dreitzel_reasonofstate

History of European Ideas 28 (2002) 163–187

Reason of state and the crisis of politicalaristotelianism: an essay on the development of

17th century political philosophy$

H. Dreitzel

Faculty of Historical Science and Philosophy, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

1. The reception of the category of reason of state

In German political theory the career of the concept of ‘reason of state’ can bedated from the publication of De arcanis rerumpublicarum libri sex (1605) by ArnoldClapmar (1574–1604), professor of jurisprudence at the University of Nuremberg inAltdorf. In this work he identified arcana dominationis (as distinguished from arcana

imperii, arcana domus, or flagitia dominationis) with what the Italians and the Frenchcalled ragio di stato.1 Clapmar tried to translate it either as Reichsstand or geheime

Reichssachen, but as these terms have never caught on, the transplantation of thevocabulary of reason of state into the German language failed.2 Apart fromfacilitating the German acceptance of ‘reason of state’, Clapmar’s treatise offered a

$Translated by I. Hont, B. Kapossy, Y. Podbielski and R. Reynolds.1 Arnold Clapmarius, De arcanis rerumpublicarum libri sex (Frankfurt a.M., 1611), p. 7; and by the same

author, Conclusiones de jure publico (Frankfurt a.M., 1617). n. 47: ‘Arcana imperii sunt certae profundae

et intimae leges sive privilegia conservandi pristini status sive reipublicae. Sicut arcana dominationis (Italis et

Gallis est ragion di stato, Germani non efferunt, nisi forte per Reichsstand vel per Reichssachen) sunt certa et

secreta privilegia conservandae dominationis, introducta boni publici causa, quibus opponuit Tacitus flagitia

dominationis (Itali la cattiva ragione di stato), quibus fides et religio violatur’.2 For ‘Geheime Reichssache’ see A. Clapmarius, De arcanis, ebd.; for other translation attempts see

Godofredus de Jena, Fragmenta de ratione status diu desiderata (n.p., 1667), d.3.1. Von Jena used ratio

status, jus dominationis, and arcana imperii sive dominationis as synonims and translated them into German

as ‘das heimliche Regierungsrecht, das Regimentsrecht, die Wahrnehmung, Beobachtung, Erhaltung des

allgemeinen Reiches, Landes, Wesens, Standes vel uno verbo der Staat’; Christian Weirach, Della Regione di

stato, das ist, von der Geheimen und Ungemeinen Regierungs-Klugheit (Leipzig, 1673); Johann Eberhard

Schweling, Concertationis publicae e Literis Politocorum et Jurisconsultorum de Ratione Status (Bremen,

1701), p. 4: ‘Nec sine mente Itali eam vocarunt Ragion di Dominio, di Regno, d’Imperio, Ragionamento di

Stato. Gallis Raison vel Inter#et d’#etat. Est vero apud Latinos Idem, quod Regnativa Prudentia, Jus

Dominationis, Imperii Secreta vel Arcana etc. ... Germanis Regiment oder dessen Standt, item Regierung oder

Regiments-Vernunft etc. Inque Machiavellistis der rasende Staat, item gottlose politische Griffen, politische

Finessen und Arglistigkeit etc.’. These examples all show that the concepts of‘arcana’ and ‘ratio status’ were

not clearly distinguished from each other, and more often than not were deployed interchangeably.

0191-6599/02/$ - see front matter r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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contribution to three further important debates within contemporary discussionsof politica: (1) the establishment of an autonomous Staatsrecht, grounded inthe categories of Roman law and Bodin’s theory of sovereignty; (2) ‘Tacitism’, i.e.the attempt to use the historical works of Tacitus as the authoritative model for the‘empirical’ analysis of the politics of princely states; and finally (3) the developmentof political Aristotelianism whose hallmark was the subordination of jurisprudenceto the science of politics. This last facet of Clapmar’s work was particularlyimportant, because it helped him to establish a clear distinction between jura andarcana, which then led to the dominant interpretation of ‘reason of state’ withinGerman Staatsrecht, as the domain of exceptional laws and the exercise of statepower during states of emergency (an interpretation that was accepted as valid untilthe Vorm .arz in the run-up to the revolution of 1848).3

Though over time Clapmar’s work gained the status of a minor classic, we need toconsider its doctrines in their contemporary context, in the company of other texts

3 Throughout his entire treatise Clapmar distinguished law (Recht, jus) from politics (arcana). Chapter 1

deals with the sovereign rule (jus imperii), ch. 4 with laws pertaining to states of emergency (jus

dominationis): ‘Juris imperii usus proprie est in pacata et tranquilla republica, at vero juris dominationis est in

violenta et seditiosa, in qua jus in mancu est positum ..., quo tempore multa fiunt fierique oportet contra jus

commune ... Jus dominationes est restrictio quaedam earum legum, quibus solutus est (princeps) earumque

limitatio: non enim de omnibus solutus est’ [The use of the right of power, in the strict sense, is for a pacified

and tranquil republic, while the use of the right of domination is appropriate for a violent and seditious

republic, in which the right stems from this disfigurement ..., during which time many things are done and

it is fitting that they be done against the common law ... The right of domination is a particular restriction

of those laws, from which (the prince) is absolved: but not an absolution from all laws]. On the other hand,

chs. 2 and 3 deal with political means appropriate in these legal frameworks, while ch. 5 deals with the

concept of ‘arcana inana’. For a history of the continued use of reason of state within German public law

see Johann Ludwig Kl .uber, .Offentliches Recht des Teutschen Bundes und der Bundesstaaten, 4th ed.

(Frankfurt a.M., 1840), pp. 826–832: ‘ .Außerstes Recht’ in the case of ‘evidenter, dringender Noth des

Staates’ [extreme legal measures (in the case of) evident and strict danger for the state], ‘genannt Jus sive

imperium eminens, jus extremae necessitatis, vis potestatis, Staatsnothrecht, Staatsraison (ratio status, sc.

extraordinarii)’. Kl .uber made it clear that there was an extensive literature on the subject, reaching back to

Aristotle and Grotius. For the legal use of the notion of ‘necessitas’ see H. Wessel, Zweckm .aßigkeit als

Handlungsprinzip in der deutschen Regierungs- und Verwaltungslehre der fr .uhen Neuzeit (Berlin, 1978), ‘Die

Durchsetzung von Zwecken unter .Uberwindung von Rechtsschranken’, pp. 114–134; J. W. Pichler,

Necessitas. Ein Element des mittelalterlichen und neuzeitlichen Rechts. Dargestellt am Beispiel

.osterreichischer Rechtsquellen (Berlin, 1983); H. Boldt, ‘Ausnahmezustand, necessitas publica, Belager-

ungszustand, Kriegszustand, Staatsnotstand, Staatsnotrecht’ in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches

Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. by O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck, vol. 1

(Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 343–358. This and other studies reveal what a dynamic function necessitas had in

politics (for example in framing laws), although as a legal category its main function was to limit and

codify factual circumstances. In those cases where necessity was accepted as part of the legal order, it could

be used as an argument for the legality of self-defence, or more precisely, ‘he who acts accordingly will

always remain within law’. ‘Necessity’ legitimised only a certain number of very restricted emergency

regulations. For the jurists ‘reason of state’ was almost identical to jus eminens. This interpretation was

traced back to Sc. Ammirato (Discursus ad Tacitum, Bk.12 note 1). They tended to identify reason of state

also with propriety (aequitas, epikeia), and with ‘potestas extraordinaria’ as a separate part of governance

(see Christoph Besold, De majestate politica (T .ubingen, 1614), n. 36 and 37; Johann Christoph Becmann,

‘De dominio eminente’ in: Meditationes Politiquae XXIV Dissertationibus Academicis expositae, 2nd ed.

(Frankfurt a.O., 1672), d. 21). Naturally necessitas was also used as a category in civil law (Mundraub

[theft of comestibles for personal consumption], Durchzug [right of passage], Notwehr [self-defence] etc.).

