E International Migration and International...
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AOIAP 0/b 0 160 E World Bank DiscussionPapers International Migration and International Trade Sharon Stanton Russell Michael S. Teitelbaum mf!l. -@ Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript of E International Migration and International...
AOIAP 0/b 0
160 E World Bank Discussion Papers
InternationalMigration andInternational Trade
Sharon Stanton RussellMichael S. Teitelbaum
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(Continued on the inside back cover.)
1 6 0 1z1 World Bank Discussion Papers
InternationalMigration andInternational Trade
Sharon Stanton RussellMichael S. Teitelbaum
The World BankWashington, D.C.
Copyright O 1992The International Bank for Reconstructionand Development/THE WORLD BANK1818 H Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
All rights reservedManufactured in the United States of AmericaFirst printing May 1992
Discussion Papers present results of country analysis or research that is circulated to encourage discussionand comment within the development community. To present these results with the least possible delay, thetypescript of this paper has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formalprinted texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibility for errors.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) andshould not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members ofits Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee theaccuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for anyconsequence of their use. Any maps that accompany the text have been prepared solely for the convenienceof readers; the designations and presentation of material in them do not imply the expression of any opinionwhatsoever on the part of the World Bank, its affliates, or its Board or member countries concerning thelegal status of any country, territory, city, or area or of the authorities thereof or concerning the delimitationof its boundaries or its national affliation.
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ISSN: 0259-210X
Sharon Stanton Russell is a research scholar at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Instituteof Technology. Michael S. Teitelbaum is a program officer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Russell, Sharon Stanton, 1944-International migration and international trade / Sharon Stanton
Russell, Michael Teitelbaum.p. cm. - (World Bank discussion papers; 160)
Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-8213-2116-11. Emigration and immigration-Economic aspects. 2. Ermigrant
remittances. 3. International trade. I. Teitelbaumn, Michael S.II. Title. III. Series.JV6118.R87 1992304.8'2-dc2O 92-12848
CIP
iii
Foreword
As this report demonstrates, international migration is an issue ofincreasing importance and interest, from several aspects. The heightened concernover migration flows in Western Europe is only one of several migrant receivingareas where such concerns have arisen. Globally, the pressures for migrationappear to be rising, with rapid growth in the working age population in thedeveloping countries, the widening income differentials among countries, and thereduction in the costs of transportation and communication. The main area ofinterest of this Department, but only one of the areas of interest to the WorldBank, is the important role which workers' remittances now play in the tradeaccount of developing countries. As recent events have shown, and as the reportdemonstrates more broadly, this source of foreign earnings can be very volatile.
The report was commissioned to give a detailed account of recent trends inmigration by region, both sourcing and receiving regions, and to provide anestimate of the global flows of remittances. As well, the authors were asked tosuggest areas for further research. It is hoped that the detail provided onmigration patterns, old and new, on the estimates of remittance flows and thepublication of the detailed data underlying them, and the discussion ofdevelopments in the role of international migration in trade in services will beof use to policymakers concerned with these issues and to other researchersworking in this area.
D.C. RaoDirector
International Economics Department
iv
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Mr. Ronald Duncan of the International EconomicsDepartment for his guidance as Task Manager for this study, and Ms. Noga Lewin,IECIT, for preparation of the basic data files. Ms. Lourdes Pagaran, World BankGraduate Scholar at MIT, provided invaluable research assistance in organizationand analysis of the remittance data and preparation of the final tables.
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Table of Contents
Page No.
Summary ........... vii
I. INTRODUCTION ........... 1
II. TYPES OF AND TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION. 2
A. Conceptualizing International Migration. 2B. General Trends. 6C. Regional Trends. 9
III. REMITTANCES FROM INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION .28
A. Conceptual Issues .28B. Recent Trends in the Volume of Remittances .30
IV. KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRADE .33
A. Trade, Aid, and Development: Can They Stem Migration? .33B. Migration and Trade In Services .36C. Conclusions and Implications for Further Research .42
V. REFERENCES ......... 44
Tables ......... 50
Annexes ......... 57
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List of Tables
Table 1 - Economically Active Populations 1970-1990 and 1990-2010Table 2 - Distribution of Remittance Credits, World Total, 1980-1989Table 3 - Distribution of Remittance Debits, World Total, 1980-1989Table 4 - Share of Total Remittances to GDP for Selected Countries,
1980-1989Table 5 - Share of Total Remittances to Merchandise Exports for
Selected Countries, 1967-1989Table 6 - Share of Total Remittances to Merchandise Imports for
Selected Countries, 1980-1989Table 7 - Distribution of Remittances, Swamy's Selected Countries,
1980-1989
List of Annexes
Annex I:Table 1.1 - Global Worker Remittance Credits, 1980-1989Table 1.2 - Global Migrants Transfers Credits, 1980-1989Table 1.3 - Global Labor Income Credits, 1980-1989
Annex II:Table 2.1 - Global Worker Remittances, Debit, 1980-1989Table 2.2 - Global Migrants Transfers, Debit, 1980-1989Table 2.3 - Global Labor Income, Debit, 1980-1989
Annex III:Table 3.1 - Total Remittances, Selected Countries (Swamy) 1980-1989Table 3.2 - Inflows of Workers Remittances for Selected Countries
(Swamy) 1980-1989Table 3.3 - Inflows of Migrants Transfers for Selected Countries (Swamy)
1980-! °osTable 3.4 - Inflows of Labor Income for Selected Countries (Swamy) 1980-
1989
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Summary
This paper reviews the major types of international migration and recentglobal and regional trends in population movements, as well as conceptualissues and recent trends in the volume of remittance flows. The paper furtherconsiders the extent to which trade, aid, and development can be expected tostem future migration flows, the role of international migration in trade inservices, and implications for future research.
The number of international migrants is large--conservatively upwards of100 million people--and potentially rising as the result of demographicpressures and labor force growth in developing areas, widening economicdifferentials amongst countries, and the extension of transportation andcommunications. Migration flows are heavily concentrated in a few worldregions and are increasingly volatile and unpredictable, with political aswell as economic causes and consequences.
Financial flows associated with international migration are also large:official remittances were nearly US$ 66 billion in 1989, second in value onlyto trade in crude oil and larger than official development assistance. As theGulf war demonstrated, however, remittance flows are vulnerable to suddenchanges. Migration is central to trade in services, including some previouslyconsidered 'non-tradeable". Remittances alone constitute about 8.5 percent ofthe total value of world trade in services and reflect only a fraction of thetotal financial flows associated with international migration. While there isgeneral consensus that flows of capital and goods should be free, there is nosuch agreement on the movement of people.
Over generations, rapid economic development can be expected to moderatethe pressures that produce out-migration. Over the short term, however,development can increase the propensities for movement, both becausedevelopment itself alters previous social and economic patterns, and becausetrade, aid, and development policies often unwittingly work at cross purposes.
There are a number of research issues relevant to migration and trade.Measurements of financial flows can be improved by better understanding thereporting, recording, and directions of official remittances, and bydocumenting and estimating the volume of trade generated by internationalmigration. Case studies of the role of migration in expansion of bankingservices and of "intermediary transactions" in migration processes are but twoexamples. Little is known about the extent to which national policies towardin-migration impede trade in services; a survey of firms across selectedindustries might shed light on this issue. The indirect effects of migrant-importing strategies on the subsequent economic trends and trade positions of
receiving countries in selected industries remain to be assessed. There islittle documentation of the economic and trade consequences in countries withpolicies to train workers for international export, and a need to assess thetrade potential of developing new labor intensive services in sending areas.The adoption of measures to address the potential for migration from Centraland Eastern Europe offer new opportunities to understand interactions amongstmigration, trade, aid, investment, and development, as do the "turnaroundcases" (e.g., Italy, Spain, Portugal) of countries that have shifted or areshifting from being areas of emigration to ones of immigration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. "Is international migration an important issue for those concernedwith international trade and the balance of payments?" This is the centralquestion posed to the authors by the World Bank's International EconomicsDepartment and to which this paper is addressed. The unequivocal answer,discussed more fully in the pages to follow, is yes, for three overridingreasons:
1.2. First, the magnitudes of human flows across national boundarieshave become very large over the past three decades. Estimates are necessarilycrude, but as of the late 1980s some 80 million persons were resident outsidetheir nations of citizenship (Widgren 1987)1/; conservatively, these numbersare likely to have reached 100 million since the dissolution of the formerSoviet Union and are expected to increase further in the coming decades.
1.3. Second, the international financial flows that follow such humanmovements are substantial. The total value of official remittance inflows(credits) worldwide was US$ 65.6 billion in 1989. This figure, while large,does not begin to capture the value of other financial transactions directlyor indirectly associated with the movement of people. For reference as toorders of magnitude, official development assistance in 1988 was US$ 51billion (World Bank 1990:127); during the period 1982-1984, the total annualaverage value of trade in coffee (the most important non-oil primarycommodity) was US$ 9 billion.
1.4. Third, international migration is not only a factor in thecompetitive production of manufactures for trade, international migration iscentral to international trade in services. Until relatively recently, it wasassumed that services were not tradeable because services had to be producedwhere they were consumed. International travel has altered this assumption;as one observer has put it, "all international trade in services is linked toan international movement of people, information, money, or goods" (Feketekuty1988:28). Remittance inflows constitute about 8.5 percent of the total valueof world trade in services2/.
1 This figure includes legally employed foreign workers and theirdependents; undocumented workers; and official and unofficial refugees. Itdoes not include large numbers of "foreign born' who have obtained citizenshipin their countries of current residence, nor foreign born persons in countries,such as Germany that count as "citizens" those born abroad who share the samenational or ethnic origin as native born citizens.
2/ The value of trade in services in 1990 is estimated at US$ 770 billion(The Economist 1991: 62).
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1.5. Section II below provides an overview of the prevailing types ofinternational migration and considers in greater detail recent global andregional trends in migration flows and their prospects for the future.Section III discusses conceptual issues in estimating the flow of remittancesfrom international migration and analyzes available evidence from IMF balanceof payments data. Finally, section IV considers some links between migrationand trade, and identifies key unresolved issues that require further research.
II. TYPES OF AND TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
A. Conceptualizing International Migration
2.1 There are any number of ways to conceptualize and categorizeinternational migrants and international migration flows3/. One may considerat least five dimensions:
o Who? Migrant units are--often simultaneously--individuals, membersof a household or whole households, members of a community or wholecommunities. Within any of these units, migrants may be distinguishedby individual or group characteristics such as age, sex, education orskill level, wealth, etc..
o Where? International migrations may entail movement over longdistances or short ones. Even migrants from the same country can differas to their destinations, depending upon a host of factors ranging fromtheir individual or group characteristics to conditions in receivinglocations.
o When and how lone? Migration flows can be distinguished by theirtemporal characteristics, and accordingly may be seasonal and follow ayearly pattern, even over long periods of time; non-seasonal andtemporary; or permanent.
o How? Migrants may be distinctive in the ways by which they migrate.Millions of Asians travel by air to work in the Middle East, whilecountries as diverse as Vietnam, Haiti, and Albania have come to beknown for their "boat people", and Mexicans can be seen walking acrossthe border to the United States.
o Why? The motivations for migration are probably as numerous asmigrants themselves. For those who migrate voluntarily, the reasons maybe primarily economic, as part of an individual or family strategy forbetterment, and even this group may be subdivided according to theiractivities in the area of destination, e.g., employment, study,
3/ Two recent useful attempts to summarize types of migration are to be foundin Skeldon (1991) and Sharp et al. (1991). These approaches are synthesizedin the discussion below.
retirement. Still others migrate primarily for family or ethnic reasonssuch as marriage or reunification. At the other extreme are officialand defacto refugees, those who are fleeing from persecution, war,famine, mass expulsion, general political and economic disorder orenvironmental crises.
2.2 An alternative approach blends these dimensions into fivecategories of international migrants, with the categories differingsubstantially as to the intentions and characteristics of the migrants, themechanisms of their movement, and the time-scale involved. However, as willbe seen, these categories are often quite soft around the edges. Moreover, ilLis increasingly common for migrants in one category to be transformed intoanother, and for would-be migrants to claim membership in the group thatprovides the best migration option.
o Settler migrants are those whose movement across borders--whetherlegal or illegal--is essentially permanent. In many cases, thepermanence of the move was not intended in the first instance, but themigrant's preference for remaining in the new location increases withtime.
o "Work'v m.igration". or "temporary contract labor": Such migrationincludes generally low-skilled, low-paid workers, and is in theorycirculatory. The "bracero" program for Mexican farm workers in theUnited States from 1942 to 1964, and the European "guest worker"programs that ran from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, are classicexamples. The idea *is to import temporary workers from low-wagecountries to fill temporary gaps in the labor market. These workers areadmitted for only limited periods, without accompanying family members,with the intention that they will circulate back to their homes afterproviding the desired labor services, earning high wages, and learningnew skills.
o Skilled labor migration: This category includes short-term movementsof skilled workers and technical personnel to staff overseas posts.Such movements include intracompany transfers by multinational companiesand governmental agencies, and the movement of those involved ininternational trade and commerce.
o Student migrants: The admission of foreign students for educationalpurposes is a policy practice of most nations. These migrants areadmitted for limited time periods, and often are prohibited fromemployment while students. In many cases, they too become permanentmigrants by virtue of either violation of their limited-term admissionor by legal adjustment of their status to a more permanent category.
o Refugees and asylees: Perhaps the most desperate, and paradoxicallyalso the most privileged in some sense, are those international migrantswho qualify as "refugees". There is a clear internationally-agreeddefinition of this term, embraced in the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating to
4
the Status of Refugees4/. In addition, there are extended definitionswhich include those moving across borders to escape civil wars orgeneralized violence, environmental crises, or even abject poverty.While The Organization of African Unity has adopted such a definition,it has not been accepted in other world fora.
2.3 In the evolution of migration theory, different disciplines havetended to focus on different dimensions (or combinations of dimensions) ofmigration and often on different units of aggregation. Much of the basiceconomic theory of population movements grew from consideration of internalmigration. In what may be the first example of the "push-pull" formulation ofmigration, Ravenstein (1889) observed from British census data that peoplemigrate from areas of low opportunity to areas of high opportunity, and thatdistance is a chief mediating factor5/.
2.4 Arthur Lewis (1954) built upon these observations, linkingmigration to economic development in a two-sector model in which surplus laborwith low marginal productivity in agriculture moved to the labor-short modern(urban) sector. Sjaastad (1962) introduced a human capital approach whichstressed individual cost-benefit analyses, and this was extended by Todaro(1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) to explain persistent rural to urbanmigration in the face of urban unemployment. The so-called Todaro, or Harris-Todaro model argued that migration is an individual investment decision basedupon differential wage rates and the probability of obtaining urbanemployment.
2.5 Subsequent developments in economic theories of migration haveunderscored the importance of moving beyond the individual as the unit ofanalysis. Stark (1991), for example, has stressed the importance of thehousehold as a decision-making unit, and has postulated that migration of oneor more members is a risk-reducing strategy for many households. Others(Bilsborrow 1986, Findley 1989) have demonstrated that propensities to migrateare affected not only by individual and household characteristics, but also bycommunity characteristics.
2.6 The latter observation is no surprise to sociologists, whose recentcontributions to migration research have stressed the importance of family,
4/ The United nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines arefugee in part as a person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of beingpersecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality [...etc.) is outside the
country of his nationality, and is unable or.. .unwilling to avail himself ofthe protection of that country..." The Organization for African Unity (OAU)Convention of 1969 expands this definition by adding the following: "The termrefugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression,occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing the publicorder.. .is compelled to leave.. .to seek refuge in another place".
5/ This brief overview of economic approaches to migration draws upon Sharpet al. (1991).
5
ethnic, and kinship networks in shaping migration patterns. Some historians(cf. Hoerder 1990) and geographers (cf. Skeldon 1991) have conceived ofgeographically and economically related migrations in a certain period as"migration systems". In yet another approach, political scientists and someeconomists have pointed out that international migration--unlike internalmigration--cannot be viewed in even the most simplified models as merely theresult of market forces. Governments regularly exercise what has been deemedas their most fundamental sovereign right: the control of entry.
2.7 Indeed, while migration flows are driven by underlying forces thatinclude economic, human rights and ethnic or familial factors, they areincreasingly recognized to be affected by political factors. It is important,therefore, to consider the political economy of such movements.
2.8 Political forces internal to migrant receiving countries areimportant determinants of migration. Such forces include employers;religious, ethnic and kin groups; nationalist and ideological opponents to thegovernments of sending countries; advocates for human rights and/or civilliberties; and politicians seeking to increase the numbers of theirsupporters.
2.9 Examples of the dominance of such political forces are numerous.The immigration and refugee policies of the principal countries of immigration(United States, Canada, Australia, and France) have been driven by such forcesfor many years. So too have the policies of countries such as Israel andGermany, which admit with no limitation all persons defined as members of "thepeople" (Volk) of whatever national origin.
2.10 Recent political forces have turned sharply negative towardimmigration in many of these countries. This is especially true in Europe,where anti-immigration political movements have grown rapidly followingaccelerating inflows of immigrants from the East and from the third world. 'Inmany refugee situations, such as those in Pakistan, Sudan, and Jordan, thewillingness of the receiving state to allow the entry and residence of largenumbers of non-nationals is driven by political opposition to the governmentof the source country. In some cases, too, the refugees are viewed as auseful buffer to cross-border incursions from antagonistic neighbors.
2.11 Demographers, anthropologists, and adherents to other disciplinesoften stress still other factors affecting international migration, but it isnot within the scope of this paper to review these exhaustively. The mainpoint is that any discussion of international migration trends and prospectsmust deal simultaneously at the levels of global trends, national, community,and household conditions, and individual behaviors. Unlike the movement ofcommodities or manufactures, which are driven by market participants whomobilize large volumes, the movement of people involves not only markets andgovernments but the decisions of millions of families and individuals. Inthis respect, international migration trends are rather like aggregatefertility rates, which although heavily influenced by societal andgovernmental forces, ultimately are determined by the rather intimatedecisions of individuals.
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B. General Trends
2.12 It is important to understand that only a small minority of theworld's people ever move across national boundaries as migrants. Even inextreme cases, such as those of Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Cuba, thepercentage who leave the country is in the range of 10-25 percent.
2.13 Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the diverse pressuresunderlying international migration movements have been growing substantiallyover the past three decades, and can be expected to continue to do so wellinto the next century. It should be stressed, however, that these pressuresinduce only a potential for international migration, the actualization ofwhich depends heavily upon a variety of other factors.
2.14 Among the pressures inducing increasing potential forinternational migration are:
o the dramatic demographic increase of the past three decades, whichhas led (with a 15-20 year lag) to rapid labor force growth, especiallyin the young adult age groups known to have the highest migrationpropensities. According to ILO estimates and projections, in the twodecades from 1970 to 1990, the economically-active population of theless developed world increased by 58.8 percent, or some 658 millionpeople. By comparison, the economically-active population of the moredeveloped countries increased by only 22.8 percent, or 109 millionpeople (see Table 1)
o over the two decades from 1990 to 2010, labor force growth in thedeveloping world is projected to be considerably larger in absoluteterms (733 million) and somewhat smaller in percentage terms (41.2percent). Because fertility declines have not yet occurred in much ofAfrica (and excluding the potential effects of AIDS), that continentshows the highest potential for increase in economically-active persons--over 75 percent.
o increasing economic differentials, especially between Westernindustrialized countries and some oil exporters as compared to much ofthe third world and the formerly centrally-directed economies of Easternand Central Europe. Other things being equal, increasing differentialsin real wages and standards of living should be expected to increase theincentives favoring international movement.
o technological advances, especially in transportation andcommunication. These advances, which have literally transformed life inindustrialized countries since World War II have affectedpreviously-isolated populations in Asia, Africa and Latin America evenmore profoundly.
7
-- Hundreds of millions of people who only decades ago would havelived out their lives within a few kilometers of their birthplacesnow have access to the means to move internationally.
-- Long distance migrations from one continent to another,previously high-risk and costly enterprises, have become quick andinexpensive.
-- Films, television, and VCRs have brought to the attention ofremote millions the economic attractions of life in other areas.
-- International telephone and fax communications have allowedmigrants to maintain close ties with family and friends thatpreviously would have had to be sacrificed.
o the development of dense social networks across borders, as thesocial infrastructure of international migration.
o increasing trade competition across deep world fissures, between thehigh-wage economies of the West and the low-wage economies in much ofthe third world. Some economic actors in high-wage economies seek torespond to such competition by recruiting low-wage labor from thirdworld countries.
o governmental decisions (whether explicit or implicit) to activelypromote labor export as a matter of economic policy. Such policies arefollowed by governments as diverse as Turkey, the Philippines, SouthKorea, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Cuba, Barbados,Mexico, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
o increases in violence, repression, persecution, and ethnic tensionsin countries and regions with large populations.
2.15 International migration flows have not only increased in size, buthave become increasingly volatile and unpredictable, as much for political asfor economic reasons. Although South-North and South-South movements dominatemigration patterns numerically, there are fears of mass flows from Central andEastern Europe. Indeed, recent political and economic events have producedmillions of international migrants, notably from amongst selected ethnicgroups (ethnic Germans, Jews, Armenians, Greeks) and principally from EasternEuropean countries to former West Germany, Austria, and other destinations.Moreover, there are widespread speculations about much larger impendingpressures for outmigration from the former Soviet republics, Yugoslavia,Poland, Romania, and elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe. It is virtuallyimpossible to predict the likely scale and timing of such movements.
2.16 Equally dramatic pulses of migration also have occurred recentlyfrom and to countries of the Middle East, in the aftermath of the 1990 Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait and the contemporaneous easing of Soviet restrictions onJewish emigration to Israel.
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2.17 The increasing volatility of international migration is mostclearly reflected in refugee flows. Using the internationally agreeddefinition of the UN Protocol, the numbers of persons "in need of assistance"(i.e. who have not found a permanent place of settlement that can protect themfrom persecution) rose rapidly during the 1980s, from some 8.5 million in 1980to about 14.5 million in 1989. Over the same period, the number ofPalestinians under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for PalestineRefugees in the Near East (UNRWA) also increased from 1.8 to 2.4 million.Together, then on the order of 17 million persons were counted as refugees inneed of assistance at the end of the 1980s (United Nations 1991; U.S.Committee for Refugees 1991)6/.
2.18 In addition, there are large and--so far increasing--numbers ofasylum claimants: persons who have entered industrialized nations andthereupon claimed refugee status, or what is termed in some countries"political asylum". The number of asylum seekers in European countries rosefrom 71,000 in 1983 to 450,000 in 1990 (Widgren 1991), with the largestnumbers being in Germany. The largest increases in such claims in recentyears have originated in Eastern Europe. However, the liberalization of EastEuropean political systems, coupled with deteriorating economic conditions,has led many West European government leaders to question the validity of mostsuch asylum claims.
2.19 Determinations as to who qualifies as a "refugee" are increasinglysubjective, as the boundaries between "political" and "economic" reasons formovement become more and more blurTed. Such definitional problems are mostvexing in countries (such as the United States, Canada, and Germany) in whichideological advocacy and domestic political interest groups have successfullypushed for admission as "refugees" of groups with only questionable claims tosuch status (e.g. many, though by no means all, from Cuba, Nicaragua, ElSalvador, Poland, the former Soviet republics, etc.).
2.20 Human rights groups, ethnic lobbies, churches, and politicalactivists continue to exert strong pressures to expand the definition of"refugee" to include those fleeing environmental destruction or catastrophes,civil wars, or desperate poverty. Expansion of the Protocol definition of"refugee" to include such groups would produce numbers dwarfing the estimated17 million persons currently qualified as refugees in need of assistance.
6/ The U.S. Committee for Refugees' mid-1991 estimate has been reviseddownward to 16.1 million, largely as the result of the intervening return ofKurds to Iraq from refuge in Iran and Liberians from host countries in Africa.A few observers argue that the figure of 17 million is an overestimate becauseit includes refugees in the U.S. and elsewhere who are awaiting officialresettlement, and because some countries (e.g., in Africa) may inflate thenumber of refugees to attract international assistance. The U.S. Committeefor Refugees reports that its figures are already corrected for overreportingby some governments and the numbers awaiting resettlement in the U.S. aresmall.
