East Asian Economic

Cooperation and Integration: Japan’s Perspective

Takatoshi Ito

Discussion Paper No. 41

Takatoshi Ito

Professor, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology

The University of Tokyo

Discussion Paper Series APEC Study Center Columbia University

September 2005

East Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Japan’s Perspective

Takatoshi ITO1

The University of Tokyo

Presented in the AEA session on East Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration January 2004

1. Introduction Movements toward regional economic and monetary integration has been accelerating in East Asia. On the trade front, various FTAs have been proposed and negotiated. The Japan-Singapore “FTA plus” treaty has been completed and implemented. This is the first FTA for Japan. The Korean government has concluded a negotiation of its first FTA with Chile, to be ratified by the Parliament. In the area of financial cooperation, the Chiang Mai Initiative has solidified the grouping called ASEAN plus Three—Ten ASEAN countries and Japan, China, and Korea. The network of swap agreements has been built to complement IMF resources, should another crisis hits the region. Japan’s interest in regional financial cooperation has recently grown for four reasons. First, intra-regional trade and investment is increasing. The region has become a natural candidate for an economic area with common interest in trade deepening and in the exchange rate stabilization. Second, the experience of the Asian currency crisis that was highly contagious has shown that the Asia and Japan have been “on the same boat.” Their strong trade and financial linkages mean that one country’s financial difficulties affect others quite easily. Preventing a financial crisis in one country, if possible, is of others’ interest. Moreover, the less-than-perfect performance of IMF in managing various stages of the Asian currency crisis, 1997-98, has given an interest in building a regional framework that is substitutable or complement to IMF. Third, success in economic and currency integration in Europe shows that it is indeed possible for a region to unify the currency. Of course, there are many steps before monetary union. But, Europe clearly shows a model for a group of advanced and middle-income emerging market economies to integrate real economies and financial markets. Fourth, there is a fear factor. Asia may be left behind in rush toward

1 Professor, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, the University of Tokyo. Contact: ITOINTOKYO@aol.com

2

regionalism. The EU is poised to expand to the east and the NAFTA may be expanded to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Fragmented Asia may suffer in any trade negotiations or trade wars as each of the Asian economies may be dwarfed by the expanded Euro Area or the “dollarized” Americas. Once the worst of the currency crisis was over, a movement toward economic integration restarted. In May 2000, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), to build a network of swap agreements in the region to help the hard currency liquidity in need was agreed. The grouping for CMI is “ASEAN plus Three” countries, namely Japan, China, and Korea. The CMI has been negotiated and built up to a multilateral swap agreement among the ASEAN ten countries and a network of bilateral swap agreements between one of the Three and one of the advanced or middle-income ASEAN countries (original five). Economic integration and cooperation on the trade and investment front has become accelerated too. Japan has implemented its first FTA with Singapore, and started negotiations with Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, as well as Mexico. China has proposed a FTA with ASEAN, and has already implemented “early harvest” with ASEAN countries. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the reason that the regional cooperation has become so popular in the second half of the 1990s. The groupings and mandate of the existing regional forums are also summarized. Section 3 considers the four major topics of cooperative frameworks: FTA, CMI, Currency regime, and Asian bonds. Section 4 concludes the paper. 2. Rationale for Regional Financial Cooperation It had been proposed in several different forms that countries should cooperate each other in averting a financial crisis. The central banks typically have large foreign reserves, and they can pool them to lend to each other. Preventing a crisis in one country is of interest to neighbors, since a crisis tends to spread to neighboring countries with strong financial ties, directly and indirectly. The proposal of economic affiliation under the proposal of East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) was proposed in the early 1990s, but opposed by the United States and never materialized. The proposal of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), after the Thai devaluation, but before the Korean and Indonesian crisis, was opposed by the United States and China in 1997 and never materialized2. 2 The proposal of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) could have been a defining moment in the history of financial integration in Asia. Instead, it became a source of controversy

3

During the Asian crisis of 1997, several factors contributed to the growing sense of regionalism. First, the crisis spread to neighboring countries from Thailand quite quickly. Reasons for the “contagion” have been debated, but most economists agree on at least two factors: institutional investors’ decision to put Asian in one basket; and negative spillovers through a trade linkage. When a crisis occurs, it works as a “wake-up call” for institutional investors. They start looking for weak countries to look out for who’s-next. Investors start withdrawing funds from countries they think vulnerable and similar to the initial crisis country. This happened in the Mexican crisis as well as the Thailand crisis. Moreover, sometimes mutual funds are organized by geographical grouping. For example, when Thailand falls into a crisis, shareholders may want to cash out, so perceived by fund managers. Fund managers sell equities and bonds in the fund to fatten cash reserves. Therefore, securities and currencies in the fund will be sold and negative pressures on bonds, stocks, and currencies will result of the rest of the region. This is a contagion process through investors. Contagion can be caused by trade link. When Thailand goes into a serious crisis, demand for goods—some of them imports—will decrease. Those countries that export to Thailand will suffer from declined aggregate demand. This may be amplified as spillovers go into a spiral of aggregate declines. From these reasons, contagion occurred. The exchange rates of Asian currencies declined together from July 1997 to January 1998, although degree of correlation varies from one country to another. The sense of “we are on the same boat” was enhanced greatly. Contagion occurred in the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. Pressure was applied to Argentinean and Brazilian markets. However, contagion was stopped before it caused devaluation in other countries, thanks to IMF program to Argentina in March 1995. In the case of Asia, IMF policies were not effective in stopping a crisis. Some think that the IMF policies even aggravated the downturn of the economies in some countries. For the Thai crisis, the IMF arranged a “package” of US$17.2 billion, in which IMF contributed US$4, and Japan also US$4, with the rest came from the World Bank, ADB,

in the following three years, putting fetters on any regional effort toward financial cooperation. Although elements of the AMF proposal were quite sensible, the package was presented without coordination among Asian countries. It was quickly painted as a substitute for IMF, as a challenge to global institutions, and as an inward-looking framework for mutual “self-help” without tough economic reform.