H. Dreitzel / History of European Ideas 28 (2002) 163–187164

which appeared at the same time, and shaped the main trends of German politicaltheory in the first 30 years of the 17th century. The following works might beconsidered: the Politica of Johannes Althusius (1st edition 1603); the Doctrina

politica in genuinam methodum, quae Aristoteles, reducta of Henning Arniseus (1606);the Politicorum libri decem (1620) by the Jesuit Adam Contzen; the Tractatus de

regiminae saecularis et ecclesiastica by the Lutheran minister Diederich Reinking(1619); the Principiorum juris naturae libri quinque (1615) by Benedict Winkler (asyndicus in L .ubeck); the Hof-, Staats- und Regierkunst by Georg Engelhard vonL .ohneyß (1622–1624), and last but not least, the comprehensive Staatsrecht of theHoly Roman Empire by Johannes Limnaeus (1629–1634). These books encompassedvarious discourses, such as the Staatslehre of the monarchomachs; politicalAristotelianism; thomist-aristotelian counter-reformation Catholicism; the LutheranDrei-St .ande-Lehre; Lutheran natural law (as a development of the doctrine ofsubjective rights in the status integratis); the pragmatical Regimentslehre of themedieval German F .urstenstaat; and finally Reichsrecht (which became autonomousboth in method and in its choice of legal sources). This list is obviously not quitecomplete: there were a number of other political discourses, and of course this kindof simple taxonomy always fails to take into account the significant variations anddevelopments within each political idiom. Nonetheless, it gives us a rough indicationof the dominant tendencies of the time.

The German reception of ‘reason of state’ occurred in the context of the emergingnew discourses of politica and Staatsrecht in the Empire at the beginning of the 17thcentury. The new idioms soon entered the curriculum of German universities andalso generated widespread public discussion in the pamphlet literature. Their rise wasnot at all arrested by the 30-Years-War; indeed, they flourished more than ever in thepost-war reconstruction period. In the last thirty years of the century, however, newfeatures of political thought emerged in Germany in the shape of divine right theoryand natural jurisprudence, the latter gaining a foothold mainly through the receptionof Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli et pacis (1625) and later the influence of Pufendorf’sdoctrine of socialitas. The emergence of these two discourses appears to have beenconnected with the ‘overcoming’ of the legacy of monarchomach political theory,which since the middle of the century played the role of counterweight to them inpolemical debates. If one was to outline the main foci of interest in this development,two central points in particular would have to be highlighted: the debate on theorganisational and legitimising function of ‘sovereignty’ (the sovereign power of thestate), and on the respective merits of the monarchomach model of divided (double)sovereignty, Bodin’s constitutional monism and the pluralism of the Aristotelians.The controversy also included the issues of the separation of powers and thelimitation of sovereignty. In the German Empire and its associated territories, thedebate naturally focused on the limits and competence of princely power within apolitical structure composed of estates. The applicability of Staatsrecht for theEmpire and the territories was also widely discussed, including the issue of the divineright of kings, and the various issues related to the practical methods of constitutingand preserving princely rule. A second, and equally central, plank of the Germandebate concerned the foundations of the Christian community; that is to say the

H. Dreitzel / History of European Ideas 28 (2002) 163–187 165

question of a ‘good police’ (guten Policey), not only as a competition betweenCatholics and Protestants and their respective notions of politica christiana, but alsoas a clash between the various Protestant positions, one of which was politicalAristotelianism, with its tendency to emphasize the secularised autonomy of politica

(according to the maxim ‘nostra respublica quad substantiam non differt a republica

ethnicorum’).4 This second type of debate focused on the possibility of reformingstate and society, as demanded, in their various ways, by Protestantism, Catholicismand humanism alike.

The reception of the concept of reason of state was relatively late in Germany. Itsfirst impact came through the reading of various Italian authors (G. Botero,Tr. Boccalini, Sansovino, Sc. Ammirato, L. Frachetta, H. Zuccoli, L. Settala,F. Bonaventura). After the ‘Thirty Years’ War’ German attention had focusedon a number of French thinkers (Rohan, Richelieu, Mazarin). Sometimes it isargued that the influence of Baltasar Gracian’s writings was crucial, but evidenceof this can be found only towards the end of the 17th century.5 The belatedreception of reason of state in Germany had three consequences: first, it hadto compete with already well established interpretations of some of its mainthemes, of problems like that of ‘mutationis rerumpublicarum’ and ‘secreta politica’;secondly, it was merged with several positions which were no more than remnantsfrom earlier phases of the European debate (such as the distinction between a ‘good’and a ‘bad’ reason of state); and finally, several doctrinal positions, which in theWest-European context could easily be interpreted as reactions to Machiavelli, andhence count as examples of ‘Antimachiavellism’, in Germany were receivedindependently and separately from that context, such as the works of Justus Lipsiusand the Tacitists, or even emerged independently, like the catholic Staatslehre ofAdam Contzen (1571–1635).

The way the Germans read Machiavelli also ought to be understood in the contextof their sluggish response to reason of state: while his Il Principe was more or lessconsistently cited as a negative reference point in the ‘reason of state’ controversy,the general absorbtion of his thought (which included his thoughts on republics) hadtoo much of an Aristotelian flavour to have any special impact. The reading ofMachiavelli in Germany thus failed to generate any kind of republicanism. At bestone can say that the Protestants read him not as an anti-Christian, but as an anti-papal heretic writer. Despite the growing polarisation within mid-17th century

4 Christoph Besold, Principium et finis politicae doctrinae (Strassburg 1624), 1.2 note 5; Heinrich Julius

Scheuerl, Dissertationum Politicarum Decas (Leipzig 1628), p. 68: ‘Politica christiana non differt a reliquis’.5 Knut Forssmann, Baltasar Gracian und die deutsche Literatur zwischen Barock und Aufkl .arung, Diss.

phil. (Mainz, 1977), pp. 145 ff.: D. C. von Lohenstein’s 1672 translation of his ‘Politico’ had no impact; his

influence can be dated from the French translation of N. Amelot de la Houssaye (1684). This begun with

Christian Thomasius’ lectures at the University of Leipzig in 1687–1688 ‘ .uber des Gratian Grund-Reguln,

vern .unftig, klug und artig zu leben’ [On Gratian’s maxims concerning an enlightened, prudent and

decorous way of life], which were based on J. L. Sauter’s (1687) German translation of Amelot’s French

version. The debate on ‘political prudence’ (Weltklugheit) was well on its way before Gracian had any

impact in Germany. Similarly, most scholars overestimate the influence of the doctrine of ‘vita aulica’. In

German politica tended to distinguish between ‘court’ and ‘ruling’ (Regiment), although the term ‘court’

had often been used to mean both. See also footnote 29.


political theory of the Empire between ‘Machiavellianism’ as the ‘right’, and‘Monarchomachism’ as the ‘left’ deviation from the generally accepted norms ofruling in a princely state6, there was a residual, though nonetheless tangible,awareness that a distinction had to be made between ‘Machiavellism’ andMachiavelli’s own views. This distinction was reflected in the oft repeatedinterpretation of Il Principe as a satire.7 Frequently Machiavelli was not evenregarded as the ‘source’ of ‘Machiavellism’: after all Aristotle, Xenophon, andTacitus had all presented more extensive accounts of tyrannical practice before him.Because Machiavelli’s ‘mirror-for-tyrants’ was classified as an exercise in patholo-gical diagnosis, as administering a ‘poison’, it could be neutralised as such. Hiswritings were not prohibited in Protestant territories and a number of professorseven put them on the list of recommended reading for their university courses inpolitics.

Soon after the publication of Clapmar’s treatise there were signs that otherGerman scholars also began to deal with the issues of arcana imperii and ‘reason ofstate’, although the bulk of the literature only appeared during the period betweenthe end of the 30-Years War and the 1680s.8 Then the various problems connected tothe notion of reason of state were taken up in earnestness within all contemporarydiscourses of politics; the literature produced was truly immense. In this period (andeven later) ‘reason of state’ became a favourite topic for dissertations and lectures atProtestant universities in the Empire. Arcana and reason of state were also discussedin the pamphlet and periodical literature, and not just as a part of the opposition tothe policies of Louis XIV, but in the controversy between Protestants and Catholicsabout the Peace of Westphalia and the English civil war. In these debates a set of newterms came into widespread use, such as Statista and ‘interests’, and, subsequently,these concepts were developed further as independent entities.

