Ecology and Security in South Asia

For the countries of the South Asian region, the post-colonial period was marked by what

Nehru called a “tryst with destiny.” It is the impacts and implications of these nationalist

trysts, as well as the growing awareness of the interconnectedness of the region‟s ecosystems

that compels a fresh examination of the interface between nature, culture and democracy. How

are the concerns of “national security”, and the politics, of development undermining ecology?

How are citizens‟ groups, communities and social movements, concerned with growing

ecological conflicts, negotiating and bargaining with the state apparatus? How are they

seeking a redefinition of governance, representation and democracy? These questions are

crucial to examine since the mainstream political process, as well as conventional democratic

forces, have remained largely apathetic, and have responded to them in traditional political

terms. As a result, the stratification of power and wealth, as well as most ecological

conflicts—whether related to the alienation of tribal peasants from their land, or the

degradation or commercialisation of a commons, or the pollution of life—and livelihood—

supporting water bodies, or displacement caused by development projects—continue to be

either neglected or co-opted within conventional political discourse.

Towards a Politics of Ecological Rootedness

One significant distinction between western environmentalist priorities and those of this

region is that, for us at the popular level, priorities are not global warming, climate change,

industrial pollution, the dumping of toxic waste or nuclear power and its adverse

implications—even though these are issues around which there is some mobilisation. For us,

the priority is the fact that an overwhelming majority of the population is heavily dependent

on the natural system and the biomass that it provides, not only for supporting a subsistence

economy, but also as a contributor to its cultural rituals and practice. Thus, any disruption in

access to and control over these resources directly impinges on the survival, identity and

security of these communities. Secondly, the current patterns of economic development,

particularly the present means of achieving economic growth, are heavily dependent on the

intensive and extensive utilisation and despoliation of the natural environment. The processes

of economic development directly and indirectly disrupt the livelihoods and lifestyles of

millions of people, pushing a majority of them into a life of subservience and dependency. The

depletion and degradation of productive natural resources have provoked increasing conflict

both within and across South. Asian states. The growing scarcity of resources for sustenance,

the exacerbation of contending claims to the same resource, and the enforced uprooting and

mass migration of people (both within and between countries) are just three instances of

conflict situations. These patterns also emanate from, and sustain, the devaluation of nature

and its processes—in keeping with the Baconian maxim that “Men are the Lords and

Possessors of Nature.”

Uneven development, multiple forms of ecological degradation and loss of control, have also

resulted in an increasing polarisation of wealth. In India in 1990, in comparison with the 20%

of the populace which controls 60% of the assets, the bottom 20% only controls 1%. In 1960,

however, the top 20% controlled only 30% of the assets. What is striking in the distributive

process is that, while Third World debt rose from $50 billion to $1.3 trillion between 1960 and

1990, net transfer to industrialised countries was $20-30 billion a year.1

Thirdly, the growing presence, role and influence—particularly on the behaviour and role of

the state—of multilateral banks and transnational corporations (TNCs), coupled with legal

regimes like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with the active support of economic and

political elites in our own countries, are significantly closing the political and geographical

spaces, to sustain ecological and cultural diversity. Based on the recognition of these

fundamental developments, this paper argues that:

(i) national security can only be achieved as an aggregate of peoples security, which itself is

critically dependent on the health and sustainability of the natural system; and

(ii) since the region is so ecologically and culturally interdependent, national security also

needs to be seen in the larger context of regional security.

This is not only the context in which the various environmental discourses or narratives (in

theory and in practice) in the region need to be located, but also the basis on which an

ecological politics needs to be, and is being, constructed. While I have delineated, these

discourses below, it is critical to briefly discuss the larger framework of the modes of

production and modes of power as they inform ecological debates.2

Modes of Production or Modes of Power?

Within this perspective, it has become important to locate the literature on ecological practices

in India within an analysis of the different modes of production. Gadgil and Guha3, for

instance, provide an insightful analysis of the conflicts between competing modes of

production and power, and their respective impacts on pastoral, tribal,4 agrarian and industrial

modes. Others deny that there exists a distinction between agrarian and tribal modes, since

most tribals practice settled agriculture.5

It is true that tribal communities such as the Gonds,

the Santals, and the Mundas practice settled agriculture and do work as labourers. However,

tribals continue to depend more heavily on the forest than other rural peasants.6

For most, the

forest not only supports a larger share of their economy, but as stated at the outset, it is

intrinsic to their culture and protection. It is this complex relationship that has inspired and

spurred most of their historical and contemporary struggles.

What has not yet been explored sufficiently are the power relations between actors in these

different modes, and how they are changing in the context of internal and external

transformations. As Rao and Hargopal, and several others have tried to point out, there is a

need for an inventory of how rights over nature (both the physical resources and cultural

meanings) were historically appropriated.7

After five decades of developmentalist regimes,

new kinds of polarisations have emerged. Simultaneously, new modes of struggle have also

manifested themselves.

Some commentators have argued that these polarisations have created two worlds—the world

of those who inhabit the urban, industrialising world, and the other rural, from where a

majority of the resources for the urban world come. As far as access to, and control over

resources is concerned, India‟s ex-Commissioner of Scheduled Castes and Tribes8, B. D.

Sharma makes three distinctions—between India, Bharat and Hindustanawa—as they position

themselves in the equation of power. (Similar distinctions can be made for the other countries

of the region). In his formulation, India envelops the urban, industrial sector, while Bharat

encompasses the landholding peasantry. What is thus excluded are the growing number of

landless and assetless people in both urban and rural areas, most of whom are experiencing a

distinct ecological crisis. His observations are worth quoting at length:

In our country, there has been talk for some time about so-called India vs. Bharat. But in that

discussion the interests of that big world of Hindustanawa which is below India and which

covers most of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, have been

ignored. Bharat is keen to compete with India and get linked with it. In this process, the

situation of Hindustanawa further deteriorates. It is necessary for the organised sector of India

to realise and accept its unjust position. In a similar fashion, it is necessary on the part‟ of

Bharat, which has full command over resources and means of production in the traditional

system, that it realise and acknowledge its unjust position in relation to the resourceless

Hindustanawa.9

It is also important to recognise that women constitute the majority of Hindustanawa. They

also bear a disproportionate burden of resource decline. Within this reality then, how have the

movements of peasants, labourers, tribals, Dalits and women defined their politics?

Gender and the Environment

Bina Agarwal, Gail Omvedt and Vandana Shiva, to name three diverse voices who have

drawn on other women‟s expressions and contributed to a wider debate on the relationship

between women and nature, assert the specific contribution of women to ecological

movements.10

Shiva portrays the cosmology of the pre-colonial period in the region in which

nature was conceptualised as mother goddess, Prakriti, or Aranyani, the forest goddess, whose

powers were that of Shakti. Highlighting women‟s ecological knowledge, Shiva argues that,

“nature herself is the experiment and women as sylviculturalist agriculturalist and water

resource managers, the traditional scientists.”

Although more rigorous historical work than that done by Shiva is needed to examine the

interface of ecology and gender in the region s history and society, her assertion that modern

science and the state have further marginalised women‟s worth and status brings a

controversial political economy dimension to the gender and ecology debate. Also problematic

is her neglect of the many levels of subjugation that women undoubtedly experienced as

repositories and practitioners of ecological knowledge.

For her part, Bina Agarwal shows how the environment is “engendered”, and how women are

adversely affected by environmental decline. At the same time, women are active in

movements of environmental protection and regeneration, often bringing to these struggles

gender-specific perspectives. Such perspectives, she observes, articulate interests generated by

women s position in the division of labour within productive and reproductive systems. Seeing

women simply as victims of environmental decline is only one side of a complex story.

