Ecological Modernization and the Global Economy - Ecological...Ecological Modernization Theory...

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Ecological Modernization and the GlobalEconomy

Arthur P. J. Mol

1. Introduction

Arguably ecological modernization ideas—and to some extent ecological mod-ernization practices—have gained solid ground in at least the West Europeannation-states. It is not only the increasing amount of literature that points inthat direction, but even more the fact that the fundamental debates around eco-logical modernization ideas seem to have disappeared in Europe. While the eco-logical modernization perspective met severe criticism and skepticism in the1980s and early 1990s, during the second half of the 1990s this debate fadedaway. Some of the causes are to be found in the maturation of ecological mod-ernization ideas.1 But the changing nature of the environmental discourse, andthe changes in the social practices and institutional developments related to en-vironmental deterioration and reform have also contributed to this.Eco logical Moderni zation and the Global EconomyArt hur P. J. M ol

But that does not mean that ecological modernization is no longer subjectto doubts, controversies and debates. It only indicates that these controversiesand debates transcend the level of the European nation-state. Today, discussionson the adequacy of ecological modernization—both as interpretation schemeand as normative trajectory for environmental reform—are to be found outsideEurope, for example, with regard to the US and the newly industrializing coun-tries and with respect to the global economy. In this paper, I want to focus onthe latter challenge. What is the relevance of ecological modernization ideaswith respect to understanding global environmental reforms? Can we alreadyidentify ecological modernization mechanisms and dynamics that direct a stilldominant market driven global capitalism into more sustainable directions?What trajectories can we envisage for a more comprehensive system of globalenvironmental governance? What does this mean for the agenda of ecologicalmodernization studies?

In dealing with these questions I will shortly summarize the ecologicalmodernization ideas (section 2). I will then elaborate upon the discussions andambivalences of globalization processes in relation to environmental decay andreform, especially entering into a discussion with neo-Marxists (sections 3

Global Environmental Politics 2:2, May 2002

© 2002 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1. See Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000.

and 4). Subsequently, I will analyze from an ecological modernization perspec-tive what actors, institutions and mechanisms are presently in the making totame the global treadmill of capitalism (sections 5 to 7). Finally, I return to eco-logical modernization theory by outlining the consequences globalizationshould have for ecological modernization studies.

2. Ecological Modernization Theory

Several empirical studies identify from the mid-1980s onward a rupture in thelong established trend of parallel economic growth and increasing ecologicaldisruption in most of the ecologically advanced nations, such as Germany, Ja-pan, the Netherlands, the US, Sweden and Denmark. This slowdown is often re-ferred to as the decoupling or delinking of material �ows from economic �ows.In a number of cases (regarding countries and/or speci�c industrial sectors and/or speci�c environmental issues) environmental reform can even result in anabsolute decline in the use of natural resources and discharge of emissions, re-gardless of economic growth in �nancial or material terms (product output).The social dynamics behind these changes, that is the emergence of actual envi-ronment-induced transformations of institutions and social practices in indus-trialized societies, are encapsulated in the ecological modernization theory. Thistheory tries to understand, interpret and conceptualize the nature, extent anddynamics of this transformation process.

The basic premise of ecological modernization theory is the centripetalmovement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations in social practicesand institutional developments. This results in ecology-inspired and environ-ment-induced processes of transformation and reform going on in the corepractices and central institutions of modern society. Within ecological modern-ization theory these processes have been conceptualized at an analytical level asthe growing autonomy or independence of an ecological perspective and eco-logical rationality vis-à-vis other perspectives and rationalities.2 In the domainof policies, politics and ideologies, the growing independence of an ecologicalperspective took place in the seventies and early eighties. The construction ofgovernmental organizations and departments dealing with environmental is-sues dates from that era, followed later by the emergence of green parties in thepolitical system of many countries of the Organization for Economic Coopera-tion and Development (OECD).3 In the ideological domain a distinct green ide-ology—as manifested by, for instance, environmental NGOs and environmen-tal periodicals—started to emerge in the 1970s. Especially in the 1980s, thisideology assumed an independent status and could no longer be interpreted interms of the old political ideologies of socialism, liberalism and conservatism.4

Arthur P. J. Mol 93

2. See Mol 1995 and 1996; and Spaargaren 1997. Also see Seippel 2000; and Andersen and Massa2000.

3. See Carter 2001.4. See Paehlke 1989; and Giddens 1994.

But the crucial transformation, which makes the notion of the growing auton-omy of an ecological perspective and rationality especially relevant, is of morerecent origin. In the economic domain, ecological rationality has started tochallenge the dominant economic rationality. And since, according to mostscholars, the growing independence of an ecological rationality and perspectivefrom their economic counterparts in the domain of production and consump-tion is crucial to “the ecological question,” this last step is the decisive one. Itmeans that economic processes of production and consumption are increas-ingly analyzed and judged, as well as designed and organized from both an eco-nomic and an ecological point of view. Some profound institutional changes inthe economic domain of production and consumption have been discerniblefrom the late 1980s onward. Among these changes were the widespread emer-gence of environmental management systems, the introduction of an economicvaluation of environmental goods via the introduction of eco-taxes, the emer-gence of environment-inspired liability and insurance arrangements, the in-creasing importance attached to environmental goals such as natural resourcesaving and recycling among public and private utility enterprises, and the articu-lation of environmental considerations in economic supply and demand. Thefact that we analyze these transformations as institutional changes indicates theirsemi-permanent character. Although the process of ecology-induced transfor-mation should not be interpreted as linear and irreversible, as was common inthe modernization theories in the 1950s and 1960s, these changes have somepermanency and would be dif�cult to reverse.

Various ecological modernization scholars have elaborated on the socialmechanisms, dynamics and processes through which social practices and insti-tutional developments at the national level take up environmental interests andconsiderations. Most attention has been paid to technological change, marketdynamic and economic actors, political modernization and new forms of gover-nance, and the strategies and ideologies of social movements.5

3. Challenging Ecological Modernization: Globalization and Anti-Globalization

This ecological modernization perspective of ongoing institutional transforma-tions triggered by relatively independent environmental ideas and interests hasbeen challenged since the late 1990s by economic globalization. Perceptions oneconomic globalization, as I will argue below, have brought neo-Marxist per-spectives on the treadmill-of-production and on the second contradiction ofcapital strongly back into the environmental debate.

