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AUTHOR Pearce, Kimber CharlesTITLE "Dissoi Logoi" and Rhetorical Invention:

Contradictory Arguments for Contemporary Pedagogy.PUB DATE [94]

NOTE 27p.PUB TY?E Viewpoints (Opinion/Position Papers, Essays, etc.)

(120)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage.DESCRIPTORS Audience Awareness; Higher Education; *Persuasive

Discourse; *Public Speaking; *Rhetorical Invention;*Rhetorical Theory; Student Needs

IDENTIFIERS Classical Rhetoric; *Rhetorical Strategies

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the origins of "dissoi logoi" (or

twofold arguments) as a sophistic concept and pedagogical practice. Arationale is offered to explain why "dissoi logoi" should be adoptedas a conceptual base for teaching invention in contemporary publicspeaking courses. Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives on"dissoi logoi" are compared and contrasted to reveal the need toteach "dissoi logoi" to contemporary students because of theheterogeneous nature of audiences in modern society. Contains 44references. (Author/RS)

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Dissoi Logol and Rhetorical Invention: Contradictory

Arguments for Contemporary Pedagogy

by

Kimber Charles Pearce

Department of Speech Communication

234 Sparks Building

The Pennsylvania State University

University Park, PA 16802-5201

(814) 237-7054

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ABSTRACT

This essay examines the origins of dissoi logoi (or twofoldarguments) as a sophistic concept and pedagogical practice. Arationale is offered to explain why dissoi logoi should beadopted as a conceptual base for teaching invention incontemporary public speaking courses. Aristotelian andProtagorean perspectives on dissoi logoi are compared andcontrasted to reveal the need to teach dissoi logoi tocontemporary students because of the heterogeneous nature ofaudiences in modern society.

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//

Rhetorical pedagogy is nearly as old as the idea of rhetoric

itself. Not long after the rise of a rhetorical consciousness in

Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E.,1 training in

rhetoric anl oratory became fundamental to both theory and

practice. "Written treatises and school 'systems,' which allowed

rhetorical discoveries to be transmitted to others, enabled the

Greeks and then the Romans to amass a considerable body of

precepts for the guidance of speakers and writers."2 Greco-

Roman rhetorical precepts remain the bases for much of what is

taught in contemporary public speaking courses. Many modern

public speaking textbooks and other course materials are largely

derived from an Aristotelian approach to theory and practice.2

For centuries, Aristotle's Rhetoric has been considered a

master-text of rhetorical pedagogy. Says George A. Kennedy,

"Most teachers of composition, communication, and speech regard

it as seminal work that organizes its subject into essential

parts, provides insight into the bases of speech acts, creates

categories and terminology for discussing discourse, and

illustrates and applies its teachings so that they can be used in

society."4 However, despite the longstanding popularity of

Aristotle's Rhetoric, modern speech teachers should recognize

that much of the Aristotelian perspective evolved from sophistic

origins that also hold practical value for rhetorical pedagogy

today.

Since the late 1960s, various attempts have been made to

incorporate sophistic perspectives into rhetorical theory, and

much attention has been paid to the extant fragments of such

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2

figures as Protagoras and Gorgias, among others.5 As the

earliest known speech teachers, the Sophists ushered rhetoric

into ancient Greece and established the first systematic study of

speech composition. Richard Leo Enos writes: "Sophistic

influence became so endemic and pervasive that its mode of

teaching, including rhetoric, became synonymous with higher

education."

One sophistic precept in particular, dissoi logoi (or

twofold arguments), deserves close attention because of its

utility for teaching invention in contemporary basic public

address courses. This essay briefly examines the origins of

dissoi logoi as a sophistic concept and pedagogical practice and

provides a rationale for why dissoi logoi should be adopted as a

conceptual base for teaching invention in contemporary public

speaking courses.