The Devaluing of Traditional Knowledge

The lack of in-depth studies of the ecological knowledge and practices of rural communities

(particularly the poorer among them), and other occupational castes, has been a neglected

concern even among those committed to a politics of the subjugated. What is also neglected is

empathy for, and understanding of, ecological practices, and how they relate to a politics of

identity. In the specific context of Jharkhand‟ among others, Ram Dayal Munda, Devnathan

and the Jharkhand Mukti Andolan have begun to relate ecology with identity.12

There continues to be a tendency among policy makers and others to portray those who

populate Hindustanawa as victims. Thus the traditions of communities who have their own

ways of perceiving and utilising nature continue to be devalued or neglected altogether. The

fact that they critically depend on ecological sustainability and nature‟s economy (more than

the farmers who populate Bharat), and that their rights to these resources are not legally

recognised, are similarly issues that continue to be marginal in contemporary political

discourse.

The Environmental Narrative in South Asia: A Critical Review

To better situate this perspective and the questions raised at the outset, let me make some

preliminary comments regarding the four main environmental discourses in the South Asian

region.13

While these discourses are being constructed primarily on the basis of Indian

experiences and examples, there are obvious parallels with other South Asian countries in

particular, and the Third World in general. It needs to be stressed that the boundaries between

these discourses are not rigid. In fact, the porosity and fluidity between them creates

significant possibilities for advancing an ecological politics of the region.

Environment as ‘Discovery’: The Discourse of the State

The policies and practices of the developmentalist state14

have not only degraded the

environment, but also created an environmental discourse & where it is assumed that this

degradation can be managed along with the current patterns of industrial and urban

development. Policies and programmes for “managing the environment” raise fundamental

questions about the role of technology, and the implications of modern scientific rationality.

That is also why we need to better understand the intersection between ecology and the city.

Does the city, as it has evolved in modem South Asia, stand and develop in contradiction to

ecology? Is a reconciliation possible? Or is there a fundamental contradiction between the

resource-intensive and centralising characteristics of the city and ecological sustainability? Do

the rural and urban middle classes have common aspirations, modes of consumption and

responses to technology, or are there significant differences?

A brief historical overview of the official discourse on the environment is relevant here. After

Indira Gandhi‟s participation in the Stockholm Conference in 1972, and her much publicised

opposition to the Silent Valley Project15

, environmentalism acquired a degree of official

legitimacy. The growth of environmental concern at the global level was mirrored by a flush

of official activity. In India, various processes were initiated to set up a Ministry of

Environment and Forests (MOEF), and dialogues were organised with a wide range of

independent scientists and NGOs. Since India‟s ecosystems were under siege, numerous

individuals and organisations saw the possibilities of initiating or expanding their activities to

work in this newly discovered‟ area. Others saw the opening up of possibilities for progressive

state intervention, to protect and preserve the country‟s diverse ecosystems.

Over the past decade and a half, these groups and individuals have been participating in

numerous government programmes. They also serve in various advisory capacities. While this

does create a degree of democratic space for communities struggling in increasingly degraded

and polluted conditions, significant contradictions remain since most “collaboration” also

provides the state with legitimation — a credibility that it sorely needs and proudly

propagates, especially at international forums.

The contradictions also arise from the basic character of the modern South Asian state (see

section entitled „The Developmentalist State‟ below). It is a state that both legitimises the

intensive and extensive extraction of natural resources, as well as acts as an occasional buffer

against the expropriation of resources by non-state national and international actors.

Fundamentally, therefore, its continuing defence of a rapacious and unjust model of economic

development, as well as a commitment to a plethora of anti-ecological technologies (the most

obvious being defence and nuclear technologies), reduces most of the stated commitments to

eco-friendly planning to vacuous rhetoric.

Additional limitations arise not only from the relative lack of importance accorded to the

Ministry (or Department) of Environment in the hierarchy of state policy, but also from the

almost total lack of coordination between policy sectors. Thus in most cases, these sectors

work in opposition to environmentally sensitive directions defined by environmental policy or

in official rhetoric. In India, for instance, the Ministry of Agriculture will legitimise

widespread adoption of hybrid seeds, while the Ministry of Environment and Forests will

launch an ambitious project on protecting India‟s biodiversity. These examples can be

multiplied across the policymaking spectrum.

Obviously, official politics is far more nuanced. The alliance of Indian governmental

representatives with those of Malaysia during the United Nations Conference on Environment

and Development (UNCED) process, their criticism of Western policies pertaining to

biodiversity and global warming, as well as their defence of anticolonial struggles in other

parts of the Third World (whatever their actual record) make basic critiques at home all the

more difficult.

There is also the complex question of national sovereignty. Invoked in a wide variety of, at

times, contradictory contexts, this invocation has been one of the most important weapons of

the state against internal and external critiques. How does criticism of a development project

(like the Kalabagh dam in Pakistan, or the dams on the Narmada river, or the Super Thermal

Power Plant at Dahanu, Maharashtra, or the nuclear plant at Kaiga, Karnataka) get labelled

„anti-national‟ by the government? Why is almost total acquiescence to the policy dictates of

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or the penetration of “stateless”

TNCs, not perceived as a fundamental threat to national sovereignty? Yet, in the absence of

widespread popular mobilisation, who else but the state can act as a buffer? Is the challenge

then to democratise the state? Some of these questions are developed in a later section.

While numerous governmental and quasi-governmental institutions (examples in India include

the Forest Research Institute, National Environmental and Energy Research Institute, Indian

Institute of Science, and Botanical Institute of India) are involved in the pursuit of scientific

research—some of which has relevance to concerns of ecological justice—there are obvious

limitations to this enterprise. Functioning as they do under state scrutiny and patronage, most

of this work is either not accessible, or is propagating a knowledge paradigm that is in direct

contradiction to the recognition of the primacy of local knowledge and power. Interestingly,

emerging critiques from within these institutions embody dissenting traditions that, however

marginal to mainstream research, represent the possibilities of freeing these institutions from

state control.

Additionally, many UN agencies and institutions are concerned with environment and

development issues in the region. Almost all of them function with the consent of the

government, and as such, play a weak role in addressing the structural causes of environmental

despoliation and degradation, as well as the question of equitable local control over productive

resources. In fact, much of the technical assistance provided through the UN system supports

or condones environmentally destructive and socially unjust economic development.

Nevertheless, given the political nature of the regimes in the region, some of the UN agencies

provide a window to raise issues and resources for generating environmentally sensitive

projects and programmes (i.e. sanitation, sewage and drinking water projects), and to “repair

the damage” caused by “destructive development.”

Similarly, bilateral donors like the Norwegian Agency for International Development

(NORAD) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) have supported a

wide range of environmental awareness and training activities. In Pakistan, CIDA played a

strong supportive role in the development of the National Conservation Strategy (NCS), and

has contributed to the production of the NCS document. Bilateral donors are spending an

increasing amount of money on these programmes, and while a large number of groups are

collaborating in this, several others are attempting to radicalise the kinds of activities that are

supported.

2) Environment as Wilderness: The Terrain of Conservationists

Among the earliest modern environmentalists in the Subcontinent were naturalists and natural

scientists. Ambitious programmes were launched in the 19th century to map the region‟s

biogenetic diversity. The establishment of the Bombay Natural History Society is part of that

legacy. In the post-1947 period, with most governments implementing a policy of rapid

industrial growth and permitting limited democracy, the only formal environmental work was

being done by conservationists and wild-life enthusiasts.