6 See H. Dreitzel, Monarchiebegriffe in der F .urstengesellschaft (K .oln-Weimar-Wien, 1991), vol. 1, pp.

253–266; and the contemporary judgment of Jacob Thomasius, De Machiavellistas et Monarchomachos

(1662), in Dissertationes LXIII varii argumenti, ed. Christian Thomasius (Halle, 1693), pp. 300–310;

Johann Friedrich Engelmann, De Machiavellistorum et Monarchomachorum dogmatis (Leipzig, 1674);

Johann Jakob Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae, vol. 4, 2 (Leipzig, 1744), pp. 784–803. The negative

interpretation of the term ‘politicus’, following the similarly pejorative French use of the word ‘politique’,

emerged still earlier: ‘Politicus omnis est atheos, et politica est peritia pro utilitate reipublicae Deum

religionumque omnem aspernandi’ (H. Conring, De civili prudentia liber unus (Helmstedt, 1672), c. 2). The

politica of the Catholics used the term ‘pseudo-politicus’, see Henricus Wangnereck, S. J., Vindiciae

politicae adversus pseudopoliticos, qui, Gaspare Scioppio in Paedia Politices suppetias pseudologicas ferente,

finem et media verae politices corrumpunt Dillingen, 1636); in Bk. 2 he argues that the ‘pseudopoliticorum et

Machiavelli in primis praecepta a vera Politica aliena esse’. This notion was used in Protestant versions of

‘politica christiana’ too.7 See footnote 32.8 For an overview of the literature see M. Stolleis, Staat und Staatsr .ason in der fr .uhen Neuzeit. Studien

zur Geschichte des .offentlichen Rechts (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), p. 153 ff., and also his Geschichte des

.offentlichen Rechts in Deutschland, vol. 1 (Munich, 1988), pp. 200–212. A significant part of the important

ideas on reason of state were not published in dedicated monographs with the telling key-words in the title,

but in the relevant chapters of more broadly framed treatises.


2. The variety of reactions to reason of state and their significance

What were the specific political languages which made up the context of the entryof the category of ‘reason of state’ into German debates? This very question hadalready excited 17th century political theorists, and, predictably, it led them to quitedifferent conclusions. Ratio status, like all terms which at one time or anotherbecame fashionable in political language, acquired a number of different meanings.Each tract or chapter with ‘de ratione status’ in its title contained a list of the possibledefinitions and critical evaluations. The term did not have a clear and well-developedtheoretical content (tied to a definite theory of the state or politics). Rather it wasunderstood as a gesture towards acknowledging the presence of a cluster oftroublesome questions. It was a provocative notion, presenting a challenge to allexisting political theories. Only when embedded in one or another version of thecompeting political theories of the age, could ‘reason of state’ acquire a distinctivecharacter.9 Sometimes it was simply referred to as a set of ‘negative’ techniques of a‘machiavellian’ kind (the art of despotical and tyrannical princes10), or it could standfor the art of governing in general.11 It could be limited to practices in casu

9 H. Conring, Dissertatio de ratione status (1651), n. 10: ‘Quod alius vulgo dicitur, quot capita tot

sententiae, id optimo jure dicere possumus de iis, qui rationis status definitionem tradere conati sunt’. In the

secondary literature the opposite position is the dominant one. See M. Behnen, ‘Arcana-Haec sunt Ratio

Status’, Zeitschrift f .ur Historische Forschung 14 (1987), 130: ‘Without wanting to present an over-

generalised picture, it seems that the intention of most authors who wrote on reason of state can be

summarised as follows. They wanted to introduce and establish a useful concept for the legitimation of

existing political or religious arrangement, in order to justify the political protection of the particular

interests of persons, dynasties or states. No author considered ‘reason of state’ to be more than a

subsection of political theory. It was not thought of as the general legitimation of politics, but primarily as

a theory of a particular class of actions.10 For example: Dietrich Reinkingk, Biblische Policey, das ist: gewisse, auß Heiliger G .ottlicher Schrift

zusammengebrachte auff die drey Hauptst .ande: als Geistlichen, Weltlichen und H .aßulichen gerichtete

Axiomata oder Schlußureden (Frankfurt a.M., 1653), l. 2 ax. 36–40: ‘Sweet justice competes strongly with

its naughty, nasty step-sister, called ratio status or one’s desire to enlarge one’s empire or state by any

means whatsoever (per fas vel nefas)’. Reinking contrasts this with ‘justa et vera ratio status’ which

describes the art of governing in general. ‘If reason of state is accompanied by law, truth and justice, it is

nothing else but the cautious, prudent and reasonable reflection of rulers (Regenten) of a state or

commonwealth (gemeinen Wesens) on the means of preserving and improving both, with the help of God,

by right and proper means, to place them on a more stable footing and to preserve their true nature, to

develop them and make them flourish and at the same time to forestall threatening circumstances through

timely and reasonable advice and avert future threats and danger’ (p. 67). As an important representative

of Lutheran politica Reinkingk tried to re-establish the Drei-St .ande-Lehre as a sort of Christian realism

which must not be mistaken for pious other worldliness. He put together a catalogue of prudential

principles for the preservation of authority (n. 40 ff.) and for the securing the obedience of subjects (n. 104

ff.). He advocated the disarming of subjects and the prohibition of religious innovation. He appeared to

identify the state with the normal conditions of the mixed constitution of estates.11 For example: Wilhelm Ferdinand ab Efferen, Manuale Politicum de ratione status seu Idolo Principum:

in quo vera et falsa forma gubernandi rem publicam de religione, de virtutibus principum, de potestate

ecclesiastica, de bello et pace compendiose agitur (Frankfurt a.M. 1662) l. 1 p. 1: ‘Quid sit ratio status? Est

prudentia gubernandi, augendi et conservandi rempublicam’. This Catholic doctrine of governance followed

in the footsteps of Adam Contzen’s scholastic Aristotelian position, as presented in his Politicorum libri

decem (Mainz, 1620).


necessitatis12, or seen as a general guideline13 for prudential behaviour at all levels ofpolitical practice. ‘Reason of state’ sometimes referred to ‘secret’ or exceptionalmeasures which deviated from ordinary laws and general ethical norms, butsometimes the opposite was the case, when it was seen as the core idea of politics assuch.14 From yet another perspective it was either used to signify the particularpolitical prudence of individual states,15 or, in contrast to this, as the principleunderlying any political action in general.16 The magnetic attraction of the term wasso strong that a whole range of problems, which had been endlessly discussed inpolitical theory at least since the medieval receptions of Aristotle and Roman law,were now speedily subsumed under ratio status (or at least often discussed in this newcontext), such as the issue of exceptional norms that applied in grave necessity, thepriority of the bonum commune (principles of political conduct that could overridethe bonum privatum), or generally, the relative autonomy of ‘political prudence’(regnativa sive civilis prudentia), the determination of the interests of particularstates according to their social-economical and geographical conditions and theirspecific constitutional tradition17, and even the time-honoured questions about the

12 See footnote 2.13 For example Christian Weirach, Della Ratione di Stato, das ist, von der geheimen und ungemeinen

Regierungsklugheit in X Discurse verfaßute Abhandlung (Leipzig, 1673), d. 5: Ratio status was here defined

as a kind of ‘irregular governmental prudence’ required by necessity, place and time; Johann Elias Kessler,

Detectus ac a Fuco Politico repurgatus rationis status (N .urnberg 1678): ‘extraordinary bylaws

(extraordinaire Neben- und Bey-Observantz), to preserve or improve the ruling order (Regiment) with

all means available at the time’ (p. 17); T. D. a. Winsheim, Princeps absolutus cum aliis variarum rerum

aulicarum, forensium, militarium observationibus politicis (Frankfurt a.M., 1693), p. 65: ‘Prudentia

senatoria, rempublicam atque etiam majestatis subjectum extraordinariis ac praesertim occultis consiliis sive

rationibus contra malevolos defendendi et conservandi. ‘Weirach and Keßler show that the concept of

‘reason of state’ was integrated into the Protestant doctrine of governing which guided even the medium

and small sized German states of the time; their political theory was similar to the doctrines of V. L. von

Seckendorff’s Teutschem F .urstenstaat (1658). See H. Wessel, Zweckm .aßuigkeit als Handlungsprinzip in der

deutschen Regierungs- und Verwaltungslehre der fr .uhen Neuzeit (Berlin, 1978), pp. 46–150, especially

pp. 126–134 (about J. E. Keßler).14 See Hippolithus a Lapide [Bogislav Chemnitz], Dissertatio de Ratione Status in Imperio nostro

