Dumbo’s Feather:Dumbo’s Feather:

Why We Need Free WillWhy We Need Free Will

Dumbo’s StoryDumbo’s Story

Dennett’s MoralDennett’s Moral

Libertarian FW is a culturally-Libertarian FW is a culturally-imposed psychological crutch.imposed psychological crutch.

What we need to “fly” as moral What we need to “fly” as moral beings does not require beings does not require indeterminism.indeterminism.

Drop that feather!Drop that feather!

My MoralMy Moral The FW feather is Crazy Glued to us by The FW feather is Crazy Glued to us by

systematic beliefs about freedom.systematic beliefs about freedom. There are sound reasons to believe in There are sound reasons to believe in

freedom as part of human nature.freedom as part of human nature. Skeptical reasons to drop the feather Skeptical reasons to drop the feather

are forced at best.are forced at best. Some feathers are better than others.Some feathers are better than others.

Gilligans’s Island and OnionsGilligans’s Island and Onions

Skipper GoneSkipper Gone

Just Gilligan!Just Gilligan!

The Onion of FreedomThe Onion of Freedom

Political

Social

Physical

FW

Metaphysical ClaimsMetaphysical Claimsi.i. Human freedom Human freedom existsexists in a unified fashion, and when more in a unified fashion, and when more

than minimally instantiated (than minimally instantiated (perhapsperhaps as FW?), does so in a as FW?), does so in a metaphysically layered manner. metaphysically layered manner.

ii.ii. The layers are The layers are logically orderedlogically ordered in terms of descending in terms of descending necessary conditions (or alternately, ascending sufficient necessary conditions (or alternately, ascending sufficient conditions)—i.e., an “outer” layer such as political freedom conditions)—i.e., an “outer” layer such as political freedom requires an “inner” layer of social freedom to exist.requires an “inner” layer of social freedom to exist.

iii.iii. Any particular human freedom exists as a Any particular human freedom exists as a complex complex relational propertyrelational property, and is constituted by an individual’s , and is constituted by an individual’s minimal minimal abilityability with with at leastat least one relevant one relevant alternativealternative or or opportunity opportunity of its exercise; even if not actually instantiated of its exercise; even if not actually instantiated (e.g., the relevant ability remains dispositionally “quiet”), (e.g., the relevant ability remains dispositionally “quiet”), the relational parts must obtain so that the relation is the relational parts must obtain so that the relation is metaphysically possiblemetaphysically possible..

iv.iv. Any “outer” layer is supervenient upon at least one “inner” Any “outer” layer is supervenient upon at least one “inner” layer and more complex by at least one relatum.layer and more complex by at least one relatum.

v.v. The innermost layer of freedom is The innermost layer of freedom is basicbasic—that is, it is —that is, it is supervenient upon no other layer of freedom.supervenient upon no other layer of freedom.

vi.vi. The mind-body distinction makes it problematic to transfer The mind-body distinction makes it problematic to transfer the conceptual/empirical significance of these five claims the conceptual/empirical significance of these five claims (from their ground in the outer physical layers) to a purely (from their ground in the outer physical layers) to a purely mental freedom.mental freedom.

Comments:Comments: (iii) is the source of my thesis that the thought-experiment (iii) is the source of my thesis that the thought-experiment

yields an empirically-based and unified conceptual yields an empirically-based and unified conceptual modelmodel or or schemaschema of freedom. Because the relational components of freedom. Because the relational components change from freedom-type to -type, no change from freedom-type to -type, no definitiondefinition of freedom of freedom is thereby offered.is thereby offered.

Please note, however, that (iii) indifferently refers to the Please note, however, that (iii) indifferently refers to the need of one or need of one or moremore alternatives for relevant abilities. That alternatives for relevant abilities. That allows the model to be further shaped by potential fallout allows the model to be further shaped by potential fallout from Frankfurt-style arguments about PAP.from Frankfurt-style arguments about PAP.