9
Only a few examples of the potential numbers of "environmental refugees"should suffice to illustrate the point:
o Some 1.7 billion people in 80 countries already suffer from "seriouswater shortage", contributing to widespread drought and famine,particularly in Africa (World Commission 1987:109).
o At the same time, deforestation of upland water shelters hasincreased the severity of floods in alluvial plains such as those ofBangladesh. This, in combination with increasing population densities,left some 25 million homeless following the serious Bangladesh floods of1988.
o More speculatively, if the global warming and rising sea levelspredicted by some actually occur, heavily populated coastal areas mayhave to be abandoned. In Bangladesh, a one-meter sealevel rise by theyear 2025 would displace some 20-25 million people (Sadik 1990:11).Speculative estimates for the world as a whole are four to five timeslarger.
C. Regional Trends
2.21 The flow of human migrants, and the economic flows that follow,are heavily concentrated in a few world regions. Of the estimated 80 millionpersons currently counted as international migrants, roughly 35 million are insub-Saharan Africa alone, and approximately 13-15 million each in theprosperous regions of Western Europe and North America. Another 15 million orso are in the Middle East and Asia, where a few areas have especially heavyconcentrations of migrants: Pakistan and Iran together host nearly 6 millionrefugees from Afghanistan; before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the oil-richstates of the Arab Gulf together accounted for over 7 million migrants, 5million of whom were workers. There are smaller but notable concentrations ofmigrants in Australia and Latin America as well.
2.22 Major South-South movements characterize patterns of internationalmigration today, despite the fact that observers in Europe, the United States,Canada, and Australia tend to be preoccupied with migration to these areas.In certain regions, females are increasingly prominent among internationalmigrants, not only as refugees or family members migrating for accompanimentor reunification, but also as independent migrants for employment.
Data sources
2.23 Quantitative data on migrant flows--the number of persons enteringand exiting a country within a given time period and the net remaining--arevirtually nonexistent. Thus, the data for this study concern stocks ofinternational migrants and derive largely from enumeration of the foreign bornor foreign nationals in the 1980 and (as they become available) the 1990rounds of censuses. Periodically, countries report census results to the
10
Population Division of the United Nations Department of International Economicand Social Affairs which publishes selected analyses of these results in itsannual World Population Monitoring Report. It should be noted, however, thatcensus data, which at best are slow to be published, are rapidly renderedoutdated by migrations associated with sudden economic reversals (e.g.,changes in oil or commodity prices) or political events.
2.24 For specific regions, supplementary sources of data are used;these include periodic monitoring surveys such as the ILO-sponsored AsianMigration Project, and SOPEMI (Continuous Reporting System on Migration)published for the OECD region. Refugees may or may not be counted in nationalcensus results or regional surveys, and data for this study specificallyconcerning stocks of refugees are from the World Refugee Survey, publishedannually by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and comprise persons officiallydesignated as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR)
Trends in Selected Industrialized Regions
2.25 For Europe and North America, the most salient trends over thepast 5 years have been:
o rising numbers of total in-migrants, especially in the categories ofasylum claimants and illegal migrants. The numbers admitted throughregular channels, such as family migration, have remained relativelystable;
o shifts in regions of origin, often unpredictable and volatile incharacter (e.g., Central and Eastern Europe);
o the recent appearance of new destination countries, previouslycountries of out-migration (e.g., Italy, Spain). The countries ofSouthern Europe are viewed by many as the "gateway" to employmentopportunities in the EC;
o increasingly active domestic politics surrounding immigration,including both anti- and pro-immigrant sentiments (e.g., Germany,France).
Notwithstanding these trends in common, there are important differencesbetween Europe and North America.
2.26 Europe. For EEC Member States taken together, out of the totalpopulation of about 324 million in 1989 (SOPEMI 1990:25), those counted as"foreign residents" account for only 4 percent, or some 13 million. Of these,about 8 million originated from outside the EEC, over half of these from theMaghreb, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The remaining 5 million come from within thecurrent EEC membership. In Europe, the past two years of convulsive politicalchange in the East has produced very substantial migration flows to the more
11
prosperous West7/. These movements have been largely additive to those fromthe "South", i.e., the Maghreb, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and increasingly from Asiaand Sub-Saharan Africa.
2.27 Available data on stocks and recent flows of foreign residents areknown to be underestimates, for several reasons:
o in rapidly-changing circumstances, official data generally lag behindreality;
o official European data on immigration or "foreigners" generallyexclude entries described as short-term (e.g. up to 3 months). Thistype of movement has been rising rapidly (SOPEMI 1990:13), and mostnon-governmental observers agree that much of it is likely to turn outto be long-term or permanent;
o the official counts of "foreign" residents in some Europeancountries, and especially in Germany as the largest country ofimmigration, do not include those born abroad but of similar ethnicorigin. Similar practices are followed in other countries such asTurkey, Greece, Hungary;
o generally speaking, foreigners who acquire nationality are no longercounted as foreign.
2.28 Among the EEC Member States and in part as a function of the easeof obtaining citizenship, there is considerable variation in the percentage ofpopulation defined as "foreign", ranging from less than 4 percent in Norway to7 percent in France to 9 percent in Belgium. Switzerland, not a member of theEEC, reports nearly 16 percent foreign, and the Principality of Luxembourg,another special case, reports some 28 percent foreign residents (SOPEMI1990:Table A.2).
2.29 Germany, with its large foreign-born population who are of Germanethnicity and hence not counted as foreign, presents special definitionalproblems. Germany reports 1.054 million net in-migrants for 1989. Of these,only 20 percent (211,000) were reported as "foreign" (i.e., both foreign-bornand non-German in ethnic terms). Of the remaining 80 percent, about 343,000came from Eastern Germany; another 377,000 migrated from Eastern Europe butwere counted as "Germans" because of their ethnic ties; and another 121,000were reported as [non-German) asylum seekers. In 1990, the number applying
7/ Germany has been particularly affected by these flows. Some 282,000"Aussiedler" (people of German ethnic origin) from Eastern Europe and theformer Soviet Union arrived in the Western part of Germany during the firsthalf of 1990; in addition, Germany received over 130,000 asylum seekers fromthe East between 1988 and the first half of 1990. These figures do notinclude the estimated 1 million East Germans who have moved to the Westernpart of the country since the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989(Chesnais 1991:10,14; Boston Globe 1992:5).
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for asylum in Germany was 194,000, the highest figure on record (SOPEMI 1990:49). These in-migrants include only those enumerated officially; thoseentering illegally, or overstaying short-term visas, are not included.(SOPEMI 1990:Table 3).
2.30 In-migration to France has also risen, but less dramatically thanin Germany. For France and Sweden, recent asylum claims account for overone-half the numbers of in-migrants (SOPEMI 1990:19).
2.31 The recent period has also seen the emergence of wholly newimmigration trends towards countries that for centuries have been netemigration countries. Recent inflows to Italy and Spain have come mainly fromdeveloping countries, including many historically lacking any special links tothese new destination countries.
2.32 To the surprise of most observers, Italy recently discovereditself to be a country of substantial immigration, much of it illegal.Current estimates are that Italy hosts some 662,000 registered non-ECimmigrants (Financial Times 1991:3) and as many as 1.2 million illegals. Therecent operation to legalize such migrants revealed that most originated inthe Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, along withnon-trivial numbers from Yugoslavia and Poland (SOPEMI 1990:23-24). Asubstantial number of Asian migrants are women, many of whom are educated butmigrate to take up domestic work. The salary of a Thai domestic worker inItaly is 10-15 times that of a lower level professional worker in Thailand(Weinart 1991:10).
2.33 There are relatively few studies of the new immigration to Spain,but according to one, the number of all non-nationals there doubled between1970 and 1985, when there were more than 500,000 from Portugal and thedeveloping countries. The majority were illegal entrants from Latin America,Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. The number of legal non-nationals has alsoincreased; between 1980 and 1988, the number of legal Africans increased from4,900 to 20,500 (a four-fold increase), while the number of Asians more thandoubled, from 13,240 to 28,747 (Weinart 1991:11).
2.34 Even countries of Central and Eastern Europe are being affected bynew in-migrations. Poland is now reported to host many illegal workers fromRussia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, whose monthly earnings in Poland can beconverted at black market rates to the equivalent of eight months' pay intheir home country (New York Times 1991a:1,14).
2.35 There is some speculation that project-tied migration (i.e.,organized temporary migration of workers on contract with non-nationalenterprises or employers) may increase after 1992 because public bidding willbe Community-wide, and legal provisions offer opportunities for cost-savingsthrough engaging lower wage workers from other countries. For example,Portuguese and Turkish workers have been found in the former USSR working forenterprises from their home countries (ILO 1989:8).
2.36 The future of international migration in Europe will depend, inpart, on the evolution of public, political reactions. During the 1980s,
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anti-immigrant political movements emerged on the far right, although theyoften had appeal for working class voters who were otherwise supporters ofparties on the left. In France, these were led by the "National Front" ofJean-Marie Le Pen; in Germany the "Republican Party" and 'People's Union"; inAustria the "Freedom Party"; in Switzerland, the "Auto Party" and "SwissDemocratic Party", both of which recently have achieved sufficient votes togain "major party status", i.e., seats on standing legislative committees (NewYork Times 1991b:A4, and 1991c:11).
2.37 In general, these began as fringe political movements, disparagedand largely ignored by the established political classes. However, as thevolume of migration has accelerated over the past few years, a powerfulpolitical backlash emerged rather suddenly across much of continental WesternEurope. By October 1991, a French public opinion poll reported that publicsupport for the policies of Le Pen's National Front had doubled from thepreceding year, from 18 percent to 32 percent (New York Times 1991c:11).Essentially all of France's established parties have done volte faces,speaking out in sometimes exaggerated language against the uncontrolled influxof migrants. The Socialist Premier called for chartering of aircraft toforcibly return large numbers of illegal migrants to their homelands. Thestrong anti-immigrant rhetoric of conservative leader Jacques Chirac was laterechoed (to the surprise of most observers) by the liberal former PresidentGiscard d'Estaing.
2.38 North America. The numbers of permanent immigrants to the UnitedStates and Canada have been rising sharply during the past two years, but fordifferent reasons. In the United States, 1986 legislation legalized some 3.1million illegal aliens, and in 1989 some 479,000 of these obtained permanentresidence and hence were first counted as "immigrants".
2.39 The U.S. immigration reforms of 1986 established for the firsttime that employers could no longer lawfully employ workers illegally in thecountry. Known as "employer sanctions", these provisions had been strenuouslyopposed for over a decade by various economic, political, and ethnic interestgroups. This opposition continues, with the same groups now urging repeal ofemployer sanctions on grounds that they have led to increased employmentdiscrimination against those who appear to be foreign.
2.40 Legislation adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1990 will have theeffect of substantially increasing the number of legal immigrants, by some 30-40 percent. This places the United States in the unusual position ofincreasing immigration numbers at a time when many other Western nations aredebating how best to restrict immigration flows.
2.41 A major force underlying the 1990 increases was ethnic advocacy insupport of increased visa numbers for would-be immigrants from Ireland. Atthe same time, there were efforts to shift the balance of immigrants from thepredominant reliance upon family connections (which currently account for some95 percent of immigrant admissions) toward criteria that give greater weightto labor force skills in short supply. Some employers forecast futureshortages of scientific and technical workers, and argued that the future
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international competitiveness of the U.S. economy required increased flows ofsuch skills.
2.42 Advocacy on international migration issues by the American "NewRight" differs markedly from that of the European Right. While the lattertends to oppose immigration (the more radical groups espouse xenophobicpositions), the American New Right goes to the other extreme, arguing insupport of very large or even unlimited immigrant admissions. Their argumentsare essentially those of "free trade", in which labor is seen as one of manyfactors of production, the movements of which should not be impeded bygovernmental actions.
2.43 In Canada, the Government adopted a policy to increase the numbersof immigrants, partly in response to domestic political groups and partly onthe basis of concerns in some circles about low Canadian fertility rates. Inaddition, Canada's generous asylum system attracted increasing numbers ofself-initiated migrants seeking designation as "refugees".
2.44 In the United States, family connections overwhelm all otherfactors in determining admissions. Only about 5 percent of legal immigrantsare admitted on the basis of their education or skills, although, as notedabove, 1990 legislative changes seek to increase the numbers of suchadmissions while continuing family-based admissions. By contrast, in Canada,skills and education play a much greater part in immigrant selection. Despitethese differences in admissions policy, for both the United States and Canada,Asia has become the principal source continent for legal immigrants.
2.45 Another important difference between the two neighboring countriesis in the propensity of immigrants to emigrate to another country. While mostlegal immigrants to the U.S. appear to become relatively permanent residents,in Canada there is more substantial emigration on the part of both immigrantsand native-born, but with the former thought to be about 8 times more likelyto depart than the former. Of emigrants from Canada, some 40 percent aredestined for the United States (SOPEMI 1990:44).
2.46 Australia. Net annual immigration to Australia has risen sharplyover the past half decade, reaching 164,000 in 1988-89. This was the highestlevel since the early 1950s, and accounted for some 55 percent of netdemographic increase (SOPEMI 1990:37).
2.47 As of 1989, over 22 percent of the Australian population wasforeign born, over two-thirds of whom came from ten countries. The UnitedKingdom and Ireland accounted for the largest numbers by far, followed by NewZealand, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Germany, and Vietnam (SOPEMI 1990:38).
2.48 Recent immigration trends have stimulated considerable publicdebate in Australia. In the words of a leading Australian official,
... immigration is never far from the headlines. Support for pastimmigration flows tends to be almost unanimous'but current intakesgenerate considerable debate... .While the response to such pressures has
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tended to be incremental, a major review of immigration policy wascompleted in 1988 by the Committee to Advise on Australia's ImmigrationPolicies (CAAIP) (Gibbons 1991).
Most of the recommendations of this Committee were accepted by the AustralianGovernment, including:
o division of the immigration program into three main streams offamily, skill, and humanitarian admission;
o establishment of a Bureau of Immigration Research to assess thecharacteristics and impacts of Australian migration trends; and
o a new "points system' aimed at achieving more effective control ofthe program.
Latin America
2.49 The most salient characteristic of international migration fromand within Latin America (comprising Mexico, Central America, South America,and the Caribbean), is the overwhelming attraction of a relatively fewcountries: the United States, Argentina, and Venezuela host most migrantsfrom the region, with the United Sates being by far the main country ofdestination, in terms of both absolute numbers and the proportion of sending-country populations who migrate. Mexico is by far the main country of origin.Of the 2.2 million Mexicans enumerated abroad in the 1980 round of censuses,99 percent were in the United States. Colombia was the second major sendingcountry, with between 700,000 and over 1 million people abroad (UN 1989b:382,Table 66). Based upon the World Bank's interpolated labor force estimates,these figures suggest that migrants abroad were nearly 10 percent of Mexico'sdomestic labor force, and between 8.8 and 12.5 percent of Colombia's.
2.50 If one excludes Mexican migration to the United States, however,there is a notable amount of voluntary migration among countries within LatinAmerica itself. Of the 4.8 million foreign born in Latin America in 1980,nearly 2 million were from the region, with the remainder being older stocksof European settlers (UN 1989b:381).
2.51 Until the 1980s, Argentina was a major pole of attraction in theSouthern Cone, and the foreign born constituted 6.8 percent of the totalpopulation in 1980. Argentina was the country of destination for 92 percentof Paraguayans, 74 percent of Bolivians, 71 percent of Uruguayans, and 68percent of Chileans. In the northern part of the region, Venezuela was themajor pole of attraction, the favored destination for three-quarters ofColombians abroad, and a significant secondary destination for migrants fromPeru, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. Altogether, the foreign born were7.2 percent of Venezuela's total population.
2.52 Some countries, including Brazil and Argentina, both send andreceive migrants: as of 1980, some 214,000 Brazilians were enumerated asbeing abroad (principally in Paraguay, and secondarily in Argentina, the U.S.,
16
and Uruguay), while Brazil itself recorded 1.2 million foreign born (UN1989a). Argentina had nearly 211,000 nationals abroad and hosted some 1.9million foreigners.
2.53 Poor economic conditions in Latin America during the 1980s arethought to have reduced the attraction of the region's migrant receivingcountries in recent years, and many skilled Latin American migrants arereported to have left for the United States or Europe. While data limitationspreclude a comprehensive estimate of levels and trends, in 1990 there werenearly 52,000 Latin Americans in Italy (with Brazil and Argentina being theleading source countries) and over 25,000 in Spain from Argentina andVenezuela alone (SOPEMI 1990:22, Table 8; 64). In addition, Latin Americansof Japanese origin (nisei), notably from Brazil, have sought employmentopportunities in Japan. In the latter half of 1990, between 30,000 and 50,000went to Japan under contracts to work (Skeldon 1991:28).
2.54 The trends just described are based largely upon census data oradministrative statistics. However, there is a considerable amount ofundocumented migration which may or may not be captured by these sources andwhich, by its very nature, is difficult to measure. To illustrate thepossible orders of magnitude, Mexico sent about 72,000 legal migrants to theU.S. in 1987, and that year over 2 million undocumented Mexicans (who hadentered over a number of preceding years) applied for legalization.Altogether, of the 3.1 million people who took advantage of the legalizationprograms in the U.S. following passage of the 1986 Immigration Control andReform Act, three-quarters were from Mexico (Goering 1990:11-12).
2.55 Despite the prominence of refugee situations in Central America,Latin America has the lowest number of official refugees of any region,119,000 out of 16.1 million8/ worldwide (U.S. Committee 1991:33). Althoughthere were relatively small flows of refugees to Latin America earlier, thefirst mass movements of refugees in the region began in Central America in1979-80, with Guatemalans following old worker migration routes intosoutheastern Mexico, and Salvadorans moving into neighboring countries.During the late 1980s, organized voluntary repatriations saw nearly 200,000returns.
2.56 The current figure of 119,000 official refugees does not, however,include the 'externally displaced", people not officially recognized by theUnited Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees but who arenonetheless in refugee-like circumstances. This group is estimated to numberover 1 million--primarily in Mexico, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala (UN1991:28-29), not including those migrants in the U.S..
2.57 Finally, there is emerging evidence within the Latin Americanregion of what some observers have called "the migration transition", i.e.,countries that have shifted from net labor exporters to net importers. This
8/ The number of refugees worldwide at the end of 1990 was originallyestimated to be 16.7 million. This figure was revised downward in July 1991as a result of changes in the number of Kurdish refugees.
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phenomenon has been observed particularly in some of the small northern andeastern Caribbean states (including the Bahamas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, andthe Cayman Islands), notably as the result of developments in tourism andoffshore banking (McElroy and Albuquerque 1988).
North Africa
2.58 Migration from the Maghreb (principally from Algeria, Morocco, andTunisia) to European OECD countries is a long-standing phenomenon. As of1970, there were nearly 1.2 million nationals of these three countriesresident in six OECD countries; by 1989-90, there were nearly 2.1 million ineight European countries9/ (UN 1989b:368-369, Table 62; SOPEMI 1990:16, Table5). These figures exclude undocumented migrants, who are of growing concernto European governments. In Italy's regularization campaigns of 1986 and1990, Maghrebians were by far the largest group, numbering 124,247 out of thetotal regularized (321,349) (SOPEMI 1990:22, Table 8).
2.59 These figures are not entirely the result of migration, however;they include natural increase amongst the resident Maghrebian population.While most migration from the Maghreb has been employment related, not allNorth African migrants resident in the EC are employed. Crude labor forceparticipation rates amongst Maghrebians range from a low of 0.14 in Belgium toa high of 0.64 in Switzerland (which has notably restrictive migrationpolicies)10/. The figures used to calculate these participation rates excludethe unemployed and the self-employed, however, and the latter group includesmany women who work in the informal sector. These figures are also likely toexclude those Moroccans and Tunisians who, with the tightening of entryrestrictions, have opted for short-term seasonal migration on 4-month touristvisas to work in agriculture (Seccombe and Lawless 1985:126).
2.60 Within North Africa, Libya has been a pole of attraction forforeign workers, who came to staff nearly all sectors of the economy (notablyconstruction) as oil revenues fuelled phenomenal growth in government revenuesand related investment in development projects. As of that country's 1973census, there were nearly 200,000 foreign nationals in Libya, comprising 8.8percent of total population (UN 1989a). In 1975, expatriate workers alonenumbered more than 260,000 and constituted nearly 33 percent of the country'slabor force (Birks and Sinclair 1980:136, Table 6.15; 135, Table 6.14). By1983, Libya's Secretariat of Planning estimated that there were some 569,000foreigners in the country, constituting a large proportion of Libya's laborforce of 1 million (Economist Intelligence Unit 1987:13-14).
2.61 While the vast majority of these were Egyptians and Asians, someoriginated from other North African countries. The number of Maghrebians in
9/ The six countries were Germany, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Sweden, andSwitzerland. The eight included these together with Italy and Spain.
10/ Crude labor force participation rates were calculated from SOPEMI1991:16-17, Tables 5 and 6.
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Libya is reported to have grown during the first half of the 1980s, as theconsequence of continuing restrictions in Europe. Tunisians alone wereestimated to be 15 percent of Libya's total population in 1983 (Seccombe andLawless 1985:128). In August-September 1985, Libya expelled thousands ofexpatriate workers, including 32,000 Tunisians, 7,000 Egyptians, and severalthousand from Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, in retaliation against labor sourcecountries politically opposed to Libya and as part of an effort to reduce theoutflow of hard currency in the form of worker remittances (EconomistIntelligence Unit 1987:14).
2.62 In late 1987, Libya's diplomatic relations with Tunisia wererestored and in early 1988, the frontiers with Egypt were reopened. Newmigration flows followed. By March of 1988, some 30,000 Tunisians had arrivedin search of work (Economist Intelligence Unit 1988-89:15). Subsequently, anestimated 10,000 are reported to have returned home after failing to findemployment. The potential for international migration within North Africa islikely to continue to grow with the creation in 1989 of the Arab MaghrebUnionll/, which has as a stated priority the promotion of free movement ofcitizens among member states.
Sub-Saharan Africa 12/
2.63 General trends. Nearly half--some 35 million--of the world'stotal international migrants are estimated to be in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ricca1989:3), although the region itself contains less than 10 percent.of theworld's population. Despite severe data limitations, several regional andsub-regional trends are observable:
o while Africa's refugee burden is considerable relative to thecontinent's resources, and Africa ranks second after the Middle East andAsia in total number of refugees (approximately 5.4 million officiallyrecognized refugees, and possibly as many externally displaced), themajority of the region's migrants are not official refugees.
o despite European concerns about increasing levels of migration fromSub-Saharan Africa to EC destinations, the largest flows have beenwithin the continent (South to South migration). The vast majority ofmigrants are Africans, although non-Africans include long-time residentsoriginating from Lebanon, Syria, India, Pakistan, Europe and the WesternHemisphere. The proportions of foreign born in total populations varyconsiderably, with the highest being in West Africa.
11/ Members include Algeria, Libya, Mauritania (considered here with Sub-Saharan Africa) Morocco, and Tunisia.
12/ This section draws upon the World Bank study, International Migration andDevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa by Russell et al. 1990 and extensions ofthat work conducted by the author for the National Research Council'sCommittee on Population.
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o labor migration has been a feature of all sub-regions, but especiallyof West Africa, and from Southern Africa to the Republic of SouthAfrica. As elsewhere, clandestine migration is pervasive throughout theregion and considered "routine" in West Africa, where seasonal migrationis also more pronounced than elsewhere on the continent.
o migration flows of all types are notably volatile in Sub-SaharanAfrica, as much for political as for economic reasons.
2.64 Most of Africa's refugee-producing and refugee-receiving countriescan be found in East Africa, especially in the Horn. Large refugee flows havealso been produced by Mozambique, which now surpasses Ethiopia as the leadingsource country, with most Mozambican refugees fleeing to Malawi, Zambia, andZimbabwe.
2.65 Historically, migration in the sub-region was affected bypre-colonial inflows of Arabs and Asians; the partition of the area intocolonies; the development of export-oriented agriculture, mining, andextractive industries; and, from time to time, restrictions on free populationmovements. As contract labor replaced old East-West slave routes, populationsmoved from Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire to Uganda, Kenya, and elsewhere in EastAfrica, as well as from Malawi and Mozambique to South Africa, Zimbabwe, andZambia (Adepoju 1988:34,35). Tanzania has been both a labor sending and alabor receiving country, with explicit policies to govern such movements.
