ECB a Evropská krize (dokument v AJ)

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Market Economics 30 August 2012

Daily Economic Spotlight

ECB: Managing ExpectationsKen Wattret

In the forthcoming Market Mover, there will be a detailed preview of what we canexpect from the ECB policy meeting and press conference on 6 September. Intodays Daily Economic Spotlight, we offer our thoughts on a key aspect of nextweeks get-together, i.e. whether the ECB can deliver a sufficient level of detailon key elements of the new framework for sovereign debt market interventions tomaintain the risk-on mood in markets.

If there are any lingering expectations of the ECB embarking on a buying spreein sovereign markets at, or soon after, the next weeks press conference, theyare going to be disappointed. The timing of ECB action under the new framework

will be dependent on political events that are not within the central banks control:i.e. whether a eurozone government will formally request external assistanceand/or whether the Constitutional Court ruling in Germany on 12 September willfinally open the way for the ESM to become operational. As such, we are lookingat a press conference that is going to be long on words, but short on action.

The prior press conference on 2 August left a series of questions unanswered.Below, we outline our thoughts on some of the key issues.

Yield caps. This has been the focal point for much of the media speculation in thepast week. In our view, there is a low probability of the ECB announcing an explicitcap on yields at this point considering the complications associated with takingsuch an approach, e.g. how much the ECB would have to commit to buy and therisk of moral hazard as a result. While we do not expect the ECB to make public an

explicit target, we should be able to deduce over time what the ECB is aiming toachieve by gauging its interventions relative to yield levels and movements. Giventhe speculation surrounding an explicit cap, there is a risk of disappointment if theECB opts for a vague commitment. But, an adverse reaction can only go so far as,under the proposed framework, higher yields would raise the likelihood of a countryasking for help, opening the way for the ECB to intervene. It could be argued that,in effect, a yield cap is already in place.

New facility. We expect the ECB to confirm that sovereign debt purchases will bemade under a new facility: i.e. will not be done under the SMP. Creating a newfacility is an important step, in our opinion, as it will underscore the formerprocedure and reinforce the message that the limited and temporary status ofthe SMP will not apply to future interventions.

Transparency. One of the drawbacks associated with the SMP is that details ofthe purchases made are not revealed, merely the scale of the overall buying. Onthe basis that the ECB is keen to establish a new approach, as the old one wasnot very successful in reducing risk premia in sovereign markets, there is a highlikelihood that the new procedure will include announcements of how much wasbought, in which markets and at what maturities specifically. In theory, the scaleof debt purchases could also be quantified by the ECB ahead of an intervention.But in practice, we see such an approach as being more in keeping with primary-market support via the ESM/EFSF. Our assumption is that the ECB, while willingto divulge more details about its actions, would still prefer to do so after thepurchases have been made, allowing greater flexibility. Still, in the interests ofimproving the transparency and effectiveness of interventions, there is a case forannouncements being made more frequently, rather than via a weekly update,as with the SMP procedure.

Next weeks ECB meeting and pressconference will be key to whether therisk-on mood is maintained

We outline our thoughts on some of thekey aspects of the new framework forsovereign debt purchases, including

yield caps

whether there will be a new facilityto replace the SMP

how transparent the process is likelyto be


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Market Economics, 30 August 2012 2


Maturity. In the press conference of 2 August, it was made clear that the ECBwould buy only in shorter maturities. But how short is short? To quote from thestatement: The shorter the spectrum, the closer it is to money marketoperations. In the context of LTROs, maturities may extend to three years, ofcourse, but in normal operations maturities like the ones we are operating onright now can go from six months to nine months to a year. This suggests thatthe ECB could go out as long as three years, but it might want to concentrate its

buying out to one year to give the impression that it is operating mainly within thenormal duration of money-market operations. More details on this issue at thepress conference would be very welcome, but it may be that we only find outhow the ECB will do it in practice, as the outstanding debt of the countryrequesting the support, plus its primary issuance schedule, are influences onwhat the ECB ultimately opts to buy.