Freedom Freedom f f = ability = ability ff + opportunit + opportunitx (where x=“-y” (singular) x (where x=“-y” (singular) or x=“-ies” (plural))or x=“-ies” (plural))

Problem I:Problem I:

How should the concept of ability be taken here? My own How should the concept of ability be taken here? My own take is that it is always dispositional, so as to allow freedom take is that it is always dispositional, so as to allow freedom to obtain (at least in a weak sense of instantiation) even to obtain (at least in a weak sense of instantiation) even when a relevant ability is, as I say, “quiet”. One is certainly when a relevant ability is, as I say, “quiet”. One is certainly freefree to talk so long as one is able to and has the to talk so long as one is able to and has the opportunity to do so even if one actually remains silent. In opportunity to do so even if one actually remains silent. In such cases I would prefer to say that such a use is typical of such cases I would prefer to say that such a use is typical of the role that “free” plays in ordinary expression—that we the role that “free” plays in ordinary expression—that we most usually refer to the most usually refer to the potentialitypotentiality for or for or possibilitypossibility of of freedom rather than its actual realization. Therefore I freedom rather than its actual realization. Therefore I suggest that such uses are correct only if the “all-in” suggest that such uses are correct only if the “all-in” metaphysical (as opposed to mere logical) possibility of metaphysical (as opposed to mere logical) possibility of freedom as sufficient dispositional ability, conjoined with a freedom as sufficient dispositional ability, conjoined with a lack of constraint on its exercise, obtains.lack of constraint on its exercise, obtains.

Problem II:Problem II:

A note on what I mean by metaphysical possibility. Though A note on what I mean by metaphysical possibility. Though any coherent account of this possibility must obviously any coherent account of this possibility must obviously support a counterfactual analysis of dispositionality, it must support a counterfactual analysis of dispositionality, it must also be held tight to the actual world: freedom imparted to also be held tight to the actual world: freedom imparted to even fairly close counterparts might be a chilly comfort to even fairly close counterparts might be a chilly comfort to an imprisoned actualist original. A loose expression of an imprisoned actualist original. A loose expression of what’s needed might be “the logical possibilities that what’s needed might be “the logical possibilities that nature actually allows.” An account that yields dispositional nature actually allows.” An account that yields dispositional ability and is compatible with metaphysical indeterminism ability and is compatible with metaphysical indeterminism (to allow for opportunit(to allow for opportunitiesies) should suffice.) should suffice.

Problem III:Problem III: Another note on the Another note on the relationalrelational nature of freedom. Some nature of freedom. Some

(Gert and Duggan, e.g.) have advocated an account of free (Gert and Duggan, e.g.) have advocated an account of free will (here taken as an example of freedom) as will (here taken as an example of freedom) as onlyonly an an ability. But, as already noted, ability need not be exercisedability. But, as already noted, ability need not be exercised—a “quiet” ability constitutes only a metaphysical —a “quiet” ability constitutes only a metaphysical possibility short of full instantiation. A moving arm actually possibility short of full instantiation. A moving arm actually exercises ability because of an ongoing relation of that arm exercises ability because of an ongoing relation of that arm to available space through which it moves. Without that to available space through which it moves. Without that space, movement doesn’t and can’t occur. Thus the full space, movement doesn’t and can’t occur. Thus the full instantiation of that freedom is the exercised ability to instantiation of that freedom is the exercised ability to move in actual relation to the space moved. However, the move in actual relation to the space moved. However, the can-docan-do metaphysical possibility of that freedom only metaphysical possibility of that freedom only dispositionally requires the ability in relation to available dispositionally requires the ability in relation to available space. The relations differ in actuality and possibility—but space. The relations differ in actuality and possibility—but both are still inherently relational.both are still inherently relational.

