1SOTCW: Vietnam War Study GroupSummer 1999 Issue # 12

INTRODUCTIONThis issue we have two articles on the involvement of Southern Hemisphere forces involved in the war (Australia and NewZealand); reviews of new rules, scenery and figures; scenario and rules.

Nowfel Leulliot has a new web site dedicated to the French involvement in Indochina at :http://members.tripod.co.uk/Indochine/index.htmlThere are three e-mail lists dedicated to Vietnam they are:Charlie Company Rules: http://www.egoup.com/charlie-companyFree Fire Zone: E mail - free-fire-zone-subscribe@egroups.comVietgaming (Covers all periods and all rules of the Vietnam War): http://www.onelist.com/subscribe/Vietgaming

The Grunt! Site at: http://www.soft.net.uk/entrinet by Michael Ruffle is rapidly expanding. There is a lot of informationthere it is must visit if you have Internet connection.

I have been doing a lot of research lately into LRRP/Rangers in the war thanks to a number of books purchased fromwww.amazon.co.uk so next issue will be a bit of a LRRP special. Detailed organisation, equipment and tactics used. Therewill be also a new set of squad type rules I am writing which uses a famous commercial games mechanisms for combat(more of that next time).

CONTENTSIntroduction.....................................................................................................................................................................1Contents...........................................................................................................................................................................1Caught in a Killing Zone..................................................................................................................................................2The Withdrawal from Khe Sanh.......................................................................................................................................7Review: Frontline Terrain...............................................................................................................................................13Morale System for Wargames.........................................................................................................................................14Diary of an NVA Soldier................................................................................................................................................16Operation Ballarat Analysis Report.................................................................................................................................17Review: Bodycount v. 2.................................................................................................................................................31Vietnam (Victory Games, 1984) Errata...........................................................................................................................32Trouble at Muc Duc.......................................................................................................................................................33Several Klicks In The Nam.............................................................................................................................................34New 25mm Figures........................................................................................................................................................38OPLAN 34A..................................................................................................................................................................38Full Plastic Body Bag #2................................................................................................................................................39

2CAUGHT IN A KILLING ZONEby Colin Smith

Further to my book "The Killing Zone - NZ infantry in Vietnam" I have received input from various NZ InfantryVietnam veterans to considerably expand the narrative of an action relating to Sergeant Tuhiwais DCM citationdescribed on page 30 of the book, which is incorrectly dated 1969 and attributed to Victor 3 Company.

During the years 1967 to 1971 New Zealand committed a total of nine infantry companies which were attachedto the Australian Task Force, based at Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy province South Vietnam.Up to two NZ Rifle companies served as attachments to the various Australian Infantry battalions serving theirsix month to one year tours of combat duty in that time frame. The New Zealand Government had previouslycommitted 161 Battery Royal N.Z. Artillery Regiment and a medical team in 1965 in response to an Americancall for assistance from her regional allies.

The Australian Task Force had been assigned the mission to pacify Phuoc Tuy province by GeneralWestmoreland following an initial combat employment by various Australian units as a part of the US 173rd

Airborne Brigade (Separate). This deployment had been successful but operational differences between thetactical methods of the ANZAC and US Army units had caused problems and misunderstandings.Logistical problems had also arisen because of the equipment differences between the two armies, apart fromradios, M16 rifles and M60 machine guns the Anzacs used indigenous or British equipment.

Basically the American Paratroopers aggressively sought out the Viet Cong to assault head on whereas theANZAC tactic was to patrol silently and ambush the Viet Cong and avoid if possible immediate assaults onemplaced enemy troops. The "Body count" didnt have the impact on the career prospects of the ANZACofficers as seems to be the case with some American units.The US Paratroops were the cutting edge of the Air-Mobile concept at that time whilst the ANZAC infantry hadcome from the protracted jungle campaigns of Borneo and Malaya which emphasised foot patrolling andambushing.

According to the official Australian Army history "Towards Long Tan Vietnam 1950-66 "by Ian McNeill, PhuocTuy province was chosen for the Australian Task Force because of several reasons.

Firstly the Australian logistics requirements could be resolved through the nearby port of Vung Tau.Secondly the size of the province allowed for the Brigade sized Task Force to operate independently from theAmerican command structure, for example if they had been based at Bien Hoa the brigade would have beenmanaged by the US command structure present. This issue was essentially a political one but important to theAustralian/New Zealand Governments to demonstrate their commitment to the Free World cause.This autonomy also allowed the Task Force Commander to plan and implement the military and civic strategiessuccessful in the Malayan Emergency campaign.

The New Zealand infantry were mainly from 1 RNZIR based in Malaysia/Singapore and served tours of duty of6 months or 1 year depending on their company rotation period. The New Zealand infantry companies servedas a integral whole in their respective tours with few individual replacements.

The soldiers were regular, professional troops with no conscripts or draftees. They had volunteered for Vietnamservice and were specialists at a chosen infantry role, such as scout, machine gunner, rifleman, roles, whichthey were trained for prior to Vietnam duty.

The New Zealanders adopted Australian Rifle Company organisation of a Headquarters (Major commanding)and 3 Rifle Platoons, each of a Platoon HQ group (Lieutenant commanding) and 3 rifle sections (squads)consisting; a Corporal , Scout group (2 Privates), Rifle group (4 Privates including M79 Grenadier) and aMachine Gun group with Lance Corporal, 2 Privates with M60 GPMG.

Typically Officers, Signallers (PRC 25 radios), NCOs and 1 of each scout group carried Ml 6 assault rifles.Riflemen, including the M79 Grenadier carried the Australian manufactured FN licensed SLR (semi-automatic7.62mm self loading rifle similar in capabilities to the US Ml 4).

3The FN/MAG machine gun was generally replaced in Vietnam by the M60 machine gun of US manufacture asthe section machine gun although 7.62mm calibre Bren guns also were used.

US issue M72 Rocket launchers, M26 grenades and Claymore mines were enthusiastically adopted by the NewZealand troops, along with butt packs, webbing and anything else they could scrounge from their lavishlyequipped (and generous) American allies.

The ANZAC pacification strategy of mounting operations in specified areas and deploying by Helicopter orvehicles to cordon and sweep for the Viet Cong was similar to the US strategy in execution.

The tactical methods of the ANZAC infantry were silent patrolling and ambushing for extended periods(depending on water supplies). Tracks were used for ambushing the Viet Cong but were not usually patrolledon.

Typical statistics, as supplied to the author courtesy of Major J D McGuire Commanding Officer Victor 5Company, show that New Zealand infantrymen initiated contacts with the Viet Cong at the ratio of 10 to 1,indicating the level of dominance these professional soldiers attained against the Viet Cong "Home Team"D445 Battalion and the NVA 174 Regiment.

The narrative which follows is of the non typical end of the scale but is a situation which could potentially occurat any time as intelligence on the Viet Cong enemy in Phuoc Tuy was usually incomplete, even late in theconflict.

Prior to the New Zealand infantry committal to Vietnam the Australian D Company 6RAR had fought a largeengagement at Long Tan, lessons of which set various procedures in place for operations. These included amuch higher amount of ammunition, especially for the M60 machine guns, being carried than was the setamount previously, not patrolling in less than half platoon strength and operating within 105mm artillery range.

On 19 March 1970 members of 3 Platoon, Victor 4 Company, attached to the Royal Australian Regiment 6Battalion, were caught in the killing ground of a Viet Cong ambush.

Against heavy odds the Platoon fought back superior numbers of enemy soldiers fighting from defensivebunkers on ground of their choosing, with an outflanking movement by the Viet Cong being thwarted by acontact with Victor companys 1 Platoon and the Company HQ.For the first time the complete story of what happened in that ambush has been related from the point of view ofthe soldiers present and to the best of my understanding is as follows.

Other than the DCM award to the 3 Platoon commander Sergeant T.H.Tuhiwai no awards or official recognitionwas given to the New Zealanders who featured in the action. The only previously published account of theaction is a brief summary in the 6RAR battalion history which I referred to verify the accuracy of this narrative.

The Viet Cong actions are recounted from deductions made by various veterans and from the physicalevidence left on that battleground which was found during a post-action sweep on 20 March 1970.

Victor 4 Company was tasked with a 3 day duration operation to search the nearby Nui Dinh hills for the ChauDuc VC company.

The initial deployment would be by helicopter in two lifts to Landing Zones on the top of the feature then adispersed sweep on foot patrolling back towards the Nui Dat firebase across the eastern side of the hills to thelowland beyond. The company would be extracted by Ml 13 Armoured Personnel Carriers back to the Nui Datbase.

The Nui Dinh hills had been the subject of previous operations as they overlooked two highways, one of whichwas the main supply road between the Vung Tau Logistical base and the Nui Dat Fire base.

After an early intelligence estimate that an entire VC Regiment was entrenched in the heavily vegetated andbroken hill terrain the first B52 bomber strike in support of the Australian Task Force was carried out. That andsubsequent operations always produced evidence of the presence of the Chau Duc company in the hills butwithout any major combat encounters.

4The short duration of the operation plus the information from a US Army radio relay station on top of Nui OngCau that no enemy activity was evident led to the decision being made to rest several personnel from 3Platoon, Victor 4 Company including the platoon commander Lieutenant S D Kidd and the specialist scoutsfrom 3 section. This was usual procedure as the NZ infantry companies operated almost continuously onextended operations.