Seniority. The ECB belatedly acknowledged the importance of the seniority issuein the 2 August press conference. The ECBs senior status contributed to theineffectiveness of the SMP in stabilising sovereign debt markets, and the formalrecognition on 2 August that the issue would be addressed was very welcome.How the ECB will address it, however, is unclear. One option is for thegovernments of the eurozone to indemnify the ECB against any losses incurredthrough its purchases, perhaps via the ESM. Theoretically, this is feasible, but it

may not be easy in practice to secure political agreement. It would also use upsome of the ESMs already limited resources. Another option is for the ECB tobypass the issue by committing to buy bills only. A problem with this option isthat the ECBs interventions may have a limited impact on the sovereign marketsif they are confined to bills. An alternative is for the ECB simply to renounce itsseniority status. This would have important implications for Greece and would beone way for the eurozone authorities to extend support to Greece without theneed for a third programme. A problem with taking this route, however, is the lowcapital of the ECB (EUR 10bn) and the Eurosystem (EUR 95bn).

Sterilisation. Future debt purchases are unlikely to be sterilised in the same wayas under the SMP: i.e. by taking term deposits from banks of equivalent size tothe debt purchases made under the SMP. As the full allotment procedure shouldapply at ECB refinancing operations for a considerable period of time, theprocess of sterilisation put in place when the SMP was implemented in spring2010, looks like an anachronism and is unlikely to be rolled forward.

EU/IMF programme countries status. Is it fair that the ECB is willing to supportthe sovereign debt markets of countries that sign up to a quasi-programme andthe light conditionality this entails, but will not commit to supporting the debtmarkets of countries already meeting the requirements of a formal programmewith much tougher conditionality, such as Ireland or Portugal? Moreover, if theintention of the ECBs interventions is to ease the impairment of the transmissionmechanism for monetary policy, then Portugal surely merits help, with 10-yearsovereign yields at 9%. We expect the ECB to acknowledge this contradiction atthe press conference next week and we may see it commit to offering support tocountries adhering to programme conditions (i.e. excluding Greece at this point).But when such support would be given is uncertain. It should be straight away.This could also encourage Spain to request help, if it is effective. But, we suspect

that as the mechanics of ECB interventions under the new framework are stillbeing worked through, it may have to wait until a non-programme country asksfor assistance and the process is better established.

In summary, while we expect the press conference to provide more details on arange of issues, as highlighted above, not all of the loose ends may be tied up.Some of the practical aspects of the procedure for intervening in debt marketsmay be left rather vague. For example, how will the ECB decide at which time tobuy if a country asks for help? As soon as a memorandum of understanding hasbeen signed and the ESM/EFSF terms agreed, on trust that the conditions will bemet by the country asking for the support? What if a country does not stick to theconditions subsequently? How would the ECB react, by formally announcing itwas withdrawing its support? The questions are endless.

in what maturities the ECB will buy

what will be done about the seniorityissue

whether the purchases will besterilised

and the status of the countriesalready in EU/IMF programmes

In sum, more details will be providedon a range of issues, but not all of theloose ends will be tied up


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US: No SpilloversJeremy Lawson

After a quiet start to the week, Wednesday was a more active day on thedomestic data front. As expected, Q2 GDP growth was revised up in the secondestimate, to 1.7% q/q saar from 1.5% in the advance estimate. However, the

modest upward revision to growth in the quarter does not change the fact thatthe economy grew below trend in the first half of the year, and we expect thissub-par performance to continue in the second half of the year. The latest BeigeBook (covering the period between 18 July and 20 August) reinforced thedisappointing message from the data, with reports from business contacts in the12 Fed districts suggesting that economic activity continued to expand graduallyin July and August across most regions and sectors. This wont be enough tosatisfy the FOMC that the economy is on the cusp of a substantial and sustainedstrengthening. Meanwhile, pending home sales grew more solidly thananticipated in July, pointing to better existing home sales in August, thoughmortgage refinancing activity has fallen significantly in the month, and the latestFed data showed that household mortgage debt fell again in the second quarter.

