Dubnick & Justice 2011: Barnard's Regret
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DealingwithBarnard’sRegret:
AccountabilityandtheZoneofExpectations
DRAFT:PLEASEDONOTCITEORQUOTEWITHOUTAUTHORS’PERMISSION
MelvinJ.Dubnick
UniversityofNewHampshire
Durham,NH03824
JonathanJustice
UniversityofDelaware
Newark,DE19716
PaperpreparedforpresentationatTheSixthOrganizationStudiesSummerWorkshop“BringingPublicOrganizationandOrganizingBackIn”
25-28May2011AbbayedesVauxdeCernay,Paris,France
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Introduction:Barnard’sRegret
Byallindications,intherealmsofbusiness,publicserviceandscholarship,ChesterI.
Barnardlivedacharmedlife.Hiseffortsandachievementsinallthreearenasarenotedas
"exemplary"bymany.Nevertheless,inhisfinalyearshedidexpresssomeregretinterms
ofhisacademicwork:thathispreoccupationwithquestionsofauthorityinmodern
organizationsdivertedattentionfromanequallyimportanttopic:responsibility.
In my opinion, the great weakness of my book is that it doesn’t
deal adequately with the question of responsibility and its
delegation. The emphasis is too much on authority, which is the
subordinate subject. Now, all the teaching in business circles, and
most of them in military and academic circles, is wrong from my
standpoint. The emphasis is put on authority which, to me now, is
a secondary derivative set up.
Thereferenceto“mybook,”ofcourse,istoTheFunctionsoftheExecutive(FOTE),the
productofaseriesofeight1937lectureswhichwereconvertedtopublishableformand
releasedin1938byHarvardUniversityPress(HUP).Thequotedcommentisfrom
exchangeshehadwithWilliamWolfjusttwomonthsbeforehisdeathin1961(citedin
Wolf1995).
Between1938and1947,Barnardactivelyengagedinwritingthatextendedthevarious
themesandideasstruckinFOTE,andthesewereeventuallypublishedasacollectionof
“selectedpapers”inOrganizationandManagementbyHUPin1948,justayearafterthe
issuingofa10thanniversaryprintingofFOTE.Withoneveryrelevantandnotable
exceptiondetailedbelow,Barnardpublishedlittleafterthat,butWolfnotesthatin1949he
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didprovideanoutlineforaproposednewworkon“OrganizedBehaviorandProcessesof
Decision.”1Barnard’soriginaloutlineforthevolumeinvolved15chapters.Afterreflection,
Wolfstates,headdeda16 th–onethatfocusedon“Responsibility”.Unlikethecoverageof
thatsubjectinFOTE,thetitlewasnotqualifiedbytheterm“Executive”.Itisclearthathe
hadstartedtorethinkhisfocusonauthoritativerelationshipsinFOTE.
Theproposedvolumedidnotmaterialize,andtheoneexceptiontoBarnard’spost-1947
lackofscholarlywritingisnoteworthyforthepresenteffort.The1958articleemerged
fromarecentlectureandwasofferedastheleadarticleintheinauguralissueofthe
CaliforniaManagementReview.RarelycitedbythecriticsofBarnard,herewefindthe
explicitexpressionofwhatweareterming“Barnard’sRegret.”
In“ElementaryConditionsofBusinessMorals”(ECBM)Barnardsetsforthhisimmediate
projectas“empirical”ratherthantheoretical,theological,philosophicalorsociological.
“Whatfollows,”henotes,“istheresultofreflectionuponlongpersonalexperienceina
widevarietyoforganizations—business,governmental,andphilanthropic—withextensive
opportunityforobservation…”(ECBM,1).Hethenprovidesanintellectualautobiography
ofsortsthatexplainswhatbroughthimtothespecificsubjectofbusinessmoralsandhis
current(modified)viewsonorganizations.Hebeginsbyexpressingwhathehadattempted
toaccomplishinFOTE:“Iwasmerelytryingtodescribeorstatethenatureoftheessential
toolorapparatuswith,through,orbywhichexecutiveshavetowork,asanindispensable
1 One can only speculate as to the reasons for this, but intellectually his “project” had already been taken up by
Herbert Simon, whose Administrative Behavior was published with a Foreword by Barnard in 1947.
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creationsofthesocialsystemsofwhichtheyarepart.Moretothepoint,ratherthan
viewingbusinessmoralityasareflectionofsomemoregeneralmoralityorthepersonal
codesofindividuals,heseesthemasmanifestationsofthesocialdynamicswithinwhich
theyemergeandarenurtured.Ifthiswasthecase,thesignificanceofgeneralstandardsof
socialmoralityandpersonalethicstoorganizationwasindirectatbest,perhapseven
irrelevantordysfunctionalinanorganizationalsetting.Usingsocialorpersonal
conceptionsofrightandwrongastheanalyticmeasureofbusinessmoralitywouldnotbe
appropriate.“Rather,businessmoralityrelatesto‘goodoftheorganization,’‘interestsof
society,’‘prescriptionsoflaw’”astheyrelatetotheorganizationitself(ECBM,4).