In the recent past, however, with available land for agriculture shrinking and with more lands

being lost to desertification, waterlogging, salinisation and bad management, conflicts

between conservationists and settled farmers have escalated. Ironically, a critique against

reserved forests and sanctuaries has also emerged from Marxist and liberal democrats, whose

commitment to anthropocentric democracy stands in contraction to the defence of “green

spaces.” Significant rethinking is taking place among conventional conservationists, and while

acceptance of the importance of local people in the management of sanctuaries and parks has

grown, fundamental issues of the incompatibility between current patterns of

industrial and agricultural development and genuine sustainability are still not widely

accepted.

In May 1993, numerous citizens‟ groups supported the formation of the Indian People‟s

Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights (IPT). The IPT recently organised a national

workshop on „Forests and the Rights of Local Communities‟—an event that brought together

conservationists with academics and social activists. The debate led to a significant joint

statement and a decision to hold a national peoples‟ tribunal on the conflict between protected

ecosystems and local people.

3) Environment as Commerce: The Sustainable Development People

Sustainable development organisations, most of which came into being about a decade and a

half ago, have had the most visibility in the middle class world and in the press. Partly in

response to environment as fashion, and partly as efforts to fill the space created by official

acceptance of environmentalism, these groups have created a commendable niche for

environmental concerns. Important new ground has been broken, particularly in laying bare

the extent of ecological collapse. However, by and large, the work of these organisations and

groups has neither kept up with the pace and scale of environmental devastation and

degradation, nor graduated to effective intervention in ongoing political processes. It can be

argued that this ought not to be their mandate. While there is some truth in this, most of the

efforts continue to be targeted at the English-speaking middle class, or to primarily foreign

audiences.

There is an equally serious problem in the political perspectives of these groups, most of

whom believe that the current patterns of economic development are compatible with

environmental sustainability. The need, they argue, is to humanise industrialism and

decentralise decision-making. To this end, a dialogue with the state and with parliamentarians

and elected representatives must be sustained, and a major role must be played in informing

state policy. While these roles are important, the basic task of strengthening social movements

and being accountable to them, continues to be largely neglected. In fact, in some cases, there

is greater accountability to foreign donors than to the mandate of the movements and to long-

term ecological sustainability.

4) Environment as Tradition: The Critics of Modern Science and Development

Another important discourse from which movements have drawn, and which in turn is “fed”

by the “little traditions of knowledge” and resistance, is that of a group of individuals and

organisations that have carved out an important space for themselves. Most of them argue that

modern science encodes a structure of domination and violence, and that this violence is not

confined to genetic engineering or nuclear physics, but is an integral part of its history and its

articulation. It is this myth of being an “impersonal method” that, they argue, also legitimises

the notion of Trumanesque development. In their analysis, the modem weapon of development

is based on the legitimisation of social engineering on a massive scale, where realities are

treated as objects, and hierarchies of „developedness‟ are created. It is this worldview, they

„argue, that devalues the traditional as backward, that deems it important to inflict pain on

others in the pursuit of progress, and that justifies the irrelevance of traditions of knowledge,

cultures and species. Modern science and the project of development are then, in essence,

genocidal.

Those concerned about the environment in the countries of South Asia, and the debates that

they are contributing to, can be broadly placed in the above four groups. As stated in the

introduction to the above section, the boundaries between these groups are quite fluid, and the

more difficult task of trying to create a political consensus calls for pragmatism and

envisioning. It is in evolving a balance between compromise and resistance that the most

difficult political challenges lie. Before presenting a glimpse of the range of action in civil

society in India, we will briefly outline an overview of the social, political and economic

situation in the region.

Overview of the Social, Political and Economic Situation

The South Asian region continues to be marked by intense social stratification. Traditional

power blocs (feudal landlords, upper caste groups and social groups controlling religious

communities, etc.) have to an extent been joined by other economically upward communities

(particularly those who have gained as a direct consequence of uneven capitalist

development). Significant conflict has arisen as lower-middle class groups have become more

upwardly mobile, and have sought a share in power. However, overwhelmingly, political and

economic decisions continue to be taken by a relatively small handful of powerful groups.

India remains an essentially plural polity that constitutionally upholds a secular society where

all religions are allowed to coexist equally. In. the past few years, this semblance of unity and

tolerance has been breaking down, creating severe strains in inter-community relations. Hindu

extremists have been assertive in their desire to create a Hindu state that could more

effectively deal with the challenge (imagined or real) of Muslims both within and outside the

country. While recent state elections and other political developments have contained their

hegemonic intentions, the extremist Hindus enjoy significant support, particularly among the

elite.

In the other countries of the region, escalating social violence has continued to deflect or

devalue social and ecological agendas. In areas like the Northeast in India, or the central and

north-eastern districts of Sri Lanka, protracted ethnic conflict and state violence has had an

adverse impact on ecological spaces and practices.

For the region as a whole (though the space and timing of this differs from one country to the

other), economic decision-making has increasingly moved away from local and national

contexts to the global one. The IMF and the World Bank exert significant and powerful

influence on the direction of each economy, and though they are not always successful, the

degree of control exerted by global capital in collaboration with national capital is

phenomenal.

An Economic Overview

Global capital has become increasingly mobile across South Asian boundaries. While India is

a relatively recent entrant into the IMF-World Bank guided restructuring process, the other

countries of the region continue to be dependent on the western-dominated financial and

economic system. In that sense, it can be said that the global economy continues to be heavily

dominated by the industrial countries with selective and tactical alliances with elites in the

industrialising world. It is no coincidence that during the political changes in Pakistan in 1993,

the transition President was brought in from Washington, and was none other than Moeen

Qureshi, till recently the Senior Vice President of the World Bank.

Similarly in India, the appointment of the new Finance Secretary —arguably the most

powerful bureaucrat in the economic domain—was not only subject to approval by the Bank,

but was an individual who had worked as a senior economist for a substantial part of his

professional career.

The resulting policy prescriptions and structural change that have been implemented (or are

suggested) legitimate an extractive economy which is run primarily by the elites who control

world trade, and provide fiscal incentives to invest in export-oriented extraction. In fact, for

most parts of the region, local producers‟ control over what they produce, how they produce it,

and at what price they can sell it on the market, has diminished. Over the past decade, and for

countries like India, more intensively over the past two years, this control has even started to

slip from the hands of national elites. The new rhetoric of competitive market ideology makes

it clear that the economically vulnerable have only themselves to blame, and that money

power is the only power worth having.

As already mentioned, this economic process is significantly dependent on the intensive and

extensive extraction of natural resources, and in the societies of the region, where a majority is

critically dependent on the sustainability of the natural resource base, this extractive economy

generates large-scale impoverishment and immiseration.

However, it is not just a consensus among elites that is of concern, but the emerging

realignment of global institutions to define and sustain this control. These institutions, despite

their rhetoric to the contrary, are also perpetuating a dynamic that sustains national and global

centralisation. This is a major shift from the past when Third World countries were attempting

to define a more autonomous identity and independent economic priorities in keeping with

their own needs. As recently as three years ago, the South Commission suggested alternatives

to the increasing domination of the G-7 countries in global economic and cultural affairs.16

The attempt here is not to narrate the trajectory of the growing dependency of our countries on

“western” banks and governments. Suffice it to say, that much before the South Commission,

most South Asian governments (as well as those in most of the Third World) were so

weakened that they would have been unable either to attempt to become “equal partners” with

the industrialised countries, or assert a unified collective identity.