The main contributor to the upward revision to Q2 GDP growth was net trade,which is now estimated to have contributed 0.3pp to growth in the quarter after

originally having been reported as subtracting 0.3pp. Most of the strongercontribution from net trade was due to a downward revision in imports growth inthe quarter to 2.9% from 6% in the advance release. However, export growthwas also modestly revised up to 6.0% from 5.3%. With much weaker importgrowth, it wasnt surprising that the data that came in after the advance estimateshowed much weaker inventory accumulation than originally reported. Privateinventories are now estimated to have subtracted 0.2pp from growth in Q2 aftersubtracting 0.3pp in Q1. Though these were the most important revisions in thesecond estimate, there were some other changes to the profile of growth in thequarter that are worth noting. PCE growth was revised up to 1.7% from 1.5%,while equipment and software investment was revised down to 4.7% from 7.2%.This pace of E&S growth in the quarter is much more in line with what we hadforecast before the advance release.

Chart 1: High Profits, but Low Investment

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Change in Real Capital

Stock (%, RHS)

Corporate Profits (% GDP)

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro

The second estimate for Q2 GDP was accompanied by the release of estimatesfor growth in real gross domestic income (GDI) and corporate profits in thequarter. Real GDI slowed significantly in Q2, to 0.6% q/q saar from 3.8% in Q1.Weaker personal income growth accounted for most of the slowdown, as growthin compensation of employees slowed to 3.2% q/q saar from 7.6% in the quarter.Both wages and salaries, and supplements slowed in the quarter. Meanwhile,after declining 10.4% q/q saar in Q1, corporate profits rebounded modestly in Q2to grow 2.2%. The turnaround in profit growth was due to stronger growth indomestic, non-financial corporate profits and a return to positive territory for

profits from the rest of the world after two quarters of declines. This improvementwas partially offset by a fall in profits for domestic financial corporations.

Q2 GDP growth revised up modestly inthe second release.

The main contributor to the upwardrevision was trade.

A modest improvement in corporateprofits, but weaker real income growthoverall.


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Although corporate profits growth has slowed as of late, the profit share of GDPis still at a multi-decade high. Strong corporate profitability is usually seen as apositive sign for the economy as it suggests that firms have plenty of scope toincrease investment and employment. However, so far in the recovery, healthyprofits appear to have yielded relatively little benefit to the overall economy, asmany firms have chosen to increase their cash buffers rather than commit tosignificant new capital spending or boosting their headcount. For example, the

period in which corporate profitability has reached new highs has coincided witha dramatic slowdown in the growth rate of the capital stock to a post-war low(see chart above). This is a potentially worrying development on a number oflevels. First, by failing to invest sufficiently in the productive capacity of theirbusinesses, firms may be undermining their ability to generate higher revenuesand profits in the future. This could make it difficult to sustain current valuationsin the equity markets. Second, the government sector has also cut back oncapital spending, which is undermining the quality of public infrastructure. Morebroadly, slower capital deepening means that the economys potential growthrate is also lower. In an environment where trend growth is already being pusheddown by population aging, this will make it harder to close the budget deficit overtime without tax increases and spending cuts, while living standards would alsogrow more slowly.

Chart 2: Capital and Labour Are Complementary

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Change in Real Capital

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Employment to Population Ratio

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro

The slowing in capital accumulation also has unfavourable implications for jobsgrowth. During the post-war period, the correlation between annual growth in thecapital stock and the employment-to-population ratio has been around 0.95.While causation runs in both directions and a variety of factors are affecting bothvariables, capital and labour are clearly complementary at the economy-widelevel. Going forward, this might suggest that it will be difficult to get a sustainedimprovement in the labour market without also getting a strong pick-up in netinvestment growth. In the near-term, neither looks likely as the economy isstruggling to grow above 2%, while many firms investment plans appear to beon hold, due to the uncertainties generated by the election, the fiscal cliff and the

crisis in Europe, amongst others. Beyond the near term, a sustained accelerationin investment will depend on the favourable resolution to the forces holdingcapital spending back. Will the Fed finally be successful in generating asustained period of above-trend growth? Can Europe undertake the necessaryreforms to put the current crisis behind it? Is the US political class capable ofreaching a grand bargain that makes the tax and health care systems moreefficient and puts fiscal policy on more sustainable footing? Only time will tell, butany failure to create an environment that significantly raises investmentincentives would have far reaching consequences.

