Edited by José Medina and David...

TruthEngagements Across

Philosophical Traditions

Edited by

José Medina and David Wood

Praise forTruth

Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions

“There are no longer two dialogues – analytic and continental. It is all onenow, and more complicated than ever.This collection is an indispensable pointof entry to the new conversations.”

Barry Allen, McMaster University

“It is virtually impossible to imagine a more useful collection of texts on thisthorny philosophical topic.There is no pretense that herein lies the truth abouttruth, but there is the realization of a set of complex issues illuminated fromradically diverse, yet often surprisingly overlapping, perspectives.”

Vincent Colapietro, Pennsylvania State University

“While there are many collections concerning debates about truth, this book isunique. It not only provides a paradigm for doing philosophy in a pluralisticmanner; it also shows how fruitful it can be.”

James Bohman, St. Louis University

“This carefully crafted anthology on what Medina and Wood call ‘thenormative turn’ in the debate on truth provides a welcome opportunity to putinto practice a philosophical pluralism that is too often absent from theclassroom.”

Robert Bernasconi, University of Memphis

“This is a remarkable anthology of diverse readings on one of the centralphilosophical topics. Not many books nestle texts by Heidegger, Levinas, andCatherine Elgin next to one another. Still fewer try to help readers see howthinkers like these offer conflicting, but mutually illuminating, approaches tothe same subject matter.This volume promises to help bridge the regrettablerift between ‘continental ’and ‘analytic’ ways of doing philosophy, and that issomething to be celebrated.”

Harvey Cormier, Stony Brook University

BLACKWELL READINGS IN CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Series Editor: Simon Critchley, University of Essex

Each volume in this series provides a detailed introduction to and overview of acentral philosophical topic in the Continental tradition. In contrast to the author-based model that has hitherto dominated the reception of the Continental philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world, this series presents the central issues of that tradition, topics that should be of interest to anyone concernedwith philosophy. Cutting across the stagnant ideological boundaries that mark theanalytic/Continental divide, the series will initiate discussions that reflect thegrowing dissatisfaction with the organization of the English-speaking philosophicalworld. Edited by a distinguished international forum of philosophers, each volumeprovides a critical overview of a distinct topic in Continental philosophy through a mix of both classic and newly commissioned essays from both philosophical traditions.

1 The Body: Classic and Contemporary ReadingsEdited and introduced by Donn Welton

2 RaceEdited by Robert Bernasconi

3 The ReligiousEdited by John D. Caputo

4 The PoliticalEdited by David Ingram

5 The EthicalEdited by Edith Wyschogrod and Gerald P. McKenny

6 Continental Philosophy of ScienceEdited by Gary Gutting

7 Truth: Engagements Across Philosophical TraditionsEdited by José Medina and David Wood

8 Self and SubjectivityEdited by Kim Atkins

TruthEngagements Across

Philosophical Traditions

Edited by


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Truth: engagements across philosophical traditions / edited by José Medina andDavid Wood.

p. cm. – (Blackwell readings in Continental philosophy)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1-4051-1549-1 (alk. paper) – ISBN 1-4051-1550-5 (pbk. :alk. paper) 1. Truth. I. Medina, José, 1968– II. Wood, David (David C.)III. Title. IV. Series.

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CONTENTS

Preface ix

Acknowledgments x

General IntroductionJosé Medina and David Wood 1

Part I The Value of Truth: “Revaluing our highest values” 7

Introduction 9

1 Friedrich NietzscheOn Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense 14

From The Will to Power 24From Beyond Good and Evil 24From Twilight of the Idols 25

2 William JamesPragmatism’s Conception of Truth 26

Suggested Reading 39

Part II Representation, Subjectivity, and Intersubjectivity 41

Introduction 43

3 Søren KierkegaardTruth, Subjectivity and Communication 48

4 Ludwig WittgensteinRemarks on Truth 61

From On Certainty 61From Culture and Value 68

5 Donald DavidsonTruth and Meaning 69

6 Hilary PutnamThe Face of Cognition 80


Part III Truth, Consensus, and Transcendence 93

Introduction 95

7 Richard RortyRepresentation, Social Practice, and Truth 99

8 Jürgen HabermasRichard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn 109

9 John McDowellTowards Rehabilitating Objectivity 130

10 Paul FeyerabendNotes on Relativism 146


Part IV Non-Propositional Truth: Language, Art, and World 159

Introduction 161

11 Gianni VattimoThe Truth of Hermeneutics 168

From “The Decline of the Subject and the Problem of Testimony” 181

12 Joseph MargolisRelativism and Cultural Relativity 182

13 Maurice Merleau-PontyPerception and Truth 197

From “An Unpublished Text” 197From “Cézanne’s Doubt” 203From “Reflection and Interrogation” 205

14 Jacques DerridaThe End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing 207


Part V Disclosure and Testimony 227

Introduction 229

15 Edmund HusserlSelf-Evidence and Truth 235

“Relativism in an Extended Sense” 242

vi CONTENTS

16 Martin HeideggerOn the Essence of Truth 243

From “The Origin of the Work of Art” 258

17 Emmanuel LevinasTruth of Disclosure and Truth of Testimony 261

18 Catherine Z. ElginWord Giving,Word Taking 271


Part VI Truth and Power 289

Introduction 291

19 Hannah ArendtTruth and Politics 295

20 Michel FoucaultThe Discourse on Language 315

From “Truth and Power” 333

21 Linda Martín AlcoffReclaiming Truth 336


Part VII A Supplement: Radicalizations of Truth 351

Introduction 353

22 SelectionsFrom Slavoj Zizek, For They Know Not What They Do 359From Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter 359From Luce Irigaray, “The Power of Discourse and the Subordination

of the Feminine” 360From Luce Irigaray, “Veiled Lips” 361From Jean Baudrillard, “The Precession of the Simulacra” 361From Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2:The Time-Image 363