According to Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras of Abdera

(possibly 490-420 B.C.E) "was the first ta say that on every

issue there are two arguments opposed to each other,"7 a concept

expressed by the Greek phrase, dissoi logoi. Edward Schiappa

interprets the fragment as follows:

. the fragment represents a claim about the relationshipbetween language and reality. Protagoras' claim marks atransition between compositional and attributionalpatterns/logics of explanation. Finally, the two-logoifragment can be translated usefully with either a locativeemphasis or a veridical emphasis (the former is preferred).The locative emphasis yields: "Two accounts [logoi) arepresent about every 'thing,' opposed to each other." Theveridical emphasis yields: "Two contrary reports [logoi] aretrue concerning every experience."8

This study will recognize both the locative and veridical

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emphases, as mentioned by Schiappa. However, considering the two

modes of translation for contemporary pedagogical purposes raises

a theoretical issue that has become a locus of debate in studies

of sophistic thinking during the past decade. Schiappa makes a

distinction between ". . . a) appreciating sophistic thinking as

contributing to contemporary rhetorical theory and criticism, and

b) reconstructing specific sophistic theories or doctrines about

rhetoric."9 He claims that while extending sophistic thinking

and deliberating over historical facts are both profitable

pursuits, the two methods are most validly applied separately.

As an example of the problem with combining methods of

historical reconstruction with theory extension for thinking

about the Sophists, Schiappa has critiqued John Poulakos' essay,

"Towards a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric."10 Schiappa

concludes that, on a theoretical level, Poulakos' goals and

methods are inappropriate for the study of Greek thought. While

Schiappa and Poulakos continue this debate elsewhere,'1 it

should be noted that this study extends sophistic thinking for

purposes of neo-sophistic pedagogy, and does not intend to engage

in historical reconstruction of sophistic theories and doctrines.

For extending the sophistic concept of dissoi logoi, an

additional ancient source to examine is the sophistic tract

Dissoi Logoi. The Dissci Logoi is "a treatise written in

literary Doric at some time subsequent to the end of the

Peloponnesian War. nu The history of the treatise is highly

speculative, as are the authorship, date, state, and purpose of

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4

the work. Some speculate that the tract may be a student's

exercise or lecture notes or a teacher's unfinished lecture, and

some that it may actually be two or more separate essays."

Since the only clear evidence for dating the treatise comes in an

allusion by the author to the Peloponnesian War (1, 8) as "most

recent events,"" placement of the document at around 400 B.C.E.

has generated discussion about possible influences on the author.

T. M. Robinson and others believe that Protagoras is most likely

the major influence on the author of the Dissoi Logoi,15 "with

some minor influence of Hippias, some even more minor influence

of Gorgias, and the possibility of some Socratic influence.""

In a statement in the Dissoi Logoi found in a chapter on

truth and falsehood, translated by Michael J. O'Bien, the author

conveys a relativistic perspective on language and reality. The

emphasis of 0/Brien's translation resembles Schiappa's veridical

translation of the fragment about Protagoras in Diogenes :

(1) Twofold arguments are also put forward concerningthe false and the true, concerning which one personsays that a false statement is one thing and a truestatement another, while others say the true statementis the same as the false. (2) And I hold the latterview: in the first place, because they c.re bothexpressed in the same words, and secondly, becausewhenever a statement is made, if things <should> turnout o be as stated, tl'en the statement is true, but ifthey should not turn out to be as stated, the samestatement is false.°

This statement about twofold arguments denies the

Aristotelian Law of Non-Contradiction, which claims that a

thing cannot be both true and false. Commenting on

contemporary responses to this aspect of dissoi logoi, Susan

'7

5

C. Jarratt asserts that from ". . . our location on the far

side of Aristotle's insistence on the Law of Non-

Contradiction," we see dissoi logoi as a basis for taking

any side in an argument and for making the weaker case the

stronger.18 But she adds that ". . . under the

epistemology attributed to Protagoras in [Plato's]

Theaetetus and revealed by other fragments, dissoi logoi are

unavoidable outcomes of any group discourse."19 Jarratt's

claim holds practical implications for extending the

veridical emphasis in dissoi logoi for use in contemporary

speech pedagogy.