Globalization re�ects a kind of common sense view of the global transfor-mations and interdependencies that most people claim—or are told—to witness.The idea of the nation-state as the rule, the organizing principle and unit, and

94 Ecological Modernization and the Global Economy

5. See Jänicke 1993; Anderson 1994; Mol 1995; Spaargaren 1997; and Hajer 1995.

everything outside it as the exception that proves and forti�es this “rule,” hasbeen discarded by an increasing number of people. Global networks and �ows,rather than countries, are the “true architectures of the new global economy.”6

This is particularly important for environmentalists and environmental reformsin OECD countries, where the combating of environmental problems has relied�rmly for at least the last quarter of the twentieth century on strong nation-states, albeit in vain. Consequently, environmentalists have always been hostileto infringements on the nation-state, whether they be the result of privatization,deregulation or, now, globalization. For instance, the anti-globalization move-ment that became well known after its protests at the 1999 World Trade Organi-zation (WTO) summit in Seattle, has a strong environmental signature.

In most studies globalization is often closely associated with, if not lim-ited to, the dynamics of global capitalism. The internal dynamics of the capital-ist mode of production explains to a large extent the emergence, shape and dy-namics of what is called “globalization.” Consequently, globalization may leadto the same kind of social disasters that befell capitalism. While arguably on anational scale most industrialized societies have to a greater or lesser extentmanaged to reduce and neutralize the most severe consequences of the “free”capitalist market, we are now witnessing the return of these very same problems,especially on a global scale and within developing societies. It is globalization—or, more precisely, global capitalism—that is the root cause of this new round ofsocial and environmental destruction.

Some scholars conclude that globalization might lead to the end of theglobal capitalist economic order, because it jeopardizes the sustenance base ofproduction and consumption. This line of thinking was implicit in the ideas ofsome protesters at Seattle in 1999 and is articulated explicitly by a number ofneo-Marxist environmental sociologists such as Ted Benton, Peter Dickens,Allan Schnaiberg and his colleagues, and James O’Connor.7 They have com-bined the idea of an aggressive global expansion of the capitalist economy withthe ongoing and intensifying (global) environmental crisis to formulate the“second contradiction of capitalism” argument. According to them, the eco-nomic growth and expansion that are inherent within the global capitalist econ-omy will run up against environmental boundaries that will, in the end, turnthe tide of the global capitalist economic order and change it beyond recogni-tion. “A systematic answer to the question, ‘Is an ecologically sustainable capi-talism possible?’ is, ‘Not unless and until capital changes its face in ways thatwould make it unrecognizable to bankers, money managers, venture capitalists,and CEOs looking at themselves in the mirror today’.”8 One of the great histori-ans of our time, Eric Hobsbawm,9 reaches a similar conclusion on the environ-mental crisis in the last chapter of his study on the Age of Extremes.

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6. Castells 2000, 61.7. Benton 1993; Dickens 1998; Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg et al. 2002; and O’Connor 1998.8. O’Connor 1998, 235.9. Hobsbawm 1994.

Should we thus conclude that an ecological modernization perspectivehas nothing to offer when we move from the level of the national state to thelevel of the global economy? I do not think so. Before focusing our attention onthe contribution of an ecological modernization perspective to the understand-ing of the relationship between globalization and the environment, I want toclarify the distinctions between ecological modernization scholars, on the onehand, and neo-Marxists, on the other.

4. Ecological Modernization and Neo-Marxism

Neo-Marxist inspired scholars focus on the continuity of capitalist exploitationof nature, trivialize any environmental improvement and blame the ecologicalmodernization perspective for their failure to get at the “roots of the environ-mental crisis.”10 More systematically, �ve major points can be raised to clarifythe differences between the two schools of thought (see Table 1).

First, ecological modernization studies concentrate on “environmentalradicalism” rather than on “social radicalism.” That is, in their assessments ofexisting patterns of change in-the-making ecological modernization perspec-tives tend to focus on the contributions to environmental reform, and not pri-marily on the effects of these changes in terms of various other criteria. “Small”deviations from existing institutions and practices can produce substantial envi-ronmental improvements, just as “big” changes in terms of a radical or funda-mental reorganization of the economic relations of production can have limitedenvironmental bene�ts (as we know from former communist Eastern Europe).Ecological modernization is �rst and foremost an environmental social theory,analyzing the environmental origins and environmental consequences of socialchange. Neo-Marxist scholars seem to be primarily interested in changes that in-volve a transformation of the capitalist or treadmill character of production andconsumption. The hypothesized one-to-one relationship between the “relationsof production” and environmental disruption causes them to count changes assigni�cant only if they undermine the treadmill.

Furthermore, the analysis of change in the two perspectives differs in termsof what might be called “absolute” (neo-Marxist) versus “relative” (ecologicalmodernization). Criticizing ecological modernization theory for its rather naiveideas on environmental improvements, neo-Marxist scholars claim that all—orthe overwhelming majority—of production and consumption practices are stillgoverned by treadmill logics, and that ecological, environmental orsustainability criteria will seldom, if ever, become dominant in the organizationand design of production and consumption. In my view, however, this is not somuch what contemporary ecological modernization theorists will or shoulddeny. I would agree that treadmill (or economic) criteria and interests play acrucial and dominant role in organizing and designing global production and


10. Pepper 1984.

consumption, and that they will probably always remain at least as important asecological or other criteria.11 But the innovation is that ecological interests andcriteria are slowly but steadily catching up with economic criteria. Compared tosome decades ago, environmental interests can no longer be ignored and in-creasingly make a difference in organizing and designing production and con-sumption. In that sense, ecological modernization theory looks at relative (butsigni�cant) changes into more environmentally sound directions, in contrast tothe “absolute” sustainability sought by neo-Marxist scholars.