Index 367

CONTENTS vii

PREFACE

This editorial project could not have been carried out without the enthusiastic supportof Jeff Dean at Blackwell, for whose constant help and encouragement we are mostgrateful.We are also indebted to all our colleagues and graduate students at VanderbiltUniversity who have stimulated our conversation and provided the ideal atmospherefor crossing boundaries and maintaining a dialogue across philosophical traditions.Weare particularly grateful to those graduates and undergraduates to whom we experi-mentally introduced some of these ideas in topic-oriented courses: Medina,“Truth andInterpretation,” Fall 2000;Wood,“The Paradoxes of Truth,” Spring 2003. Special thanksgo to our editorial assistant Aaron Simmons who has worked tirelessly and patientlywith us on this project and (with Chad Maxson) prepared the index.

We have shared equal responsibility in the development of this project from its incep-tion to its completion.All the selections and introductory essays are the product of ourcollaborative work over the last four years. For the record, although we share respon-sibility for each of the sections, José Medina is the primary author of the introductionsto sections 1, 2, and 3, and David Wood of those to sections 4, 5, and 6.We co-wrotethe General Introduction and the concluding Supplement.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors and publisher gratefully acknowledge the permission granted to reproducethe copyright material in this book:

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” pp. 79–91 in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ed.and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979).© by Daniel Breazeale. Reprinted with permission.

1b. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J.Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 289, 292. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

1c. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern (Edinburgh andLondon:T. N. Foulis, 1909), pp. 5–6.

1d. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin,1968), p. 41. Reprinted by permission of Penguin Books Ltd.

2. William James,“Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” in Pragmatism:A New Namefor Some Old Ways of Thinking (London: Longman, 1907), pp. 197–236.

3. Søren Kierkegaard, excerpts from Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophi-cal Fragments,Vol. 1: Text, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna. H. Hong(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 72–82, 85–6, 91–2, 106–8,189–94, 198–200, 202–5. © 1992 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted bypermission of Princeton University Press.

4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M.Anscombe and G. H. von Wright,trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), pp.15–18, 20–3, 27–8 (§ 94–117, 137–62, 191–206). Reprinted by permission ofBlackwell Publishing.

4b. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains,edited by G. H von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman (second edition

of the text by Alois Pichler, translated by Peter Winch) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998),pp. 41, 64.This book was originally published as Vermischte Bemerkungen in 1977(revised second edition 1994). Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishing.

5. Donald Davidson, Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press:1984), pp. 22–36. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

6. Hilary Putnam, excerpts from “The Face of Cognition,” in The Threefold Cord:Mind, Body, and World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 49–59,64–70. Reprinted by permission of Columbia University Press.

7. Richard Rorty, “Representation, Social Practise, and Truth,” from PhilosophicalStudies 54 (1988), pp. 215–28. Reprinted with kind permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers and the author.

8. Jürgen Habermas,“Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn,” in Rorty and His Critics, ed.Robert Brandom (Oxford: Blackwell: 2000), p. 32 (excerpt), 37–55. Reprinted bypermission of Blackwell Publishing.

9. John McDowell, “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity,” in Rorty and His Critics,ed. Robert Brandom (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 109–23. Reprinted by per-mission of Blackwell Publishing.

10. Paul Feyerabend,“Notes on Relativism,” in Farewell to Reason (London and NewYork:Verso, 1987), pp. 49–62. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

11. Gianni Vattimo,“The Truth of Hermeneutics,” © 1991 from Questioning Founda-tions, ed. Hugh Silverman (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 11–28, 255–6 (notes).Reprinted by permission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Books, Inc.

11b. Gianni Vattimo, excerpts from The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzscheand Heidegger, trans. Cyprian Blamires (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1993), pp. 40, 41, 50, 52, 54, 58. Reprinted by permission of Polity Press.

12. Joseph Margolis, excerpts from “Relativism and Cultural Relativity,” in What,After All, Is a Work of Art?: Lectures in the Philosophy of Art (University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 41–65. © 1999 by The Pennsylva-nia State University. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

13. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text” by Maurice Merleau-Ponty:A Prospectus of His Work, trans. Arleen B. Dallery, in Primacy of Perception, ed.James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 3–11.Reprinted by permission of Éditions Gallimard and Northwestern University Press.

13b. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, excerpts from “Cézanne’s Doubt,” in Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: North-western University Press, 1964), pp. 13–16. Reprinted by permission of ÉditionsGallimard and Northwestern University Press.

13c. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, excerpts from “Reflection and Interrogation,” in TheVisible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL:

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 41–3, 49. Reprinted by permission ofÉditions Gallimard and Northwestern University Press.

14. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimoreand London:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp 6–26, 323–5 (notes).© 1997 by The Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with the permissionof The Johns Hopkins University Press.

15. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, trans. J. N. Findlay (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 760–70. Reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Books Ltd.

15b. Edmund Husserl, excerpt from Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 144–5. Reprinted by permission of Taylor& Francis Books Ltd.

16. Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” trans. John Sallis, in Basic Writings(revised and expanded edition) ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1993), pp. 117–41. English translation © 1977, 1993 by HarperCollinsPublishers, Inc. General introduction and introductions to each selection © 1997,1993 by David Farrell Krell. Reprinted with permission of HarperCollins Pub-lishers, Inc. and Taylor and Francis Ltd.

16b. Martin Heidegger, excerpts from “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry,Language, Thought, trans. and ed. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row,1971), pp. 35–6, 38, 41–5, 62, 71. © 1971 by Martin Heidegger. Reprinted bypermission of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.

17. Emmanuel Levinas, “Truth of Disclosure and Truth of Testimony,” trans. Iain MacDonald, in Basic Philosophical Writings, eds. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 98–107, 184–5 (notes). Reprinted by permission ofFlammarion.

18. Catherine Z. Elgin,“Word Giving,Word Taking,” in Fact and Value: Essays for JudithJarvis Thomson, ed.Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, Ralph Wedgwood (Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 97–116. © 2001 by MIT Press. Reprinted by per-mission of MIT Press.

19. Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” in The Portable Hannah Arendt (London:Penguin, 2000), pp. 545–75 (excerpts). Originally published in Between Past andFuture in The New Yorker, February 25, 1967.

20. Michel Foucault, “The Discourse on Language,” trans. Rupert Sawyer in SocialScience Information (April 1971), pp. 7–30. © 1971 by Sage Publications Ltd andFoundation of the Maison des Science de l’Homme. Reprinted by permission ofSage Publications Ltd.

20b. Michel Foucault, excerpt from Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–77, edited by Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980),pp. 131–3. Reprinted by permission of Pearson Education Ltd.

xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

21. Linda Martín Alcoff, “Reclaiming Truth,” a slightly revised version of an articlewhich appeared under this title in The Hedgehog Review: Critical Reflections on Con-temporary Culture, vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 26–41. Reprinted by permission ofThe Hedgehog Review.

22b. Slavoj Zizek, excerpt from For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Politi-cal Factor (London and New York:Verso, 1991), p. 196. Reprinted by permissionof the publisher.

22c. Judith Butler, excerpt (© 1993) from Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limitsof “Sex,” (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), p. 207. Reprinted by per-mission of Routledge/Taylor & Francis Books, Inc. and the author.

22d. Luce Irigaray,“The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine,”from This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke(New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), selections from pp. 68, 69, 74, 75, 76,79, 80, 85. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

22e. Luce Irigaray,“Veiled Lips,” in Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Gillian C.Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 86. Reprinted by permis-sion of Columbia University Press.

22f. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulacrum, trans. Shiela Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan, 1984), selections from pp. 1–7, 12, 27. Reprinted by permission of the University of Michigan Press.

22g. Gilles Deleuze,Cinema 2.The Time-Image, trans.H. Tomlinson and R.Galeta (Min-neapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1989), selections from pp. 129–47.Reprinted by permission of the University of Minnesota Press and Athlone Press.

Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permissionfor the use of copyright material.The publisher apologizes for any errors or omissionsin the above list and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should beincorporated in future reprints or editions of this book.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION


There is no topic more central to philosophy than truth. Throughout the history ofphilosophy, truth has remained one of the most fundamental philosophical notions,and it continues to occupy a special place. But the philosophical debate on truth hastaken a new and distinctive turn in contemporary philosophy: a normative turn. Thisnew direction will be examined in this volume through a series of conversationsamong philosophers from different traditions and schools.What unifies these conver-sations and the different philosophical issues discussed in them is the normativity oftruth. The question of the normative power of truth was brought to center-stage ofphilosophical debates on truth by philosophers such as Nietzsche and James who askedradical questions about the value of truth as a norm that guides our practices.There-fore, it is fitting that the series of conversations on truth contained in this volumeopen with a dialogue between Nietzsche and James.This dialogue will frame the con-stellation of questions concerning the normativity of truth that constitutes the focusof the book.

Study of the question of truth is certainly valuable for its own sake, but it alsoaffords two additional benefits. In the first place, the philosophical debate on truthprovides an excellent point of access to a wide set of fundamental issues in metaphysics,epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, ethics, political philosophy,and aesthetics. The debate on truth covers questions concerning objectivity, reality,knowledge, communication, standards of correctness, identity, authenticity, freedom,and creativity (among others). Readers of this volume will become familiar with thesecentral questions while mastering the multifaceted debate on truth. In the secondplace, the philosophical discussion of truth can be a bridge between philosophical tra-ditions and schools of thought. And this is exactly how we use it in this volume.Theprodigious capacity of this theme to cross (and sometimes question, even destabilize)boundaries and to put in communication unlikely conversation partners has been pre-cisely the inspiration and motivation for the development of this editorial project; andit is reflected in its methodology, which we explain below. Readers of this volumewill become familiar not only with some of the most central positions in the debateon truth, but also with their interconnections, their similarities and differences, and

the complicated and multiplying pathways that can be created among them. However,this volume does not purport to be an exhaustive sampler of all the philosophicalpositions in the debate on truth.1 Being exhaustive has been sacrificed for the sakeof being focused and effective. Although all the major trends in the literature are con-sidered, not all the major players in the contemporary discussion of truth are repre-sented in our selections. In order to retain a sharp focus and to be able to make adistinctive contribution to the literature on truth, we have been highly selective. Ourintroductions and lists of suggested readings, however, broaden our selections andgesture toward a wider spectrum of philosophical views.We also offer as a supplement(Part VII), an inconclusive conclusion that addresses some of our exclusions, whileinsinuating the impossibility of closure in the philosophical conversation on truth.