2.66 Kenya has not been a major country of in-migration, but--untilrecently--was a major receiver of educated Ugandans iDuring the 1980s, theincreasing availability of skilled Kenyan graduates placed pressures upon theKenyan labor market, and as a result, skilled Ugandans are moving to otherlocations within and outside Africa, including to South Africa.
2.67 In addition to both hosting and producing refugees, Sudan has beenan exporter of migrants to the oil producing countries of the Middle East andelsewhere. An estimated 334,000 Sudanese were abroad as of 1983 (Choucri1985:5), and by 1985 some 500,000--including two thirds of the country'stechnical and professional workers--were abroad (UN ECA 1988:1). Some of theresulting manpower shortage has been filled by skilled Ethiopian refugees(Adepoju 1990:7). Although the oil price downturn in the 1980s promptedconcerns about large-scale return migration, as of the end of the decade therewas no evidence this had occurred. The consequences of Sudan's support forIraq in the latest Gulf war have yet to be determined, however.
2.68 Historical patterns of international migration in Central Africawere linked to religious and tribal expansion, the slave trade, migrations ofnomads and pygmies, and movement across "artificial", colonial politicalboundaries by members of socio-economic units thus divided.
2.69 Amongst the Central African countries for which census data areavailable, the largest migrant stocks (over 600,000) were enumerated in Zaire,where mineral deposits and infusions of investment capital created jobs forskilled and unskilled workers alike. However, in yet another example of the
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volatility of international migration, recent political disorders haveresulted in the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of foreigners.
2.70 The Congo has the highest proportion of migrants among largecountries in Central Africa (over 5 percent), mainly from Zaire, CAR, Angola,Mali, Senegal, Cameroon, and Benin. At the other extreme, the foreign born inAngola were less than 1 percent of total population in 1983.
2.71 The total number of refugees from Central Africa increasedslightly, from 490,000 in 1988 to 521,000 in 1990, but (because of evengreater increases in other sub-regions) their proportion among all Sub-Saharan African refugees declined from 12.5 to 10 percent. The absoluteincrease of refugees in Central Africa resulted from greater numbers fleeingfrom drought-induced famine and continued hostilities in Angola, by far themajor source country.
2.72 The highest concentration of migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa is inWest Africa, a sub-region that migrants have always considered as an economicunit where the movement of people flowed as freely as trade in goods andservices. Precolonial migrations were often group movements related to inter-necine warfare, slave raids, famine, drought, and the spread of religions--aswell as trade. During the colonial period, the development of plantationagriculture helped to bring about a shift from group migration to individualmovement, differentiated by age, occupation, and sex.
2.73 Migration in West Africa has become largely spontaneous andincludes levels of both seasonal and undocumented migration reportedly higherthan elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. The levels and directions of migrationin the sub-region are notably volatile. Until the late 1960s, Ghana was thefavored destination of West African migrants; as of the 1960 census, migrantsnumbered over 800,000 and were 12 percent of Ghana's total population. By1970, after the onset of an extended period of negative economic growth, thenumber of migrants fell and their proportion dropped to only 6.6 percent oftotal population.
2.74 Over the past two decades, Cote d'Ivoire has supplanted Ghana as amajor pole of attraction for migrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Ghana,and elsewhere. Foreigners, who were 22 percent of total population in 1975,are now reported to be 30 percent, giving Cote d'Ivoire by far the highestconcentration of foreign born in Sub-Saharan Africa. The second highestconcentration is in the Gambia, where migrants are about 11 percent of totalpopulation and include significant numbers from Senegal, Guinea, GuineaBissau, and Mali.
2.75 Census data from Nigeria are not available, but it is well knownthat flows to that country increased substantially during the 1970s. By 1982,there were an estimated 2 to 2.5 million non-nationals in Nigeria, roughly 2.5percent of total population. A 1983 survey of migrants in Nigeria found thatonly 23 percent of them were legal, so their numbers and proportions may havebeen even higher (Orubuloye 1988; Adepoju 1988:64; Makinwa-Adebusoye 1987:23).Economic and political adversities since the early mid-1980s have dramaticallychanged international migration to Nigeria. Between 1983 and 1985, some 1.5
21
million non-nationals were expelled by Government order (Afolayan 1988:21-23). By the late 1980s, Nigeria had become an exporter of professionally andtechnically trained personnel, over 110,000 of whom took jobs abroad between1987 and 1989 (Adegbola 1990 in Adepoju 1990:11).
2.76 There is little quantitative evidence on the composition ofmigrants in West Africa. They are generally thought to be primarily young;male; illiterate or at least less well educated than the host country popula-tions; and concentrated in low status, temporary jobs, especially in agricul-ture, mining, commerce, and services. On the other hand, they are alsoreported to have high levels of employment.
2.77 There are exceptions to this characterization, however. Ghanaiansin Nigeria included large numbers of school teachers, professionals, andtechnicians; the 1983 survey of migrants found that nearly 53 percent hadsecondary, technical, or tertiary education. It is probable that implemen-tation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regionalprotocols on free circulation during the 1980s, along with rising levels ofeducation, have led to more migration of skilled workers in West Africa. Ithas also been observed that more recent flows in West Africa (especially toCote d'Ivoire) have included more women and children, reflecting a shifttoward family migration (Makinwa-Adebusoye 1987).
2.78 Despite the volatility of population flows, there is also evidenceof medium to long term migration, especially from Mali, Burkina Faso, andGuinea. Nearly 25 percent of African migrants enumerated in Mauritania's 1977census had been resident ten years or more. The comparable figure for SierraLeone in 1974 was 20 percent, and another 19 percent of foreign nationals hadbeen born there.
2.79 The future of Cote d'Ivoire as a pole of attraction is somewhatuncertain at present. Given historical trends and the continuing relativeeconomic deprivation of neighboring source countries, there may be littlesignificant reduction in flows. On the other hand, both economic andpolitical conditions in Cote d'Ivoire are worsening, and there are reportedlyhigh levels of unemployment among educated Ivoirians and a less welcomingresponse to migrants.
2.80 Furthermore, educated Ivoirians may elect to emigrate, asNigerians and others are now doing. As noted earlier, Sub-Saharan Africanshave become increasingly visible among growing numbers of undocumentedmigrants to southern Europe and asylum seekers in OECD countries. Ofregistered non-European foreign residents in Italy in 1990, nearly 12 percent(over 75,000) were from Sub-Saharan Africa (SOPEMI 1990:22, Tables 8 and 9).The share of Sub-Saharan Africans amongst Italy's estimated 1.2 millionillegal migrants in 1990, is also thought to be high. Ghana and Zaire, withnearly 34,000 and over 27,000 registered claimants respectively, ranked amongthe top ten source countries for asylum seekers in Europe and North America inthe period 1986 to 1989 (Widgren 1991).
2.81 In the past several years, refugee flows have come to figure moreprominently than heretofore in West Africa. In 1988, Guinea Bissau was the
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only country in the sub-region producing refugees; numbering only 5000, theseconstituted less than 1 percent of all Sub-Saharan African refugees.Similarly, the sub-region's 10 asylum countries hosted only 21,000 refugees(primarily from Chad in Central Africa), only 1 percent of the total (Russellet al. 1990:148). Only two years later, 13 West African nations wereproviding asylum to nearly 854,000 people (over 16 percent of all Sub-SaharanAfrican refugees), primarily from other West African countries, notablyLiberia (758,000) and Mauritania (60,000) (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1991).
2.82 Migration in Southern Africa has been characterized as temporaryand oscillatory, historically and in the present shaped by migration to theRepublic of South Africa (RSA), principally from Botswana, Lesotho, andSwaziland (BLS) but also from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. In additionto migration of mineworkers (organized through labor recruiters) therewas--until 1963--a considerable amount of clandestine migration, whichincluded accompanying women and children. In 1963, South Africa imposedstrict immigration controls which curtailed both undocumented migration andfamily migration, and further prohibited BLS migration to South Africa exceptfor work in mines and agriculture.
2.83 Changes in the national composition of migrant mineworkers inSouth Africa began to appear in the mid-1970s. As several sending countries(Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi) imposed their own restrictions on migration toRSA, there has been a shift toward increasing proportions from Lesotho (UnitedNations 1989b:379ff).
2.84 A number of factors have combined to bring about these and otherrecent changes in Southern African migration to South Africa (De Vletter1988:5). First, following increases in the price of gold, the withdrawal ofMalawian labor, and worsening relations with Mozambique, South Africa soughtto stabilize its migrant workforce and to attract more domestic mine laborwith substantially increased wages and longer work contracts. Second,legislative changes have accompanied a policy shift toward "careers inmining".
2.85 Third, in response to periodic bans on migration by suppliercountries, South Africa has used either threatened or actual expulsions as adisincentive to further political actions by remaining suppliers. Finally,with rising levels of education in both labor supplying countries and withinSouth Africa itself, the benefits of an educated workforce have become moreevident, and have enabled establishment of a permanent, skilled domestic laborforce.
2.86 From Chamber of Mines of South Africa data, it is possible todiscern some of the consequences of these factors. Although total employmentin the mines increased, and a growing proportion of official migrants havebeen concentrated in mining, the proportion of workers from foreign countriesdecreased from 78 percent in 1974 to about 40 percent in 1984-86. (UnitedNations 1989b:379,380, Table 65; Financial Mail 1987:33).
2.87 The full impact of these changes on the labor supplying countriesof Southern Africa is not yet clear. However, the supply of mine labor now
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far exceeds demand throughout Southern Africa (De Vletter 1988:3), andcountries of the sub-region are bracing for expected further declines inmigration to South Africa. In Botswana alone, the number of mine laborrecruits dropped from 40,390 in 1976 to 19,648 in 1986, and the proportion ofnovices (first-time workers) among all recruits dropped from 25 percent in1976 to 1.6 percent in 1985 (Taylor 1990:255;259).
2.88 Some will find new destinations outside their countries of origin.Migrants from Lesotho are already known to have begun taking work in"homeland" areas (which South Africa considers to be independent nations) andanecdotal reports suggest that other national groups (including Ghanaians, andUgandans formerly resident in Kenya) have begun doing so as well. Whileofficial policies of source countries discourage this trend, it may wellcontinue as opportunities in South Africa decline further.
2.89 Others will look to Southern African states. In Swaziland, -migrants already comprised over 5 percent of total population by the 1976census, with most from South Africa and Mozambique. In Botswana, theproportion of migrants is smaller, but the range of source countries suggest6potential future migration patterns: migrants come from South Africa,Zimbabwe, Namibia, Lesotho, Angola, Malawi, Swaziland, and--in smallernumbers--from Nigeria and Ghana.
2.90 Generally in Southern Africa, there is evidence of growinginternational migration for employment among women, linked to rising levels offemale education, growth in the female labor force, the elimination of legalrestrictions on female migration, and changing norms in rural areas. In a1978 survey of migrants in Lesotho, 23 percent of respondents who had workedin South Africa were women (Wilkinson in Momsen and Townsend 1987:225-239), afinding roughly consistent with results of both the 1976 and 1986 Lesothocensuses, in which females were about 18 percent of nationals absent at thetime of enumeration. There is also evidence of primary female migration fromZambia and Tanzania and in West Africa (Russell et al. 1990:22).
2.91 The proportion of all Sub-Saharan African refugees hosted bySouthern African countries has declined slightly, from 6.6 percent in 1988 to5.4 percent in 1990, largely as the result of the repatriation of Namibiansprior to that country's independence from South Africa in March 1990.Southern Africa produces less than 1 percent of all Sub-Saharan Africanrefugees. With 4.8 percent of all refugees, South Africa remains the majorasylum country, hosting an estimated 251,000--nearly all from Mozambique.However, South Africa itself is also the sub-region's largest source ofrefugees, although their numbers declined between 1988 and 1990, as somereturned from Angola and Swaziland.
The Middle East and Asia
2.92 Over the past fifteen years, South and Southeast Asians have cometo dominate Middle Eastern migration streams, and thus the Middle East andAsian regions are considered together here. Indeed, The Economist observed in
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the late 1980s that Asia has become the largest market for migrant labor theworld has ever known.
2.93 Migration to the Middle East. At least until 1990, the predomi-nant direction of international migration within the Middle East and Asia wasto the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for employmentopportunities associated with increased government and private spendingfuelled by the oil price rises of the 1970s. In 1970, there wereapproximately 884,000 migrants in the Gulf; five years later, the number ofmigrants workers had more than doubled, to nearly 1.9 million. By 1985, therewere an estimated 7.2 million foreigners in the Gulf (UN 1991, Table 97) ofwhom 5.1 million were migrant workers, constituting on average over 70 percentof the Gulf labor force (Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair 1987:2).
2.94 The largest stocks of foreign nationals in the Gulf in 1985 werein Saudi Arabia (4.5 million), followed by the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait(with 1 million each), and another 640,000 in Oman, Qatar, and Bahraintogether (UN 1991). These figures do not include migrants to Iraq which,prior to its invasion of Kuwait, was estimated to have between 1 and 3 millionmigrant workers, mostly Egyptians. A landless agricultural worker whoseaverage monthly wage in Egypt during 1986-87 was equivalent to US$ 65, couldearn an average gross monthly wage of USS 255 in Iraq (Adams 1991:19).
2.95 While construction is conventionally viewed as the dominant sectorof non-national employment in the GCC region, in fact, as of 1985, the largestproportion (almost 30 percent) of migrant workers were employed in financial,personal, and community service sectors of the economy, with construction aclose second (employing just under 29 percent), followed by wholesale andretail trade (14 percent) (Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair 1987:3).
2.96 One of the major changes in migration to the Middle East over thepast 20 years has been the shift from Arab to South and Southeast Asian sourcecountries. From the beginnings of the oil industry in the 1930s to the mid-1970s, migrants to the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East werepredominantly Arabs, including large numbers of Palestinians displaced byestablishment of the State of Israel and related Arab-Israeli conflicts.After introduction of Egypt's "open door" policy (infitah) in 1973, Egyptbecame a major labor exporter. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, as thecombined result of labor demand, cost, and political factors, Asians began toswell the ranks of migrants to the Middle East. In 1970, non-Arabs were only12 percent of all workers in the Gulf; by 1980, they were 41 percent. By1985, 63 percent of Gulf migrants were Asians.
2.97 Amongst Asian migrants, there has also been significant
diversification by source country. Historically, there were long-standingflows of Indian migrants, associated with the labor policies of the BritishEmpire. Even in the late 1970s, four countries--India, Pakistan, Korea, andthe Philippines--accounted for over 87 percent of all South and SoutheastAsian migrants. By the late 1980s, these countries accounted for about 75percent of Asian migrants, with the Philippines alone being the source for 45percent. The numbers from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand hadincreased substantially (UN 1991:13ff).
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2.98 This shift in the composition of migrants from Arabs to Asians hasbeen accompanied by the increasing importance of female migration, to the Gulfand elsewhere. Kuwait is a case in point. Beginning in the early 1970s,rates of growth in Kuwait's Asian female migrant population were considerablyhigher than rates of growth both in the Arab female population and in the malemigrant populations from either source. Only between 1975 and 1980 did ratesof growth in the Asian male population briefly exceeded those of Asianfemales. By the first half of the 1980s, Asian females were Kuwait's fastestgrowing migrant group, coming largely as domestic household workers who, inturn, were 60 percent of the country's migrant female labor force in 1985(Russell 1990).
2.99 Migrants from Indonesia to Saudi Arabia are now predominantlyfemale. Before the invasion of Kuwait, over three quarters of Sri Lankanmigrants to the Middle East were women; more than 60 percent of them weremarried and 67 percent of these had left children behind (Eelens and Spekmann1990). Not all Asian female migrants are domestic workers; over 32 percent ofPhilippine women deployed to the Middle East in 1987 were in professional andtechnical categories (Quiray 1989:24, Table 2.7).
2.100 One of the debates before the invasion concerned whether or notmigration to the Gulf declined in the late 1980s, as the result of decliningoil prices and increasing economic stringency. The commonly held view is thatit did. However, a close reading of the limited evidence suggests that, whilethere was certainly a slowdown in labor demand in the Gulf, the feared massivedeclines in the overall numbers of migrants did not materialize. Indeed, datafrom the ILO Asian Migration Project show that the average annual number ofAsian migrants registered in their home countries increased between 1981 and1987, and the Gulf continued to be their major destination. In Kuwait alone,there were over 144,000 more Asian migrants present in July 1990 than in 1985.
2.101 Mieration Effects of the Gulf War. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait inAugust 1990 profoundly affected the trends just described and illustrates thevolatility that often characterizes international migration. Within thefollowing nine months, some 2 million people, many of them foreign workers,had been displaced from Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (U.S. Committee forRefugees 1991:13). Saudi Arabia expelled some 750,000 Yemeni workers inOctober 1990 (New York Times 1990:1), after the Government of Yemen came outin support of Iraq.
2.102 Before the war, there were an estimated 450,000 Palestinians inKuwait and smaller but sizable communities in Saudi Arabia and other GCCcountries. By the time of the allied offensive, as many as three-quarters ofthe Palestinians had fled to Jordan, where many hold citizenship. This figureincludes 120,000 expelled from Saudi Arabia and 15,000 expelled from the UAEand smaller Gulf States. The war further displaced between 750,000 and850,000 workers from a number of other countries, including Egypt, India,Pakistan, and the Philippines, to name only a few. In Kuwait alone, it isestimated that between 1.4 and 1.6 million, or up to 94 percent of the pre-invasion population, had fled by the end of hostilities.
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2.103 Most of the "evacuees", as the Egyptian and Asian workers werecalled, were repatriated to their home countries. With the return of mostKuwaitis and the commencement of reconstruction, some foreign workers, such asFilipinos, have already begun to return to the Gulf. Indeed, the total numberof Filipino contract workers deployed to the Middle East in May 1991 (28,425)exceeded the highest total for any month in 1990 (January). While SaudiArabia continued to attract the largest numbers, over 1,000 went to Kuwait inMay 1991 alone (Philippines Overseas Employment Administration 1991).Similarly, Egyptians are reported to have begun returning to Iraq.
2.104 The prospect for workers whose countries of citizenship sup-ported Iraq (Palestinian Jordanians, Yemenis, Sudanese) are more uncertain,and many face rising levels of unemployment, exacerbated by the massivereturns of population from the Gulf and deteriorating economic conditionsassociated with the loss of worker remittances.
2.105 While the Gulf has been the major pole of attraction forinternational migration within and to the Middle East, it has not been theonly destination of note. Jordan has been a labor importing as well as anexporting country: as of the early 1980s, while between a third and two-fifths of its own labor force was working abroad, Jordan hosted some 120,000migrants, including Egyptian agricultural workers and growing numbers of Asiandomestic and service workers. However, as economic conditions in Jordanworsened during the latter half of the 1980s, in-migration appears to haveslowed or declined.
2.106 Nor is labor migration the only significant form of internation-al population movement in the Middle East. Although migration for permanentsettlement is not as common as in Latin America, the U.S., Canada, andAustralia, Israel is an exception. Between 1980 and 1988, Israel experiencednet out migration of approximately 157,000 people. This situation changeddramatically in 1989, with the relaxation of exit restrictions in the SovietUnion and the arrival of some 105,500 Soviet Jews that year (Chesnais1991:13). In 1990, the number of Soviet immigrants rose to nearly 200,000,and in 1991 the number was expected to be as high as 400,000. Recent eventsin the former Soviet Union, together with economic difficulties in Israelitself, have resulted in downward revisions of these estimates.
2.107 Refugee movements also figure prominently in the Middle East andSouth Asia, which together account for 9.8 million refugees or 60 percent ofthe world's total. Afghanistan alone is the source for over 6 million. For aperiod following the recent Gulf war, as many as 3.5 million Kurds were inrefugee status. Another 3 million Palestinians are in diaspora, of whom 2.4million are official refugees, with sizable populations in Jordan, the Gazastrip, the occupied territories, Lebanon, and Syria (U.S. Committee forRefugees 1991:33-34).
2.108 Migration within Asia. Although proportionately the Gulf hasbeen the favored destination for Asian migrants, a number of alternativedestinations within Asia itself have emerged during the 1980s, among themJapan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan Province of China, South Korea,and Brunei. Asians are now also the largest group migrating for permanent
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settlement in the U.S., Canada, and Australia. In the latter case, as of1986, Asian females outnumber males.
2.109 Philippine data illustrate the rapid growth of internationalmigration within Asia. In 1984, the number of Philippine overseas contractworkers deployed to Asian destinations (38,817) was only 16 percent of that tothe Middle East (250,210). By 1990, this figure had risen to 42 percent(90,768 vs. 218,100). Put another way, while the number of deployed contractworkers to the Middle East decreased by nearly 13 percent between 1984 and1990, the number going to Asian destinations increased by 134 percent. Iftrends evident in the first five months of 1991 continue to the end of theyear, there could be a 37 percent increase in migration to Asia over 1990figures. Five destinations have accounted for over 98 percent of the 1991Asian deployment so far: Hong Kong, Japan, Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia(Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 1991).
2.110 A number of factors have contributed to the emerging importanceof migration within Asia. High rates of economic growth in several Asiancountries have coincided with substantial fertility declines in thesecountries. The resultant labor shortages have drawn local women into thelabor markets, to the point that further increasing their participation is notan option. Indeed, their labor activity has induced additional demand fordomestic workers. At the same time, the volatile nature of the market formigrant labor in the Middle East, rising wage levels in Asia, and,undoubtedly, the fact that costs of migration to the Middle East haveincreasingly been shifted to migrants themselves, have added to the appeal ofdestinations closer to home.
2.111 In Japan, rapid export growth and slowing labor force increasehas produced upward wage pressures, especially in construction or the so-called "3-D" jobs (Demanding, Dirty, Dangerous). The number of migrantsadmitted to work legally in Japan has been small (81,000 in 1988). Most areadmitted as entertainers and the majority of these are women.
2.112 Of greater significance, however, is the increase in illegalmigrants to Japan, estimated to number about 300,000 as of mid-1990 (Martin1990). Until 1988, the majority of these were also female; however, that yearmale undocumented workers outnumbered females, reflecting growing malemigration for construction and manufacturing jobs. These migrants, some ofwhom enter as "foreign students" and then violate their visas, are largelyfrom Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Thailand, andthe Philippines. The growth of illegal migration has led to the introductionin late 1989 of employer sanctions, with what effect remains to be seen. Itis an open question as to whether Japan's complex politics will produce a"guest worker" program along the lines of Europe's programs terminated in the1970s.
2.113 The rapid export-led growth of Singapore's economy has producedlabor shortages and wage rates roughly twice those of nearby Johor State inMalaysia. These conditions have drawn more than 150,000 (primarily unskilled)foreign workers who constituted 11 percent of Singapore's labor force in 1989.In addition, there are estimated to be another 40,000 to 50,000 domestic
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workers (primarily Philippine women) and significant numbers of illegal malemigrants, largely from Malaysia and Thailand. Singapore's investments inJohor State have intensified preexisting rural to urban migration flows inMalaysia, with resulting labor shortages in rural oil palm plantations and inthe manufacturing sector being filled by illegal migrants from Indonesia,estimated to number 500,000. The emerging "growth triangle" planned to linkSingapore, Malaysia, and Batam Island in Indonesia is likely to generatefurther migration in this sub-region (Skeldon 1991:23-24).
2.114 Taiwan Province of China's labor shortage in 1987 was estimatedto be in the range of 200,000 in the manufacturing sector and 120,000 inconstruction. Although organized importation of Southeast Asian labor forpublic works construction is planned, in the recent past official policy hasbeen to admit only highly skilled workers, and thus those who have come tofill the available lower-skilled jobs do so by illegally overstaying theirtourist or visit visas. These migrants are primarily from Malaysia, thePhilippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and mainland China. The latter group aloneis "guestimated" to number about 50,000 (Skeldon 1991:26).
2.115 The future of migration from Hong Kong remains uncertain.Canada, Australia, Singapore, and most recently the U.S. have facilitated theimmigration of people with special skills, entrepreneurial abilities, andcapital. A number of "business migrants" from Hong Kong have availedthemselves of these opportunities; however, it.is unclear whether theiremigration will be permanent or merely a means of ensuring an alternative,should conditions in the territory deteriorate after 1997 (Skeldon 1989:24).
