EAPPRE implementation issues: Airport Operator‘s role … Meetings Seminars and Workshop… ·...

© Flughafen Zürich AG| |Zurich Airport |

EAPPRE implementation issues: Airport Operator‘s role in Preventing Runway Excursions (session 6)

Marc KeuschSafety Office

7.11.2013

© Flughafen Zürich AG| | EUR/NAT Regional Runway Safety Seminar, Istanbul2

Agenda

• definition of a runway excursion• Zurich Airport operational concepts• Runway Excursion risk factors at ZRH Airport

- runway length, RESA- tailwind as a contributing factor

• current/future mitigation strategies• summary

7.11.2013


Runway Safety

Runway Excursions

Runway Confusion

Runway Incursions

"A Runway Incursion is:

Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.“

What about Runway Excursion?

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Runway Excursion• Any occurrence at an aerodrome of an aircraft leaving the surface

designated for landing or take off at an incorrect or unauthorised position

• Veer off• Overrun• Non designated taxiway turn off• Touchdown before threshold

• Most common type of accident in commercial aviation (26% of all accidents)

• Landing:→ most common• Take off:→ more likely to be fatal

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© Flughafen Zürich AG| |

Data analysis worldwide

EUR/NAT Regional Runway Safety Seminar, Istanbul5

NLR – ATSI worldwide database 1980 – 2008:1,732 Runway Excursions – more than one every week

Take-Off excursion rate has decreased over timeLanding excursion more common and INCREASING

Since 1995: 374 Runway Excursions w 290 fatalities

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What do we know about?


• Runway Excursion rates have changed little in 30 years• Eurocontrol has released a European Action Plan –

similar to EAPPRI but for Runway Excursions (EAPPRE 1.0)• Principal causes are all pilot induced errors (last safety barrier:

unsafe act)• Runway contamination/condition features highly→ International harmonisation on runway condition and braking action

is required• RESA is a post accident severity mitigation

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Causal Factors (“unsafe act“)


• Take-Off rejected after V1• Pilot loss of control• Unstable approach• Long touchdown• Tyre failure• Nosewheel steering failure• Wet / contaminated runway• Crosswind / gusts• Incorrect take-off mass

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Airport Risk Factors (latent failure):Aerodrome Operator


• Runway construction – surface drainage & friction• Runway maintenance – friction level• Runway resurfacing – friction levels• Use of Noise Preferential runway selection• Contaminated RWY – accurate measuring & reports• Training & competence of Ops personnel - reporting• Operating with reduced declared distances• Clarity of runway markings and lights• Wildlife management – potential for RTO• Intersection departures – distance information

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Airport Risk Factors (latent failure): Aerodrome / ANSP


• ILS provision over non-precision aids• Use of Noise Preferential runway selection (tailwind)• Change of runway implifies rate decrease and delay• Weather conditions and timely reporting• Airspace design to allow safe descent profile• Correct maintenance of Landing Aids• Vectoring to comply with ICAO Doc 4444• glide slope to be intercepted from beneath• Unstabilized approach due to high tailwind at 1000ft, 2000ft…

→ for Zurich Airport “use of noise preferential runway selection” and the RESA non compliance of the ICAO-Recommendation are the most critical issues

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EAPPRE/I implementation issues

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Situation LSZH (cont)

EUR/NAT Regional Runway Safety Seminar, Istanbul11 7.11.2013


Optimization RWY 28 (quantitative approach)


• Use Runway 28 more frequently in the future• Assess the associated risks with landings on runway 28• Show the difference between ICAO Compliances / Non Compliances

(Study took place from 2008 – 2010)

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Optimization RWY 28: Hazard Scenarios

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Overall Risk Summary

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Present situation ICAO Compliance

Risk

per

app

roac

h

OverrunRunway crossing collision Lateral veer-offGo-around after the OCHUndershootApproach (visual segment)Approach (instrument segment)