The strength of 3 Platoon was 14 men including the acting platoon commander Sergeant Tuhiwai organisedinto two reduced rifle sections and a command group. The Operation code named Waipounama (probablemisspelling of the Maori name for the NZ South Island - Waipounamu - the Greenstone source Island)commenced on 18 March 1970 with Victor 4 company being airlifted into two landing zones in the centre of theNui Dinh hills by Iroquois UH 1 assault helicopters.

The Company HQ, 2 and 3 Platoons landed on the western side of the mountain top while 1 Platoon landed onthe Nui Ong Cau feature.

The large re-entrant in the eastern side of the mountain was the objective of the immediate patrolling done thatday, with 3 Viet Cong engaged in the early afternoon in a fleeting contact.

The Company deployed in a defensive posture at last light around the main plateau and an uneventful nightpassed.

On the morning of 19 March 1970 the eastwards sweep commenced.

1 Platoon covered the movement of 2 and 3 Platoons as they investigated the tracks located the previous day.Around mid morning a command detonated mine injured Privates Paul Thomas and John White of 2 Platoon.The Viet Cong didnt follow up this ambush and the injured New Zealanders were evacuated by helicopter"Dustoff medivac.

2 Platoon continued to patrol southeast to the bottom of the hill, following enemy tracks while 3 Platoon followeda circuit track back towards the V4 Company HQ, moving in thick vegetation, referred to as triple canopy whichmeans jungle with plenty of large trees. At the bottom of a short steep downhill section the terrain opened outinto open rocky ground which gently sloped uphill.

Various members of 3 Platoon had noticed the signs of enemy activity, such as fresh wood cutting forbunkers/hootchs and human waste as they slowly moved along in a single file patrol formation.Private T W (Mo) Paenga led in his role of lead scout followed by Private Bill Keatch who was his cover scout.This pair worked in tandem, covering each others movement as they cautiously scoured the jungle surroundsfor the Viet Cong.

The 3 section commander followed the scouts, Corporal Olly Taukamo, from where he commanded thedepleted section. The M60 Machine gun group of Private Beau Heke, the gunner, and the number two PrivateRay Symons followed next followed by the section 2nd in Command Lance Corporal Graeme Goldring who wasthe Machine gun group commander. Three Platoons acting commander Sergeant Tom Tuhiwai followedGoldring, with his signaller following.

The other section group followed, with another six soldiers organised the same as the 3 section and moving insingle file. This section contained the 2nd M60 Machine gun group of Privates Aussie Young and Don Clark.

The limited visibility of the thickly vegetated terrain made excellent ambush country and the lead scout wasplaced under the stress of ensuring the platoon wasnt caught in a devastating point blank range ambush inaddition to the certain knowledge that if the Viet Cong were waiting in ambush he would be the first to know.

We will never know what the lead scout was thinking about that time as the leading 3 section membersemerged from the jungle and made their way up the rocky spur that led to the Viet Cong company position. Nodoubt he was relieved to emerge into the more open terrain where he could see more than ten feet ahead, alsothe ever present chance of a trip wire booby trap would be reduced.

The Viet Cong had set an ambush on the main track approaching their main camp where they had set upaiming posts for their 60 mm mortars. They were aware that enemy troops were patrolling near the camp andhoped to annihilate a patrol before retreating back to the populated lowlands. The enemy firepower required the

5Viet Cong to engage at close range on ground of their choice with an escape route prepared before the weightof artillery and aerial firepower overwhelmed them.

The indirect approach of the New Zealand patrol threw this plan into disarray but the Viet Cong soldiers, beingveterans of this long conflict, quickly prepared to ambush the patrol from a different direction which was coveredby bunker positions. RPG teams moved through covered trenches into these bunkers and quickly assembledthe 85mm Rocket Propelled Grenades from their wrappings, which were then slid into place at the front of thelauncher. Other comrades set up RPD light machine guns or took up position with a SKS or AK47 rifle andwaited.

Private T W (Mo) Paenga, scouting ahead of the 3 section across a small re entrant, was killed instantly when aClaymore anti personnel mine was command detonated at the New Zealanders, thereby initiating the ambush.A split second later numbers of Viet Cong soldiers popped up out of their concealed bunkers to fire RPGs(85mm Rocket Propelled Grenades) at the leading New Zealand soldiers.

Lance Corporal Graeme Goldring, who was close to the Platoon HQ just at the jungle edge, recalls the suddenshock of having the infantrymans worst nightmare suddenly occur - that of being caught in an ambush. Thesheer mind numbing blast of firepower caused him to think that the leading section was being engaged byAmerican troops in error.

The leading New Zealand infantry section was dispersed which meant the VC rocket fire and possibly severalmore claymore mines impacted mainly around the lead scout-Private Mo Paenga, the cover scout - Private BillKeatch and the section commander Corporal Olly Taukamo.

Heavy automatic gunfire from an array of AK47 assault rifles, RPD light machine guns and at least one 30calibre machine gun laced the area from the killing ground back to the edge of the jungle.

In that immediate maelstrom of incoming fire the lead section was effectively decimated, with only one soldierable to return fire amongst those caught in the open. Private Ray Symons fired approximately ten 7.62mmrounds from his SLR at the area the deluge of VC fire was coming from.

Further back at the edge of the jungle other platoon members fired their rifles with no noticeable impact on theentrenched enemy. The situation at this point was that the Viet Cong had achieved dominance over the NewZealand infantry platoon and had the initiative on the battleground.

In situations such as this the actions of individuals who seize the moment and perform beyond that which isreasonable to expect can make all the difference.

Private Ray Symons who had taken cover behind a large tree heard one of the leading New Zealand soldierscry out in pain and without further ado ran forward into the area where the explosions had occurred. Heencountered Private Beau Heke, the section M60 Machine gunner, who had just been laced with shrapnel in hisshoulder an instant before when a RPG round impacted near him.

Symons pulled Heke away from the M60 machine gun and after giving him his SLR directed the shocked andbleeding man into an area of dead ground back towards the jungle.

The section commander, Corporal Olly Taukamo, who had been up front with his scouts staggered backtowards Symons. Symons assisted the wounded and deeply shocked Taukamo (wounded for the third time intwo tours of duty) and directed him back to where Beau Heke was. Symons decided to take the fight to the VietCong at this point and of his own volition picked up the M60 machine gun and moved forward to a position fromwhich he judged he could effectively engage the enemy.

The cover scout Private Bill Keatch appeared next, walking upright and seemingly oblivious to the hail ofprojectiles shrieking through the air.

He was bleeding from his head and had lost his right eye. Symons paused to drag Keatch down to the groundand when Keatch was clear of his position opened up with the M60 machine gun. He had approximately 800rounds of linked 7.62mm ammunition for the M60 with him and set about firing controlled bursts at the enemyposition. His actions earned him the attention of a number of VC who fired back at him, mainly with automaticweapons as the firepower generated by the M60 machine gun would have dissuaded most of the RPG gunners

6from standing up out of their bunker entrances in front to fire at him. (If fired from within an enclosed space theback blast from the RPG could kill the gunner). They were still able to launch their rockets at the area behindSymons however.

Private Don Clark arrived forward to assist Symons, having been called forward by Sergeant Tom Tuhiwai withPrivate Aussie Young carrying the rear section M60 Machine gun. Young set up his M60 behind and to the leftof Symons while Clark moved forward. Symons was concerned that the linked ammunition supply was gettinglow and sent Clark back to recover belts of that ammunition from the wounded men. Between firing controlledbursts from the M60 machine gun Symons repeatedly called out ahead for the missing scout Private MoPaenga, to no avail. Covered by the barrage of bullets pumped out by the two M60 machine guns Clarkattempted to crawl forward to where Symons indicated that Paenga would be. Twice Clark was literally pinnedto the ground as fragments whirled around him from RPG rounds exploding. He recalls having to wipe the dirtout of his eyes while waiting for the explosions to pause. On the third attempt Clark found Private Paengasbody. At first sight Clark knew that Paenga had died instantly. The VC position was less than 50 metres awayand in spite of the best efforts of Symons and Young firing the M60 machine guns the enemy fire was toointense for Clark to bring Paengas body in. Clark picked up Paengas M16 rifle, grenades and ammunition andscampered back to the main 3 platoon position.

The Viet Cong continued to pour automatic fire back at the New Zealanders throughout as Clark returned withenough belts of linked ammunition to enable Symons to continue a heavy rate of fire with the M60.

According to the Australian 6RAR Battalion history Clark made three trips across that exposed area withammunition. He reported the death of Mo Paenga to Sergeant Tuhiwai during one of his forays.

Clark recalls that the other New Zealand soldiers in the main position had spotted VC movement flitting aroundthe flanks of the ambush and after informing Tuhiwai of Paengas fate was ordered to tell the M60 machinegunners to fall back to the main position.

Clark explained to Tuhiwai that the M60s were in a better position to engage the VC where they were andTuhiwai consented to leave them in place. The NZ platoon couldnt move with all its casualties as the VC wouldhave slaughtered them in a running fight and to leave the wounded to the mercy of the enemy was unthinkable.The NZ infantry had a code that they would never leave their dead behind on the battlefield, even if theycouldnt recover the body immediately they would remain nearby to prevent the VC from getting to it.For these reasons Sergeant Tom Tuhiwai and the platoon remained where they were.

The amount of firepower now being put out effectively dissuaded any thought of overrunning the New Zealandplatoon the VC might have had in a frontal charge. The VC were not going to run across open ground into thecombined firepower of the two M60 Machine guns but started to send out small groups of riflemen around theflanks of the NZ patrol to scout for other NZ troops prior to assaulting the ambush ground from a flank.

