�� %��@��&��&��the affected contracts, the SFO was in a position to determine the appropriate amount to be recovered. The approach to costs was conservative, with the result that the agreed methodology �� %��% �� '�&��%�� as trading surplus in the accounts. No allowance has been made for the payments which are considered bribes or inducements.

In addition to the Civil Recovery Order, OUP:

?� Unilaterally offered a voluntary contribution of £2 million ��%��%��educational purposes in sub-Saharan Africa. This was a ��4�� Q!�"�� of events that were subject to the investigation and OUP’s wish to acknowledge that the conduct fell short of that expected within its wider organisation. The funds would not be used in a way which would provide OUP with a commercial advantage

?� Paid US$500,000 to the World Bank

?� Introduced enhanced compliance procedures intended ��%��'�� )�� &�&��'#� These procedures will be subject to review by an independent monitor who will report to the Director of the SFO within twelve months, with additional and separate reporting to the World Bank.

In response to previous criticism in relation to the transparency of the processes and proceedings in civil recovery matters concluded &'�� &�"��and the basis for the proceedings were dealt with in some detail in ��=��!��_��#�6��%�� "��"��%"�� %��"��"��'��`�

?� The test under the Code for Crown Prosecutors in relation to the case meeting the criteria to prosecute could not be met:

� { Key material obtained through the investigation was not in an evidentially admissible format for a criminal prosecution

� { Witnesses are in overseas jurisdictions and were considered unlikely to assist or co-operate with a criminal investigation in the UK

?� ;�� &��%��"��jurisdictions involved and potential risks to the personal welfare of affected persons

?� The resources needed to facilitate an investigation into this matter would be considerable and a Civil Recovery Order allows a better strategic deployment of resources to other investigations which have a higher probability of leading to a criminal prosecution

?� OUP has conducted itself in a manner which fully met the criteria set out in the SFO guidance on self reporting matters of overseas corruption

1� �|��Q}�$�&��'�;%��~��;��&��|�� "��

which are also included in this edition. These earlier editions are available from www.ey.com.

I UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

?� No evidence of Board level knowledge or connivance within OUP in relation to the corrupt business practices

?� The products supplied were of a good standard and provided at ‘open market’ values — the jurisdictions involved have not been victims as a result of overpaying for the goods or as a result of being supplied with goods which were unsuitable or not required

?� 6�� %��'��contract will be disgorged

?� The subsidiaries will be subject to parallel World Bank procedures which will result in them being debarred from participating in future World Bank funded tenders for a number of years.

We note a number of interesting facts to this case:

?� It has a number of echoes of the Macmillan Publishers case ��(��|��%��%�� )�� in east and southern Africa

?� It is yet another case featuring risks created by agents and intermediaries

?� The explanation of the reasons given for pursuing a civil recovery order provides useful insights. However, we still await cases that shed light on the interpretation of the Bribery Act. For example, had the bribery in this case occurred after July 2011, we may have been provided with insights into:

{ The scope of “Associated persons” under Section 7 as regards the agents, intermediaries and subsidiaries

{� �6��&��5��Ministry of Justice Guidance.

,� �� "��#$%#�continued

28.�!��"��&��

Abbott Group is a private equity owned Aberdeen based drilling & ��#�+��& ��"��settlement under the self-reporting initiative since it was introduced in Scotland in 2011. Under the Proceeds of Crime ��%��%��'��#��%��on a contract between its overseas subsidiary and an overseas oil and gas company. The contract was entered into in 2006 and corrupt payments were made in 2007. Further details of the corrupt payments were witheld in view of any criminal investigation of others that may follow.

The corrupt payments were brought to light in May 2011 following routine enquiries by an overseas tax authority, which resulted in an investigation by UK lawyers and forensic accountants instructed by Abbot. Abbot reported the results of the investigation to the ��!�� "��!��9 �'��#� The investigation is reported to have considered over 100 contracts covering twelve years and one million email communications.

