Ebert, Plato's Theory of Recollection. Meno 80a-86c

THEODOR EBERT University o] Erlangen

PLATO'S THEORY OF RECOLLECT ION RECONSIDERED AN INTERPRETAT ION OF MENO 80a-86c

In this article 1, I should like to put forward an interpretation of a passage in the Meno which is probably the earliest reference in Plato's writings to what has generally been known as the "Theory of Recollection." Together with the "Theory of Forms," to which it is systematically subordinate, the "Theory of Recollection" is one of the doctrines most central to Plato's philosophy. The upshot of this theory, as it has generally been understood by Plato's inter- preters, might be stated briefly as follows : the human soul has had a vision of the eternal Forms before birth; this knowledge of the Forms is, however, lost when the soul enters the world, and has to be recovered by the process of recollection. Since all true knowledge is knowledge of Forms, knowledge can only be achieved through recotiection.

It would appear to be obvious that this theory, in comparison, for example, with the logical achievements of Aristotle, or of Plato himself in his later dialogues, is of little genuine philosophical interest; we may be interested in it for historical reasons, but it does not provide an answer to a philosophical problem which might still be accepted as valid today. On the contrary, it would appear to be an obstacle to a solution of the problem it pretends to solve, in that it poses the problem in somewhat inappropriate terms.

Although the above statement of the "Theory of Recollection" accords with the interpretation widely accepted among scholars, it does not harmonize with the texts as well as it should. Although the difficulties which arise in any attempt to give a consistent interpretation of the texts relevant to recollection have been discussed, so far as I can see no satisfactory solution of them has been forthcoming. I should like to draw attention to the two principal difficulties posed by the Mena. Firstly, although this dialogue contains the most detailed statement of the "Theory of Recollection," there is, insofar as this theory is concerned, no allusion to the "Theory o.f Forms."

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In spite of H. Cherniss' claims against Klara Buchmann 2, I can find no suggestion whatever in the Meno that recollection is meant to be a recollection of Forms. In introducing his puzzling statement that all learning is recollection, Socrates is appealing to the religious doctrines of the Orphics and/or Pythagoreans about reincarnation and metempsychosis.

The second difficulty lies in the scepticism apparent at the end of Socrates' discussion of recollection (Men. 86b6-c2; cp. Phaedr. 257a). Socrates' concluding remarks in the Meno look in fact as if they were a sort of revocation of what has just been proved in a somewhat dogmatic way. N. Gulley thinks that this retraction is Plato's way of conveying his doubts about the Theory of Recollection to his readersL This suggestion would imply however, that within the space of a few pages, Plato is affirming and questioning one and the same doctrine without giving his readers a hint as to what the solution of this riddle might be. Gulley's interpretation seems to me0 therefore, to be somewhat implausible.

Besides this "traditional" account of the theory of recollection, there is another approach, which has found favour especially among nen-Kantian scholars*. According-to the explanation which this approach has given rise to, the philosophical rationale of the Platonic anamnesis is the apriori. What is hidden behind the metaphysical mythology of a prenatal vision of Forms is in reality nothing other than the modern philosophical insight that there are concepts and truths which can never be formulated merely on the basis of sense-perception, but which must be knowable independently of it, and which are logically prior to it; those of pure mathematics for example. And is it not a mathematical truth that is discovered, "recollected" by the slave- boy in the Meno ?

This account, which has been widely accepted by continental philosophers since Natorp and N. Hartmann put it forward was not actually initiated by the neo-Kantians. It was Leibniz who first insisted, in the course of his meta- critique of Locke's criticism of innate ideas, that this was the true meaning of Plato's recollection, and who first tried to force this meaning from the obfuscations of the Platonist tradition ~. But neither Leibniz nor the neo- Kantians were able to give a convincing explanation of the Hatonic texts. Although Leibniz contended that it was the Platonists only who gave the theory of recollection its mythical form, he did not explain how this view was to be reconciled with the fact that in the Meno as well as in the Phaedo recollection is dealt with in terms of a prenatal life. Natorp is more critical

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of this point, and blames Plato for what he calls "a psychological, and what is more, a metaphysical bias"" of the a prio.ri.

Thus neither the "traditional" nor the "aprioristic" interpretation of the theory of recollection gives rise to a cogent account of the Platonic texts. In order to overcome the difficulties they involve, we should, I think, bear in mind the following principles :

(1) We should not interpret Plato's dialogues by making presuppositions about what he might have wanted to convey to his readers, by assuming either a "Metaphysica Platunis" or looking for anticipations of the achievements of modern philosophy. Even if Plato might in some respects have anticipated Kant or Leibniz, looking at him through Kantian or Leibnizian spectacles might prevent us from seeing other more important aspects of his philosophy. We should attempt to explain what Plato himself is trying to say.