If dissoi logoi are produced in group discourse, an

epistemological function emerges that necessarily affects

rhetorical invention and transcends the scope of the modern

application of argument/counterargument ordinarily taught in

forensics. Cranted that Schiappa's locative translation of

the fragment from Diogenes yields that ". . . two accounts

[logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each

other,"" then the Law of Non-Contradiction remains intact,

where one thing is true and one thing is false, situated as

opposites. This locative translation, which is preferred by

Schiappa, maintains an excluded middle, a position that is

reflected in applications of argument/counterargument in

contemporary forensics. On the other hand, Schiappa's

veridical translation does not adhere to non-contradiction.

6

Thus the veridical translation possesses greater heuristic

value for extending the concept of dissoi logoi to a

strategy of invention that addresses group discourses where

either/or outcomes are not easily produced.

O'Brien's translation of the statement on truth and

falsehood from the Dissoi Logoi denies an excluded middle:

"the true statement is the same as the false."2' This

veridical emphasis recognizes the pragmatics of situational

constraints and the limitations of language operating in the

context of socially-constructed realities. The pragmatic

dimension of the veridical emphasis offers the contemporary

speech teacher a broad conceptual tool in dissoi logoi for

channeling and fccusing diverse opinions and perspectives in

the public speaking classroom. As will be shown, dissoi

logoi offers a holistic method for teaching invention that

can be used to encourage students' rhetorical sensitivity to

race, class, gender, and different ideologies to prepare

nem to meet multiple demands of group discourse in the

larger context of a diverse society.

Unrestricted by the rule of non-contradiction, students

are better equipped to recognize merits of an honorable

opposition. Such a consideration of multiple perceptions is

an approach to invention that allows more latitude for

adapting arguments to situational constraints. Michael

Billig clajms that the power of dissoi logoi is the power of

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7

logos itself, citing a potential to provoke discourse: "The

power of speech is not the power to command obedience by

replacing argument with silence. It is the power to

challenge silent obedience by opening arguments. "n If

dissoi logoi does serve such a liberatory discursive

function, then it behooves contemporary speech teachers to

adopt it as a precept for teaching invention. Rationales

for instituting dissoi logoi in public speaking courses can

be discovered by comparing and contrasting locative and

veridical readings of dissoi logoi in Aristotelian and

Prot,slgorean perspectives.

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle provides a rationale lor

dissoi logoi:

Speech based on knowledge is teaching, but teaching isimpossible [with some audiences]; rather, it isnecessary for pisteis and speeches [as a whole] to beformed on the basis of common [beliefs], as we said inthe Topics about communication with a crowd. Further,one should be able t.:) argue persuasively or either sideof a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, notthat we may actually do both (for one should notpersuade what is debased) but in order that it mightnot escape our notice what the real state of the caseis and that we ourselves may be able to refute ifanother person uses speech unjustly. None of the otherarts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic andrhetoric alone do this, for both are equally concernedwith opposites. Of course the underlying facts are notequally good in each case; but true and better ones areby nature always more productive of good syllogismsand, in a word, more persuasive."

Aristotle's rationale is congruent with a locative

emphasis on dissoi logoi. Aristotle says that during

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8

invention, a speaker should consider opposite accounts to

understand the real state of a case in order to refute what

is "debased" and to advocate facts that are "true and

better." In this view, the speaker incurs an ethical

responsibility attached to the acceptance of the locative

emphasis on dissoi logoi, where one is not "to make the

weaker seem the better cause. 1124 But, as Kennedy notes,

while the Greeks considered defense of the "weaker" cause

morally wrong, their willingness to give it a hearing was

basic to free speech and to advocacy of unpopular causes

with potential importance for society.25

The fundamental difference between Aristotelian and

Protagorean perspectives on dissoi logoi appears to reside

largely in their disparate beliefs about the relationship of

language and reality. Diogenes quotes Protagoras as saying:

"Of all things the measure is man, of things that are, that

they are, and of things that are not, that they are not. nn

Although interpretation of Protagoras' man-measure doctrine

has been a matter of controversy since Plato's time," G.