We have created these dialogues across different philosophical traditions and schoolsof thought in different ways. In some (exceptional) cases we piggy-backed on exist-ing dialogues (such as the one between Rorty and his critics) and have expandedthem by adding new interlocutors who address the same problems, arguments, andobjections. But for the most part, we have created the dialogue ourselves, though –we hope – not arbitrarily or artificially. As the specific introductions make clear, thetexts we have juxtaposed constitute converging (even while dissenting) discussions oftruth that have strong methodological and thematic affinities. We want to highlighttwo important features of these dialogues on truth: their intersectedness and their open-ness. On the one hand, while the different conversations gathered in this volumeappear to be compartmentalized in independent sections, they intersect in complexand rich ways. There are many paths that readers can travel across the texts we haveselected. In the brief introductions we have appended to each section, we have high-lighted some of these paths, calling readers’ attention to productive interrelations andpossible conversations to explore. On the other hand, the dialogue among the textsof each section stands on its own feet and even seems to have a certain (though notfinal) closure. Each conversation on truth is presented as a complete whole, yet it isat the same time left open, with loose ends and unthematized issues to be taken upby other conversations. The relation of each dialogue to the others can be seen intwo ways: as resulting from an exuberant completeness – that is, from an overflow,from an excess – or, alternatively, as resulting from a lack of completeness or an absence,from the necessity of being continued, supplemented, by other dialogues that take upthe things that were not talked about or were only touched upon. Each of these dia-logues says too much, calling for a more explicit articulation or an extended discus-sion of its content in other dialogues. But each dialogue also says too little, becomingan invitation to further elaborations in other dialogues.This invitation to further dia-logue can be reiterated indefinitely, as Derrida’s logic of the supplement indicates.This logic is dialogically and performatively enacted in our volume by providing asupplement to the six dialogues on truth – a supplement which in turn, far from pro-viding closure, invites other supplements, other conversations, and indeed an indefi-nite conversational chain.

The intersectional and open nature of the dialogues on truth of this volume reflectsthe actual dynamics and methodology underlying the collaboration of the editors.Our conversational methodology is no editorial trick or tool; it reflects the way thisvolume came together.This editorial project is the product of our ongoing (and con-

2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

stantly challenging) discussions about truth over four years. The conversationalmethodology underlying the production of this volume is reflected in the organiza-tion of the different sections. The following overview of the volume tries to makeclear: (a) what unifies the dialogues on truth to be found in the different sections;and (b) what is distinctive about the kind of conversation that the volume as a wholeaims to facilitate in the philosophical debate on truth.

The central focus of this book is the normativity of truth. Different schools of thoughthave emphasized the normative power of truth while offering different conceptual-izations of it.The normativity of truth does not just mean that truth claims are simul-taneously value judgments. It means that “truth” is a space with its own ends, endsthat are inseparable from other ends such as freedom and justice. “Truth” designatesa normative space, a constellation of desiderata or principles that regulate discourseand agency and what can be disclosed in and through them. In this volume we explorethe ethical, political, and historical questions opened up by different conceptualizations oftruth as a normative framework (a regime or complex network of norms) embeddedin discursive practices. In what follows we explain how the normativity of truthunifies the different sections by providing the overlapping and criss-crossing dialecti-cal threads that run through the volume.

Why do we value truth? This is the central question that we pose in Part I.We seemto take for granted all kinds of prima facie obligations with respect to truth. Otherthings being equal, we assume that in communication one ought to tell the truth andaccept the truth, in inquiry one ought to seek the truth, in life one ought to honorthe truth, etc. Truth appears to be one of our highest values. But what is the sourceof this value? This is the radical question that both Nietzsche and James raised whileinviting us to “revalue our highest values.”Through a conversation between Nietzscheand James we start with the debate between a nihilistic and a pragmatist account ofthe value of truth. Nietzsche developed a genealogical account of “the will to truth”in order to show that truth had been put at the service of an ideology or constella-tion of values, and that the positing of truth as our highest (unquestionable) valuewas a way of warding off critical scrutiny. In a different way James also insisted that,far from being independent of our valuations, our attitude towards truth is bothinformed by what we value and a determining factor of what we value. Accordingto James, truth is a “species of good,” a practical value: we value truths for their “agree-able consequences,” for their action-guiding role. Rejecting the traditional notion oftruth as formal adequatio (or passive copying), James emphasizes the relation of truthto agency and its ethical dimension. By calling attention to the normative aspects oftruth, Nietzsche and James helped to bring the debate on truth into sharper focus,and they set the agenda of this debate in the twentieth century. The different ques-tions raised by Nietzsche and James in their critical examination of the value of truthare explored and developed in the subsequent Parts of the volume.