Romano-Germanico, s. l. 1640, Proleg. p. 3: ‘Nos ergo ratio status populariter describimus, quod sit certus

quidam politicus respectus, ad quem tamque ad norman seu cynosuram aliquam omnia consilia omnesque

actiones in republica diriguntur, ut eo felicius et expeditius summum finem, qui est salus et incrementum

reipublicae, consequatur’ [Thus we will describe ratio status according to the popular understanding,

insofar as it should be a certain kind of politics in which all the counsels and actions in the republic are

directed as far as some norm or cynosure, so that by this, the greatest end, which is the safety and

prosperity of the republic,might be achieved more felicitously and expeditiously].15 For an example of reason of state as ‘politica specialis’ see for example the treatise of the Duc de

Rohan, De ratione status principum et statuum orbis christiani (1640).16 H. Conring, Dissertatio de ratione status (1651), in Opera omnia (Braunschweig, 1730), vol. 4,

pp. 549–580, and especially n. 13–41 (pp. 554–570) argues that the ratio status generalis was one ‘quae

uniuscuiusque rerumpublicarum status vel plurium conservationem intendit seu agit, ut respublica omnimode

sarta tectaque a periculo corruptionis conservetur’ [which aimed at the preservation of the state of each and

every republic or of many republics; or it acted so that the republic might be preserved intact, by any

means, from the danger of corruption].17 For contemporary understandings of the concept of the state see H. Dreitzel, ‘Aristoteles’ Politik im

Denken Hermann Conrings’ in F. Fangiani and G. Valera (eds.), Categorie del Reale e Storiografia.


preconditions for preserving the stability of a community (which had alwaysincluded questions related to the role of piety and religion, as well as of ‘justice’ andthe sufficiency of the existing economic foundations, and also the various strategieswhich have to be implemented in order to prevent or contain ‘revolutions’). Modernhistorians have often argued that these concerns were discovered only when theconcept of ‘reason of state’ had arrived on the European scene. Whereas, in fact,these notions had been there already for quite a long time and what really happenedin the late-16th and early 17th centuries was simply a refocusing on and crystallisingof a broad range of ideas around a newly emerged and highly fashionable catchword.

Thus the term ‘reason of state’ brought under its umbrella a great variety ofdifferent problems and concepts, from which contemporary theorists could extractspecific categories as they wished. The opposite practice was also present. Problemsclearly relevant to ‘reason of state’ were often theorised without bothering tomention the term. In the 17th century problems of reason of state were closely linkedto various theories of ‘preserving the state’. Nonetheless, this clearly paramount issuewas frequently discussed without the term ‘reason of state’ having been actuallydeployed in the text (and sometimes the phrase was avoided quite deliberately).18

(footnote continued)

Aspetti di Continuitae Trasformazione nell’Europa Moderna (Milan, 1986), pp. 45–51; A. Seifert, ‘Conring

und die Begr .undung der Staatenkunde’, in M. Stolleis (ed.), H. Conring (1606–1681). Beitr .age zu Leben

und Werk (Berlin, 1983), pp. 201–215; R. Zehrfeld, H. Conrings Staatenkunde (Berlin-Leipzig, 1926).18 For example: Johannes Althusius discussed the problem of ‘domestic’ reason of state under the title

‘De studio concordiae conservandae’ (Politica methodice digesta, 3rd ed. (Herborn, 1614), Ch. 31).

Throughout the book he used Gregoire of Toulouse and Jean Bodin as his authorities, as well as Scipione

Amirato (Discorsi, n. 10, 15, 16, 17, 25, 70, 75, 78), Botero (n. 28, 30, 32), Lipsius (n. 23, 56, 62), Danaeus

(n. 18, 22, 60), and sometimes Clapmar (n. 33) and Gentillet (Antimachiavell; n. 16). His historical

examples were overwhelmingly from the Old Testament, and in addition he also referred to Tacitus (n. 25,

n. 42), Sallust (n. 41), Xenophon (De republica Athenensium, n. 77) and Valerius Maximus (n. 10, 25, 42).

Althusius avoided the terms ‘arcana’ and ‘ratio status’. The measures which he advocated for the domestic

preservation of the regime were, among others, to make the subjects powerless and unarmed, to distract

from politics by making them preoccupied with the economy, to soften them by education and the ‘studia

liberalia, to redirect the energies of ambitious youth by giving them special tasks to perform, to tax and

burden the subjects to a degree that they could not enrich themselves, to prohibit gatherings, to provoke

feuds among the citizens through employing agent provocateurs, to initiate wars for making the idle busy,

etc. In foreign policy he advocated preventive wars against those neighbouring states whose power could

become threatening. Adam Contzen, S. J., Politicorum libri decem (Mainz, 1620), considered heresy as a

serious threat to the state (2.14); his elaborate programme for the persecution of heresy must therefore also

be considered as an instance of reason of state (2.17). His programme included the acceptance of tolerance

as a tactical device, the skilful exploitation and indeed support of feuds among Protestants, the persecution

of religious leaders while offering protection to simple believers, etc. ‘Nam quod in divinam religionem

committitur, in omnia fertur injuriam, quod omnibus nocet, reipublicae periculo nocet, ideoque a

republica repelli debet’ [As far as what is undertaken in divine religion, that considered an injury in all

things, that which hurts all, dangerously harms the republic, and likewise it should be repelled by the

republic](n. 12). Dietrich Reinkingk in his Biblischen Policey (see note 9) advocated precisely the opposite

policy; for him toleration was acting on the demands of ‘reason of state’, although he did not actually use

the term: ‘When the regime is in upheveal, when weeds take deep root and cannot be eradicated without

greatly disturbing and changing the entire spritual and temporal order (Standes und Regiments), it is then

that a reasonable authority should consider following Christ’s teaching: let the weed grow with the wheat,

at least until the time of the harvest, for it is better to tolerate the weed than to destroy the pure wheat with


3. The fundamental problem of ratio status

The gist and historical novelty of ‘reason of state’ becomes much clearer once oneturns one’s mind towards the moral dilemmas associated with ratio status and‘Machiavellianism’. In this context the term status did not originally signify a ‘state’in the modern sense at all (as in the definition of the 20th century Weimar juristHermann Heller: ‘the autonomous, and legally grounded, organisation of thecommon life of a territorially defined community’). The difficulty of identifyingstatus with respublica was reflected in Johannes Limnaeus’ unavailing attempt in hisNotitia Galliae (1654).19 The identification of status, ‘state’, with respublica only


it (Bk. 1, p. 34). Even the right of resistance could be understood as an instrument for preserving the state:

‘Quid si princeps totam rempublicam eversam velit? Defensionem esse licitam; eversio enim sub jure imperii

non comprehenditur; ita tamen defensio instituenda, ut vis avertatur, non inferatur’ [But if the prince should

wish the entire republic subverted? Defence is allowed; for destruction is not included under the ius imperii;

thus indeed a defence should be established so that power might be turned aside, not brought forward].

(Johann Christoph Becmann, Conspectus Doctrinae Politicae (Frankfurt a.O., 1691), Ch. 23). In

Aristotelian political theory the problem of preserving the state was discussed under the heading ‘de

mutatione rerumpublicarum’ and as part of the concept of ‘remedia’, see for example the widely used

textbook of Balthasar Cellarius, Politicae succinetae, ex Aristotele potissimum erutae ... libri II (Jena, 1653),

6th ed. (Jena, 1661), ‘De rerum publicarum corruptione seu mutatione et conservatione’, pp. 321–334. Samuel

Pufendorf developed his own ‘reason of state’ interpretation as a ‘via media’ between the idea that men,

like gladiators, were constantly involved in fights for life and death, and utopian visions, see his De statu

naturali, n. 18–24 in Politica inculpata (Lund, 1679), Diss. 10; he also avoided the terms ‘reason of state’

and arcana, but did not shirk from advocating the disarming of citizens, the disempowerment of ‘potentes’,

forbidding the formation of parties and proscribing any innovation, using trade policy to disadvantage

other states and cancelling treaties according to changes in the political situation.19 Johannes Limnaeus, Notitia regni Franciae (Strasbourg, 1654), l. 1 c. 9: ‘Status pro substantia et

corpere reipublicae vel universitatis’; ‘non impendit rempublicum statum dicere, quando stat, licet aliquando

esse vel stare desinere possit’, ‘forma regiminis forma status est, et ab haec forma status nomen qualitatis

trahit. Sic ubi monarchica administratio status vel reipublicae est, status vel respublica monarchia dicitur: ex

haec enim qualis sit cogniscitur’ [The state, in view of the substance and body of the republic or whole

community; it doesn’t pay to call the republic a state (thing established) when it is in existence, although at

any time it can exist or cease to be’’, ‘‘the form of government is the form of the state, and from this form

the name of state derives it’s nature. Thus where there is monarchical administration of the state or of the

republic, it is called either a state or a republican monarchy: from this, indeed, it may know what sort of

thing it is]. While Limnaeus used the term ‘status’ to describe the political community, H. Conring used it

to refer to the political system: ‘Breviter nos rationem status utilitatem reipublicae definimus ...