ThisdiscussionofmoralityandresponsibilitydiffersinsignificantwaysfromBarnard’s
treatmentof“ExecutiveResponsibility”neartheendofFOTE.There,havingalreadyputso
muchstressontheroleofauthorityinmanagingorganizations,Barnardfocusedalmost
exclusivelyonthecompetingmoralcodesfacingthoseinleadershippositions.Itwastheir
moralityandspecialsenseofresponsibilitythatmatteredmost.Thiswasexplicitlyevident
inhisviewthatthe“creationofmoralcodesforothers”(FOTE,279)andthe“maintenance
ofmorale”(FOTE,231)(thatis,themoralsenseofthoseengageinorganizational
activities)weretoberegardedascorefunctionsofBarnard’sexecutives.Hedetailedthese
asa“processofinculcatingpointsofview,fundamentalattitudes,loyaltiestothe
organizationorcooperativesystem,andtothesystemofobjectiveauthority,thatwill
resultinsubordinatingindividualinterestandtheminordictatesofpersonalcodestothe
goodofthecooperativewhole…”(FOTE,279).
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TherecanbelittledoubtthatBarnardassumesandmaintainsaninstrumentalist
perspectiveonmorality(Feldman2002,ch.2),bothinFOTEandECBM.Overtheyearshe
didnotalterhisunderlyingassumptionthattheorganizationalendeavoriscriticaltoour
civilization:“thedependabilitywithwhichtheburdenofspecializedactivitiesiscarriedon,
andthedependabilitywhichweascribetothosewhodothecarryingon,isthemost
essentialaspectofmodemcivilization”(ECBM,13).Butifthatendeavoristosucceedit
mustreininand/orsubordinatethebothersomemoralityfactorsthatmightinterferewith
thoseactivities.InFOTE,Barnardleavesthistasktotheexecutives,anddoessoinaway
thathasresultedinchargesofelitismandauthoritarianpredispositions.Heregards
executivesasindividualswhopossessahigher“senseofresponsibility,”andthereforeare
inapositiontounderstandandinstillinotherswhatmoralstandardsareappropriateand
necessaryforthecooperativefunctionsthatneedtobecarriedout–andwhicharenot.
InECBM,however,hebacksawayfromtherelianceonexecutiveauthoritytodealwiththe
challengesposedbytheincreasinglycomplexmoralmilieugeneratedwithinmodern
organizations.
[The moral problem] takes on increasing importance with respect
to one of the crucial problems of our times: how to secure the
essential degree of coordination of a vast system of activities while
securing the degree of decentralization and autonomy essential to
initiative and, indeed, to responsible behavior. It is almost obvious
that those who are not capable of dependable behavior cannot be
entrusted with the making of local decisions. Yet, if this cannot be
done the burden placed upon centralized authority for securing
appropriate behavior over vast areas is in fact an impossible one.
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Modernmanagement,intheformofexecutiveauthority,hasitslimitsincontendingwith
themoralproblemsinherenttomodernorganizations.Toassertsuchauthorityinvites
failure,foritaltersthefactthatthemoralunderpinningsofcooperationmustbe“freely
accepted”inordertoassuresomedegreeofsuccess.
The span of control is so limited that despite methods of
specialized training and the inculcation of the appropriate points of
view authority could not sufficiently operate if it were not for the
development, whether inculcated or spontaneous, of the moral
sense to which we broadly give the name "sense of responsibility."
Responsibility cannot be arbitrarily delegated and, therefore, a
high degree of effective autonomous behavior cannot be secured
except as responsibility is freely accepted. When so accepted the
possibility of effective autonomous behavior is realized. (ECBM,
13; emphasis added)
Thus,fortheregretfulBarnard,itisnotexecutiveauthoritybutresponsibilitiesrelatedto
organizationalmoralitythatmustaddressthecoreproblemsofcooperativeactionamong
membersofanorganization.ThisisaradicalreconfigurationoftheFOTEargument,and
Barnardisawareofthatashedelivershis1958lecture.Organizationalmoralitytakes
shapeinconcretesituations,andshouldnotbetreatedasmerelythesameasexternally
derivedabstractionsthatcanbecontrolledandappliedtopracticalbehavior;theyinvolve
standardsthatemergefromwithinthesocialrelationshipsthatcomprisetheorganized
endeavor,andmustbetreatedassuch.Theverymoralitythatdevelopsasaresultof
cooperativework–andthe“senseofresponsibility”forthatorganizationallyconceived
moralitydevelopedamongtheworkers–isnoteasilysubjectedtothesametreatmentas
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religiousorsocialorpersonalmoralcodesbroughtto(orimposedupon)theorganization
fromoutside.Theremaystillbearoleforexecutivefunctionsthatattempttoreshapeor
precludetheinfluenceofexternalmoralfactors,butthisroleforauthorityisof“secondary”
importancetothemorechallengingandcriticaltaskofdealingwithanorganization’s
internallyderivedmorality.
Dealingwiththatchallengebeginsbyfocusingattentiononthemoralityoftheorganization,
butthisitselfhasproventobedifficult.Despitethesignificanceoftheseorganizationally
rootedmoralstandards,Barnardarguestheyhavebeenhiddenfromplainviewbythe
languageappliedinthetypicalviewoforganizationallife.Theconceptualproblemfacedby
thoseseekingtoassumeamore“practical”viewoforganizationalmoralityisthus
exacerbatedbythereluctancetoapply“moralterms”toorganizationalcontexts:
[M]oral terms are not much admitted in business or public affairs.