Thirdly, there is a major difference between the two perspectives in theirassessments of the environmental changes that have been set into motion fromthe late 1980s onwards: window-dressing (neo-Marxists) versus structuralchanges in institutions and social practices (ecological modernization). It goeswithout saying that empirical evidence to underpin either of the two can easilybe found and constructed. After all, the large variety in data sets, criteria, vari-ables, time intervals and the like rule out the possibility of any “objective” �nalanswer or conclusion. Neo-Marxist scholars insist that they see no real, lastingenvironmental improvements and therefore de�ne all environmental initiativesand institutional changes as window dressing. Ecological modernizationistsclaim that an assessment of environmental transformations in terms of win-dow-dressing seems to bypass the differences that exist between the current pe-riod of institutionalization of the environment—regardless of all the shortcom-ings and limited successes—and that of the 1970s.

Fourthly, a distinction should be made between the nature of the changesadvocated by the two frameworks. Both neo-Marxist and ecological moderniza-tion perspectives contain analytical as well as normative, and even prescriptive,dimensions. This means that they both analyze contemporary processes of so-cial continuity and change, but also seek to contribute to the development of

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Table 1:

Comparing Contrasting Perspectives on Environmental Reform

Treadmill-of-Production Ecological Modernization

Main emphasis Institutional continuity Institutional transformations

Kind of radicalism Economic radicalism Environmental radicalism

Environmental improvements Absolute sustainability Relative improvements

Assessment of environmental change Window dressing Real changes

Relation between changes analyzed

and changes proposed

Weak relation Strong relation

Object of evaluation High consequence risks “Conventional” environmental

problems

11. See Mol 1995, 28–34.

normative, political trajectories of transformation that ought to take place in or-der to turn the tide of environmental destruction. Most neo-Marxist studies dis-play a major gap between the quite advanced and detailed theoretical analysesof the immanently destructive character of the treadmill of (global) capitalistproduction, on the one hand, and the suggestions made for concrete trajectoriestowards social change, on the other. David Pepper,12 James O’Connor13 andGoldfrank’s14 world-system theory volume put forward detailed and re�nedneo-Marxist analyses of the destructive pattern of the capitalist world economy,but rather “meager” and utopian countervailing strategies for environmentalreform. It seems to me that the strategies for change developed within neo-Marxist inspired perspectives have not been improved and re�ned in step withtheir analyses of environmental disruption. They are founded only marginallyon existing patterns of social transformation and thus have a highly “utopian”character. In contrast, within ecological modernization theory there is a closerlink between the analyses of existing changes-in-the-making in the main institu-tions and social practices, and the design of “realist-utopian”15 trajectories forenvironmental reform for the near future.

Finally, a distinction can sometimes be found in the kind of environmen-tal problems that form the object of evaluation. We have already touched uponthis in an earlier stage in noticing that the “apocalyptic horizon of environmen-tal reform,” usually more dominant in neo-Marxist inspired studies, is oftenonly related to the so-called “high-consequence risks” of climate change, bio-diversity, ozone layer depletion and the like.16 At the same time, “conventional”environmental problems such as surface water pollution, solid waste, local andregional air pollution, and noise are, or at least have been until the mid 1990s,the more typical objects of ecological modernization studies. This difference inobject sometimes contributes to differences in evaluations. One of the clearestexamples of this contrast is the debate around the presentations of the Environ-mental Sustainability Index at the World Economic Forum in 2001.17 The Envi-ronmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is a measure of overall progress towardsenvironmental sustainability, developed for 122 countries. The ESI scores arebased upon a set of 22 core “indicators,” each of which combines two to sixvariables for a total of 67 underlying variables. It is used to rank countries frommost environmentally sustainable (Finland, Norway and Canada being the topthree) to least environmentally sustainable (Haiti, preceded by Saudi-Arabiaand Burundi). The New Economics Foundation (NEF), among others, attackedthe report and calculations as “global misleadership.” It was especially critical of


12. Pepper 1984.13. O’Connor 1998.14. Goldfrank et al. 1999.15. See Giddens 1990.16. Mol and Spaargaren 1993.17. This study was done by the Columbia University Center for International Earth Science Infor-

mation network (CIESIN), the Yale Center of Environmental Law and Policy, Yale University,and the World Economic Forum’s Global Leaders for Tomorrow Environment Task Force. Seehttp://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI.

the fact that the US was listed 11th on the index, when its ecological footprintplaced it 129th out of 151 countries, and carbon dioxide/climate change indica-tors placed it 149th. While these latter indicators—and the NEF—take a globalperspective, the Environmental Sustainability Index is preoccupied with localand national successes in combating environmental pollution, incorporatingglobal issues such as climate change as just one out of the 67 variables thatmake up the ESI.

In the remaining part of this paper I illustrate that an ecological modern-ization perspective can balance the idea of an all-determining global capitalismthat only results in further environmental decay. Also, at a global level, we canidentify the emergence of actors, institutions and mechanisms that tame thetreadmill of global capitalism, although these re�exive dynamics differ fromtheir national equivalents (that emerged some twenty years earlier in the mostdeveloped countries).

5. Taming the Treadmill of Global Capitalism: Political Modernization

Political scientists and international relations theorists, in particular, have con-centrated on the construction of global, multilateral or supra-national environ-mental organizations, institutions and regimes as instruments to contribute toenvironmental reform of a globalizing world order. Especially since the early1990s, international relations scholars have identi�ed environmental issues as anew and interesting issue for multilateral actions, institutions and regimes. Theyhave devoted a great deal of attention to the numerous multilateral environ-mental agreements (MEAs), most of which focus on one or a limited number ofenvironmental issues (such as the protection of the ozone layer, the export ofwaste, transboundary air pollution, the protection of the oceans, or the Frame-work Convention on Climate Change). Although they remain a set of “piece-meal or issue-speci�c arrangements,”18 the expanding number of multilateralenvironmental agreements are increasingly moving towards common denomi-nators in terms of legal and policy principles (via spill-over and other mecha-nisms), and thus becoming more relevant as building blocks for universal inter-national environmental law and policy. In that sense, they jointly contribute tothe emergence of a relatively independent environmental realm in national andglobal politics.