4

and group of Asian countries. Countries like Korea, China, and others contributed US$1 billion dollars each. It was notable that the United States or any European countries contributed to IMF package. These developments contributed to a notion that Asian countries should help each other in preventing and managing crisis. The regional self-help is important. Japan provided financial assistance, that is, short-term and long-term loans through Japan Export-Import Bank, of its own under the new Miyazawa initiative from 1998. This alleviated some acute credit crunch due to banking crisis in the aftermath of the currency crisis. In 1999, the Euro was introduced. This was the last major step in the long history of European economic integration. This stimulated the interest in regional integration among Asian countries. As the EU has succeeded in deep integration, and the NAFTA seems to be expanded to an entire Americas (FTAA), the Asia seems to be hopelessly fragmented. The newly revived interest in regionalism in Asia has been fueled by defensive considerations. The failed attempt to launch WTO rounds in Seattle also put some pressure toward regional initiatives. Although a new round was launched two years later in Doha, now the regional FTAs are considered to be building bloc rather than a stumbling bloc. There are many forums and framework for financial cooperation in the region. The following table summarizes the functions and status of the major grouping in the region.

5

Ta

ble

1:

Reg

iona

l sur

veill

ance

For

a in

Asi

a

Gro

upin

g St

ruct

ure

Focu

ses

Man

date

Man

ila F

ram

ewor

k G

roup

(MFG

)

Est

ablis

hed

in 1

997

The

grou

p of

Fi

nanc

e an

d C

entra

l

bank

of

ficia

ls

from

14

m

embe

r

coun

tries

(A

ustra

lia,

Bru

nei

Dar

ussa

lam

, C

anad

a,

Chi

na,

Hon

g

Kon

g,

Indo

nesi

a,

Japa

n,

Kor

ea,

Mal

aysi

a,

New

Ze

alan

d,

the

Phili

ppin

es,

Sing

apor

e, T

haila

nd,

and

the

Uni

ted

Stat

es o

f A

mer

ica)

, an

d

seni

or r

epre

sent

ativ

es f

rom

IM

F, W

B,

AD

B, B

IS

mac

ro-e

cono

mic

po

licie

s of

cris

is-a

ffect

ed

econ

omie

s in

th

e

regi

on,

exch

ange

ra

te

deve

lopm

ents

and

thei

r im

plic

atio

ns f

or m

onet

ary

polic

ies

in t

he r

egio

n (6

th M

eetin

g in

Mar

ch 2

000)

stre

amin

g of

IM

F fa

cilit

ies,

stre

ngth

enin

g th

e in

tern

atio

nal

finan

cial

syst

em, i

nclu

ding

the

wor

k of

IMF,

G-2

0, F

SF (8

th M

eetin

g in

Mar

ch

2001

)

Fina

nce

and

Cen

tral B

ank

Dep

utie

s

Agr

eem

ent a

t the

mee

ting

in M

anila

In N

ov 1

997

as fo

llow

s

This

fram

ewor

k in

clud

es th

e fo

llow

ing

initi

ativ

es;

(a)

a m

echa

nism

fo

r re

gion

al

surv

eilla

nce

to

com

plem

ent

glob

al

surv

eilla

nce

by

IMF,

(b

) en

hanc

ed

econ

omic

an

d te

chni

cal

coop

erat

ion

parti

cula

rly i

n st

reng

then

ing

dom

estic

finan

cial

sy

stem

s an

d re

gula

tory

capa

citie

s, (c

) m

easu

res

to s

treng

then

the

IMF’

s ca

paci

ty

to

resp

ond

to

finan

cial

cr

isis

(d

) a

coop

erat

ive

finan

cing

ar

rang

emen

t th

at

wou

ld

supp

lem

ent I

MF

reso

urce

s

6

Gro

upin

g St

ruct

ure

Focu

ses

Man

date

APE

C (A

sia-

Paci

fic E

cono

mic

Co-

oper

atio

n)

Est

ablis

hed

in 1

989

Led

by

Hea

ds

of

Gov

ernm

ents

,

finan

ce

min

iste

rs

(initi

ally

Fo

reig

n

Affa

irs a

nd T

rade

Min

iste

rs)

of 2

1

coun

tries

(A

ustra

lia,

Bru

nei

Dar

ussa

lam

, C

anad

a,

Chi

le,

Chi

na,

Hon

g K

ong,

Ind

ones

ia, J

apan

, K

orea

,

Mal

aysi

a,

Mex

ico,

N

ew

Zeal

and,

Papu

a N

ew

Gui

nea,

Pe

ru,

the

Phili

ppin

es,

Rus

sia,

Si

ngap

ore,

Taiw

an, T

haila

nd, t

he U

nite

d St

ates

of

Am

eric

a, a

nd V

iet N

am)

Mac

roec

onom

ic i

ssue

s an

d ex

chan

ge

rate

iss

ues,

free

r an

d st

able

flo

ws

of

capi

tal,

priv

ate

sect

or p

artic

ipat

ion

in

infr

astru

ctur

e de

velo

pmen

t, an

d th

e

deve

lopm

ent

of f

inan

cial

and

cap

ital

mar

kets

Lead

ers’

Dec

lara

tion

in V

anco

uver

in

Nov

199

7 (T

his

is t

he f

irst

time

to

touc

h up

on th

e re

gion

al su

rvei

llanc

e)