(2) We should take the literary form, that is to say the Platonic dialogue, as the starting point of our interpretation. Plato's (written !) doubts about the insufficiency of the written word in matters of philosophy would be rather pointless if his dialogues were nothing but dramatized treatises. It seems to me that we come nearer to the truth if we regard his dialogues as an attempt to solve the problem of overcoming the danger of dogmatism and misunderstanding inherent in written logoi without leaving philosophy exclusively to transient oral conversations. In other words, we should regard the dialogue-form as an answer to the problematic situation of the philosophical author. Plato is the philosophical pupil of a man who left nothing written. The Platonic dialogue, unlike the dialogues of the Enlightenment for example, is not the dressing of philosophical doctrines in the convenient form of a conversation. The most striking difference between the Platonic dialogue and that of later times seems to consist in the different function of question and answer. To put it briefly : in Plato's dialogues questions do not function as a mere staging of the (correct) answer; the respondent may be wrong and although he may be wrong, this is brought out not by direct criticism, but in the rather indirect approach of an etenctic questioning. Socrates tries to show what is wrong with his interlocutor's thesis by means of a questioning technique which is designed to deduce the absurd consequences of a wrong answer. It is this technique of elenctic questioning which seems to be the specific feature of the Platonic dialogue, and which gives it its character of a dialogue between author and readerL

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II

It is a sound exegetic principle to start an interpretation of a difficult and puzzling text with what seems to be clear in it; in the case of the passage under discussion, this qualification clearly applies to the famous Socratic geometry lesson (82b9-85b7) s. We can even rely on the text itself for this assumption : the geometry lesson is meant to be an explication of Socrates' statement that all learning is recollection (cp. 81d4-5). It is quite evident from this lesson that the slave-boy is learning something, and in what sense he is doing so. _After the problem of duplicating a square has been explained to him, his first answer is erroneous, assuming that one can construct the double square from the side of double length (82e2-3). He is then brought to see the error of his first and second proposals, and finally confesses that he has no answer to the problem at all (84al-2). From that point he is led to the discovery of the solution : the square of double size can be constructed from the diagonal of the original square.

It is, however, in no way evident that Socrates' young pupil is recollecting something in this process of finding an elementary geometrical truth. In order to give a rational explanation of this discovery one would not have to. rely on the farfetched and implausible hypothesis of prenatal learning. The boy corrects his mistakes and makes his discovery by way of trial and error combined with a method of testing the proposed answers: by counting segments of equal size in the squares to be compared. It is all the more paradoxical that Socrates should interrupt his lesson on two occasions (82 and 84a-d) in order to tell Meno, on the first occasion, to pay attention to the slave-boy's recollection; and, on the second, to ask him what point in the process of recollection has been reached by the slave.

The promised exemplification of Socrates' puzzling statement turns out to be rather unsatisfactory. In view of the difficulty involved in making sense of the geometry lesson as an explanation of the "learning-is-recollection" statement, if we take this statement at its face value, we would appear to be justified in trying another approach. Let us suppose that recollection is used here in a metaphorical way, and that what Socrates wants to draw attention to is an analogy between learning and recollecting. We should bear in mind however, that this supposition will shed its hypothetical character only if it not only provides a plausible interpretation o.f the geometry lesson but can also be shown to be in accordance with Socrates' speech in 81aS-dS, where

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the argumentation seems to be based wholly on religious and mythical grounds.

In taking recollection to be a metaphor, we should however avoid connecting it with those theorems of modern philosophy which belong to a systematically and historically different context. In order to do so I shall first try to give an analysis of what could be called the "essential" or "constitutive" feature of recollection itself, quite apart from its function within a philosophical theory or within our beliefs about this theory.

As is shown by a passage in the Philebus (34b6-c2), the Greek 'dv6t~v~]o~'has two meanings. It may either designate the process of mere reminiscence i.e. the bringing to mind of something one knows but had not actually thought of, or the recollecting of something one had forgotten. Nosy I take it for granted that ~dvdktvqo~c_ ~ is used in the second sense in the passages relevant to the theory of recollection. This supposition finds support in the many references to forgetfulness in these passages (Phaed. 73el-4; 75d7-76a7; Phaedr. 248c7), which make it obvious that ' dvd#vF o~' is understood as recollection of something that had been forgotten. The fact that a process of recollection involves as its starting point a state of forgetfulness is relevant to the structural nature of recollection itself. In order to bring out this structure we have first to give an analysis of forgetfulness.

Forgetfulness is not a mere lack of knowledge but is characterized by a specific reflectiveness : having forgotten something does not only mean not knowing something, but implies a no.t being aware of this lack of knowledge. It is, of course, true that when somebody says "I have forgotten so-and-so" he is not in this state of total forgetfulness. But this only means that he has overcome this state of total forgetfulness and has taken what might turn out to be the first step in a process of recollection. We can refer to such a state of total forgetfulness only in the case of talking about a third person, not in the case of talking about ourselves. In the case of statements introduced by "I have forgotten" the awareness (of forgetfulness) expressed has been preceded by a lack of awareness about one's having forgotten. Thus, forgetfulness is like the blind spot in our visual field : there, too, we not only do not see anything, but we are not even aware of our not seeing anything.

The reflexive structure of forgetfulness now gives recollection its crucial feature : recollection consists of two cognitive acts : first, one has to realize lthal one has forgotten something, and then one can recollect what one has

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forgotten. These two steps may coincide in borderline cases, when, for example, I am suddenly reminded by something of something I had forgotten. But even in these cases the awareness of something's being forgotten is a logical presupposition for any recollection of it. Only if we recognize what we have recollected as something we have known earlier but which we do not actually know, are we entitled to speak of recollection; otherwise it would not be distinguishable from any new information.

It is easy to see that this gradual succession in the process of recollecting has its formal counterpart in the passage from error (fictitious knowledge) to true knowledge : both forgetfulness and error can be characterized as an ignorance about ignorance; we are lacking knowledge about a lack of knowledge in both cases. And in both cases the way to knowledge leads through the awareness of one's ignorance.