The terms most used are "loyalty," "responsibility," "duties," and
"obligations." Though such terms are ambiguous (e.g.,
"responsibility" is often used to mean "legal liability" where no
moral question may be involved) they are in fact loaded with moral
implications. These being the terms currently used, I shall from
here on largely use them instead of "moral" or "morality" as being
more convenient and as lending themselves perhaps to more easily
intelligible discussion. (ECBM, 5)
Here,again,weseeasignificantbreakwithFOTE,wherehehadgiven“responsibility”(and
theexecutive’s“senseofresponsibility”)specialstatusasamoralvirtueinitsownright–
asamoralstandardofahigherorderthateffectivelydistinguishesanddefinesthe
authorityofthoseinexecutivepositionsthroughouttheorganization.InECBM,however,it
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isputonequalfootingwithothercharacteristicsoftheorganizationalmoralorder,e.g.,
loyalty,duty,obligation,commitment.InECBM,responsibilitybecomesthesynonymic“key
word”thatformsanumbrellaoverallthoseaspectsoftheorganization’smoralorderthat
emergeasessentialbyproductsofconsciouslydesignedcooperativeendeavors.
Table1summarizesthevariousformstakenbyanorganizationalmoralorderasdescribed
byBarnardinECBM.Inonesense,thislist(forwhichhemakesnoclaimsof
comprehensiveness)isnodifferentfromalistof“typesorresponsibilities”thatmightarise
withinanysocialsystem,formalorinformal,focusedonsurvivaloroncooperation,
traditionalormodern,etc..Whatmakesthislistspecialisthat,withinthecontextofa
formalizedattempttocreateandsustainacooperativeendeavor(i.e.,themodern
organization),theinherentlyconflictualnatureoftheseresponsibilitiesposesacore
challengethatmustbeconfrontedtoavoidfailure.Whathehasrealizedlateinlifeisthat
hisinitial(over)relianceonexecutiveauthoritytomeetthechallengeofbridgingor
integratingtheseaspectsoftheorganization’smoralorderwasinsufficientandperhaps
mademattersevenworse.
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• judicial(“essentially…theprocessofnarrowinganddelimitingtheareasof
responsibilities,thusrestrictingtheincidenceofconflict”);
• reconciliation(“theprocessofdemonstratingthatapparentorallegedconflictsof
responsibilityarepseudo-conflictsbasedonfalseassumptionsorignoranceofthe
facts”;e.g.,reframingtheproblem);and
• the“inventionofconcretesolutions”(e.g.,“todiscoverorconstructanother
proposalwhichwilleffectivelyaccomplishtheendsinitiallydesiredwithout
involvingthedeleteriouseffectstobeavoided”).
Whatismostinterestingaboutthesealternativestoexecutiveauthorityisthat,ratherthan
replaceit,theyactuallyshiftthesolutiontotheorganization’s“moralproblems”into
arenasthatmerelytransformratherthanreducetherelianceonexecutiveauthority.Thus,
theresolutionofmoralconflictsbecomesamatterofimposingalegalorder(judicial),a
bargainingregime(reconciliation),oratechno-structuralprocess(invention)onthe
organization.Initsapplication,eachapproachsuggestedbyBarnardinvolvesthecreation
ofrolesfordifferenttypesofexecutiveswhowouldassumepositionsnolessauthoritative
andcriticalthantheexecutivemanagerstheywouldreplace.Thelegalordersolution
requiresajuridicalsystemheadedby“judges”toironouttheinevitableconflictsthatarise
fromconflictingmoralresponsibilities;thebargainingregimerequiresafacilitator-
executivewhoisengagedinhelpingtoresolve(orevenarbitrate)theconflictsamong
relevantpartieswhentheyarise;whilethetechno-structuralsolutionwouldmeana
reversionbacktotheTayloristscientificmanagementapproachinwhichacommitteeof
experts,examiningthesourcesoftheconflictsindepth,areempoweredtoengageina
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continuousredesignofaspectsofthecooperativeendeavoritself.[Onecanarguethat
Barnard’ssolutionshaveinfactbeenoperationalizedwiththeadventofcontractingout
(usuallyperformance-based),humanisticmanagement,andTQM…].
Noneofthesesolutions,itshouldbenoted,addressthepossibilitythattheresolutionof
conflictingmoralresponsibilitiescanbebuiltintothedesignoforganizationsandtheir
management.“Manyofthemoralcollapsesofindividualsinactiveaffairsresultfromtheir
beingplacedinpositionsinvolvingmoraldilemmaswhichtheyhaveinsufficientabilityto
resolvebyinventionandconstruction”(ECBM,12).Inshort,theverycapacitytodealwith
suchconflictscandeterminetheeffectivenessandsuccessoforganizedendeavors.
Itwasintheconcludingsection,however,thatBarnardhighlightedthesignificanceand
implicationsofhisreanalysisofFOTEandreassertedtheproblematicthatwas(and
remains)centraltotheexecutivefunctionwithinorganizations.Inasocietythatis
increasinglydependentoncomplexorganizations,itisnotenoughtofocusonthescientific
andtechnicalchallengesweface.Wemustalsodealwiththeissuesraisedbytheconflictual
natureofthesemoralresponsibilities.Moreover,thisisnotaproblemresolvedmerelyor
evenprimarilythroughtheexerciseofauthority,butthroughothermeansthat,Barnard
admits,requiresfurtherconsideration.