Back at the Platoon HQ frantic requests had been made for support from the Australian Task Force.Unfortunately the action was outside the range of friendly mortars and the topography made artillery fireimpossible to safely use.

The wounded men had been placed in a stream bed at the base of the slope and were being tended by otherplatoon members. Sergeant Tom Tuhiwai was wounded by a mortar round hitting the tree beside him and alarge white hot fragment slashing into his leg, which was the second time he was injured during his Vietnamtour of duty. The VC firepower had set fire to scattered patches of vegetation around the New Zealand platoonand efforts were required from the soldiers to contain these fires near the main platoon position.

After what must have seemed a long time of continuous fighting and constant pandemonium outside help finallyarrived in the form of US Army AH 1 Cobra helicopter gunships clattering in line formation and calling on the NZ3 Platoon HQ radio for confirmation of the Viet Cong position prior to attacking.

The order was probably shouted by the platoon HQ for the forward group to throw a coloured smoke grenade ,in any case to avoid being victims of US firepower it was judged prudent by Symons to throw smoke to marktheir position.

Once the gunship pilots had established the location of the NZ troops they proceeded to blast the VC bunkerswith rockets and machine gun fire, some of the fire coming perilously close to the forward NZ group in spite of

7the smoke marker. The VC fire noticeably eased off after the Cobra gunships had made several passes and forthe first time since the ambush started the New Zealand soldiers realised they would probably survive. An orderwas shouted for the forward group to fall back to the main platoon group as the VC fire had ceased completely.Before they did so both M60 gunners resumed a heavy rate of fire to enable Private Don Clark to crawl forwardto recover Mo Paengas body.

After this they rejoined the platoon in the stream bed and set up a perimeter to protect a hovering "Dustoffmedivac helicopter which by means of a jungle penetrator device extracted the casualties.

The Victor 4 Company headquarters group had come under spasmodic mortar, machine gun and rocket fireprior to this as the main VC force moved from the bunker complex.

A Viet Cong scout group had pinpointed their position but as reports of other NZ troops in the vicinity came inthe Viet Cong commander decided to withdraw his forces from the area. A fleeting contact also had occurredwith the NZ 1 Platoon - probably with a VC scout group probing to follow up their initial ambush success toannihilate the remnants of 3 Platoon.

The VC company moved quickly away from the New Zealand troops and were tracked later to a lowlandregional South Vietnamese Army force post, where they disappeared amongst the population nearby.The Victor 4 Company harboured that night in the mountain area, with the shock of the days action suddenlyhitting Private Ray Symons. As he relaxed with a meal and cup of coffee, alongside Lance Corporal GraemeGoldring, he realised they were the only members of 3 section left - he cried.

Further ReadingTowards Long Tan - Australian Army Vietnam 1950-66 by Ian McNeillThe Killing Zone - NZ Infantry Vietnam 1967-71 by Colin SmithFirst to Fight - ANZUS Brigade 1965 by Bob BreenVarious privately published RAR (Australian) Battalion histories.

I acknowledge the assistance of Ray Symons, Aussie Young, Don Clark, Graeme Goldring, Graeme Beattieand Geoff Dixon in preparing this article, in the form of filing out questionnaires and a number of interviews, andthe cooperation of the Vietnam Veterans Association secretary Alan Nixey to help me contact these peoplethroughout New Zealand and Australia.

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM KHESANH

By Peter Brush

(I was planning an article on Khe Sanh for this issue of Dustoff, however, I was beaten to it by John S. Harrel inissue 32 of The Journal. To compliment his article I have an article about the retreat from Khe sanh. editor)

The Withdrawal from Khe Sanh

Two months after withstanding the most ferocious siege of the Vietnam War, Khe Sanh was abandoned to theenemy.

On May 23, 1968, U.S. Marine Corps Colonel David E. Lownds was invited to the White House. There,President Lyndon Johnson awarded Lownds' 26th Marine Regiment the Presidential Unit Citation, the nation'shighest unit decoration, for its bravery at Khe Sanh in 1968. The text noted that because of the unit's actions,"enemy forces were denied the military and psychological victory they so desperately sought." An editorial inthe Washington Star took the Marines' accolades even further, claiming that "One day, in fact, the victory overthe siege may be judged a decisive turning point that finally convinced the enemy he could not win."

8Vietnamese Communists view Khe Sanh differently. For them, not only did the Americans not win a victory atKhe Sanh, they were forced to retreat in order to avoid destruction. The Communists claim Khe Sanh was a"stinging defeat from both the military and political points of view." The fighting at Khe Sanh during Tet 1968was widely covered in the U.S. media. As the battle continued, American military commanders gave frequentexplanations as to why the United States sought a confrontation with Communist forces.

Khe Sanh had been garrisoned by Americans since 1962. General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S.forces in Vietnam, felt maintaining a presence at Khe Sanh was critically important. It served as a patrol basefor interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as the western terminus for the defensive line along the DemilitarizedZone (DMZ), and as a barrier to Communist efforts to carry the fighting into the populated coastal regions ofSouth Vietnam. By early 1968, 6,000 Marines at Khe Sanh were surrounded by 20,000 North Vietnamesetroops. The siege began on January 21, 1968. In a report dated February 18, the New York Times explainedthe importance of Khe Sanh, noting that this area in northwest South Vietnam provided a base for alliedoperations against the infiltration by the Communists of men and supplies into the south. After the NorthVietnamese Army (NVA) surrounded the Marine position at Khe Sanh, allied forces were unable to inhibit thisinfiltration; it became too dangerous for the Marines to leave their base in sufficient numbers to greatly affectthe movement of enemy forces. Although that situation may have reduced the strategic value of Khe Sanh inany conventional sense of the word, American military commanders believed the United States would suffer aheavy psychological blow if they retreated from Khe Sanh.

Unlike the Americans, the North Vietnamese were unable to hold fixed positions due to the efficacy of alliedfirepower. As a result, the Communists concentrated on harassing and disrupting allied forces. The Americanmilitary command concluded that the only way to stop the disruption was to destroy enemy forces in sufficientnumbers. The American commanders hoped that at Khe Sanh they would be able to kill enemy troops in a ratioof 10 to 1, 20 to 1, or even 30 to 1. The Americans clung to their belief in the value of a positive kill ratio in faceof compelling evidence showing they were mostly unable to achieve it.

Despite the fact that Khe Sanh was encircled by enemy troops, the U.S. Defense Department claimed that thefortress blocked five avenues of infiltration from Laos into South Vietnam. According to the official view of thesituation in February 1968, if Khe Sanh were abandoned, entire North Vietnamese divisions could "pour downRoute 9 [the major east-west highway below the DMZ] and four other natural approaches through the valleysand could overrun a chain of Marine positions; the Rockpile, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Phu Bai to the east."This would mean that the North Vietnamese could be in a good position to seize control of South Vietnam's twonorthernmost provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien, with grave political and psychological consequences.

This strategic rationale was secondary to the primary reason for holding onto Khe Sanh: Washington wasunwilling to give its enemy a psychological victory by giving ground. One official source explained the basis forthis reasoning by recalling the first Battle of Khe Sanh, fought in 1967. "We had to put our foot down, and forpsychological and political reasons, we wouldn't want to pull back," said the official. "What would thenewspapers have written if we had given up Khe Sanh afterward?"

Another reason for holding Khe Sanh was its importance as the western anchor of the McNamara Line, a high-technology barrier designed to impede the flow of Communist troops and supplies into South Vietnam. Thebarrier was supposed to stretch from the South China Sea to the Laotian border. Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara hoped the barrier would allow the Americans to reduce their reliance on the bombing of NorthVietnam, thereby increasing Washington's flexibility in seeking a diplomatic settlement to the war.

On February 25, General Westmoreland expressed doubt that the North Vietnamese could stand a long war.Responding to a question during an interview in Saigon about whether his fundamental strategy had beenchanged by the Tet Offensive, Westmoreland replied, "Basically, I see no requirement to change our strategy."

The key to the defense of Khe Sanh was overwhelming air power. On March 27, senior Marine officers in DaNang claimed that the effectiveness of allied airpower was so great that "they have no plans for pulling theMarines out no matter how much the enemy might increase his shelling at Khe Sanh." An Air Force spokesmansaid that since January 22, allied airmen had dropped 80,000 tons of ordnance around Khe Sanh. "We plan tokeep up the pace indefinitely," he added.

The same report noted that airpower had limited effectiveness. Even though 80,000 tons of ordnance amountedto more than the nonnuclear tonnage dropped on Japan throughout World War II, it had not stopped enemymovement around Khe Sanh. On March 25, a Marine patrol was halted by heavy enemy machine-gun and

9mortar fire after traveling only 100 to 200 yards past the camp's barbed wire perimeter. During the previousweek, the enemy had managed to fire 1,500 rocket, artillery and mortar rounds at the Khe Sanh base.

Other examples illustrate that the protective aerial umbrella around Khe Sanh was less that 100 percenteffective. On February 8, enemy gunners fired hundreds of mortar rounds into a Marine position on nearby Hill64. The NVA assault that followed the mortar barrage resulted in 21 men killed, 26 wounded and four Marinesmissing in action. Only one Marine on Hill 64 was unscathed. Colonel Lownds, the base commander, however,later described the Marine casualties resulting from the fighting on Hill 64 as "light."