The Changing Nature of the Global Economy: Multilaterals, Transnationals, Trade

Regimes and Elites

The South Asian experience, particularly from an ecological and social perspective, indicates

that it would be naive to assume that institutions like the World Bank are “developmental

institutions.” With the IMF, the prescription of eliminating trade barriers, encouraging exports,

tightening monetary policies, cutting public expenditure, devaluing currencies, etc., has led to

increased social insecurity and ecological injustice. Little or no attention has been paid to land

distribution, to the recovery and regeneration of degraded lands, or to structural changes that

would generate more equitable access to, and control over, resources. In fact, what has

invariably been witnessed is that the privileged are given even greater access to land, water,

subsidy, credit and technology. The rights and eco-cultural spaces of millions have been

subordinated to the interests of corporate development.

There is now overwhelming evidence that there is an emerging nexus between four actors—

TNCs, multilateral banks, trade regimes like the WTO, and economic and political elites in the

so-called North and South—to control global and national economies. In that sense, there have

been fundamental changes in the global political economy:

Fifteen of the world‟s largest TNCs now have gross incomes that are larger than the GDP of

120 countries. TNCs control 70% of global trade, and 80% of the land that grows crops for

export. Over the past decade, these TNCs have succeeded in exerting enormous power over

national governments. They have been the main agencies that have aggressively pushed for

deregulation and privatisation, not only in national economies, but in the world economy as a

whole. The full implications of this shift in the configuration of power has received little

attention from either scholars or activists. The Indian government‟s former Chief Economic

Advisor stated in 1992 that TNCs are emerging as the new global government, a World Inc.,

with the G-7 as the Board of Directors. This is not to say that these corporations have an

uncontentious relationship, that this structure is already in place, and that the traditional

system of competition and mutual suspicion has been subsumed in this “global project.” Far

from it. Rather, what is being highlighted are the new arrangements whose skeleton and some

elements of form are already evident. A recent World Bank document states, “this relationship

[between corporations, the Bank and the Fund] is being strengthened to achieve greater

cohesiveness in global economic policy making.”17

Despite this, corporations continue to

violate ethical norms. In countries like India, this control, and efforts to direct the national

economy, have also meant withdrawing legislation that protected domestic industry, the

indigenous producer as well as other occupations that were better suited for the specific

context, i.e. that a society was labor-intensive.

The implications of this go beyond notions of national sovereignty. The emerging thinking

argues for a restructuring of the UN system itself. Specifically, it is being propagated that the

UN should henceforth confine itself to the social and cultural terrain, with economic issues

being controlled by the WTO and by a Council representing the nexus.

A careful study of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which preceded the

WTO) documents, and in particular, the Dunkel proposals18

and the process that led to their

drafting, demonstrates the almost total exclusion of most governments of the Third World,

with no participation of independent citizens‟ groups or other non-governmental agencies. In

fact, the only non-government actors that were permitted access to most of the deliberations

were senior representatives of TNCs. Undoubtedly, these proposals legitimise a fundamentally

undemocratic trading regime that will lead to the acceptance of a lowest common denominator

in environmental standards19

, and an inevitable escalation in the violation of human rights, as

governments are coerced into accepting the terms of the new global regime. In fact, a recent

commentator analysing the low interest expressed by the press in such a far reaching

development noted that if only the press had made an effort to decipher the real meaning, it

would have found an enormously important story, one that would not only be “readable and

exciting”, but that “involves money, greed, power, and lots of self-interested actors working in

corporate and political circles.”

Threats to Federalism and Sovereignty

For countries like India, these proposals and the emergence of the more coordinated nexus

poses a direct threat to its federal structure since the nation would increasingly be brought

under one homogeneous economic regime, whose terms would primarily be set by this quartet

of actors. In fact, the threat to sovereignty that is inherent in instruments such as the WTO

would be one reason alone to significantly rethink WTO.20

This critique should not be misunderstood as an argument against globalisation per se. It is,

nevertheless, the contention here that globalisation only helps when trade, labor and capital

flows are between equals, and even here there can be tremendous problems, as the current

differences of the US with Europe and Japan indicate. It is indeed a pernicious philosophy that

globalisation affords all parties access to the market. In a differentiated, heterogeneous

world—both within and between countries—globalisation can only be equated with the slow

subjugation of weaker actors, and the annihilation of cultural and ecological diversity.21

The current agendas for economic reform, in the absence of a fundamental restructuring of the

social and economic systems to make them more democratic and accountable, are then just a

means to the ends outlined above in the emerging strategies of the nexus. The imposition of

these macro policies is then not just an imposition of a monoculture, but a fundamental

flattening of the spaces for sustaining the struggles for ecological sustainability and

democracy. Clearly, the WTO, as well as the directions of the new alignment of economic

power, is an agenda for the recolonisation of most of the world.22

It is the contention of this

paper that this neo-colonising end is embedded in the dominant strategies of achieving

economic development.

Internally, within each country, the social and environmental impacts of these processes are

far reaching and grim, as the environmental situation in India demonstrates. Of course, these

impacts are differentially felt, both at the level of national economies as well as at the

individual level. Yet, since most South Asian countries are not implementing a democratic

agenda that includes significant internal restructuring, globalisation impels a maximisation of

the export of primary goods and natural resources.

Gandhiji predicted the dangers of adopting the colonial and capitalist mode of resource

extraction when he said, “God forbid that India should ever take to industrialisation after the

manner of the west. The economic imperialism of a single island kingdom is today keeping the

world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it

would strip the world bare like locusts.”23

Since these patterns are dependent on the extraction of these resources, there is a perpetuation

of processes of internal colonisation. The resultant escalation of the loss of control over

productive resources, and the consequent increase in economic and social insecurity,

contributes to the growth of dissent and the escalation of social conflict. This is not the place

to develop this argument, but the case of Punjab in Pakistan and India is an indication of how

declining surpluses from Green Revolution agriculture (caused primarily by unsustainable

agricultural practices), ecological degradation, and the low availability of employment outside

the land, can cause disaffection, part of which (as the Indian case suggests) gets channelled

into militancy and terrorism.24

Secondly, regional governments have been militarising themselves not just as a check to

threats from other national aggressors, but also as a means of containing internal unrest and

militancy. Regional liberation movements, collective dissent, and other social conflicts,

engender greater internal militarisation and counterinsurgency. This in turn absorbs key

resources, and disrupts the possibilities of long-term culturally and socially sensitive

sustainable development. This really is a central aspect of “the development question.”

This is not to say that there is a united, well coordinated “grand strategy.” Or that this nexus

operates in an all-pervasive manner. It is precisely the spaces that are left Open by conflicts

within these interests at global, regional and national levels that have created spaces for

alternatives and for resistance.

The Other Costs of Economic Development

The ecological impacts of industrialisation, and of the dominant patterns of economic growth,

are no longer “externalities” that can be neglected or “managed.” Across the region, there is

accumulating evidence that more and more areas are becoming unsustainable and unliveable

Mini-Bhopals are taking place every day. Despite a virtual explosion of awareness, legislation

and action, the root causes of much of this have hardly been touched upon.

In most of the region, with a majority of countries deep in a debt crisis25

, expenditure on

clean-up and preventive initiatives is going to remain substantially weak. With the growing

pressure to export more primary products, including raw materials, most South Asian societies

will continue to be locked into a spiral of pollution, degradation and conflict.

The South Asian experience suggests that current patterns of achieving economic growth are

incompatible with social justice, and with sustainable ecological principles. In fact, most

strategies of economic growth have left the basic systemic and Structural issues untouched.

Despite overwhelming evidence in the post-World War II period, the belief is prevalent that

this growth will not only percolate downwards and “lift” the poor from their poverty, but will

generate enough surplus to provide governments the incentives and resources to protect the

environment.”