It must occur to anyone who considers this subject that we are in a
state of considerable ignorance. It simply is not known to any wide
degree what are the number and the character of the moral
problems that are faced by those who do the world's work. It is
here, I think, that the universities in the future will have a great
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opportunity, for I doubt if those within our organizations can be
sufficiently adept and objective to give appropriate study to the
nature of the moral problems which they face.... (ECBM, 13)
ItisthefailureofnothavingaddressedthatprobleminFOTEthatconstitutesBarnard’s
Regret.Intheend,however,hisreflectionsonthatregretleavesopenthequestionofhow
todealwiththemoralproblematicsofmodernorganizations.Thequestionweattemptto
addressintheremainderofthispaperishowhemighthavedonesogiventheconceptual
toolsheauthored(especiallythe“zoneofindifference”)andthethemeshehaddevelopin
thosefinalyears..
BringingExpectationsandAccountabilityintoPlay
Ourargument,inbrief,isthatBarnardwouldhavebuiltupontheworkofcomplementary
thinkerssuchasMaryParkerFollett(whosemajorworksprecedeFOTE)andHerbert
Simon(whowritingsfollowandexplicitlybuilduponFOTE)totakeanevenfurtherstep
beyondTayloristicmodelsofscientificmanagementthanhealreadyhadinFOTE.In
particular,wethinkBarnardmighthaveextendedhisconceptionoforganizationsand
motivationinwaysthatwouldexpresslyputadministrativeaccountability–understoodas
acontextuallyspecificinstanceofabroaderphenomenonofhumanmotivation–atthe
centerofthecooperativedynamicsoftheorganizationinlieuoftheprimacypreviously
giveninFOTEtoauthority.Moreover,wewillofferwhatwebelievetobea
reconceptualizationofhis“zoneofindifference”thatBarnardmightfindappropriatefor
hismore“practical”approachtomanagingcomplex,cooperativesocialsystems.
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Barnardrecognizedthatveryfewifanyorganizationaltasksandrolescouldbestructured
inwaysthateliminateeveryformofindividualdiscretion.Infact,alongwithFollettand
Simon,Barnardviewedoneofthefundamentalchallengesofleadershipandmanagement
tobehowoneshapesindividualdiscretionwithinorganizationsinwaysthatelicithigh-
qualityperformance(i.e.,cooperation)towardorganizationalgoalswithoutrequiring
excessiveinvestmentsinmanagerialsurveillanceanddirection.Thiscanincludenotjust
whatbehaviortochoosewhenmorethanonealternativeisavailable,butalsowhetherand
towhatextentindividualschoosetoinvest"ingenuityandenergy"intheirwork,overand
abovemeetingtherequirementsimposedonthembyformalauthority(Blau&Scott1962,
140).Williamson,Wachter,andHarris(1975)termedthisapplicationofinitiativeand
ingenuity"consummate"asopposedto"perfunctory"cooperation.
Inotherwords,thereisadistinctdifferencebetweenmerelydoingaswearetoldandmore
affirmativelydoingallthatwecanappropriatelydo.InFOTE,Barnardputthisproblemin
termsofthecultivationof“personalservices”--acoreexecutivefunctionthatdependson
theexerciseofauthority.
The second function [of the executive]…is to promote the securing
of the personal services that constitute the material of
organizations. The work divides into two main divisions: (I) the
bringing of persons into co-operative relationship with the
organization; (II) the eliciting of the services after such persons
have been brought into the relationship. (FOTE, 227)
Toperformthisfunction,theexecutivewouldfocuson
the maintenance of morale, the maintenance of the scheme of
inducements, the maintenance of schemes of deterrents,
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supervision and control, inspection, education and training.
(FOTE, 231)
TheseareburdensoftheBarnardianexecutiveinFOTE,andeachrequiresnotmerely
variouseffortsat“maintenance”,buttheappropriatedesignofthoserelationshipsthat
weretobemaintained.ForBarnard,insightfulandobservantmanagerthathewas,
organizationswerestructuresthatshapehumanbehaviorandchoices,andthe
authoritativetasksofthemanager/executivearenotmerelytoengageindirective
activities,butalsodesignactivitiesandtheexperiencesmembershaveofthoseactivities
andtheirorganizationalcontexts.Boththedirectiveanddesignfunctionsoftheexecutive,
however,werelimitedbythenaturalsocialspaceswithinwhichhumansinteract.
AtthispointitisworthnotingthatamongBarnard’ssignificanttalentsastheoristof
“practice”washisuseofanalogiesdrawnfromotherarenastoarticulatealternativestothe
moremechanisticanalogiesofthepopularTayloristviewsoftheday.Hisworkdraws
heavilyandextensivelyfromcontemporaryworkinsociology,socialpsychologyand
culturalanthropology,withtheuseofthe“socialsystem”analogybeingthemostobvious
example.Norishereluctanttoborrowfromlesscognatedisciplines(FOTE,75-76,note7):
An organization is a field of personal “forces,” just as an
electromagnetic field is a field of electric or magnetic forces. The
evidence of the effects, in both cases, is all that can be used to
describe or define these forces; and the dimensions within which
those evidences occur are said to define the field of those forces….
...[P]ersons are the objective sources of the organization forces
which occupy the organizational field. These forces derive from
energies that are found only in persons. They become organization
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forces only when certain conditions obtain in the field and are
evidenced only be certain phenomena such as words and other
action, or are inferred by concrete results imputed to such action.
But neither the persons nor the objective results are themselves the
organization. If they are treated as if they were, inconsistencies and
inadequacies of explanation of phenomena ensue.