The first point of my argument is, then, that the geometry lesson points to this analogy between the process of recollecting and the process of learning in the sense of "coming to know from an error." We have seen above that the process of learning Socrates' young interlocutor is undergoing leads from fictitious knowledge (the answer in 82e2-3), to the predicament in 84al-2, and from this point to the discovery of the solution (85b). That Plato wants to lay emphasis upon these steps in the process of learning is shown by the dramatic staging of the geometry lesson: the questioning of the slave-boy is divided - - by Socrates' questions directed to Meno in 82e and 84a-d - into three sections (82b9-82e3; 82e14-84a2; 84d3-85b7). These sections lead to error, predicament, and the discovery of the solution respec- tively. The fact that the dramatic arrangement of the mathematical lesson stresses these steps in the process of learning is not, however, sufficient proof that Plato/Socrates is actually pointing to an analogy between the processes of learning and recollecting. To prove this we need further evidence. We find it, I should like to suggest, in the questions and comments Socrates addresses to Meno in the two interruptions of the geometry lesson.

The first interruption (82e4-13) is a comment upon the slave-boy's first erroneous reply. Socrates calls attention to the fictitious knowledge expressed in this answer (cp. o[~zal d3~vat 82e5, o~'ezat el0). He then goes on to urge Meno to "pay attention how he [i.e. the slave] will recollect step by step (gc;~q;) as one ought to do in recollection" (82e12-13). This remark implies that someone who is undergoing a process of recollection will go through a gradual process in a necessary sequence. If we adopt the

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"traditional" account of the theory o.f recollection, the meaning of this remark remains mysterious. Bluck, for example, has no satisfactory explanation for it ~ The statement becomes understandable, however, if we interpret it in the light of our analysis of recollection : Socrates is alluding here to the formal characteristics the process of recollecting shares with the process of learning. And he can do so at this point because the slave has been led into an error, i.e., into a state corresponding to total forgetfulness. We may say that Socrates is merely translating his previous comments upon the mere belief, the fictitious knowledge of his interlocutor, into the metaphorical language of recollection.

The second part of the geometric epideixis (82e14-84a2) brings the slave to an awareness and confession of his ignorance. He now knows that he has no solution to the geometric problem (84al-2). He has reached the predicament, the aporia.

At this turning-point in the geometry lesson, Socrates interrupts his mathematical questioning for the second time and asks Meno: "Do you recognize, Meno, which point he has now got to in the process of recollection ?" (84a3-4). There is no answer to this question in the same metaphorical terminology, i.e., in terms of recollecting. Socrates does not state explicitly that the slave is now in the state of - - speaking in terms of recollection - - recognizing that he has forgotten. This answer is left to Meno and/or to the reader. Socrates, however, gives an explanation of the slave- boy's state in terms of knowing and not-knowing (84a4-bl). The boy now does not know the solution any more than he did befo.re (84a4-6), but he has taken a step within his state of ignorance. He has taken the step from fictitious knowledge( dfezo ... ,6ze egS&al a6) to the awareness of his lack of knowledge (vf;v ~... o~:x o~&v, o~'o~ezat e~gvat a7-bl). It is, however, worth notidng that Socrates can give this explanation instead of a direct answer. Socrates states where the slave has arrived in his process of learning, that is he gives, in the non-metaphorical language of learning, the answer to a question that was put in the metaphorical terms of recollection. The key to the riddle of the Platonic recollection lies in this shift from Socrates' metaphorical question to his non-metaphorical answer. To be able to read Socrates' remarks about the predicament o,f the slave-boy as an answer to the preceding question presupposes, however, a recognition of the structural analogy between the processes of recollection and of learning. Socrates obviously cannot point directly to this analogy : this would imply a

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teaching of Meno (and of the reader) and not a mere guiding by means of questions.

III

In spite of the plausibility of the above interpretation of the geometry lesson, this leaves us with a problem. If the geometry lesson is designed to illustrate the analogy between the processes of recollecting and learning (in the sense of "coming to know from an error"), then any correction of any error will be a case of "recollection." Is this the whole outcome of the Platonic recollection ? Does Plato merely want to make the somewhat trivial point that any correction of an error (a false belief) logically presupposes the awareness of that error ? Or does the Platonic recollection have a more specific significance in the Meno and in the whole of Plato's philosophy ? I think it does.

In order to see this significance, we shall have to consider the function of the geometry lesson in the wider context of Socrates' discussion with Meno. In the questioning of the slave we witness nothing but the correction of an error concerning a particular geometric construction. In the context of the dialogue, however, the geometry lesson has a much more distinctive function : it is as it were, the play in Hamlet, a "play within a play," and just like this performance, it has the object of displaying the state of the persons for whom it is staged.

We shall see what this lesson is intended to tell us and is intended to tell Meno about Meno if we turn first to an analysis of Meno's predicament concerning the nature of virtue expressed in his speech at the beginning of our passage (79e7-80b7). Meno is fair enough to admit that he has no answer to Socrates' repeated question (79e5-6) as to the nature of virtue. All his pretended definitions have been proved to be wrong. The confession of his predicament, however, is brought out only in 80bl-2, after quite a lengthy statement concerning what has happened to him in the course of his discussion with Socrates. The way in which he describes his own aporetic situation makes it clear that he does not know what his predicament means to him. He is referring to himself as being "bewitched" and "deluded" and "enchanted" by Socrates (80a2-3; cp. 80b6). These metaphors as well as the famous and much quoted comparison of Socrates with the torpedo paralyzing everybody who gets into contact with him (80a5-bl) are designed to bring out a negative fact : the loss of the capacity to use one's own mind

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and one's own limbs. Meno sees enchantment where in fact he has been released from the spell of fictitious knowledge. He believes himself to have been paralyzed by Socrates, the "torpedo," whereas the paralysis of error has in fact been taken away from him. So his remark : "And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people - - and very good speeches they were, so I thought" (80b2-3 - Lamb's translation) does not imply a self-criticism and the insight that his speeches about virtue have been based on mere belief; it is rather intended to remind his listeners of how unnatural the situation is into which he has been brought by Socrates' tricky questions.