From within our discursive practices, truth appears as a value that structures howwe speak and act, determining (or at least constraining) what can find a place in thosepractices and how it is to be assessed. In Part II we propose a dialogue around thefollowing question: Is the normative space of truth something objective, fixed, and homoge-neous? Metaphysical realism gives an affirmative answer to this question. According tothis view, truth is an objective and unchangeable relation between our beliefs and the

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3

facts. This relation of correspondence has a formally homogeneous structure: that ofan isomorphism between our mental representations and mind-independent states ofaffairs. Kierkegaard’s existentialism can be understood as a response to the objectivismand metaphysical realism of correspondence theories of truth. Kierkegaard argues thatthere is a fundamental difference between the objective perspective on communica-tion (which focuses on what is said) and the subjective perspective (which looks athow it is said). He ties truth to subjectivity, to what he calls indirect communica-tion, and (performatively) to the emancipation of the other. This subjectivist view oftruth from the immanent perspective of truth-seekers gives rise to an interesting pluralism with respect to truth. A different kind of pluralism is developed in the laterWittgenstein’s view of truth as a context-dependent normative notion. On this view,truth talk acquires a rather different normative significance in different “languagegames.” For Wittgenstein, both what can be considered a truth-candidate and howtruth-candidates are to be assessed varies from context to context.This view suggeststhat the limits of intelligibility are to be drawn contextually in a piecemeal fashion.Some have argued that these limits are always being pushed further and remain foreverelusive.This is suggested by Davidson’s account of interpretation in terms of Tarskiantheories of truth for particular languages. Davidson develops an internalism thatexplains truth “in terms of the language I know” and undermines realist accounts oftruth as an external relation between language and reality. A very different kind of neopragmatism can be found in Putnam, who, while rejecting traditional forms ofrealism and antirealism, wants to preserve basic realist intuitions in a pluralist view oftruth that underscores the many ways in which our claims can relate to reality.

In Part III we ask: What is the normative force of truth talk within communities/practicesand between communities/practices? In this section we include texts that discuss how weare compelled to form consensus as well as to interrupt it for the sake of truth, rep-resenting different perspectives on the complex relations between truth, agreement,and community. The normativity of truth has been depicted both as a community-forming force and as a community-transcending force. Some philosophers haveemphasized the unifying power of truth and have linked truth to consensus. Con-sensus theories of truth range from those that are perspectival and relativized to traditions (Feyerabend, Rorty) to those that are universalistic (the early Habermas).The discussion of the relationship between truth and consensus in Part III beginswith a conversation between Rorty and two of his critics: Habermas and McDowell. Habermas objects that Rorty’s consensus theory of truth leaves out theunconditionality of truth claims, which is a formal presupposition of the pragmatics of communication. On the other hand, McDowell argues that there is more to theobjectivity of truth than allegiance to the standards of a community (whether actualor ideal, particular or universal): our inquiries are normatively beholden to theirsubject matters and, therefore, our truth claims are answerable to the world, and notjust to the community of researchers they address. Feyerabend joins this conversationas a relativistic voice that calls into question community-transcendent claims of objec-tivity. Arguing against scientistic views, Feyerabend calls our attention to the socialprocesses of manufacturing truths through consensus in scientific communities. Heoffers a spirited defense of relativism and criticizes any transcendent notion of truthas illusory. This analysis suggests that truth talk can operate as a mechanism of inclu-


sion and exclusion which empowers some and disempowers others.The issue of howany order of truth is grounded in a set of normative exclusions will be discussed later(cf. Parts VI and VII).

Part IV is centered around the question of whether truth can be thought of in a non-propositional (or pre-propositional) way, whether we might need to think of truth like this,and how best to understand the pre-propositional. We give voice to a number ofapparently different accounts of such truth, drawing on language itself, on the inten-tional structures of art, on our perceptual engagement with the world, and on ourculturally embedded “dwelling.” And in fact this theme is taken up by essays in othersections, when they write of “forms of life,” “embodiment,” the world of “simulacra,”or “the experience of truth.” What is denied is not that truth is importantly proposi-tional, but that it is only propositional. Indeed if, as it is claimed, propositional truthis intimately bound up with these structuring or background conditions, truth cannotjust be propositional. If there is some measure of agreement here in the material wehave selected, it also shares the need to avoid what we could call a new foundation-alism, one that would credit some mystically inchoate and wordless dimension witha determinate founding privilege. Much of the fascination comes from seeing howthese thinkers wrestle with that temptation. The contributors in this section sketchdistinctive portraits of the place of language, and the truth claims it makes possible,in the broader world of experience and social and cultural practices. Each of them isstruggling with a philosophical tradition that has resisted pre-propositional truth, andeach makes a persuasive case for resisting it no more.

The conversation in Part V is centered on the issue of disclosure and testimony.Thisconversation is traversed by both a contrast and a continuity. The contrast is thatarticulated by Levinas, when he opposes disclosure (having to do with being, in anethically neutral way) to the fundamentally ethical dimension of testimony.The con-tinuity or convergence is apparent in our beginning the conversation with Husserl’ssearch for “self-evidence.” For what self-evidence, disclosure, testimony, and witness-ing have in common is the claim to being fundamental forms of attestation, funda-mental in the sense of not being derivative from anything else, supplying, if you like,basic shapes of truth. The nest of questions raised here include: Does this oppositionbetween the ontological and the ethical really stand up? (Husserl sees validation throughself-evidence as tied to my being able to be responsible for what I say; Heidegger seesdisclosedness as a condition for personal and collective authenticity; Levinas seemsunable to shake off various ontological assumptions.) Or again: Where is the dimensionof obligation in testimony properly located? (Do I have an obligation to believe your tes-timony? Or do you have a duty to speak the truth in a way I can rely on?) Do theseissues really bear on truth in a deep and important way, or only in some loose and allusiveway? Might it not be that the normativity of truth is at stake here as never before inthese discussions? We open up this conversation to some current work in moral psy-chology, which fruitfully engages with the interplay of ethical and epistemologicalquestions in such areas as trust, truth, and truthfulness. And we frame the whole dis-cussion by the challenge thrown down by Vattimo in Part IV (p. 181): Is not the veryidea of testimony anachronistic, a throwback to a “pre-critical” sense of the subject?