2.116 In 1990, East Asia and the Pacific recorded some 592,000refugees, of whom the largest number were Cambodians (344,500)--primarily inThailand--and Vietnamese (122,200), who were distributed among ten countriesof the region. The situation of the Vietnamese remains most problematic, asthe countries involved seek to implement the international Comprehensive Planof Action for Vietnamese asylum seekers (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1991).
III. REMITTANCES FROM INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
A. Conceptual Issues 13/
3.1 For those concerned with international trade and balance ofpayments, the financial flows directly associated with internationalmigration--remittances, or the portion of migrant workers' earnings sent backfrom the country of employment to the country of origin--are of centralinterest. Despite concerns among some observers (cf. Birks and Sinclair 1980)
13/ For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Russell 1986. That articlealso reviews the body of research evidence concerning remittances as of themid-1980s. There is a large and contentious literature on the consequences ofmigration and remittances for development in emigration countries, a subjectthat is beyond the scope of this paper.
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that remittances would decline with recession in the world economy during the1980s (indeed, there were several consecutive years of decline in the mid-1980s), the total value of remittances (creditsl4/) has increased in nominalterms from US$ 43.3 billion in 1980 to US$ 65.6 billion in 1989, making thevalue of remittances second only to crude oil trade and significantly largerthan the value of trade in coffee (the most important non-oil primarycommodity)15/.
3.2 Estimating the volume of remittance flows worldwide is a somewhattricky business. The principal source of data for estimating officialremittance flows is the International Monetary Fund's Balance of PaymentsStatistics Yearbook. However, there are a number of limitations inherent inthese data.
o Data in the relevant categories are not reported for all countries;
o Countries record and report remittances in different categories ofthe BOP statistics: e.g., some report "worker remittances" in aseparate line; others aggregate these receipts with "other privatetransfers"; some include only cash transfers; others include the valueof in-kind transfers;
o Reporting requirements differ among countries (e.g., reporting ofremittance receipts below a certain amount may not be required);
o Most importantly, only a portion of total remittances flow throughofficial channels. It must be stressed that remittances are largelyprivate transfers, and any number of factors may serve as disincentivesto their reporting (e.g., exchange regulations, differentials betweenofficial and grey or black market exchange rates, etc.).
3.3 In discussions of remittances, there is considerable scope forconfusion, arising from definitional issues. There are actually threecategories in the BOP's detailed current account statistics of relevance forthe calculation of total remittance flows. Two are subsets of "unrequitedtransfers": "worker remittances" (lines 35 and 36) and "migrant transfers"(lines 33 and 34); the third is "labor income" (lines 27 and 28), reportedunder "goods, services, and income".
3.4 Strictly speaking, "worker remittances" are the value of transfersfrom workers abroad for more than a year; "migrant transfers" reflect the flowof goods and changes in financial assets resulting from migration; and "labor
14/ The balance of this discussion will focus on credits, not only becausethey appear to be more fully reported, but because the direction of flow ismore generally toward developing countries.
15/ Total exports of petroleum in 1984 were valued at US$ 240 billion; thetotal annual average value of worldwide coffee exports in 1982-84 were USS 9billion (World Bank estimates).
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income" is factor income of migrants working abroad for less than one year.In practice, however, distinctions amongst these categories can becomeblurred. For example, it is not clear that central bank authorities reportingto the IME--or even migrants themselves--can know a migrant's intended lengthof stay abroad. It was for this reason that Swamy (1981) elected to includeall three IMF categories in what has become "the World Bank's definition" ofremittances--the definition used in the analysis of global trends below.
3.5 Understanding and interpreting the causes and significance offluctuations in official remittance flows over time is complex. There are alarge number of variables that may affect such flows: the number of workersabroad; their wage rates; individual and household characteristics; economicactivity in host and sending countries; relative exchange and interest rates;transfer facilities; and political and economic risk factors--to name only afew. That there is little agreement in the literature on which of these is"most important" probably reflects the fact that the answer will differ fromcountry to country and over time.
B. Recent Trends in the Volume of Remittances
3.6 Surprisingly, to the best of the authors' knowledge, there has beenno previous attempt to calculate the total global volume of remittance flowsfrom IMF BOP data. Published estimates have tended to be for selected laborexporting countries (e.g., Swamy 1981, Keely and Tran 1989--both discussedbelow), or "back of the envelope" calculations based upon global estimates ofthe number of workers and a figure for average annual per capita remittances.
3.7 For this paper, IMF BOP data files provided by the InternationalEconomics Department of the World Bank were used to calculate the total valueof remittances for 193 countries. For the period 1980-1989, debits andcredits were considered for each of the three categories in which remittancesmay be reported (i.e., worker remittances, migrant transfers, and laborincome). Summary results are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
3.8 It may come as no surprise that global credits do not equal globaldebits, either overall or in any of the three relevant categories takenseparately. Through 1986, total annual inflows exceeded outflows by about US$10 billion on average; thereafter, the difference between the two began towiden further, with inflows exceeding outflows by over US$ 27 billion in 1989.
3.9 There are somewhat different patterns within categories. Recordedworker remittance debits are consistently below credits and in some yearssubstantially so (e.g., in 1989 debits were only 36 percent of credits).Credits and debits for labor income were roughly equal until 1985, with noconsistent pattern in the direction of difference. In 1986, however, theybegan to diverge, with outflows consistently exceeding inflows in subsequentyears. On the other hand, outflows of migrant transfers (like workerremittances) are consistently below inflows, and (as with the global total)this difference widens substantially after 1986.
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3.10 The reasons for these patterns are not entirely clear.Differentials between global debits and credits in more recent years mayresult from lags in reporting and corrections to IMF data, or be linked tosome underlying change in patterns of relative exchange rates, or it may bethat commercial banks simply aggregate and report some remittance outflows incategories altogether different from those considered here. Alternatively,the different observable patterns among and within categories may reflectunderlying changes in the composition or directions of migration, or relateddifferences in completeness of reporting.
3.11 As may be seen in Table 4, for certain countriesl6/, remittanceshave been a sizable proportion of GDP. Among European countries, remittancesare a large and (at least through 1989) growing share of GDP (8 percent) inYugoslavia, and a declining but still high share in Portugal. In the MiddleEast, although remittances declined from a high of 78 percent of GDP in Yemen(PDR) in 1980 to 14.6 percent in 1989, they were sufficiently high to makeSaudi Arabia's expulsion of Yemeni workers in 1990 an event of significance toYemen's overall economic performance. Before the expulsion of Jordanian-Palestinians from Kuwait and elsewhere in the Gulf, Jordan was similarlyreliant on remittances. The figures for Sudan are misleadingly low; it isestimated that only 11.3 percent of remittances inflows are through officialchannels (Choucri 1985:1-10,5). In Africa, Lesotho is notable for itsreliance on remittances.
3.12 The importance of remittances to the economies of labor-sendingcountries is even more striking when their value is considered in relation toexports (Table 5) and imports (Table 6). For these selected countries, it isnot uncommon for remittances to be 25-50 percent of the value of merchandiseexports; in certain cases (e.g., Egypt, Yemen, Lesotho) their share is muchhigher. Remittances tend to be a slightly smaller share of merchandiseimports, but still an important one, for many in the range of 10-33 percent.Thus, remittances play a role in enabling such countries to participate inworld trade.
3.13 The task of calculating global remittance flows and monitoringtheir changes on an annual basis is not a monumental one, but it isnonetheless worth considering whether much the same information might bederived by monitoring only selected countries, specifically those identifiedby Swamy a decade ago. In brief, it appears that a global approach yieldssubstantially better results.
3.14 In the global calculations shown in Table 2, on average, theworkers remittances category accounts for 62.6 percent of total remittanceinflows, followed by labor income (28.6 percent) and migrants transfers (8.8percent). The migrant transfer category accounts for a notably larger
16/ For purposes of longitudinal comparison, the countries selected are thosein Swamy's 1981 study. The growth of migration in countries not listed (e.g.,the Philippines) suggests that a new selection of countries may be in order.
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proportion of the total global flows in 1988 and 1989, again for reasons thatare not understood.
3.15 By contrast, as seen in Table 7, in Swamy's selection ofcountries, worker remittances account for a much larger proportion of eachannual total; correspondingly, migrant transfers and labor income are a muchsmaller proportion of the total. These findings suggest that, on a globalbasis, shorter term migration (reflected in labor income) is somewhat moreimportant than in Swamy's selected countries (on balance ones in which longerterm migration has been established). Overall, this selection of countriescaptures only 58 percent of the global value of remittance credits; thus,monitoring only a selection of countries can seriously underrepresent theglobal volume of remittance flows.
3.16 Not all studies of remittances use the definition employed here;some, for example, consider only the workers remittances line in BOP data.Keely and Tran (1989) have used an entirely different methodology to estimatethe value of remittances. Because of limitations in access to data, theycalculated net private unrequited transfers for 50 countries, categorized bygeographical region. This approach necessarily excludes the value of laborincome and includes not only worker remittances and migrant transfers but alsoother components of unrequited transfers that are not relevant to remittances.The resulting estimated value of remittances is comparable to Swamy'sestimate: only 57 percent of the global total. The use of a regionalaggregation is instructive, however, and could be adopted in construction ofglobal estimates.
3.17 This brief review of patterns in remittance flows suggests anumber of directions for further research and analysis. On a global basis,the number of variables potentially involved probably make it impossible toexplain all the sources of variation in official remittance flows. However,there is much more that could be understood--on global, regional, and countrylevels--about the contribution of reporting and exchange rate factors inaccounting for fluctuations in official remittances.
3.18 To what extent, for example, do countries distinguish meaningfullyamong the worker remittances, migrant transfers, and labor income lines whenreporting BOP data? How do commercial banks determine where to aggregate agiven international financial transfer when they report to central bankingauthorities? Is there evidence that remittance outflows are recorded incategories other than the three considered above? It would also be useful tohave global figures aggregated by region, and to have net inflows and outflowsby region, country, and possibly by GDP level, in order to assess thedirections of net transfers. Clearly, the volume of remittances flows andtheir importance in the global economy warrant giving further attention tosuch issues.
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IV. KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRADE
A. Trade, Aid, and Development: Can They Stem Migration?
The Development-Migration Paradoxes
4.1 It is widely assumed that the economic pressures underlying recentincreases in international migration can best be moderated by rapid economicgrowth in "sending" countries. To this end, many have advocated economictransfers (via aid, investment, and trade) from high-income to low-incomecountries as a tool of immigration policy.
4.2 In the United States, for example, a "Marshall Plan for Mexico" hasbeen urged by some politicians; in Europe, there is now widespread discussionof attempting to stem in-migration through increased foreign assistance to andinvestment in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and thedramatically changing countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, as inmany aspects of international migration and economic development, the bestevidence available suggests that such arguments are overly simplistic.
4.3 In 1986, the U.S. Congress established a special 12-personCommission to examine the relationships of international migration andeconomic flows such as trade, investment and assistance. This Commissionundertook a three-year series of studies and consultations with governmentsand experts across the Western Hemisphere. Its report was delivered to theU.S. Congress and the President in July 1990.
4.4 The unanimous report of the Commission concluded that theserelationships are far more complex than commonly believed, and include severaldisconcerting contradictions and paradoxes that surprise many advocates whoare unfamiliar with the evidence.
4.5 The first paradox lies in the contradiction between the short-termand long-term effects of economic development upon the propensities foremigration. The "long-term" here implies a period of generations, i.e., manydecades; in discussions of migration, the "short-term" is on the order of adecade, perhaps two. The paradox is as follows:
4.6 Over the long term of generations, rapid economic development inthe Third World can be expected to moderate the pressures that produce highpropensities toward out-migration, currently and prospectively. There aremany historical examples of such changes, over the past 100 years, e.g.,Sweden, Germany, Britain, Japan, and Italy. Rapid economic development overseveral decades could
o provide job opportunities for rapidly-growing labor forces;
o expand career opportunities for highly-trained professionals andbusinesspeople with needed skills;
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o provide governments with financial resources necessary to improveeducation, health, infrastructure, and community services;
o reduce the now very large differentials in earnings in developingcountries as compared to those of industrialized countries; and
o contribute toward rapid declines in the often high rates ofdemographic increase that fuel out-migration pressures in manycountries.
4.7 In the shorter-run, however, the effects of successful and rapideconomic development are in the opposite direction: they increase thepropensities for emigration. Rapid development is profoundly destabilizing tothe old social and economic orders. Rural modernization increasesagricultural productivity but ruptures traditional social networks andeconomic relationships, thereby encouraging rural-to-urban migration andsometimes direct international migration.
4.8 The rapid growth of cities that accompanies development producessaturated labor markets and inequitable income distributions, but also arevolution of rising expectations and access to the information and resourcesneeded for international migration, especially for those who find themselveson the fringes of these urban economies. The costs of such movements declinewith the improved transportation and communication links that usuallyaccompany successful economic development, while rising individual andhousehold incomes make the migration option more accessible to greater numbersof people. Hence economic development tends to promote and accelerateoutmigration over the "short term", i.e. 10-20 years. This is the firstparadox.
4.9 The second paradox may be summarized as follows: although allindustrialized countries have embraced explicit policies and formal mechanismsto further economic development in Third World countries, in practice theireconomic policies often tend, directly or indirectly, to neutralize theseefforts.
4.10 Most industrialized countries provide concessionary financialassistance to developing countries, and many offer preferential trade accessto their domestic markets (e.g., the Lome Conventions, the Caribbean BasinInitiative, etc.). However, concessionary assistance flows are not largeenough to be decisive. Indeed, only trade and investment are sufficientlylarge economic flows to make a difference to development trajectories.
4.11 Yet trade policy in most industrialized countries is heavilyinfluenced by domestic interest groups concerned about their own economicwellbeing. The outcome of domestic political debates on trade is often apolicy framework that--unintentionally--damages the development potential ofthe same countries to which concessionary assistance and trade preferences areprovided, as these domestic interests understandably seek to restrict accessto "their" markets for many goods for which low-wage countries offer powerfulcompetition.
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4.12 Even explicitly preferential trade provisions such as theCaribbean Basin Initiative and the Lome Conventions often explicitly excludeor sharply limit labor-intensive products (such as shoes, garments,labor-intensive agricultural products) for which the less developed countrieshave an obvious comparative advantage.
4.13 Sugar provides a particularly flagrant example. Both the UnitedStates and the European Community maintain sugar support policies that, forthe benefit of relatively small numbers of domestic producers, have seriouslydamaged the highly competitive sugar industries of developing countries in theCaribbean and Asia.
4.14 The controversial Caribbean Basin Initiative, a unilateral U.S.Government tariff preference system adopted in the 1980s, was intended tostimulate economic development in the Caribbean Basin and Central America.Almost at the same time, the U.S. agricultural lobby forced through a sugarprogram that required reductions by nearly 75 percent in IJ.S. imports of sugarfrom the same region (the largest supplier, the Dominican Republic, saw itsquota decline from 774,000 tons to 204,000 tons over the period). In thewords of the U.S. Commission:
The sugar support system is a classic use of protection benefittingdomestic producers at the expense of U.S. consumers and lower-costforeign suppliers. The latter include migrant-sending countries likethe Dominican Republic, long highly dependent on sugar exports... Whilethe drop in quotas is now forcing these countries to begin to diversifytheir economies, the transition is harsh, resulting in sharply increasedunemployment and, in some cases, intensification of emigration pressures(Commission for the Study of International Migration...:55).
4.15 The European Community's Agricultural Policy (CAP) and theagricultural import policies of Japan, have both direct and indirect negativeeffects on development in emigration countries. Directly, these policiesclose or limit market access for agricultural products from less developedcountries. Meanwhile, the price subsidies the CAP provides for agriculturalexports impose direct competitive damage upon developing country producers.
4.16 Another indirect, but quite different, example is provided by theU.S. Government's chronic budget deficit. This deficit, attributable in partto the domestic political stalemate on taxes and spending, has the unintendedand indirect effect of causing high real interest rates in the U.S. and hencein international markets. Such high real interest rates exacerbate the fiscaland balance-of-payments problems of those developing countries that sounwisely allowed themselves to fall heavily into debt. At the same time, manyof these countries are among those receiving substantial concessionaryassistance from the U.S. government.
4.17 Thus, domestic policies driven by political forces inindustrialized countries have unintended negative impacts on less developedcountries, paradoxically operating in a way that neutralizes the positiveeffects of foreign policies directed toward the same developing countries.
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Migration and Alternative Investment and Production Strategies
4.18 In a competitive internationat trade environment, firms andgovernments alike seek to reduce costs of producing traded goods and services.For labor-intensive industries in particular, "labor shortages" and risingwages are anathema. The ways in which countries elect to manage theirperceived "labor shortages" or to cut labor costs have differentialimplications for migration. Skeldon (1991:22) has noted three strategies,pursued to varying degrees by labor-short countries. The first is to shift tocapital intensive high-technology industries; this approach, however, maysimply induce skilled migration and may not fully eliminate shortages inconstruction and services.
4.19 The second strategy is to export capital to low-wage countries orregions for the production of labor intensive manufactures. Such aninvestment strategy may reduce immediate migration pressures on the investingcountry, but may induce population flows toward the investment areas--some ofwhich may be geographically nearby. Hong Kong's investment in the SpecialEconomic Zone of Shenzhen across the border with China, and in GuangdongProvince illustrates such effects: the creation of two million manufacturingjobs has induced large scale migration from within China, particularly ofwomen from Guangdong and beyond (Skeldon 1991:23).
4.20 Further, this strategy may account, in part, for the rising numberof "executive migrants" from investing countries themselves. The number ofJapanese assigned to overseas branches of national firms rose from 13,000 in1975 to over 83,000 in 1988; the number of Koreans similarly assigned rosefrom 31,000 to 87,000 in the same period, while Taiwanese serving overseas in1990 were estimated at more than 100,000 (Skeldon 1991, Table 9).
4.21 The third strategy is to import labor, a strategy that Europepursued for nearly two decades until it was terminated in 1973-74, that theoil rich states of the Arab Gulf continue to pursue, and that--oftenreluctantly--Asia's growing economies are now following. Analysts are dividedin their assessments of the consequences of labor importation, in part becauseits benefits and costs are often difficult to quantify and may emerge indifferent time periods.
B. Migration and Trade in Services
Framine the Relationship Between Migration and Trade in Services
4.22 The relationship between international migration and trade inservices is grounded, in part, in the definition of services. Severalalternative conceptual approaches have been advanced. Bhagwati (1987:208) andothers have stressed that, in contrast to goods, services are "nonstorableo orimpermanent, i.e., they must be consumed as they are produced. Therefore,
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services require interaction between user and provider. This approachdistinguishes two broad classes of services: those that require physicalproximity ("temporary-factor-relocation-requiring" services) and those thatare arm's length or "long-distance" services. For some classes of servicesrequiring proximity, either the provider must move to the user (e.g., Koreanconstruction services in the Middle East) or the user moves to the provider(e.g., for heart transplants); for other services, movement could be in eitherdirection. There are also services for which proximity is not required (e.g.,filmed concerts, banking, insurance). As technological advances incommunications become more widespread, this latter group is expanding toinclude some engineering and computer-assisted design and data entry services.
4.23 A related but somewhat different conceptual approach distinguishesservices not only by the location of their provision and consumption, but bythe nature of the user and provider: (1) services that are provided andconsumed by residents of a country and that do not enter the internationalmarketplace (laundry, hairdressing, public services), and thus are non-traded; (2) service provided within national boundaries but to non-residents(hotel accommodations for non-nationals, air and seaport services to non-nationals); (3) services provided by resident firms or individuals acrossnational boundaries to firms or individuals abroad (air and sea freight,motion picture rentals); (4) services provided through contractualrelationships (royalties, licenses, franchises); (5) services provided throughoverseas affiliates of a parent company (commercial banking subsidiaries,equipment leasing); and (6) services provided to foreign markets throughdirect export or through overseas affiliates (United Nations 1985:5). Thedegree to which international migration is required for delivery of suchservices will obviously differ.
4.24 Still another approach defines services in terms of the relevantindustry groupings, as reflected in the International Standard IndustrialClassification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) and, relatedly, in the BOPcurrent account statistics. By this definition, international trade inservices may includel7/: (1) shipping (air, ocean, associated insurance); (2)passenger services (transport of persons); (3) other transport (portservices); (4) travel (visiting foreigners or domestic residents abroad); (5)direct investment income (dividends, interest, earnings arising fromownership); (6) other investment income (receipts/payments on loans, holdings
17/ Not all discussions of international service transactions include all ofthe categories below, and the value of such transactions is extremelysensitive to the definition of services. Using a narrow definition ofservices to include only those that actually cross an international boundary,services were 12 percent of world merchandise trade in 1980. If all thecategories below are considered in the definition, the value of internationaltrade in services is 39 percent of merchandise trade (see United Nations1985:11ff for a fuller discussion). Estimates as to the relative importanceof migration in trade in services will thus be affected both by the definitionof remittances and by the definition of services.
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of equity and debt); (7) labor income not included elsewherel8/; (8) propertyincome not included elsewhere (income from land, patents, royalties, licensefees); (9) other goods and services not included elsewhere (non-merchandiseinsurance, communications, brokerage, management, professional and technicalservices); (10) inter-official not included elsewhere; and (11) other residentofficial not included elsewhere (United Nations 1985:20). Because services,by this definition, are measured largely in financial terms, they are oftencharacterized as being "intangible" or "invisible"19/
4.25 International trade in services is affected by many types ofgovernment policies, including foreign exchange restrictions; procurementpolicies; incentives; measures affecting trade and investment; differentialtaxation of foreign enterprises; and--most important for this discussion--various barriers to the movement of persons: difficulties in securing entryvisas, restrictions on the issuance of residency or work permits, or even onthe employment of non-nationals.20/
4.26 The extent to which barriers to the movement of persons should beaddressed in an international regime governing trade in services has becomeone of several issues dividing industrialized and developing countries in theUruguay Round of the GATT. At the meeting of GATT members in Montreal inDecember 1988, negotiators agreed to examine both tradeable and non-tradeableservices.
4.27 However, while the U.S. and the EC favor a definition of "trade inservices" that includes the cross-border supply of services and the movementof companies (the "right of establishment"), they have sought to limitconsideration of the cross-border movement of people to "essential personnel".Although this.term has yet to be defined, the implication is that suchpersonnel would be limited to highly skilled workers in professional,technical, and managerial categories. The concerns of U.S. and EC members arethat large movements of labor would further exacerbate domestic sensitivitiessurrounding immigration issues. Developing countries, by contrast, favor freelabor movement but refuse an automatic right of establishment to foreignservice firms (Nicolaides 1990).
18/ Recall that labor income derives from border workers and those remainingfor less than one year. Income of migrants staying for more than one year isincluded in worker remittances, under "private unrequited transfers", and thusby this definition neither worker remittances nor the value of migrant
transfers is included in the value of trade in services.
19/ Not all observers agree that intangibility is a relevant or definingattribute of services. Grubel (1987:319) cites British economist T.P. Hill'sassertion that all consumption involves intangible benefits, and that manyservices (e.g., car repairs) embody elements of permanence.
20/ For a review and fuller discussion of the various types of policies thatcan affect trade in services, see United Nations (1985).
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4.28 A number of observers have weighed in on this debate. The OECD(1989:89, 90) has argued that for some services (e.g., construction andengineering), there has been a strong "provider-relocation requirement" thatimplies the "right to establish" should embrace labor mobility, and thattreatment of labor relocation issues must be addressed in any meaningfulconceptual framework for trade in services.
4.29 Other senior figures in the international trade field have framedthe issue with characteristic bluntness. Bhagwati has observed that, amongthe various types of services that exist, those requiring physical proximityare the more important at present, that there is an essential connectionbetween international factor mobility and international trade, and,
Therefore, the question of devising a services compact.. .is inextricablybound with the question of provider-mobility across nationalborders... .the concept of the right to establish cannot meaningfully orjustifiably be circumscribed to exclude the inward mobility of foreignlabor and its services. And the problem this raises cannot be dismissedsimply by saying, 'Oh, we cannot dismantle immigration restrictions andhave free mobility of labor across national borders." The criticalissue is, not immigration, but the temporary relocation of labor to makethe service transaction possible (Bhagwati 1987:208-9).