The COPFS listed the following criteria that were considered in the decision to refer this case for an extra-judicial settlement in accordance with the published guidance on self-reporting:

?� The nature and seriousness of the offence and the extent of the harm caused

?� The extent of the wrongdoing within the business, including whether the conduct was authorised by, or connived in, by senior management, or restricted to a small number of lower-ranking individuals

?� Whether it was clear that the business was taking action as soon as the matter came to the attention of senior management ��)%�� &��)�� %�%��%��

?� ?��& ��"� ��"��"��'��"� ��'�� #� This would go beyond a previous criminal conviction, and would include any regulatory enforcement action or warning

?� Whether the individuals involved in the wrongdoing had left the business and, where decisions were taken at Board level, whether there was a new Board in place, and in both cases the timing and reasons for the departure of these individuals

It is yet another case featuring risks created by agents and intermediaries.Oxford University Press case

GUK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

?� Whether the business had honoured its commitment to engage with the Crown meaningfully and in particular to disclose the full extent of the wrongdoing

?� Whether the business had in place adequate anti-bribery systems at the time of the criminal conduct and whether it has further addressed this following the conduct

?� Whether there were particular considerations which may have weighed against prosecution, such as the consequences of prosecution for the company’s employees and stakeholders.

The COPFS announced that the funds which have been recovered will be remitted to the Scottish Consolidated Fund to further expand the CashBack Programme by funding projects that will contribute towards delivering youth employability, healthy lifestyles and reducing re-offending for the young people of Scotland.

While the COPFS has sought to provide an explanation of its approach to this case, as set out above, these settlements remain open to criticism of a lack of transparency compared with deferred prosecution agreements, which would be made public through the Court process. Concerns have also been raised that the active use of civil settlements in Scotland may be out of step with the harder line being indicated south of the border: however, such concerns may be premature, based as they are on a single case in Scotland and no cases under the new SFO regime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The Abbott case is another example of a new owner acquiring a bribery exposure as part of its acquisition: the bribe was paid in 2007, the private equity acquisition of Abbott Group took place in 2008 and the tax audit that led to discovery of the bribe was in 2011.

As noted, Abbot reported the results of the investigation to the COPFS in July 2012; this case was brought to resolution quite swiftly, by November 2012.

While the Abbot case was heralded as a success by the Scottish Government, the current lack of certainty south of the border as regards the consequences of self-reporting raises interesting questions as to whether such settlements will continue in Scotland.

29.�;��;� ��<��;��&��

Mawia Mushtaq became the second person to be convicted of an offence under the Bribery Act by attempting to bribe a R��%��&��"��@��#�7��7 ��>��"��R��%��&�&�� or £300 in exchange for a pass mark on his test, having failed � ��"� ��'#�6��R��%�� &��> ��'�informed his manager of the attempted bribe, who referred this matter to the police.

There are some lessons for the business community in this prosecution:

?� The amount and nature of the payment is similar to what many people would mistakenly explain away as facilitation payments. Rather, by his offer of payment Mr Mushtaq was seeking to get ��%�� requirements and it is therefore a bribe, albeit small. To be clear, there is no concept of facilitation payments in the Bribery Act

?� The personal exposure to prosecution for these sorts of acts.

It is another example of a new owner acquiring a bribery exposure as part of its acquisition.Abbott Group case

%$ UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

Cases referenced 1 to 21 are set out in Edition 1 of the Bribery Digest. Cases referenced 22 to 26 �� All of the cases are included in the summary table.

22.�;��8��4=�"�� 5�F�)��9� ��'��

6��7�&�'��9��`� the company itself was prosecuted in September 2009 and three ��&� ��'��"��'��;%��#�7�&�'��9��irregularities in early 2008 and, therefore, the matter took four years to be fully resolved. The January 2012 case concerned a civil order requiring the shareholder of Mabey & Johnson �7�&�'�|%��%��%��R��'�� in recognition of sums received through share dividends derived from contracts won through unlawful conduct.

In the SFO Press Release, Richard Alderman, the Director of the SFO at that time, stated: “First, shareholders who receive the proceeds of crime can expect civil action against them to recover the money… In this particular case, however, the shareholder was totally unaware of any inappropriate behaviour… The second broader point is that shareholders and investors in companies are obliged to satisfy themselves with the business practices of the companies they invest in. This is very important and we cannot emphasise it enough. It is particularly so for institutional investors who have the knowledge and expertise to do it. The SFO intends to use the civil recovery process to pursue investors who have &��%��"�'#�?�� &�� less sympathetic to institutional investors whose due diligence has clearly been lax in this respect.”