PartVI is concerned with two sorts of questions: constitutive and regulative questionsabout the internal and external connections between truth and power. The constitutive

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5

questions have to do with ways in which truth, in the shape of regimes of truth (discourses, codes, practices), is intrinsically an operation of power – framing, classifying,distributing, excluding, etc. At this level, truth could not simply be said to serve power,it would be power (or a power) itself.This line of thought is most clearly developed byNietzsche and Foucault. In the external or regulative sense, truth would serve power.Here the questions have to do with what value truth has in political life, whether dif-ferent kinds of truth are more or less susceptible to manipulation, what value there mightstill be in impartial institutions.And this very distinction (between internal/constitutive,external/regulative relations between truth and power) is itself being challenged by ourdiscussants, many of whom highlight precisely the ways in which rigid dichotomiesreflect absolutist, agent-neutral, and hence impoverished views of truth. If there is somemeasure of agreement about the socially embedded nature of “regimes of truth,” thequestion of whether truth can continue to have a critical reflective edge becomes moreurgent.We do not need to assume some privileged philosophical truth to fear a collapseof “truth” into discursive practices serving special interests.

Reflecting the problematic of “closure” and completeness alluded to by many con-temporary discussions of truth, we have added to this volume a concluding Supple-ment. Here we give voice to various ways in which some of the most arrestingcontemporary thinkers destabilize the traditional metaphysics of truth, particularly theassured operation of fundamental oppositions, and the classical alliance betweenTrue/False and Reality/Appearance. When Baudrillard writes cryptically that “Thesimulacrum is never what hides the truth – it is truth that hides the fact that thereis none,” and when Deleuze promotes the forger as the artist of truth, should we treatthese pronouncements as the tremors that precede a conceptual earthquake? Or issomeone just playing too loudly in the basement?

Note

1 There are two excellent anthologies on truth already currently available: Truth, ed. SimonBlackburn and Keith Simmons (Oxford University Press, 1999), which focuses more nar-rowly on deflationary and minimalist views of truth; and The Nature of Truth, ed. MichaelLynch (MIT Press, 2001), a very broad sampler representing many traditions, but withoutany attempt to construct a dialogue between them.


PART I

THE VALUE OF TRUTH: “REVALUING OUR HIGHEST VALUES”

INTRODUCTION

Nietzsche and James are responsible for posing the hardest and most crucial questionsthat subsequent philosophical debates on truth will have to answer.Their radical criti-cal questions concern the very value of truth, which is commonly taken for grantedboth in philosophy and in ordinary life when we assume that it is our obligation to seek the truth, to tell the truth, to acknowledge the truth, etc. The questions Nietzsche and James pose call for more than the aseptic tasks of analysis and theorybuilding. In their hands the discussion of truth becomes a critical endeavor: it be-comes, in Nietzsche’s words, the critical enterprise of “revaluing our highest values”.The Nietzschean and Jamesian critical questioning of the value of truth opens up aset of issues and concerns that can be grouped under three headings relating to different aspects of truth: the normativity, the performativity, and the relativity of truth.

The brief discussion that follows tries to bring to the fore the similarities and dif-ferences between Nietzsche’s and James’s elucidations of these aspects.We try to makeexplicit both the convergence and the divergence between their views of truth. Foralthough Nietzsche and James are of one mind in posing very similar questions andin setting the agenda for the philosophical debate on truth around the same themes,there are substantive disagreements between them stemming from the crucial differ-ences in the philosophical orientations underlying the positions they defend. So byjuxtaposing these texts we hope to create a dialogue between Nietzsche and James,as well as a dialogue with a common interlocutor, namely, absolutism, the view of truthas an absolute, unquestionable value. In this twofold dialogue Nietzsche and Jamesappear both as dissenting voices and as kindred voices fighting against a commonenemy.

There are other voices that, being both distinctive and akin, can naturally join Nietzsche and James in their critical enterprise of “revaluing our highest values”:Marx, Freud, Husserl, F. C. S. Schiller, and Dewey, to name a few critical philosopherswho are, roughly, their contemporaries (see Suggested Readings).

Why should we value truth rather than falsity? Why should we hold people respon-sible for respecting the truth and complying with it? Why should we do so ourselves?These questions raised by Nietzsche and James make us critically conscious of a crucialaspect of the concept of truth that traditionally had been either assumed or deniedin philosophy:1 namely, the normativity of truth. As Allen (1993) has pointed out, Niet-zsche and James warn us that we should be suspicious when it is built into the verynotion of something that that thing is valuable.They both encourage a skeptical atti-tude towards any alleged built-in normativity. Nietzsche denounces the virtues associ-ated with truth (such as honesty) as “occult qualities” that explain nothing and aresupported by nothing. On the other hand, James criticizes the appeal to truth as “anend in itself,” which turns truth into an arbitrary stopping point of explanation andjustification. In this way Nietzsche and James both warn us to beware of those prop-erties that are said to have intrinsic value, a value that cannot be called into question;for making a value absolute and self-evident is the best way of protecting it whilehiding a dogmatic attitude towards it. Rejecting the absolutist conception of truth,Nietzsche and James argue that truths are desired for their consequences, for theimpact they can have on our life-experiences and practices. So, in a general sense,

both Nietzsche and James can be characterized as consequentialists, but their alethicconsequentialism could not be more different. For, although they both tie the value oftruth to its practical consequences, they assess these consequences, and hence truth’svalue, in very different ways.