…..s

trong

ly

endo

rse

the

fram

ewor

k

agre

ed t

o in

Man

ila a

s a

cons

truct

ive

step

to

en

hanc

e co

oper

atio

n to

prom

ote

finan

cial

sta

bilit

y: e

nhan

ced

regi

onal

su

rvei

llanc

e;

inte

nsifi

ed

econ

omic

and

tech

nica

l coo

pera

tion

to

impr

ove

dom

estic

fin

anci

al

syst

ems

and

regu

lato

ry c

apac

ities

…

Mem

oran

dum

to A

PEC

Lea

ders

in S

ep

1999

….M

inis

ters

rea

ffirm

ed t

he v

alue

of

peer

su

rvei

llanc

e w

ithin

A

PEC

econ

omie

s an

d th

e be

nefit

s to

be

deriv

ed

from

gr

eate

r co

-ope

rativ

e

effo

rts a

t th

e m

icro

lev

el, p

artic

ular

ly

in fi

nanc

ial a

nd c

apita

l mar

kets

7

Gro

upin

g St

ruct

ure

Focu

ses

Man

date

ASE

AN

(A

ssoc

iatio

n of

Sou

th E

ast

Asi

an N

atio

n)

Est

ablis

hed

in 1

967

ASE

AN

Sur

veill

ance

Pro

cess

Est

ablis

hed

in 1

998

The

asso

ciat

ion

of

10

mem

ber

coun

tries

(I

ndon

esia

, M

alay

sia,

th

e

Phili

ppin

es,

Sing

apor

e,

Thai

land

,

Bru

nei

Dar

ussa

lam

, V

ietn

am,

Laos

,

Mya

nmar

, Cam

bodi

a)

The

inst

itutio

nal

bodi

es

cons

ists

of

ASE

AN

Fi

nanc

e M

inis

ters

M

eetin

g

(AFM

M),

ASE

AN

Sel

ect

Com

mitt

ee

and

ASE

AN

Cen

tral B

ank

Foru

m

The

obje

ctiv

e ra

nge

from

fre

e tra

de to

envi

ronm

enta

l pr

otec

tion,

so

cial

,

cultu

ral a

nd sc

ient

ific

deve

lopm

ent

Mon

itorin

g an

d an

alyz

ing

mac

roec

onom

ic

situ

atio

n an

d

deve

lopm

ents

, an

d an

y ot

her

spec

ific

area

s in

clud

ing

stru

ctur

al a

nd s

ecto

ral

issu

es

Enha

ncin

g su

rvei

llanc

e w

ork,

rel

evan

t

sect

or a

nd i

nter

natio

nal

orga

niza

tions

with

in a

nd o

utsi

de A

SEA

N m

ay b

e

cons

ulte

d

Term

s of U

nder

stan

ding

in 1

998

1.ex

chan

ging

in

form

atio

n an

d

disc

ussi

ng

econ

omic

an

d fin

anci

al

deve

lopm

ent…

2.pr

ovid

ing

an e

arly

war

ning

sys

tem

and

peer

rev

iew

pro

cess

to

enha

nce

mac

roec

onom

ic s

tabi

lity

and

finan

cial

syst

em.

3.hi

ghlig

htin

g po

ssib

le p

olic

y op

tions

and

enco

urag

ing

early

un

ilate

ral

or

colle

ctiv

e ac

tions

to p

reve

nt a

cris

is…

4.m

onito

ring

and

disc

ussi

ng

glob

al

econ

omic

an

d fin

anci

al

deve

lopm

ents

…

8

Gro

upin

g St

ruct

ure

Focu

ses

Man

date

ASE

AN

(A

ssoc

iatio

n of

Sou

th E

ast

Asi

an N

atio

n) p

lus 3

Esta

blis

hed

in 2

000

(bas

ed o

n “J

oint

Sta

tem

ent

on E

ast

Asi

a C

oope

ratio

n”

issu

ed

by

the

ASE

AN

+3 L

eade

rs a

t th

eir

Info

rmal

Mee

ting

in 1

999)

Led

by F

inan

ce M

inis

ters

of

ASE

AN

,

Chi

na, J

apan

, and

Kor

ea

Enha

ncin

g po

licy

dial

ogue

s an

d

regi

onal

co

oper

atio

n ac

tiviti

es,

parti

cula

rly i

n th

e ar

eas

of r

egio

nal

self-

help

an

d su

ppor

t m

echa

nism

,

inte

rnat

iona

l fin

anci

al

refo

rm

and

shor

t-ter

m c

apita

l flo

ws m

onito

ring,

Exch

angi

ng

data

on

ca

pita

l flo

ws

bila

tera

lly

amon

g m

embe

r co

untri

es

on a

vol

unta

ry b

asis

The

join

t Min

iste

rial S

tate

men

t of

the

ASE

AN

+3 F

inan

ce M

inis

ters

Mee

ting

in C

hian

g M

ai in

May

200

0

…w

e ag

reed

to

stre

ngth

en o

ur p

olic

y

coop

erat

ion

activ

ities

in

, am

ong

othe

rs,

the

area

of

ca

pita

l flo

ws

mon

itorin

g,

self-

help

an

d su

ppor

t

mec

hani

sm a

nd i

nter

natio

nal f

inan

cial

refo

rms…

The

join

t Min

iste

rial S

tate

men

t of

the

ASE

AN

+3 F

inan

ce M

inis

ters

Mee

ting

in H

onol

ulu

in M

ay 2

001

…w

e ag

reed

to

up

date

th

e ca

pita

l

flow

s si

tuat

ion

in

each

m

embe

r

coun

try

and

to

exch

ange

da

ta

on

capi

tal

flow

s bi

late

rally

am

ong

mem

ber

coun

tries

on

a

volu

ntar

y

basi

s…

9

Gro

upin

g St

ruct

ure

Focu

ses

Man

date

EM

EA

P (th

e Ex

ectiv

es’M

eetin

g of

East

Asi

a an

d Pa

cific

Cen

tral B

anks

)

Esta

blis

hed

in 1

991

A c

oope

rativ

e or

gani

zatio

n of

cen

tral

bank

s an

d m

onet

ary

auth

oriti

es o

f 11

econ

omie

s:

Aus

tralia

, C

hina

, H

ong

Kon

g,

Indo

nesi

a,

Japa

n,

Kor

ea,

Mal

aysi

a,

New

Ze

alan

d,

the

Phili

ppin

es, S

inga

pore

, and

Tha

iland

Exch

angi

ng

the

info

rmat

ion

in

the

area

s of

ba

nkin

g su

perv

isio

n an

d

mon

etar

y po

licy,

fo

reig

n ex

chan

ge

polic

y an

d op

erat

iona

l iss

ues

(3W

G o

n

Paym

ent

and

Settl

emen

t Sy

stem

s,

Fina

ncia

l M

arke

ts,

Ban

king

Supe

rvis

ion)

Rep

ortin

g on

th

e R

egio

nal

Fore

ign

Exch

ange

M

arke

ts

Mon

itorin

g an

d

Exch

ange

Rat

e R

egim

es

Gov

eror

s’ un

anim

ous

agre

emen

ts

at

the

mee

ting

in Ju

ly 1

997

that

a

clos

er

coop

erat

ion

and

coor

dina

tion

amon

g EM

EAP

mem

bers

is n

eces

sary

and

impo

rtant

to e

nhan

ce

finan

cial

st

abili

ty

and

mar

ket

deve

lopm

ent i

n A

sia

Paci

fic re

gion

.

SEA

CE

N (

Sout

h Ea

st A

sian

Cen

tral

Ban

ks)

Esta

blis

hed

in 1

982

A o

rgan

izat

ion

of c

entra

l ban

ks o

f 11

Econ

omie

s:

Indo

nesi

a,

Kor

ea,

Mal

aysi

a, M

yanm

ar, M

ongo

lia, N

epal

,

the

Phili

ppin

es, S

inga

pore

, Sri

Lank

a,

Thai

land

, Tai

wan

Faci

litat

ing

co-o

pera

tion

in

rese

arch

stud

ies

and

train

ing

prog

ram

rel

atin

g

to th

e po

licy

and

oper

atio

nal a

spec

ts o

f

cent

ral b

anki

ng

The

obje

ctiv

es

of

The

SEA

CEN

Res

earc

h an

d Tr

aini

ng

Cen

tre

esta

blis

hed

as a

lega

l ent

ity

to p

rom

ote

a be

tter

unde

rsta

ndin

g of

the

finan

cial

, m

onet

ary,

ban

king

and

econ

omic

dev

elop

men

t mat

ters

…

SEA

NZ

A

(Sou

th

East

A

sia,

N

ew

Zeal

and,

Aus

tralia

)

Esta

blis

hed

in 1

956

A r

egio

nal

polic

y fo

rum

of

cen

tral

bank

go

vern

ors

from

B

ritis

h

Com

mon

wea

lth

coun

tries

in

A

sia

Paci

fic re

gion

Prov

idin

g tra

inin

g co

urse

for

cen

tral

Ban

k st

affs

an

d fo

rum

of

B

anki

ng

Supe

rvis

ors

in

orde

r to

ex

chan

ge

info

rmat

ion

on is

sues

and

pro

blem

s of

com

mon

inte

rest

.

The

obje

ctiv

e of

The

SEA

NZA

For

um

of B

anki

ng S

uper

viso

rs e

stab

lishe

d as

an o

ffsho

ot

to

prov

ide

a m

eans

fo

r ba

nkin

g

supe

rvis

ors

from

th

e re

gion

to

esta

blis

h co

ntac

t with

eac

h ot

her…

10

Gro

upin

g St

ruct

ure

Focu

ses

Man

date

BIS

Asi

an C

onsu

ltativ

e C

ounc

il

Esta

blis

hed

2001

The

coun

cil

with

in B

IS,

com

pris

ing

the

Gov

erno

rs

of

the

BIS

m

embe

r

Cen

tral

Ban

ks

in

the

Asi

a/Pa

cific

regi

on

(The

sec

reta

riat

are

prov

ided

by

the

BIS

Rep

rese

ntat

ive

Offi

ce fo

r Asi

a an

d

the

Paci

fic in

Hon

g K

ong.

)

Prov

idin

g a

vehi

cle

for c

omm

unic

atio

n

betw

een

the

Asi

an

and

Paci

fic

mem

bers

of t

he B

IS a

nd th

e B

oard

and

Man

agem

ent o

n m

atte

rs o

f int

eres

t and

conc

ern

to t

he A

sian

cen

tral

bank

ing

com

mun

ity

IOSC

O

Asi

a Pa

cific

R

egio

nal

Com

mitt

ee (I

OSC

O A

PRC

)

(IO

SCO

: Int

erna

tiona

l Org

aniz

atio

n of

Secu

ritie

s C

omm

issi

ons,

Esta

blis

hed

1976

)

One

of

the

four

Reg

iona

l co

mm

ittee

s

of IO

SCO

(a

wor

ld-w

ide

foru

m

for

secu

ritie

s re

gula

tors

) co

nsis

ts

of

Aus

tralia

, B

angl

ades

h,

Chi

na,

Hon

g

Kon

g, I

ndia

, Ind

ones

ia, J

apan

, Kor

ea,

Kyr

gyz

Rep

ublic

, N

ew

Zeal

and,

Paki

stan

, Pa

pua

New

G

uine

a,

the

Phili

ppin

es,

Sing

apor

e,

Sri

Lank

a,

Taiw

an,

Thai

land

, V

iet

Num

an

d

Mal

aysi

a (2

002)

Reg

iona

l co

-ope

ratio

n in

th

e

regu

latio

n of

th

e ca

pita

l m

arke

ts,

parti

cula

rly

focu

sing

on

th

e

enha

ncem

ent

of c

o-op

erat

ion,

mut

ual

assi

stan

ce a

nd i

nfor

mat

ion-

shar

ing

in

the

enfo

rcem

ent

of i

llega

l se

curit

ies

activ

ities

.