4.30 Feketekuty (1988:81) agrees but stresses that the problem is notan easy one:
There are few policy issues as sensitive as immigration policy. Whatthat means is that most countries assign a high priority to theobjective of controlling entry by foreigners and lower priorities totrade and other policy objectives. At the same time, internationaltrade in services could not flourish if people could not move from onecountry to another for temporary periods. The definition of trade inservices with respect to the movement of people is therefore one of themost difficult issues that negotiators will have to face in developingfuture agreements on trade in services.
What these observers do not mention, but governments of industrializedcountries well know, is that temporary movements of people often becomepermanent settlements.
The Role of Migration in Traded Services: Some Illustrations.
4.31 The role of migration in agricultural and industrial production islong-standing and fairly widely recognized. Less widely appreciated--and muchless documented--is the role of migration in facilitating the expansion oftrade in services. Even labor intensive services such as health care andconstruction, traditionally viewed as non-tradeables, have implications forinternational migration.
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4.32 Health services are of special concern in many Western countries,as their populations shift gradually toward higher median ages and as thetechnologies of health care for the elderly become more labor-intensive. Onecommon response is to allow for the importation of substantial numbers ofnurses from Third World countries, some of which (e.g., Barbados, Philippines)follow an explicit policy of training an excess supply of nurses for export.
4.33 In recent years, however, there has been more seriousconsideration given to the possibility of such health care services becoming acomponent of international trade. For many years, oil-rich nations of theArab Gulf (especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) entered the internationalmarket for the purchase of health care services for their nationals,especially from the private fee-for-service sector of Britain ("Harley Street"doctors and private hospitals). For the most part, the medical servicesobtained internationally were of a type not yet available in the Gulf. Morerecently, such services have been imported to the Gulf through large scalehealth and medical service contracts.
4.34 In the West, the realization is gradually spreading that thelow-technology but labor-intensive services required by the frail elderly orchronically ill citizens of industrialized countries might be provided at muchlower cost and to a comparable standard in many Third World settings. Suchfacilities already exist in Third World cities that have become chosendestinations for retired nationals of industrialized countries, e.g.,Monterrey and Guadalajara in Mexico. Others (e.g., Barbados) could becomeplanned centers for provision of such services, if the governments ofindustrialized countries provided for transferability of pensioners' healthinsurance benefits (at suitably reduced prices) to such settings. There isactive consideration of establishing planned communities in Asia and Africafor retired Japanese workers, and there is already a small community ofretired Japanese in Australia--cared for by migrant Philippine nurses.
4.35 In some instances, technology is enabling the emergence ofalternatives to migration for some aspects of traded services. Highly skilledIndian engineers and draughters now receive architectural drawings bysatellite transmission from the West Coast of the U.S., perform their work inIndia and send the results back to the U.S. by satellite. Similarly, a numberof data entry procedures associated with financial services in the U.S. arenow performed in the Caribbean and transmitted electronically.
4.36 Remittances are one measure of the financial flows resulting frominternational migration. However, there are other, yet-to-be measuredfinancial flows associated with the migration process itself, many of them inservice industries. In Turkey, for example, one of the major effects ofmigration has been on the services sector. The presence of Turkish migrantsabroad has increased demand for transport, banking, and communicationservices, and stimulated business and tourist travel between Turkey and ECcountries (Martin 1991:58). Placing values on such services and transactionsis necessarily speculative. However, a description of "the migrationindustry's" components highlights some of the changing characteristics ofinternational migration.
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4.37 The transport of international migrants is one obvious component.As international migration has grown in volume and distances traversed, so toohas the size of the economic exchanges underlying it. The problem of placinga value on such services is partly because of the broad range of providers,including international airlines, travel agents, internal bus and taxioperators, and cross-border smugglers.
4.38 Intermediaries also play an important role in internationalmigration and may range from legal and open to unlawful and sub-rosa. Duringthe "guest worker" programs of European countries such as West Germany,official labor recruiters were sent to source countries such as Turkey. TheArab Gulf states developed other mechanisms for recruitment, includingsending-government agencies, private recruiters, and "turn-key" contractorswho provide most necessities including labor. In some source countries suchas India and the Philippines, recruitment may be sub-contracted to localrecruiters, who often receive a fee not only from the employer but also fromthe would-be employee.
4.39 Even more difficult to measure are the economic transactionsunderlying illegal migration. These include the substantial fees charged bysmugglers (e.g., the sophisticated sea smugglers operating out of the Bahamasand across the Mediterranean, or the more local landbased smugglers on theU.S.-Mexico border). To a degree unknown (and perhaps unknowable), suchpeople-smuggling operations are connected closely to drug and arms-running.
4.40 Within the countries of destination, there are growing industriesserving the needs of immigrants and would-be immigrants. These includeprofessionals in immigration law, which has been one of the most rapidlygrowing sectors of the legal profession in the United States; quasi-legaladvisors selling their services as "immigration consultants" and "notaries";and labor contractors who have proliferated in California agriculture inrecent years as a means by which farmers can avoid direct employment ofworkers of questionable legality.
4.41 For some developing countries, the emigration of nationals hasstimulated the export of other goods and services. Within the past few years,the Philippines has expanded its banking services to serve migrant communitiesin the Middle East and Europe (thereby increasing per capita remittances fromlabor income). Indian goods and agricultural products are now widelyavailable in the Arab Gulf, as are Asian foodstuffs in the U.S.. It has beensuggested that cooperation between developing countries in construction andengineering services may have benefitted from providers' links to emigrantpopulations already established in countries purchasing such services (OECD1989:29).
4.42 While the volume of such migration related trade remains to bemeasured, the broad principle is clear: the movement of people can affect thecharacter of trade in commodities as well as services.
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C. Some Conclusions and Implications for Further Research
4.43 Directly measurable economic flows from international migrationare substantial. Official remittances alone were nearly US$ 66 billion in1989, making the value of remittances second only to trade in oil andsignificantly more important than the value of trade in coffee. If the valueof informal remittance flows and other financial transactions associated withmigration were to be included, this figure would be even higher. Thus,international migration represents a major global economic force,consideration of which has often been missing from the international tradeliterature, but that cannot continue to be ignored.
4.44 International migration already involves large flows of people--upwards of 80 million people. Further, the potential for increasing migratorymovement is rising as the result of a number of factors, including demographicincrease in developing areas and related labor force growth, increasingeconomic differentials among countries, and the extension of transportationand communications. International migration is increasingly volatile,volatility which itself may have important economic implications.
4.45 Many receiving countries have experienced unanticipatedconsequences of international migration. European and U.S. temporary workerprograms have unintentionally resulted in the permanent settlement ofmillions. Many migration streams that began as the result of demand inreceiving countries have been transformed into supply-push flows. Changes inlegal migration often have unexpected results: for example, asylum provisionsadopted for humanitarian reasons have become a major route for non-refugeemigration, and--as migrants seek to maximize the probability of admission--categories of migration are increasingly blurred. Political reactions tomigration, unanticipated in Europe and elsewhere, can have unexpectedconsequences for economic and trade policy debates.
4.46 Thus, the political economy of migration is arguably moreimportant than the straight economics of such movements. There is generalconsensus that flows of capital and goods should be free, but no suchagreement on the movement of people. For example, migrant-dependentindustries such as garments and agriculture also tend to be highlyprotectionist (Martin 1991b).
4.47 There are close connections between migration and internationaleconomic conditions, both as causes and as consequences of these flows.Migration and trade, in particular, are deeply entwined, and the interactionsbetween them operate in both directions. Migration may facilitate andstimulate trade between sending and receiving areas, but may also give rise totrade protectionism. Over the long run, economic development resulting fromforeign investment and export-led growth may reduce pressures for emigration,but in the shorter-term such development may increase these pressures.
4.48 This review of international migration trends, remittance flows,and selected links between migration and trade have suggested a number ofresearch issues of relevance to those concerned with international trade.
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There is much to be done to improve measurement of the value of economic flowsfrom international migrations. One may begin by better understanding therecording and reporting of official remittances, and analyzing the directionsof their.flows. Beyond that, there is a need to document and estimate thevolume of trade in goods and services that are generated directly andindirectly by international migration. A case study of the role ofinternational migration in expansion of the banking industry is only oneexample; a study of "intermediary transactions" in the migration process isanother.
4.49 For migrant-receiving countries, little is known about the degreeto which national policies toward in-migration constitute an impediment totrade in services. A survey of firms across selected industries might shedlight on this issue. There is also more to be known about the indirecteffects of migrant-importing strategies on the subsequent economic trends andtrade position of these countries in selected industries. For example, it hasbeen argued that while Germany imported Turkish labor for its auto industry,Japan developed less labor intensive modes of production that ultimatelyproved to be competitively superior.
4.50 For sending areas, there is little documentation of the economicand trade consequences in countries that have followed an explicit or implicitpolicy of training skilled workers for international export (e.g., thePhilippines, Sri Lanka, Barbados). Finally, there is room to assess the tradepotential of developing new labor intensive services such as health care inthese countries.
4.51 The rapid pace of economic change in Central and Eastern Europe(and the adoption of new measures to address deep concerns over potentialmigration from these areas to the West) offer new opportunities for monitoringthe migration impacts of trade, aid, investment, and economic development, andcomparison and contrast to past experience with the migration consequences ofdevelopment in the Third World. Similarly, study of the "turn-around cases"of Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which have recently shifted or are in theprocess of shifting from being countries of emigration to countries ofimmigration, may provide new insights into the relationships amongstmigration, trade, and development.
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Table 1: Economically Active Population, 1970-1990 and 1990-2010…-- - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- -- -- … --
Region/ Estimated/Projected Percent Percent Percent excess ofCountry Economically Active Increase Increase Change Change 1990-2010 over
…-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --_… - - - - -…-
1970 1990 2010 1970-1990 1990-2010 1970-90 1990-2010 1970-1990('000) ('000) ('000) ('000) ('000) (%) (%) (%)
WORLD 1,596,749 2,363,547 3,146,806 766,798 783,259 48.0 33.1 2
Less Developed 1,119,859 1,778,038 2,510,837 658,179 732,799 58.8 41.2 11More Developed 476,890 585,509 635,969 108,619 50,460 22.8 8.6 -54
Latin America 90,808 158,285 246,212 67,477 87,927 74.3 55.5 30Africa 147,629 242,784 425,371 95,155 182,587 64.5 75.2 92Asia, South 431,733 660,932 976,906 229,199 315,974 53.1 47.8 38Asia, East 501,203 775,590 920,817 274,387 145,227 54.7 18.7 -47Oceania 8,196 12,181 15,568 3,985 3,387 48.6 27.8 -15U.S.S.R. 117,276 146,634 167,160 29,358 20,526 25.0 14.0 -30Europe 203,929 231,702 239,098 27,773 7,396 13.6 3.2 -73Northem America 95,974 135,438 155,673 39,464 20,235 41.1 14.9 -49
…-------…------…Source: ILO, Economically Active Population 1950-2025 (1986), Vol. V, Table 2.
LJI0
51
Table 2: Distribution of Remittance Credits, World Total, 1980-1989 (in million current U.S. dollars)---.-------.-----.-----------------.-------.------ .-----------..-----.--...-...---..-..----.-------.-----.- -.----...-------.------....-----..-. ------.--..--- .---.---- ------...-- -.-..--.
Inflows 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Workers Remittances 28,894 27,712 27,578 27,249 27,343 25,691 28,144 31,345 32,700 37,358Migrants Transfers 2,885 3,286 3,076 3,018 2,958 2,862 3,530 5,288 7,709 9,232LaborIncome 11,507 11,109 11,810 12,027 11,333 11,161 13,937 16,566 18,221 18,979
Total 43,286. 42,107 42,464 42,293 41,633 39,714 45,611 53,199 58,631 65,569--------------------------------------------------------------------................................--------------------------------------------------...-------..-----------.....---------....--------
Percent Share of Each Component in World Total Remittance Credits, 1980-1989............. . ............. . .. __._........ __... .. _._..... __ ------ - -- - - - --- -..--- _ - -------- - ------ _._ -------- -_ --- --
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Workers Remittances 66.8 65.8 64.9 64.4 65.7 64.7 61.7 58.9 55.8 57.0Migrants Transfers 6.7 7.8 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.7 9.9 13.1 14.1Labor Income 26.6 26.4 27.8 28.4 27.2 28.1 30.6 31.1 31.1 28.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Annex I
52
Table 3: Distribution of Remittance Debits, World Total, 1980-1989 (in million current U.S. dollars)_ .......... ......... . ...... .................................... . . ....................... ___... _....................
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 i988 1987 1988 1989
Workers Remittances 19,291 19,401 19,314 18,729 17,532 17,011 17,943 19,348 20,360 13,456Migrants Transfers 1,374 1,448 1,409 1,278 1,390 1,342 1,418 1,820 1,849 2,066LaborIncome 11,793 11,289 11,577 11,580 11,321 11,628 14,984 18,799 21,115 22,578
Total 32,457 32,138 32,301 31,587 30,243 29,982 34,345 39,967 43,324 38,100
Percent Share of Each Component in World Total Remittance Credits, 1980-1989
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Workers Remittances 59.4 60.4 59.8 59.3 58.0 56.7 52.2 48.4 47.0 35.3Migrants Transfers 4.2 4.5 4.4 4.0 4.6 4.5 4.1 4.6 4.3 5.4Labor Income 36.3 35.1 35.8 36.7 37.4 38.8 43.6 47.0 48.7 59.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0
Source: Annex 2
53
Table 4: Share of Total Remiance to GDP for Selected Countries (Swamy), 1980-1989
GDP at market prices (a)County (in million U.S. dollars) Percent Sharm (b)
Europe and N. Afnca 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Yugoslavia 73,081 45,636 78,294 5.6 6.9 8.0Greece 40,147 33,754 53,410 2.8 2.8 2.6Turkey 56,919 49,668 79,074 3.6 3.6 3.9Italy 452,719 413,860 865,724 0.7 0.7 0.5Spain 212,096 156,227 379,355 1.0 0.8 0.5Cyprus 2,154 2,278 4,525 4A 3.2 2.1Porugd 24,669 19,165 44,877 12.0 11.5 83Morocco 18,821 12,751 22,386 6.9 22.0 6.5Tunisia 8,742 8,033 10,072 3.6 3.9 . 4.8Algeri 42,347 52,947 49,197 1.0 0.6 0.6
The Middle East 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Egypt, ARL 22,913 30,643 33,399 11.8 12.8 10.6SyrdanA.R. 13,062 17,603 11,464 5.9 1.8 3.1Yemen A.R. - - 7589 - - 5.4Yemnen, PDR 635 1,128 1,193 78.5 61.2 14.6Jordan - 4,735 4,454 - 26.1 14.0Sudan 7,944 9,082 11,677 2.7 4.3 2.5
Asia 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Idia 172,066 194,060 265,721 1.6 13 1.0Pakdstan 23,690 31,152 39,534 7.4 8.8 4.8Bangladesh 12,950 14,130 20,521 1.5 3.7 3.8Korea Rep. of 62,626 90,132 211,877 0.2 0.2 0.3
AMica 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
BurkdnaFaso 1,711 1,295 2,595 8.8 3.5 5.7Mali 1,629 1,061 2,007 3.6 1.6 4.5Benin 1,148 955 1,681 9.4 2.4 3.9Botswana 893 1,138 2,503 8.7 2.0 1.8Malawi 1,239 1,208 1,590 0.0 0.0 0.2Lesotho 368 308 451 71.5 71.5 169.6
Cental andS. America 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Mexico 194,766 175,606 209,934 0.2 0.2 1.1Jamaica 2,679 2,374 3,869 3.7 2.0 5.5Colombia 33,400 38,253 39,441 0.3 0.2 1.2El Salvador 3,567 4,134 6,446 13 2A 0.0Paraguay 4,579 4,392 4,115 1.1 0.6 0.8Bolivia 3,073 2,799 4,518 0.0 0.1 0.2
Sources: (a) GDP: World Bank International Economics Department(b) Renittances: Annex 3
54
Table 5: Share of Total Remittances to Merchandise Export for Selected Countries (Swamy), 1967-1989.
Country Merchandise Exports (in mflion U.S. dollars) (a) Percent Share
Europe and N. Africa 1980 1984 1989 1967 (b) 1973 (b) 1980 (c) 1984 (c) 1989 (c)
Yugosavia 9,093 10,136 13.560 9.8 49.4 45.1 31.3 46.4Greece 4,093 4.934 5,994 49.9 59.3 27.3 19.2 23.1Turkey 2,910 7,389 11,771 17.5 90.2 71.2 24.5 26.0taly 77,024 73,836 140,302 9.0 7.0 4.4 3.9 2.8Spain 20,544 22,714 43,301 22.4 17.0 10.6 5.4 4.3Cyprus 489 523 717 15.2 9.4 19.2 14.1 13.0Portugal 4,582 5,206 12,751 28.5 63.3 64.8 42.3 29.1Morocco 2,415 2,161 3,312 12.4 27.4 54.1 129.6 43.9Tunisia 2,158 1,776 2,931 13.3 23.8 14.8 17.8 16.6Algeria 13,652 12,792 7,620 25.4 18.2 3.0 2.6 4.0
The Middle East 1980 1984 1989 1967 (b) 1973 (b) 1980 (c) 1984 (c) 1989 (c)
Egypt, A.R. 3,854 3,864 3,755 4.4 11.7 70.0 101.7 94.1Syrian A.R 2,112 1,834 2,812 3.2 10.4 36.6 17.5 12.6Yemen AR 13 9 606 83.7 134.0 9661.5 12552.9 67.6Yemen. PDR 60 31 114 Dn. 1373.7 835.6 2249.2 152.6Jordan 575 752 1,109 58.3 60.8 138.1 164.5 56.2Sudan 594 519 543 0.5 1.2 36.3 76.1 54.7
Asia 1980 1984 1989 1967 (b) 1973 (b) 1980 (c) 1984 (c) 1989 (c)
Endia 8,332 10,192 11,884 9.8 6.1 28.1 25.0 23.1Pakistan 2.341 2,480 4,906 n. 20.8 89.6 110.4 38.7Bangladesh 722 932 1,305 na. 4.9 50.2 56.5 59.1Koa Rep. of 17,214 26,335 61,408 10.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.0
Afiica 1980 1984 1989 1967 (b) 1973 (b) 1980 (c) 1984 (c) 1989 (c)
Burkina Faso 161 141 214 n a 4.7 95.3 64.0 68.7Mali 205 192 268 78.1 83.0 23.2 16.9 33.7Benin 222 224 379 9.2 24.5 57.2 18.0 17.4Botswana 545 678 1,817 56.6 80.4 13.7.- 7.4 2.5Maawi 281 312 297 37.9 16.9 0.0 0.0 1.2Lesotho 58 28 66 5.4 7.1 501.0 1139.8 11592
Central andS. Ameica 1980 1984 1989 1967 (b) 1973 (b) 1980 (c) 1984 (c) 1989 (c)
Mexico 15,511 24,196 22,765 1I1 4.8 2.1 1.7 10.0Jamaica 963 702 1,017 7.1 19.3 10.4 11.2 21.1Colombia 3,986 4,273 6,029 4.4 0.4 2.7 1.8 7.7ElSalvador 1,075 726 611 0.6 n.s. 4.4 21.6 0.0Paraguay 583 361 1,097 naL 2.4 8.9 6.6 3.2Bolivia 942 725 724 na. 0.3 0.1 0.8 1.2
Sources: (a) WB International Economics Department(b) Figures fron Swamy 1981(c) Annex 3
55
Table 6: Share of Total Remittances to Merchandise Imports for Selected Countries (Swamy), 1980-1989
County Merchandise Imports (in million U.S. dollars) (a) Percent Share (b)
Europe and N. Africa 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Yugoslavia 13,992 10,925 13,502 29.3 29.0 46.6Greece 9,650 8,624 13,377 11.6 11.0 10.4Turkey 7,513 10,331 15,972 27.6 17.5 19.2Italy 93,958 79,654 142,292 3.6 3.6 2.8Spain 32,272 26,985 67,797 6.8 4.5 2.7Cyprus 1,079 1,225 2,072 8.7 6.0 4.5Portugal 8,611 7,233 17,943 34.5 30.4 20.7Morocco 3,770 3,569 4,991 34.7 78.5 29.1Tunisia 3,139 2,929 4,137 10.1 10.8 11.8Algeria 9,596 9,235 6,675 4.2 3.6 4.6
The Middle East 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Egypt, A.R. 6,814 10,080 11,419 39.6 39.0 30.9Syrian AtL 4,010 3,687 1,821 19.3 8.7 19.5Yemen A.R. 1,869 1,401 1,283 67.2 76.2 31.9Yemen, PDR 598 734 554 83.3 94.0 31AJordan . 2,398 2,473 1,883 33.1 50.0 33.1Sudan 1,339 600 1,051 16.1 65.9 28.3
Asia 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
India 15,892 14,216 17,661 17.5 17.9 15.6Pakistan 4,857 6,234 7,359 36.0 43.9 25.8Bangladesh 2,372 2,340 3,291 8.3 22.5 23AKorea, Rep. of 21,598 27,371 56,811 0.5 0.5 1.1
Africa 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Burkina Faso 368 270 513 40.9 33.4 28.7Mali 308 258 344 19.3 12.6 26.2Benin 499 291 511 21.5 13.8 12.9Botswana 603 583 1,066 12.8 8.6 4.3Malawi 308 162 253 0.0 0.0 1.5Lesotho 424 433 565 62.1 74.5 135A
Central andS. America 1980 1984 1989 1980 1984 1989
Mexico 18,896 11,255 23,410 1.8 3.7 9.7Jamaica 1,038 1,037 1,569 9.6 7.6 13.7Colombia 4,283 4,027 4,548 2.5 1.9 10.3El Salvador 897 915 967 5.3 17.2 0.0Paraguay 1,054 649 1,171 4.9 3.7 3.0Bolivia 574 412 730 0.2 1A 1.2
Sources: (a) WB International Economics Department(b) Calculated from Annex 3
56
Tebl 7: Dlstuibufiou of Remittance, Swamy's Selcted Coul., 1980-1989
1980 1961 1962 1983 1964 1985 1986 1967 1988 1989
Workers Reminu 25,867 24,965 24.713 24.494 24,777 23,212 25,187 27,937 28850 33,206Miz Trmansfrs 716 825 683 1,161 2,223 5,482 1,426 1,781 1.297 227LAbor Incom 3,747 3,667 3.783 3.665 3.651 3,438 4,197 4,650 4.611 4,693
Total 30,330 29.456 29.179 29,320 30.650 32,132 30.810 34,368 34,758 38,126
Shim ciEKa Compoent to Total Remimmanes, Selected Com (Swany), 190-90
Worker Remis 85.3 64.8 84.7 83.5 80.8 72.2 81.8 81.3 83.0 87.1MlPsTrndfs 2.4 2.6 2.3 4.0 7.3 17.1 4.6 5.2 3.7 06LAbelocoe 12.4 12.4 13.0 12.5 11.9 M7 13.6 13.5 13.3 12.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sbha of Total Workens' Remitances for Swuny's Selected Coammies to World's Total 1980.1990.
1980 1981 1962 1983 1964 1965 1986 1987 1988 1969
Worker' Remilces 89.5 90.1 89.6 89.9 90.6 94 89.5 89.1 86.2 68.9MIss' Trnsfs 24.8 25.1 22 38.5 75.2 191.5 40.4 33.7 16.8 2.5Lar Income 32.6 33.0 32.0 30.5 32.2 30.8 30.1 2&1 25.3 24.7
TOa Share 70. 70.0 67 69.3 73.6 80.9 87.5 64.6 59.3 53.1
Soue: Annex 1-3
57
Annex 1
Table 1.1: Global Workers' Remittance Credits, 1980-1989 (US$ thousands)..................----..-...--.---..... ...........................................................................................................................................................