6��!��<��!��<�� "�'��cases and offers broad powers to the SFO, especially in dealing with privately held businesses. Proceeding against a publicly owned business and more “passive” investments using this power is likely to be more problematic for the enforcement agency.

The position is rendered yet more complex by the yet-to-be ��$�&��'�<�� commercial organisations to prevent bribery by an associated ��& ��

,� �� X� ��"��#$%#

<��#�6�� %��&��'� ��the Act will not accrue “through simple corporate ownership or investment or through the payment of dividends” and appears to require a more direct and intentional link between the investor and the bribery.

$�� &��&��#%#�$�&��'�<��"��#%#�!��<��%��&�&��'��for sound analysis and advice for investors in managing corruption risk. The SFO’s comment, quoted above, highlights that an investor will be in a more defensible position where adequate due diligence has been performed.

23.�!��P��*-�P��"�� -�:��"��=�))��)��9� ��'��

This case highlights a type of corrupt activity that receives less comment but which is potentially of serious consequence: ��%��#�

6�� &��&'�companies acting as procurement agents for the projects in the oil and gas sector. Certain of the defendants were engaged by these procurement agents and had access to information which ��'�� %��%��&��%�� or agreed to make, corrupt payments for the information, disguised as “consultancy services”.

These were established UK-based procurement companies, dealing with some of the larger projects in the sector. Several of the bidders who agreed to pay for the information were in mature economies, such as Italy, France and Canada.

The SFO reports that the procurement companies helped the investigation enormously and were appalled at the apparent &��%��&'��"�� '�� integrity of the project environments.

��%�� 9 �'��$�&��'�<�� and bidding companies are likely to have been exposed to prosecution for the section 7 offence of failing to prevent bribery.


The judge held that Mr Gill had acted dishonestly in procuring Mr Jaffery’s services to assist him in obtaining the loan and that the bank would not have proceeded with the loan had it known that Mr Jaffery had been promised a 10% interest in the project.

26.�!��-��0�� 7��;�"�)��9 ��

This UK-based bribery case involved a major supplier of potatoes to Sainsbury’s. It appears to involve many of the classic features and ��4�%��&�&��'��#

Andrew Behagg and David Baxter were the Operations Director and Finance Director respectively of the company, which supplied half of Sainsbury’s potatoes in the UK. John Maylam was a buyer for Sainsbury’s.

The scheme appears to have been straightforward: Sainsbury’s were overcharged for potatoes supplied since 2006 with the �@��~#��&�%�� called The Fund. John Maylam and his associates received ��#(��6�� &'� the other defendants.

��4�%�� %%��&'��!��"��%��include the following:

?� R�"��'��'��9��7�'�� %� a £200,000 bill at Claridge’s Hotel and a £350,000 holiday ��7��!�@��6��

?� Some £1.5 million transferred by John Maylam to Luxembourg

?� A “consultancy report” for which he was paid £85,000

?� Large and frequent cash payments to him — the scam was uncovered by an employee of the potato supplier who became suspicious of being asked to withdraw £5,000 in bundles of £50 notes

If there was any lingering doubt that bribery is a risk faced by all sectors, then that doubt is surely dispelled by this case: if the potato business generates a bribery prosecution then any sector must be seen as at risk.

24.�7�) �;��-�.�""��)�;��* -�7��)��,��"��"��7��

This case involved the familiar bribery model of a supplier making ��'��%�"��"� ��%�and continuation of contracts, in this instance CCTV provided to the Ministry of Defence in Northern Ireland. It is another example of a domestic bribery prosecution and in this case both the supplier ��%�"�� #�?��bribery can become a family matter: Carol Kealey is the sister of William Marks and became involved by agreeing to use her bank accounts to receive the corrupt monies.

25.��*��"��7��""��7�'��

This case is a reminder that bribery allegations may be pursued, in certain circumstances, by way of civil disputes between private parties and that English law takes a broad view of what constitutes a bribe for civil claims where the briber is inducing what he knows to be an agent of another party and there is a failure to disclose it to the other party.