Nevertheless, I would argue that, in the end, the regional, originally eco-nomic, institutions such as the European Union (EU) and to a lesser extent theNorth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are probably of greater rele-vance for the future taming of transnational capitalism. The “institutional-ization of the environment” in these regions has proceeded beyond a level ofpiecemeal or issue-speci�c environmental arrangements. The design of over-arching political institutions and arrangements, originally intended to furthereconomic integration, increasingly includes environmental protection. The

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18. Young 1997.

same is true for the economic arrangements, albeit to a lesser extent. In most ofthe other regions—including the upcoming economic region centered aroundJapan—organizations and institutions such as Asia-Paci�c Economic Coopera-tion (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN FreeTrade Area (AFTA) and Mercosur have until now remained dedicated to tradeliberalization and economic integration. And although this environmental in-clusion in the EU and NAFTA is far from ideal from an environmental interestperspective, most scholars looking for promising developments and prospectsin the taming of transnational capitalism are turning their attention to the Euro-pean Union and to a lesser extent the NAFTA.19 The preference for the EuropeanUnion above NAFTA as a model for future global governance is due to its rela-tively strong supra-national institutions (such as the Commission, the Euro-pean Parliament and the European Court of Justice), which are to a major ex-tent lacking in MEAs, as well as in NAFTA, the greenest trade agreement todate.20 This makes the EU unique, not only because it has the supra-nationalpower to counteract the environmental side-effects of global capitalism, causedor facilitated by member states and transnational corporations (TNCs) linked tothese states, but because it is the �rst experiment in supra-national democraticgovernance, as advocated so strongly by David Held and his colleagues.21

Beyond the Up-Scaling of National Environmental Arrangements

From an environmental reform perspective, most of the new and primarily po-litical supranational entities are to some extent the equivalent of the nationalpolitical arrangements that inspire them. The industrialized nation-states haveproduced national political arrangements from the 1970s onward, which havehad some success in turning structural ecological deterioration into environ-mental improvements. The basic idea now seems to be that since environmentalproblems have moved to supra- and transnational levels, in terms of bothcauses and manifestations, the political institutions and arrangements to dealwith them must also be “upgraded” to those levels in order to remain effective:“es handelt sich letzten Endes um die Strategie eines ‘Weiter-so’ auf gehobenemNiveau.”22

But there are some serious shortcomings in this rather simple idea of up-scaling. First, in the age of globalization, environmental deterioration has takenon an entirely different aspect as compared to the situation in the 1970s and1980s. This change goes much further than a change in scale, and thereforemerely up-scaling the nation-state institutions and political arrangements forenvironmental reform to the global level will not do. The dynamics of environ-mental deterioration and effective reform in an era of globalization are not so


19. See, for example, the Group of Lisbon 1995; Held 1995; Martin and Schumann 1996; and Beck1997.

20. See Vogel 1997; Hogenboom 1998; and Esty 1999.21. Held 1995; and Held et al. 1999.22. “In the end, it is a strategy of ‘more of the same thing’ on an elevated level.” Beck 1997, 221.

much related to geographical scale but to the speci�c characteristics of the glob-alization processes. The actors involved in triggering political innovations, thelegal status, the absence of a sovereign entity and the “democratic” limitationsof alternatives for such a sovereign entity, the changing character of capitalismitself, and the disenchantment of science are but a few of the factors that causesupra-national or global political institutions to deviate fundamentally ratherthan marginally from their national counterparts.23

A second and partly related reason is that supra-national, transnational orglobal political institutions do not have a similar relevance for all countries.There are profound differences between countries in terms of economic devel-opment, political and economic integration in the global system, national polit-ical institutions and “environmental reform capacity.”24 Moreover, with respectto environmental decision-making and implementation, the global politicalsystem still depends to a large extent on nation-states. As a result of all thesefactors, countries will be involved unequally in and react differently to “up-scaling” in different parts of the planet. Developing countries in sub-SaharanAfrica are hardly involved in and barely “touched” by the emerging global polit-ical institutions and agreements aiming at environmental reform, so they havelittle to gain from them in terms of alleviating their environmental problemsand crises. Other industrializing economies, such as those in Southeast and EastAsia, directly or indirectly, for political or economic reasons, show more interestin taking up “universal” or global environmental norms and standards. Thesituation in the most developed parts of the economy appears even more prom-ising, as global environmental harmonization seems more and more the objec-tive of these countries.

Third, under conditions of globalization, political arrangements and insti-tutions dealing with environmental reform are no longer restricted to the na-tion-state system. Decentralized forms of government (such as municipalities orregions) are also appearing on the global stage of environmental politics. Fur-thermore, global environmental politics, regardless of the level, now also in-volves actors other than the traditional political agents and institutions.Subpolitical developments—environmental politics involving actors and mech-anisms outside the traditional political domains “occupied” by (the system of)nation-states, parliaments and political parties—are interpreted by some as anew answer to environmental deterioration, following some of the typical fea-tures of globalization. Nongovernmental environmental organizations have al-ways been at the forefront of environmental reform in the OECD countries, butuntil recently their role in environmental politics was basically restricted topressing the traditional political agents—national environmental authorities—to act. Conversely, the role of transnational enterprises has traditionally beenone of either simply causing environmental deterioration or (hesitantly, reac-tively or even symbolically) complying with reform measures in response to

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23. See Held et al. 1999; and Scholte 2000.24. See Jänicke 1991.

pressures from, primarily, national governments. These traditional patternsseem to be changing: both the agents of “civil society” and the agents of eco-nomic interests are beginning to become active and powerful in environmentalpolitics at the national, the sub- and the supra-national levels.25 Such innova-tions along the lines of ecological modernization can only be understoodagainst the background of a weakening system of sovereign states, the limitedachievements of these nation-states, emerging globalization processes and theinstitutionalization of the environment in political and economic domains. Thefollowing two sections focus on these sub-political innovations, and their rolein taming the global treadmill.