On February 25, a two-squad patrol, instructed not to venture farther than 1,000 meters from the baseperimeter, vanished. Two weeks later, casualties of the so-called ghost patrol were established as nine dead,25 wounded, and 19 missing. A company-size patrol on March 30 had as one of its missions the recovery of thebodies of the ghost patrol. This second patrol suffered three dead, 71 wounded and three missing before beingordered to pull back. Only two bodies from the ghost patrol were recovered at that time.

On April 5, the 76-day siege was officially declared ended. Since 7,000 North Vietnamese were still reported tobe in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, however, the end of the siege was more official than real. The North Vietnamesehad fired more than 40,000 artillery, rocket, and mortar rounds into the Marine positions during the siege.

By April, the situation had changed in the Khe Sanh area. The New York Times noted that the NorthVietnamese had built several new roads into South Vietnam from Laos--apparently in an effort to improve theirability to move troops, heavy weapons and supplies into combat areas. Two of the new roads pushed acrossthe South Vietnam-Laos border to the north and south of the Khe Sanh combat base. No longer would NVAtroops have to endure protracted marches along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They could be driven closer to thebattlefield in trucks. Heavy weapons and ammunition could be transported to the front more quickly and ingreater quantity. These new logistics capabilities had profound implications for American military commanders.General Westmoreland had built up the Marine force at Khe Sanh to approximately 6,000 men, a figure thatrepresented a balance between the number that could be effectively supplied and the force level necessary toensure adequate defense of the combat base. Since at that time the Marine garrison could only be supplied byair, any increase in the Communists' ability to launch attacks against the Marine positions could tip the balanceagainst the Marines.

According to a New York Times report dated May 24, both President Lyndon B. Johnson and GeneralWestmoreland felt the decision to defend Khe Sanh was the proper one. They believed that the defense of thecamp not only prevented the North Vietnamese from opening a major route into South Vietnam's populatedareas, but also greatly strengthened the American initiative toward peace talks, "for they [the Marine defenders]vividly demonstrated to the enemy the utter futility of his attempts to win a military victory in the South,"according to the New York Times.

Although the level of fighting fell off in April, it was not over. On May 30, 600 NVA attacked Marines in theirnight defensive positions around Khe Sanh. The attack was supported by mortar, artillery and rocket fire.Marine losses were 13 killed and 44 wounded. Two days later another battle took place when a large NVA forceattacked Marine positions two miles southeast of Khe Sanh. Two-hundred-thirty North Vietnamese werereported killed in that battle, in some of the heaviest fighting in South Vietnam at that time.

In a June report, New York Times reporter Douglas Robinson described Khe Sanh as "still a fearsome place ofexploding shells and death." North Vietnamese artillerymen fired 130mm artillery shells from caves or dug-inpositions on the Co Roc massif in Laos. These guns, out of the range of the largest U.S. artillery, had beenfiring on Khe Sanh for months. It was difficult to prepare adequate defenses against them, since even dudrounds penetrated four feet into the ground. The Americans were unable to destroy these guns. In early June,the North Vietnamese gunners at Co Roc were still able to fire more than 100 rounds in a single day into thebase at Khe Sanh. Marine Brig. Gen. Carl W. Hoffman claimed, "The North Vietnamese still want Khe Sanh andwe are still trying to keep them from getting it." The general described the enemy as being composed of "fresh,well-equipped troops with new haircuts and good morale, proof we are facing not a rabble but well-trainedforce."

In the six weeks preceding that June report, the Marines had killed about 1,300 North Vietnamese Armyregulars within a four-mile radius of Khe Sanh. During that time, American dead and wounded had flowed in asteady stream to the Khe Sanh aid station, which was dug deep into the ground. General Hoffman concededthat the Communists had the ability to keep the Khe Sanh combat base under pressure for "as long as they

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wished." Months earlier, the Marines had made an effort that, had it been successful, would have given themmeans to counter the threat posed by the NVA heavy artillery at Co Roc. In August 1967, a large supply convoyleft Dong Ha for Khe Sanh, including several U.S. Army 175mm self-propelled guns. General Westmorelandhad wanted to position the guns at Khe Sanh to deal with NVA artillery in Laos. When the convoy ran into anenemy ambush along Route 9, however, the decision was made to deploy the large guns at Camp Carrollrather than risk their destruction at the ambush site. (See "Expend Shells, Not Men" in the August 1997 issue ofVietnam.)

That incident caused a change in thinking about resupply for Khe Sanh. Route 9 was too risky; thereafter,during the period from August 1967 until Route 9 was reopened in April 1968, Khe Sanh would be resupplied byair. The reopening of the road was accomplished through Operation Pegasus, a combined Marine and Armysweep of Route 9 to the combat base.

With the arrival of the relief column, an Army colonel replaced Colonel Lownds as base commander. Armytroops would replace the Marines, freeing them to go on the attack. Although ending the siege freed thebeleaguered Marines for offensive operations, it also gave increased flexibility to the enemy forces. No longerwould they have two divisions tied down at Khe Sanh. Even though a large portion of the NVA force withdrewinto Laos near the DMZ, they could easily be shifted to other battlefields as needed. One American officialclaimed the North Vietnamese withdrawal had been prompted by the effectiveness of the American bombingcampaign. The U.S. military command refused to say definitely whether it planned to keep American troops atKhe Sanh. However, since the purpose of the base had been to serve as a center for anti-infiltration activitybefore the siege, some senior officers hinted that a continued American presence at Khe Sanh was likely.

The reopening of Route 9 to convoy traffic did not mean that the supply problem had been solved. Theseconvoys faced the same threats that they had in 1967. American units had to be stationed at every bridge andculvert to guard against ambushes. Steep cliffs lined the roadway, making it possible for the enemy almost todrop grenades into passing trucks. Supplies moving overland were threatened by almost nightly ambushes andfirefights.

On June 16, Marines reported a North Vietnamese attack on Marine positions south of Khe Sanh, in which 168Communist soldiers were killed. Although the fighting continued, the U.S. command felt significant changes hadtaken place around Khe Sanh. Friendly strength, mobility and firepower, had increased since the Army forceshad arrived, but the extent of the enemy threat had increased due to a greater flow of replacements and achange in NVA tactics. Consequently, the base at Khe Sanh was to be abandoned.

Senior Marine commanders had long felt that maintaining a large force at Khe Sanh was more of a liability thanan asset. They had only garrisoned the place because of pressure from General Westmoreland. In late 1967,an Army task force was formed to control activity in this critical sector of South Vietnam; Westmoreland felt theMarines were unable to adequately direct the battle. In March, Army Lt. Gen. William B. Rosson took commandof the task force. Unknown to General Westmoreland, Rosson and his Marine counterpart, Lt. Gen. Robert E.Cushman, decided on their own in April to withdraw American forces from Khe Sanh.

Naval gunfire experts and Air Force liaison officers were sent to Khe Sanh to plan for the destruction of theMarine positions. Marines began packing their equipment and filling in foxholes. The base chaplain at Khe Sanhnoted in his diary, "The general attitude of people in the base is that it is wrong to abandon the base afterfighting so long for it." When Westmoreland found out about Rosson and Cushman's plan, a Marine general onWestmoreland's staff in Saigon claimed that he "never saw Westy so mad." The Marines at Khe Sanh werenotified that the base would not be abandoned. They began unpacking their personal gear and started diggingin again.

Marines would continue to occupy Khe Sanh and various nearby hill positions and engage in search anddestroy missions. Fresh Marine and Army units would replace the Marines who had spent the siege at KheSanh. More than 400 American troops would be killed and 2,300 wounded in the 10 weeks following the end ofthe siege. Those figures were more than two times the casualties sustained by the Marines in the siege duringthe period from late January to late March.

On June 11, 1968, General Westmoreland relinquished his command of U.S. forces in Vietnam. The Rosson-Cushman plan to abandon the base, previously rejected by Westmoreland, was to be implemented. Thisversion of the plan was dated the day after Westmoreland turned control over to his successor, Army General

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Creighton W. Abrams. The Marines who had fought at Khe Sanh were furious, with one of the battalions"almost in open revolt" over the decision.

There is speculation that the base closing was ordered by President Johnson, who wanted no more nonsenseabout defending exposed positions. According to some sources, Johnson told General Abrams to get out ofKhe Sanh as soon as Westmoreland was gone from Vietnam and before he could become fully established asArmy chief of staff in Washington.

It is clear that President Johnson took a great personal interest in the fighting. Earlier, the New York Times hadnoted that the ultimate command post for the battle of Khe Sanh was the White House in Washington, D.C.There, Johnson asked "tense and urgent" questions of his commanders in the field, probing "policy, tactics,preparations, morale," according to the Times. The responses these questions evoked "adds up to the largestvolume of messages and reports ever gathered by the White House for a tactical engagement in the war."

General Abrams ordered the base closing to be kept secret for as long as possible. When it was finally madepublic, only a minimum amount of detail and explanation were provided. The decision was met with "incredulityand bewilderment" when the news reached the United States. National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow noted,"I believe we have a serious problem--perhaps of substance, certainly of public relations." Rostow pointed outthat intelligence estimates on the enemy order of battle still placed about 40,000 NVA troops in the DMZ area."If it was good to pin down two divisions with 6,000 men, then why not now?" he asked. The Pentagonacknowledged the base closing announcement caused a "difficult public relations task."