To reiterate, the dominant patterns of economic development in the region (and in much of the

world) continue to underplay or overlook the following endemic problems:

(i) This economics continues to be reductionist. For instance, the justification of a wide range

of development projects is still based on a cost-benefit analysis where it is assumed that

everything is quantifiable. While important work is being done to incorporate hitherto non-

quantifiable elements (e.g. the value of forest resources to a local forest-based community),

there continues to be an assumption that it is only a matter of time before sophistication will

be achieved to comprehensively account for costs. Can the true value of an old-growth forest

be costed? Can the loss of culture or community cohesion be costed? Additionally, the

dominant processes of evaluation identify natural resource utilisation merely with extraction,

thereby ignoring the short- and long-term productive function of conserved resources. This

reductionism has been the direct consequence of a gradual process over the past century,

which involved a disembedding of economics from its ethical and cultural moorings.26

(ii) The dominant strategies continue to be dependent on the intensive and extensive

exploitation of natural resources. Millions integrally depend on the health of these systems,

and any disruption directly undermines not only the subsistence economies of these

communities, but their livelihoods, lifestyles and lives themselves. Much of the diversity and

complexity of social and ecological existence in areas like South Asia is due to the rich mix of

communities, landscapes, and ways of social organising that the human species has preserved

or helped create over the course of its evolution. This diversity is being fundamentally

undermined by the monoculture of modern industrialism and consumerism.

(iii) There is a progression in the loss of control from the local to the global on terms that the

local rarely sets.

(iv) By and large, development continues to be identified with sectoral growth, ignoring the

underdevelopment induced in related sectors through negative externalities and the related

undermining of the productivity of the ecosystem.

Citizens’ Responses

In each of the region‟s states, the contradictions in the “dominant logic”, as well as the

implications of the “moral purpose” of the state (which creates contradictory pressures on it),

have left spaces open for popular movements and other forms of citizens‟ action to expand. In

India, the scale and depth of people‟s response to the growing environmental crisis is quite

impressive. Literally thousands of citizens‟ groups have sprung up in the last two decades or

so, forcing their voices into the process of decision making, even where the state has/not

wanted to hear them. Besides those involved in conventional or reformist conservation and

environmentalism (some of it state-sanctioned), where the preoccupation is with symptoms

rather than causes, two broad categories of groups and individuals can be recognised: those

who challenge and oppose the structural causes and consequences of environmentally

destructive activities, and those who carry out regenerative work or build up alternatives to

these activities. Of course, neither of these roles is more important than the other, and many

groups and individuals are playing both.

Several recent examples of successful resistance can be given. In the l970s, a major World

Bank-funded project to replace a massive area of natural mixed forests in central India by

industrial pine plantations was abandoned after strong local tribal opposition. A move to hand

over several thousand hectares of common lands to a private industry in Karnataka (South

India) was contested and won in court, backed by considerable local mobilisation The

National Federation of Fishworkers, which had managed to stall destructive trawling off parts

of the Indian coast, and to enforce seasonal fishing restrictions in marine waters, is now pitted

against a fresh wave of domestic and international interests impelled by a New Economic

Policy, whose main aim is to increase the catch and export of marine “products.”

Several major dams have been stopped before or during planning stages by popular local

opposition, or in the case of Bargi, succeeded in pressurising the government to provide a

comprehensive package of land-based alternatives (Suvarnarekha Dam: Lok Jagruti Kendra;

Bargi Dam: Bargi Bandh Virodhi Samiti; Pooyamkooty Dam: Altermedia Koel-Karo, etc.).

The ongoing agitation by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save Narmada Movement) against

the Sardar Sarovar Projects has significantly redefined the contours of the environment-

development debate all over the world, and shown that even as powerful an agency as the

World Bank can be successfully challenged.

While it is obviously difficult to do justice to the full mix of activities that movements and

groups in the country are involved in, a small representative list is presented below to give a

sense of their diversity and range. Unless indicated, besides the examples cited, similar

movements are active throughout the country.

What is important to note is that most of these groups and movements do not perceive

themselves as “environmental.” They see themselves as social and political groups who are

defending and struggling for greater social, political and cultural control over their lives. To

this end, many see their defence and protection of the ecosystems that they inhabit as crucial.

Others—often the politically more powerful, like a majority of those in the Jharkhand

movement —are much less self-conscious about ecological priorities and values. The range of

these groups would include struggles of:

Tribals and other peasants against displacement, alienation of land, loss of control over

productive natural resources including commons. These communities are challenging

processes which create not just a crisis of survival, but also threaten their social and cultural

fabric. They are also asserting demand for greater political and economic autonomy. Similar to

the struggles around mega-projects like those in the Narmada valley, most of this activity also

challenges the dominant patterns of economic development.

Some representative groups are: Kashtakari Sangathana (Organisation of Toilers), and Bhoomi

Sena (Land Army) in Maharashtra. Mazdoor Kisan Sangharsh Samiti (Workers‟ and Farmers‟

Struggle Collective), Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Collective for the Liberation of Jharkhand).27

Lower caste groups (also called, „Dalits‟) against caste discrimination and various forms of

bondage, for granting permanent rights to lands that they work on as agricultural labour, for

strategies to strengthen affirmative action, etc.

Some representative groups are: Association for the Rural Poor in Tamil Nadu, and the

Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Front for the Liberation of Bonded Labor) working in different parts

of the country. The Dalit movement has a long and important history in the contemporary

political life of the country. Babasaheb Ambedkar, the chairman of the team who drafted the

Indian Constitution, was also a Buddhist Dalit leader who inspired generations of Dalits to

leave the folds of a caste-ridden Hindu community, and struggle for an equal place in Indian

society. Dalits all over India, and especially in Western India, have some of the most vibrant

organisations—from literary and cultural groups to those participating in political party

activities. Many Dalit groups are becoming increasingly conscious of issues of ecological

justice, though the dominant trend of the Dalit movement is towards seeking their due share in

the urban-industrial complex.

Urban working classes, particularly those who are unorganised, generally lack security of

tenure, and are targets of regular eviction. This would also include contract and construction

labour. Urban residents, particularly the poor who become victims of industrial and

environmental disasters, are crucial in this regard (the Bhopal gas tragedy is only one dramatic

example. In the case of Bhopal, several significant citizens‟ initiatives were taken. These

ranged from medical surveys to campaigns for justice by those affected by the gas leak and the

indifference that followed).

Also, the movements of organised workers, particularly the trade unions in mining areas like

Dhanbad in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh who have marked some of the most remarkable

struggles in the recent history of the country. One particularly remarkable example is of the

Chattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh (Union of Mine Workers of Chattisgarh).

Other examples of urban activists include the vast range of women‟s groups, as well as more

mass-based groups in states such as Rajasthan and Kerala. Several struggles also focus on

ecological questions as well as resistance to social problems like alcoholism. Representative

examples of the latter are: the Utterakhand Sangharsh Vahini (Utterakhand Struggle

Movement, which is now also active in the demand for redrawing the internal boundaries of

Uttar Pradesh), and the Chipko (Hug the trees) movement in Karnataka.

Farmers who face the adverse impacts of new economic policies, which have not only reduced

or withdrawn the subsidies to agricultural inputs, but propose to implement policies which

would increase dependence on transnational chemical and seed companies. A farmers‟ rally in

Delhi (held on March 1-2, 1993) brought together over 150,000 farmers from all over the

country to express their opposition to the new proposals drafted under GATT-proposals

which, for instance, would legitimise the foreign patenting of indigenous plant varieties and

genes. Another group of relatively more affluent farmers held a smaller rally on March 31,

expressing its support for some aspects of the GATT proposals. An example of the former is

the Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangh (Karnataka State Farmers‟ Association), and of the latter,

the Shetkari Sangathana (Organisation of Farmers), active primarily in Maharashtra. Both

movements have extensive horizontal alliances with similar farmers‟ associations in different

parts of the country.