B. Kerferd lists wo points about the passage that he claims

have been "reasonably settled":--

The man who is the measure is each individual man, suchas you and I, and certainly not the human race ormankind taken as a single entity. Secondly what ismeasured about things is not their existence and non-existence, but the way they are and the way they arenot, or in more modern terms what are the predicatesthat are to be attached to them as subjects in subject-

1.1

9

predicate statements."

Kerferd claims that the discrepancy between Aristotle's

non-contradiction and Protagoras' man-measure doctrine

arises when two logoi are stated about one thing. In such

statements, one thing functions as a subject and two logoi

are what are expressed b'y predicate terms applied to the one

subject." Kerferd speculates that if Aristotle conceived

dissoi logoi as attributions of contradictory

characteristics to a single subject (of what it is and what

it is not), it "would explain why Aristotle regularly treats

Protagoras' man-measure doctrine as involving a denial of

the law of non-contradiction."30 However, if one focuses

on the predicates in statements as different things rather

than on the single subject described, it is conceivable that

the statements can be true without contradiction. Pointing

to Protagoras' apparent observation of the multiple ways

that different individuals can experience the same

phenomenon, Kerferd concludes: "We may infer that Protagoras

insisted that which is not one but a plurality on all

occasions."

This conceptual dimension of Protagoras' insistence on

the plurality of oneness appears to be inextricably linked

to human perception in a context, which is consistent with a

statement attributed to Protagoras by Sextus: ". . . that

all opinions are true and that truth is a relative matter

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10

because a man's every perception or opinion immediately

exists in relation to him."32 In this statement, it is

evident that human perception within a frame of reference is

key to Protagoras' relativistic conception of truth. Sextus

continues: "He (Protagoras] says too that the reasons

[logoi] of all the appearances are present in the matter, so

that the matter is capable, as far as lies in its own power,

of being everything that appears to everybody. Men,

however, apprehend different thinqs at different times

according to their various dispositions."33

Aristotle voices objections to Protagy7as' relativism

in the Metaphysics, where he refutes Protagoras' argument

because it denies non-contradiction:

. .if all contradictories are true at the same time

about the same thing, clearly all things will be one.For the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and aman, if of anything one may truly affirm or truly denyanything, and this necessarily follows for those whouse the argument of Protagoras. For if it seems tosomeone that a man is not a trireme, it is clear thathe is not a trireme; but then he is also a trireme, ifindeed the contradictory is true.34

Schiappa observes that Aristotle's refutation ignores

"Protagoras' assumption that things (or experiences) are not

independent or in themselves, but are only relative to d

frame of reference or 'meas'Ire."35 He places Aristotle's

argument within an either/or logic and Protagoras' argument

within a both/and logic: "To him [Protagoras] experience was

rich and variable enough to be capable of multiple--and even

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11

inconsistentaccounts."36 These differing forms of logic

appear to mark a primary point where Aristotle's and

Protagoras' rationales for dissoi logoi diverge.

Aristotle ::ees Oissoi logoi as a tool for recognizing

opposite arguments on a question. Protagoras believes Lhat

opposing accounts can be both true and false as perceived in

multipla ways by individuals relative to a particular frame

of reference. These divergent systems of logic in the

Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives on dissoi logoi

hold very different implications for the rhetor in the act

of invention. However, any rhetor designing a discourse for

a heterogeneous audience will find the Protagorean system a

more practical approach than the Aristotelian system,

because Protagoras emphasizes the multiplicity of human

perceptions of truth in a given context under specific

conditions. For this reason, the contemporary speech

teacher finds a compelling rationale for adopting a

veridical emphasis on dissoi logoi as a precept for teaching

invention. We will continue to expand on this point as it

relates to modern pedagogy.