The U.S. command in Saigon claimed the base closing was a result of a changed military situation around KheSanh. "When the situation changes, you ought to change your tactics," explained an unnamed general on theSaigon command staff. The Marine presence at Khe Sanh had been established to inhibit infiltration. Explainingthe logic of the decision, the unnamed general said that the construction of additional infiltration routes by theNVA into South Vietnam meant Khe Sanh had become less valuable as a means to check this infiltration. KheSanh had long served as a logistical center for the supply of the nearby hill positions. Now the general claimedthat it did not make sense to maintain even a reduced garrison to defend Khe Sanh in order to use it as asupply base for servicing troops who would be conducting mobile operations in the area. "Khe Sanh was in theway; it was tying us down," the general explained.

Displaying a flawed grasp of geography that paralleled his convoluted logic, the general claimed the supplyfunction of Khe Sanh could be taken over by other installations in the area, such as Camp Stud. This base,"unlike Khe Sanh, is beyond the 17-mile range of the enemy's artillery in the demilitarized zone at the borderbetween North Vietnam and South Vietnam," said the nameless general. In reality, Stud was situated farthernorth than Khe Sanh, which puts it closer to the DMZ and not farther away. In any event, it was NVA artillery inSouth Vietnam and Laos that fired on the Marines at Khe Sanh, and not artillery from the DMZ.

An American colonel claimed he did not think "we ever really planned to have a base there in the first place."According to this view, the Marines came into the small Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh. When the NVAsurrounded Khe Sanh, "all of a sudden we had five to six thousand men there." Responding to the question asto whether it was proper to defend the base at the height of the fighting there in February and March, thecolonel rolled out the kill-ratio argument, saying: "We killed many, many more of their troops than we lostourselves." The colonel claimed, "We showed them that if we wanted to hold Khe Sanh we could do it."

Although the vulnerability of Khe Sanh to enemy artillery was a reason given by the military for abandoning it,one high Army official stated it was unlikely that seven other bases within the range of enemy artillery in theDMZ would be abandoned. "Khe Sanh was always different," he said. In reality, the major difference betweenKhe Sanh and other bases near the DMZ was simply that Khe Sanh was the only major American base to beabandoned.

The actual process of abandoning the Marine base was complicated and dangerous. Nine allied infantrybattalions were operating in the vicinity of Khe Sanh when the decision to close was made. Those units had tobe deployed elsewhere without advertising the move to the North Vietnamese. Allied forces would be extremelyvulnerable to enemy attack while the base was being dismantled.

The U.S. command wanted to leave a "completely clean piece of real estate" at Khe Sanh. Ruined aircraft werecut up and hauled away so they could not be used for propaganda purposes by the Communists. Nothing would

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be left to indicate that the Americans had been forced to withdraw. Eight hundred bunkers, miles of barbed wire,and acres of metal runway materials were buried, destroyed, or physically removed.

Communist gunners continued to fire on the Marine positions as the trench lines were filled in and sandbagswere emptied.

On July 5, the base was officially closed. Five Marines were killed in fighting near Khe Sanh that day. The finalMarine withdrawal was conducted at night and was interrupted for several hours when Communist artillerymenscored a direct hit on a bridge on Route 9. The bridge was finally repaired, allowing the Marines to move downRoute 9 to the east.

Fighting continued in the Khe Sanh area even after the base closing was complete. On July 9, Marines on Hill689 near Khe Sanh "vowed to hold the peak until the last attacking North Vietnamese had been killed." TheAmericans claimed 350 North Vietnamese died in this round of fighting. Echoing the rationale that brought theMarines to Khe Sanh in the first place, and seemingly unaware of the change in policy, the 3rd Marine Divisioncommander, Maj. Gen. Raymond Davis, said, "We are going to move off this hill, but not until we have defeatedthe North Vietnamese." That same day a Marine spokesman denied a Hanoi radio report claiming that a VietCong flag had been raised on the recently abandoned Khe Sanh combat base.

As predicted, North Vietnam was quick to exploit the propaganda benefits of Khe Sanh's abandonment. In thefive-day period beginning on July 7, 1968, Hanoi radio devoted 70 percent of its broadcast time in all Asianlanguages to discussions of the "American defeat" and the "Communist victory" at Khe Sanh. Hanoi specificallymentioned previous American explanations regarding the vital contribution of Khe Sanh to its strategy in theVietnam war. In a report from Hong Kong, the New York Times noted that Asians believed the NorthVietnamese explanation for the base closing and mostly rejected the American version that it was due to achanged military situation.

A clear distinction can be made regarding the merits of closing Khe Sanh between American military andpolitical leaders on the one hand, and Marines who participated in the defense of Khe Sanh on the other. Likeno other Vietnam battle, Khe Sanh captured the attention of the media and the American public. Roughly 25percent of all Vietnam film reports shown on evening television newscasts during February and March 1968were devoted to the situation at Khe Sanh. In the case of CBS, the figure was 50 percent. By March, supportersof the war among the American public were outnumbered by those who opposed the war. Gallup polls indicatenearly one person in five switched from the hawk position to the dove position between early February and mid-March. The best way to keep Khe Sanh from causing a negative influence on support for the war in Vietnamwas to close it.

Official explanations for the closing are inadequate. As has been shown, the situation around Khe Sanhremained much the same before the siege as after. In May 1968, four North Vietnamese regiments supportedby artillery were reported to be in the immediate vicinity of the base. According to the commanding general ofthe 3rd Marine Division, the situation at Khe Sanh at that time was the same as in late 1967, whenWestmoreland had ordered Khe Sanh reinforced. As early as February 1968, the New York Times reported thatcivilian officials who studied Vietnamese history were unwilling to share the level of confidence of military menthat Khe Sanh would prove to be an American victory. These civilians noted "the North Vietnamese willingnessto suffer overwhelming casualties for the sake of victories with political impact."

General Westmoreland, always the driving force behind the continued American presence at Khe Sanh, wasunable to grasp this willingness. In his biography, Westmoreland says of North Vietnamese Army commanderGeneral Vo Nguyen Giap, "A Western commander absorbing losses on the scale of Giap's would hardly havelasted in command more than a few weeks." Still espousing the value of a positive kill ratio, Westmorelandclaimed Giap's casualties at Khe Sanh were far in excess of those incurred by the French at Dien Bien Phu.The Vietnamese Communists, who also compare the two battles, claim that Khe Sanh was "America's DienBien Phu." The decision to abandon Khe Sanh is better described as a tactical withdrawal rather than a forcedretreat. The Marines on the ground were willing to maintain their positions at Khe Sanh if ordered to do so. Iwas at Khe Sanh from December 1967, before the fighting began, until April 1968, when the siege was officiallydeclared ended. There was no sense that we were a defeated force, and I had no idea the base was scheduledfor closing. My Marine unit was told that we would remain at Khe Sanh until another mortar battery couldreplace us. When that happened we relocated to the east and continued operations against the NorthVietnamese.

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The aggressive spirit of the encircled Marine garrison at Khe Sanh is exemplified by a comment made by aMarine commander who found his unit in a similar position during the Korean War. Told his regiment wassurrounded by Communist forces near the Chosin Reservoir on November 28, 1950, General (then colonel)"Chesty" Puller said, "that simplifies our problems of finding these people and killing them." Intelligencepersonnel of the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh were well aware of Communist tactics at Dien Bien Phu.Initially, the Marines at Khe Sanh had tried to keep the North Vietnamese from getting too close to the base.Massed artillery fired could have accomplished this. With the overland route to Khe Sanh closed, it provedimpossible to deliver sufficient massed artillery fires from a logistics standpoint--aerial resupply simply could notdeliver the volume of artillery rounds needed. When that became evident, the Marines decided to let the NorthVietnamese move in close to the base in order to simplify the problem of locating and destroying them. TheMarines did just that until they were ordered elsewhere.

Since the Communists did not share the American belief in favorable kill ratios, it is necessary to use differentcriteria to determine who achieved a favorable outcome at Khe Sanh. In the long run, who had use of thecombat base? In March 1973, American officials in Saigon reported that North Vietnamese troops had rebuiltthe old airstrip at Khe Sanh and were using it for courier flights into the south. That was the first time NorthVietnamese airplanes had flown into South Vietnam.

A New York Times story dated May 7, 1973, noted that several thousand North Vietnamese laborers had beensent south to construct roads and airfields. The single most ambitious project was construction of an all-weatherroad from Khe Sanh, through the A Shau Valley, to the outskirts of Da Nang. The same report indicated KheSanh was being developed into a major logistical center by the Communists. This represented a completereversal of the supply path of the Marine Corps garrison at Khe Sanh, whose supplies frequently arrived fromtheir logistical center at Da Nang. The NVA installed at least a dozen surface-to-air missiles sites around KheSanh in addition to anti-aircraft guns. Those facts cast further doubt on the explanation of American militarycommanders that Khe Sanh no longer had strategic value in the context of the war in Vietnam.

Although conventional war was what America fought best, Vietnam is known as a war without fronts.Consequently, search and destroy operations were the means by which America would try to win the war ofattrition. Even though General Westmoreland acknowledged that "a commander...wins no battles by sitting backwaiting for the enemy to come to him," this is precisely the role he assigned to the Marines at Khe Sanh.