Nietzsche’s alethic consequentialism brings with it a skeptical and deconstructiveapproach. He draws a contrast between “the will to truth” and “the will to falsehood,”which he characterizes as being at the service of two opposed goals: the preservationof the herd and the preservation of the individual, respectively. His genealogicalaccount tries to show that there is nothing natural about the will to truth, that ratherthan being a human tendency that arises naturally and spontaneously, it is a duty thatsociety imposes on us:“the duty to lie according to a fixed convention” (p. 17 below).Moreover, he calls attention to the “petty benefits” and the “high costs” associatedwith the will to truth: it can give us repose, security, and consistency, but at the priceof “petrification” and “forgetfulness.” The socially enforced will to truth coagulatesthe prodigious dynamism and diversity of which our life and thought are capable;and it makes us forget all those other ways of thinking and acting that are not in con-formity with the herd, thus making us lose our creativity and originality. Nietzschecontends that we must overcome the herd mentality and transcend the will to truth.This liberation is the emancipatory goal that, on his view, the critical activity of“revaluing our highest values” should have.

James arrives at very different conclusions in his critical examination of the nor-mativity of truth. Rather than aiming at a nihilistic view through a deconstructivegenealogy, he develops a reconstructive account whose goal is the rehabilitation of thevalue of truth on pragmatic grounds. Following Schiller and Dewey in viewing truthas “a species of the good” (i.e. the good in the way of belief ), James characterizestruth as what is “expedient in the way of our thinking” (p. 33 below). Denouncingthe idealizations and abstractions of rationalism which have led philosophers to despise“the muddy particulars of experience” (p. 36 below), he wants to explain “the cash-value of truth” in experiential terms. His empiricist and pragmatist view tries to bringthe concept of truth back to the world of concrete experience and praxis (to the life-world ) in which it functions. It is important to note that in his experiential and prag-matic justification of the value of truth, James depicts our obligation towards truth as“tremendously conditioned” – that is, as “part of our general obligation to do whatpays” (p. 36 below). On James’s view, truths are reliable guides in our life and prac-tice. As he puts it, the value of true ideas lies in their “useful leading”: they lead toconsistency, stability, and solidarity, and away from “eccentricity and isolation.”

This is, of course, where James and Nietzsche part company. For although they offer converging accounts of the practical consequences of truth, where James sees only valuable benefits, Nietzsche sees “high costs” that outweigh “petty benefits.” Farfrom assessing eccentricity and isolation negatively, as James does, Nietzsche consid-ers them the source of the creativity and originality that are at the core of humanexistence. We would like to suggest, however, that within a Nietzschean perspectivethere is still room to reinstate the value of truth in a new sense: namely, by focusingon the disruptive, subversive, and ultimately affirmative potential of truth, which neither Nietzsche nor James considers explicitly in these selections.As a wolf in sheep’s cloth-ing, the will to truth can be subverted and put at the service of the life-affirming

10 THE VALUE OF TRUTH

power of creativity.The valorization of these disruptive truths, truths that break agree-ment and interrupt the social life of the community, is indeed compatible with Niet-zsche’s critique of the herd mentality. But it is important to note that this disruptivedimension of truth does not merely stand in opposition to standard norms: it is morethan a simple (masked) negation of the will to truth that accepts established conven-tions; it is a subversion of this conformist will that displaces it, destabilizes it, andopens up the possibility of a new affirmation. This Nietzschean valorization of an orientation towards truth that embraces disruption, subversion, and affirmation maybe more urgent than ever as modern democracies enter into a new phase.2 We willrevisit this issue in part VII.

A second set of questions raised by the critical discussions of Nietzsche and Jamesconcerns the performativity of truth. Both Nietzsche and James call attention to thethings we do, the actions we perform, with the truth (telling it, hiding it, twisting it,confessing it, etc.). The performative dimension of truth has two different senses: aninstrumental and a constitutive sense (which will be the focus of Part V below). In itsinstrumental sense, the performative power of truth consists in the consequences itcan bring about. In a constitutive sense, truths themselves (and not just their conse-quences) have a performative character, because they are produced by our alethic dis-cursive acts: they are formed and enacted, constituted and performed, in discursivepractices. (This could not be otherwise, for, as James puts it, “All human thinking getsdiscursified [. . .] by means of social intercourse” (p. 31 below).

Both Nietzsche and James emphasize that truths are not just there, inert and given;they have to be produced. In his critique of the copy theory of truth, James argues that true ideas and thoughts are not mere copies, but symbols, and that therefore theyinvolve more than a passive mirroring: they require an active making. In a similarvein, Nietzsche argues that truths have to be manufactured linguistically. He describesthe discursive production of truth as the making of an illusion, for it requires theforgetfulness of its own genesis in discursive practices: to believe in the truth, accord-ing to Nietzsche, we have to forget how things have been made true. Both Nietzscheand James describe truths as symbolic events or processes, insisting that ideas andthoughts are not veridical in themselves (veridicality is never an intrinsic quality), butthat they have to be made true. In this sense the focus of their discussions is on makingtrue, rather than on being true (see also Parts II and III below).