2 x 10-7

6 x 10-7

7 x 10-7

5 x 10-7

4 x 10-7

3 x 10-7

10-7

TOP 2 riskTOP 1 risk

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Optimization RWY 28: risk evaluation Overrun


• Risk with installed arrestor bed (EMAS) = risk with RESA recommendation• Risk reduction by 50% (landings), risk reduction by 35% (departures)• Investment of USD 15 Mio. / maintenance cost: 10’000.- USD/year

per landing per departure

Today (RESA standard) 4.90*10-8 7.70*10-8

RESA recommendation 3.20*10-8 5.90*10-8

EMAS 3.20*10-8 5.90*10-8

Extension of runway 28 andRESA recommendation 2.50*10-8 5.00*10-8

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EMAS: installation of an arrestor bed



Tailwind Study 2011- 2013

Scope:assess the significance of (known) main contributing factors (tailwind) for runway excursions against the operational and environmental context of Zurich Airport.factors:• Landing performance of operations at Zurich Airport• Approach and Departure procedures• Ambient conditions and reportings• Runway Surface condition and runway condition reporting• Airport / ANS infrastructure• runway selection• political issues

(study has covered runway excursion risks for both landing and take/off phases)



Zurich Airport operational concepts


Main issues in Zurich are:- Use of Noise Preferential runway selection- Operational interruptions due to change of runways

In many situations in Zurich landings take place according operatinghours, not according met conditions...

The limiting factors for changingthe runway are 2 – 3 go arounds...

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RWY Concepts

Early morning RWY Concept:

LDG: RWY34

TKOF: RWY32

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RWY Concepts

Normal RWY Concept during the day:

LDG: RWY14

TKOF: RWY28, RWY16

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RWY Concepts

Evening RWY Concept:

LDG: RWY28

TKOF: RWY32

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Zurich Database with regards to Runway Excursions

• 18 incidents of runway excursions since 1965• in most cases no injuries/light injuries• in 60% of all incidents no damage or only slight damage (aircraft/infrastructure)• in 44% of all runway excursions the runway was dry• in 2 cases there was a prevailing tailwind (6kts and 14kts)• in 44% involvement of BA/GA• external airlines: causal factor crew error is more common• homebase airlines: technical problem or birdstrike lead to a runway excursion• technical faults: nose-wheel steering / engine failure• veer off: 50%; overrun: 39%; undershoot incidents: 11%



Prel. Risk Assessment (qualitative approach)

• FOCA (Swiss CAA) started preliminary Risk Assessment in 2008• main focus was on tailwind landings at Zurich Airport• Operating in tailwind conditions has adverse effects on aircraft performance

and handling qualities in the critical phase of approach and landing• Different inputs from the industry as well as FOCA internal meetings

indicated the existence of a latent tailwind hazard for approaching aircrafts in LSZH

We knew from our own analysis that the risk of a runway excursion, especially on the westerly runway 28 is existentThe question remains how big this risk is and whether or not the airport can live with this existing risk



ICAO recommendation


“It appears according to several inputs from the industry that an exceptionally high numbers of landings are conducted at Zurich airport with tailwind components that exceeds values recommended by a/c manufacturers or ICAO respectively”:

See also: ICAO Annex 11, DOC 4444, ATM Manual Switzerland

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Tailwind Study (tailwind landings)


• The data received from several companies within Switzerland and the European Union confirmed the concerns on that particular topic

• Statistical data from Zurich showed that about 96’000 approaches were flown to runway 14 during the period 2005/2006 – per year

• According to the data received, 14% of the landing on RWY 14 were done with a tailwind exceeding ICAO recommendations (5kts). This gave an average of 37 landings per day LSZH

-10kts +10kts7.11.2013


Tailwind Study (tailwind landings)


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

%

Jan Feb Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug Sep Okt Nov Dez

Tailwind 14

> 5 Kt0-5 Kt

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

%

Jan Feb Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug Sep Okt Nov Dez

Tailwind 28

> 5 Kt0-5 Kt

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Tailwind Study (causal factors for go arounds)