High corporate profits not translatinginto stronger capital spending.

Slow capital accumulation means lowlabour utilization.


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Key Data Preview

Chart 1: Eurozone ESI, Manufacturing Sector BNP Paribas Forecast: Further Moderation

Sources: Reuters EcoWin Pro

Aug (f) Jul Jun May

Economic Sentiment 87.8 87.9 89.9 90.5Industrial Sentiment -16.0 -15.0 -12.8 -11.4

Services Sentiment -7.5 -8.5 -7.4 -5.2

Consumer Confidence -24.6 -21.5 -19.8 -19.3

Key Point:

Economic sentiment should deteriorate for fifth monthstraight, with particular struggles in the manufacturingsector.

Eurozone: EU Economic Sentiment (August)Release Date: Thursday 30 August

The European Commissions Economic Sentiment Indicatorsare among the last survey releases of the month, and weexpect to see another moderation in economic sentimentacross the eurozone in August.

In July, economic sentiment fell sharply to 87.9, down 2points from its June print. Since April, the indicator has lost6.6 points. The deterioration has spread across all sectors,but has been particularly strong, once again, in the industrialsector. The equivalent index fell to -15.0 from -12.8 in Junebecause expectations declined, orders remained weak andstock levels increased further.

The manufacturing sector is struggling and German industry,in particular, seems to be hit hard. Since its peak in early2011, the German index has fallen nearly 30 points, theFrench one has dropped some 25 points, the Italian indexhas slipped 20 points and the Spanish index around 12points. And we expect further deterioration in August.

Chart 9: German Employment and PMI BNP Paribas Forecast: Temporary Deterioration


Aug (f) Jul Jun May

Change (000) 10 7 7 1

Rate (%) 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8

Key Point:

Employment growth is set to slow and unemploymentset to increase, but the labour market will remain tight.

Germany: Labour-Market Data (August)Release Date: Thursday 30 August

Economic sentiment indicators are signalling slowing activityin the German economy and, consequently, slowing hiringintentions among companies. This suggests that companiesare starting to expect the tough times to last longer,particularly in the manufacturing sector. This led to aslowdown in employment growth throughout the secondquarter. The latest June figures suggest employment grew1.2% y/y, with a further slowdown to come (note thatemployment data is published with a months lag).

Unemployment rose 32,000 in the four months to July andwe expect another increase in August, as survey indicatorssuch as the PMI have suggested a continuation of theweakening trend.

While the German labour market goes through a phase ofmoderation, it still remains in overall favourable shape.Unemployment remains close to post-reunification recordlows. And the prospect of labour shortages should activitypick up again should prompt companies to limit theiremployment adjustments throughout the cycle. This shouldhave a relatively stabilising effect on the labour market.

Key Data Preview


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Chart 3: US PCE BNP Paribas Forecast: Weak Durables, Strong Utilities


% m/m Jul (f) Jun May Apr

Personal Income 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2

Consumption 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2Core PCE Prices 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1

Key Point:

Nominal spending should post a healthy increase in July,on the back of a pick-up in utilities and non-durablegoods spending, with lower durable goods spending onlypartially offsetting the increase in other categories.

US: Personal Income & Spending (July)Release Date: Thursday 30 August

In July, nominal personal spending is expected to register thebiggest monthly increase since February rising by 0.4%m/m,

as a healthy increase in core retail sales in the month andstrong services spending on the back of unseasonably warmweather across the country is only partially offset by a declinein spending on autos.

