(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions with personnel of particular religion

(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise,

~ Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) ~

Some Title VII Exemptions

1) That all or substantially all members of the opposite group (e.g.,

gender) are unable to perform in the role

2) That the essence of the business would be undermined without

protected-group based hiring decisions

3) That no reasonable alternative to the discriminatory hiring exists

BFOQ Tests

§ 1604.2 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification

Sex as a BPOQ should be interpreted narrowly

Examples of situations NOT warranting a BFOQ exemption:

•The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general (e.g., assuming that turnover rate among women is higher than among men)

•The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes (e.g., women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship). Individuals must be considered on the basis of individual capacities – not assumed group characteristics and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group

•The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers

Okay as a BFOQ: For authenticity or genuineness purposes, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification (e.g., an actor, actress) or reasonable expectations of privacy (role of culture)

Adapted From: PART 1604—GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX

In early 2009, a male applicant filed suit against Hooters of America after he was turned down for the position of server. His claim is that Hooters is engaging in sex discrimination by only hiring females as wait staff. Many years earlier, Hooters settled a class action suit after being faced with a similar allegation. In the settlement, they agreed to pay $3.75 million and open positions in their restaurants to males. But, under the agreement, the position of servers was limited to only females. In 2010, two separate lawsuits were filed against alleging weight discrimination (Convery v. Hooters of Roseville; Smith v. Hooters of Roseville). Two past servers contend that they were fired because they were judged to be overweight and did not look good in the Hooters uniform. The uniform sizes are reportedly extra, extra small, extra small, and small. (These suits also claim that Hooters weight requirements represent per se gender discrimination). Do you think Hooters should be allowed to engage in these practices? Why or why not?

Case Example

• For Hooters to be successful, they need to provide evidence that limiting servers to females is reasonably necessary for the operation of its business (a BFOQ). How easy will this be for Hooters?

• Key to Hooters defense will be how it defines the nature of its business and how being female (in certain positions) is crucial for their business operations.

• This suit contends that Hooters violated a Michigan civil rights law banning employment discrimination on the basis of religion, race, age, sex, height and weight. In response to the weight discrimination suit, Hooters has stated that its servers function as "entertainers," and that physically fit and attractive women are key to the organization's image.

Hooters Case (cont.)Hooters Defense

Yikes!!!

What is LEGALLY wrong with the message being delivered by these pictures?Legitimate to have different uniform requirements (dress codes) for men and women as long as such standards place corresponding burdens on each sex. The law in this area reflects a “separate but equal” mindset -- as acceptable, practical manifestations of social norms regarding suitable attire for men and women

Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977)

Describe the background of the case?

• Plaintiff applied for a job as a “correctional counselor” (prison guard)

• She was rejected because she failed to meet the height and weight requirements established for the position [5’2” and 120 pounds]

• She filed a suit alleging that the state’s requirements violated Title VII and the 14th amendment (Due process, equal protection across the states; permits employees to sue state and local government; often used to sue municipal agencies (police and fire departments for race and sex discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions) and for reverse discrimination suits

• Sex criteria: While the suit was pending, the state adopted a sex criteria for working in “contact” positions (those requiring close proximity to inmates), many who were sex offenders within it’s prisons. Females not allowed to work with male inmates in such situations

Alabama Prison Environment

• Like most correctional facilities in the United States, Alabama’s prisons are segregated on the basis of sex

• Most of Alabama's prisoners are held at the four maximum-security male penitentiaries, 336 of the 435 correctional counselor jobs were in those institutions, a majority of them concededly in the "contact" classification.

• The environment in Alabama's penitentiaries is a peculiarly inhospitable one for human beings of whatever sex. Indeed, a Federal District Court has held that the conditions of confinement in the prisons of the State, characterized by "rampant violence" and a "jungle atmosphere," are constitutionally intolerable.

• Prisons are arranged in dormitory fashion, understaffed, and consists of consists of substantial amount (20%) of sex offenders mixed with other inmates

What evidence did Rawlinson offer to to form a prima facie case?Pronounced: Pre-mah fay-she • That the facially neutral height and weight requirements disproportionately exclude women from eligibility for employment by the Alabama Board of Corrections.

• The height and weight requirement excluded 41% of females and 1% of males

Defense rebuttal:

• Rawlinson's failure to produce comparative statistics concerning actual applicants for correctional counselor positions in Alabama

• Job relatedness, manifest relationship, business necessitySC: There is no requirement that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must always be based on … actual applicants…. The application process itself might not adequately reflect the actual potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as being discriminatory.

SC Decision: Height and weight requirements are not job related. They are used as a proxy for strength, an unspecified amount of which is essential to effective job performance as a correctional counselor!. Should directly measure strength

Sex as a BFOQ

The BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex

An employer could rely on the BFOQ exception only by proving "that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."SC Decision: Sex in this instance was a BFOQ --- concern for

prison safety; being female would pose a substantial security risk. Workplace safety, not worker safety, was the legal basis for excluding women from prison guard duty in all-male maximum-security prison

SC Decision (cont.)