Distinguendum putamus inter utilitatem reipublicae et publicam civium salutem et commodum ... Respublica

in genere est civitatis ordo, cum in aliis magistratibus, tum in eo maxime, qui omnium est princeps ... Cum

autem respublica et administratio publica Idem valent, et administratio sit principis: hinc sequitur principatum

esse penes vel unum vel paucos vel multus’ [We will define reason of state briefly, as the utility of the

republic. We think there ought to be a distinction made between utilty of the republic and the public safety

and advantage of the citizens. . . The republic is a kind of ordering of the polity, both in some magistracies,

and also in that especially, who is the prince of all ... When, morevoer, the republic and the public

administration are the same and the admisintration belongs to the prince; hence it follows that the

principate belongs to either the one the few or the many]. (De ratione status, n. 10 u. 12). Thus for Conring

ratio status means the rules for the preservation of the system of governance, or the political system in

general, including the form of government. He argued that reason of state was bad if it was deployed in the

interest of a corrupt form of government (n. 44). On the other hand the ‘common thing’ (respublica) was


emerged, and even then quite tentatively, towards the end of the 17th century. AsChristian Weise wrote in 1690: ‘State-otherwise called a republic or a common-wealth, signifies a large society in which there are rulers and subjects’. The evolutionof the new meaning of status was linked to the birth of a new German terminologyfor politica in general; the Latin terminology had shown virtually no development atall, and in Latin usage the meaning of status remained much less close to themeaning of respublica. The meaning of status was understood as a derivation ofstare, that is of ‘standing’: accordingly status was that which had to be preserved, i.e.the current situation. In this sense status stood in contrast to actio and mutatio.20 Inpolitical discussions it was deployed to refer to three things: to the ‘power’ of theruler (Herrschaft, dominatio, dominium), to the political system or constitution of thecommonwealth (forma regiminis), and to the ‘legal and social status of a person’(the way that is still common today in the English language).

Every one of these interpretations shares a common preoccupation with ‘duration,constancy, and essential forms of existence’ and with ‘usefulness to the subject inquestion’: ‘Status namque est convenientia propria cuiuslibet rei ac rationes status

media sunt, quae hancce convenientiam sartam tectamque servent’.21 Ratio status

accordingly stands for the ways and means necessary to preserve ‘duration,constancy, and essential forms of existence’. The term is characteristically linked tothe notion that there is a threat to preservation and existence; hence its obviousconnection to the traditional idea of necessitas. It was also linked to notions of‘improvement, aggrandizement, strengthening’ and towards the end of the century itfinally became associated with perfectio. The primary aim of action was conservatio

status, with utility as the criterion of success: ‘Utile autem est, quod conservat

reipublicae’. Because of the close ties between utile and conservatio status, ‘reason ofstate’ and ‘expediency’ became virtually synonymous with the preservation andimprovement of life, including the goal of maintaining or raising the standard ofliving of particular individuals or groups. As a consequence there was a tendency to


often identified with the ruler and his status (see note 21). For this conceptual change see P.-L. Weinacht,

Staat. Studien zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes von den Anf .angen bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin,

1968).20 H. Conring, De ratione status, n. 5: ‘Vox status vulgariter ... sumitur non tantum pro conditione

privatorum, sed et per illum presens reipublicae fortunae, conditio et constitutio saepius exprimitur, et status

vocabulo omnia ea indigantur, sine quibus respublica consistere nequit. Huc spectat etiam, quando dicimus

statum alium esse ecclesiasticum, alium secularem, alium oeconomicum’ [The expression of state, commonly

called, is taken up, not only on account of the condition of private persons, but also the present condition

and constitution of the republic’s fortunes are often expressed by that, and all these things are indicated by

the word state, the things without which the repulic could not exist. So far it seems, even, when we say

state, that some are ecclesatical, some secular, and some economic].21 Chr. Besold, Politica doctrina, 6th ed. (Amsterdam, 1648), l. 1 c. 1 n. 39; J. Chr. Becmann,

Meditationes politicae, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt a.O., 1674), d. 3 ‘De ratione status’: ‘Status est consistentia et

stabilimentum rerum’ (p. 39); ‘Status vere est, per quem res est et conservatur’ (p. 42); ‘ratio status est

conformitatem cum statu singulorum’ (ibid.).


make preservation (conservatio) the leading (if not the sole) principle of thefoundations of morality.22

Apart from the rise of a ‘reason of constitution’ which was above all concernedwith the search for methods to preserve the existing constitution of the Empire,the status in ‘reason of state’ developed a further characteristic, namely anassociation with the interests of individuals. This development had three importantimplications:

(A) There was a general tendency when invoking the term ‘reason of state’ toprioritise the problem of preserving the ruler’s power over all other political tasks. Inthe context of Aristotelian politica this was easily justified, at least in part, as aprecondition for preserving the ‘ordo inter parentes et imperantes’ (the Aristoteliansdefinition of a ‘respublica in sensu strictu’). G. Scoppius, a radical proponent ofreason of state theories, asked the following question:

‘quicquid ergo in politica praecipitur, nisi vim habeat efficiendum finem eius, qui est

status conservatio?’ [What, therefore, is commanded in politics, except that itshould effect that end, which is the conservation of the state?]

22 In ancient ethics self-preservation was the generally accepted starting point, but as a very

underdetermined principle insufficient for providing ethics with an overall shape; in Stoic teaching self-

preservation was man’s ‘first nature’, in common with other animals: ‘Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi

probatur simulatque, natum sit animal—huic enim est ordiendum—ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se

conversandum et suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu

iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur offere’ [It is agreed upon by those, he said, whose thinking is

manifestly deceitful in my view, that man is born an animal—at this point indeed, discussion should

begin—this very animal is made happy in himself and entrusted to himself and ought to return to his state

and those things, which conserve his state should be esteemed, he is separted moreover from destruction

and from those things, which seem to offer destruction]. (Cicero, De finibus, Bk.3 n.16; see also Bk. 4 n.16

(‘ars vivendi, ut tueatur quod a natura datum sit’), Bk.5 n.24). The first philosopher who took individual

self-preservation as the first principle of human nature was, I believe, Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588): For

the preservation of world order and the sustaining of the eternal fight between heat and cold God made it

the task of all things to preserve themselves and he also gave them the strengh for it (‘quae agandi

operandique facultates entibus eorumque naturis inditae et munera demandata sunt, propterea illae inditae et

demandata haec sunt, ut juxta illas agentes operantesque et haec obeuntes, seipsas et quae ab illis constituta

sunt entia, conservent ...’; [Which faculties of acting and working are placed in beings and their natures and

given as gifts, for that reason these are placed and those given, so that men might preserve themselves and

whatever entities are constituted by them, (though) nearby those are acting and working and these are

dying]. (De rerum natura libri IX (Naples, 1586), l. 2 n. 12, p. 57); also, the function of the spirit (l. 9 n. 2)

was to fight ‘corruptio’ and to ensure ‘conservatio’. All virtues were special articulations of self-

preservation; the chief task of the God given ‘soul’ was to supply internal knowledge of the deity. Society

among men was created for improving their chances for self-preservation. In Germany this kind of

reductionist moral philosophy was popular mostly in the Protestant territories, for an early example see

Ludwig Crocius, Politica Germanorum virtus et libertas (Bremen. 1618): ‘Ex eo enim, quod res omnes sui

conservationem tamquam summum bonum quaerunt, et destructionem, ut summum malum, adversantur, bona

et mala habent, quod sunt bona et mala ... Omnia igitur sua natura bona sunt, sed homini tantum id, quod eum

conservat, bonum est’ [From this indeed, because all things seek their preservation as the highest good, and

avoid their destruction as the worst evil, they consider things good and evil, because they are good and evil

... All things are good therefore according to their nature, but to man only that which preserves him is

good]. However, Protestant authors integrated the idea of an ‘eternal soul’ into the concept of

preservation. For other authors see footnote 1 (particularly J.E. Schweling), 26 and 28. The works of B.