The performative character of truth brings to the fore the crucial dependence oftruth on our practices and interests (which will be explored and discussed in differ-ent ways in all subsequent parts of this book). And this brings us to the last aspectof truth that Nietzsche and James call our attention to: namely, its relativity. BothNietzsche and James reject any philosophical view of truth as an absolute property.Emphasizing the holistic and dynamic nature of truth, James describes truths as rela-tive in a twofold sense: truths are relative to the always changeable reality we copewith in our experiences and practices; and they are also relative to the always change-able frameworks or belief systems in which they are inscribed. On the other hand,Nietzsche argues that there are always contingent and arbitrary, “anthropomorphic”elements3 in any alleged truth which get forgotten: “truths are illusions that we haveforgotten are illusions” (p. 17 below). The absolute perspective on truth is an ideo-logical cover-up that makes us oblivious to this forgetfulness and to the illusory nature

INTRODUCTION 11

of truths, which are presented as absolute and final realities. However, although bothNietzsche and James call into question any sharp boundary between what is true andwhat passes for true in our practices, James does not share the skepticism and thor-oughgoing relativism of Nietzsche. James is certainly a pluralist, but is he also a rela-tivist?4 He defends the diversification of truth according to plural practices and pluralinterests, arguing that we should always talk about truths in the plural, for they arerealized in rebus. But no matter how diverse human practical interests may be, Jamescontends that there is always the possibility of convergence provided by the generalinterests of mankind – that is, by the interests that relate to adaptation and the sur-vival of the species.These general interests constitute the ground for what James callsour “general obligation to do what pays,” which is what brings us all together astruth-seekers. On this naturalistic perspective, truth is viewed as what proves to bereliable and adaptive in the long run. Given this neo-Darwinian naturalism, it is doubt-ful that James should be considered a radical relativist. Although he calls attention tothe relativistic elements in our assessments of truth, his empiricist and pragmatic relativism in conjunction with his naturalism make room for a strong notion of objec-tivity. By contrast, Nietzsche’s life-affirming relativism eschews this notion, emphasiz-ing that there is only an aesthetic relation between different spheres of discourse andtheir different truths. He remarks that, unlike the enslaved “rational man,” the “liber-ated intuitive man” is bound only by aesthetic criteria.This relativism is quite alien toJames’s pragmatic view of truth (although they are both based on a critique of ratio-nalism). The issue of objectivity and relativism will be revisited in Part III.

Notes

1 In many discussions of truth in the history of philosophy its normative dimension wassimply ignored, but in many others it was considered and denied. The latter is the case inso-called decriptivist views of truth. Relying on a strong separation between the factual andthe normative, these views treat “true” as a purely descriptive predicate. Although thefact–value distinction has come under heavy attack on various fronts, descriptivism still sur-vives in naturalist approaches defended in the contemporary literature (see e.g. Field 1994).

2 Nietzsche’s “disruptive” impact on twentieth-century French and German philosophy hasbeen extraordinary, and particularly on many of the figures selected in this volume. Thebest-known treatments of Nietzsche – including books by Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault,Irigaray, and Heidegger – are listed here: Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans.Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Jacques Derrida, The Earof the Other: Otobiography, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Schocken Books, 1985); JacquesDerrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1979); Michel Foucault,“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader (NewYork: Random House, 1984), pp. 76–100; Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 1: The Will toPower as Art, trans. David F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); vol. 2: The EternalRecurrence of the Same, trans. David F. Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984); vol. 3:Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, trans. Joan Stambaugh and Frank Capuzzi(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986); vol. 4: Nihilism, trans. David F. Krell (New York:Harper & Row, 1982); Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); Luce Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the

12 THE VALUE OF TRUTH

Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz(South Bend, IN: Regentry/Gateway, Inc., 1979); Carl G. Jung, Nietzsche’s “Zarathustra,”ed. James L. Jarrett (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Pierre Klossowski, Niet-zsche and the Vicious Circle (London: Athlone, 1993); Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor,trans. Duncan Large (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

3 On Nietzsche’s view, these elements are unavoidable given the fact that human symboli-zation is always based on contingent and optional metaphors.

4 F. C. S. Schiller, who had a great influence on James, thought that pragmatism vindicatesthe Protagorean dictum “Man is the measure of all things,” of which he said: “Fairly inter-preted, this is the truest and most important thing that any thinker has ever propounded”(Humanism (London: Macmillan, 1912), p. xxi). An analysis and defense of Protagoras’sdictum will be offered by Feyerabend in Part III.

INTRODUCTION 13

1

ON TRUTH AND LIES IN ANONMORAL SENSE1

and Other Readings

Friedrich Nietzsche

1

Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersedinto numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beastsinvented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “worldhistory,” but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths,the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die. – One might inventsuch a fable, and yet he still would not have adequately illustrated how miserable,how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect lookswithin nature.There were eternities during which it did not exist. And when it is allother with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has noadditional mission which would lead it beyond human life. Rather, it is human, andonly its possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly – as though the world’s axis turnedwithin it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he like-wise flies through the air with the same solemnity,2 that he feels the flying center ofthe universe within himself. There is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant innature that it would not immediately swell up like a balloon at the slightest puff ofthis power of knowing. And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so eventhe proudest of men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes ofthe universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” pp. 79–91 in Philosophy and Truth: Selec-tions from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeals (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:Humanities Press, 1979). © by Daniel Breazeale. Reprinted with permission.

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York:VintageBooks, 1968), pp. 289, 292. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern (Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis,1909), pp. 5–6.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 41. Reprintedby permission of Penguin Books Ltd.

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