Problem IV:Problem IV:

(vi) acknowledges that any conclusions drawn about the (vi) acknowledges that any conclusions drawn about the metaphysical nature of free will on the basis of the outer metaphysical nature of free will on the basis of the outer layers of freedom may be wrong, and that free will may layers of freedom may be wrong, and that free will may have an overall conceptual shape quite other than a have an overall conceptual shape quite other than a complex relational property of ability and opportunitcomplex relational property of ability and opportunitxx. But . But even those who have very radical notions of a purely even those who have very radical notions of a purely mental freedom (“hard libertarians” or agent-causationists) mental freedom (“hard libertarians” or agent-causationists) and posit a form of existence of free will that is beyond the and posit a form of existence of free will that is beyond the pale of empirical examination still appear to subscribe to an pale of empirical examination still appear to subscribe to an internal element of internal element of controlcontrol over choices and the over choices and the indeterministicindeterministic nature of final choice. What is this except nature of final choice. What is this except another manifestation of the same kind of property another manifestation of the same kind of property described in (i)-(v)? So on an admittedly inductive ground described in (i)-(v)? So on an admittedly inductive ground (vi) appears not to undercut the significance of (i)-(v) for (vi) appears not to undercut the significance of (i)-(v) for free will.free will.

Against FW SkepticsAgainst FW Skeptics

My thought-experiment counts against skeptics about free My thought-experiment counts against skeptics about free will in at least a conceptually holistic way. Whatever else will in at least a conceptually holistic way. Whatever else “freedom” might mean, the outer layers intuitively count “freedom” might mean, the outer layers intuitively count against calling them against calling them unfreeunfree in any intelligible sense except in any intelligible sense except an incompatibilist one. Politically enabled people can (in an incompatibilist one. Politically enabled people can (in the appropriate system) vote or (as is our American wont) the appropriate system) vote or (as is our American wont) not vote; socially enabled people can elect to speak or not not vote; socially enabled people can elect to speak or not speak. To call such situations “unfree” is tortured semantic speak. To call such situations “unfree” is tortured semantic license at best, and most plausibly just downright license at best, and most plausibly just downright disingenuous. disingenuous.

Free will skeptics may retreat to the thorny confines of (vi) Free will skeptics may retreat to the thorny confines of (vi) and try to find solace there, but any flailing about that they and try to find solace there, but any flailing about that they do in the course of lecturing will be demonstration enough do in the course of lecturing will be demonstration enough of what they accept as the truth maker of (v).of what they accept as the truth maker of (v).

Some Feathers are Better then Some Feathers are Better then OthersOthers

Gary Watson’s “Two Faces” of responsibility: roughly, Gary Watson’s “Two Faces” of responsibility: roughly, moral acts are moral acts are attributableattributable to moral agents only if they are to moral agents only if they are worthy of having the “finger of responsibility” pointed at worthy of having the “finger of responsibility” pointed at them; them; accountabilityaccountability concerns what is appropriate follow-up concerns what is appropriate follow-up to that pointing.to that pointing.

My present concern is about attributability only, and in one My present concern is about attributability only, and in one very specific sense: how is it possible to point the finger of very specific sense: how is it possible to point the finger of responsibility? responsibility?

AttributabilityAttributability To situate my concern a bit, begin with how this question To situate my concern a bit, begin with how this question

might be answered by classic compatibilists, who would might be answered by classic compatibilists, who would say, essentially, if your finger points say, essentially, if your finger points atat the right person— the right person—the author of the act—then you have done all that is the author of the act—then you have done all that is necessary to accomplish attributability.necessary to accomplish attributability.

Psychological compatibilists and libertarians alike complain Psychological compatibilists and libertarians alike complain that this runs roughshod over issues of compulsion, akrasia, that this runs roughshod over issues of compulsion, akrasia, character defect, and so on that are genuine concerns in character defect, and so on that are genuine concerns in distinguishing legitimate attributions of responsibility from distinguishing legitimate attributions of responsibility from illegitimate ones.illegitimate ones.