AmongthemostwidelycitedofBarnard’sanalogicframes(andtheoneofgreatestinterest
forthepresentpaper)wasthe“zoneofindifference,”aconceptBarnardarticulatedusing
languageborrowedfromwhatwerethenstillrelativelyrecentdevelopmentsinmicro-
economicanalysisbyFrancisEdgeworthandVilfredoPareto(seeMoscati2007,fora
historicalaccount).Thecentralrelevantnotionhereisthatanindifferencecurve
encompassesanarrayofchoices(differingbundlesorcombinationsofgoods)among
whichtheconsumerisliterallyindifferent.Alonganysingleindifferencecurve,the
consumerisequallypleasedbyanyofthequitedifferentscenariosofconsumption
presentedalongthecurve–typicallypresumedtoincludeextremeimbalancesamongthe
goodsinthevariousbundlesaswellasbundlesthathavemorebalancedproportionsofthe
goodsinthem.Inotherwords,thechoicescanbestarkly,qualitativelydifferent,andyet
theconsumercouldnotcarelesswhichofthemshetakes.
Inthissense,then,azoneofindifferencemaybeunderstoodtodefineasetofbehaviors
amongwhichanactorisliterallyindifferent.Accordingly,BarnardnotedinFOTEthat
instructionsthatfallwithinthezoneofindifferencewouldbe"unquestionablyacceptable"
(169):whicheverbehaviormanagementorcolleaguesaskanorganizationalmemberto
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choosewillbenomoreorlesspreferredbyherthananyoftheotherchoiceswithinthat
zone.Thus,shemighthappilysuspendherownwillandmoraljudgment,andenact
whateverisurgedonherbyorganizationalauthority.Choicewithinthezone,ifnot
directedbytheorganization,mightthenbehighlyunpredictable,evenarbitrary,sincethe
actorliterallywillnotcarewhichofthechoicessheadopts.
Goingbeyondtheeconomicanalyticrootsofthezoneofindifference,Barnard’suseofthe
“zone”imagery–aswellashisuseof“energyforces”–impliesafascinationwiththeroleof
spatialityinhumanrelationships.Thezoneisasocialarenawithinwhichpreferences,
choices,options,valuesandactionsinteract,anditislikelytoemergewheneverand
whereverhumansengageinacooperativeendeavorinvolvingsomeformofdirected
purposeorobjective.Ofcourse,whatinterestsBarnardistheexplicitandconsciously
pursuedcooperativeendeavor,buthisfrequentcitationoftheworkofsocial
anthropologistsandsocialpsychologistsisaclearindicationthathewellunderstoodthe
“naturalistic”natureofsocialrelationshipsunderlyingthezoneofindifference.
ThisposedsomethingofaconundrumfortheFOTEBarnard,forbyadaptingthelogicof
indifferencefromeconomics,heseemedtobeeffectivelyprecludingtheroleofmoralityin
organizations.Theeconomicnotionofpreferencesisfundamentallyanamoralone.It
emphasizespersonalsatisfactionratherthanmoralcommitmentasitscentralconcern–a
pointconsistentwiththeideaoforganizationsasconstitutingeconomiesofself-interested
responsestoincentivesinthenarrowestsense.Thatsaid,itshouldbenotedthatevenin
FOTE,Barnardcannotfairlybeportrayedasneglectingentirelytherelevancetoindividual
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andorganizationalchoiceofnormativecommitmentsotherthanselfinterest,andthefact
thathetaskedexecutiveswiththeneedtoengageinmoral“inculcating”reflectshis
understandingthatmorality(intheformof“morale”)couldhardlybeignored.
Consistentwiththeirsharedinterestinthewayinwhichorganizationsandtheirleaders
shapeindividualmembers'decisions(throughinteractionswiththosemembers'factual
knowledge,values,andabilities),Simon(1997)adaptedBarnard'sconceptandusedthe
languageofanareaofacceptancetodescribethesetofactionsanemployeewillwillingly
andcompetentlyperformwithinthezone.Thelanguageofacceptanceisactuallyprobably
truertoBarnard'soriginalFOTEconception,andunquestionablyclosertohisfinal(1958)
articulationofbusinessmorals,inthatitdoesnotimplyliteralindifferenceamong
alternativepreferences.Rather,itcanbeunderstoodasencompassingarangeofactions
whichmaywelldifferintermsofhowanactorfeelsaboutthem,eventhoughallare
sufficientlyacceptable(oratleastarenotsorepugnant)thattheactorwillundertake
whicheverofthemsheisaskedtoperform,albeitnotnecessarilyunquestioningly.
Importantly,thelanguageofacceptanceappliedbySimondoesnotimplyabandonmentof
individualpreferenceamongalternatives,onlythattheactorispreparedtoaccept
authoritativeorpeerdirectiontoactinwaysthatthatmayormaynotcoincidecompletely
withindividualpreferencesoranyofthehostofothercategoriesofbusinessmorals
articulatedbyBarnardinECBM.Furthermore,thislaterlanguageandconception,freefrom
theusagesofneoclassicaleconomics,ismoreexplicitlyamenabletoincorporatingafull
rangeofhumanvaluesandmotivations,includingthosethatarefundamentallyother-
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oriented(i.e.,accountable)aswellasthosethataregroundedinpersonalsatisfaction.This
allowsustoseethesignificancetoindividualadministrativechoiceandbehaviorof
organizationalcultures,moralleadership,andotherinfluencesbeyondjusttheexpression
ofauthorityandtheallocationofrewardsandsanctions.Indeed,themetaphorof
acceptancepointedtotheoperationofmoralresponsibilityandaccountability askey
motivatorsofactionwithinorganizationsinwaysthattheindifferencemetaphordoesnot.2
Atthisjuncture,itisnecessarytoraisetheissueofaccountability–oratleasthowwe
conceptualizethatnowiconicterm(Dubnick2002).Asweusethewordhere,
accountabilitydescribesasocialprocessbymeansofwhichindividualactorsaremotivated
toactinwholeorinpartwithreferencetothepotentialreactionsofotherstotheirconduct.