For Meno, the predicament is a sort of defeat. He has been "caught" by Socrates. But even in the confession of what he thinks is a defeat, he still shows his conviction that he is superior to Socrates thanks to his rhetorical education : Meno is a friend and pupil of Gorgias (cp. 71c-d, 73c, 76b), and the somewhat artificial metaphors he uses to describe his aporetic situation are made up in the style of his teacher. So is the comparison of the torpedo : this conceit even uses the typically Gorgian stylistic figure of the homoio- teleuton : za~z~ T~ ~,~aze~a vd~x~ z~ Oa2)~az[a (80a5-6).

One of Socrates' intentions in staging the slave's aporia is to correct Meno's misunderstanding of predicament. This is to be seen most clearly in Socrates' questions about the predicament of the slave-boy in the geometry lesson (84a3-c9). After having characterized the step from error to the awareness of ignorance as a progress brought about through the predicament (84a4-bl), Socrates gets Meno to admit that their young pupil is now, i.e., after having been brought to see his ignorance, in a much better state (84b3- b5). Then he goes on to point out a direct connection between this cognition and Meno's conception of predicament : in describing the slave-boy's state in terms of the torpedo metaphor, he is able to give this metaphor a sense contrary to its original meaning in Meno's speech at 80a-b. Meno has to concede that the slave has suffered no harm by having been brought to his predicament and by having been paralyzed as by a torpedo (84b6-8).

Socrates' next question; by its ironical overstatement, makes it quite clear that what he is pointing at is in reality not the slave's but Meno's predicament : he is alluding to Meno's remark from 80b2-3, when he says that the slave (who for the first time - - cp. 85d-e - - has been confronted with a geometrical problem), before coming to realize his predicament, had been "only too ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of

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people any number of times, that the double space must have a line of double length for its side" (84b11-cl. - Lamb's translation). Meno is to realize that what still appeared to him in 80a-b as a sort of knowledge which had merely been rendered ineffective by the aporetic incantation, is in fact a fictitious knowledge, is error. Therefore, the following question insists on the difference between error and predicament : he who is labouring under a misapprehension does not even try to find the truth, is not even longing for knowledge (84c4-6). Socrates concludes his questioning of Meno with another allusion to the torpedo metaphor : "Then the torpedo's shock was of advantage to him ?" (84c8. - Lamb's translation). Here, as in 84b6-7, Socrates' question implies a critique of the negative meaning in Meno's previous use of the torpedo metaphor.

If Meno, in admitting his predicament, is at the same time displaying his misunderstanding of predicament - - and this has been confirmed by the corrections Socrates tries to elicit - - then there must be some point in looking for a reason for this. Why does Meno misunderstand the function of the predicament ? We shall find an answer to this question if we analyze Meno's famous eristical argument (80d5-8). This eristical objection is brought forward in opposition to Socrates' proposal to look for a common solution to the common predicament (80d3-4).

Meno's argument consists of three questions. The first (80d5-6) consists of contesting in a general way the po,ssibility of searching for something when one does not know what it is ( zo~zo b~r162 ogo~ga zd) :zaod:zav 6vt do,Iv ) and this, it is understood, is the case with Socrates' question regarding the nature of virtue. Meno's second question (80d6-7). is meant to support or prove (),d o d6) the argument suggested by the first. It isto establish why, in the case of a What-question, there can be no method of searching, no z#,~xor ~'~r#a8o3~" : because the possibility of searching for something presupposes that one has an idea (cp. :zOo~9~l~,~vor d7) of what one is looking for. This condition can, of course, not be fulfilled if one does not know what one is looking for. The last question (d7-8) brings forward quite a subtle objection. Even if we pass over the difficulties implied in the notion of looking for something one does not know, even if we restrict our consideration to the case in which someone stumbles by chance upon what he is looking for, it must be the case that such a person would still not have found it; for finding something involves more than merely stumbling upon it ( ~,zvyzdetv d7), finding implies an identifica-

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tion of what one has stumbled upon with what one is looking for. This identification is however impossible if one does not know what one is looking for.

It should be noticed that Meno's three questions show the influence of the technique of eristical argumentation taught by the sophists : Meno is, as we have already noticed, a pupil of Gorgias. This influence is most evident in the way in which the objections are mustered, a device reflected in the "even if" (d xat 80d7) of the last question: after one difficulty has been overcome, the nert is already waiting. Gorgias in IIeo~ zo~e~ &,zo~ uses the same pattern of argumentation 1~

The reason that Socrates' thesis about learning and recollection is provoked by Meno's eristical objection is to suggest the necessity o.f a much more careful examination of Meno's argument and its underlying premisses than is usually given to it 11. It is easy to see that Meno's objection owes its apparent plausibility to its implicit orientation toward the search for per- ceptible things. If we are looking for something that is an object of sense- perception, we must know what it is that we are looking for : we must have perceived it at an earlier time, or we must possess a sufficient description of it. It is indeed quite absurd to look for something and not to, know it, if what one is looking for is an object of sense-perception, i.e., if it can be known in the sense of knowledge by acquaintance (connaitre, kennen, 7~,'&va,). The plausibility of Meno's argument disappears, however, if what one is looking for is something that can be known as a matter of propositional knowledge (savoir, wissen, egO&at ). When we are looking for the solution to a riddle or a mathematical problem, we have no idea of what might be the solution to the riddle or the result of the calculation. We simply know which conditions a proposed solution is to fulfill; we are looking for a term within a relation.