A veridical reading of the Protagorean perspective on

dissoi logoi reveals a practical conceptual base for

teaching invention to contemporary students for the same

reason that Barry Brummett offers in his defense of modern

relativists:

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12

. truth that is consensus is not consistent orunified; it is multiple. . . . Furthermore, because weare grounded in competing social groups that are oftenin conflict, the commitments urged upon us by thosegroups also create contradictory and inconsistenttruths for the given individual who stands at theconjunction of such groups.37

As an individual operating within the parameters of a

collective society, the student in a contemporary public

speaking course often stands at the conjunction of competing

social groups. These social groups are situated within the

broader framework of race, class, gender, nationality,

ideology, etc. When called upon to design and deliver a

persuasive discourse to advocate a position on a

controversial social issue, a student might not readily

perceive the range of possible commitments and contradictory

truths implied by his or her choice of topics. The student

might not fully realize, as Billig does, that ". . . any

individual argument is actually or potentially, a part of a

social argument."38 As a result, the student speaker may

approach invention with the mistaken notion that an

individual rhetor can easily induce radical conversion in an

audience with a single persuasive speech.

To offset such a monologic misconception about

invention and persuasion, the speech teacher is obligated to

underscore the idea that rhetoric only functions in

sitaations where different perceptions of truth arise due to

a lack of apparent absolutes--where dissoi logoi are

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13

produced in group discourse. Students of speech should

clearly understand that, in rhetorical situations, a valid

goal for the rhetor is to further a process whereby

competing perceptions of truth might eventually be moved

toward compromise. In such a process, the ends of

successful persuasion are recast, not as acts of silencing

and marginalizing opponents by all available means, but

instead as more realistic efforts at gaining gradations of

inducement toward compromise. This suasory goal of

negotiating compromise begins with the generation of

constructive dialogues about issues in dispute.

However, acceptance of such an incremental process for

negotiating compromise is not always congruent with an

approach to persuasion that adheres to the Aristotelian Law

of Non-Contradiction. In many cases, strict adherence to an

either/or logic actually impedes effective visualization of

a progression toward a consensus. As a practical

alternative, a veridical emphasis on dissoi logoi

contributes to a more holistic method of invention because

it demands an examination of contradictory truths to

discover nodes in networks of conflicting reports, which are

inherent in every social experience. This is not to suggest

that dissoi logoi is the simplest approach to rhetorical

invention, for integrating one's communicative behaviors

with those of different social groups may well be the most

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19

difficult challenge any rhetor will ever face. George

Herbert Mead recognizes the extreme difficulty that

individuals often experience when attempting to integrate

their behaviors with those of different social groups:

. . those social situations in which the individualfinds it most difficult to integrate his own behaviorwith.the behavior of others are those in which he andthey are acting as members, respectively, of two ormore different socially functional groups: groups whoserespective social purposes or interests areantagonistic or conflicting or widely separated."

Thus, when a student speaker strives to resolve the

difficulties associated with integrating his or her position

with the conflicting ideas and interests of others to reach

a negotiated compromise, a primary advantage is gained from

approaching invention as a social act from the start. Karen

Burke LeFevre claims that while rhetorical invention is

widely viewed as the private act of an individual, it is

best conceptualized as P ocial act:

The social aspects of rhetorical invention aresignificant, constituting much more than a mere settingor environment within which the creative acts ofindividuals occur. Invention may first be seen associal in that the self that invents is, according tomany modern theorists, not merely socially influencedbut even socially constituted. Furthermore, oneinvents largely by means of language and other symbolsystems, which are socially created and shared.°