As a percentage of North Vietnam's prewar population, the number of NVA killed in the war against theAmericans was equal to the percentages of those killed in several of the European nations laid waste duringWorld War I. Westmoreland was unable to grasp why his adversaries found that rate tolerable. The answer is,of course, because the stakes were equivalent for the Europeans and the Vietnamese Communists. As militaryhistorian Ronald Spector has pointed out, during the first half of 1968 (the period of heavy fighting at KheSanh), the Marine casualty rate in Vietnam exceeded the rate of American casualties in either the European orPacific theater of World War as well as during the Korean War. With nothing to be gained by the Marines at KheSanh beyond killing Communists, ordering their withdrawal and closing the base was a sensible political andmilitary decision. Although many claim that the United States never lost a battle in Vietnam, it is impossible toreasonably put the fighting at Khe Sanh in the American "win" column.

A Marine Corps veteran of the siege of Khe Sanh, Peter Brush is a frequent contributor to Vietnam Magazine.For further reading try: Valley of Decision, by John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe; The End of the Line, by RobertPisor; and Battle for Khe Sanh, by Captain Moyers S. Shore II, U.S. Marine Corps. Or, for a differentperspective on the Battle of Khe Sanh, try "Window of Opportunity," by Captain Ronnie E. Ford, U.S. Army, inthe February 1995 issue of Vietnam.

REVIEW: FRONTLINE TERRAINA new range of terrain by Frontline in 20mm the pieces are:FV1 Command Post with Observation Platform (6.40)FV2 Bunker with corrugated roof (4.30)FV3 Bunker with tent roof (4.30)FV4 Mortar position (3.80)FV5 Perimeter trench (3.80)

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FV6 Perimeter bunker ((3.20)FV7 Checkpoint guard house and barrier (4.20)FV8 Oildrum and sandbag wall 7.5 cm long (0.50)FV9 Barrack Hut (5.40)FV10 Village Hut (3.90)*FV11 L Shaped hooch (4.25)*FV12 Sanpan with thatched shelter (2.50)*

I have purchased the last three items marked * and have seen some of the other items in the range. They areall cast in resin and appear well detailed. FV10 is 9cm x 5.5cm x 4.5cm, it is a good looking hut with adetachable thatched roof for placing figures inside. It has a door and 2 windows. FV 11 is 11cm x 6.5cm x 5,.5cm and again has a detachable roof. The roof is more detailed than FV10, the building has 3 windows and adoor. FV12 comes in 4 parts: the boat base 14cm x 2.5cm and the thatched roof and two sides for placing in themiddle of the boat.

I have also seen the bunkers for use in a firebase or SF/Mike base. They are well constructed and detailed andpaint up nicely.

MORALE SYSTEM FORWARGAMES

At my club we have been using my Wheres Charlie rules for all our Vietnam games. However, I have neverbeen happy with the morale and motivation system. I decided to completely overhaul the system it could quiteeasily be slotted into any other set of rules. (Many thanks to the Vietgaming e-mail lists for their help andsuggestions).

Many people think that morale should not be included in Vietnam games because of the nature of the war.However, if some system isnt used then players are liable to fight to the last man of their unit which clearlyisnt satisfactory. If you do not like using morale rules than I will discuss the alternatives at the end of this article.

In S.L.A. Marshalls excellent books he discusses the soldiers reservoir of energy, many things effect howtroops react in battle. Their training, enthusiasm, experience, leadership are all factors that have to be takeninto consideration. To reflect this each unit and officer is given a rating between 3 and 11 and is known as theirGung-Ho factor. The higher the number the better the troops.

Each time a unit or officer wants to conduct certain events he must roll 2D6 and roll equal to or less than hiscurrent Gung-Ho to succeed. If he rolls greater than his Gung-Ho he has failed the action. Besides a simplesucceed or fail he may also have a critical success (which is any double equal to or below his Gung-Ho) and hemay have a critical failure (any double greater than his Gung-Ho). [A roll less than or equal to Gung-Ho ispresented by =

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Factor Troop Type11 This should only be saved for characters like the Air Cavalry commander in Apocalypse Now played

by Robert Duvall.(Nothing will ever effect him and hes loved by his men).10 Airmobile, Armoured Cavalry, 101 Airborne, LURPS, Australian SAS, Green Berets, ROK Marines9 ARVN Airborne, ARVN Rangers, US Marines, ROK, Australian, New Zealand8 Regular NVA, ARVN Rangers, US Infantry, Kit Carson Scouts, VC Main Force (post 68)7 ARVN6 VC Main Force (pre 68), ARVN (3rd, 5th, 9th, 18th Divs)5 VC Locals, Dan Cong, CIDG

If you want to vary the possible Gung-Ho rating decide on whether the troops at the start of the scenario arepoor, fair or excellent. When they first make contact roll a D10

Poor : 1 = 4, 2-5 = 5, 6-9 = 6, 0 = 7Fair: 1 = 6, 2-5 = 7, 6-9 = 8, 9 = 9Excellent 1 = 8, 2-5 = 9, 6-0 = 10

Encounter a Booby TrapRoll against Gung-Ho

=< Gung-Ho Trap foundDouble =< Gung-Ho Trap found and neutralised>Gung-Ho Trap activated

Modifiers may be added to the dice roll at the Umpires discretion (e.g. +1 if in thick jungle)

Request Artillery/ Airstrike The requesting officer rolls on his Gung-Ho

=< Gung-Ho Artillery / airstike arrives in 1D6 turnsDouble < Gung-Ho Artillery / airstrike arrives next move> Gung-Ho Request not yet authorisedDouble > Gung-Ho Request not authorised yet wait 1D6 turns before requesting again.

To correct inaccurate fire the requesting officer has to roll less than his Gung-Ho otherwise it continues to fall inthe same place.

Morale / MotivationUnits only roll on this table if they are under fire or have sustained casualties.

No < 50% casualties > 50% Casualties=< Gung-Ho Carry on unit O.K.Double < Gung-Ho Carry on unit OK and all figures

become unpinned

Carry on unit O.K.

> Gung-Ho Unit halts Unit withdraws 1 moveDouble > Gung-Ho Unit withdraws 1 move Unit routs and will not halt.

Modifiers may be added to the dice at Umpires discretion:-1/-2 In hard cover, bunker+1 Under H.E. Fire+2 In the open+1 Majority of unit pinned

FireFights (Experimental)I havent decided fully on the use of Gung-Ho on the firing rules but here are my ideas. It is generally acceptedthat the poorer the troops the worse they perform under combat situations. Some sets of rules (mine included)do not take into account the combats unit rating in their fire power. These results fit into the Wheres Charlierules. Basically in my rules all firing is done by totalling the number of figures firing at a given target, each figure

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has a number of D6 to roll depending on the weapon used and its range. All the dice are added together andmodifiers applied to the total number of dice e.g. if the target is in soft cover halve the number of total dicerolled.

Now there are two ways this can simulated:

1) Roll against their Gung-Ho

Gung-Ho Half the number of dice (the lads are keeping their heads down)Double > Gung-Ho Quarter the number of dice (No-one wants to fight today)

2) Depending on their Gung-Ho

If their Gung-Ho is equal or greater than 10 double the number of diceOf their Gung-Ho is less than 6 halve the number of dice.

Other CircumstancesIn any other situation not covered by the rules roll under the Gung-Ho. This also caters for those questions bythe players (e.g. Can my Sergeant throw a hand grenade through the slit in the bunker roll a critical successagainst his Gung-Ho and he can!).

In my rules (and some other sets) all figures within a squad must keep together. If a figure becomes isolated hemust roll under his Gung-Ho separately. Another time a squad leader may want to 2 men to retreat down thetrail they have just walked along to see if the unit is being followed. Each move they must roll against theirGung-Ho to see if they continue.

Alternatives to Morale/MotivationAt least some system is required for troop effectiveness. When drawing up a scenario the write should write inwhat particular units do at a given time. This may be on the loss of a percentage of casualties or when a certainevent happens e.g.

The 1st VC squad will disengage any combat when they have lost 3 casualties.The 2nd VC squad will retreat from the table if they come under more than 2 rounds of artillery fire.The 3rd VC squad must advance towards the enemy under a firefight to stop the US using artillery. When theylose 50% casulaties they retreat.The Alpha company ARVN platoon will freeze when first fired upon and will only advance if a 6 is rolled on aD6.

So you can see that the players may have limitations to his actions (although they will not be revealed until theevent occurs).

ConclusionAs you can see all the units actions depend on their Gung-Ho rating. The poorer units will need more luck tocarry out their actions.

Wheres Charlie rules available from: http://freespace.virgin.net/pete.jones/dustoff/namrules.html if you do nothave Internet access let me know and I will send you a free printed copy of the rules (note: they areconsiderably different from the earlier issue printed in Dustoff especially in the combat section).

DIARY OF AN NVA SOLDIER"I don't want to go to war. I don't want to leave my fiance, my studies, my family.

Last night I pedalled the streets of Hanoi. They city felt so dark and empty. Dark in case the bombers came. It

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made me sad to know that I would never walk down by the river with my fellow medical students again. Neveragain sit by the water and hold hands with Kim.

No one ever comes back My neighbours, my uncle, my father. All gone. Dead? We don't know. No letters. Nomessages. We never hear from them.

Never.

(A month later.)

My foot is terribly sore. Infected. The soles of my sandals are worn through. Two days ago I stepped on ajagged piece of metal that made a deep cut in my foot I try not to say anything, the other men would think that Iam weak. The pain is almost unbearable.

(Two weeks later.)

We have crossed into the South. All day we hide in bunkers forty feet underground, waiting for the B-52s topass over. The earth shakes as if we were inside a volcano.

Sometimes, we get caught in the open. Slowly, my comrades are disappearing. The Uncle Soldiers search forus all the time.