Meno's argument - - and this is my second point - - rests o.n the implicit presupposition that all knowledge has the logical structure of knowledge by acquaintance. The misconception of knowledge implied in this presupposition is not, however, merely a contingent error or a misunderstanding quite natural to the philosophically untrained mind.

In order to see the full implications of this misunderstanding, we have to examine the difference between knowledge by acquaintance and propositional knowledge. For brevity's sake, Jet us put knowing (a) for knowing by acquaintance and knowing (p) for propositional knowledge. Now the most

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basic feature in the case of knowing (a) is that this sort of knowledge is not articulated in propositional form, although 'u,,hat is known (i.e., the known object) may have the form of a proposition : I can know (a) people's opinions and judgments and poems. On the other hand, knowledge (p) has always a propositional character; "knowing (p)" - - if used in the affirmative

- - can always be constructed with a that-clause. Now this difference between "knowing (a)" and "knowing (p)" has

consequences for the meaning of the negative use of "to know" (not knowing) in the two cases. Since what I know (p) is necessarily a fact, something to be expressed in a true proposition, what I think I know may be not the case, may be expressed in a false proposition. Thus one meaning of "not knowing (p)" is "being mistaken." "Not knowing (p)" in this sense implies "taking a proposition R, to, be true whereas Not-R is true."

But obviously this is not the only meaning of "not knowing (p)." Not knowing the fact expressed in the true proposition R ought not to imply taking Not-R to be true. It may as well mean "having no, idea about the fact expressed by R," or just "not having yet made up one's mind as to whether R or Not-R is true" (grammatically this latter case is indicated by the use of an interrogative clause). "Not knowing (p)" in this second sense means "being ignorant about." Thus, we have to distinguish two senses of "not knowing (p)" : error and mere ignorance.

In the case of "knowing (a)" however, there is only one opposite meaning: "Not knowing (a) B" is "not being acquainted with B" and acquaintance, because of its non-propositional character, does not allow of error : thus there is no, meaning of "not knowing (a)" which corresponds to, the first sense of "not knowing (p)." I am acquainted with something if and only if I have become acquainted with it (which usually means that I have perceived it), and its idea has not escaped my memory.

Now it will, at first sight, seem rather unlikely that any supposed knowledge (a) should be free from error. Obviously there are cases in which we are mistaken about an object we are acquainted with. I can, for example, believe wrongly that I know someone's brother, if the person who has been introduced to me as such is in fact somebody else. And the same is true of all cases in which the description of the object consists of referring to relational properties. (Proper names can also be interpreted as belonging to this class of descriptions : to know Peter is to know someone whose name is "Peter." There is, however, a crucial difference between these errors in the

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field of knowledge by acquaintance and a mistaken knowing (p). When I am mistaken in believing I know (p) something to be the case, I do in fact not know anything. After the discovery of the error, the pretended knowledge (p) disappears completely. When, however, I am mistaken about an object of knowledge (a), it is not the case that I do not know anything - - on the contrary, I do know (a) this person or thing; I can, for example, recognize him/it or give a description of him/it. What I do not know is who or what he/it is. The error in these cases belongs to a pretended knowing (p) that is parasitic on the genuine knowing (a). Thus we can in fact say that there is only a simple dichotomy between "knowing (a)" and "not knowing (a)"; this dichotomy co.rresponds to. the opposition of having in mind and not having in mind.

IV

This examination of "knowing (a)" and "knowing (p)" now enables us better to understand the implicit premisses of Meno's eristical argument. He is arguing on the implicit assumption that all knowledge can be considered to have the logical structure of knowledge by acquaintance. This assumption implies that knowing (p) and its negation form a dichotomy, as does "being acquainted with" and "not being acquainted with." The assumption of this difference .eclipses the basic difference between the two meanings of "not knowing (p)," between error and mere ignorance. For Meno., knowledge is the presence in one's mind or memory of something known, lack of knowledge the absence of a content of knowledge. This misconception of knowledge obfuscates the difference between error and mere ignorance, as well as the progress implied in the step. from error to predicament. Thus we now get an answer to our question as to the reason for Meno's misunderstanding of predicament : it is rooted in his misconception of knowledge.

This is confirmed by Socrates' first reply to Meno,'s eristical objection. It seems to be significant that his first answer is not a rejection of Meno's argument as a sophistical inference by analogy, but an explication of what has been implicitly presupposed by Meno's questions : the simple dichotomy of knowing and not-knowing; either, so runs the interpretation of Socrates, you know something, and then you need not look for what it is, or you do not know it, and then yon do not know what to look for (80e3-5) x2.

If Socrates characterizes Meno's objection as an eristical argument (80e2),

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this ought not to imply that Meno himself is aware of the sophism implied in his questions. On the contrary, the naivet6 of his question in 81al-2 strongly suggests that he is unaware of the falsehood of his underlying premisses. He is in fact labouring under a crucial misapprehension : he believes he knows what knowledge is, but does not.

