Economic’reforms’and’UNGASS:’’ Micro’&’Macroeconomics’of ...€¦ ·...
Transcript of Economic’reforms’and’UNGASS:’’ Micro’&’Macroeconomics’of ...€¦ ·...
Economic reforms and UNGASS: Micro & Macroeconomics of the
Supply-‐Side Dr. John Collins
Coordinator, LSE IDEAS InternaDonal Drug Policy Project
Opening Points • EffecDve internaDonal cooperaDon? • Current framework unsustainable:
– failures – own goals – IrraDonaliDes – Costs; – disproporDonaliDes;
• PoliDcal unsustainability • Global Strategy IS changing.
– Can we guide in more raDonal approach. • Trajectories of control
– Past: poliDcal will ! ProhibiDon without limits. – Future: CommericialisaDon Q
10 Point Framework
• LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy – Chair: Professor Danny Quah.
• 5 Nobel Prize Winning Economists; World leading drug policy experts; human rights experts; world leaders.
• ‘It is Dme to end the ‘war on drugs’ and massively redirect resources towards effecDve evidence-‐based policies underpinned by rigorous economic analysis.’
1912-‐1970s • Ba`le: – ConstrucDng a system that balances:
• ProhibiDonist’ geang to ‘zero’s with: • RegulaDon: planned global economy
• RegulaDon won. – Highly imperfect model: 1961 ConvenDon
• Seized by ascendant prohibiDonist ideology 1970s onwards. • convenDon system + bilateral diplomacy to internaDonalise • 1998 final iteraDon of “Drug Free World” • 2008 onwards: emergence of public health and human rights
paradigm.
Part 2: System’s Regulatory Flaws
EradicaDng illicit market
Eradicate Illicit Market
• Most recent grand strategic elaboraDon: UNGASS Decade: – ‘A drug free world’ i.e. illicit supply to zero. – Whether actual or aspiraDon:
• prioriDes & resource allocaDon.
Microeconomics: Supply IntervenDons
• ProhibiDon raises prices. – Consumers pay markup to illicit market actors. – BUT
• Marginal Supply intervenDons; footloose; inelasDc D: – S disrupDon at E1 where D = k ! "S ! #P ! #S ! "P !
– E2 ≈ E1. – New violence equilibrium?
Marginal Level
• Marginal spend ineffecDve/negaDve? – Reuter & Pollack, 2014.
• Metric for opDmal spend? • Huge implicaDons for enforcement and policy prioriDes. (see later)
• E.g. Cut enforcement intensity in US by 50% and see no increase in consumpDon. – Reuter and Caulkins, 2004.
Macroeconomics: Commodity Prices
• SO, iniDal spend effecDve at raising prices to a point. • Therefore, presumably reducing consumpDon? – Depends on substance; Age of market; elasDcity etc.
• I.e. for high value/weight raDo products drasDcally increases price. E.g. Cocaine. – E.g. Cocaine: markup > possible taxaDon – E.g. Cannabis: TaxaDon possible to subsDtute for black market.
– Opium: different criteria. • Focus on medicalising consumer country. • Minimising price distorDons at farmgate. • TargeDng cross border flows and containing commodity chain?
Macro II: Geography and ExternaliDes
• US and Europe can claim supply side policies in LatAm reduce health their costs. E.g. cocaine.
• BUT Global jusDce dimension: does not apply to producer & transit countries – “outsourcing” – Quah 2014.
• Where is aggregate price increase distribute: poliDcal and violent capital intensive factors yield highest returns ! rewards go to bribing poliDcians and buying weapons. – Cocaine markup on Wall Street results in corrupDon in South and Central America.
– NOT as result of commodity, but in regulatory framework ! benefits to violent and corrosive forces.
Key Take-‐away: Fundamental paradox at base of current strategy.
Tac;cal Victory ! Strategic failure
Policy Responses?
• Shiu towards targeted interdicDon Policies. • Decriminalise front end of the commodity Chain. – How far?
• Experiment with regulaDng parts of commodity chain. – Not necessarily fully legalised commodity chain? – How do issues of commercialisaDon apply?
Key Economic Issues in Drug Policy Reform
• Spending Imbalance: – Enforcement vs. Public health. – Marginal returns on investment:
• Enforcement: Zero or NegaDve. • Harm ReducDon: excepDonally high CBA + low Investment baseline ! high returns. • Treatment services.
– Increase returns on investment through decrim and reducing policy costs.
Policy Goals Clear
• Minimise the harms of consumpDon • Minimise the harms of drug policy • Minimise the harms of illicit markets • Experiment with regulated markets • Focus on price effects • Move beyond prohibiDonist framework • Adopt, Learn, adapt, improve new policies • Manage internaDonal drug issues
ImplementaDon: UNGASS?
• Major reforms feasible. Overt or deeper processes: – InterpreDve reform… – as precursor to wri`en reform? – Role of Expert Commission.
• Need to see a normaDve shiu. • Happening? • ! resource shiu?
From InternaDonalism to Regionalism
• UN vs. OAS vs. • ASEAN • Russia. • ! UN Commission on NarcoDc Drugs (CND) becoming a discussion forum rather than enforcement forum.
• Era of “Policy Pluralism” (Collins, 2014). • Issue diversificaDon. – Components: health; access to medicines; human rights; security; governance; realpoliDk. Etc. etc.
Treaty InterpreDve Widening
Currently Three Models
I: Resource/State Capacity LimitaDons: SelecDve Enforcement Model (USA)
• “ConsDtuDonal LimitaDons” – E.g. Art. 35, 1961 ConvenDon: ‘Having due regard to their consDtuDonal, legal and administraDve systems the ParDes shall…’
• State vs. Federal: – realisDc implementaDon ! selecDve prioriDes and enforcement.
II: Supremacy of Human Rights
• Uruguay = key proponent, but emerging LaDn American jurisprudence.
• UN Charter human rights obligaDons. – Art 103: “in the event of a conflict between…the present Charter and…any other internaDonal agreement…the present Charter shall prevail.”
• Uruguay: “has a comprehensive view of the law and obligaDons assumed by the country not only in the sphere of the Drug ConvenDons…but also in the field of the protecDon of human rights”
Supremacy of Human Right II
• Uruguay: – “given two possible interpretaDons of the provisions of the ConvenDon, the choice should be for the one that best protects the human right in quesDon, as stated in ArDcle 29 of the American ConvenDon on Human Rights.”
III: Expanded DefiniDon of “Medical and ScienDfic” via ExperimentaDon
• Single ConvenDon Commentary: – “the term “medical purposes” does not necessarily have exactly the same meaning at all Dmes and under all circumstances.”
– E.g. Quasi-‐medical use prior to 1961. – Heroin Maintenance and other OST.
• Envisioning regulatory experimentaDon as precursor to treaty reform?
Closing Points
• NaDonal changes ! reverberated & destabilised UN system !
• InternaDonal normaDve shiu ! – Feeding back to naDonal levels globally.
• Post-‐UNGASS: regional, naDonal and subnaDonal levels. !
• Eventually feed back up to UN level? – Empiricism will likely win out. E.g. Harm reducDon.
Thank you.