Personal income is forecast to increase 0.3% in July afterrising 0.5% in June. Despite the better-than-expected gain inpayrolls, hours worked grew a modest 0.1% in July andaverage hourly earnings grew at the same pace. We expectnon-wage forms of income to post another solid increase.With income growing slower than spending, the personalsavings rate should post a small decline in the month,breaking the recent upward trend.

We think that the headline PCE deflator will rise 0.1%,pushing the annual pace to decline to 1.4%. Core inflation is

expected to rise 0.1%, with the annual pace remaining at1.8%.

Todays Events

GMT Local Previous Forecast Consensus

Thu 30/08 23:50

(29/08)

08:50 Japan Retail Sales y/y : Jul 0.2% 0.5% -0.3%

07:00 09:00 Spain HICP Flash y/y : Aug 2.2% 3.1% n/a

07:55 09:55 Germany Unemployment (Chg, sa) : Aug 7k 10k 8k

07:55 09:55 Unemployment Rate : Aug 6.8% 6.9% 6.8%

08:00 10:00 Eurozone Economic Sentiment : Aug 87.9 87.8 87.5

08:00 10:00 Industrial Sentiment : Aug -15.0 -16.0 -16.0

08:00 10:00 Consumer Sentiment : Aug -21.5 -24.6 n/a

18:00 20:00 ECBs Asmussen Speaks in Potsdam

08:00 10:00 Italy Wages m/m : Jul 0.2% 0.1% n/a

08:00 10:00 Wages y/y : Jul 1.5% 1.6% n/a

09:00 11:00 ISAE Business Confidence : Aug 87.1 87.0 n/a

08:00 10:00 Norway Unemployment Rate (nsa) : Aug 2.7% 2.6% n/a

08:30 09:30 UK Net Consumer Credit : Jul GBP0.6bn09:30 10:30 Mortgage Approvals : Jul 44.1k

09:00 10:00 Portugal Consumer Confidence : Aug -50.4 -50.1 n/a

09:00 10:00 Economic Climate Indicator : Au -4.4 -4.5 n/a

10:00 11:00 Retail Sales y/y :Jul -5.2% -7.0% n/a

09:15 11:15 Belgium CPI m/m : Aug 0.18% 0.18% n/a

09:15 11:15 CPI y/y : Aug 2.32% 2.75% n/a

12:30 08:30 US Personal Income m/m : Jul 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%

12:30 08:30 Personal Spending m/m : Jul 0.0% 0.4% 0.5%

12:30 08:30 Initial Claims 372k 368k n/a

Release dates and forecasts as at c.o.b. prior to the date of publication: Source: BNP Paribas


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Rest of the Week

GMT Local Previous Forecast Consensus

Fri 31/08 23:01

(30/08)

00:01 UK Gfk Consumer Confidence : Aug -29

06:00 07:00 Nationwide House Prices m/m : Aug -0.7%

06:00 07:00 Nationwide House Prices y/y : Aug -2.6%

23:30 08:30 Japan CPI National y/y : Jul -0.2% -0.3% -0.3%

23:30 08:30 CPI Tokyo y/y : Aug -0.8% -0.6% -0.6%

23:30 08:30 Household Consumption y/y : Jul 1.6% 1.3% 0.8%

23:30 08:30 Unemployment Rate (sa) : Jul 4.3% 4.3% 4.3%

23:50

(30/08)

08:50 Industrial Production (Prel, sa) m/m : Jul 0.4% 0.8% 1.7%

05:00 14:00 Housing Starts y/y : Jul -0.2% -8.6% -9.8%

07:00 09:00 Germany Retail Sales (Real, sa) m/m : Jul -0.1% 0.5% n/a

07:00 09:00 Spain Retail Sales y/y : Jul -5.2% -6.7% n/a

08:00 10:00 Italy PPI m/m : Jul -0.1% -0.1% n/a

08:00 10:00 PPI y/y : Jul 2.2% 1.7% n/a

08:00 10:00 Unemployment Rate q/q : Q2 9.8% 10.5% n/a

09:00 11:00 CPI (NIC, Prel) m/m : Aug 0.1% 0.4% n/a

09:00 11:00 CPI (NIC, Prel) y/y : Aug 3.1% 3.2% n/a09:00 11:00 HICP (Prel) m/m : Aug -1.7% 0.0% n/a