In order to correct this error of Meno's, Socrates chooses a digression, the subtlety of which is, however, not easily recognized by the modern reader. Socrates assumes the role of an epideictic orator in the style of Gorgias. Gorgias has been present behind Meno all the time in the dialogue (cp. the allusions to Gorgias' teaching 70b3, 71c5-d8, 73c7, 76bl, 76c4, 79e6). For his eristical questions in Gorgias' manner Meno gets in return a "theatrical reply," a zoayx~ } d~:z~xO~o,~r similar to the one in 76d3-5 (cp. 76e3).

Socrates' following short speech in 81a5-d5y with its conclusion that all learning is recollecting, is, I want to. argue, a parody of a Gorgian epideictic logos. It has to be read aloud in order to catch the abundant stylistic devices typical of Gorgias' rhetoric. Typical of the Gorgian character of Socrates' speech is the breaking up of the sentences into small cola, accentuated by homoioteleuta and alliterations2 * I shall quote a few examples of this: d~x~]xoa ?d~ dwcS~c?ov ze xa't ~/vva~z~v oow6v (81a5)--twocolaofequal length immediately at the beginning, with homoioteleuta and a twofold rhyme within the second. The abundance of rhyming syllables in : ... z~v [~oov ~e xa~ zCov [e~etc~v 8aot~ ... :ze~" c~v ... o~t'oe~ ~'dvat c~tcSdvat (81al0-bl), or in : ~22ot :~o22o~ ~c~v~ot~z~v &sot zSgoc.. (81bl-2) ; the alliteration in : xa~ zoz~ #ev ze,~evzSv - 8&'7 d~oOv~oxetv xa2ogoot (81b4- 5). The elaborate alternation of ~, z, fl and the figura etymologica in: c)e'iv c)~ &d zaaza d)~ 6otc6~a~a &afitGovat zbv fllou (81b6-7); the ele- gant consonance in the antithesis : xal zd &~dc)s xa't ,a g:v ~'Atc)ov (81c6).

The quotation from Pindarus serves to accentuate a prose which embodies the rules or poetry :~5 rhythm and euphony are overriding grammatical simplicity: witness the hyperbata (e.g. 81all-b1), and the sonorous, rhyming genitive cases instead of the nominative (81a10, bl). Besides the stylistic devices, both the composition and the solemnity of this speech provide further evidence that Socrates is speaking in the r61e of sophistical orator. It starts off with a reference to authorities, but the pathetic attributes Socrates is using (cp. aoclo&v 81a5, z$s~a a6, z$s~ot b2) conceal the vagueness of what they are attributes of. Only Pindarus is mentioned by name, the "many other poets" are rhetorical dumb actors. The solemnity evoked by the

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vocabulary is accentuated moreover by the distinction drawn between the diction used in the speech and the language of ordinary people (81b4-5;

d2-3). Only after Socrates, by referring to priests and poets, has created the

nimbus of a "higher" truth fo,r what these authorities are saying, is the argument itself brought forward. Meno's impatient interruption serves to bring out the artificialty of this procedure : Meno wants to know the argument first, and only then those who are using it (81a7-9). Moreover, the main thesis of the speech is only an inference that cannot be based directly on the authority of "many divine poets" (bl-2). This fact, however, is skillfully concealed by the emphatic reference to Pindarus and by the long quotation which is in fact a digression, as has been noticed by Bluck. 16

It is worth noticing however, that the doctrine of reincarnation is part of the philosophical theory of Empedocles (cp. fragments 8, 11, 15, 1i7, 118 Diels/Kranz). And as is shown by Socrates' definition of colour in 76c-d, Meno can be supposed to be well acquainted with the philosophy of Empe- docles. The line in 81b4-5 3c5r 7 a=o4vFa~e~, za2o~o, seems to echo the verse in fragment 15 (Diels/Kranz) of Empedocles :z6 c}r 7 flgozov xa)~{ovol.

We know that Socrates mocked the affected speeches of Greek orators (cp. Menex. 234c-235c), we know his view that in a dialogue the answers should be as short as possible (cp. Gorg. 449b-c; Prof. 334c-335a). If we assume that Socrates' speech in the Meno is not meant to be ironical, we have to explain the contrast between what he says and what he does, because his speech is quite evidently constructed in the manner of a rhetorical epideictic logos, and is delivered in lieu of an answer to a short and meaningful question. It seems to be much more reasonable to assume that Socrates is deliberately acting the r61e of a sophistical orator - - as he does in his two speeches in the Phaedrus and in the great speech in the Menexev~us. That this is not stated explicitly in the case of our dialogue has an obvious reason : Meno is to be taken by surprise by a Socrates who suddenly shows himself to be well acquainted with the tricks of sophistical rhetoric. Ir

V

The literary character of the passage 81a5-d5 has been misunderstood because this speech has been taken to. be the enundation of a dogma of Platonic metaphysics : the Theory of Recollection. Indeed, such a dogma

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THEODOR EBERT

seemed to require the imposing solemnity of this speech. However, reading it as a parody of a Gorgian speech provides us with a key as to the meaning of the concluding statement that learning is recollection. This statement, if taken literally, would indeed be inconsistent with the subtle analogy between recollecting and coming to know from an error which we have taken to be the meaning of the geometry lesson. Socrates' puzzling statement has to be read as an allegorical conceit, a stylistic device usual in Gorgias as well as i~ Empedodes (cp. Gorg. fr. 5a; Empedocles ft. 55, 66, 99 Diels/Kranz). The reader had to guess the meaning of these metaphorical riddles.

