Economist Insights 2013 10 072
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7/27/2019 Economist Insights 2013 10 072
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Economist Insights
Dancing on the ceiling
7 October 2013Asset management
The terms debt ceiling and debt limit are actually rather
misleading. They imply a restriction that stops borrowing
happening, but in fact simply refer to an enabling law
which allows borrowing to happen. Prior to 1917, when the
first debt limit was introduced, the US Treasury had to ask
permission for every Treasury note, T-bill or loan it needed to
issue. This was a laborious process, so a general permission
was introduced that enabled the Treasury to issue debt up to
a pre-set limit. It was a bit like granting the Treasury a limit
on its credit card rather than having to come back each time
revenues fell short of expenditures.
In short, the debt limit is not a way to control spending, but
rather a way to allow financing. Commentators often talk about
the fact that Congress has raised the debt ceiling 78 times since
1960 as if this shows that the limit was a failure because it did
not constrain debt. This is missing the point entirely.
Many outside the US, and even inside the country,overestimate how much power the US President has. It is
Congress that controls the purse strings: as the legislative
branch, Congress decides what taxes can be levied and what
expenditures can be made. The executive branch, headed
by the President, is then responsible for collecting the taxes
and spending the money as authorised by Congress budget.
When spending is higher than revenue, the Treasury needs
to borrow. For 2013, the Treasury has been instructed to
spend USD 3.5 trillion and revenues are expected at USD
2.8 trillion. This would mean borrowing of around USD 0.64
trillion (depending on how revenues come in). The existing
debt ceiling is too low to allow for that much borrowing.Since Congress has passed one law (the debt ceiling) that is
in direct contradiction with another law that it passed (the
budget or continuing resolution), the executive branch faces a
constitutional as well as practical dilemma.
Other countries avoid this problem by ignoring the whole
concept of a debt ceiling: since revenues and expenditure
are set by the budget then let the Treasury borrow as much
as is needed to balance the two. Denmark (alone in Europe)
has a debt ceiling but gets around it by setting the ceiling so
high that it would never make a difference. In 1975 Congress
introduced a sensible and logical approach by legislating that
the debt limit automatically increased in line with the budget.
In 1995 the Republican-controlled House of Representatives
voted to scrap that law and ever since then the debt ceiling
has become a political weapon.
If the debt ceiling is a weapon, then it is one that is liable to
explode in the users face. If the debt ceiling is not raised in
time, there is the possibility that the US could be forced into
a technical default technical because interest payments or
redemptions would be missed but investors still believe that
they would be repaid once Congress sorted the mess out.
Nonetheless, the financial and economic effects of even atechnical default could be devastating.
Ignoring for the moment all the high profile aspects of
finance such as mergers, share issuance and the like, the
less glamorous part of finance involves more mundane
borrowing and lending for short periods of time. You can
think of this as the plumbing of the financial system: not
very exciting but you really want it to work properly. Much
of that borrowing involves a borrower providing a security as
collateral for a loan, and much of that collateral is composed
of US Treasuries and T-bills. If these securities are called
into question by a technical default they may no longer beaccepted as collateral. To extend the analogy, there would no
longer be any water in the plumbing of the financial system.
The last time that this kind of systemic shock hit the financial
system was after Lehman Brothers collapsed five years ago.
Joshua McCallum
Senior Fixed Income Economist
UBS Global Asset Management
Gianluca Moretti
Fixed Income Economist
UBS Global Asset Management
The US Congress has passed one law (the debt ceiling) that is in
direct contradiction with another law (the budget or continuing
resolution) leaving the executive branch with a dilemma. If
Congress fails to extend the debt ceiling, it will force the Treasury
to either break the budget law by not spending what it is
meant to spend, or break the debt ceiling law and issue more
debt. Paradoxically, hitting the debt ceiling could be better in the
long run (if the debt ceiling is then challenged in the Supreme
Court) by removing the debt ceiling as a political weapon once
and for all. If the debt ceiling is raised, we know that Congress
will just be dancing with disaster again in the future.
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7/27/2019 Economist Insights 2013 10 072
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We are still experiencing the damaging impacts of that event
on the economy.
When the 17 October deadline is hit, will the US default on
its debt that day? Maybe, maybe not. The Treasury will have
USD 30 billion of cash on that day, and if revenues come in
like they did last year then there could be enough to cover
expenditures for a few more days. As far as Treasuries are
concerned, the first interest payment is on 31 October (see
chart). As long as the market is willing to roll over T-bills in
the interim then a default on government securities can be
delayed until the end of the month. Other payments would
stop earlier, including a sizeable social security payment due
on 23 October.