6. Taming the Treadmill of Global Capitalism: Economic Dynamics

One major—and disputed—innovation of the ecological modernization theoryand related interpretation frameworks has been the notion that market dynam-ics and economic actors have a distinct role to play on the stage of environmen-tal reform, and are already doing so in the most developed nations. What is re-ferred to here is not the isolated “free” markets, the ideal-typical capitalistsettings or the short-term pro�t-maximizing companies that have no regard forcontinuity. Environmental reform is coming about in the interplay betweeneconomic markets and actors on the one hand, and (organized) citizen-con-sumers and political institutions seeking to condition them on the other. Suchinterplay allows environmental considerations, requirements and interests toslowly but increasingly become institutionalized in the economic domain. Ifsuch market/economy-induced environmental reforms have come about in na-tional settings in the OECD countries, will they also hold in an era marked byglobalization, and what would be the difference?

Market-Induced Environmental Reforms

Numerous scholars, including those writing in an ecological modernization tra-dition, have identi�ed several “economic” mechanisms and dynamics which re-direct global capitalist developments and trigger or mediate environmental in-novations and reform. As a rule, such economic mechanisms and dynamics donot originate in the economic domain itself. In that sense “market failure” inthe provision of common or collective goods, such as the environment, isalso—or even more—evident on a global scale. In this sense, also, credit is dueto the neo-Marxist scholars warning us not to be over-optimistic about the envi-ronmental motives and contributions of economic actors and dynamics per se.


25. An illustrative example might be the breakdown of the Global Climate Coalition, a group oflarge energy-intensive multinationals that claim that there is insuf�cient scienti�c evidence onclimate change to justify political measures such as those negotiated in Kyoto. After BP, Shelland Dow Chemicals, Ford Motors also left the coalition in December 1999, emphasizing theneed for pro-active measures and R&D.

As a rule, the self-regulating economic actors have to be put under “pressure”�rst before they contribute to environmental improvements (leaving the few“win-win” situations aside). Political decisions, civil pressure, and citizen-con-sumer demand are decisive. But while they may arise in one corner of the globeat a certain point in time, the economic “domain” has a strong role to play in ar-ticulating, communicating, strengthening, institutionalizing and extending (intime and place) these environmental reforms across the globe by means of itsown (market and monetary) “language,” logic and rationality and its own“force.”26 Transnational industrial companies, global markets and trade, globalinformation and communication networks and companies, and global eco-nomic institutions (such as the European Union, multilateral trade treaties suchas NAFTA, investment banks like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank(ADB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),and international �nancial institutions) play—or, rather, are beginning toplay—a vital role in this dynamism. Moreover, developing regions are generallymore deeply affected by the global markets and economic actors than by supra-national political institutions, although this varies according to each country’sdegree of integration in the global economy. The environment becomes to someextent institutionalized in the economic domain. And thus (global) economicinstitutions, rules and actors operate less and less according to economic princi-ples alone and they can no longer be understood in mere economic logics andterms.

However, we cannot be clear enough about two points. First, these eco-nomic dynamics behind environmental reform cannot be understood as estab-lished “fact” in all countries, or the majority of foreign investments or trade, noras an evolutionary development that will “automatically” unfold. These dynam-ics can only be interpreted as developments taking place, a transformation in-the-making in the global economy that can be identi�ed and which might verywell develop on an increasing scale in the decades to come. But, at the moment,it is still a process in status nascendi, accompanied by power struggles, standstillsand even regression. While various developments point towards an institution-alizing of the environment in the economic domain, there is no fundamentalreason or principle preventing the stagnation or reversal of this process of ongo-ing institutionalization. Second, the economy-mediated environmental inno-vations and transformations as they are developing now are signi�cant and amajor �rst step, but they are far from suf�cient. Economic mechanisms, institu-tions and dynamics will always �rst follow economic logics and rationalities,which implies they will always fall short in fully articulating environmental


26. To give an example: the transnational food company Unilever decided in May 2000 to ban allgenetically modi�ed ingredients from their products sold in Europe. Unilever had been underconsumer pressure in Germany, Austria and the UK. As Unilever buys its bulk ingredients suchas soy centrally in Europe, it has one European strategy towards product-related environmentalissues. Consumers of Unilever products in the Netherlands and Spain, for instance, ‘pro�t’ fromthis economic mechanism, in contrast to consumers in America.

interests and pushing environmental reforms, if they are not constantly paral-leled and propelled by environmental institutions and environmental move-ments. Neo-liberals who would have us believe that we can leave the environ-ment to the economic institutions and actors are wrong. Besides, sinceeconomic interests are distributed unequally, any environmental reformbrought about by economic players will display similar inequalities, making theresults sometimes ambivalent.

The role of global economic dynamics in environmental reform, as well asthe ambivalences involved, can be illustrated by the adoption of the ISO 14000standards. The increasing need to have ISO 14000 standards in order to get ac-cess to certain international markets has triggered a drive for environmentalharmonization. However, in their analysis of the global introduction of the ISO14001 standard for environmental management systems, Krut and Gleckman27

show that this economic push for environmentally harmonized reform can alsohave its drawbacks. For one thing, a major part of the developing nations wereexcluded from the design process of the standard. Another drawback is that theexistence of the standard disables countries from moving beyond compliancetowards more stringent environmental goals. Both the reluctance of global �rmsto work towards such new environmental “standards” as well as the limits im-posed on the possibilities of governments to move beyond the WTO regulationsthat sanction these ISO standards can hamper progressive environmental devel-opments. In a similar way, the global regime of foreign direct investments hasled to a “stuck in the mud” situation,28 as it fails to provide the incentives for na-tion-states to engage in a “race to the top” of the environmental standards.29

Thus, in conclusion, environmental reforms induced and articulated byeconomic dynamics, institutions and actors do take place, and we may expectthem to become increasingly important. In ecological modernization terminol-ogy, the environment is slowly becoming institutionalized in the economic do-main. But this process will continue to be challenged and criticized for sometime, with the traditional economic interests on the one side, and those who be-little the environmental gains and emphasize the related and unequally distrib-uted social drawbacks, on the other.