Thisprocessincludesavarietyofcomponentmechanismsincludingthecommunicationof
expectationsbyothers,throughorganizationalmandatesand/ororthroughculturalnorms
andmoralvalues;mechanismsthroughwhichothersobtainandevaluateformaland
informalaccountsofconduct(directinteraction,observation,formalreporting,etc.);and
formal(organizationalorlegalsanctionsandrewards)aswellasinformal(expressionsof
indignation,resentment,orapprobation)reactions.Accountablebehaviorthenis
individualaction,inthesensethatitischosenandsubjectivelymeaningfulbehavior,which
isselectedatleastinpartbecausetheactorisconcernedwithhowthatactionwillbe
observedandevaluatedthroughsomeoneormoreofformalizedproceduresandless
formalsocialinteractions,moralsentiments(Smith,1759/1976;Wallace,1994),and
reactiveattitudes(Strawson,1962).Thusaccountabilityshapesbothactionthatis
2 See Aaron Wildavsky’s (1987) view on “preferences” and preference formation, which he associates with the
cultural theory originating with Mary Douglas.
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primarilyself-interested,insofarastheactorisconcernedwithothers'expectationsand
anticipatedresponses,andactionthatstemsmainlyfromunderlyingmotivationsother
thancalculatedpersonalbenefit.
Viewedinthisway,accountabilitycanaddacriticaldimensiontothezoneof
indifference/areaofacceptance.Whilethecreationofindifferencereliesonindividual
preferences,andacceptanceonsharedvaluesandnorms,accountabilityisrootedinthe
interactionandinterplayofexpectations(broadlydefined)betweenandamongthose
engagedinthecooperativeendeavor .Derivedfromavarietyofsources(seeDubnickand
Romzek,1993),theseexpectationsinformindividualsastowhatwillbeperceivedtobe
acceptableand/orappropriatebehaviorwithingivensocialactioncontexts.
Applyingthelogicofaccountability,thedeterminationof“acceptability”and
“appropriateness”canberegardedastheresultofatriangulationofthreedistinct
perspectives:thatoftheself-interestedindividual;thatoftheperceivedexpectationsof
organizational“other(s)”(e.g.,management;co-workers;citizens;clients)engagedinthe
relationship;andtheextra-organizationalmoralpressuressocentraltoBarnard’sECBM
reflections.AsFeldman(2002)noted,muchoforganizationandmanagementtheory
rootedinFOTEisbasedonadichotomouslogicthatpitstheindividualagainstthe
collective,thusreducingtoproblemofmorality(usuallyregardedasanexternal
interference)tosomethingthatmustbeeliminatedor(asisthecasewithFOTE)“managed.”
InECBM,Barnardisessentiallyseekingameansforintegratingthemoralfactor(andallits
associatedproblems)intotheorganizationalcalculus.Webelievethatprovidingamore
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centralplaceforaccountabilityaccomplishesBarnard’sECBMgoal.Thezoneof
indifference/acceptancecanbere-conceptualizedasazoneofexpectationsthat
encompassesthelogicofaccountability.
ThereismuchtobegainedbyexpandingBarnard’szoneofindifferenceandSimon’sarea
ofacceptancetoencompassexpectationsandaccountability.Atminimum,itbreaks
throughthatdichotomouslogicofindividual-organizationconflictsinherentinthe
indifference/acceptanceschemesbyinjectingamoralfactorintothezone.Moreover,it
providesanopportunitytoapproachthezoneasadesign(asopposedtostrictlya
management)probleminvolvingthedevelopmentofalternative“accountabilityspaces”in
whichtheexpectationsforresponsiblecooperativebehaviorcanbesatisfiedwithminimal
risktointernalmoralitythatmakescooperationincomplexorganizationspossible.
DealingwithBarnard’sRegret
Wepauseheretoreiterateourmajorpoint:Giventheinevitabilityofdiscretionatevery
levelandinvirtuallyeveryactivityofanorganization,anditsmaterialsignificanceto
organizationalefficiencyandeffectiveness(aswellastomembers'satisfactionand
materialrewards),akeyresponsibilityofleadershipinFOTEwastofacilitatewise,
mission-appropriateexerciseofdiscretion.Theemphasisheplacedontheprimacyof
authoritywascentraltoBarnard'sRegretandreflectedhisrecognitionthathehadnot
adequatelyarticulatedthewayinwhichanorganization'sleadersbearresponsibility,in
effect,notfor"holdingpeopleaccountable"inahighlydirectiveandsanction-driven
fashionbyrelyingontheirindifferenceamongchoices,butratherforconstructingspaces
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ofsocialinteractionwithinwhichpeoplecanactinagenuinelyaccountable(responsible)
fashion.