GA - Causal Factors, RWY 14

18.0%

15.8%

12.6%

9.3%

7.1%

6.6%

5.5%

7.7%

5.5%

8.2%

2.7%

1.1%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 18.0% 20.0%

too high/fast/close

WX, visibility

RWY blocked

Technical defect

not stabilized/established

Wind

Tailw ind

WS

Unknow n

Miscellaneous

No clearance

w ake turbulences

19.7%

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Tailwind Study (main wind direction)



Tailwind Study (location of wind sensor equipment)


Wind:RWY 14/16RWY 34RWY 28OberglattBuelhof

Due to topographicalspecialities it is difficult tomeasure adequate winds

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Tailwind study (outcome)


Topic Procedure Poss. Deliverable Who When

Tactical approach runway Review ofprocedures

adapted procedures (ifnecessary)

Skyguide, FOCA

Information Flight Crews Review ofprocedures/contents

adapted contents (ifnecessary) Skyguide

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Mitigation strategies (Airport Infrastructure)


Topic Procedure Deliverables Who When

Runway Contamination (Reporting)

Review ofprocedures

adapted procedures(unreliable, AMDT. 11) FZAG, Swiss OCT 2013

ILS Slopes >3 Degrees Analysis Occurrences

Hazard Analysis Glides Slope Angles

FZAG, Skyguide, Swiss

MAR 2013

Installation of additional wind socks

Additionalinformation installation FZAG APR 2014

Signs, Markings/tools to indicate remaining runway length for cockpit crews

Review Best Practise

Infrastructure/equipmentadjustment

FZAG,Swiss, LH, JetA NOV 2013

Turbulence caused by buildings, Terrain in theapproach

Feasibility studyOverview warningsystems or warningprocedures

FZAG, Meteo NOV 2013

Reducing effects of Runway Overrun, EMAS

Comparison ofsystems

Feasibility studyArresting System FZAG, Swiss planned 2016

Runway extension by 400m planning extension FZAG 2020

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Mitigation strategies (ATC; Meteo)



Optimisation of rwy conceptswith regards to safety

Review ofprocedures

adapted procedures (ifnecessary)

Skyguide, FOCA

Actual informations to cockpitcrews (wind at 1000ft, 2000ft)

Review ofprocedures/contents


Forecasted wind informations for ATCO supervisors

Adaption ofcommunicationprocedures

adapted procedures (ifnecessary) Meteo CH

Definition of max. tailwindcomponent (5kts,6kts)

Review ofprocedures

adapted contents (ifnecessary)

Skyguide, FOCA

Telephone conferencesimilar to Winter OPS

Review ofprocedures


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Mitigation strategies (Operations)



Tailwind Operations DeepeningPreliminary HAZID

Hazard Analysis Tailwind Operations

FOCA, Skyguide, FZAG, Swiss, Meteo

NOV 2013

Landing distances Analysis of data Landing Distance Performance Review Swiss/LH MAR 2013

Stabilized approaches Review of spec. situation LSZH Guidance Material Operator,

Skyguide MAR 2013

Go-Arounds Analysis Occurrences

Classification of Go-arounds LSZH Operators MAR 2013

Aquaplanning Training adapted procedures (ifnecessary) Operators ongoing

No landings/take offs of heavy aircraft on RWY 28 when wetand tailwind

Procedure changeadapted procedures (ifnecessary) FZAG NOV 2013

Use of thrust reverse in AIP forlanding on runway 28 Procedure change adapted procedures (if

necessary) FZAG NOV 2013

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Summary


• We know the hazards with regards to runway excursions• We take responsibility as an aerodrome operator• We will implement further mitigation measures

• Arrestor bed• Operational and infrastructural issues from tailwind study

• a safe runway operation is essential for an aerodrome operator• It’s a teamwork of all partners (total Aviation system)

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Questions

7.11.2013

EAPPRE implementation issues: Airport Operator‘s role … Meetings Seminars and Workshop… ·...

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