Form

ulat

ing

a re

gion

al a

ppro

ach

in

com

batin

g th

ese

illeg

al

oper

atio

ns,

whi

ch h

ave

affe

cted

inv

esto

rs i

n th

e

regi

on

APR

C

will

co

nsid

er

its

regi

onal

mul

tilat

eral

M

emor

andu

m

of

Und

erst

andi

ng,

aim

ed

at

enha

ncin

g

info

rmat

ion

shar

ing

as

wel

l as

cros

s-bo

rder

co-

oper

atio

n an

d m

ultip

le

juris

dict

ion

surv

eilla

nce

and

enfo

rcem

ent

func

tions

. (2

002)

(IO

SCO

est

ablis

hed

a Sp

ecia

l Pr

ojec

t

Team

on

co

-ope

ratio

n,

whi

ch

is

deve

lopi

ng

an

IOSC

O-w

ide

mul

tilat

eral

MO

U)

Not

es: A

utho

r’s su

mm

ary

11

3. Further Integration in Four Fronts 3.1. FTA Traditionally, Japan had maintained a strong commitment for multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT/WTO (World Trade Organization) regime, and hesitated to join any regional trading or political arrangement, such as EAEC. In the 1990s, formation of the NAFTA and EU have change the view of the Japanese politicians and bureaucrats. The disadvantage of being left out from major regional groupings have become obvious toward the end of the 1990s.3 Moreover, the financial crisis in the East Asia had made it clear that there exists a regional interest to form a common trade and financial strategies. However, it has been difficult to organize any trade grouping in Asia, for historical and political reasons. The APEC has been the first to publish the target of free trade as the Bogol goal. However, it did not have any enforceable agreement or political leadership. Common interests among the diverse APEC members are difficult to find. The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, AFTA, has also pushing free trade among ten members. Sometime in 2000-2001, Japan’s trade policy has shifted from hesitation to promotion of regional arrangements. On the financial side, the Chiang Mai Initiative was agreed among the ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN+3), and this grouping has quickly become a preferred grouping for the regional integration. Considering the importance of the East Asian countries as markets of the made-in-Japan products and also as a production base for Japanese multinational companies,4 Japan has good reasons to assist and cooperate with the regional economy. Since Japan has lowered the tariffs of most of the products under the past GATT rounds, the average tariff rate of Japan is quite low. Major restraints on Japan’s imports, both in the form of quota or tariffs, remain only in the agricultural sectors. Although most of the agricultural products are freely imported—and the ratio of “domestically produced calorie” is lowest—but the remaining products have strong political backing for protection. Japan’s first FTA was negotiated with Singapore. Japan negotiated a FTA-plus agreement—Japan Singapore Economic Partnership Agreeement (JSEPA)—with

3 In response to the stagnation in the domestic consumption, Japan gradually increased export dependency in the 1990s, mainly through East Asian market. The share of Japan’s export to East Asia was 29.8% in 1990, but it went up to 40.4% in 2000. 4 According to METI’s survey, the profit rate of Japanese subsidiaries in Asia has doubled that in the U.S, exceeding 17.2% in amount (about 1 trillion Yen) in 2001. However, it was seriously changed by the crisis from 1998-99.

12

Singapore in 2001 and the treaty took effects in 2002. Since Singapore has little productions in the agricultural sector, it was thought to be easy for Japan to conclude the treaty. Since the average rate of tariffs of Singapore has been very low, the main point of the treaty was The main point of the JSEPA was to expand the cooperative arrangements beyond traditional trade area into services and movement of people. Although the expansion was limited, the JSEPA removed any doubt on the will of Japan to pursue regional arrangment. Korea has been always the first priority country of FTA for Japan, for the geographical proximity and strong trade relationship. However, for various reasons, the negotiation did not start. Korea maintained tariff and nontariff barriers to Japanese goods until the currency crisis and its resolution. The opening of the Korean markets to Japanese goods (especially autos) and culture has been proceeding slowly in the last five years. Korea has been reluctant to go for a regional arrangement in the past. But, Korea also negotiated an FTA with Chile. Japan and Korea agreed to start negotiation in December 2003. China has become very enthusiastic to ASEAN plus Three process, both in the trade and financial fronts. China has proposed an FTA with ASEAN and agreed to conclude negotiation by 2010. The so-called early harvest in liberalizing agricultural imports to China was implemented in 2003. Japanese businesses have complained bitterly about the discrimination that they suffer in Mexico. Since Mexico is a member of NAFTA and also has a bilateral FTA with EU, the US and European manufacturing subsidiaries in Mexico enjoys free imports of parts from parent companies. Also, US and European companies can export finished goods to Mexico without tariffs. Japanese companies are subject to high tariffs. The Japanese business pushed the government to negotiate an FTA with Mexico. The negotiation came close to a conclusion when President Fox came to Japan in December 2003. However, pork and orange juice became the last stumbling block, and the negotiation broke down. This shows how strong the agricultural lobby in Japan. In terms of population, agriculture has only 5%, but it has a power to stop FTAs. Japanese approach to ASEAN in the area of FTA has been influenced by the overture of China to ASEAN. Since ASEAN has been a primary area for Japanese corporations to invest in the last two decades, the economic integration with ASEAN is important for Japan. Goods and parts moving freely around the ASEAN countries and between Japan and ASEAN is important for Japan. On the one hand, Japan proposed an FTA with ASEAN countries, one year behind the Chinese schedule. On the other

13

hand, Japan is pursuing negotiations of bilateral FTAs with Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. After the breakdown of the Japan-Mexico FTA negotiation, Japan’s prospects of FTA with Asian countries are not so good. Tabel 2: Timeline of the Japanese FTA