TwobasicpointsunderlieourspeculationastowhatBarnardmighthaveacceptedasa
credibleresolveofhisRegret.First,fromthelecturesthatledtoFOTEonward,Barnard
wasexpresslyandconsistentlyengagedingivingtheoreticalandconceptualshapetothe
worldof“practice.”Hewasneitherscientistnorphilosopher(despitethefactthathewas
oncecalledthe“philosopherking”ofmanagementtheorists)–nordidheaspiretosuch,
eventhoughhewassupportiveofSimon’s“administrativescience”agenda.Forhim,what
knowledgehecouldimpartwasbasedonexperience.Thehighregardwithwhichheheld
thewisdomgainedthroughpracticalexperiencenodoubtspilledoverintohisviewsabout
thedegreeofdiscretionanyindividualshouldbeallowedinorganizationalendeavors.
Thus,itisnotdiscretionpersethatneedstobegivenfreerreininorganizations,butrather
discretiontiedtothat“senseofresponsibility”thatcomesfromthepracticalexperienceof
engagingincooperativeactions.
Indeed,whenBarnardwritesaboutthecentralityof"thousandsofmoraldilemmas"(ECBM,
10),"moralachievement"in"concreteconditions"(4),and"responsiblebehavior"(13)to
bothself-awaremembershipinlargeandcomplexorganizationsandtheefficiencyand
effectivenessofthoseorganizations,hispointseemsstrikinglysimilartocontemporary
urgingsthatorganizationalleadersandsocialinstitutionsingeneralinculcatethecore
Aristotelianvirtueofpracticalwisdom( phronesis)(e.g.,Kane&Patapan2006;Molina&
Spicer2004).WhileBarnardconcludedbycallingforempiricalresearchtoaddressa"state
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ofconsiderableignorance"(ECBM,13),wesuspectthathemightwellhaveagreedwiththe
assertionthatoneofthemostimportantfunctionsoftheexecutiveis"toencouragetheuse
ofpracticalwisdomratherthaninhibitingit"(Schwartz&Sharpe,2006,p.377).
Encouragingthatpracticalwisdomwhichisrelevanttothesuccessofthecooperative
endeavorshouldprovidethecentrallogicalassumptionofeffortstodesignazoneof
expectationsbasedonaccountabilityspaces.
Forourpurposes,therearetwofactorsthatdifferentiateamongalternativeexpectation
zones:(1)thespecificityofthetaskinvolved(fromlowhigh)and(2)thelevelofautonomy
(trust)requiredbytheactorinvolved(lowtohigh)(seeFigure1).
Levelofautonomyforactor
Perceivedneedfordirectedaction(control):
Low High
High
Constitutivezone
Managerialzone
Low
Regulatoryzone
Performativezone
Figure1:ZonesofExpectations
The performativeexpectationzoneismostrelevanttothosesituationsinvolvinglittleorno
roomforerrorsthatmightprovecostlyorevencatastrophicforthecooperativeendeavor.
Here,eventhoughthelikelihoodoffailuremightinfactbelow,thereisperceivedtobe
littleornoroomforexcusemakingandposthocexplanations,foriftheerroroccursit
mightbetoolate.Undernormalconditions,thetasktobecarriedoutisdeliberatelymade
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veryspecific,andthedegreeofdiscretionallowedtheactorisextremelylow.Unlessthe
requiredactisperformedasrequired,theentireorganizedprocesscomestoahaltor
potentiallyimplodes.Inafictionalcasethatprovidesapowerfulexample,acentralsubplot
inthepopularUStelevisionseries“Lost”involvedarequirementthatacertainsequenceof
numbersbeenteredintoacomputerevery108minutes.Whilethosecarryingoutthetask
wereneverreallycertainaboutwhatconsequencesmightresultiftheydidnotfollowthe
preciselydefinedorders,thosewhoassumedtheresponsibilitytookitseriouslydespite
theireverpresentdoubts.Discretionaryactionwouldmeanfailure,andinthecaseof“Lost”
itmeantadisastrousbreakintheworld’sspace-timecontinuum.
Asfar-fetchedasthatexamplesounds,therealityofhighreliabilityorganizations(HROs)
(e.g.,operatingnuclearpowerplants)oftenrequiresmundanetasksthatmustbe
performedtoassurethatsafeandsecureoperationofthefacility.Acknowledgingthestatus
ofawarningdevicebypressingaresetbuttoneveryhourorsomightseem
inconsequentialwhendonebyawell-paid,highlyknowledgeableengineersittingatsome
controlboard,buttheperformativeexpectationcanprovecriticalfortheentireenterprise.
Therelevanceofthatindividual’spracticalwisdomoughttobeminimalundernormal
conditions.Thosemonitoringtheday-to-day,hour-to-houroperationsofthepowerplant
mayhavebeenonthejobfordecadesorevenholddoctoratesinnuclearphysics,butthe
degreeofdiscretionastowhetherornottoflipparticularswitchatadesignatedtimein
ordertoconfirmthesafestatusoftheunitislikelytobezero,absentspecialconditionsor
knowledgeontheemployee'spartthatrequirehertoconsiderdivergingfromroutine.
Herethezoneofexpectationisverystructuredandspecific,andasnotedthespacefor
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offeringexcusesorexplanationforerror(theaccountabilityspace)isseverelylimited.Yet,
truly"consummatecooperation"inthesecaseswillalsoinvolverecognizingwhen
abnormalconditions–anapproachingtsunami,perhaps–requireviolationofstandard
procedures,eventothepointofapparentdisobedienceregardingendsaswellasmeans.