This idea of invention as a social act is a perspective

that easily accommodates a veridical emphasis on dissoi

logoi as a method for managing language. This reference to

managing language is not intended to denote an individual's

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15

understanding of the structural features of a particular

language system nor a rhetor's choice of words. Instead,

when we refer to language, we are alluding to the worldviews

of different discourse communities as manifested in the

verbal behaviors of competing social groups. In this sense,

managing language through dissoi logoi involves careful

inspection of contradictory truths to discover the multiple

purposes and interests of competing social groups. Learning

to manage language through dissoi logoi affords students

both a means to engage others effectively and a means to

engage the authoritative languages of institutional

discourses as well. Don H. Bialostosky writes of the vital

need for students to engage the different languages they

encounter in academic discourse, a concept that he extends

to encompass languages present in any conceivable social

arrangement in society at large:

Recognizing languages as languages and exploringthe worldviews inherent in them allows us toengage languages in a new way: responsibly, self-consciously, and openly, or--for it amounts to thesame thing--authentically. To know our minds asthe site of dialogue among languages is todiscover both the relevance of other people'swords to our predicaments and the relevance of ourcontributions to others with whom we share theworld and the ongoing dialogue about it. 41

In order to discover what is persuasive for an

audience, amidst the multiplicity of others' perceptions of

truth in a given situation, a student speaker must learn to

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recognize conjunctions of competing worldviews. Therefore,

when designing a persuasive discourse, a student should be

taught how to approach invention as a social act aimed at

discovering effective means to manage language within the

spectrum of views on the issue at hand. Dissoi logoi offers

a useful method for examining contrary reports inherent in

the conflicting worldviews of competing groups that can

comprise any given audience. However, as a method for

invention, dissoi logoi should not be taught as a simple

word game, nor as a means of deception, nor as the

traditional forensic approach to argument/counterargument.

Instead, it should be presented to students as an

epistemological function naturally arising from the

dialogues of discourse communities within the larger

framework of a heterogeneous society. The final section of

this essay will turn to practical aspects of teaching about

dissoi logoi in public speaking courses.

So far, this essay has attempted to compare and

contrast Aristotelian and Protagorean perspectives on dissoi

logoi, and to provide a rationale for adopting dissoi logoi

as a precept for teaching invention in contemporary public

speaking courses. An effort has been made to explain why a

veridical emphasis on dissoi logoi, as a both/and logic,

offers a more practical conceptual base for teaching

invention than non-contradiction, which involves an

17

either/or logic. Finally, a section has been devoted to

exploring the need to teach dissoi logoi to contemporary

students because of the heterogeneous nature of modern

society, where competing social groups create contradictory

truths about societal issues. At this juncture, we will

attempt to synthesize the arguments to explicate the

practical implications of adopting dissoi logoi for

contemporary speech pedagogy.

First, the Law of Non-Contradiction, as has been

argued, proves to be an arbitrary axiom when applied to

social experience. As Joseph Margolis concludes from the

philosopher Charles S. Peirc,3's evaluation of bipolar truth-

values: ". . . when the excluded middle is applied to

experience, to the experienced world, rather than to mere

idealized terms, we cannot ensure its applicability except

relative to our distinctions, provisionally with regard to

their acceptance, and conditionally on the inherent

inexhaustibility of experience or the experienced world. it 42

This position on the inapplicability of non-contradiction is

compatible with the statement attributed to Protagoras by

Sextus, ". . . that truth is a relative matter because a

man's every perception or opinion immediately exists in

relation to him."43

Such a perspective on the relative nature of truth

holds practical implications for rhetorical invention

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18

because it suggests that in order for a speaker to be

persuasive, he or she must first account for truth-values

beyond the realm of individual experience. To speak

effectively, a rhetor must inquire into notions of truth

outside of his or her own distinctions before attempting to

engage the notions of others to defend a position in a

reasoned way. Paul K. Moser discusses such a process of

inquiry as it relates to explaining one's notion of truth:

Ones's adopted specific notion of truth vill influencehow one explicates one's talk of truth. This does notentail, however, that one's adopted specific notion oftruth will determine that this notion itself iseffective for accomplishing one's ends in using anotion of truth. One's pertinent ends may very wellfavor an alternative specific notion of truth, and onecould come to recognize this--even withoutrelinquishing one's adopted notion of truth."

