Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2010 Lecture 11.
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Transcript of Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2010 Lecture 11.
![Page 1: Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2010 Lecture 11.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062421/56649e4b5503460f94b3f8ec/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Econ 522Economics of Law
Dan Quint
Spring 2010
Lecture 11
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HW 1: end of class today
Midterm: Wednesday
Grading
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Why do we need contracts?
Which promises should be enforced?
First purpose: enable cooperation
Second purpose: efficient disclosure of information
Contracts: the story so far…
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Breach of contract Breach is efficient when cost to perform > benefit Breach will happen when cost to perform > liability Expectation damages: liability for breach = anticipated benefit Leads to breach exactly when breach is efficient Third purpose: secure optimal commitment to performance
Reliance Reliance is efficient when expected benefit > cost Or (Probability of performance) X (Increase in value) > cost Reward any reliance overreliance Fourth purpose: secure optimal reliance Hadley v Baxendale, foreseeable reliance
Contracts: the story so far…
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Default Rules
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Gaps: risks or circumstances that aren’t specifically addressed in a contract
Default rules: rules applied by courts to fill gaps
Default rules
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Gaps: risks or circumstances that aren’t specifically addressed in a contract
Default rules: rules applied by courts to fill gaps
Writing something into a contract vs leaving a gap Allocating a loss (ex post) Versus allocating a risk (ex ante), before it becomes a loss
Default rules
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Cooter and Ulen: use the rule parties would have wanted, if they had chosen to negotiate over this issue
This will be whatever rule is efficient
What should default rules be?
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Cooter and Ulen: use the rule parties would have wanted, if they had chosen to negotiate over this issue
This will be whatever rule is efficient
Fifth purpose of contract law is to minimize transaction costs of negotiating contracts by supplying efficient default rules Do this by imputing the terms the parties would have chosen if they
had addressed this contingency
What should default rules be?
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Don’t want ambiguity in the law
So default rule can’t vary with every case
Majoritarian default rule: the terms that most parties would have agreed to In cases where this rule is not efficient, parties can still override it in the
contract
Court: figure out efficient allocation of risks, then (possibly) adjust prices to compensate
Default rules
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Example: probability ½, the cost of construction will increase by $2,000 Construction company can hedge this risk for $400 Family can’t do anything about it
Price goes up – who pays for it?
Default rules
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Example: probability ½, the cost of construction will increase by $2,000 Construction company can hedge this risk for $400 Family can’t do anything about it
Price goes up – who pays for it? Construction company is efficient bearer of this risk So efficient contract would allocate this risk to construction
company Should prices be adjusted to compensate?
Default rules
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Example: probability ½, the cost of construction will increase by $2,000 Construction company can hedge this risk for $400 Family can’t do anything about it
Price goes up – who pays for it? Construction company is efficient bearer of this risk So efficient contract would allocate this risk to construction
company Should prices be adjusted to compensate?
Default rules
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So, Cooter and Ulen say: set the default rule that’s efficient in the majority of cases
Most contracts can leave this gap, save on transaction costs
In cases where this rule is inefficient, parties can contract around it
Default rules
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Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules”
Sometimes better to make default rule something the parties would not have wanted To give incentive to address an issue rather than leave a gap Or to give one party incentive to disclose information “Penalty default”
Default rules: a different view
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Baxendale (shipper) is only one who can influence when crankshaft is delivered; so he’s efficient bearer of risk
If default rule held Baxendale liable, Hadley has no need to tell him the shipment is urgent
So Hadley might hide this information, which is inefficient Ayres and Gertner: Ruling in Hadley was a good one, not because
it was efficient, but because it was inefficient… …but in a way that created incentive for disclosing information
Penalty defaults: Hadley v Baxendale
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Real estate brokers and “earnest money” Broker knows more about real estate law Default rule that seller keeps earnest money encourages broker to
bring it up if it’s efficient to change this
Penalty defaults: other examples
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Real estate brokers and “earnest money” Broker knows more about real estate law Default rule that seller keeps earnest money encourages broker to
bring it up if it’s efficient to change this
Courts will impute missing price of a good, but not quantity Forces parties to explicitly contract on quantity, rather than leave it
for court to decide
Penalty defaults: other examples
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Look at why the parties left a gap in contract Because of transaction costs use efficient rule For strategic reasons penalty default may be more efficient
Similar logic in a Supreme Court dissent by Justice Scalia Congress passed a RICO law without statute of limitations Majority decided on 4 years – what they thought legislature would have
chosen Scalia proposed no statute of limitations; “unmoved by the fear that this…
might prove repugnant to the genius of our law…” “Indeed, it might even prompt Congress to enact a limitations period that it
believes appropriate, a judgment far more within its competence than ours.”
When to use penalty defaults?