This case was brought by the bank against one of its former senior �@�� "��'��9��'��!��#�Mr Gill was the agent for several of the bank’s customers and the case concerned a series of loans made by the bank to those customers. All of the customers were introduced to the bank by Mr Gill and both defendants admitted that the relevant customers were all ultimately owned by one or other of Mr Gill’s sisters.

The key allegations were that Mr Jaffery acted in breach of his �� '�� '��&�)�&'�� %��4�� '��&�)��Mr Gill dishonestly assisted Mr Jaffery’s breach. Of the various bribery allegations made by the bank, the successful claim concerned a promise made by Mr Gill to Mr Jaffery that he would receive a 10% interest in a project for which a customer connected with Mr Gill was seeking funding from the bank. The judge held that the 10% had been promised as a quid pro quo for Mr Jaffery assisting Mr Gill to obtain banking facilities and that after being promised the interest Mr Jaffery had encouraged the bank to loan money to Mr Gill and his family. The encouragement took the form of promoting the loans and giving references to the bank for Mr Gill and his family.


�� 6�8��#-�7��#$%/Case reference Date Name Sector

Enforcement ��

Enforcement agency Source of enquiry

29 December 2012 Mawia Mushtaq Public service October 2011 Greater Manchester Police CPS

Individual who was offered bribe

28 November 2012 Abbot Group Limited Oil and gas July 2012 COPFS Tax audit

27 July 2012 Oxford Publishing Limited �!��@��Q"��'�!��

Publishing November 2011 SFO World Bank investigation

26 June 2012 Andrew Behagg David Baxter John Maylam

Food retailing 2008 CoLP Audit

25 May 2012 Syed Jaffery Pritpal Gill

Banking

�� March 2012 James McGeown William Marks John Symington Carol Kealey

Government procurement ��6��

2002 Ministry of Defence Police �7;!�SFO

Whistleblower

23 January 2012 Andrew Rybak Ronald Saunders Philip Hammond Barry Smith

Oil and gas April 2008 SFO CoLP

Whistleblower

22 January 2012 7�&�'�|%��%��%�� R��'�� 7�&�'��9��R��

Engineering��'�&��%��

January 2007 SFO

21 November 2011 Mazhar Majeed Salman Butt Mohammed Asif Mohammed Amir

Cricket/gambling N/A N/A Press investigation

20 October 2011 Munir Yakub Patel Public service Not known CPS Press investigation

19 July 2011 7��! &��R��7!R� Educational materials December 2009 SFOCoLP

World Bank report

18 July 2011 Willis Limited Wholesale insurance and reinsurance broking

Not known FSA ��<��<_�� with SOCA

17 April 2011 DePuy International Limited Medical goods October 2007 SFO Internal whistleblowerReferred to SFO by DoJ

16 April 2011 Mark Jessop Medical goods 2007 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

15 February 2011 Aftab Noor al-Hassan Oil and gas September 2008 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

15 February 2011 Riad El-Taher Oil and gas August 2008 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

�� February 2011 7?�}��%%�R��7?}R� Oil and gas October 2009 SFO French prosecutors

13 February 2011 Richard Forsyth David MabeyRichard Gledhill �_��7�&�'��9��R��

Engineering ��'�&��%��

January 2007 SFO

12 December 2010 BAE Systems plc Defence �� SFO Investigative journalism

11 December 2010 Weir Group plc Oil and gas services �� COPFS UN Independent Inquiry Committee

10 October 2010 Julian Messent �!?��+��R��

Insurance broking October 2005 SFOCoLP

Foreign and ��

9 June 2010 Paul Kent Silinder Singh Sidhu Stuart Ford Rebecca HoyleSarah Kent �R��%��)�� R��

Government funded training programmes

Not known SFO West Mercia Police

LSC Whistleblower

8 April 2010 Robert Dougall �;�! '�+��R��

Medical goods Not known SFOWest Yorkshire Police

Internal whistleblowerReferred to SFO by DoJ

7 March 2010 Innospec Limited Chemicals October 2007 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

6 October 2009 AMEC plc Engineering and project management

March 2008 SFO

5 September 2009 Mabey & Johnson Limited Engineering ��'�&��%��

January 2007 SFO

� January 2009 Aon Limited Insurance broking April 2007 FSA �<_��<� and FSA

3 October 2008 Balfour Beatty plc Engineering and construction services

April 2005 SFO

2 September 2008 ��6�&��$_��Ananias Tumukumbe

Security consulting services Not known CoLPCPS

1 April 2008 Shinder Singh Gangar Alan WhiteNigel Heath �;�&&�?��

High yield investments April 2006 SFOLeicestershire Police ECU

A separate SFO investigation

Self-reported?