Telesio which were first printed only in Venice, Rome and Naples, were also published in Geneva in 1588.


To which the eminent Aristotelian Conring replied:

‘Nec finis unicus politici est status conservatio, sed felicitas civilis societatis, qua

revera absolvitur exercitatione virtutis cum rerum sufficienta conjuncta’ [Nor is theonly end of politics the conservation of the state, but the felicity of civil society, inwhich respect the end of politics is in fact discharged by the exercise of virtue,joined with a sufficiency of things].23

The reduction of princely ‘politics’ to ‘reason of state’ (aimed not only againsttheir subjects but also against their rivals in the higher nobility) quickly earned thetitles of ‘Machiavellism’ and ‘despotism’. According to Aristotelian doctrine,despotism signified a regime where rule was exercised primarily in the interest ofthe ruler, and only secondarily for the benefit of his subjects. The critique levelledagainst libido dominandi and this new politics of ‘reason of state’ was more than mereimpractical moralising. ‘Reason of state’ had indeed implied a serious threat to theidea of reasonable politics as understood in the 17th century. Both in politicalphilosophy and in the art of government, the reduction of politics to ‘reason of state’implied a very severe contraction in the justifiable goals of the state. Justus Lipsius,just to take one example, had reduced the goals of the state to those of preservation,justice, and the protection of the Church. This move was first and foremost criticisedby the Aristotelians (who clung to the idea of the bene et beate vivere), and by theupholders of the politica christiana (who believed in a gute Policey). When it wasperceived that the higher goals of the political community, such as religion, etc., werein the danger of becoming mere instruments to the preservation of the political state,the critique grew even sharper.24

(B) The definition of politics as the use of power or ruling (dominatio) became partof a large set of similar conceptions. It could be easily distinguished from themonarchomach’s idea of politics which was grounded in the Roman law idea ofuniversitas, from the polis (civitas) model of the Aristotelians, and from the conceptof the magistratus put forward by the older, mainly Ciceronian, humanists. Rather,its orientation was towards the social reality of the patriarchal society of landowners,for example in the Lutheran derivation of obedience to authority from the fourthcommandment of the Decalogue, or in the Catholic analogy between princely powerand God’s direct authorisation of the ‘spiritual power’ of the Church (andparticularly that of the Popes). This tendency was expressed in the term majestas

introduced by Lipsius to summarise the supernatural charisma of the rulerunderlying his ability to preserve the state. The various theories of divine right(which can only be mentioned briefly here) were also concerned with the office andthe rights of princes, and with the personal qualities of the ruler or the royal dynasty.For the Lutherans, the theory of divine right was connected to the sacred origins ofpatriarchy, authority, and of moral theology. Another way to express the same view

23 Gaspar Scioppius, Paedia Politices (Helmstedt, 1663), p. 7; P. 9: ‘Cum enim Politica in tradendis iis tota

occupetur, quae utilia sunt condendo et conservando imperio aut statu publico’. H. Conring, Opera omnia

(1730), vol. 3, p. 52 u.24 See Daniel Clasen, De religone politica (Magdeburg, 1655).


of politics—and this was not confined exclusively to the Catholic part of theEmpire—was to represent the hierarchy of power as the reflection in the social worldof the hierarchy in nature: ‘Ordines enim dignitatum Deus ipse constituit, non modo in

hunc mundo, verum etiam in hierarchiis coelestibus’ [God himself established thedegrees of dignity, not only in this world, but truly even in the celestial hierarchies].

The Silesian jurist Christian Gastel in his De statu publico Europae novissimo

tractatus (1675) presumed a connection between the concept of a divine hierarchy ofpower and the technical doctrines of political self-preservation and aggrandisement.He described in detail all the European holders of power (starting with the Pope andthe Emperor, continuing with the various kings, and finally down to city councilsand the doctors of law), connecting all of them to a ‘mirror-for-princes’-styledoctrine of reason of state, throughout using the idea that the earthly hierachy ofpower was a mere continuation of the celestial hierarchy. The model for his ‘mirror-of-rulers’ was Richelieu’s Political Testament. He introduced his translation ofRichelieu’s work as follows:

having been elected as the highest servant of my king, I wanted first and foremostto make him the most eminent of kings, wishing him to be the most Christian, themost powerful, the firstborn member of the Church. I wanted him to be the mostjust, so that he could give himself to the entire world and thus receive the entireworld. My first concern was the loftiness of royal majesty, the second the extent ofthe realm.25

Gastel’s work shows how quite modern conceptions, such as the preserving andexpanding versions of ‘reason of state’, ‘sovereignty’ and the ‘Stoic’ focus on princes,could be integrated into the traditional political outlook of the European nobility.Even the most ‘modern’ state of the times, France, was interpreted and upheld as anideal in this fashion.

(C) Following the common interpretation of status as ‘standing’, and continuingboth the the Roman law and scholastic doctrines concerning governing and the dutyof rulers, ‘reason of state’ doctrines had, from the beginning, serious implications forthe discussions of the principles governing the conduct of subjects and ‘private’individuals within society. This enlargement was reflected in Clapmar’s definition ofarcana: every science, every ‘conditio in rebus humanis’ had to have its own arcana;thus there were also ‘arcana privata, hoc est, intima consilia communis privataeque

vitae in luce hominum feliciter et decore instituendae’ [private mysteries, that is, theinnermost counsels of communal and private life which ought to be institutedfelicitously and decorously before the eyes of men]26, which differed from the secret

25 Christian Gastellus, De statu publico Europae novissimo tractatus (N .urnberg, 1675), Pt.1 Ch. 3: ‘De

ordine coelestium’, p. 28. In his ‘mirror-for-princes’ Gastel wrote: ‘And it is certain that of all the means

through which an empire or princely state can be preserved, there are two of particular significance; the

first is authority and the effective power of the prince, which rests on his army (Kriegsvolk) and on the

alliances he is party to, the other is the reputation and honour that he enjoys abroad’ (p. 21).26 A. Clapmarius, De arcanis rerumpublicarum, p. 14; in Bk.6 n.17 he deals with the ‘arcana quaedam

communis vitae’. The Jesuits developed a rich literature on the arcana; the arcana was a topic for the

philosophical schools (‘sects’) too.


arts of using power, preserving a dynasty, or commanding an army. In 1652 thephilosopher and jurist Johann Paul Felwinger (who taught in Altdorf) discussed thequestion of how a monarchy or principality might be preserved according to theseprinciples. Although his answer had a definite leaning towards absolutism, henonetheless concluded with the idea of an ‘arcana oboedientia et subitorum’, whichincluded advice on how the subjects might successfully resist princely tyranny.27

This was not the only kind of polemic which mattered. The controversyconcerning the legal interpretation of the term status was even more influential:

Statum hic nihil aliud est quam consistentia, constitutio, conditio et conservatio

imperii ... Sicut jus aut publicum aut privatum: ita et status sic dividi potest ...

Privatus status videtur dicendus, qui singulao tangit et per quem singulorum res stat,

et est qualitas et conditio hominis privati, ut hoc vel illo jure utatur vel non utatur

[State, here, is nothing else than the coming into being, the establishment, theagreement upon, and the conservation of power ... Just as law is either public orprivate; so also a state can be divided ...The private state seems to be called thatwhich pertains to individuals and through which the affairs of individuals areestablished, and also the property and condition of the private man, so that athing can be enjoyed or not, according to that law].28

The real subject matter of this particular polemic was the definition of subjectiverights and how they might be deployed for one’s own advantage. According to theBrandenburg jurist Gottfried von Jena, the range of such rights extended to liberty,the general rights of citizens, the rights associated with the family and the household,and the legal protection of ‘honour’. The mediating link between status privatus andstatus imperii was ‘dominium in se ipsum’, understood as personal liberty. In light ofthis, von Jena argued that ratio status too had to be divided into two, one thatlooked after the utility of the state and another ‘quae ad singulorum commodum

spectat, et quae privati callide et caute non sine fructu uti solent’ [which looks to thecomfort of individuals, and which private men are accustomed to use cleverly,

27 Johann Paul Felwinger, Institutionum politicarum libri duo (Frankfurt a.M., 1652), Bk.2. Ch.1: ‘De

monarchia sive principatus bene habendi et conservandi proximis rationibus et modis’; Ch.3: Arcana

obedientiae; Ch.8: Arcana subditorum (mainly against tyrants).-Felwinger comes close to having a

republican perspective; he puts political liberty at the forefront of his analysis of constitutional forms:

‘Libertas nihil aliud est quam potestas absoluta summa habens in semetipsa atque intra semetipsa plenum

perfectumque imperandi jus’ [Liberty is nothing else than the absolute highest power, having in itself and

within its limits the full and perfect right of commanding]; in a monarchy nobody but the monarch is free,

the liberty of the subjects is so limited that it hardly deserves the name of freedom in contrast to

democracy, whose institutions Felwinger (1616–1681) accurately and faithfully described. Nonetheless, in

his discussion of inequality among men, Felwinger came out in favour of aristocracy as the best form of

government (faithful to the ideals of Nuremberg, at whose university in Altdorf he taught).28 Godofredus de Jena, Fragmenta de ratione status diu desiderata, (n.p., 1667), p. 15. In the context of

‘status hominis’ Aquinas also brought up the notion of ‘ratio status’: ‘ergo videtur, quod sola obesedientia

divinorum sufficiat ad rationem status’ (Summa theologica, 2.2 qu. 183 a. 1); ‘ratio’ signified a determining

principle, a key characteristic. According to Aquinas ‘ratio status’ was connected to the (civil and spiritual)

freedom or unfreedom of man alone. In his doctrine of the forms of government he used the term ‘ratio

regiminis’ (see footnote 10): ‘‘ (ibid., 2.2 qu. 50 a. 1). One of its ‘privileges’ was the deliberate killing of men

(ibid., qu. 64 a. 7).


carefully, and not without some benefit].29 In this way, reason of state became thestarting point of an individualistic and utility orientated moral theory. As von Jenaexplained:

Whatever men have done in the past, whatever they do at present, and whateverthey might do in future, whatever they have failed to do, and whatever they willfail to do, it had been and always will be done for either private or public reasonof state.30

Even Christian piety and ethics could be defined in this fashion as expressions ofreason of state. The preservation of the standing of a man as a Christian required onhis part a determined quest for salvation and a willingness to defend the Church. Theprotestant philosopher and historian Johann Christian Becman (1641–1717), whotaught at the university of Frankfurt an der Oder, developed this notion into asubjective ethics of utility and into a systematic theory of natural law and society.His social and political thought combined instrumental rationalism and utilitarianreason of state with the only active reception of Hobbes’ political theory in 17thcentury Germany. He broke away from both Aristotle and the transformation ofAristotelian ideas into the natural rights theory of Grotius and Pufendorf.31 It was inhis sort of theory that the idea of a specific and concrete social universe as the properreference point first gained genuine importance. For Becman many norms whichwere traditionally regarded as universal were reduced to the level of purelyinstrumental devices, whose purpose was simply to reveal the various ways whereby

29 Ibid. p. 17. The author, a councellor and envoy of the ‘great’ Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of

Brandenburg to the Imperial Diet, combined the interest of the citizens with a strong absolutistic tendency

of emphasizing the good of the state: ‘Monarchae neque filios habet neque filias, neque fratres neque uxores,

neque similia. Interesse et ratio status omne est, quod habent, et praeter hac plane nihil habent’ [Monarchs

have neither sons nor daughters, neither brothers nor wives, nor anything like them. To be an interested

party and reason of state is everything, which they have, and moreover in this clearly they have nothing].

His discussion of reason of state was repeated verbatim by J. Chr. Becmann, Meditationes politicae, 2nd

ed. (Frankfurt a.M., 1674), Ch. 3.30 G. de Jena, Fragmenta, P. 17, and J. Chr. Becmann, Meditationes, Ch.3 n.4 (transl.).31 J. Chr. Becmann referred to Hobbes as the first thinker who genuinely derived political philosophy

from the principles of reason and social life (Politica Parallela (Frankfurt a.O., 1676), p. 5); he also

explicitly referred to reason of state writers (Machiavelli, A. Clapmarius, G. Naud!e, J. Th. Sprenger, C.

Lentz, G. von Jena) and to contemporary historical biograhies (Meditationes Politicae, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt

a.O., 1674), 1.1 n. 510). He dismissed the idea of natural sociability (socialitas), and with it also

Aristotelism in general. In his view all social relations evolve from the endeavour of forever needy men to

form a limited association with each other in order to overcome threats to their life and to satisfy their

particular wants. He emphasized especially the motivating force of ‘amor sui’, ‘propria commoda’, and

‘mutuus metus’ in this kind of sociability. Man’s natural state is a state of war, society was established by

contract and the mutual transfer of rights. This was the only source of obligation. The state was

established by the irrevocable transfer of liberty rights to (libertas est potestas in se) a real, sovereign and

autarchic body, whose competence, however, was limited to earthly matters and hence did not amount to a

complete extinction of the liberty of the subjects. He rejected the common Aristotelian distinction between

society (civitas) and state (respublica). For Becmann a universal duty of man towards others, purely

because they were fellow human beings, could only be established in the form of an inner religious

commitment.


a specific group might hope to come to agree on its common interest (thus naturallaws were only of use in so far as they were embodied in positive constitutional law).

However, this was just one of the constituent parts of the development that led to‘reason of state’ being identified with ‘politics’, and allied to prudence and utilitas.The other main component in the transformation of the meaning of ‘politics’emerged from reflections on the deeds of the politicus, who was generally perceivedas an associate of the prince or an administrator of his power. In the milieu oftraditional political society these unscrupulous, although usually skilfull, politicians,obviously guided by a quest for power and money, were judged even more negativelythan the despotic princes of Machiavelli.32 The idea of ‘private’ politics mainly(although not exclusively) referred to the behaviour patterns prevalent in the prince’scourt and in the conduct of state officials. Such positions offered the most importantopportunity for social and financial advancement in traditional society. This sort of‘reason of state’ generated the most severe kind of hostile criticism, since it stood instark contrast to all prevailing idioms of moral reflection, as much to the teaching oncardinal virtues and as to the various theories of legal and moral norms, especiallythe Christian ones. Nonetheless, the individualistic notion of reason of state becameintegrated into the Christian-Aristotelian education of future officials under therubric of ‘politica personalis or prudence, or how one should conduct oneself as amember of a respublica’ by the author and educational reformer, Christian Weise(1642–1708). His argument was characteristic of this tradition: ‘A large society can

32 From the beginning of the 17th century (Johannes Caselius, Propoliticus (Helmstedt, 1600))

Aristotelian political theorists increasingly criticised the extension of political prudence to the whole of

‘social life’ (for example, J. Althusius and Chr. Becmann) and to intellectual and cultural interaction on

the other (see Thomas Sagittarius, Disputationes politicae extraordinariae (Jena, 1605), Ch.2: De

conversatione privata, Ch.3: De conversatione publica; Martin Husanus, Politischer Weltmann oder gewisse

Anleitung, wie man nach jetziger Zeit .ublichen Stylo nicht allein in conversationem und zusammenk .unften,

sondern auch zu Hauß mit den seinigen und einem jeglichen, was Standes, Geschlechts und W .urde er auch sei,

sich zu verhalten habe (Cologne, 1643)) and prudential patterns of behaviour in general. See H. Dreitzel,

Absolutismus und st .andische Verfassung in Deutschland. Ein Beitrag zur Kontinuit .at und Diskontinuit .at der

politischen Theorie in der Fr .uhen Neuzeit (Mainz, 1992), pp. 10–15; and V. Sellin, ‘Politik’, in Geschichtliche

Grundbegriffe, vol. 4 (Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 814–836. See also Emilio Bonfatti, La ‘civil conversazione’ in

Germania. Letteratura de compertamento da Stefano Guazzi al Adolph Knigge 1574–1780 (Udine, 1979).

Before Gracian (see footnote 4) in Latin countries the most successful propagator of political prudence

was Hieronymus Cardanus, Arcana politica (Leiden, 1635) (also under the title Proxenata sive de prudentia

civilis liber singularis (Leiden, 1627); (Helmstedt, 1668); (Leipzig, 1673 and 1700). A polemical dispute

similar to the D. Reinking’s critique of ‘Machiavellism’ (see footnote 9) flared up after the publication of

the anonymous Breviarium politicorum secundum rubricas Mazarinicas, 1st ed. (Cologne, 1664), 4th ed.

(Cologne, 1691), and the satirical pamphlet of Pacificus a Lapide [Philipp Andreas Oldenburger], Homo

Politicus. Das ist: Consiliarius novus, Officiarius et Aulicus secundum hodiernam praxin (Cosmopoli 1661,

1665, 1668); as well as the long commentary thereon by Christoph Peller, Politicus sceleratus impugnatus.