Attheotherextremeintermsofnormaltaskspecificityistheconstitutivezoneof
expectations,solabeledbecauseitinvolveslittlemorethanestablishing(constituting)the
settingwithinwhichtheactorisexpectedtoexerciseahighdegreeordiscretionin
applyingherexpertiseandpracticalwisdom.Thisinvolvesorganizationaltasksthatrelyon
substantialknowledgeandperhapsyearsofexperience–thekindoftaskswheretheactor
isrenderedineffectiveifoverlyconstrained.Theexpectationisthatsheorhewillusethe
practicalwisdomgainedovertheyears,andthereisconsiderableroominthe
accountabilityspaceforexcusesandexplanationsthatmightamounttonothingmorethan
“bettersafethansorry.”Theuseofa“ship’scaptain”metaphorisoftenusedinthe
corporateworldtojustifythedemandsofsomeCEOsthat(inordertomaximize
shareholdervalue)theybefreeofanyoftheformallimitsandchecksthatmightbe
imposedbyaboardofdirectors.Butevenwithoutexplicitlypushingtheirdemandsforan
expansivedegreeofdiscretion,corporateculturesoftenfallintothisconstitutivezone.
Thatculturalthemeandthegrowingtendencytoview“leadership”ascriticalhashadits
impactaswellinthepublicandnonprofitsectorswhere,despiteformalsystemsofchecks
andbalances,thereisatendencytodefertothedecisionsofasingleactororsetofactors
asameansforachievingorganizationalgoals.
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Perhapsmorerelevanttotypicalorganizationaloperationsandmembersarethetwo
spaceswheretheconsequencesoffailureareperceivedtobemuchlower.Inone,the
managerialzoneofexpectations,relianceonthepracticalwisdomofworkersissignificant
andtaskspecificitylow,butthelevelofdiscretionislimitedtotheareaofmeans,notends.
Hereisthezoneofexpectationswherestressisplacedonsupervisionandoversightto
assurethattheactionstakenbythosewithdiscretionareinlinewiththepurposesand
objectivesoftheorganization.Heretheaccountabilityspaceisdesignedbymanagementto
directtheenergiesandpracticalwisdomoftargetedactorstowardaspecificendorgoal.
Modestamountsofdiscretionareappropriate,andthenatureandconsequencesof
members'rolesandtasksrequireneitherhighlyprecisebehavioralprescriptionnor
empoweringmemberstoconsiderdisobedienceunderextremeconditions.
Theclearestexampletodayistherelianceonhighstakesperformancemeasurementin
Americanschoolsystemsunderthepressuresimposedbytheferalgovernment’sNoChild
LeftBehindpolicy.Inresponse,K-12teachers,longregardedasacompetent(albeitunder-
compensated)professionalclass,arebeingsubjectedtodemandsthroughamanagerial
cadre(i.e.,schooladministrators)thattheiractionsaseducatorsproducehigherstudent
scores.ItisthezonewheretheobservationsderivedfromFOTEaremostrelevant,and
whereexecutiveauthoritycanprovecritical.
Finally,thereisthezoneofwheretheneedforcontrolovertheactionsofworkersis
perceivedtobelow,buttheleveloftrustremainslowandthereissomeanxietyofgranting
toomuchautonomy.Thisistheregulativezoneinwhichmechanismsareputinplaceto
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assureandreinforcethecompetenceoftheorganization'sworkers,butwhereinpractice
oversightisintermittentatbest,andperhapsevenritualizedtoenhancetheworker’ssense
ofresponsibility.Theaccountabilityspaceinthiszonecanhaveconsiderablebreadthand
depth,butitisultimatelylimitedbyboundariesdesignedtorendersomeactions
inexcusableor“unprofessional.”
TheclassiccasestudyhereisHerbertKaufman’sTheForestRanger,aworkthatdescribes
indetailtheestablishmentandmaintenanceofanorganizationculturethatsucceedsasa
cooperativeendeavordespitethewidespatialandtemporalseparationofagents(the
Rangers)fromthecentralofficeinWashington.Kaufmanstressesthatmuchofthesuccess
oftheUSForestServicehasdependedontheprofessionalismandlocalcompetenciesofthe
Rangers,butthattheircompetencyitselfistiedcloselytoahighlydevelopedregulative
systembasedonanelaboratesetofpoliciesandproceduresthatcovereverythingfrom
recruitmenttorecordkeepingtoinspectionsandconstantreinforcementoftheService’s
moralcode–tothepointof“brainwashing”.Inaveryrealsense,theForestServicemade
theexerciseofauthoritativemanagementunnecessarywhilenurturingapracticalwisdom
thatembodiedtheagency’scoremoralprinciples.
Preliminaryandtentativeconclusion
BeyondtheobjectiveofdealingwithBarnard’sRegret,thispaper(initscurrentform)
representsanefforttorevitalizethe“zonal”constructsofBarnardandSimonthatplayed
suchacriticalroleinthedevelopmentofbothorganizationalandmanagementtheory.We
intended,aswell,toprovideananalyticframeforincludingtheambiguous,overusedand
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frequentlymisusedconceptofaccountabilityinthestudyoforganizations.Whetherthe
zoneofexpectationsframeworkweprovideachievesthatpurposeawaitsfurther
elaborationandapplication.
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