Date of transactions Value of transactions Location of transactions Legal basis of actionOctober 2011 £200 or £300 UK Bribery Act

Yes 2007 Not known Not known Civil Recovery Order: POCA

Yes 2007 to 2010 Not known East Africa Civil Recovery Order: POCA

January 2006 to January 2008

£8.7m UK Criminal: S.1 PCACriminal: S.329 POCA

May 2007 to May 2010

<��@��"�� UK �"�`�$�� '�� '��&�&��'

January 1998 to ��&� ��'��

��#��"�� UK Criminal: S.1 PCA ��`��!��+��Order 1996 Criminal: S.89 Police Act 1996

2001 to 2009 <��@��"�� Iran, Egypt, Russia, Singapore ��<& �;��&��UK, Italy, Canada, France �� &��%�

Criminal: CJA

2001 and 2002 ��)��"�� "�� Iraq �"�`�!��<��!��

August 2010 £150k UK Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt

August 2011 £500 UK S.2 Bribery Act

Yes 2002 to 2009 ��#��"�� Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia �"�`�!��<��!��

2005 to 2009 ��#��

“High risk jurisdictions” Egypt, Russia and Argentina cited

�"�`��7<��

1998 to 2006 ��#~��#��'��)��

Greece Civil Recovery Order: POCA

2000 to 2003 Q��#��"�� €339,886 in improper payments paid or due��+��>

Iraq ��`�6��+��>��Q��

2001 to 2002 Q��#��US$1.6m in illegal payments

Iraq ��`�6��+��>��Q��

2001 Q��)��US$500k in illegal payments

Iraq ��`�6��+��>��Q��

Yes �((�� Q��&��"�� Q��~��'��%�"��

Nigeria �"�`�!��<��!��

2001 and 2002

��#��"� �� )��'��%�"��

Iraq ��`�6��+��>��Q��

1999 to 2005 Q��(#(��"�� Q��#��'��

Tanzania Criminal: S.221 Companies Act 1985

2000 to 2002 ��#(��£3m kickbacks

Iraq Civil Recovery Order: POCA ��%��#��<��(~��`�6��+��>��Q��

February 1999 to June 2002

US$1,982,230 as inducements or rewards Costa Rica Criminal: S.1 PCA

June 2003 to August 2005

��#��"�� £270k kickbacks

UK Criminal: S.1 PCA��`��#��(��&��!��<��'�� %��`��#��~��!��<��> �� '��`��#��6��<��(�~�� '��"��%�� &'��

1998 to 2006 ��#~��#��'��)��

Greece Criminal: S.1 PCA

1999 to 2006 Q��"�� US$11.7m in commissions to agentsUp to US$8m in bribes

Indonesia ��`��#��R��<��(��'� �� Criminal: S.1 PCA

Yes 2005 to 2007 US$9m South Korea Civil Recovery Order: POCA ��%��#��<��(~��

Yes 1993 to 2002 +��>`��#��"� ��)��'�� to government9��`��~��"� ��)� ��'��`��"� ��)� ��'��

Iraq, Jamaica and Ghana Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt

January 2005 to September 2007

Q��#��"� ��%��'��%�Q��#��#�� to 9 intermediaries

Bahrain,Bulgaria, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam

Civil: S.206 FSMA

Yes 1998 to 2001 Not known Egypt Civil Recovery Order: POCA ��%��#��<��(~��

May 2007 ��)��"�� ~�)��'��

Uganda Criminal: S.1 PCA

Not known US$500k bribe United States Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt and conspiracy to defraud


Financial penalty �� Other penalties ��

2 months imprisonment suspended for 12 months and a 2 month curfew from 6pm to 6am