As Moser explains, one might discover that a particular

perception of truth is not the most efficacious notion for

accomplishing one's ends in argumentation. Moreover, even

if one decides to retain one perception of truth in lieu of

adopting another alternative, one is still left to contend

with the possibility of confronting the alternative in the

course of a reasoned defense. Regardless of the perception

of truth that one chooses to adopt, a more holistic

understanding of multiple notions of truth can emerge from a

thorough inquiry. Thus, one becomes more aware of how a

reasoned defense ought to proceed.

For purposes of rhetorical invention then, dissoi logoi

19

can serve the function of inquiry that Moser describes. By

teaching studants to examine both their own and others'

perceptions oZ what is true about the issues on which they

choose to speak, rhetor!cal invention becomes epistemic:

This epistemic function can prevail throughout the speech

design process, in choosing a topic, in audience analysis,

in research and collecting supporting materials, and in

structuring the speech for presentation to the public

speaking class. Teaching dissoi logoi as a method of

invention can maximize a student's learning experience. As

a method, dissoi logoi promotes a mode of learning that

transcends the task of simply designing and delivering a

persuasive speech that results in a monologic presentation.

By examining contradictory truths, a student must seek

to know more about the issue on which he or she has chosen

to speak. Through that process of invention, a student

gains a better sense of his or her own position in relation

to the issue, and is allowed to alter that position if he or

she sees fit. By adopting dissoi logoi as a precept for

teaching invention, a speech teacher can transform the

curriculum of a public speaking course from the purely

technical concerns of design and delivery to a rhetorical

exposition of diversity. For if a student feels strongly

enough about an issue to deliver a speech on the subject,

then there must be an abundance of fertile curiosity

20

motivating that student. Dissoi logoi is a method that can

tap a student's curiosity for all of its potential worth.

And when a student's full potential is channeled into

reasoned discourse before a public speaking class, every

member of the classroom community can be enriched by the

experience.

21

Notes

1. George A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton,NJ: Princeton up, 1963) 27.

2. James J. Murphy, "The Origins and Early Development ofRhetoric," A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. James J.Murphy (Davis, CA Hermagoras P, 1983) 3-4.

3. Stephen E. Lucas, The Art of Public Speaking 4th ed. (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1992); Raymond S. Ross. Speech Communication:The Speechmaking System, 8th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1989); Rudolph F. Verdeber, The Challenge of EffectiveSpeaking, 7th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1988); John FletcherWilson, Carroll C. Arnold, and Molly Meijer Werthheimer, PublicSpeaking as a Liberal Art, 6th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1990).

4. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans.George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) ix.

5. Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); R. Bett, "The Sophists andRelativism," Phronesis 34 (1989) : 139-69; R. A. Engnell,"Implications for Communication of the Rhetorical Epistemology ofGorgias of Leontini," Western Speech 37 (1973) : 175-84; R. L. Enos,Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland P,1993); B. E. Gronbeck, "Gorgias on Rhetoric and Poetic: ARehabilitation," Southern S eech Communication Journal 38 (1972):27-38; W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge, Cambridge UP,1971); Edward Hussey, The Presocratics (London: Duckworth, 1972);S. C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1991); S. C. Jarratt, "TheRole of the Sophists in Histories of Consciousness," Philosophy andRhetoric 23 (1990) : 85-95; S. C. Jarratt, "Toward a SophisticHistoriography," Pre/Text 8: 9-26; G. B. Kerferd, The SophisticMovement (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981); G. B. Kerferd, TheSophists and Their Legacy, ed. G. B. Kerferd (Wiesbaden: FranzSteiner, 1981); D. Payne, "Rhetoric, Reality and Knowledge,: A Re-Examination of Protagoras' Concept of Rhetoric," Rhetoric SocietVQuarterly 16 (1986) : 187-97; J. Poulakos, "Gorgias"Encomium toHelen' and the Defense of Rhetoric, ' Rhetorica 1 (1983) : 1-16; J.Poulakos, "Towards a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric," Philosophyand Rhetoric 16 (1983) : 35-48; J. Poulakos, "Rhetoric, theSophists, and the Possible," Communication Monographs 51 (1984):215-26; T. M. Robinson, Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of theDissoi Logoi (New York: Arno P, 1979); E. Schiappa, Neo-SophisticRhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of SophisticDoctrines?" Philosophy and Rhetoric 23 (1990) : 192-217; E.