So, the finger of responsibility must not just point So, the finger of responsibility must not just point atat a a perpetrator but to something perpetrator but to something withinwithin the accused that the accused that encompasses worthiness to blame. (The “tracing” encompasses worthiness to blame. (The “tracing” problem.)problem.)

Kane’s AttackKane’s Attack Robert Kane makes the case that, even if compatibilists can Robert Kane makes the case that, even if compatibilists can

find mental (or even brain) structures that correspond to find mental (or even brain) structures that correspond to sufficient conditions for finger-pointing by their accounts sufficient conditions for finger-pointing by their accounts (e.g., the presence of second-order desires in accord with (e.g., the presence of second-order desires in accord with first-order wiill), it is implausible to hold that the finger first-order wiill), it is implausible to hold that the finger must must stopstop at those structures. at those structures.

While Kane allows that such “finger sliding” (or While Kane allows that such “finger sliding” (or “tracing”)might well make sense to an extent—the drunk-“tracing”)might well make sense to an extent—the drunk-driver is blamed for a prior decision to drink more than for driver is blamed for a prior decision to drink more than for being incapacitated at the time of an infraction—there must being incapacitated at the time of an infraction—there must be be self-forming actionsself-forming actions (SFAs) that cease such finger-sliding. (SFAs) that cease such finger-sliding. There and thenThere and then, at the time and place of the SFA, is where , at the time and place of the SFA, is where the finger of responsibility must stop, and where, according the finger of responsibility must stop, and where, according to Kane, it encounters the libertarian characteristic use of to Kane, it encounters the libertarian characteristic use of indeterminism to marry the various elements of psychology indeterminism to marry the various elements of psychology into choice. The finger can go into choice. The finger can go nowhere and nowhen elsenowhere and nowhen else. . This is This is ultimacyultimacy of responsibility, and attempts to account for of responsibility, and attempts to account for moral properties of action in terms of ultimate creativity of moral properties of action in terms of ultimate creativity of these as human projects.these as human projects.

Against KaneAgainst Kane

There is no evidence either objective or subjective that There is no evidence either objective or subjective that could attest purely to the indeterminacy of the choice—no could attest purely to the indeterminacy of the choice—no monitoring device, scan, “choice-detector”, or confession, monitoring device, scan, “choice-detector”, or confession, or phenomenological description that can capture the or phenomenological description that can capture the crucial time and place where the finger of responsibility crucial time and place where the finger of responsibility stops as it finds stops as it finds onlyonly the indeterminism of the SFA. the indeterminism of the SFA.

If the indeterminism of SFAs is not self-announcing, and If the indeterminism of SFAs is not self-announcing, and thus is only known by other empirical markers, then even thus is only known by other empirical markers, then even Kane’s attribution of ultimacy is knowable only by these Kane’s attribution of ultimacy is knowable only by these same markers.same markers.

Kane and compatibilists are effectively in the same boat Kane and compatibilists are effectively in the same boat when it comes to pointing out psychological features of when it comes to pointing out psychological features of responsibility that make possible the kind of moral responsibility that make possible the kind of moral attribution I describe above.attribution I describe above.

ConclusionConclusion

While Dennett correctly wants the libertarian feather While Dennett correctly wants the libertarian feather dropped, he also clearly believes in a form of compatiblism. dropped, he also clearly believes in a form of compatiblism. But that’s also a feather of another type—one that allows But that’s also a feather of another type—one that allows that there are markers of human agency at which we can that there are markers of human agency at which we can point our wagging fingers. We simply can’t fly without that. point our wagging fingers. We simply can’t fly without that. So if the Kane feather is to be dropped, it’s only because So if the Kane feather is to be dropped, it’s only because another one needs to be Crazy Glued in its place.another one needs to be Crazy Glued in its place.

V. Alan WhiteV. Alan WhiteUniversity of Wisconsin—ManitowocUniversity of Wisconsin—Manitowocawhite@uwc.eduawhite@uwc.edu