Our leader says that soon we will reach Saigon. I am ready Yesterday, we were spotted in a field duringdaylight. An FO called in artillery, and many, comrades died. We are few who remain from those who startedthe journey. Only just a few. Soon, we will be none. Soon, we reach Saigon.

I am happy. I feel blessed. When we attack Saigon, many Americans will be killed.

I just want to kill one Uncle Soldier before I die."

-Diary of a North Vietnamese soldier (printed in the 25th Division Tropic Lightning magazine).

The NVA soldier died at Ton Son Nhut Air Force Base in 1968 trying to storm the wire. Charlie Company, 4thBattalion, 9th Infantry Brigade 25th Infantry Division defended the base. Charlie Company become known asSuicide Charlie because of their high casualty rate.

No one knows if the soldier was granted his final wish but one things that strikes you is how this NorthVietnameses attitude changed toward the Uncle Soldiers (USA soldiers).

OPERATION BALLARAT ANALYSISREPORT

DATED 30 SEP 67

A COMPANY OPERATION ANALYSIS REPORT OPERATION BALLARAT

Reference: Maps XA BINH BA (SE) and XA BINH BA (NE) 1:25,0001. Subunit A Company 7 RAR2. Commander Maj E.J. O'DONNELL3. Operation Name Operation BALLARAT4. Duration 050600 - 160900H Aug 675. Outline Tasks

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a. Move to line BRAVO at GRID REF 362721 by 1600 hrs 5 Aug 67.b. Established company base for recce and subsequent ambushes in the "GARDENS" area vicinity GRID REF343763 on 6 Aug 67.c. Ambush track at GR364784 9 - 11 Aug 67.d. Ambush SW corner of rubber plantation at GRID REF 417793 12 - 15 Aug 67.e. Search area GREYHOUND approx 3000m SOUTH of the previous ambush position on 15 Aug 67.6. Sequence of Events. See Appendix 1.7. Assessment of Operationa. The initial plan for secrecy was well carried out, especially by the RAAF who completed a large resupply onthe night of 5 Aug 67 in 2 mins 40 secs. It is well worthwhile restricting helicopters, air-strikes, and artillery in theearly stages of such an operation in the interests of security.b. A separate assessment of the major engagement on 6 Aug 67 is included in the Engagement Report. In briefthe company fought a battle with C12 Company 3 Battalion 274 Regt, and inflicted an estimated 40 casualtieson the VC, as well as capturing a number of enemy weapons and documents. The engagement confirmed thatalthough the mainforce VC are brave and skilful fighters, through the employment of close fire support andairpower we can achieve a decisive advantage once contact is made.(E.J. O'DONNELL)MajOC A Company

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO 7 RAR SVN 9/67

DATED 30 SEP 67

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

5 Aug 67This was the final day of a three days Company search operation in the NW corner of the 7 RAR TAOR. Anumber of ambushes were laid, including one at GRID REF 351718 where there is a junction of several tracks.At 1145 hrs a recce patrol from 1 Platoon moving out from the ambush spotted two VC, one armed, but werealso seen by the enemy who disappeared before an aimed shot could be fired.At 1900 hrs the company was resupplied at GRID REF 362721 by four Iroquois - the whole resupply wascompleted in 2 mins 40 secs. This was done to preserve the security of the operation in the initial stages. TheSAS insertion technique was used.

6 Aug 67Moving towards the projected base in the "GARDENS" area, the Company crossed the SUOI CHAU PHA atabout 1040 hrs. 2 Platoon, who were leading, reported a fresh VC track at GRID REF 344742 and were orderedto ambush it while the OC moved forward to examine the area. At 1045 hrs two armed VC walked into theambush and were killed. A major contact then developed which is described in detail in the attachedEngagement Report. Following the contact, and after resupply, the company harboured at GRID REF 345744.

7 Aug 67The company was ordered to remain in its overnight location until B Company had closed from the NORTH.However B Company found signs of the enemy and were delayed by a contact during the day. At 1130 hrs onearmed VC dressed in greens walked along a track towards a 2 Platoon sentry. The sentry fired at and woundedthe VC who escaped leaving a blood trail. It should have been a certain kill but the sentry fired too quickly - infairness to him it should be mentioned that he had joined the company as a reinforcement on the night of 5 Aug,and had been in the middle of the 6 Aug engagement, and was understandable tense.

At 1700 hrs the company was ordered to move NORTH to link up with B Company. This was impossible beforedark because of the tangled undergrowth caused by airstrikes and artillery, and the company harboured atGRID REF 346755, 300m SW of B Company.

8 Aug 67After A Company had linked up with B Company, both moved NE to GRID REF 357778 where a two companypatrol base was established. Fresh VC tracks heading NW were passed at GRID REF 354763.

9 Aug 67The company was ordered to act as reaction company while B Company searched the surrounding area

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Local ambushes were set on possible approach routes to the patrol base. At 1500 hrs the company wasordered to ambush a track which had been spotted from a helicopter. This was done. There were clear signs ofa VC platoon sized group having moved NW along the track within the previous 24 hrs.

10 Aug 67The ambush was maintained throughout the day without contact.

11 Aug 67After resupply the company was ordered to move NE as standby for B Company. An Iroquois helicopterreported seeing a mortar 200 m from the resupply point but a search revealed only an old bomb crater.

During the subsequent move, when the company could not locate the creek junction at GRID REF 374797, itbecame clear that the previous ambush position had been approx 400 m further NORTH than previouslythought. An aircraft fix was obtained and the company error adjusted. The company harboured at GRID REF383796.

12 Aug 67The company moved to an ambush position at GRID REF 417793 at the SW corner of a rubber plantation whileother coys moved to similar positions around the plantation fringe. Numerous small and recent VC tracks werefound running NE through squares 4079 and 4179. Local guerilla movement is probably constant through thearea.

13 Aug 67The ambush was maintained without contact.

14 Aug 67As above. Resupply was taken at 1230 hours.

15 Aug 67The company was ordered to move SOUTH to search to approx 3000 m from the ambush position. A prominentVC track heading WEST was found at GRID REF 403770 - last used by about a platoon one week previously.The clearing at GRID REF 395759 was secured for the subsequent fly out of the Battalion.

16 Aug 67A and D Coys flew out to NUI DAT by air mobile Company starting at 0820 hrs. The fly out was efficient andwithout incident.

APPENDIX 2

ENGAGEMENT REPORT

A COMPANY ENGAGEMENT AT GRID REF 344742 ON 6 AUG 67

Description of Contact

1. Introduction.

7 RAR was engaged on a search and destroy operation named Operation BALLARAT in the NW of PHUOCTUY Province. The initial phase called for the four rifle coys to move undetected into company patrol baseswithin the AO to commence recce and ambushing with the aim of killing those VC who were in the area beforethey realised that an operation was in progress. A Company on completion of a 3 day operation was to movefrom GRID REF 362721 to vicinity GR343764 to established such a patrol base on 6 Aug 67.

2. Initial Contact.

2 Platoon, who were leading, crossed the SUOI CHAU PHA at 1040 hrs and at 1045 hrs reported finding atrack at GRID REF 344742 which had been used only minutes earlier. OC A Company told the platooncommander, 2Lt G.H. ROSS to move his platoon astride the track and to cover it both ways while he movedforward to recce. At 1050 hrs 2 VC armed with slung rifles moved into the ambush along the track from the

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WEST and were killed. The terrain was thick primary jungle with visibility approx 10 m lying, up to 40 mstanding.

3. Phase 1

a. OC A Company who was at the scene of the contact ordered 1 Platoon to move forward to secure the areawhile 2 Platoon prepared to sweep along the axis of the track to the WEST in the hope of finding the remainderof what was thought to be a VC squad. At the same time the Company FO fixed artillery from 106 Battery atGRID REF 335745 to cut off the VC escape route.

b. 2 Platoon had gone about 100 m along the axis of the track when a further contact developed. One LMG andseveral automatic rifles could be distinguished. 2 VC who were seen on the track were engaged - probableresult 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA. Because the fire was coming more from the NW, the platoon commander decidedto leave 5 Section as fire support while he took the remainder of the platoon in a right flanking attacks towardsthe enemy.

c. As soon as the platoon attack got under way, 2 platoon ran into heavy fire from further to the NORTH, and itbecame apparent that the VC had by now deployed at least a platoon. Using fire and movement 2 Platooncontinued to advance as far as they could. 3 VC whose bodies were later recovered by A Company were killedin this phase, but the VC fire was too intense and accurate for 2 Platoon to continue moving. 2 Platoon had twomen killed and a number wounded in very close fighting. Both sides were throwing grenades and several of 2Platoon were lightly wounded by shrapnel.

d. The FO changed the fire of 106 Battery to approx GRID REF 341751 and then adjusted at FIRE FOREFFECT within 400 m.