Dialectics of Markets and Politics

In analyzing the role global economic actors and mechanisms can and to someextent already do play in environmental reform, it should be stressed that theseeconomic actors and mechanisms are not footloose, neither in the political


27. Krut and Gleckman 1998.28. Zarsky 1997.29. The idea of a ‘race to the bottom’ of national environmental regimes following competition for

foreign direct investment is not supported by empirical studies carried out on this issue (see,among others, the studies of the World Bank, the OECD, and political scientists such as Leon-ard and Jänicke).

sense nor in the geographical sense. Firstly, markets and economic actors havealways been and will remain phenomena that in the end are politically sanc-tioned. It is not only that contemporary markets are organized and regulated bypolitical systems and that they could not function as absolutely free marketsthese days. It is also that global companies and global markets depend in theend on a political legitimation of their products and production processes, andincreasingly environmental controversies are part and parcel of this legitimacyquestion. This was so when they operated primarily on a national level and thisis not fundamentally different at the global level, however �exible all forms ofcapital have become in moving around the globe. Environmental groups andtheir (global) networks, international media, global political actors and institu-tions, and states intervene in markets and condition the actions of global pro-ducers. Secondly, markets and global �rms have to settle in geographical loca-tions. This is evident when it comes to material operations in terms ofproduction, distribution and consumption of capital and consumer goods, butit is no less true for the operations of monetary capital.30 Although geographical�exibility has vastly increased, “even in a globalizing world, all economic activi-ties are geographically localized.”31 And in these localities, the economic inter-actions are organized, designed and shaped by extra-economic logics such asthe local social, cultural, political and physical conditions, even if they engagewith actors on the other side of the globe. So if, from an ecological moderniza-tion perspective, we emphasize the growing importance of market dynamics inglobal environmental reform, we have to be aware that “das Projekt derMarktwirtschaft war immer auch ein politisches Projekt—eng verbunden mitder Demokratie.”32 The global market economy and its representatives are un-der constant scrutiny for the legitimacy of their performance regarding the envi-ronment, exactly because they are not footloose.

Political backing (in the broadest sense) is always needed to get marketsand economic actors moving in a desirable direction, before market and eco-nomic actors can “take over” by articulating and institutionalizing the environ-ment in their domain. It remains a fact that the political drive to activate globalmarkets and economic relations for environmental reform still comes mainlyfrom the most developed countries. This is something that is rooted in history,since these countries were the �rst to experience very severe environmentalproblems, as well as protests, and are currently less occupied with the basic eco-nomic needs or scarcity. For this reason, and due to unequal power distribu-tions, the environmental priorities and de�nitions of the developed countriesare dominant in global economic institutions (and often also in multilateral en-vironmental agreements), while developing countries often see their environ-mental priorities neglected. From that perspective one could also have sympa-


30. See Sassen 1994.31. Dicken 1998, 10.32. “The project of the market economy has always been a political project as well—closely con-

nected to democracy.” Beck 1997, 232–233.

thy with the Environmental Sustainability Indicator ESI of the World EconomicForum (see above). Furthermore, developing countries are at a disadvantage ininitiatives to redesign economic institutions to incorporate environmental pri-orities (for example, the WTO),33 or initiatives to conclude multilateral environ-mental agreements (for example, the developments in the Framework Conven-tion on Climate Change).34 The re-negotiations on the Multilateral Agreementon Investment MAI (either in the framework of the OECD or, more likely, inthat of the WTO) as well as the greening of the WTO (such as eco-labels, precau-tionary principle, article XX revisions) will be future cases where these environ-mental disparities between developed and developing countries will re-emerge.Only strong political backing from beyond the economic and political elites ofthe most developed countries can ensure that these global economic institu-tions contribute to future environmental reform in a mode that is less “biased”towards the northern hemisphere.

7. Taming the Treadmill of Global Capitalism: Global Civil Society

It often seems that those who are furthest removed from the actual practice ofwhat has become known as the global civil society, are the �rst to emphasizeand acknowledge the growing countervailing powers of the global environmen-tal movement and the universality of environmental norms and principles.Among them are not only the captains of transnational industries such as Shelland General Electrics, leaders of economic institutions such as the OECD, orneo-liberal economic scholars such as Kenichi Ohmae and World Bank presi-dent James Wolfensohn, but also (former) political world leaders such as theGerman President Roman Herzog and the US Vice-President Al Gore. All ofthem have stressed the major role of a globalizing civil society, tightly connectedto the communication and information revolution, in achieving environmentalreforms by taming global capitalism. Meanwhile, environmentalists, and the so-cial scientists and political commentators closely linked to environmentalmovements, are much more cautious, ambivalent or even pessimistic as to theachievements of a global civil society. In most of their messages they continueto underline the dominant pattern of global capitalist developments, almost asif it had not been touched by the relentless efforts and pressures coming fromenvironmental movements, “green” politicians, relatively marginal global envi-ronmental organizations such as UNEP and a diffuse and intangible global en-vironmental consciousness. How can such contrasting evaluations be ex-plained?

In fact, there are several explanations. One of them is the political “game,”in which the environmental movement creates for itself an underdog positionin order to be able to “beg” for the massive support it needs to beat the Goliath


33. See Sampson and Chambers 1999.34. See Gupta 1997.

of global capitalism. By the same token, representatives of global capital over-state the strength of this movement, in order to suggest that suf�cient counter-vailing power exists to balance global capital or even stress the dangers of thesepowerful groups and ideas and legitimize a “green backlash.”35 To some extent itwill also be caused by the view that the neighbor’s grass is always greener, whilethe moss and ill weeds are most easily spotted in one’s own backyard. From theperspective of transnational companies, Greenpeace must look like a powerful,well-organized and in�uential organization that manages to articulate environ-mental anxieties and consciousness into well-coordinated campaigns that at-tract widespread media attention and increasingly force global economic play-ers into retreat (and reform). The Brent Spar campaign is an illustration. Fromthe inside, the perception is much more that of the dif�culties of co-ordinationbetween and within national groups, the failures in campaigns, the limited en-vironmental results and the ambivalent relations with the media, or the ten-sions between the professional NGO of�ces and the large population of sup-porters and grassroots environmentalists.