? ? ? Asean+3 2012? 2005? ? Asean

2005? 2002:12- Concluded Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia

2004? 2002:12-Concluded Korea

Soon? 2002:11-Concluded Mexico 2002:1 Concluded,

2001 Concluded Singapore

Signed NegotiationStudy

14

3.2. CMI

The right form of financial regional architecture has been a focus of discussion ever since the Asian currency crisis started in July 1997. The idea of complementing the IMF was dubbed as the Asian Monetary Fund. At the time of the Mexican and Thailand crisis, the IMF lending to a crisis country was limited to the amount of five times of the quota of the country—this is called an access limit. The access limit made it necessary to form a “IMF package” with a regional power—the United States in the case of the Mexican crisis and Japan in the case of the Asian crisis. The Asian Monetary Fund did not materialize when it was opposed by the IMF, the United States, and China in September 1997. The problem of access limit was partially eased at the level of the IMF decision making, by the introduction of the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), that was used for Korea in December 1997. The global discussion also took a direction of emphasizing the role of creditors—the discussion is called private sector involvement (PSI)—rather than lending ever large amount to a crisis country. (See Ito (2003a).)

In May 2000, Japan took another leadership in forming ASEAN plus Three group to start negotiating foreign exchange swap agreements—the Chiang Mai Initiative. This aims at the cooperation among the 13 countries, with a network of arrangements for sudden foreign currency needs. The ASEAN countries had had a multilateral swap agreement among themselves. The size was expanded by five-fold, and became a 1 billion dollar facility. Japan started to negotiate a swap agreement with four middle income countries—Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia—in the ASEAN, and concluded by March 2003. China and Korea, respectively, negotiated with these five countries. Japan and Singapore also concluded a swap agreement in 2003. Bilaterals among the three, namely Japan-China, China-Korea, and Japan-Korea, have been concluded, too. See Table 1 for details.5 Negotiations to complete the matrix is under way.6

5 This is the sum of all BSAs, including the amount that Japan committed under the New Miyazawa Initiative—a total of US$7.5 billion, or US$5 billion with South Korea and US$2.5 billion with Malaysia—, except that two-way BSAs are doubled for calculation purposes. Excluding the amount committed under the New Miyazawa Initiative, the total sum is US$31.5 billion. 6 While Indonesia has proposed BSAs with China and South Korea, actual negotiations have yet to begin.

15

Table 3. Progress on swap arrangement under the Chiang Mai Initiative (as of end-March 2003)

BSAs Currencies Conclusion Dates

Size

Japan-South Korea USD-Won July 4, 2001 US$ 7 billiona

(1-way) Japan-Thailand USD-Baht July 30, 2001 US$ 3 billion (1-way)Japan-Philippines USD-Peso August 27, 2001 US$ 3 billion (1-way)Japan-Malaysia USD-Ringgit October 5, 2001 US$ 3.5 billionb

(1-way) China-Thailand USD-Baht December 6,

2001 US$ 2 billion (1-way)

Japan-China Yen-Renminbi March 28, 2002 US$ 3 billionc

(2-way) China-South Korea Renminbi-Won June 24, 2002 US$ 2 billionc

(2-way) South Korea-Thailand USD-Won or

USD-Baht June 25, 2002 US$ 1 billion (2-way)

South Korea-Malaysia

Won-Ringgit July 26, 2002 US$ 1 billionc

(2-way)

South Korea-Philippines

Won-Peso August 9, 2002 US$ 1 billionc

(2-way)

China-Malaysia USD-Ringgit October 9, 2002 US$ 1.5 billion (1-way)

Japan-Indonesia USD-Rupiah February 17, 2003

US$ 1.5 billion (1-way)

Japan-Singapore Concluded in 2003 China-Philippines Under negotiation China-Indonesia Under negotiation South Korea-Indonesia

Under negotiation

Notes: (a) The amount includes US$5 billion committed under the New Miyazawa Initiative.

(b) The amount includes US$2.5 billion committed under the New Miyazawa Initiative.

(c) The amounts are US dollar equivalents. According to the general agreement of the Chiang Mai Initiative, a country can borrow

16

hard currency collateralized by domestic currencies with government guarantees. The swap will be extended up to 90 days and, renewable up to seven times, is aimed at an arrangement. The interest rate is equivalent to the LIBOR plus 150 basis points for the first drawing and first renewal. The premium of 50 basis points will be added every two renewals, subject to a maximum of 300 basis points. Up to 10 percent of bilateral support can be released immediately, but the rest is subject to a condition that a country will obtain an IMF program. In this sense, the CMI is complementing the IMF. The linkage to IMF is necessary given that CMI itself does not have a secretariat or an independent surveillance function to prevent a moral hazard problem. The CMI will be reviewed in May 2004. 3.3. Currency Regime7 One of the lessons from the Asian Currency Crises is the danger of the de facto dollar peg adopted by the Asian economies that had extensive trade and investment relationship with countries other than the United States.i When the yen appreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar, the Asian economies enjoyed the boom, or a bubble in some cases, due to increased exports. But, when the yen depreciated, the Asian economies tended to experience a recession, or a burst bubble. The experience of the Asian boom and bust in the 1990s, along with the yen-dollar exchange rate fluctuation, is a stark reminder of risk of the fixed exchange rate regime.

An obvious solution for this problem is to increase flexibility of the exchange rate. If the baht had appreciated during the yen appreciation phase of the 1993-95, the extent of overheating in Thailand might have been limited; and if the baht had depreciated along with the yen in 1996-97, then the decline in exports could have been mitigated. This kind of exchange rate flexibility can be achieved by a flexible exchange rate regime which keeps the real effective exchange rate relatively stable. An insight here is that an emerging market economy, which exports to the United States and Japan, is well advised to consider managed exchange rate regimes, in order to avoid excessive volatility of the real effective exchange rate. The questions to be considered include how to determine a reference rate as an appropriate real effective exchange rate and how much fluctuation is excessive.