Fishing communities whose livelihoods have been threatened by mechanised fishing, as well

as the increasing commercialisation and export of fish. Federations of fisherfolk exist all along

India‟s long coastline, as well as along some rivers and lakes. The better known movements

are the National Fishworkers‟ Federation, and the Ganga Mukti Andolan (Movement to Save

the Ganga).

The social roots of the environmental crisis are clearly recognised by these popular

movements. They have, therefore, opposed measures which are vaunted as environmental

protection by the state, but which in reality are both anti-poor and short-sighted. In the early

1980s, a blatantly anti-forest dweller Forest Act drafted by the central government had to be

dropped due to nation-wide mobilisation by tribal, human rights, and environmental groups.

Increasingly, top-down wildlife protection steps are being challenged on human rights

grounds, with the assertion that human and wildlife interests have to be reconciled in any.

biodiversity conservation attempt. (Environmental groups ranging from Sanctuary to the

Bombay Natural History Society to Kalpavriksh are collaborating with social action groups

like Vikalp (Alternative), Tarun Bharat Sangh and the Narmada movement to raise these

issues).

It is not a far step from such opposition and resistance to regeneration and the creation of

alternatives. Here, too, citizens‟ efforts in India are many and diverse. The famous Chipko

movement in the Himalaya has not only successfully resisted deforestation in several areas,

but also shown the relevance of community afforestation with indigenous species. Successful

attempts at reviving traditional, or developing new, methods of ecological farming are now

widespread. Fanners‟ and citizens‟ groups have shown that adequate levels of crop production

without the use. of synthetic chemicals are possible and economically viable, and are

increasingly networking amongst themselves to build an effective lobby. Other farmers‟

groups (e.g. Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangh, or Karnataka State Farmers Association) are

challenging multinational seed corporations like Cargill as well as the adverse implications of

the WTO. A network of farmers‟ groups are building a decentralised seed bank of indigenous

varieties (Navdanya).

A group of energy experts in Bangalore (ASTRA) has developed alternative energy scenarios

for several states, which would be far less resource-depleting and environmentally destructive

than the current energy generation models. Assisted by engineers and hydrologists with a pro-

people bent of mind, communities in diverse ecological zones, including the driest arid areas

of western India, have shown that watershed management and simple rain water harvesting

techniques can achieve—at much less ecological, social, and financial costs—what big dams

cannot.

Several groups in the urban areas are involved in producing popular literature (Centre for

Science and Environment), undertaking training (Centre for Environmental Education), and

working on urban and rural issues (Deccan Development Society, Goa Foundation).

Again, the most important issue is that a wide range of groups and movements do not self-

consciously perceive themselves as “environmental groups”, but as social and political action

groups who are also environmentally conscious. The Narmada movement, for example, is a

fundamentally political movement that sees the environment as one of the central aspects of a

more comprehensive struggle.28

In the past six years, a major development has been the formation of national level

associations. The range of initiatives is indicative of the fact that many groups working in

local contexts or spheres of action feel the need to form coalitions that can further their

political concerns on a wider societal level. These coalitions also defy easy classification. A

few illustrations will indicate the diversity. Some older initiatives were either state-level (e.g.

FEVORD-Federation of Voluntary Organisations in Rural Development in Karnataka and

Tamil Nadu), single event-based (National Convention on the Forest Policy, or the National

Convention on Women‟s Rights), or single issue-based (National Working Group on

Displacement).

Specific „developments have also engendered collective responses. One of the best examples

was the mobilisation after the Bhopal Tragedy in 1984. Doctors, lawyers and other

professionals teamed up with representatives of the affected communities to fight for justice

for the victims of the worst industrial disaster in history. Like the Narmada campaign, though

on a smaller scale, horizontal alliances were created with trade unions working in other Union

Carbide factories, as well as with grass roots organisations like the Highlander Center in the

US.

Several newer initiatives attempt to be more oriented to the longer term, and are more

politically self-conscious of the need for a structural reorganisation of society. Five examples

would be the Jan Vikas Andolan (Movement for People‟s Development—a loose coalition of

over 200 groups, ranging from political movements to urban support organisations), Bharat

Jan Andolan (a coalition of movements working almost entirely in tribal areas), the Federal

Front (a coalition of primarily movement—based groups seeking a fundamental reorganisation

of the polity), Azadi Bachao Andolan (Movement for the Defence of Independence-working

to expose the adverse implications of the lending programmes of the World Bank29

and the

IMF, as well as other interventions in the economy that threaten livelihoods and ecosystems,

particularly of poor communities), and the National Campaign for Housing Rights, a coalition

of groups working in urban and rural areas asserting a definition of the concept of housing30

.

The Narmada Bachao Andolan is obviously another example. Similar coalitions exist at the

level of states, e.g. Shoshit Jan Andolan (Movement of the Oppressed People), which

comprises groups working predominantly in the tribal areas of Maharashtra.

Recently, there have been some efforts to collaborate across these initiatives since many

people in them recognise that fragmentation and disparate, uncoordinated activity is

counterproductive. The formation of the National Alliance of People‟s Movements (formerly

Alliance for the. Right to Life) is one such effort. Most of these federative efforts have

produced literature that details a political critique, as well as a blueprint towards realising

people-centered governance.

The clear lesson from the dynamic of both environmental destruction and environmental

reconstruction in India is that people —local communities everywhere—have to be involved

in any kind of natural resource management. That is a lesson that even the Indian State,

howsoever reluctantly, is beginning to learn.

Political Autonomy or Political Party?

The issue of political participation has been the centre of concern for almost all groups

working in the country. What differs is the degree of emphasis, the content of what comprises

participation, and what means will be used for realising this. One of the most contentious

issues has been the relationship with political parties.

Often, success in establishing a base in an area motivates representatives of existing political

parties to seek the integration of that activity into the party. Refusal to consent to these

overtures, or those made by the state to become a recipient of state development funds, can

bring various forms of retribution-ranging from isolation to repression. The case of the

Chattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh (CMSS)31

is illustrative. A remarkably innovative

independent trade union, working in the mining areas of southern Madhya Pradesh (Dally-

Rajahara), was able to muster significant support, in the process eroding the base of the older

party-based unions in the area. The trade union was able to not only achieve successes in the

conventional economic agenda, it was also able to have a significant impact on the social

aspects of the worker‟s life-health, education, alcoholism, etc. Resentment grew among the

older unions, and all efforts to woo them were unsuccessful. The union was able to gradually

have an impact in the neighbouring areas, and in late 1991, one of its main leaders, Shanker

Guha Niyogi, was murdered. While this reprehensible act was not the doing of the other trade

unions (but of the then ruling party-supported industrialists), this case shows the high costs of

asserting autonomy from the established structures of society.

Unions and groups like the CMSS have been debating another option: to form a party of their

own. Several years ago, over 80 groups had also begun a process of forming a Green Party.

None of these initiatives has as yet been realised. What is gaining ground, however, is an even

more fundamental debate. Is participation in electoral politics necessary? Is it not possible to

assert local autonomy and control over the local means of production? On December 1990,

over 150 groups and movements publicly announced a radical programme of “Our rule in our

villages.” While this may be criticised as an isolationist strategy that cannot work, it

nevertheless represents the strong sentiment of disillusionment and frustration with the

democratic limitations of electoral politics.