09:00 11:00 HICP (Prel) y/y : Aug 3.6% 3.3% n/a

08:00 10:00 Norway Retail Sales (sa) m/m : Jul -1.1%

08:00 10:00 Retail Sales (nsa) y/y : Jul 7.4%

08:30 10:30 Eurozone Eurocoin : Aug

09:00 11:00 HICP (Flash) y/y : Aug 2.4% 2.6% 2.4%

09:00 11:00 Unemployment Rate : Jul 11.2% 11.3% 11.3%

09:00 11:00 ECBs Coeur Speaks at MEDEF Summer University in Jouy-en-Josas

10:00 12:00 ECBs Nowotny on Panel in Alpbach, Austria

12:30 08:30 Canada GDP q/q : Q2 1.9% 1.5% 1.5%

12:30 08:30 GDP (monthly) m/m : Jun 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%

13:45 09:45 US Chicago PMI : Aug 53.7 53.0 53.5

13:55 09:55 Michigan Sentiment (Final) : Aug 72.3 74.0 73.8

14:00 10:00 Factory Orders m/m : Jul -0.5%

14:00 08:00 Fed Chairman Bernanke Speaks on The Monetary Policy Since The Crisis in Jackson

Hole, WY

16:00 10:00 BoEs Haldane Speaks on Financial Stability in Jackson Hole, Wyoming

17:10 11:10 BoEs Posen Speaks on Monetary Policy in Jackson Hole, Wyoming

During 30/8-1/9 US Economic Symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming

Week

Release dates and forecasts as at c.o.b. prior to the date of publication: Source: BNP Paribas


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Research Disclaimers

Important Disclosures: Please see important disclosures in the text of this report

The information and opinions contained in this report have been obtained from, or are based on, public sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty,express or implied, is made that such information is accurate, complete or up to date and it should not be relied upon as such. This report does not constitute an offer orsolicitation to buy or sell any securities or other investment. Information and opinions contained in the report are published for the assistance of recipients, but are not to berelied upon as authoritative or taken in substitution for the exercise of judgement by any recipient, are subject to change without notice and not intended to provide the sole

basis of any evaluation of the instruments discussed herein. Any reference to past performance should not be taken as an indication of future performance. To the fullestextent permitted by law, no BNP Paribas group company accepts any liability whatsoever (including in negligence) for any direct or consequential loss arising from any useof or reliance on material contained in this report. All estimates and opinions included in this report are made as of the date of this report. Unless otherwise Indicated in thisreport there is no intention to update this report. BNP Paribas SA and its affiliates (collectively BNP Paribas) may make a market in, or may, as principal or agent, buy orsell securities of any issuer or person mentioned in this report or derivatives thereon. BNP Paribas may have a financial interest in any issuer or person mentioned in thisreport, including a long or short position in their securities and/or options, futures or other derivative

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Market Economics Team

Paul Mortimer-Lee Global Head of Market Economics 44 20 7595 8551 Julia Coronado Chief Economist North America 1 212 841 2281

Ken Wattret Chief Eurozone Market Economist,Germany

44 20 7595 8657 Jeremy Lawson US 1 212 471-8180

Luigi Speranza Head of Inflation EconomicsEurozone, Italy

44 20 7595 8322 Yelena Shulyatyeva US 1 212 841 2258

Dominique Barbet Eurozone, France 33 1 4298 1567 Bricklin Dwyer US, Canada 1 212 471 7996

Gizem Kara Eurozone, Scandinavia 44 20 7595 8783

David Tinsley UK & Ireland 44 20 7595 8150

Evelyn Herrmann Europe 44 20 7595 8476

Ricardo Santos Europe 44 20 7595 8369

Catherine Colebrook Europe, Inflation 44 20 7595 1298

ECB a Evropská krize (dokument v AJ)

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