It appears that the real disqualifying factor in the Court's view is “the employee's very womanhood.” The Court refers to the large number of sex offenders in Alabama prisons, and to “the likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman.” In short, the fundamental justification for the decision is that women as guards will generate sexual assaults. With all respect, this rationale regrettably perpetuates one of the most insidious of the old myths about women - that women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects. The effect of the decision, made I am sure with the best of intentions, is to punish women because their very presence might provoke sexual assaults. It is women who are made to pay the price in lost job opportunities for the threat of depraved conduct by prison inmates. Once again, “the pedestal upon which women have been placed has . . ., upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage. It is particularly ironic that the cage is erected here in response to feared misbehavior by imprisoned criminals

Dissent (Regarding Sex as a BFOQ)

– Defendant (battery maker): Exposure to lead entails health risks, including the risk of harm to fetuses. Company warned fertile women of the dangers of lead toxicity

– Eight employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels exceeding that noted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as critical for a worker planning to have a family

– Company switched from a warning to an outright ban on fertile women entering high-lead jobs (except those whose infertility was medically documented)

– Petitioners sued the company claiming sex discrimination

United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991)

Background of the case?

Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm

* Responsibility of employers to identify problems that the government does not identify

OSHA

General Duty Clause

• Unanimous Supreme Court struck down the 7th circuit ruling under BFOQ theory

• 7th circuit upheld this policy under both adverse impact and BFOQ theory in a divided ruling

Decisions in Johnson Controls

• Sex Discrimination: Respondent's policy creates a facial classification based on gender and explicitly discriminates against women (Title VII violation … the policy explicitly classifies on the basis of potential for pregnancy (i.e., PDA), which is explicit sex discrimination• Application only to females: The policy does not apply to male employees despite evidence about the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system• Job performance: Fertile women … manufacture of batteries as efficiently as anyone else. … respondent's professed concerns about the welfare of the next generation do not suffice to establish a BFOQ of female sterility. Title VII, as amended by the PDA, mandates that decisions about the welfare of future children be left to the parents … rather than to the employers who hire those parents or the courts• Fetal Protection Policies: Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote, at best

BFOQ Summary [Applies to national origin, religion, and sex]

– Title VII cases have focused on gender

– Defense has NOT succeeded for customer preference (Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 1971 -- airlines may not exclude male flight attendants based on passenger preference) or worker safety (e.g., Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls)

– Defense has succeeded for workplace safety (e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson), customer safety, and privacy (e.g., female janitors excluded from all-male bathhouses; Brooks v. AFC Industries, 1982)

– Overall, BFOQs are difficult to defend

Exemption for Religious Institutions

From Title VII: It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.So, under Title VII, religious organizations are permitted to give employment preference to members of their own religion. The exception applies only to those institutions whose “purpose and character are primarily religious.”

Factors to determine this include:•Do its articles of incorporation state a religious purpose? •Are its day-to-day operations religious (e.g., are the services performed, products produced, or the educational curriculum directed toward propagation of the religion)? •Is it not-for-profit? •Is it affiliated with or supported by a church or other religious organization?

>>> Only allows religious organizations to prefer to employ individuals who share their religion. Other forms of discrimination are outlawed (e.g., race, sex)

•Clergy members (e.g., ministerial exemption) cannot bring claims under the federal employment discrimination laws (e.g., , Title VII, ADEA, EPA, ADA)

•Based on First Amendment --- governmental regulation of church administration, including the appointment of clergy, impedes the free exercise of religion and constitutes impermissible government entanglement with church authority

Ministerial Exception

MINISTERIAL EXCEPTIONEEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor

Sequence of Events:

•Plaintiff (Cheryl Perich) after receiving the required training (e.g., coursework, oral exam) was categorized as a “called teacher (versus “lay” teachers) and was given the formal title of “Minister of Religion Commissioned”

•Plaintiffs duties overlapped a lot with those of lay teachers. But, she also taught a religion class, led students in daily prayer and devotional exercises, and took students to school-wide chapel services on a weekly basis

•Plaintiff developed narcolepsy and took disability leave (Fall of 2004-2005 term)

•In January, plaintiff announced she’d return in February

•Principal told plaintiff a lay teacher had been hired to replace her for the remainder of the year. Principal also doubted plaintiff was ready to return and, subsequently, congregation offered to pay portion of her salary to resign. Plaintiff refused.

•In February, plaintiff showed up for work and refused to leave until written documentation was given that she’d reported to work

Sequence (cont.)

Principal called plaintiff and said she’d likely be fired. Plaintiff responded that she’d contacted a lawyer and intended to sue.

Plaintiff received termination letter for:

•Insubordination and disruptive behavior

•Damage to the working relationship by threatening to sue

Plaintiff contacted EEOC claiming violation of the ADA; EEOC sued church for retaliation

Decision:

District Court granted SJD for defendant (Church)

6th Circuit: Plaintiff was NOT a minister (e.g., lay teachers did same work, Plaintiff did many secular duties)

S.C. Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the exception – ruled for the Church

Bona Fide Seniority Systems   Sec. 703 (h): Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority … system provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin …”

Some Exemptions (Title VII, 1964, cont.)