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Afghanistan .. .. ..Albania .. .. .. .. ..Algeria 405,738 447,193 506,730 392,374 329,496 313,457 358,334 486,624 378,713 306,000American samoa .. .. ..Angola .. .. ..Antigua & Barbuda .. .. ..Argentina ..Australia .. .. .. .. .. ..Austria 214,757 197,826 200,951 188,343 175,526 183,600 268,699 364,883 410,222 419,801Bahamas .. ..BahrainBangladesh 197,400 362,300 368,300 575,700 526,600 363,700 497,400 617,400 737,000 771,000Barbados .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Belgium...............Belgium-Luxembourg 534,106 455,331 387,819 393,910 357,544 384,975 481,563 553,660 628,459 584,838Belize .. .. .. .. 17,650 20,650 16,850 15,850 12,900 17,900Benin 107,400 127,000 99,500 23,600 38,200 52,500 68,700 84,500 81,600 65,900Bermuda .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Bolivia 0 500 .500 500 500 300 500 600 800 800Botswana .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Brazil 4,000 14,000 6,000 2,000 4,000 2,000 0 0 0..Brunei .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Burkina Faso 150,271 153,321 110,269 113,162 90,192 125,876 191,739 173,357 165,185 147,332Burundi .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Cameroon 11,000 21,100 17,300 25,600 14,200 1,000 2,000 3,000 3,400 2,700Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Cape Verde 40,065 31,597 25,852 20,548 20,618 20,757 26,703 31,640 35,653 40,242Central African R. .. .. .. .. .. ..Chad .. .. .. .. .. 33 1,230 1,354 346 793Channel Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Chile .. .. .. .. ..China 640,000 464,000 541,000 446,000 317,000 180,000 208,000 166,000 129,000 76,000Colombia 68,000 99,000 71,000 63,000 71,000 105,000 393,000 616,000 448,000 459,000Comoros 1,619 1,222 2,368 1,837 2,140 4,229 4,765 6,801 7,383 7,887Congo, People's R. 781 .. .. .. .. .. .Cook Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Costa Rica .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0 0.Cote D'lvoire .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Cuba...............Cyprus .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0Czechoslovakia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14,300Dominica 8,600 8,500 7,500 9,400 10,800 11,100 9,300 10,700 11,700.Dominican Republic 183,100 182,900 190,000 195,000 205,000 242,000 230,300 277,400 292,900 305,800Ecuador .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ..Egypt, Arab Rep. 2,696,000 2,180,860 2,081,900 3,165,400 3,930,500 3,496,200 2,972,800 3,011,900 3,383,900 3,532,000El Salvador 10,880 42,160 77,720 92,480 114,200 126,200 138,557 167,400 194,380.................................................................................................................................................................................................
58
Table 1.1: Global Workers' Remittance Credits, 1980-1 989 (US$ thousands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Equatorial Guinea . ..
Ethiopia ... .. .. .. .25,940
Faeroe Islands... * .
Fiji O.. . .0. .. 0 19,100.
Former Spanish . .. .. ..
SaharaFrance 447,485 346,810 321,997 336,418 342,214 230,501 321,966 398,577 444,71 9 541,425French Guiana . .. ..
French Polynesia ......
Gabon 47 184 61 289 92 134 231 266 134..Gambia,T7he ... .0 0 0 0 0.German DA .. .... ..
Germany, FR . ..
Ghana 500 800 900 400 4,500 400 600 700 6.000 6,000Gibraltar . .. .. ..
Greece 1,066,000 1,057,000 1,016,000 912,000 898,000 775,000 942,000 1,334,000 1,675.000 1,350,000Greenland . .. .. ..
Grenada . .. .. ..
Guadeloupe . ..
Guatemala ... . ... .. .42,700 68,700Guinea . .. .. ..
Guinea-Bissau ... .. .1,500.
Guyana ... 2,300 1,167.....Haiti 106,440 126,620 97,040 89,880 90,000 95,780 105,420 113,160 124,100 122,800Honduras . .. .. ..
Hong kong . .. .. ..
Hungary . .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 139,042
indria 2,786,000 2,339,000 2,526,000 2,587,000 2,542.000 2,220,000 2,287,000 2.721,000 2,605,000 2,750,000Indonesia ... .10,000 53,000 61,000 71,000 86,000 99,000 167,000Iran, Islamic Rep. . .. .. ..
Isle of Man . .. .. ..
Italy 1,235,520 1,163,260 1,185,280 1,135,750 1,114,330 1,083,140 1,211,200 1,214,030 1,226,500 1,381,210Jamaica 50,600 62,700 74,500 41,600 26,100 92,300 54,000 58,800 67,700 117,200
Jordan 714,600 929,400 975,500 999,000 1,113,000 921,100 1,066,400 844,200 804,600 561,100Kampuchea .. .. .....
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.
Korea, DPR . .. .. ... .
Korea, Republic of . .. .. .. ..
Lao, PDR ..... .....
Lebanon . .. .. .. ..
Lesotho . .. .... 0. .. 400,100Uberia O.. .. . .. ..Libyan AR . .. .. .. ..
59
Table 1,1; Global Workers! Remittance Credits, 1980-1 989 (US$ thousands).
Country 1980 1 981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Luxembourg . .. .. ..
Macao . .. .. ..
Madagascar 379 221 114 116 5.636 4,574 4,229 3,358 3,226 3,330Malavwi.... ...... . 3,700Malaysia.........Maldives ... .2,500 2,500.. 600..Mali 59,400 59,400, 59,400 59,400 59,400 59,400 59,400 59,400 59,400 59,400Malta 22,291 19,395 16,257 17,574 13,882 10,658 10,433 16,498 26,900 40,460Martinique.. .......
Mauritania 5.576 3,706 2,318 1,222 956 791 1,855 6,700 9,301 4,780Mauritius ... . .... 0.Mexico 139,000 128,000 98,000 111,000 177,000 173,000 180,000 207,000 209,000 1,821,000Mongolia... ... ..
Montserrat . .. .. ..
Morocco 1,053,690 1,013,480 849,241 916,145 871,797 967,156 1,398,330 1,587,230 1,303,420 1,336,450Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.
Nepal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Netherlands Antfilles . .. .. ..
Netherlands, The . .. .. ..
New Caledonia . .. .. ..
Now Zealand 200,670 196,941 214,728 229,754 290,575 322,490 352,566 429,537 501,037 514,378Nicaragua . .. .. ..
Niger 5,883 4,578 3,354 2,984 4,479 2,101 ... 10,072 9,718Nigeria 12,899 13,626 11,962 8,381 6,556 9,920 4,526 2,704 2,453 10,187
Norway 12,756 8,816 11,149 9,486 9,626 10,777 11,495 11,613 9,074 17,112Oman 34,742 40,533 43,428 43,428 43,428 43,429 39,269 39,012..
Pacific Isi. Trust Territo . .. .. .
Pakistan 1,747,600 2,097,400 2,226,600 2,888,100 2,738,400 2,456,300 2,597,000 2,280,300 2,017,700 1,897,000Panama . .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea ... . . .. .. .46,100
Paraguay 2,000 1,700 800 200 400 100..
Philippines 205,000 254,000 239,000 180,000 59,000 111,000 163,000 211,000 388,000 360,000Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0..Portugal 2,927,690 2,838,090 2,601,790 2,117,720 2,151,820 2,090,580 2,544,280 3,253,770 3,377,530 3,561,640Puerto Rico......... ..
Reunion ...........
Romania... ... ... .
Rwanda 1,088 1,659 1,486 1,601 1,188 1,333 1,723 1,895 1,125 1,000Sao Tome & Principe 774 878 671 1,039 3,254 249 60 24 14 95Saudi Arabia O.. .. , .. ..Senegal 74,783 64,476 62,202 55,109 50,348 55,046 69,303 69,875 73,863 70,531Seychelles . .. .. .. ..
Sierra Leone . .0 0 0.. . ..
Singapore . .. .. .. ..
Solomon islands . .. .. .. ..
60
Table 1.1: Global Workers! Remittance Credits, 1980.1989 (US$ fthusands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
SomalIa 57,252 7,149 19,897 21,701South Africa*.,Spain 1,648,590 1,296,470 1,122,080 938,658 844,196 1,032,890 1,183,860 1,315,540 1,529,740 1,601,450Sri Lanika 151,701 229,559 289,307 294,477 300,945 291,652 325,968 350,058 357,667 355,923St. Klts &Nevis 793 1,111 1,100 1,111 1,311 1,063 1,037 1,111 1,185 1,185St. Lucia . . . . .. 0.St. Vincent . .. .. ..
and the GrenadaSudan 209,000 305,000 350,000 415,000 395,000 430,000 350,000 250,000 445,000 297,000Suriname 784 224.. ... ...
Swaziland . . . . . ..
Sweden .. . . . . . .15,862 22,787 32,524Switzediand ... 83,733 84,797 69,371 77,326 105,619 127,415 129,844 116,142Syrian Arab Rep. 773,500 436,000 410,700 386,500 321,400 349,600 323,000 334,000 360,000 355,000Tanzania 8,000 9,000 7,000 7,000 14,000 45,000 48,000 41,000 0 0Thailand . .. .. ..
Togo 9,935 7,864 6,114 6,078 6,609 15,405 21,423 14,308 14,773 14,106
Tonga 0 0 0 15,500 13,900 14,900 20,800 20,300 20,300.Trinidad and Tobago 1,417 1,417 1,375 1,375 250 204 167 278 1,717 2,871Tunisia. 318,555 353,667 372,447 359,476 316,670 270,822 361,448 486,326 544,413 487,717Turkey 2,071,000 2,490,000 2,140,000 1,513,000 1,807,000 1,714,000 1,634,000 2,021,000 1,776,000 3,040,000Tuvalu . . .. .
Uganda . . . . . ..
United Arab Emirates . . . .. ..
United Kingdom . . . .. ..
United States .. . . . .
Uruguay . . . .. ..
Vanuatu . .8,315 5,636 6,855 6,891 6,882 6,713 7,021Venezuela . . . . . ..
Wallis and Futuna . . . . . ..
Western Samioa 18,742 18,558 18,628 20,334 20,271 23,828 28,621 36,635 37,708 40,873Yemen AR 974,000 624,000 748,000 790,000 653,000 451,000 340,000 427,600 574,500 409,700Yemen, PDR 352,350 409,386 474,529 490,742 505,508 429,074 294,156 304,868 255,070 173,714Yugoslavia 4,102,000 3,960,000 4,185,000 3,429,000 3,168,000 3,106,000 3,731,000 4,051,000 4,593,000 6,290,002Zaire O.. .. .. ..Zambia . .. .. .. 0 1,000..Zimbabwe 9,337 736 2,334.. . ..
Total 28,894,085 27,711,622 27,578,344 27,248,501 27,342,935 25,691,492 28,144,307 31,344,733 32,700,437 37,357,900
Source: WS International Economics Department
61
Annex 1
Table 1.2: Global Migrants' Transfers Credits, 1980-90 (US$ thousands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. ..Albania .. .. .. .. .. ..Algeria .. .. .. .. ..American samoa .. .. .. .. .. .Angola .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. ..Argentina .. .. .. .. .. ..Australia 503,898 594,803 614,818 756,940 780,790 879,725 978,528 1,310,800 1,790,400 2,162,810Austria 29,968 26,081 20,829 26,993 23,185 18,051 34,647 37,067 40,047 51,211Bahamas .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Bahrain .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Bangladesh .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Barbados .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Belgium..... ..........Belgium-Luxembourg .. .. .. .. .. .Belize .. .. .. .. ... .*Benin .. .. .. .Bermuda .. .. .. ..
Bhutan .. .. .. .. ..Bolivia .. 3,000 1,000 3,000 3,800 4,200 5.000 5,500 1,300 5,900Botswana 9,135 9,561 7,770 8,387 7,856 5,571 3,193 6,969..Brazil 80,000 88,000 37,000 20,000 37,000 31,000 32,000 31,000 23,000Brunei .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Burkina Faso .. .. .. ..Burundi .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Cameroon .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Canada 937,889 1,113,480 1,275,340 1,199,870 1,203,040 1,245,960 1,352,940 2,498,550 4,347,818 5,268,738Cape Verde .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Central African Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Chad... .............Channel Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Chile . .... .. .. .. China .. .. 2,000 .. .. 58,000 94,000 299,000 171,000Colombia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Comoros * .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Congo, People's Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .'Cook Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Costa Rica .. .. .. .. .. .. 0..Cote D'Ivoire .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Cuba.. .............Cyprus 31,157 26,102 24,191 22,406 20,735 20,570 22,774 24,943 22,930 21,276Czechoslovakia .. .. .. .. .Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti..... ..........Dominica..... ..........Dominican Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Ecuador .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Egypt, Arab Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..El Salvador .. .. .. .. .. .. .. … .. ..
62
Table 1.2: Global Migrants' Transfers Credits, 1980-90 (US$ thousands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Equitorial Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ethiopia...............Faeroe Islands .. .. .. .
Fiji 572 1,397 1,226 687 1,337 609 720 89 69 133Finland...............Former Spanish Sahara .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
France .. .. .. .. .. .. ..French Guiana .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
French Polynesia .. .. .. .. ..
Gabon .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Gambia, The .. .. 197 745.. .. ..
German Democratic Rep... .. .. .. .. .. ..
Germany, Federal Rep. .. .. ..
Ghana .. .. .. .. .. .. 0..Gibraltar .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Greenland .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Guadeloupe .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Guam...............GuatemalaGuinea .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Guyana .. .. .. .. 2,610.. ..
Haiti . .. . . .. .. ..Honduras .. .. .. .. .. .0. ..Hong kong .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Hungary .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Iceland 700 2,400 500 1,400 5,500 3.400 5,600 10,000 18,400 25,900India . .. .. .-. ..Indonesia .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Iran, Islamic Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Isle of .. .. .. .. .. .. ..ManIsrael 296,000 402,000 122,000 103,000 98,000 82,000 354,000 500,000 348,000 624,000Italy......... ......Jamaica .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Jordan .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Kampuchea .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Kenya 2,426 7,074 6,775 5,484 5,620 6,147 9,799 10,271 11,833 11,229Kiribati...............Korea, DPR .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Korea, Republic of 4,000 3,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 6,000 9,000Kuwait...............Lao, POR .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Lebanon .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Lesotho .. .. .. .. .. .. 0..Ubyra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Libyan Arab Republic ................................... ............................ ._. _ .. _......._ _.__......... _...__......_ ..___._._ ._. .............
63
Table 1.2: Global Migrants' Transfers Credit, 1980-90 (US$ thiousands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Luxembourg . . . . .
Macao. . . .. ..
Madagascar ... .... .1.641 1,291 803 1.665
Malaysia . . . .. ..
Maldives . . . .. ..
Malta 5.790 4,655 3,882 3.237 3.037 2,984 4,326 4,342 6,952 6,026Martinique . . . .. ..
Mauritania . . . .. ..
Mauritius . .. .. ..
Mexico . . . .. ..
Mongolia . . . .. ..
Montserrat ..
Morocco 254 387 332 844 1,930 5,366 1,318 1,675 1,218 118Mozamibique . . . .. ..
Myanmar.. . .. ....
Namibia . ... ....
Netherlands Antilles 558 1,167 1,3 833 1,056 500 20,556 556..Netherlands, The 85,686 106,110 151,994 115,058 96,711 107,484 140,138 163,817 209,738 242,811New Caledonia . . . .. ..
New Zealand 55,482 62,733 65,191 58,801 49,323 19,595 52,966 31,192 42,500 54,713Nicaragua . . . .. ..
Norway 75,518 101,556 80,493 78,582 78,144 80,633 81,493 103,637 107,046 101,210Oman . . . .... 0.
Pacific lsl. Trust Terr. . . . . . ..
Paidstan . . . .. ..
Panama . . .... .. 0.Papua New Guinea 5,446 4,737 6,100 4,313 5,355 5,607 7,007 13,434 10,013 7,227Paraguay . . . .. ..
Philippines .. . . . .1,000 2,000.Poland . . . .. ..
Portugal .. . . . .. .13,856..
Puerto Rico . . . .. ..
Reunion . . . .. ..
Romania . . . .. ..
Rwanda 1,820 1,790 5,493 1,684 1,617 1,343 2,020 2,347 2,355 2,101Sao Tome and Principe . . . .. ..
Saudi Arabia . . . .. ..
Seneal . .. .. ..
Seychelles . . . .. ..
Sierra Leone 95. 81 53 80 39.. 76 80..Singapore . . . .. ..
Solomon islands .. .. .... .
64
Table 1.2: Global Migrants' Transfers Credits, 1980-90 (US$ thousands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Somalia..... ..........South Africa 64,292 44,754 42,476 44,883 37,323 26,722 19,019 20,650 28,950 22,830Spain 410,829 381,727 312,406 277,886 253,089 77,980 70,783 50,158 48,237 49,956Sri Lanka .. .. .. .. .. .. ..St. Kilts and Nevis .. .. .. .. ..St. Lucia .. .. .. .. .. 0 .. ..St. Vincent .. .. .. .. .. ..and the Grenada
Sudan 6,600 14,672 1,221 .. .. .. ..Suriname 1,905 2,129 1,849 2,577 2,633 1,961 896 1,120 1,513 1,120Swaziland .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. 38,119 29,321 37,145Switzerland .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Syrian Arab Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Tanzania .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Thailand 6,849 2,480 391 87 87 704 647 1,986 198 79Timor..... ..........Togo..... ..........Tokelau .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Tonga .. .. .. 379 1,543 965 802 1,433 328..Trinidad and Tobago. 4,583 2,833 3,542 3,458 3,417 3,102.. 1,833.. 376Tunisia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 0Turkey ... .. .. .. .23.000Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Uganda .. .. .. ... .. .. ..United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. .. .. ..United Kingdom .. .. .. .. .. .. ..United States 260,000 250,000 250,000 250,000 220,000 220,000 260,000 300,000 310,000 330,000Uruguay .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..USSR..... ..........Vanuatu .. .. 1,039 1,510 1,613 1,844 1,141 1,750 989..Venezuela .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Viet Nam..... ..........Virgin Islands (U.S.) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Wallis and Futuna .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Western Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Yemen Arab Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Yemen, PDR .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Yugoslavia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Zaire..... ..........Zambia..... ..........Zimbabwe 3,735 27,296 30,084 18,894 3,327 124 243 181 ............... ................ _.... .. _..... ..... _. .. _........ .......... __.....................................................
Total 2,885,185 3,285,931 3,075,553 3,017,971 2,957,756 2,862,186 3,530,197 5,287,640 7,709,037 9,231,575
Source: WB International Economics Department
65
Tabl 1.3: GI"ba Labwr beam Ciediw,. 1960I969(Cm US$ tboqwa.d).
Coaafy 1960 1961 1962 1983 19614 196 196 1967 196 2969
A%fuhaaim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0..
Algera 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0..A.lmriusmost .. .... ..
Argentina .56,000 42,000 23,000 26,000 32,000 27.000 32,00 34,000..Autalia 177,6153 2M0,233 2l,5.26 196,579 245,751 167,60 149,196 175,864 223,999 328,936
Banglad"s 0 0 0 0 0 0.Burbados 9,447 11,435 9,646 9,297 11,237 8,999 11,734 11,863 9,37 10,739
B*W-4-Ln.bow 64,969 493,545 449,515 454,651 422,495 432,30 616,854 721,531 801,666 822,855Nho ...... 100 400 7,55 3,500 4,050 4,050Buie...... 2,000 4,229 6,930 6,655 7,38..
Bhutan . .. .. ..
Bolivia 1.400 1,20 1,200 1,50 1,500 1,500 2,50 2,00 2,400 1,600Boaww.. 68.191 65,014 46,657 47,496 42,130 25.702 34,058 47,351 54,687 46,037Brail 26,000 21.000 12,000 7.000 7,000 7,000 8,000 10,000 9,000..
Bwkina Fuc 161 40 33 52 46 47 75..
Cuanroos 18,400 7,600 1,700 2,400 70 2,200 2,50 3,100 3,500..
Ca"e Verde ... . .. 57 1,64 2,012 3.437CenualAhican Rep. 38 1 1 37 21.. ..
Chad aae ....
Chile . 1,000 1,000 1,000. 1,000.. 1,000China 0 0 0 75.000 66,000 91.000 199,000 51,000 35.000 44,000Caoloba" 36,000 61,000 16,00 9,000 7,000 5,000 23,000 9,000 10,000 8,000CommssCono;, Peoples Rep of die 2,395.. 0 0. 43 10 4,432 4,136cook WeandeCostaRica .. 100 100 300 400 400 500 500 600..cote D'Ivoue 32,185 30913 281,910 27,030 24,94 24,040 35,8(1 42,923..
Cyprus 62,88 56949 355534 55,826 52,65 50,935 57,127 63,813 71,363 71,934
Domium Republic .. .. ..
Ecuador .. ,.. .
Eypt.Aab Rapmblic of . .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0El Salvador 36.920 211,640 33.400 20,960 42,640 26,160 14,571 17,180 12,620..
66
TAWl 13: GO loAlLbor Income Credits, 1960I969 (in US$ bsum)
Country 1960 1961 1962 1983 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Equatoia Guinea .. .
EhIopia 12.222 10,483 10,193 11,015 11.49 14.203 113.7 6.55 11,304 8,454Faerc Weands . .*
Ff ~~~~4,30 7,882 6,65 7294 9,314 6,32 ,72 7.716 - 3,2 22,805Finand 106,254 95,760 107,548 97,176 49,415 60.672 74,044 77,742 105,306 70,851Fowmer Spwaish Sahr . .. .
France 992.881 931,490 1,015,89 94z2,52 919,931 1,162,96 1,69696 207,930 2,794,790 Z474.020French GuIwan .. *-*-
Frech Polynesia . --
Gabon .- ,33.
GambImThe .. 0 0 0 0 O.Germa Democratic Rsp~ ..
Germany, edral Repub 1,990,480 1,961,510 2,162,96 2,100,570 1,9315,820 2,061,430 2,99,02 4,002,86 4,567,380 6,111,609Ghana 400 600 600 100 200 3,800 4,600 6,30 5,300 5,400
Greew 53,000 112Z000 124,000 52,000 47,000~ 32000 25,000 73,000 62,00 37,000Grenedw .
Gus"eotWe . ..
Guam...Guatemala 26.200 24,500 10,700 3,900 3,40 1,00 700 100 3.000 16,500Guinea . ..
Guirle"Nlsau ..MGuyana . ..
Honduras 1,600 1,750 1,500 180 1,950 2,100 2,100 2.55 2,000 2,200
Hungary .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0icelan 800 700 700 g00 1,30 1.700 2,00 4,700 4,000 4,300India 1,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 3,000. 3,470.Indonwsia .
kwa, IslamIc Rep. of .
isleof MenIsrael 202,000 207,000 228,000 212,00 203,000 156,000 1194,000 236,000 244,000 240,000Italy 2,151,260 1,651,230 1,869,330 1,836,470 1,771,040 1,76,150 2,301,660 2,374,810 2.52,620 2,544,710Jamaica 49,500 48,900 52,300 48,700 2,400 69,30 7230 105,300 97,000 97,000Jewa 140,000 190,000 21000 10,000 MO 210000 2,10,000 16,00 260,000 290,000 370,000Jordan 79,400 103,300 108,400 111,000 123,700 102,300 116.600 93,600 89,400 62,400Kampuches. .. . . ..
Kenya 10,512 332 275 225 206 163 247 243 225..l0rtIa 1,54 1,954 2,536 2,252 2,194 1,67 2,1139..Korea Denmoc PeopWes F......... ,
Kora, Repuxlc ot 101,000 126,000 117.000 121,000 142,000 274,000 3568,000 439,000 617,000 615,000Kuwait. .. .,
Lao, PDR . .. .,
Lesoto 263214 290,5819 348,125 377,863 322,56 223,916 256449 363,067 371,459 364,9159
Libyan Auab Republic . ,,
67
Tabl 1.3: lobal Labor Incm Cr,dits, 1960.1989 (in US$ thousanis)
Couay 1960 1961 1962 1983 1964 198S 1966 1967 2968 1989
Luxebourg...
Madagasca 5ao.. ... oo..
Malaysia ... .. .. .48,817 99,665 138,436MakNs ....
man .. ..
Matta 6,948 4,138 19,166 21,968 19,955 21,102 31,044 25,162 17,83 23,530
Maudlw . ......a.
Mexico 194,000 216,000 I82Z000 153,000 240,000 298,000 328,000 368,00 415,000 456,000
moroo . .... . .. 0 0 0Mozambique 53,400 64,500 63,500 75,200 57,000 40,800 50,000 68,000 71,60 71,30Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0..NamhlWa . .