£5.6m !��

��~(�� Revenue generated from unlawful conduct World Bank debarment for 3 yearsIndependent monitor for 12 months

£12,500 of costs to the SFOUS $500k paid to World Bank�� '��& ��%��

3 years and 6 months imprisonment2 years and 6 months imprisonment��'��

Not reported Not reported

3 years imprisonment suspended for 2 years and 7 years ��> ��2 years imprisonment suspended for 2 years9 months imprisonment suspended for 2 yearsConditional discharge

��

��#�)

��'��'��> �� as a director3 years and 6 months imprisonment��'��'��> �� as a director12 months imprisonment suspended for 18 months

£131k Dividends received by parent company derived from contracts won by subsidiary through unlawful conduct

£2k in costs

32 months imprisonment30 months imprisonment12 months imprisonment6 months imprisonment

£105k between them in prosecution costs

3 years imprisonment

£11.26m Revenue received from potentially unlawful conduct MPL debarred from World Bank contracts for minimum 3 years SFO approved monitor put in place

MPL pay all investigation costs. MPL pay £27k SFO costs. MPL withdrew from all public tenders in education business in East and West Africa. Loss of bid securities

£6.895m ��<��%��"�� 5High standards of regulatory conduct

Willis to carry out a review of past payments to overseas third parties ��%��5��%�� the FSA

��#~�(� Had regard to penalties, settlements and seizures in US and Greece

DePuy pays prosecution costs

£150k Fine — payable to the Development Fund for Iraq ��)�� Jessop pays prosecution costs of £25k

16 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years

10 months imprisonment

£7.028m <�� "��'�&�� of parent company derived from contracts obtained by bribery and corruption

MWKL to overhaul its internal audit and control measures MWKL pay costs of investigation

��'��> �� as a director~��'��> �� as a director8 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years

£75k of prosecution costs

£125k of prosecution costs

£500k£29.5m

Fine|@�%��'��&�� of Tanzania

Remediation as set out in the Report of Lord Woolf£225k in SFO costs

��(��(��£3m

!��Fine

£100k Compensation to the Republic of Costa Rica ��'��> �� as a director

�#��'��3 years imprisonment2 years imprisonment1 year imprisonment suspended for 2 years12 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years and 200 hours unpaid work and 12 month supervision order

12 months prison term suspended for 2 years on appeal

US$6.7mUS$6m

��'��+�� Civil recovery of which US$5m to UN Development Fund for Iraq ��)%�� &��'��'�

SFO appointed monitor �� "��&�� or compensation Innospec to pay costs of a monitor for up to three years

��#(�� Contribution to costs of the Civil Recovery Order External consultant appointed

Iraq £2mJamaica £750kGhana £750k

FineFineFine

Iraq reparations £618kJamaica reparations £139kGhana reparations £658k��#��

First year monitoring costs up to £250kSFO costs £350k

£5.25m

£2.25m Not known Contribution to costs of the Civil Recovery Order External monitor appointed

5 months jail sentence suspended for a year1 year jail sentence; subsequently deported

18 months jail sentence for corruption and 6 years for fraud18 months jail sentence for corruption and 6 years for fraud6 months jail sentence

23 15

Abbreviations

CoLP City of London Police

,�:�� ,��X��:�� "��4��"��5

,7!�� ,��)��"�7� ��!��

,:�� ,��:��

CRO Civil Recovery Order

��7� ��)��7� ��

�:!�� :�� !��)��

ECU Economic Crime Unit

��!� ��"�� !��

FSMA Financial Services and Markets Act

:,!�� :��,��!��%G$A

:�,!� :�� ,��)�!��#$$#

�!P� �� !��P��

�� X�

��,!� �� ,��)�!��

Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

7��)�� \]]�4$5�#$�DG^%�/]$%�

9 )��_�*&&��)

7��;�� \]]�4$5�%#%�^/^�#%$]�

9)��_�*&&��)

Steve Caine \]]�4$5�#$�DG^%�]]//�

��_�*&&��)

David Lister \]]�4$5�%/%�DDD�#/$I�

�"� ��_�*&&��)

Contacts

ii

Disclaimer

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Ernst & Young

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