The sequel to the speech of Socrates confirms the view that the learning-is- recollection statement is a riddle in the form of a metaphor : Meno's first reaction is not a doubt as to, the truth of this paradoxical statement, but a question as to its meaning (81e3-4). What is more, the dialogue with the slave is staged not in order to. give an answer to= Meno's question, but to enable him to find one. This, however, implies the recognition of the legitimacy of Meno's question as to the meaning of this statement.

The geometry lesson which is arranged for Meno's sake (~o,3 Z~exa 82a8) aims at correcting Meno's misunderstanding of predicament by correcting his misconception of knowledge. The geometrical problem is to find a square, or the side of a square, which stands in a certain ratio to a given square, or the side of the given square. The error of the slave consists in assuming a false proportion, in taking two different ratios to be the same; he believes that 22 : 42 = 1 : 2. The recognition of his error means, in modern mathematical terms, that the magnitude looked for becomes an unknown, an x within an equation (22 : x 2 = 1 : 2). And the discovery of the solution consists in seeing that, and of course why, the diagonal of the original square is the unknown magnitude looked for.

The twist in this discovery of the solution now seems to lie in the fact that the diagonal is not something unknown in the sense of not having been seen as a line in the figure. Socrates had drawn the diagonals at the beginning of his lesson in order to define the square (80C2-3), not the lines parallel to the sides running through the centre of the square, as Thompson, Lamb, and Bluck have argued. '18 The slave was acquainted with the diagonal before he started to look for the solution, and his final discovery of the solution implies seeing the diagonal as the side of the double square.

This fact now makes it clear that the structure of togos, in its double sense of proportion and proposition, not only allows for error, predicament,

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and knowledge, but in certain cases provides the possibility of going through these steps without acquiring any new information from without. It is a characteristic feature of logoi (proportions as well as propositions) that they combine different elements without blending them : their elements remain recognizable and can be disconnected and combined in a new way and with other elements. This is also the reason for Socrates' being right when he claims that he is not teaching but only questioning his interlo.cutor : he is merely giving maieutic assistance in such a process of combining and dis- connecting logoi.

The only one to see this "didactic" strategy of the geometry lesson, although rather incidentally, has been Leibniz. In the first book of the Nou- veau Essais, he makes the point that mathematical truths are innate to our mind in an implicit manner, "en sorte qu'on les y peut trouver en consid6rant attentivement et rangeant ce qu'on a dSj~ dans l'esprit ... comme Platon l'a montr8 dans un dialogue, o~ il introduit Socrate menant un enfant /t des v~rit~s abstruses par les seules interrogations sans lui rien apprendre" (italics are mine. - Th. E.).19

The geometry lesson is staged in order to correct Meno's misconception of knowledge. Does Meno, learn what this lesson is designed to make him admit, and if not, why not ? We get an answer to this question, if we consider the questioning o,f Meno, by Socrates about the slave-boy's geometrical discovery (85b8-86b4). At first sight, in this part of our passage the attempt is made to deduce that the boy must have learned his mathematical knowledge in an earlier life. What is decisive, however, is that Socrates in this passage is merely asking, not making statements, just as he did in the geometry lesson. It is Meno. who concedes the premisses from which the mythological interpretation of the slave's learning is deduced. In particular, it seems to be worth noticing that the decisive question as to whether the slave had his opinions beforehand, is put twice (85c4, eT) and both times as an alternative question. Meno's replies are always in the affirmative. Socrates, however, does not take Meno's conclusions at their face value, as is shown by his reply to Meno in 8666-c2 : he merely wants to. make the point that it is possible to, look for something one does not know. He has now reached an agreement on this point with Meno (cp. 86c4-5) who, however, has been brought to concede this from quite different, i.e., mythologica! premisses.

It seems to be plain that Meno does not realize the import of the geometry lesson and therefore of Socrates' statement that learning is recollection. But

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THEODOR EBERT

once again this misunderstanding ought not to be interpreted as merely a transitory mistake, as a mere missing of the point of Socrates' comparison. It seems rather to be a consequence of his misconception of knowledge. Since Meno in the geometry lesson did not go through a process of "recollection" as did the slave, since he has not come to, see and correct his error about the nature of knowledge, the consequence of a mythological interpretation is quite natural. In the case of knowing by acquaintance, a progress that leads from a lack of knowledge to knowledge and is not based on outside information, is possible only in the case o,f recollection, through which we can come to know something we did not actually know merely by ourselves.

It is Meno's misconception of knowledge that causes him to persist with a mythological interpretation of the slave's learning and of the "Theory of Recollection." We should no longer, I think, follow him in this.

NOTES

1 The following article is, in its main argument, part of my doctoral dissertation which is to

he published under the title: Meinung und Wissen in der Philosiphie Platons. I am much indebted to Mr. Michael Petry for many improvements in the English text.

2 See Cherniss' review of Klara Buchmann : "Die Stellung des Menon in der platonischen

Philosophie," in : A]Ph 58 (I937) 498; also P. Friedl~inder, Platon vol. II, Berlin I964, 343. The core of Cherniss" argument is based on a petitio principii : "Yet obviously it is while

disembodied that the soul got its knowledge so that what it 'saw' could be only nonsensible;

apd, since in the Meno 'to know' is admittedly to know the ~(~Og*, the ~[ (~ that the

soul has known must be nonsensible." (Cherniss foe. cit.) There is no statement in the Meno that would support Cherniss" claim that "in the Meno 'to know' is admittedly to know the

~Og ." C. Huber who, like Cherniss and Priedl/inder, takes recollection in the Meno to

he a recollection of Forms, concedes that "hier yon dem Ideen nicht ausdriicklich die Rede ist'"

(C. Huber, Anamnesis bei Platon,, Miinchen 1964, p. 516; cp. also N. GulIey, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London ~96a, p. z9).