The Bone Fide Seniority System (BFSS) Defense

• Seniority are legal if they are:

– Not intended to illegally discriminate, and

– Legally designed, and applied equally across protected classes

– But, most seniority plans qualify for the BFSS defense ― even if they cause adverse impact

Lorance v. AT&T (1989)

Prior to 1979, plant wide seniority was used and this seniority was able to be transferred to other skilled positions (e.g., tester jobs)

In 1979, a new collective bargaining agreement made it mandatory that seniority in tester jobs was determined by the amount of time an employee had worked as a tester (job seniority not plant seniority; this position was mainly occupied by men)

1982: Economic downturn. Females hired into tester position between 1978-1980 were demoted due to “new” (1979) seniority policy. No demotions would have occurred if “old” system was in place

Case Background?

Plaintiff’s filed suit in 1983 claiming sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. That the purpose and effect of the new system was to protect incumbent male testers

From Title VII: “ … unlawful employment practice" for an employer

"(1) . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or

"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a).

Seniority systems are given special treatment under Title VII. Even if they result in adverse impact, seniority systems are not unlawful unless intent is proven

Both the District Court and CA 7 ruled that the suit was time barred; the plaintiffs had waited too long to file.

CA 7: “the relevant discriminatory act that triggers the period of limitations occurs at the time an employee becomes subject to a facially neutral but discriminatory seniority system and the the employee knows, or reasonably should know, is discriminatory.

Time Frame IssueKey is determining WHEN the discriminatory act

occurred

Supreme Court Decision: The operation of a seniority system having a disparate impact on men and women is not unlawful unless discriminatory intent is proved.

Plaintiffs has waited too long (greater than 300 days after the system was adopted) to file their claim after the alleged unlawful practice occurred (e.g., Machinists v. NLRB, 1960: Limitations period starts when the system was adopted)

“… allowing a facially neutral system to be challenged, and entitlements under it to be altered, many years after its adoption would disrupt those valid reliance interests that 703(h) was meant to protect. In the context of the present case, a female tester could defeat the settled (and worked-for) expectations of her co-workers whenever she is demoted or not promoted under the new system, be that in 1983, 1993, 2003, or beyond.”

SC Decision (cont.)

Delaware State College v. Ricks (1980)

Decision to deny tenure was the discriminatory act (triggering the limitations period) NOT one year later when the effect took place

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans (1977)

”Evan was discriminatorily dismissed the plaintiff after she worked several years as a flight attendant (1966-1968).

She got married in 1968, and was forced to resign given company policy (this resignation later ruled as illegal, but she was not party to the case; she did not file suit in 1968)

Hired by United in 1972 as a new employee – no seniority credit given for prior service. Evans sued alleging that United discriminated and continues to discriminate against her because she is a female.

~ Supreme Court Rejecting the Continuing Violation Theory ~

[a discriminatory act occurs when each concrete effect of a decision is felt]

Both male and female employees who had service prior to February, 1968, who resigned or were terminated for a nondiscriminatory reason (or for an unchallenged discriminatory reason), and who were later reemployed, also were treated as new employees receiving no seniority credit for their prior service. … In short, the system is neutral in its operation.

" ... petitioners in the present case have asserted a claim that is wholly dependent on discriminatory conduct occurring well outside the period of limitations, and cannot complain of a continuing violation."

Continuing Violation-- Evans (cont.)

This is so even if the employee who subsequently challenges that system could not reasonably have expected to be demoted or otherwise concretely harmed by the [490 U.S. 900, 914]   new system at the time of its adoption, and, indeed, even if the employee was not working in the affected division of the company at the time of the system's adoption. This severe interpretation of 706(e) will come as a surprise to Congress, whose goals in enacting Title VII surely never included conferring absolute immunity on discriminatorily adopted seniority systems that survive their first 300 days. Because the harsh reality of today's decision, requiring employees to sue anticipatorily or forever hold their peace, is so glaringly at odds with the purposes of Title VII, and because it is compelled neither by the text of the statute nor our precedents interpreting it, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Marshall in his dissent referring to the Court's decision that challenges to seniority systems must the made within the appropriate time frame (e.g., 300 days) ---

Dissenting View in Lorance

Under this continuing violation theory, each time a discriminatory seniority system is applied, like each time a discriminatory salary structure is applied, an independent "unlawful employment practice" under 703(a)(1) takes place, triggering the limitations period anew. See Bazemore v. Friday, (1986) ("Each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII") ... Viewing each application of a discriminatory system as a new violation serves the equal opportunity goals of Title VII by ensuring that victims of discrimination are not prevented from having their day in court.

Each time seniority was negatively affected by the seniority system is a continuing violation of the discrimination

Dissenting View in Lorance (cont.)

Civil Rights Act (1991) Enforcement Provisions PROVISIONS Sec. 2000e-5. [Section 706]

Seniority System Challenges (e.g., Lorrance v. AT&T)(2) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this title (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision), when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or provision of the system.