The optimality of the exchange rate regime is defined as the one that minimizes the fluctuation of the trade balances, ii when the yen-dollar exchange rate fluctuates. Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998) proposed how to calculate the optimal weights when the

7 This section draws on Ogawa and Ito (2002).

17

emerging market economy exports to Japan and the United States only. The optimal weights were calibrated with some assumptions on the demand elasticities and export shares. Ogawa and Ito (2002) extend the Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki model to include a neighboring emerging market as well as Japan and the United States. A typical Asian economy exports about one-third to the United States and one-third to Japan, and the rest to countries in the Asian region (and EU). Therefore, to simplify, we consider the case that country A (B, respectively) exports to the United States, Japan, and country B (A, respectively). Therefore, the real effective exchange rate calculation includes the currency of neighboring country.

Ogawa and Ito (2002) considers how the optimal weights may depend on what the neighboring country is adopting as weights. In the extreme case, if country A is adopting the dollar peg, country B should adopt the dollar peg; and if country B is adopting the dollar peg, then country A should adopt the dollar peg. Namely, the dollar peg is a Nash equilibrium. However, if country A is using a currency basket which mirrors the export shares, adjusted for demand elasticities, then country B should adopt a (similar) currency basket; and if country B is using a currency basket, then country A should adopt a currency basket. This trade-weighted currency basket is also a Nash equilibrium. Although the paper is motivated by the recent Asian experiences, the application is not limited to Asia. Results obtained in this paper are relevant to any developing countries with a trading structure with export destinations including different currency areas. Which of the Nash equilibria is chosen depends on the inertia as well as rational calculation. If countries can coordinate, then they should choose the best among Nash equilibria. This process of choosing the optimal Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a regional currency arrangement. Coordination failure could occur if a country has some obstacles for coordination from political or social obstacles against breaking inertia. What this paper shows is that coordinate managed float by the two countries would increase the stability in the trade balance fluctuations. 3.4. Asian Bonds8 Three of the many lessons from the currency crisis have been discussed much but not used to make changes in the real world yet. First, it was found important to reduce vulnerability is to avoid the “double mismatch” problem, namely currency and maturity

8 This section is drawn from Ito (2003b).

18

mismatches of borrowers in emerging market companies. Borrow short in the US dollar and lend long in the local currency is dangerous. Second, to avoid over-reliance on the banking sector is important, since the “twin crisis”, that is, a simultaneous currency and banking crisis, is quite damaging to the economy. Third, to avoid the dollar peg is important both from the viewpoint of maintaining price competitiveness of imports and of discouraging too much short-term capital inflows. In order to reduce reliance on the banking system, to promote bond financing is important. If the government and corporations can issue bonds for long-term projects, then they can reduce borrowing from banks. Banks also benefit from avoiding maturity mismatch. One of the problem is that the bond market in an emerging market countries in Asia has not been developed in terms of the market institutions. The bond market in emerging market may benefit from broadening the market to the region, since inviting foreign investors will deepen the market. However, in order to lure investors into the bond market, transparency may have to be enhanced. Therefore, it is desirable to establish a region-wide bond market. Asian bonds have been proposed, most prominently in several speeches by Prime Minister Thaksin of Thailand. The Asian bond has become a focal point for regional financial cooperation after the Chiang Mai Initiative. Below, I will review what has been done and propose a particular form of Asian bonds. Asian bonds are bonds issued by Asian institutions (government, corporations, and financial institutions), denominated in an Asian currency, and sold, traded, and settled in an Asian financial center (Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong). Investors are expected to be mainly regional (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, in particular), but others are welcome. In order to solve the double mismatch problem, it is essential that Asian bonds are issued in a local currency, or a basket of local currencies. By issuing bonds in local currency, the governments or corporations will be freed from possible problem of acute dollar liquidity shortage, unless maturities are bunched in particular months. Major trading center should be regional so that settlement and clearance should be done in real time. Delivery vs. Payment (DvP) can be done if regional central banks extend real time gross settlement facility to financial centers and settlement and clearance facility is developed in regional financial centers. Investors are known to have “home bias”, that is, investors’ portfolio is heavily biased toward domestic securities. Many possible reasons, including avoiding currency risk, familiarity, etc, have been presented. There may be “regional bias” in that investors may be attracted toward securities issued by countries in the region, second to

19

domestic securities. The currencies in the region are more correlated than other currencies, and familiarity of regional companies and currencies are high. That is the reason to think that major investors into Asian bonds are Asian investors. The central banks in the region (EMEAP)9 have announced that they will contribute US$1 billion to the Asian Bond Fund (ABF), managed by the BIS, in order to invest in dollar-denominated bonds issued by Asian issuers, namely Yankee bonds.10 The central banks will set aside a certain portion of their foreign reserves (estimated to be more than 1 trillion US dollars) to invest in ABF. Eligible securities are those issued by governments and quasi-governments. This is a good step toward an eventual development of the Asian Bond market. However, this proposal does not fit perfectly in what was envisioned as Asian bonds. First, the use of the U.S. dollar, presumed in the current version of ABF, does not contribute to the financial and monetary stability of the region. Second, under the current version of ABF, the monetary authorities buy and hold the Asian bond fund as foreign exchanges, so the secondary market of Asian bonds would not develop. Third, the ABF is contributed from central banks, but foreign reserves are strictly regulated on their eligible securities. Due to the regulation, the market size of bonds that can be invested by the ABF will be limited. It has been proposed that the fiscal authorities of Japan, Korea, and Thailand, and any other willing Asian countries, should jointly establish the Asian Bond Corporation (ABC) in offshore market (Tokyo, Hong Kong, or Singapore). The ABC will purchase sovereign bonds (later, corporate bonds and asset backed securities) of the participating countries, issued in the respective local market and denominated in the yen, won, and baht. The ABC’s asset side is composed of a basket of bonds in different currency denominations and different coupon rates. The ABC bond, on the liability side of the ABC, is backed by the market value of the bonds on the asset side. Hence, pricing of ABC bonds in the secondary market should reflect the value of the underlying assets. For example, we recommend that the ABC initially purchase Japanese, Korean, and Thai government bonds with value-weights of 50-30-20, respectively. Then the pricing of ABC bond reflects both the exchange rate fluctuations of the yen, won, and baht, as well as the interest rate movements in the three countries. With respect to currency risk, the ABC bonds show a feature of a basket currency, namely a weighted

9 EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks) members consist of central banks of Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 10 See http://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/03/un0306a.htm for the announcement.