Finally, it makes a difference whether one takes as one’s point of referencethe OECD members, the newly industrializing economies, or the developingcountries of, for instance, sub-Saharan Africa. The newly industrializing coun-tries in particular have witnessed a major forti�cation of the environmentalmovement and environmental consciousness under the recent conditions ofglobalization. The Latin American environmental movement, for example, hasbecome much stronger during the last decade of the second millennium, and sohave those in a number of newly industrializing economies in Asia (e.g. Thai-land, Taiwan and the Philippines). Most African states and countries like Viet-nam and China,36 however, have not spawned more than a rather scattered envi-ronmental movement, strong in some localities on speci�c issues, but ratherpowerless on a national level and poorly integrated into global networks. Nev-ertheless, even if civil society initiatives are still weak in African countries, thechanging global power relations on environmental issues can have profound re-percussions on transnational companies investing in the continent, as Shell hasexperienced in Nigeria and a consortium of oil multinationals and the WorldBank are experiencing in planning—and from October 2000 onward imple-menting—a major oil pipeline through Chad and Cameroon.

Global Environmentalism

The global civil society is not global in the sense that it has a global network ofenvironmental NGOs covering every locality of the world. Nor does it have acommon frame of reference similarly articulated in every corner of our planet.That will take some time to be accomplished. One obstacle is that any “shared”


35. See Rowell 1996; and Switzer 1997.36. See Ho 2001; and Mol et al. 2002.

environmental frame of reference falls apart in different parts of the world. Peo-ple’s environmental priorities are different in different parts of the world (cli-mate change versus clean water; nature conservation versus the “brownagenda”), and de�nitions of environmental problems diversify as they are me-diated by local backgrounds, history, and traditions. Environmental universal-ism is prevented by local factors articulating in heterogeneous cultural frame-works, as is widely acknowledged.37 But the most important reason for theabsence of a global frame of reference is the fact that the capacities and re-sources to articulate an environmental discourse in civil society are unequallydistributed, especially—but not only—along the economic divides.

The main reasons why we can still speak of global environmentalism arethe following: (i) the ethics and principles of environmental behavior as regardsthe investments, production and trade of transnational companies and invest-ment banks are increasingly applied in a similar way to practices anywherearound the globe; (ii) the potential to monitor environmental (mis)behavior oftransnational corporations and institutions has moved far beyond the majorcenters of the global environmental movement in the developed world; (iii) en-vironmental misbehavior and information are communicated around theglobe; and (iv) sanctions can transcend the boundaries of one state and are nolonger limited to the localities of misbehavior. However, even though environ-mentalism has become global, transnational investors that are not strongly con-nected to the most developed countries have less to “fear” from a global civil so-ciety. In Vietnam, for instance, American multinationals such as Nike are morevulnerable to environmental protests from global civil society than are regionalinvestors from South Korea, Taiwan or Indonesia.38

The emergence of a global civil society and its growing power to challengethe environmental destructiveness of global capitalism has made some of themajor global economic players more aware of the need to move beyond merecompliance with formal political requirements laid down in laws and agree-ments. We can witness new forms of global environmental (sub)politics, arisingespecially in situations where (i) nation-states are losing control of national andglobal developments, (ii) scienti�c “proof” is no longer taken for granted, butincreasingly seen as both an instrument of social interests and an object of so-cial con�ict, and (iii) information and communication systems heighten thetransparency of the world-wide actions of global economic actors. The contro-versies surrounding genetically modi�ed organisms are of course a typical ex-ample where formal political requirements are overtaken by civil society poli-tics. The representatives of global capitalism are �nding it increasingly dif�cultto ignore civil society environmental protests and sensibilities, while formal en-vironmental policies (both nationally and internationally) are “lagging be-hind.” TNCs are experiencing that they can less and less afford to restrict their


37. See Tomlinson 1999.38. See O’Rourke 2000.

environmental performance to compliance with formal political requirements.We can identify an increasing need, particularly for the visible multinationalsfrom the OECD countries, to justify their actions not only towards the states,MEAs and conventional political actors, but also towards representatives of civilsociety, resulting in new forms of (global) environmental politics.39 Major Euro-pean food companies are developing various strategies to get into contact with(organized) consumers and concerned citizens, in order to become aware oftheir ideas and “sensibilities” at an early stage of product development. Thisdoes not result automatically in major environmental improvements, as manyconcerned citizens experience today, but it does give us a �rst glance of the po-tential stepping stones along the way towards future global environmental gov-ernance.

8. Conclusions: Ecological Modernization Perspectives in an Era ofGlobalization

For a relatively long time, ecological modernization theory focused both theo-retically and empirically on the environmental reforms taking place in a num-ber of industrialized, Western countries, even though the importance of supra-national and global dynamics for these new patterns of (national) environmen-tal reform had been recognized.40 In an era of globalization, regional or na-tional theories are assessed on the basis of how they deal with and include theseglobalization dynamics. So, what are the consequences of globalization for eco-logical modernization theory? Do these global “ecological modernization dy-namics” in fact indicate that ecological modernization theory becomes moreuniformly valid for a much larger part of the world? Or can we no longer livewith theory that pretends to provide more generalizing insight, as post-modern-ists often want us to believe?

Ecological Modernization Theory: Meta-Theoretical Claims

I have identi�ed as the basic, most fundamental, idea of ecological moderniza-tion theory the “differentiation” or growing independence of an ecological per-spective and rationality. Elaborating on this relatively independent ecologicallogic and perspective ecological modernization theory has created a conceptualspace to study contemporary institutions and social practices from a speci�callyecological “point of view.” From the 1980s onward, social practices and institu-tional developments in the sphere of production and consumption were “in-


39. But, of course also resulting in major efforts by TNCs to legitimize their controversial productsin different ways. In early 2000, genetic engineering technology giants (e.g. Monsanto, Dupont,Dow, Novartis, Zeneca, BASF, Aventis) launched the Council for Biotechnology Information,which will spend US$50 million annually over a period of �ve years to win public acceptance ofgenetically engineered foods, under the banner “Good Ideas are Growing.”

40. For example Weale 1992; and Mol 1995.

fected” with this emerging ecological rationality, resulting in major or minorchanges – be it to a different extent, in different ways and at a different pace inthe various industrialized societies.41 The conceptual innovation of ecologicalmodernization theory enabled us to analyze and understand these processes oftransformation and reform.