If Congress fails to extend the debt ceiling, it will force the
executive branch to break the law. The Treasury can either
break the budget law by not spending what it is meant to
spend, or it can break the law and issue more debt. What
are the options available to the executive branch and the
President as head of the executive?
Default on debt. As debt falls due the government would
hope to roll over the debt; for example, a maturing T-bill
could be repaid by issuing another T-bill. If this is not
possible, it may be forced to default. Even if debt is rolled
over, it could still default on interest payments.
Default on payments. In the course of its actions theFederal government builds up obligations: employees must
be paid at the end of the month, invoices for goods supplied
and services rendered are due a certain number of days after
they are delivered. By falling late on these payments the
Treasury can free up some cash flow, at least in the short
run. This would still be a type of default and would be very
painful for the employees and companies involved, but has
the advantage that it would not be a systemic shock.
Cut spending. Much like the government shutdown,
the government could choose to cut spending. But this is
austerity by accident and eventually the effects would add up
to a further tightening of over 4% of GDP over the year. That
would spell deep recession.
Capitulate. The Democrats could grant enough concessions
to the Republicans to convince them to raise the debt ceiling.
This may keep the markets happy for now, but it will just
encourage politicians to keep using the debt ceiling as a
weapon again and again. Ironically, it would make the US a
riskier credit.
Constitutional approach. Hitting the debt ceiling
would not only force the executive to break at least one
Congressional law, but it could also break Constitutional
law. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution requires
that the validity of the governments debts shall not becalled into question. This does not just mean Treasuries;
defaulting on salaries of employees or monies owed to
suppliers would also qualify as a debt. This suggests that
the only course open to the executive is to ignore the debt
ceiling, keep issuing debt and ask the Supreme Court to
rule that the debt ceiling would breach the Constitution. For
some unfathomable reason President Obama ruled out this
approach at the last debt ceiling impasse in 2011.
Game theory suggests it would be irrational for the
Republicans to force a shutdown, and if the Constitutional
approach is legitimate then it would be irrational for the
Democrats to offer any concessions. Clearly some in the
Republican party might be willing to let the debt ceiling
be hit, but rumours are already circulating that the more
moderate Republicans would be willing to join Democrats for
a vote to raise the debt ceiling.
Paradoxically, hitting the debt ceiling could be better in
the long run, provided that the Constitutional approach is
taken and the Supreme Court rules that the debt ceiling is
not binding (only the Budget is binding). This would remove
the debt ceiling as a political weapon once and for all and
actually improve the creditworthiness of the US. In contrast,
if the debt ceiling is raised, or even worse raised for only afew months, we know that Congress will be dancing with
disaster again and again. Eventually that could make investors
question whether the US dollar really deserves to be used as
the worlds reserve currency.
The views expressed are as of October 2013 and are a general guide to the views of UBS Global Asset Management. This document does not replace portfolio and fund-specific materials. Commentary is at a macro or strategy level and is not with reference to any registered or other mutual fund. This document is intended forlimited distribution to the clients and associates of UBS Global Asset Management. Use or distribution by any other person is prohibited. Copying any part of this publicationwithout the written permission of UBS Global Asset Management is prohibited. Care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of its content but no responsibility is acceptedfor any errors or omissions herein. Please note that past per formance is not a guide to the future. Potential for profit is accompanied by the possibility of loss. The value ofinvestments and the income from them may go down as well as up and investors may not get back the original amount invested. This document is a marketing communication.Any market or investment views expressed are not intended to be investment research. The document has not been prepared in line with the requirements of any jurisdictiondesigned to promote the independence of investment research and is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research. The
information contained in this document does not constitute a distribution, nor should it be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular security or fund.The information and opinions contained in this document have been compiled or arrived at based upon information obtained from sources believed to be reliable and in goodfaith. All such information and opinions are subject to change without notice. A number of the comments in this document are based on current expectations and are consideredforward-looking statements. Actual future results, however, may prove to be different from expectations. The opinions expressed are a reflection of UBS Global AssetManagements best judgment at the time this document is compiled and any obligation to update or alter forward-looking statements as a result of new information, futureevents, or otherwise is disclaimed. Furthermore, these views are not intended to predict or guarantee the future performance of any individual security, asset class, marketsgenerally, nor are they intended to predict the future performance of any UBS Global Asset Management account, portfolio or fund.
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Ceiling caving in
Scenario for US cumulative daily expenditure and revenue flows
Source: CBO, Treasury Department, UBS Global Asset Management
Note: Revenues are assumed to be the same as for the same dates last year, scaled up
by the increase in revenues over the last 12 months relative to the prior 12 months
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Daily average Social security, military Interest Revenues
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