See N. Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 22. 4 See, for example, P. Natorp, Plates Ideenlehre, 5rd edition, Da,rmstadt I96I, p. ~xf., 142-144; A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, and edition, New York 1964, p. 26; R.E. Alien, "Anamnesis in Plato's Meno and Phaedo/" in : Rev. of Met. z3 (:t959/6o) I7o; N. Hartmann, "Das Problem des Apriorismus in der platonischen Philosophie," in : N. Hartmann, Kleinere Sehriften, Berlin I957, PP. 48-85 (first published in 1935). 5 See G.W. Leibniz, "'Nouveaux Essais,'" in : Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften (ed. by Gerhardt) vol. V, p. 74f- See also Diseours de M~taphysique, vol. IV (Gerhardt), p. 45z f. 6 Natorp, Ioc. cit. p. ~45.

The problem connected with the literary character of Plato's dialogues has been discussed since Schleiermacher and C.F. Hermann revived interest in it. For recent arguments concerning this topic see Leo Strauss, "On Plato's Republic," in : The City and Man, Chicago ~964;

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Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno, Chapel Hill 1965. The problem is discussed extensively in the "Introductory Remarks" in Klein's book, which contain a critique of R.

Schaerer, La Question Platonicienne, NeuchStel 1938. See also the "Introduction" in Stanley Rosen, P~ato's Symposium, New Haven/London 1968. 8 For a discussion of the mathematical background of this lesson see the illuminating article

by M.S. Brown, "'Plalo Disapproves of the Slave-boy's Answer," in : Rev. of Met. 21 (i967) 57-93. However, Brown does not examine the connection between the geometry lesson and Socrates' speech in 8aa5-d 5.

9 See R.S. Bluck, Plato's Meno, Cambridge I964, pp. ~6 and 297. 10 See Gorgias fr. 5 (Diels/Kranz). 11 Bluck in his commentary ad Ioc. says that "it is impossible to say who originated this

~tG~lGO~ ~()~0~... One thinks of the Megarians, and in particular of Enbulides." J. Moline, "Meno's Paradox ?," in : Phronesis I4 (~969) 155-I6~ argues tha,t Meno's questions are an argument ad h ominem to which Socrates replies with a philosophical paradox. Cp. too B. Phillips, "The Significance of Meno's Paradox," in: Class. Weekly 42 (1948/49) 87-9~. 12 Cp. to this passage P.M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, Cambridge I952, p. 52 : "The dilemma assumed that the only choice is between complete knowledge and blank ignorance."

18 The 'speech' itself is finished at 8Id5. The following lines are a comment upon it.

1,4 Cp. Eduard Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, Leipzig, ~898, vol. I, p. 64. 15 Cp. Norden, op. cit. p. 75 ft. 16 Cp. Bluck op. cir. ad Ioc. 17 It should be noticed that in the foregoing discussions Meno himself has made two short

epideictic }d)~Ot in the manner of Gorgias : at 71ei-Tza5 (a passage put among the Gorgias

fragments in the Diels/Kranz edition of the Presocratics) and in 79e7-8ob7. 18 See E.S. Thompson, The Meno of PlatG London ~9Ol ad Ioc.; Lamb's footnote in his translation of the Meno, in vol. IV of the Plato edition in Loeb's Classical Library; Bluck op. cir. ad Ioc. The text in 82c2- 5 allows for both interpretations. What is decis4ve, however, is the mathematical context. Socrates, in 82b9-c5, is giving a step-by-step definiton of the

He starts from the notion of the quadrangle. (~E~:Q(~O)~OV) in 82b9-Io, proceeds square, to the notion of the rhombus (quadrangle with four equal sides) in 82bl0-c2, and by

further specification arrives at the geometrical notion of the square (rhombus with two

equal diagonals) in 82c2-5. If we take, with the commentators, the lines referred to in 82c2-3 to

be the middle parallels (the transversals joining the midpoints of opposite sides), the

signifi6ance of this question becomes obscure and ununderstandable. First of all, Socrates"

question would be trivial: in any rhombus the lines in question do have the same length. Secondly, and this is more important, Socrates would not h~ve given a definition

of the geometric figure dealt with in the following lesson. Up until then, he has defined

a rhombus, not a square -- as Bluck has rightly noticed (op. cir. ad Ioc.). Furthermore, the slave would not be acquainted with what is most essential for the final discovery of the

solution, namely the fact that in a square (as in any rectangular quadrangle) the diagonals

must be of equal length. The figure drawn in 84e-85a is a square because its four sides are formed by the diagonals of four squares, each of which has the size of the original square

and because its diagonals have each the double length of the side of the original square. I do not think that Bluck is right in arguing (op. cir. p. 294) that the lines in question

cannot be the diagonals because "diagonals, (~ta/AF,~QOt are mentioned for the first time at 85b4.'" There they only get their scientific label. 1.9 G.W. Leibniz, "Nouveaux Essais," in : Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften (ed. by Gerhardt) vol. V, p. 74.

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Ebert, Plato's Theory of Recollection. Meno 80a-86c

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