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Regulations
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Default rules can be contracted around
Some rules cannot – immutable rules, or mandatory rules, or regulations
Fifth purpose of contract law is to minimize transaction costs of negotiating contracts by supplying efficient default rules and regulations. Coase: if individuals are rational and there are no transaction costs,
private negotiations lead to efficiency So additional regulations can only make things worse But when people are not rational, or when there are transaction
costs/market failures, regulations may help
Default rules versus regulations
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Derogate, verb. detract from; curtail application of (a law)
Contracts which derogate public policy – that is, contradict a law or regulation – are not enforceable
Contracts which could only be performed by breaking a law
Contracts whose effect is to circumvent a law
One example of a regulation/immutable rule: derogation of public policy
B(union)
C(ownership)
A(other factory)
“if I ever work for C for less than $15/hr, I’ll work
for you for $1/hr”
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Derogate, verb. detract from; curtail application of (a law)
Contracts which derogate public policy – that is, contradict a law or regulation – are not enforceable
Contracts which could only be performed by breaking a law
Contracts whose effect is to circumvent a law
One example of a regulation/immutable rule: derogation of public policy
B(union)
C(ownership)
A(other factory)
“if I ever work for C for less than $15/hr, I’ll work
for you for $1/hr”
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In general: contracts which can only be performed by breaking the law are not enforceable
But… “A married man may be liable for inducing a woman to rely on his promise
of marriage, even though the law prohibits him from marrying without first obtaining a divorce.”
“A company that fails to supply a good as promised may be liable even though selling a good with the promised design violates a government safety regulation.”
“A company that fails to supply a good as promised may be liable even though producing the good is impossible without violating an environmental regulation.”
“A promisor should be liable for breach if he knew that the promise was illegal”
Derogation of public policy
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Peevyhouse v Garland Coal and Mining Co(OK Supreme Court, 1962) Garland contracted to strip-mine coal on Peevyhouse’s farm Contract specified Garland would restore property to original
condition; Garland did not Restoration would have cost $29,000… …but “diminution in value” of farm only $300 Original jury awarded $5,000 in damages, both parties appealed Oklahoma Supreme Court reduced damages to $300
Expectation damages: default rule or immutable rule?
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Seems like classic case of efficient breach Performing last part of contract would cost $29,000 Benefit to Peevyhouses would be $300 Efficient to breach and pay expectation damages, which is what
happened
But… Most coal mining contracts: standard per-acre diminution payment Peevyhouses refused to sign contract unless it specifically
promised the restorative work Dissent: Peevyhouses entitled to “specific performance”
Expectation damages: default rule or immutable rule?
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Which works better in this case: Default rule allowing Garland to breach and pay diminution fee? Default rule forcing Garland to perform restorative work?
Ayres and Gertner: default rule should “penalize” the better-informed party Garland routinely signed contracts like these Peevyhouses were doing this for the first time Default rule allows Garland to pay diminution fee: they have no reason
to bring it up, Peevyhouses don’t know Default rule forces Garland to do cleanup: if that’s inefficient, they
could bring it up during negotiations In this case, specific performance would work as a penalty default
We can also think about Peevyhouse in terms of penalty defaults
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Ways to get outof a contract
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Formation defense Claim that a valid contract does not exist (Example: no consideration)
Performance excuse Yes, a valid contract was created But circumstances have changed and I should be allowed to not
perform
Most doctrines for invalidating a contract can be explained as either… Individuals agreeing to the contract were not rational, or Transaction cost or market failure
Formation Defenses and Performance Excuses
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Courts will not enforce contracts by irrational individuals Children Legally insane
Doctrine of incompetence One party was not competent to enter into contract Invalidates contracts which are not in best interest of that party
What if you signed a contract while drunk? You need to have been really, really, really drunk to get out of a
contract
Incompetence
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Only unenforceable if you were “intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the [contract]”
Lucy v Zehmer (VA Sup Ct, 1954)
What if you signed a contract while drunk?
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Only unenforceable if you were “intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the [contract]”
Lucy v Zehmer (VA Sup Ct, 1954)
What if you signed a contract while drunk?
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Only unenforceable if you were “intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the [contract]”
Lucy v Zehmer (VA Sup Ct, 1954)
What if you signed a contract while drunk?
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Only unenforceable if you were “intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the [contract]”
Lucy v Zehmer (VA Sup Ct, 1954)
What if you signed a contract while drunk?
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Only unenforceable if you were “intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the [contract]”
Lucy v Zehmer (VA Sup Ct, 1954)
The Borat lawsuits
What if you signed a contract while drunk?
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Only unenforceable if you were “intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the [contract]”
Lucy v Zehmer (VA Sup Ct, 1954)
The Borat lawsuits Julie Hilden, “Borat Sequel: Legal Proceedings Against Not Kazakh
Journalist for Make Benefit Guileless Americans In Film”
Moral of story: don’t get drunk with someone who might ask you to sign a contract
What if you signed a contract while drunk?