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Schiappa, Emtagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy andRhetoric (Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 1991); E. Schiappa,"Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?" Rhetoric Review 10 (1991):5-18; R. K. Sprague, The Older Sophists (Columbia, SC: U of SouthCarolina P, 1972).

6. Richard Leo Enos, Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle (ProspectHeights, IL: Waveland P, 1993) 136.

7. Rosamond Kent Sprague, The Older Sophists (Columbia, SC: U ofSouth Carolina P, 1972) 21.

8. Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in GreekPhilosophy and Rhetoric (Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 1991)100.

9. Edward Schiappa, "Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or theHistorical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?" Philosophy andRhetoric 23 (1990) : 193.

10. John Poulakos, "Towards a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric,"Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983): 35-48.

11. See: John 0oulakos, "Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: AResponse to Schiappa," Philosophy and Rhetoric 23 (1990) : 218-228;Edward Schiappa, "History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply toPoulakos, Philosophy and Rhetoric 23 (1990) : 307-315.

12. Sprague 279.

13. Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) 518.

14. Sprague 280.

15. T. M. Robinson Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the DissoiLogoi (New York: Arno P, 1979) 72; A. J. Levi, "On TwofoldStatements," American Journal of Philology 61 (1940) : 300; L.Versenyi, Socratic Humanism (Yale UP, 1963) 18; Norman Gulley, ThePhilosophy of Socrates (London, 1968) 31.

16. Robinson 72-3.

17. Sprague 287.

18. S. C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical RhetoricRefigured (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1991) 49.

19. Jarratt 49.

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20. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos 100.

21. Sprague 287.

22. Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach toSocial Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 48.

23. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans.George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) 34-5.

24. Aristotle, On Rhetoric 210.

25. Aristotle, On Rhetoric 210. See footnote 253.

26. Sprague 4.

27. G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 1981) 85.

28. Kerferd 86. While Kerferd's claim may be far from "settled"in philological debate, his reading of Protagoras' doctrineprovides a reasonable direction for purposes of extension into neo-sophistic pedagogy.

29. Kerferd 92.

30. Kerferd 92.

31. Kerferd 92.

32. Sprague 18.

33. Sprague 11.

34. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle(Grinnell, Iowa: Peripatetic P, 1979) 62.

35. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos 192.

36. Schiappa, Prota oras and Logos 193.

37. Barry Brummett, "Relativism and Rhetoric," Rhetoric andPhilosophy, ed. Richard A. Cherwitz (Hillsdale, NJ: LawrenceEr3baum, 1990) 88.

38. Billig, Arguing and Thinking 44.

39. George Herbert Mead, On Social Psychology (Chicago, IL: U ofChicago P, 1977) 276.

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40. Karen Burke Lefevre, Invention as a Social Act (Carbondale,IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1987) 2.

41. Don H. Bialostosky, "Liberal Education, Writing, and theDialogic Self," Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric ina Postmodern Age, eds. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb (New York:The Modern Language Association of America, 1991) 17.

42. Joseph Margolis, The Truth About Relativism (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1991) 52.

43. Sprague 18.

44. Paul K. Moser, Philosophy after Obiectivity: Making Sense inPerspective (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993) 163.

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