20

average of the three currencies. The coupon interest rate of the ABC bond will be a weighted average of the underlying bonds. It is likely that many investors find ABC bonds attractive. Investors have to take some currency and credit risk to receive some extra returns. But risks have to be transparent, fair, and diversified. (The Japanese investors currently receive only 0.8% yield from holding Japanese bonds, but some of them are eager to purchase Australian-dollar-denominated bonds yielding 5%, reflecting currency and credit risk. They may be attracted to an ABC bond yielding 3%, with lower currency risk.) The role of ABC is to bundle bonds from diversified sources, so that a reasonable tradeoff point in the risk-return curve will be offered in a transparent manner. The regional investors who pursue higher returns without increasing too much of risk will regard bonds issued by the ABC as just such financial instruments. If credit risk of participating bonds makes ABC bonds unattractive to risk-averse bond investors in the region, the partial guarantee may be offered by a credit enhancement agency. When corporate bonds and asset backed securities (ABS) are bundled into a ABC corporate bond, credit enhancement or separating into senior bonds and junior bonds may help widen the customer base. If currency risk, even as a weighted average, is not desirable for some home-biased investors, swap into local currencies may be offered by the ABC, or its foreign exchange swap partners. The ABC sovereign bonds will not assume any major risk, because the value and coupon payments of assets and liability matches all the time. It should behave like a currency board or a mutual fund. The ABC helps create the Asian bond secondary market. The ABC encourages the issues of bonds in the region. The ABC sovereign bond should give the benchmark for the ABC corporate bonds and ABC-ABS bonds. In comparison to the ABF proposal, the ABC proposal has several advantages. The ABC promotes local currency bond issues, while the ABF in the current version invests in the dollar-denominated bonds only. The ABC will bundle them as a basket currency bond for investors. My proposal of the ABC bonds promotes the secondary market by issuing the ABC bonds, while ABF does not. In the sense the central banks in the ABF are a buyer-investor, while the ABC is an issuer as well as a buyer. In this sense, the two proposals are quite complementary, while the ABC is based on market participants and principles. The ABC has no limit in what kind of securities to invest in, while the ABF is limited to sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds. If another crisis comes, then the foreign reserves may have to be sold to help stabilize the currency, then the monetary policy has to sell Asian bonds, aggravating the crisis by depressing the bond market. This kind of procyclicality is something to be avoided in institutional

21

design. The ABC proposal does not have such a deficiency. 4. Future Directions and Challenges Further deepening in trade and financial cooperation is expected in the East Asian region. Unresolved questions and tentative answers are as follows: (1) Grouping. An appropriate grouping for economic integration is still unclear,

although China and Japan seem to be comfortable with the ASEAN plus Three grouping. China will object to have Taiwan as an independent member. Some ASEAN countries may object to include Australia and New Zealand, although bilateral FTAs may be extended to them.

(2) Regional or bilateral FTA. AFTA is moving slowly toward an free trade area. China is pursuing a regional FTA with ASEAN. Japan has both a regional FTA initiative and a network of bilateral FTAs. In the end, ASEAN plus Three FTAs will become a target, but there seem to be a movement that bilateral FTAs are faster and will become building blocks for the future. FTAs in East Asia is not obstructing the WTO process. It would be at least as clean as NAFTA or EU.

(3) Financial Cooperation Beyond CMI. The network of CMI will be almost complete among the northeast Three and the original ASEAN five. The challenge here is what is next. Whether financial cooperation in the region should move toward an arrangement more independent from the IMF and any other global institutions is an interesting question. Asian Bond initiative is clearly a right path toward an environment that is less affected by external and internal shocks.

(4) Exchange Rate Regime. When the region (say, ASEAN plus Three) become deeply integrated, a strong incentive will emerge to pursue stability among the exchange rates in the region. Most likely, the basket currency will be formed to give an anchor to the regional currencies. Currencies in the region will limit volatility inside the basket but float together against outside currencies, just like a snake or ECU arrangements in Europe in the 1980s. Whether the yen will be inside the basket or outside the basket will be an interesting question, both from political and economic points of view.

The progress toward true economic integration has just begun, and many important decisions have to be made in the next several years before the level of economic integration becomes deep enough to talk about the exchange rate stability among the member countries. However, the path that European countries have traveled is well recognized by Asian countries, and there seems to be a political movement toward them

22

as well as economic rationale.

(END)

23

References: Ito, Takatoshi (2003a) “Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from East Asia and Latin America” Japan Economic Review, (forthcoming). Ito, Takatoshi (2003b). “Promoting Asian Basket Currency (ABC) Bonds” in T. Ito and Y.C. Park (eds.) PECC Study on Asian Bonds. (forthcoming). Ito, Takatoshi; Ogawa, Eiji; and Sasaki, Yuri Nagataki, (1998). “How did the dollar peg fail in Asia?”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 12, no. 4, December 1998: 256-304. Ogawa, Eiji and Ito, Takatoshi (2002). “On the desirability of a Regional Basket Currency Arrangement” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 16, September, 2002: 317-334.