4. Phase 2

a. At about 1115 hrs OC A Company and the FO joined the platoon commander of 2 Platoon on the right flankapprox 100 m NORTH of where the original fire appeared to be concentrated. The enemy could be heardshouting in a very agitated manner, and many were screaming from wounds. It is thought that some of thesemay have been women.

b. The OC ordered 2 Platoon to adjust and hold their present positions so as to be able to bring maximum fireonto the enemy to the NORTH and NW. 3 Platoon were ordered to take over security of the area of the originalcontact while 1 Platoon, commanded by 2Lt R.C. SMITH, prepared for a right flanking attack using 2 Platoon forfire support. After the platoon commander had been briefed, 1 Platoon moved around to the right flank and linedup with 2 and 3 Sects forward, and 1 Section in res behind 3 Section on the NORTH side.

c. 1 Platoon started to move forward carefully at about 1130 hrs with section comds directing their men from fireposition to fire position. After moving about 50 m the platoon had reached opposite the right flank of 2 Platoonwhen they came under heavy and accurate enemy fire from the same enemy who had been firing at 2 Platoonplus enemy further to the NORTH. Enemy wpns distinguished were 4 - 5 LMGs, a number of automatic rifles,and at least one B40 RL; grenades were also thrown by both sides. The Section Comds of 2 and 3 Sects wereboth killed and 3 Section in particular bore the brunt of some very accurate enemy fire. 1 Section turned to faceNORTH and were soon heavily engaged. The platoon commander reported that he could not continue toadvance and was ordered to hold where he was, and by the use of fire and movement to withdraw any exposedsoldiers into a perimeter line.

d. To deal with the enemy in the NORTH and to try to prevent the enemy moving further NE, the FO directed106 Battery at GRID REF 350750 and adjusted close, at the same time maintaining the med battery at FIREFOR EFFECT to the NORTH. The FO adjusted close with one gun and then ordered 10 rounds FIRE FOREFFECT with the adjusting gun. The MPI of this fire was 60m forward of 1 Platoon and two tree bursts wereobserved. This fire fell right amongst the enemy and is believed to have been the immediate reason whichcompelled the VC to withdraw. At the same time the remainder of 106 Battery was firing within 250 m of owntps.

5. Phase 3

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a. The OC at one stage intended to commit 3 Platoon to a further right flanking attack supported by 1 Platoonand 2 Platoon. However it was decided not to do this because artillery fire was too close, and because thelayout of the company would have been too scattered for effective control. 3 Platoon were then ordered to moveforward to link up with the right flank of 1 Platoon, to face NE and to present a continuous curved perimeter tothe enemy. The platoon moved into position as ordered. They came under enemy fire from the NE while theywere moving in, but there were no casualties, and the enemy fire died down after about five minutes.

b. The enemy then withdrew using fire and movement and maintaining excellent fire control to the last. At thisstage it was not know for certain that the enemy had withdrawn - simply that the fire was dying down.

c. At this stage it became necessary to stop the artillery to evacuate the seriously wounded. There were somegunships in the area and while the casevac was going on they laid down fire approx 100 m NORTH of 1Platoon and 3 Platoon. When the seriously wounded had been evacuate, the FO moved 106 Battery fireNORTH as a cut off. 106 Battery "A" Battery 2/35 US Army and 7 RAR mortars were fired at 10 rounds FIREFOR EFFECT NORTH and then NW.

6. Reorganisation

a. 1 Platoon and 3 Platoon then carried out a search forwards of their positions. The enemy had recovered alltheir killed and wounded less the 5 VC KIA who had been overrun during the fight, and had left no equipmentlying around except for fragments of clothing. They had even carried away most of the brass. There were manyblood-stains and dragmarks to indicate casualties to total about 40 in the immediate area.

b. The company was then laid out in a tighter perimeter around the helicopter winch point which was the sceneof the original contact at GRID REF 344742. The lightly wounded were evacuate, then all surplus equipment,then finally the dead. At the same time ammo and med stores were replenished. Ammo resupply was not largebecause all pls had taken ammo from the wounded during the casevac.c. When reorganisation was complete, the company moved to a harbour position at GRID REF 345744 for thenight.

Effectiveness of own weapons

7.

a. M60s(1) The M60s performed well throughout the engagement. Gunners reported a few minor stoppages caused bythe belts becoming twisted or mudcaked, but these were fixed within seconds.(2) A debriefing of gunners suggests that link ammo carried Mexican bandit style was easiest to employ andwas the preferred method. Ammo carried in mattress covers remained clean, but the gunners had troublegetting the belt out of the cover without making themselves conspicuous. Ammo carried in pouches was all rightas long as gunners could reach the pouch easily. In some cases the pouch was worn on the back of the beltand was hards to get at.

b. SLRs and M16sAll SLRs and M16s appeared to fire satisfactorily throughout the contact.

c. M79sThe M79s did not perform well because the dense foliage stopped the rounds from arming. This criticism is notmeant to condemn a good weapon. It only proves the point that the M79 should always be carried as asupplementary weapon, and not as the sole personal weapon.

d. M26 GrenadesMany grenades were thrown at close quarters but only one VC is known to have been killed by an M26grenade. The VC stick grenade appeared to be effective. The tape around grenades was at times hards toremove but is still considered necessary in the interests of day to day safety.

e. Alternative Wpns(1) Whilst the current range of wpns can and did perform well, it is possible that a small anti-tank type weaponwould have been more effective in getting at enemy behind such cover as anthills.

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(2) Some soldiers favour the idea of an automatic SLR. While there are advantages in being able to produceautomatic fire, it is felt that the higher rate of ammo expenditure and the loss of accuracy might offset anyadvantages.(3) A 60 mm mortar would have been useful although the selection of a base plate position would havepresented difficulties.

Effectiveness of Enemy Wpns

8. a. LMGsThe VC are thought to have had 7 LMGs (Soviet RPD Type 56) firing at the height of the battle compared withthe 6 x M60s from 1 Platoon and 2 Platoon. Their fire was extremely accurate although the round has lesspenetrating power than our own long 7.62mm ammo. The VC machine gunners were aggressive and skilful.

b. Soviet 7.62mm Assault Rifle AK47 Type 56This rifle has an automatic capability which made it hards to distinguish between VC rifles and LMGs. Theeffectiveness of the rifle appears to be comparable with the SLR, although the SLR has greater penetratingpower.

c. Chicom B40 RLThree of these wpns were reported. The rocket has a considerable blast and shrapnel effect - for instance theround which caused the serious wound to Sgt SUTHERLAND's leg landed on the ground about one metreaway. The launcher is small, only about 1.3 the bulk of the Carl Gustav, and therefore easier to use in closecountry. The VC wpns were coloured red which made them conspicuous. Loading the rocket appears to takesome time, and one VC was killed while trying to load for a second shot. One B40 RL was captured.

d. Stick grenadesThe VC stick grenades were effective and appear to have very considerable shrapnel and blast effect.

Use of Fire Support

9. a. Close support artilleryThe FO did an outstanding hob in getting fire on the ground where it was required. As mentioned earlier in thisreport, he brought FIRE FOR EFFECT from one gun to within 60m of own tps with the result that the VC wereforced to withdraw, and must have taken casualties. The close support fire from 106 Battery was extremelyaccurate. In all, 106 Battery fire over 800 rounds.

b. Other artilleryArtillery fire was fired in the cut off role throughout the contact.

c. Battalion MortarsInitially the battalion mortars were out of range. As the contact developed they were flown to a new positionwithin range.

d. GunshipsGunships were circling the area whenever DUSTOFF aircraft were in the vicinity. They were used on threeoccasions to fire on the enemy immediately in front of 1 Platoon. The method of target indication was to throwsmoke from the furthest NORTH part of 1 Platoon and then instruct the pilot to make EAST-WEST runs firing nocloser than 30 m NORTH of the smoke. This seemed to work although there was no means of knowing whatcasualties were caused.

e. AirstrikesCO 7 RAR organised 12 airstrikes of which only 8 could be flown for technical reasons. the CO arranged withOC A Company that the aircraft could have ground clearance as long as they kept NORTH of a 1000m semi-circle from WEST to NE. At least one strike fell a good deal closer to the company but no harm to own tpsresulted. It is thought that the airstrikes performed a valuable role in keeping possible VC reinforcements fromthe scene, and may well have caused casualties to VC withdrawing from the engagement or troops in rear.

Enemy Dress and Equipment

10. a. Dress

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The VC wore both black and green uniforms and both long and short trousers. Presumably the dress isoptional. They were bareheaded and the 5 KIA wore HO CHI MINH sandals made from old tyres.

b. EquipmentMost wore items of U.S. 56 pattern equipment including a belt and waterbottle. The first two VC killed werecarrying small packs but no food. None of the other VC were observed to carry packs. They may well havedropped their packs further back, as did A Company.

Enemy Tactics and Field Signals

11. a. Tactics

(1) The VC reaction to the initial contact was obviously a "Contact Front" drill. Their response was rapid andcoincided with A Company's right flanking move. The subsequent actions of the two forces seem almost to havebeen a mirror image. Their choice of ground and of fire positions was similar to ours.

(2) Their withdrawal is thought to have started with a thin out from the rear, until finally only LMGs and perhapsa few automatic rifles were left in contact. There was a brief flurry of firing at the end, and then silence. Thisoccurred after the closest fire from 106 Battery.

b. Forward SignalsThe VC do not shout as much as AUSTRALIAN troops during the battle. Instead they whistled to attract eachother's attention and then talked in a low voice. This method is thought to be superior to our own.

Casevac

12. a. PreparationsAs soon as it was known that there were casualties, the Company 2IC moved forwards with the fire supportsection to a likely winching area which happened to be where the original contact had taken place. The firesupport section and the combat engineers cut some trees using machetes and folding saws. They Companymedic and the 3 Platoon medic found a suitable area to receive casualties.

b. CommsDUSTOFF was arranged on the Admin Net with Call Sign 92 and casualty figures continued to be passed bythis means as they became known. Casualty figures were passed to Battalion HQ on Command Net from timeto time. The spare artillery set was flicked to the company frequency to enable the 2IC to get the latest sit fromthe OC and to co-ordinate