This assertion does not mean isolation from the formal political process. In fact, the process of

making the formal system (parties and governments) accountable, continues. What also

continues is the use of the available instruments of democratic institutions, particularly the

courts.

From the standpoint of the parties, there is a growing attempt to recognise independent

movements and groups. While overtures by some of the parties have undoubtedly been

perceived as co-operative, overtures for a dialogue have called for a more thorough debate

among non-party groups. A recent statement by one of India‟s leading politicians—who has

also been a celebrated trade unionist and a minister in two different non-Congress

governments at the centre—is indicative of the “shifting mood” within some parties. He said:

“In the absence of an organised socialist movement, new issues and new challenges have been

taken up by radical youth, including women, by setting up action groups and other voluntary

organisations. These issues pertain to: the rights of women and children, and their

exploitation; protection of the environment that is being devastated locally and globally by

large industry and those who serve its interests; struggles against large dams and other projects

that displace hundreds of thousands of people and ravage their lives, even while disturbing the

ecological equilibrium.., all such groups need to be drawn into the now inevitable struggle

against the new economic policies of the government.“32

Despite these efforts to bridge the gap between parties and non-party movements, all

indications currently suggest that these relationships are going to continue to be marked by a

blend of dialogue, pressurising and conflict. A dynamic tension continues to prevail between

rajniti and lokniti (state power and people‟s power)

The State and Democratic Space

Working with a state that is simultaneously a strong state and a weak one, a developmentalist

state and one that legitimises the erosion of livelihoods, a militarising state and one that opens

democratic possibilities, makes the activities of groups and movements all the more difficult

and challenging. There have been perennial debates on what kinds of contexts justify

collaboration with the state, and when there should be resistance and opposition to it.

Dilemmas are created, for instance, when developmental initiatives are being implemented by

administrators sensitive to the demands of democratising social action. Does appealing to the

state legitimise it further?

Many feel that the state is the biggest problem. However, most recognise that criticising the

state does not mean a negation of it. In most cases when there are conflicts over natural

resources, groups seek the mediation of the state. There is also the role of buffer that the state

can play in the face of increasingly predatory transnationals. Yet, in the face of growing state

lawlessness at one level, and a partisan state acting in the interests of national and global elites

on the other, newer and more creative ways are required of defining what the mechanisms to

ensure accountability ought to be. Should all these mechanisms be from within? Many

movements and groups like those in the Narmada struggle are increasingly seeking to facilitate

building pressure from the outside—both within the UN system and through other citizens

groups. Many critics have questioned the legitimacy of this approach. In fact, the state and a

section of the media have charged that seeking accountability by invoking international human

rights standards is anti-national activity. Movement groups, on the other hand, have argued

that there are international conventions that India is signatory to, and that there are a body of

internationally recognised rights that India must respect. Additionally, when the new regime is

clearly taking its directives on new economic policies from institutions like the World Bank

and the IMF, its invocation of the anti-national bogey rings false. Other, commentators argue

that in societies like India‟s, the state monopolises both violence and the right to define policy.

In that sense, it also attempts to monopolise the decision on what constitutes “national

interest.” It is precisely these monopolies that are being challenged by people‟s movements,

many of which have also begun a process of rethinking the modern state.

Conclusion

The continued destruction of the complex ecosystems of South Asia reflects the injustice

inherent in the dominant model of development, under which capital and technology (from

biotechnology to telecommunication conglomerates) from the industrialised countries with

expertise drawn from both contexts, are used to erode local and national control, and to turn

natural resources into exportable commodities for foreign exchange and private capital

accumulation, to pay debts, to primarily maintain the upward mobility of a minority, and to

purchase military hardware both to “protect one‟s borders” as well as to quell internal dissent.

Lopsided international markets, industrial technology, and an expanding appetite for a higher

standard of living by affluent populations, create needs entirely out of balance with the

ecological and social welfare of the countries with the resources to supply those needs. It is

economically, and most often politically, advantageous (particularly in the short run) for

commercial interests within and outside these countries to join hands in the exploitation of

forest and other resources. The poor in most of the region (a majority of whom remain rural)

can only be raised above a life of poverty by „recovering and regenerating degraded lands, by

more equitably distributing these resources (developmental strategies that are almost totally

absent in today‟s official developmental plans), and by wresting primary control (through

processes of local governance) over the use of these resources. This agenda does not figure

even in the manifestos of our political parties, almost all of whom are committed (with small

variations) to the dominant patterns of economic development. The challenge for non-party

political groups is twofold: (i) to build a step-by-step consensus on the adverse impacts and

implications of the dominant patterns while struggling for greater transparency and

accountability of the parties and of the state; and (ii) to continue to give substance to

strengthening governance that builds upward from the Gram Sabha to the national, regional

and global levels.

The issues these movements have, championed, and the actors they have activised, have

implications for the fundamental nature of politics. Liberal parliamentary politics as well as

radical politics have become increasingly cognisant of them, though efforts to co-opt and

manipulate them are still prevalent. Although some orthodox politicians might label these

concerns as “Luddite” or “anti-progress”, others have begun to acknowledge the basic critique

of the dominant patterns of development. A grass roots activist from Maharashtra, Bharat

Patnakar, argues that a viable programme of social transformation should now include “not

only taking over of the means of production or the bourgeois state, but also to create more

participatory ways for organising and managing production processes and alternative concepts

of agriculture/health care/industry/ecology.”

This countervailing consciousness, particularly but not only in tribal areas, asserts that rather

than accepting development as an unquestionable truth, it is important to demonstrate that it is

a product of particular historical configurations of power relations, where „underdevelopment‟

is not a natural fact, but an imaginary geography created by the developed world. By

essentialising as distinct categories of „developed‟ and „underdeveloped‟, industrialised

countries have defined the underdeveloped in such a way that they can continue to control and

manage their affairs. But in fact, both are facets of „the same world.

Many of these movements and the alliances that are being forged are not seeking a „greener‟

and environmentally sound habitat within the current capitalist system. The National Alliance,

for instance, argues that ecological problems are inherent in the social relations of production

and the mode of capitalist development, and there is therefore an urgent need for radically

restructuring the social relations of production, and that this can be achieved by not only

seeking alternative ecological principles, but also alternative social relations, both among

humans of different gender, castes, classes and ethnicities, and between humans and nature.

Movements based on an ecological ethic are, however, only a part of the larger political

challenge that can address the existing power relations. The building of a dialogue between the

various strands of resistance will require patience and perseverance.

In another sense also, the self-awakening of the Subcontinent is bound to remain similarly

elusive and transient until we find a secure basis for a confident expression of our collective

civilization within the modern world and the modern epoch. We must establish a conceptual

framework under which our ways and aspirations seem viable in the present, so that we do not

feel compelled or tempted to indulge in demeaning imitations of the western world, and the

majority of our people do not have to suffer the humiliation of seeing their ways denigrated

and despised in their own country.

These are just a few thoughts and concerns that reflect the enormously complex challenges

that lie before anyone who is struggling for ecological sustainability and justice in the

beleaguered Subcontinent. This paper is finally dedicated, in profound respect, to those

struggling against overwhelming odds all over the region.

Notes:

1. James Gustave Speth, “A Post-Rio Compact,” Foreign Policy No. 88, Fall 1992, p.149.

2. One caveat: a task this paper can only hint at, but which needs greater political and

psychological analysis, is the diverse ways in which the dominant cultural groups have

“dialogued” with the vast diversity of identities within the context of each country and within

the region, and how ecology has intersected and contributed to the exacerbation or reduction

of conflict and insecurity. There can be no disagreement that while developmental change and

technological transformations create new solidarities, they also foster or revive old identities.