It is my contention that, formulated at this meta-theoretical level, the at-tempt of ecological modernization theory to bring the environment (back) intosocial theory has proved to retain its relevance under conditions of globaliza-tion. Our analysis and empirical evidence42 provide a suf�ciently fertile basis forthe claim that ecological modernization theory is a valuable conceptual frame-work for gaining an understanding of the ways in which environmental consid-erations and interests trigger changes in (global) institutions and social prac-tices that are heavily infected by globalization. In this paper I have tentativelyindicated how the environment is articulated in these global institutions, andhow at the same time it puts under pressure and changes the rules, proceduresand functioning of these institutions. The system of nation states, the globalmarkets, the world-wide economic and political institutions, and the globalcivil society are all “put to work” in greening global production and consump-tion processes; but, at the same time, all these institutions are transformed inthe process of global environmental reform itself. In my view there is little foun-dation for the claim that emerging globalization processes have “bleached allthe green” out of production and consumption processes, which would renderany analysis from an ecological “point of view” pointless. The institutional-ization of the environment in social practices and institutions continues alsounder conditions of globalization and via globalization processes and dynam-ics, even if it is not in an evolutionary way of success upon success. And since itis the western industrialized societies that are leading the way in creating, de-signing and governing global environmental institutions and in “determining”environmental-induced transformations in all kinds of social practices and in-stitutions, this institutionalization of the environment is causing increasing ho-mogenization rather than increasing heterogenization.

Environmental Globalization

However, this “meta-theoretical homogenization” of ecological modernization,unequally determined by western industrialized societies and their institutionsand actors, but by no means fully controlled by them, converts into heteroge-neous practices, trajectories and processes of environmental reform in the dif-ferent countries and regions.

In various publications the European-based ecological modernizationheuristics have been outlined, enabling us to understand national environmen-


41. Mol 1999.42. See, for instance, the studies in the edited volumes of Mol and Sonnefeld 2000; Spaargaren et al.

2000; Mol and Buttel 2002; and the special issues of the Journal of Environmental Policy and Plan-ning 2000; Environmental Politics 2000; Geoforum 2000; and American Behavioral Scientist 2002.

tal reform dynamics in that corner of the globe.43 In confronting these ecologi-cal modernization heuristics with environmental reforms in distinct countriesand regions around the world, one critical conclusion seems to emerge straight-away. In numerous countries and regions environmental reform only seems to“follow” some of these (European) heuristics, and then often in a speci�c (na-tional or regional) form and tempo. Sometimes civil society organizations playno signi�cant role at all or its ideologies and strategies do not change accordingto these heuristics (cf. Vietnam and China), sometimes political modernizationprocesses take a different course, keep a different pace or do little to explain en-vironmental reform (such as in the US), and in other cases environmental con-siderations do not seem to become institutionalized to any signi�cant extent ineconomic and market forces.

The background of these distinctions in ecological modernization is to befound in national institutional differences. These include the state-market rela-tions, ranging for instance from developmental states to predatory states, orfrom a “Rheinländisch” model to an Anglo-Saxon model,44 national policystyles,45 the regimes of accumulation, e.g. ranging from extensive to intensive,46

the national systems of innovation, with their national-speci�c network of insti-tutions that initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies,47 and the so-called “national character,” which Cohen,48 for instance, ranks from weak tostrong environmental consciousness, and from numinous-aesthetic to rational-scienti�c epistemological commitment. These and some other aspects havebeen found to give ecological modernization a speci�c national or regional“�avor.” And it is on this level that some of the notions and ideas contained inearlier—European-originated—contributions to ecological modernization the-ory are in need of contextualisation. Under conditions of globalization, pro-cesses of political modernization, the changing ideologies and strategies of en-vironmental movements, shifting technological trajectories and economicinternalization dynamics continue to be relevant categories for us to study as wetry to understand environmental reform in very different parts of the globe. Butwe should be aware that:

i. on a global level—where globalization processes are “at work”—the na-ture and causal mechanisms of ecological modernization dynamics differfrom those identi�ed by ecological modernization theory on a nationalscale in European industrialized societies;

ii. although the increasing importance of globalization processes and dy-namics—and the articulation of environmental interests in it—adds to therelevance of ecological modernization for a growing number of regionsand countries, the heuristics that “govern” environmental reform will al-


43. For example Mol 1995; Andersen and Massa 2000; Rinckevicius 2000; and Spaargaren 1997.44. See Evans 1995; and Staute 1997.45. Richardson 1982; Vogel 1986; and van Waarden 1995.46. Lipietz 1987.47. See Nelson and Rosenberg 1993; and Edquist 1997.48. Cohen 2000.

ways be “co-determined” by national and regional characteristics (i.e., en-vironmental glocalization).

Epilogue: A Global Research Agenda

The geographical limitations of the ecological modernization theory wereidenti�ed at an early stage and have been used subsequently to question thevalue of this theory as such in an increasingly globalized world.49 On the otherhand, the supposed geographical limitations have also been challenged byscholars who have used ecological modernization perspectives in studies of en-vironmental reforms in non-OECD countries.50 The conclusion I want to drawis that both groups are partly right (and thus partly wrong).

We should remain suspicious of ideas that claim that environmental re-form processes show universal forms, dynamics and characteristics, in view ofthe fact that nations and regions differ and that environmental reform mecha-nisms vary accordingly, no matter how strongly such environmental reforms aretriggered and in�uenced by global processes. Local re�nements andcontextualization of the ecological modernization theoretical framework,which until recently could rightfully be criticized for being too monolithic andtoo Eurocentric, is essential.51

At the same time, under conditions of globalization, “global” ecologicalmodernization—to a large extent de�ned by developed countries—has an uni-versalizing effect on the way in which countries experience and design environ-mental reforms. De�ned in a not too strict way, ecological modernization wasperhaps more speci�cally Eurocentric and unique 10 years ago than it is at thestart of a new century marked by globalization. Studying and de�ning regional(or national) “variations” or “styles” of ecological modernization seems to me apromising in-between course for understanding and interpreting innovationsand achievements in environmental reform under conditions of globalization,as well as for outlining future trajectories for environmental transformation.That will enable us to see how far the commonalties of ecological moderniza-tion reach, where the speci�cs of the regional/national variations start, and howthe two change in time.

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