Nepa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Netherlands ArWile 5,556 5,500 3,556 4,056 5,056 2,611 2,776 2,778..Nethedads, Th. 518,671 450,161 504,224 451,964 3K9613 394,046 485,864 589,492 604,448 523 988New C;aledonla .... .. .
Now Zealad. .... ..
Nicaragua. .... ..
Nie 5,400 4,604 3,M8 3,6556 2,90 6,8.Nigeri 9,178 3,251 5,940 5,527 5,221.. .
Niuea - 339 1,7 490 13,166- 13,281- 14,027 17,858 19,612 22,126' 22,607Oman.........0.OAN 105,000 140,000 132,000 111,000 96,000 76,000 61,000 56.000 50,000 51,000Pacific lsL Trust Tomb . . . ... *
Pakdstan ... .. .0 0 00.Panama 800 900 900 600 700 500 300 100..Papua Now Glunea . .. .. ..
Paraguy 50,100 61,400 40,600 33,000 23,600 11,20 13,700 22,600 20,400 34,700
Philppnes 421,000 546,000 810,000 WO4,00 659,000 894,000 696,000 809,000 874,000 1,002,000POlan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0..Portugal 40,794 48,712 35,418 38,616 48,578 73,220 74,397 118,701 146,606 144,159Puerto Ricoo. .. .. ..
Reunion . .. .. .
Rom¶ania . .. .. ..
Rwanda 226 205 216 233 140 188 274 226 327 325Sao Toewnad Prlnclp. 78 41 57.. 29 26 46 so 62
S alM I 2,272 3,717 4,108 3,8581 3,410 3.339 4,399 4.991 5,036 4,702Seychelles . .. ..
SkerraLeon ... 0 0 0.. .
Singapore . .. .. ..
Solomon Isands . .. .. ..
68
Tabl 1.3: Gloolm Labor Income Cgedit. 1980-1989 (in US$ uhousnds).
Country 19810 198 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1918 19899
SurnaMe .. .. .. .. .. .. ..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .... ....... ..
Souh Artea 836,518 851,851 781,690 877,031 758,838 571.831 646,5015 825,618 828,032 1,021,970Spain 128,514 137,587 147,070 131,488 129,458 123,620 178,437 217,976 212,350 209,704Sd Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0..Sft. sand Nevis . ... ... 100 100 200 200St. Lucia .. .689.. O. ..St. Vincen and The Greoa. .. . ... 1,900 2,700 2,00 2000Sudan . .. .. ..
swlname 672 1,064 392 784 672 560 56 56 56.Swazilnd 35.311 39,934 37,207 53,047 52,668 47,660 58,010 78,584 94,525 88,116Sweden 65,988 67,647.. 22,164 22,967 23,343 18.435 4422 52,220 54,324SWZrwiten 608,608 442,919 443,290 466,381 426,440 421,224 56,884 651,82 698,371 633,892SyrkanArab tepubk .. .... .. 0 0..Tanzania 3,000 3,000. .....
Thailand 376,282 475.387 618,348 845,957 893,205 876,559 794,589 839,874 926,561 942,081
Tclwlau .....
Tong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 500.Trinidad and Tobago . .. .. ..
TLiIsle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Turkey ... .. .. .. .0
United Arab Eminates . .. .. .,
United K(ingdom . .. .. ..
United States 270,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 110,000 120,000 130,000 160,000Urugtsay .....
Vanuatu . .. .. ..
Venezuela ... .16,085 8,200 1,000..
Virgin Islands (U.S.) . .. .. ..
WaKls and Futuina .. .... .
Westen Safmo .. .. .....
Yemen Arab RepulI 282,000 303,000 442,000 456,000 414,000 358,000 330,000 334,100..Yemen, PDR 146.000 155,000 160.000 170.000 185,000.. ... .0
Yugoslavia .... .0 0.. 0 O..
Zambia .... .0 0.ZIbabwe 3,890 296 515 684 484 496 643 964..
Total 11,506.539 11,109,192 11,809,841 12,026,687 11,332,750 11,160,590 13,936,947 16,666,305 18,221,275 18,979,151
Source: WS International Econornics Departmen
69
Annex 2
Table 2.1: Global Workers' Remittances, Debit, 1980-1989 (UIS$ thousands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Afghanistn . .. .. .
Algeria 164.693 149,682 126,301 156,824 141,270 130,872 101,439 82,272 53,257Amertican safmoa . .. .. ..
Angola . .. .. ..
Antigua and Barbuda . .. ..
Argentina . .. .. ..
Austmai .. . .. ..
Austria 282,115 252,791 226,357 190,868 169,851 154,947 186,696 186,297 20Y7,896 240,921Bahamas 18,300 12,600 16.900 8.800 13,100 13,300 13,700 17,300 27,100 16,400Bahmain 95.756 106,649 108,245 100,266 111,436 228.191 207,979 193,617 194,149 198,670Bangladesh 200 200 100 0 200 200 0 0.Barbados . .. .. ..
Belgium-Luxemnbourg 803,822 786,280 593.385 528,589 464,591 429,436 507,176 639,414 664,723 797,510Belie ...... 900 800 900 550 450 450Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0' 0 0 0Bermnuda . .. .. ..
Bhutan . .. ..
Bolivia 0 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 0 1,100 4,100 1,300Botswana 16,726 20.317 19,618 21,515 23.491 15,295 21,340.Brazil 3,000 2,000 2,000 4,000 1,000.. .
Brunei . .. .. ..
Bulparia . .. .. ..
Buridna Faso 50,601 43,558 34,351 38,621 33,560 37,199 49,269 73,303 74,622 70,281Burundi . .. .. ..
Cameroon 81,300 97,200 92,500 112,200 103,300 0 0 0 0 0Canada . .. .. ..
Cape Verde . .. .. ..
Central African Rep. 19,477 15,755 17,650 16,711 15.265 15,051 24,230 28,945.Chad 4,113 593 663 2,963 .. 10,520 17,664 25,325 35,219 31,200Channel Islands . .. .. ,.
China ... 3,000 2,000 2,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 4.000 3,000Colombia .. 1.179 2,208.. ... .1.000 1,000.Comoros 1.519 743 4,772 3,994 5,120 4,908 6,786 5,923 4,264 5,232Congo, People's Rep of the 39,143 22,471 23,916 30,499 34,168 34,205 38,639 52,939 54,578 40,751Cook Islands . .. .. ..
Costa Rica . ....... 0.Cote D'Ivoire 715,642 494,608 391,351 319,631 291,105 278,902 427,369 501,106 491,527 458,924
Cyprus ....... .0. 0..Czechoslovakia . .. .. ..
Denmark . .. .. ..
Dominica . .. .. ..
Dominican Republic .... .......
Ecuador .. .. .....
Egypt, Arab Republic of .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0El Salvador... .. .... '
70
Table 2.1: Global Workers' Remittaces, Debit, 1980-989 (US$ dhousands).
Country 198 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Equatorial Guinea .. . .. .0 0.Ethiopia ....... 4435 386 242..Faeroe Islantds .. .. ..
Fiji 400.. O.. 0. .. 0.
Former Spanish Sahara . .. ..
France 3,038,980 2,721.820 2,373,780 2,190,420 1.822,930 1,882,780 2,244,930 2,451,130 2,397,180 2,228,340French Guiana . .. .. ..
French Polynesa .. ....
Gabon 143,034 81,919 78,727 90,798 87,011 103,303 163,960 144,742 150,984 128,524Gambia, Ths .... 0 0 0 0 0.German Democratic RepL.. ........
Germany, Federal Republ 4,436,562 3,825,020 3,393,300 3,237,490 3,180,620 2,739,860 3,446,860 4,060,640 4,191,650 3,992,490Ghana 4,200 3,800 700 2,900 100 1,600 2,500 2,700 2,500 2,700GibraltarGreece . .. .. ..
Greenland . .. .. ,.
Grenada . .. .. ..
Guadeloupe . .. .. ..
GuatemWal ....... .... 3,200 4,800Guinea 8,100... .. ..
Guinea-Bissau ... 14,000 10,900 4,900 3,400 1,500 2,000.Guyana .. 427.. .....
Haiti 54,340 61,840 47,340 43,480 45,000 47,240 53,400 56,920 60,680 63,460Honduras . .. .. ..
Hong kong . .. .. ..
Hungary . .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Inidonesia . .. .. ..
Iran, Islamic Rep. of . .. .. ..
Isle of Man . .. .. ..
Jamaica . .1,700 4,200 5,900 4,300 7,400 1,100 2,100 2,100Japan . .. .. ..
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Kampuchea . .. .. ..
Kenya .. 6,632 4,578 5,860 2,220 1,582 2,219 2,917 2,817 2,673Klribati 2,733 1,724 1,724 1,532 1,492 1,397 1,604.Korea, Democ. People's F.. .. .. ..
Korea, Republic of . .. .. ..
Kuwait 691,831 688,702 875,270 864,563 962,636 1,044,050 1,03,980 1,101,890 1,179,090 1 ,286,680.,Lao, PDR . .. ..
Lebanon ..... ......
Lesotho O.. .. .. ..Liberia 32,000 33,000 75,000 70,000 80,000 65,000 56,900 51,000..Uibyan Arab Republic 1,052,180 1,530,810 1,574,720 2,031,730 1,240,320 858,968 490,423 470,174 496,120.
71
Table 2. 1: Global Workers' Remnittances, Debit. 1980 1989 (USS tousands).
Country 198 1981 1982 1933 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Luxemnboturg . .. .. .
MacaoMadagasxa 30.860 23,111 19.937 11.871 9,833 14,219 15.599 11,382 13,439 13,970
Malaysia . .. .. ..
Maldives 200 300 1.300 2.000 3,400 2,000. 1,200 600 1,500Mali 18,932 15.273 14,455 13.121 11,672 28,714 37,828 43,922 45,325 45,704Malta 7,527 7,499 5,095 4,394 6.073 4,689 5,853 8,104 9,067 14,635Martinique . .. .. .~
Mauritania 32,583 21.679 31.505 27,129 24,105 24,220 29.244 32,229 34,042 32,498Mauritius . .. .. ..
Mexico .. * .. .. .0
Mongolia . .. .. ..
Montserrat . .. .. ..
Morocco 65.030 46,788 37,689 33.749 26.673 17,590 15.487 16,270 14,009 11,310Mozambique 25,300 29.400 23,600 19,900 25.700 25,000 23,000 25,000 25,300 27,500Myannmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.
Nepal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Netherlands Antilles . .. .. ..
Netherlands, The 243,879 240.157 181,873 159.795 138,470 141,758 183,349 235,633 204,541 72,185New Caledonia . .. .. ..
New Zealand 57,496 58.702 50.967 66,347 87,568 142,886 168,519 214,187 210,159 214.271Nicaraguia . .. .. .
Niger 53,337 47,878 48,59 43,150 40,279 47,491 43,315 49,911 44,99 50,156Nigeria 422.860 455,251 400,276 382,798 306,872 263,634 112,365 22,099 35,400 28,787
Norway 35,609 33,719 39,918 36,158 29,864 38,925 53,194 66,441 59,309 40,147Oman 396.642 497,973 596,410 735,379 859,879 946,742 884,859 720,416..
Paciric Isi. Trust Terrto .....
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Panama . .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea . .. ..
Paraguay .... .103...
Philippines 3,000 2,000 1,000 1,000....Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.Portugal . .. .. .... 0.Puert Rico . .. .. ..
Reunion . .. .. ..
Ronmaia . .. .. .
Rwanda 15.198 15,349 14,358 14.447 13,277 12,315 16,682 18,677 18,105 18,405Sao Tome and Principe 158 156 149 175 233 415 759 338 181 79Saudi Arabia 4,094,100 5,348,098 5,34,869 5.236,261 5,284,049 .5,198,590 4,803,781 4,934,578 6,157,541Senegal 90,260 74,780 68,684 58,205 51,493 46,565 57,464 41,592 43,647 43,886Seychelles . .. .. ..
Sierra Leone 1,524. 1,453 743 558 432 112 364 265.Singppore ..... ... .
Solomon islands . .5,664 2,525 2,35 2,769 2,125 1,897 4,322 2.747
72
Table 2.1: Global Workers' Remittances, Debit. 1980-1989 (MUSSthusands).
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Somalia .. 2,65 5,377 2,572....South AfricaSpain 146 2,061 4,644 3,449 6,930 114,405 102,002 102,500 116,903 175,651Sn Lanka . .. .. ..
St. KiQs and Nevis . .. 200 289 330 348 185 196 200 200St. Lucia ......... 0.St. Vincent and The Gren.. .. ......
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Sunname 1,513 1,737 1,90 1,849 1,457 952 672 336 392 392Swaziland 1,284 1,711 3,408 3,142 2,237 1,350 2,101 4,666 6,114 5,338Sweden ... 57,828 61,386 21,872 19,754 28,097 31,560 32,670 4,624Switzerland 602,730 570,195 889,042 867,974 795,001 789,134 1,169,590 1,524,950 1,663,360 1,604,600Syrian Arab Republic .. . .. .. .0 0..Tanzania 1,562 2,240.... ...
Thailand . .. .. ..
Togo 9,192 8,317 7,781 8,287 8,124 7,390 11,071 10,980 11,080 10,345Tokelau . .. .. ..
Tonga 0 0 0 600 500 1,100 1,400 2,200 2,200..Trinidad and Tobago 3,774 4,127 4,195 5,986 7,380 5,890..Tunisia 14,817 11,985 1 1,851 8,840 10,298 10,785 10,075 7,241 5,829 5,267Turkey ............ 0 0Tuvalu . .. .. ..
Uganda 3,600 50.Soo. ..
United Arab Emirates . .. .. ..
United Kingdom . .. .. ..
United States 810,000 670,000 680,000 600,000 700,000 750,000 780,000 830,000 1,040,000 1,050,000Uruguay......... ..
Vanuatu .. 1,039 1,006 1,371 1,59 660 4,712 2,999.Venezuela 418,000 383,000 615,000 187,000 204,000 213,000 180,000 208,000 203,000 368,000
Virgin Islands (U.S.) ... ........
Wallis and Futuna . .. .. ..
Western Samoa .. . .. .85 94 108 120 132Yemen Arab Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27,733 34,119Yemen, PDR 4,922 4,922 4,632 4,343 6,080 3,474 1,737 2,316 2,316 2,027Yugoslavia .. . .. .. .0 0.Zaire . .. .... 0.Zambia 61,360 56,349 32,517 30,656 19,965 20544 39,366 16,839 21,486.Zimbabwe 1,245.. . .. ..
Total 19,290,746 19,401,229 19,314,086 18,728,877 17,532,484 17,011,001 17,942,832 19,348,190 20,359,848 13,455,881
Source: WB International Economics Department
73
Annex 2
Table 2.2: Global Migrants' Transfers, Debit, 1980-1989 (US$ thousands)
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Afghanistan . .. .. ..
American samoa . .. .. ..
Angola . .. .. ..
Antigua and Barbuda . .. .. ..
Argentina . .. .. ..
Australia 183,997 231,954 233,431 253,323 262,350 205,305 207,188 218,670 252,039 299,921Austria 52,355 32,897 40,579 25, 153 25,451 35,663 39,147 43,691 44,672 61,790Bahamas 2,500 2,500 2,000 2,700 2,700 2.500 1,500 1,700 3,000 2,700Bahrain . .. .. ..
Bangladesh . .. .. ..
Barbados . .. .. ..
Belgium-Luxembourg . .. .- ..
Belize
Bermuda . .. .. ..
Bhutan . .. .. ..
Bolivia .. 200 300 300 200 800 300.Botswana 901 837 1,066 1,094 539 368 692 1,132.Brazil 6,000 22,000 7,000 7,000 1,000 2,000 7,000 5,000 1,000..Brunei . .. .. ..
Burkcina Faso .. . .
Burunidi ... .. .787 1,410 1,246 506 611Cameroon . .. .. ..
Canada 213,110 199,944 222,399 223,935 *208,013 207,280 211,023 227,886 253,265 272,062Cape Verde . .. .. ..
Central African Rep. . .. ..
Channel Islands . .. .. ..
China ... 10,000 8,000 10,000 6,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 6,000Colombia . .. .. ..
ComorosCongo, People's Rep oftt. . .. . ..
Cook Islands . .. .. ..
Costa Rica . ....... 0.Cote D'lvoire . .. .. ..
Cyprus 2,549 2,136 2,104 1,899 1,870 1,469 1,737 1,663 1,929 1,824Czechoslovakida . .. .. .
Denmark . .. .. ..
Dominica . .. .. ..
Dominican Republic . .. .. .. ..
Ecuador . . .. .....
Egypt, Arab Republic of... ........
El Salvador 3,320.. ........
74
Table 2.2: Global MIgranvts' Transfers, Debit, 1980-198N (US$ thousands)
Country 1980 1981 1962 1963 1984 1965 1966 1967 1988 1969
Equatorial Guinea . .. ..
EthIopia 580 435 290 483 336 366 145 628 338..Faeroe Islands.......,.Fiji 9,981 12.304 8,187 86,66 6,233 10,962 14.130 14,368 12.192 21,110Finland 7,241 5,066 5,616 5,196 3,812 5,239 9,308 11,644 14.115 15,153Former Sparish Saharam .. .. ..
French Guiana . .. .. ..
French Polynesia . .. .. ..
Gabon . .. .. ..
Gambia, The ... 124 201.....German Democratc RepL.. .. ..
Germany, Federal RepubL....*..Ghana 1,000 1,600 1,500 1,900.. 300 S0o 600 700 800Gibraltar . .. .. ..
GreeceGreenland . .. .. ..
Grenada . .. .. ..
Guadeloupe... .....
Guatemala... ...
Guinea . .. .. ..
Guinea-Bissau...Guyana . .. .. ..
Honduras O.. .. .. ..Hong kong . .. .. ..
Hungary . .. .. ..
Iceland 3,500 2,800 2,900 2,100 4,200 3,600 4,500 12,700 8,700 7,800
Indonesia . .. .. ..
Iran, Islamic Rep. Of ........-
Ireland . .... 87,452 61,632 93,064 196,540 152,227 126,62DIsle of Man... ........
Jamaic-a 29,900 30,000 25,20 20,000 20,000 31,000 22,300 16,500 15,400 14,000Japan . .. .. ..
Jordan . .. .. ..
Kampuchea . .. .. ..
Kenya 12,129 3,868 3,571 3,155 2,061 1,461 1,416 2,249 338 243KOinbadl
Korea, Republic of .. 3,000 4,000 3,000 1,000..Kuwait.. ..... ,* .*
Lao, PDR..... .... ..
Lebanon..... .... ..
Lesotho O.. .. .. ..
UIbyan Arab Republic . .. *. .*
75
Table 2.2: Global Migrants' Transfers, Debit, 1980-1989 (US$ fthusands)
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987 1988 1989
Luxembourg . .. .. ..
Macao . ,. .. ..
Madagascar 379 221 114. 104 106 118 262 135..
Malaysia 18,834 16.926 15,415 14,647 14,507 12,887 21,306 33,338 57,660 56,482Maldives . .. .. ..
MaltaMartrnique . .. .. ..
Mauritania . .. .. ..
Maultius 1,562 1,351 924 1,102 796 836 1,113 1,784 1,121 849Mexico . .. .. ..
Mongolia . .. .. ..
Montserrat . .. .. ..
Morocco 12,447 12,374 8,834 4,219 4,086 3,578 3,295 7,776 6,822 2,945Mozambique... ........
Myanmar . .. .. ..
Netherlands Antilles 6,667 4,722 6,944 7,111 9,056 12,278 46,111 3,333..Netherlands, The 193,114 177,828 213,078 139,697 127,643 115,789 162,425 415,505 284,636 346,906New Caledonia . .. .. ..
New Zealand 93,456 133,408 67,105 65,932 55,554 55,333 47,098 26,759 43,194 57,641Nicaragua
Norway 56,131 56,195 57,748 54,566 44,872 66,739 75,989 106,077 99,454 98,980Oman .. 2,895 2,895 2,895 2,895 2,895 O..
Pacific IsI. Trust Territo . .. .. ..
Pakistan 707 1,212 1,081 1,735 435 2,142 898 1,263 888 354Panama O.. .. .. ..Papua New Guinea 28,239 41,408 45,715 41,760 36,696 33,512 38,888 43,252 50,104 51,084Paraguay . .. .. ..
Philippines . .. .. ..
Poland . .. .. ..
Portugal . .. .. ..
Puerto Rico . .. .. ..
Reunion . .. ., ..
Romania.. . . .,...
Rwanda 1,379 1,357 1,637 1,685 1,707 1,689 2,008 1,933 1,988 2,026Sao Tome and Principe... ........
Saudfi Arabia .. .. .....
Senegal... .. .....
Seychelles .. .. .....
Sierra Leone . .0 0 0. .
Singapore .. .. .....
Solomon islands . .1,030 956 864 810 517 349 384 174
76
Table 2.2: GlobW Mlgrants' Transfers, Debit, 1980-1989 (USS thousands)
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Somalia.. ... ..........South Africa 64,292 67,363 48,278 44,052 35,503 26,416 30,231 18,669 14,554 7,705Spain 4,179 7,506 9,146 10,260 12,950 12,927 20,258 19,265 36,916 58,970Sri Lanka .. .. .. .. .. .. ..SL latts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. .. ..SL Lucia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0..SL Vincent and The Gren;. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 9,800 6,344 645 308.. .. ..
Surhname 4,090 2,745 3,754 5,266 4,818 3,305 2,577 2,297 3,025 2,689Swaziland 2,054 1,940 553 1,705 1,898 855 832 344 308 305Sweden 73,309 69,298 78,728 81,997 171,220 221,446 181,839 177,478 261,595 333,014Switterland .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Syrian Arab Republic .. .. .. .. ..Tanzania .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Thailand 636 801 696 609 822 551 456 428 396 389Timor...............Togo...............Tokelau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Tonga .. .. .. 986 994 213 475 565 459..Trinidad and Tobago 26,833 42,917 48,958 59,750 59,208 38,286 21,528 16,028 20,423 17,529TunIsia 7,408 10,150 5,079 7,366 5,149 5,992 3,778 6,034 4,663 7,374Turkey .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Uganda 500.. .. .. .. .. ..Urited Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. .. .. ..United lKngdom .. .. .. .. .. .. ..United States 120,000 110,000 110,000 80,000 90,000 130,000 120,000 160,000 190,000 190,000Uruguay .. .. .. .. .. .. ..USSR . . . .. .. ...Vanuatu .. .. 457 453 474 670 405 500 95Venezuela .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Viet Nam.. ... ..........Virgin Ishands (U.S.) .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Wallis and Futuna .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Westem Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Yemen Arab Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Yemen, PDR .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Yugoslavia .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Zaire...............Zambia 21,045 13,110 4,307 8,260 5,791 3,249 2,542 2,290 2,069.Zimbabwe 97,723 117,130 107,127 81,215 60,393 11,652 10,246 10,169..
Total 1,373,846 1,447,741 1,409,316 1,277,665 1,389,674 1,342,107 1,418,295 1,819,915 1,849,308 2,066,249
Source: WB International Economics Department
77
Anne 2
Tabl 2.3: lobal Labor Inoome, Debil, 1980-1989 (in US$ thousards)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1969
Afghailsia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0..
Algeila 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0..Amernca samoa ..
Angoia . .. .
Atugus and Barbuda . .. .. ..
AMgeinta 36,000 27,000 18,000 19,000 22,000 18,000 20,000 21,000..AustrWia 179,023 202,233 215,265 198,579 245,751 187,600 148,196 175,864 224,067 328,936Austria Bahamas 20,900 15,400 16,300 15,20 16,600 18,000 17,000 20,60 17,300 20,800Behmiln 234,217 260,83 284,628 246,213 272,60 550,266 508,245 478,487 474,488 496,213Bakngladesh . .. .
Barbados 696 796 647 497 845 748 796 348.. 1,591
Belgium-Luxembourg 476,209 401,203 401,198 364,110 328,842 349,809 479,281 636,968 716,403 787,590Belize ... 1,0 ,900 SA 3,5 ASX 6,5 SSBenin 21.200 20,700 24,100 20,033 36,096 41,592 41,968..Bermuda . .. .. ..
Boliva 2,400 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 4,800 3,100 3,000 6,400Botswana 47,091 43,144 30,690 22,518 17,098 11,353 16,231 16,558 19,687 14,840Brazil 12,000 10,000 12,000 6,000 3,000 5,000 3,OOQ 5,000 5,000.Brunei .. .... ..