What also needs deeper understanding is the role of the state in each of our societies, both in

contributing to the growth of people‟s insecurity, as well as in being able to immediate in the

ecological conflicts between communities, identities and groups.

3. Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land, Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1993.

4. According to the 1991 Census, Indian tribal and nomadic populations each number roughly

8% of a total population of 870 million. The largest tribal community in Bangladesh is that of

the Chakmas, who have been struggling for autonomy in the face of severe state repression

and forced integration. Chakmas also reside in India, and there are some efforts to assert a

unified Chakma politics that cuts across national boundaries. These crucial issues of autonomy

and assertion of control over productive natural resources occur in almost all tribal areas of the

Subcontinent. The tribal population in Pakistan and Sri Lanka is very small and does not face

the same sets of problems with regard to forest, land, or the attitude of the state towards them.

5. Pathy, Jaganath, Anthropology of Development: Demystification & Relevance, Delhi:

Gyan Publishing House, 1987.

6. Walter Fernandes, et al, Forests, Environment and Tribal Economy: Deforestation,

Impoverishment & Marginalisation in Orissa, Tribes of India Series, 1988.

7. Janardhan Rao and G. Hargopal, Lokayan Bulletin, 1990.

8. A classification made in the Indian Constitution of tribal groups and economically and

socially marginalised castes, for whom affirmative action and other stare protection was

mandated.

9. Sharma 1990:420.

10. Bina Agarwal (1991), Gall Omvedt (1987), and Vandana Shiva (1988).

11. Jharkhand is the name of a proposed new state based not on dominant linguistic criteria,

but on tribal identity. Located in east-central India, it encompasses an unmistakable identity

that separates it geographically, ethnically and culturally from the surrounding plains of

northern Bihar and West Bengal. Jharkhand‟s name itself suggests an ecological identity

Bihar‟, meaning „forest‟, and „khand‟, meaning „area‟).

12. Ram Dayal Munda (1987), Devnathan (t988), and the Jharkhand Mukti Andolan

(Ghanshyam 1992).

13. For the rest of the paper, I have used „region‟, „South Asia‟, and „the Subcontinent‟

interchangeably.

14. While there are significant differences between the nature and character of South Asian

regimes, which range from authoritarian to quasi-democratic, the basic dynamic of natural

resource extraction and capitalist development remain remarkably similar. One among the

many differences relate to how “developed” the industrial sector is. For instance, the post-

Partition Indian state laid great emphasis on industrial self-sufficiency. The weaker industrial

base of the other countries in the region have made them comparatively more dependent on

external capital and external control. However, under the new liberalisation in India, this is

changing.

15. A controversial dam project in one of the most fragile and pristine rain forests in south-

eastern India. Despite overwhelming support for the project from local politicians and trade

unions, a remarkable „elitist‟ campaign was launched, comprising scientists and other

professionals. Mrs. Gandhi, then Prime Minister, intervened to shelve the project. For years,

she cited this action as her commitment to the environment. For a comprehensive narrative on

the controversy, see Darryl D‟Monte, Temples or Tombs, Delhi: Centre for Science and

Environment, 1986.

16. The South Commission, The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission,

New York: Oxford University Press, 1990

17. World Bank Annual Report, 1992

18. The Dunkel Final Act was distributed to GATT delegates in Geneva in December 1991.

Arthur Dunkel was till recently the Secretary-General of GATT. This document, with minor

alterations, was formally adopted by India in the second week of April 1994, and the

Parliament gave its assent to the new World Trade Organisation (despite strong opposition)

on December 9, 1994.

19. Several leading environmental organisations in the US argue that regional trading regimes

like NAFTA will, in fact, lead to a strengthening of standards in Mexico and increased

environmental awareness generally. While there may be some truth in this, the trends that will

be reinforced when the current GATT proposals become internationally enforceable norms

under the WTO, point to the conclusions that I have outlined. There is no indication from the

dominant interests behind WTO that they are indeed willing to make global trade democratic,

equitable and ecologically sane, with an emphasis on empowering local production as well as

relative national self-sufficiency.

20. In a way, this ideology is popularly available in Jack Hadley‟s novel, Millennium, which

outlines a process through which, by the 21st century, the South loses control of its economy

to the North.

21. Interestingly, this recognition is not new. In the 1950s, Joan Robinson‟s Economics of

Imperfect Competition and E. Chamberlain‟s Economics of Monopoly Capitalism had made

the same observation, though without identifying the threats to cultural and ecological

pluralism.

22. Chakravarti Raghavan, Recolonization: GATT and the Third World, London: Zed Books,

1991. Also see Robert Weissman, “Prelude to a New Colonialism,” The Nation, March 18,

1991.

23. Mahatma Gandhi as quoted in Pyarelal, Towards New Horizons, Ahmedabad, India:

Navjivan Publishing House, 1959.

24. For one of the best documented studies of this relationship see Vandana Shiva, The

Violence of the Green Revolution, London: Penguin Books. 1988. On a similar crisis generated

in the Latin American food system, see Michael Redclift, Environment and Development in

Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability, New York: Manchester University Press, 1991.

25. In 1989, the combined external debt of the major South Asian countries was over $ 100

billion. India itself owed $ 62 billion (current estimates are around $ 80 billion). At $ 296 per

capita, Sri Lanka had the highest debt in the region, while India‟s per capita debt was $ 73.

Nepal had the lowest debt at $ 11 per capita.

26. Economics, Ecology, Ethics. The Unbroken Circle, New Haven: Yale University Press,

1992.

27. These lists of representative groups are by no means an indication that within each cluster,

these groups are similar. While there may be vital similarities in terms of goals, histories,

individual perspectives, sizes and the nature of activities are significantly different.

28. For a more exhaustive discussion on social movements and social action groups, see my

„Social Movements and the Redefinition of Democracy,‟ in Philip Oldenburg, India Briefing,

Westview Press, 1993. This article also contains significant references on what Lokayan

termed the “non-party political process.”

29. For an excellent comparative study of the role of the World Bank in tropical forestry in

India, see Robert S. Anderson and Walter Huber, The Hour of the Fox: Tropical Forests, the

World Bank, and Indigenous People in Central India, Seattle: University of Washington Press,

1988.

30. Responding to agitation against forced displacement in several parts of the country, and

the scale of this phenomenon, a remarkable initiative was taken in 1987 by a group of

activists, researchers, scientists and lawyers. Called „National Working Group on

Displacement‟, it facilitated over a dozen meetings all over the country of activists and

professionals with representatives of communities who had either faced, or were going to face,

displacement. In light of the fact that there was no national policy for those displaced by

developmental projects, a legal sub-group drafted a policy statement, which was subsequently

used by the central government to draft a National Policy in 1990. However, the government

draft was a thoroughly inadequate document, and has yet to be finalised. Estimates of the

number of people displaced by development range from 15-25 million since Independence.

31. There is considerable writing on the CMSS. For a recent article see, Sharat G. Lin,

„Shankar Guha Niyogi: Beyond Conventional Trade Unionism in India,‟ Bulletin of

Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 24, No. 3. July-September 1992, pp. 16-25.

32. This excerpt is from a meeting addressed by Mr. George Fernandes at a national dialogue

to forge a new coalition of democratic and socialist forces. The meeting was held in

Hyderabad, March 20-21. 1993.

Smitu Kothari

Ecology and Security in South Asia

(A State-of-the-Art Report for Greenpeace International, Amsterdam, 1994).