Bulgaria . .. .. ..
Burkina Faso 1,330 1,862 1,159 1,163 1,970 3,559 6,510..Burundi 240 .7,755 5,588 7,551 5,435 4,765CAmeroon 2D40 4,200 6,500 5,600 3.300 9,100 9,800 8,100..Canada . .. .. ..
Cae. Verde . ....... 1,074 679 1.034 769CentralAfrican Rep. 133 29 64 29.. ..
Channel slandS . .. .. .
Chile 70,000 93,000 81,000 14,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 14,000 14,000 18,000
Colombia 39,048 63,062 36,328 48,000 72,000 98,000 31,000 31,000 6,000 4,000Comoros .. .....
Congo, PeepWes Rep of tL....... 332 133 671.Cook Islands .. .....
Cosa Rica Soo50 600 600 700 700 800 S00 1,000..Cote DOlvolre 70,523 9,200 8,521 8,922 7,781 7,791 4,620 12,644..
CYPrus 6,515 5,220 6,680 4,747 3,739 4,734 6,948 7.275 10,92 9,726Czehoslovaida . .. .. ..
Denmark . .. .. ..
Dorminica . .. .. ..
Dominican Republi .. . .. ..
Ecuador 66,900 66,200 125,000 86,000 111,000 72,000 77,000 88,000 47,000 42,000Egypt, Arab Republic of . .0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0El Salvador 5,800 2,080 6,800 6,800 7,280 3,440 5S6 620 3,700..
78
TahI 2.3: Globa Lab~or Incowe, DebS, 1980-1989 (in US$ thousands)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1964 1I65 1986 1987 1988 1989
Equatodal Guinea . .. .. ..
Ethiopia .. 242.. ... .97 1,449Fasta Wsands . .. ..
Fin"an 7,508 6,960 6,673 7,186 7,334 7,137 6,317 7288 9,574 5,594Famew Spanish Sahr . .... . ..
France 2,031,130 1,947,090 1,967,280 1,98,730 2,016,100 2,289990 2,896,430 3,308,670 3,825,810 3,219,830French Guiana . .. .*
French Polynesia .........
Gabon 521 1,658 91 1,338 1,945 890 1,15 1,664 1,612 3,135Ganbiba, The ... 1,584 1,172 0 0' 0 0..Gwm~an wooemocgc RepL.... .. ..
Germany, Federa Rapt"l 3,430,740 3,144,790 3,112,060 3,064,130 3,029,100 2,909,520 3,94,760 5,173,920 5,795,680 6,545,469Ghana 4,20 4,500 4,000 7,700 13,800 9,000 10,500 11,60 12,700 14,200Gbrahtr . .. .. ..
Greec 59,000 65,000 64,000 77,000 58,000 45,000 60,000 77,000 95,000 118,000Greenland . .. ..
Grenada 2,600 5,20 5,100 4,300.. ..
Guadeloupe . .. .. ..
Gualemala 11,400 7,100 3,200 3,200 7,200 6,000 6,000 7,500 2,300 4.300Guina. . .. . ..
Gulnea-131ssau . .. .. ..
Guyana . .. .. ..
Hondums. .... .. 0 0 0..
Hung" ~2,00 180 240 170 10 1,0 00Iceland 2,000 ISM 2,400 1,700 1,400 ixo 2"O ~~~4,600 7,800 9,000
India 29,242 15,403 13,517 39,727 27,500 30,89 42,066 65,468..
Iran, Islamlc Rep. od . . ..
Israe 322,000 356,000 380,000 434,000 406,000 330.000 475,000 682,000 678,000 666,000Itay 273,929 295,606 336,093 326,852 324,912 384,993 498,22 710,562 996,562 1,751,720Jamaica 26,600 26,000 33,400 45,000 49,700 62,900 55,100 70,100 64,700 66,600japa 220,000 240,000 330,000 320,000 290,000 310,000 330,000 560,000 690,000 810,000Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Kampudhea...... ..
Kena 1,348 2,984 2,747 2,404 2,496 2,496 3,02 3,950 4,508.
Korea, Democ. Peoples F.. . .. ..
Kores, RepoliCof 5,000 10,000 7,000 7,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 26,000 25,000 21,000Kuwakt. .. ..
Lao, PDR . .. .. .*
Lebanon . .. .. ..
Lesotho ....... .0.
Lberl ... . 6,000 40,900 37,400 79,300 74,900..Libyan Arab RspulIc ... ,* .
79
Table 2.3: Globa Labor Income, Deb4, 1980-98 (in US$ thousands)
1960 1961 1982 1963 1984 196 1988 1987 1988 1 989
Macao . .. .. ..
Madagascar B00.o. 325 711 106 591 262 270 767Malawi 246 223 189 85 212 116 64 181 117..Malaysia ... .. .. .97,633 124,485 126,253Maldives . .. .. ..
Moalt .. .. .. 254 289 302 1,722Martinique . .. .. ..
Mauritaia . .. .. ..
Mauntilus . .. .. ..
Mexico . .. .. ..
Mongolia . .. .. ..
Montserrat . .. .. ..
Moroco * .. .. 0 0 oMozambique . .. .. ..
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0..
Nepa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Nethedands Ardilos 34,444 22,222 25,000 22,22 15,000 23,889 6,111 5,556..Nethedlands, The 457,230 406,200 426,029 394,554 347,817 368,594 493,909 529,002 605,746 593,414NeW CalKdonia . .. .. ..
New Zealand . .. .. ..
Nicaragua 2.000 4,200 2,000 2,600....Niger s0 70 113 304 460 1,420.Nigeria 99,650 28,566 26,772 24,424 21,296 28,672 16,416..
Norway . 18,233 43,56M 42,064 36,190 34,069 37,873 51,950 65,968 68,221 68.221Oman O.. .. .. ..OAN 13,000 17,000 21,000 12,000 15,000 19,000 20,000 33,000 47,000 56,000Pacific lsL. Trust Territo . .. .. ..
Pakistan . .... 0 0 00.Panama . .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea . .. .. ..
Paraguay 2,000 1,500 1.500 400 4,800 6,000 6,000 800 2.100..
Philippines 9,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 1.000 1.000 6,000 3,000 10,000 4.000Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.Portugal 32,608 17,070 16,934 19,839 10,996 14,707 36,186 27,124 29,22 36,919Puerto Rico . .. .. ..
Reunion . .. .. ..
Romania . .. .. ..
Rwanda 3,630 3,210 2,962 1,781 1,667 2,489 4,884 4,343 8,189 8,052Sao Tome andPrincipe ... 46 52 2 1 1 21 28 3 10
Senegal 161 736 456 394 343 334 433 333 671 627Seychels .... . . ..
Sierra Leones.. 0 0 0O..Singapore . .. ..
Solomon islands . . 1,321 1,048 2,017 1,831
80
Tal 2.3: Global Labor Incme, DsbQ, 1980-96 (in Us$ thousands)
1960 1961 1982 1963 1984 1965 1986 1987 1968 1989
South Africa 962.126 1,012,640 922,740 1,060,290 906,973 686,921 765,230 1.010,420 1,023,780 1,066,520Spain 5,591 2,230 2,713 2,032 3,141 3,565 6,421 8,171 6,597 11,000Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0..SI. Kltftand Nevls 1,700 2,000 300 300 300 700 37 74 Ili il1St. Lucia ... 50. 1,60 1,600 1,700 1,700 2,100 2,100St. Vincen and lbse Greni. ..
Sudan . .. .. ..
Surname 4,202 3,697 3,026 1,569 123 982 89 1,064 1,681 952SwazIland 5,393 6,161 6,802 8,26 9,015 8,232 9,672 15,717 19,794 17.616Sweden 9,489 11,641 1,363 95,328 43,679 48,996 127,980 158,087 *'189,441 189,056switzedan 1,736,580 1,756,400 1,868,740 1,822,660 1,675,540 1,719,900 2,607,880 3,507,260 4,102,370 4,271,5900SyrianArab RepubI . *... . .. 0 0..Tanzaia 32,000 15,000.. .,...
Thaliad 34,762 34,904 46,696 40,476 53,673 68,420 56,918 58,335 90,694 120,656Timor . .. .. ..
Tonga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 100.Tnnkdad and Tobago 4,583 8,583 11,000 14,125 20,917 15,388 7,167 4,972 4,085 1,953
Turkey . .. .... 68,000.. .. 0
Uganda . .. .. ..
United Arab Emirates . .. .. ..
United Klogom . .. .. ..
United StMae 550,000 6550,000 620,000 620,000 690,000 730,000 830,000 890,000 960,000 1,030),000Unigusy . .. .. ..
Vanuatu . .. .. ..
Verezuela ... .9,621 4,000 4,000 5,000 7,000 8,000 3,000
Virgin ilanskr (U.S.) .
Walls and Futuna .
western Samoa .
Yemen Arab Republic- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0..Yemen ,POR . .0
Yugoslaia. 0 0..Zaire 0..Zambia .
Zimbab~we 36,569 5,072 3,730 2,151 2,395 3,620 9,856 6,630..
Total 11,792,899 1 1,2881,940 11,577,396 1 1,5810,090 11,320,541 11,628,413 14,983,671 18,798,629 21,114,639 22,577,849
Source: WS Intenatkwna Economics Departmet
81
Annex 3
Tabe 3.1 Toul Remitnaces, Sdected Cotmaies (Swamy), 190.1 989 (io milli. U.S. doou)
Citmy 19B0 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1936 19B7 1988 1989
YugoSaia 4,102.0 3,960.0 4,185.0 3,429.0 3,168.0 3,106.0 3.731.0 4,051.0 4,593.0 6,29"0<eece 1,119.0 1,169.0 1,140.0 964.0 945.0 807.0 967.0 1,407.0 1,737.0 1,387.0Tuwkey 2,071.0 2,490.0 2,140.0 1,513.0 I,807.0 1,714.0 1,634.0 2,021.0 1,776.0 3,063.0hay 3,386.8 3,014.5 3,054.6 2,972.2 2,885A 2,8483 3,512.9 3,588.8 3,748.1 3,925.9SPn 2,187.9 1,815.8 I58I.6 1,348.0 1,226,7 1,5 1,433.1 1,583.7 1,790.3 1,861.1CyI,u 94.0 83.1 79. 782 73,6 71. 799 88B 943 932Pougal 2,968.5 2,884.3 2,6372 2,1563 2,200.4 2,163.8 2,618.7 3,3863 3,524.1 3,705.8Moceco 1,307.7 1,400.2 1,181.3 1,759.8 2,8013 6,333.7 2,716.3 3,262.0 2,521.6 1,454.3T ima 318.6 353.7 372.4 359.5 3167 270.8 361A 4863 544A 487.7ANgena 405.7 447.2 506.7 392.4 329.5 313.5 358.3 4866 37B.7 306.0Eapt,AIL 2,696.0 2,180.9 2,081.9 3,165.4 3,930.5 3,496.2 2,972.8 3,011.9 3,383.9 3,532.0Syma AR. 773.5 436.0 410.7 3865 321A 349.6 323.0 334.0 360.0 355.0Yemen AR 1,256.0 927.0 1,191.0 1,245.0 1,067.0 809.0 6700 761.7 574.5 409.7Yemen, PDR 498.3 5644 634.5 660.7 6905 429.1 294.2 304.9 255.1 173.7Jordan 794.0 1,032.7 1,083.9 1,110.0 1,236.7 1073A 1,184.9 938.0 894.0 623.5Sedan 215.6 319.7 351.2 415.0 395.0 430.0 350.0 250.0 445.0 297.0lIdia 2.787.0 2,341.0 2,528.0 2,589.0 2,545.0 2,=0 2,290.0 2,724.5 2,605.0 2,750.0Pakin 1,747.6 2,097A 2.226.6 2,888.1 2,738A 2,4563 2,597.0 2,2803 2,017.7 1,897.0Bangladesh 197A 3623 368.3 575.7 526.6 363.7 497A 617.4 737.0 771.0Korea, Rq. of 105.0 129.0 121.0 127.0 150.0 281.0 364.0 444.0 523.0 624.0BuIkIaFPo 150.4 153A 1103 113.2 90.2 125.9 191.8 173.4 165.2 147.3Mali 59A 47.7 39A 36.5 32.5 67.0 68A S82 96.0 90.1Benin 107A 127.0 99.5 23.6 40.2 56.7 75.6 91.2 89.0 65.9Botwma 773 74.6 56A 55.9 S0.0 313 373 543 54.7 46.1Malawi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7Lesotho 263.2 290.6 348.1 377.9 322.6 223.9 2755A 353.1 371.5 765.1Mexico 333.0 344.0 280.0 264.0 417.0 471.0 508.0 575.0 624.0 2,277.0Jamaica 100.1 111.6 126.8 903 78.5 151.6 126.3 164.0 164.7 214.2Colombia 106.0 160.0 87.0 72.0 78. 110.0 4160 625.0 458.0 467.0El Salvador 47.8 70.8 111.1 1134 1563 154A 153.1 184.6 207.2 0.0Paauy 52.1 63.1 41A 33.2 24.0 113 13.7 22.6 20A 34.7Bolivia IA 4.7 2.7 5.0 5.8 6.0 .0 8.6 4.5 85
ToWl 30329.8 29,455.9 29,178-5 29,320.0 30,6503 32.132A 30,809.6 34,368.1 34,757.9 38,1265
Per World Bank's definiuca which i the sum of worken' rmmilawes, migranas trsfes ad labor iSoWVe WB Intanotional Economics Depatment
82
Annex 3
Table 3.2. Inflows of Worbers' Remitances for Selected Countries (Swamy) 1980-1989 (in milan U.S. dolrs)
1980 1981 1982 t983 1984 195 1966 1967 1968 1969
Yugoslavia 4,102.0 3,960. 4,185.0 3,429.0 3,166.0 3,106,0 3,731.0 4,051.0 4,593.0 6,290.0Greece 1,066.0 1,057.0 1,016.0 912.0 89.0 775.0 920 1,334.0 1,675.0 1,350.0Turkey 2,071.0 2,490.0 2,140.0 1,513.0 1,807.0 1,714.0 1,634.0 2,021.0 1,776.0 3,040.0Italy 1,235.5 1,163.3 1,165.3 1,135.7 1,114.3 1,083.1 1,2112 1,214.0 1,226.5 1,381.2Spain 1,648.6 1,296.5 1,122.1 936.7 844.2 1,03.9 1,163.9 1,315.8 1,529.7 1,601.4Cypns - - - - -Pougal 2,927.7 2,838.1 2,601.8 2,117.7 2,151.8 2,090.6 2,544.3 3,253.8 3,377.5 3,561.6Morocco 1,053.7 1,013.5 849.2 916.1 671.8 967.2 1,396.3 1,587.2 1,303.4 1,336.5Tunisia 318.6 353.7 372.4 359.5 316.7 270.8 361.4 486.3 544.4 487.7Aleria 405.7 447.2 506.7 392.4 329.5 313.5 356.3 486.6 37S.7 306.0Egypt, A.R. 2,696.0 2,180.9 2,081.9 3,165A 3,930S 3,4962 2,972.8 3,011.9 3,383.9 3,532.0Syrian A.R. 773.5 436.0 410.7 386.5 321.4 349.6 323.0 334.0 360.0 355.0iYemen A.R. 974.0 624.0 749.0 790.0 653.0 451.0 340.0 427.6 574.6 409.7 Yemen, PDR 362.3 409.4 474.5 490.7 505.5 429.1 294.2 304.9 255.1 173.7Jordan 714.6 929.4 975.5 999.0 1,113.0 921.1 1,066.4 844.2 804.8 561.1Sudan 209.0 305.0 350.0 415.0 395.0 430.0 350.0 250.0 445.0 297.0India 2,786.0 2,339.0 2,526.0 2,587.0 2,542.0 2,220.0 2,287.0 2,721.0 2,605.0 2,750.0Paldstan 1,747.6 2,097.4 2,226.6 2,88811 2,738.4 2,456.3 2,597.0 2,260.3 2,017.7 1,897.0Bangadesh 197.4 362.3 368.3 575.7 526.6 363.7 497.4 617.4 737.0 771.0Korea, Rep. of - - -Burldna Faso 150.3 153.3 110.3 113.2 90.2 125.9 191.7 173.4 165.2 147.3Mali 59.4 47.7 39.4 36.5 32.5 67.0 68.4 88.2 96.0 90.1Benin 107.4 127.0 99.5 23.6 38.2 52.5 66.7 8.5 81.6 65.9Botswana -Malawi . 3.7Lesotho - - - 0.0 - - 400.1Mexico 139.0 128.0 98.0 111.0 177.0 173.0 180.0 207.0 209.0 1,821.0Jamaica 60.6 62.7 74.6 41.6 26.1 92.3 64.0 66.6 67.7 117.2Colombia 68.0 99.0 71.0 63.0 71.0 105.0 393.0 616.0 448.0 4S9.0El SalWador 10.9 42.2 77.7 92.5 114.2 126.2 138.6 167.4 194.4Paraguay 2.0 1.7 0.8 02 0.4 0.1Borivia 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.B
Total 25,866.8 24,964.5 24,712.8 24,493.6 24,776.8 23,212.3 25,187.1 27,936.6 28,849.8 33,206.1
Sourcb: WB International Economics Department
83
Annex 3
Table 3.3: Inflows of Migrants Transfen for Selected Counmtries (Swamy), 1980.191 (uSS mifious)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 19S7 1988 1989
YugoslaviaGreece , , -
Turkey - - - - - - 23.0Ital* Spain 410.S 381.7 312.4 277.9 253.1 78.0 70.8 502 482 50.0Cypus 31.2 26.1 242 22A 20.7 20.6 22. 24.9 22.9 21.3Ponugal - - - - - - 13.9Morocco 254.0 386.7 332.1 843.7 1929.5 5366.5 1318.0 1674.8 1218.2 117.8TunisiaAlgeriaEgvp. A.R - - - - - - - - -Syrian ARLYerien. ARYemen, PDRJordanSudan 6.6 14.7 1.2IndiaPakistan - - - - - - - - -
Bangladesh - - - - - - - -Korea, Rep. of 4.0 3.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 6.0 9.0Burkina FasoMali - -
BeninBotswana 9.1 9.6 7.8 8A 7.9 5.6 3.2 7.0MalawiLesothoMexicoJamaicaColombiaEl Salvador - - - - - - - - - -
Paguay -Boivia - 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.8 4.2 5.0 5.5 1.3 5.9
Total 715.7 824.8 682.7 1,161A 2,223.0 5,481.8 1,425.7 1,781.2 1,296.7 226.9
Source: WB Intarnatioaal Econmics Department
84
Annex 3
Table 3.4: Inflows of Labor Income for Selected Countries (Swamy), 1980-1989 (in million U.S. dollar)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1988 1987 1988 1989
Yugoslavia 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0Greece 53.0 112.0 124.0 52.0 47.0 32.0 25.0 73.0 62.0 37.0Turkey - - - - - - - - - 0.0Italy 2,1512 1,851.2 1,869.3 1,836.5 1,771.0 1,765.1 2,301.7 2,374.8 2,521.6 2,544.7Spain 128.5 137.6 147.1 131.5 129.5 123.6 178.4 218.0 212.4 209.7Cyptus 62.9 56.9 65.5 55.8 52.9 50.9 57.1 63.8 71.4 71.9Portugal 40.8 46.7 35.4 38.6 48.6 73.2 74.4 118.7 146.6 144.2Morocco - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0Tunisia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Algeba 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Egypt, A.R. - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Syrian A.R. - - - 0.0 0.0Yemen A.R. 282.0 303.0 442.0 455.0 414.0 358.0 330.0 334.1Yemen, PDR 146.0 155.0 160.0 170.0 185.0 - - 0.0Jordan 79.4 103.3 108.4 111.0 123.7 102.3 118.5 93.8 89.4 62.4SudanIndia 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.5 -PaWstan - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 °Bangladsh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - -Korea,Rep. of 101.0 126.0 117.0 121.0 142.0 274.0 358.0 439.0 517.0 615.0Burkina Faso 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1MaliBenin - - - - 2.0 4.2 6.9 6.7 7.4Botswana 68.2 65.0 48.7 47.5 42.1 25.7 34.1 47.4 54.7 46.1MalawiLesotho 263.2 290.6 348.1 377.9 322.6 223.9 255.4 353.1 371.5 365.0Mexico 194.0 216.0 182.0 153.0 240.0 298.0 328.0 368.0 415.0 456.0Jamaica 49.5 48.9 52.3 48.7 52.4 59.3 72.3 105.2 97.0 97.0Colombia 38.0 61.0 16.0 9.0 7.0 5.0 23.0 9.0 10.0 8.0El Salvador 36.9 28.6 33.4 21.0 42.6 28.2 14.6 17.2 12.8Paraguay 50.1 61.4 40.6 33.0 23.6 11.2 13.7 22.6 20.4 34.7BolMvia 1.4 12 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 1.8
Total 3,747.3 3,666.6 3,783.1 3,665.0 3,650.5 3,438.3 4,196.7 4,650.2 4,611.5 4,693.4
Source: WB Intemational Economics Department
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Recent World Bank Discussion Papers (continued)
No. 132 Adjusting Educational Policies: Conserving Resources While Raising School Quality. Bruce Fuller and Aklilu Habte,editors
No. 133 Letting Girls Leam: Promising Approaches in Primary and Secondary Education. Barbara Herz, K. Subbarao,Masooma Habib, and Laura Raney
No. 134 Forest Economics and Policy Analysis: An Overview. William F. Hyde and David H. Newman, with a contributionby Roger A. Sedjo
No. 135 A Strategyfor Fisheries Development. Eduardo Loayza, in collaboration with Lucian M. Sprague
No. 136 Strengthening Public Service Accountability: A Conceptual Framework. Samuel Paul
No. 137 Deferred Cost Recoveryfor Higher Education: Student Loan Programs in Developing Countries. Douglas Albrechtand Adrian Ziderman
No. 138 Coal Pricing in China: Issues and Reform Strategy. Yves Albouy
No. 139 Portfolio Pefornance of Selected Social Security Institutes in Latin America. Carmelo Mesa-Lago
No. 140 Social Security and Prospectsfor Equity in Latin America. Carmelo Mesa-Lago
No. 141 China's Foreign Trade and Comparative Advantage: Prospects, Problems, and Policy Implications. AlexanderJ. Yeats
No. 142 Restructuring Socialist Industry: Poland's Experience in 1990. Homni J. Kharas
No. 143 China: Industrial Policiesfor an Economy in Transition. Inderjit Singh
No. 144 Reforming Prices: The Experience of China, Hungary, and Poland. Anand Rajaram
No. 145 Developing Mongolia. Shahid Yusuf and Shahidjaved Burki
No. 146 Sino-Japanese Economic Relationships: Trade, Direc Investment, and Future Strategy. Shuichi Ono
No. 147 The Effects of Economic Policies on African Agriculture: From Past Harm to Future Hope. William K. Jaeger
No. 148 The Sectoral Foundations of China's Development. Shahidjaved Burki and Shahid Yusuf, editors
No. 149 The Consulting Profession in Developing Countries: A Strategyfor Development. Syed S. Kirmaniand Warren C. Baum
No. 150 Successful Rural Finance Institutions. Jacob Yaron
No. 151 Transport Development in Southem China. Clell G. Harral, editor, and Peter Cook and Edward Holland,principal contributors
No. 152 The Urban Environment and Population Relocation. Michael M. Cemea
No. 153 Funding Mechanismsfor Higher Education: Financingfor Stability, Effidency, and Responsiveness. Douglas Albrechtand Adrian Ziderman
No. 154 Earnings, Occupational Choice, and Mobility in Segmented Labor Markets of India. Shahidur R. Khandker
No. 155 Managing Extemal Debt in Developing Countries: Proceedings of aJoint Seminar,Jeddah, May 1990. Thomas M.Klein, editor
No. 156 Developing Agricultural Extensionfor Women Farmers. Katrine A. Saito and Daphne Spurling
No. 157 Awakening the Market: Viet Nam's Economic Transition. D. M. Leipziger
No. 158 Wage Policy during the Transition to a Market Economy: Poland 1990-91. Fabrizio Coricelli and Ana Revenga,editors
No. 159 International Trade and the Environment. Patrick Low, editor
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