Id est: Compendium novum sub schemata Hominis politici, 1st ed. (Nuremberg 1663), 5th ed. (Nuremberg,

1698); Anon., Rationis status anatomia. Heutiger verkehrter Estaats-Leute Natur, Censur und Cur: nach

dero Hertzen, Zungen, Augen, H .anden und Geb .arden entworfen (Nuremberg 1678). Independently of this

debate see also Christian Georg Bessel, Neuer politischer Gl .ucksschmied mit allerhand zum Hof- und

Weltleben dienenden und auf gegenw .artige Zeiten absonderlich gerichteten heilsamen und h .ochst n .otigen

Lehren (Frankfurt a.M., 1681). Bessel referred to Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (1605),

l.2.23.


hardly be conserved if its members fail to concern themselves with their ownconservation’.33

4. Reason of state and the transformation of aristotelianism into ‘eclectic’ philosophy

In order to understand the impact of ‘ratio status’ on political Aristotelianism34

one needs to consider its perceived power to clarify certain kinds of political and

33 Christian Weise, Politische Fragen, das ist: Gr .undliche Nachricht von der Politica (Dresden, 1708), p.

516. Even before that see Christoph Grimmelshausen, Simplicianischer Zweyk .opfiger Ratio Status

(Nuremberg, 1670; reprint T .ubingen, 1968), p. 9: ‘Denn gleich wie ein jedweder einzelner Mensch schuldig

ist, sein eigen Leib und Leben zu erhalten, so lang es ihm immer m .oglich ist, wessentwegen dann auch jeder

herzieht und das treibt, was er vermag; ebenso seynd auch jede Vorsteher und Regenten verbunden, nichts

zu unterlassen, was zur Erhaltung ihrer Person, ihres Staats und derer, die solchen Staat machen, gedeyen

mag. Die .Ubung solcher selbst Erhaltung ... wird von unserer heutigen Alamode-Welt Ratio Status

genannt ... Weil denn nun genugsam bekandt, daß kein Stand, kein Haus, je kein einiger vern .unftiger

Mensch ohne die Ratio Status sey oder ohn ihn bestehen k .onnte.’ ‘For as much as every individual has the

duty to preserve his own body and life, if at all possible, and as long he will be able to do whatever he

wants if circumstances permit; in the same way every magistrate and ruler is obliged not to refrain from

doing anything which can contribute to the preservation of his person, his state and of those who make up

such a state. It is nowadays fashionable to call the practice of such self-preservation ratio status, for it is

now commonly accepted that now, no house, not even a reasonable person can preserve himself without

ratio status’. Grimmelhausen also incorporated this ‘reason of status’ into Christian ethics.-For an account

of Chr. Weise and the so-called ‘political movement’, see the work of the literary scholars W. Barner,

Barockrhetorik. Untersuchungen zu ihren geschichtlichen Grundlagen (T .ubingen, 1970), pp. 135 ff. and

176–219; K. Forssmann, Baltasar Gracian und die deutsche Literatur zwischen Barock und Aufkl .arung,

Diss. phil. (Mainz, 1977 (with a critical summary of research; on Weise pp. 66–113); V. Sinemus, Poetik

und Rhetorik im fr .uhmodernen deutschen Staat. Sozialgeschichtliche Bedingungen des Normenwandels im 17.

Jahrhundert (G .ottingen, 1978), pp. 108–206; G. E. Grimm, Literatur und Gelehrtentum in Deutschland.

Untersuchungen zum Wandel ihres Verh .altnisses vom Humanismus bis zur Fr .uhaufkl .arung (T .ubingen, 1983),

pp. 314–346.34 This term is here exclusively applied to the ‘modernised’ Aristotelian methods of the later humanists.

It appeared in Italy, in the Netherlands (see E. H. Kossmann, Politicke Theorie in het zeventiende-eeuwse

Nederland, Amsterdam 1960, pp. 9–29) and in Germany (see H. Dreitzel, ‘Der Aristotelismus in der

politischen Philosophie Deutschlands im 17. Jahrhundert’, in: E. Keßler, Chr.H. Lohr und W. Sparn

(eds.), Aristotelismus und Renaissance. In memoriam Charles B. Schmitt (Wiesbaden, 1988), pp. 163–192;

Dreitzel, Protestantischer Aristotelismus und absoluter Staat. Die Politica des Henning Arnisaeus (ca. 1575–

1636) (Wiesbaden, 1970)), but only initially in the 16th century in France (Louis Le Roy) and in England

(John Case). In Spain and Portugal its development was stopped by the domination of the so-called

‘second scholastics’ and ‘antimachiavellian’ political theory. In the Catholic part of Germany its spread

was stopped by the Counter-Reformation university reforms initiated by the Jesuits, in its place they

tended to teach the Aristotelian doctrines of the Spanish scholastics. The development of Aristotelian

political theory was closely linked to the relative autonomy of universities as educational and research

institutions serving both the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The career of Aristotelian political theory was,

of course, greatly helped by the dominance of Aristotelian philosophy at Lutheran universities, see Walter

Sparn, Die Wiederkehr der Metaphysik. Die ontologische Frage in der lutherischen Theologie des fr .uhen 17.

Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 1796); Heikki Mikkeli, An Aristotelien Response to Renaissance Humanism. Jacopo

Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences (Helsinki, 1992); Peter Petersen, Geschichte der aristotelischen

Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1921).-To avoid any misunderstanding, it must be

emphasized that the ‘natural’ in the context of Aristotelian political thought does not refer to ‘naturally

determined’ or ‘instinctive’ processes (see Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium (1672), 7.1 n.2),


conceptual problems, especially the most modern ones. Its thoughtfully developedrelativism, for example in relation to the forms of constitution and hence the goals ofthe state, was an important cause for its success in the fragmented political system ofthe Empire and in the numerous neighbouring states of Eastern and NorthernEurope. A large number of university students from these countries (and also fromthe Northern Netherlands where political Aristotelianism was dominant in the firsttwo-thirds of the 17th century) had gone to study at German Protestant universities.The germs for a ‘reason of state’ doctrine had always been there in Aristotle’sPolitics, but the German Aristotelians made so much out of it that the republicanaspects of ancient political thought were almost completely lost. The results of thisbecame manifest in the reception and reworking of Bodin’s theory of sovereignty; inthe ensuing search for historical sources to develop German Staatsrecht (inopposition to the adherents of pure Roman law); in the acceptance of systema

civitatum as a meaningful constitutional form; in the idea of a new science whichcould also be applied to politica; in the analysis of contemporary states by using thecategories of Aristotelian natural science; in the reception of Lipsius’ doctrines ofpotentia and majestas, and finally in the beginnings of systematic reflection oneconomic policy. Thus the relevance of arcana imperii and ratio status were clearlyrecognised and their adaptation gathered pace, by Arnisaeus, Besold, Conring,Felwinger, Boecler, Praetorius, Clasen, Geilfuß, Christian Thomasius and Hertius. Ithelped that a few important Italian authors on reason of state, like Ludovico Settalaand Antonio Palazzo, were also Aristotelians. Furthermore, topics like the various‘threats’ to the state and coups (mutationes rerumpublicarum), as well as theirremedies, had been staples of Aristotelian politica for a long time. In this sense‘reason of state’ did not represent for Aristotelians such a dramatic theoreticalinnovation, and even less from the point of view of the empirical recognition of suchphenomena. This capacity for absorbing ‘reason of state’ ideas was also true inregard to Machiavelli, who was mostly regarded and accepted as a quite competentpolitical scientist. His Il Principe was acceptable as a realistic analysis of the politicsof a tyrant, but not of course as a true ‘mirror-for-princes’ piece with normativepretensions. Ratio status was often understood very differently: Felwinger’s Politica

drew a sharp contrast between princely absolutism and the arcana of the subjectswho pursue their own interests; Conring’s advice to the Danish king, who madehimself an absolute monarch via the lex regia (1665), focused on the benefits onecould expect from a partial restoration of the mixed constitution. The lawyer Johannvon Felde in his long chapters on reason of state advocated the realization of


but must be understood as an anthropological category analogous to the human capacity for speech: it

does not exclude the slow and ‘artificial’ historical process of the development of language, speaking and

rhetoric: ‘Porro si ars est, qui opus efficit permanens, possit existimari et politica ars esse, utpote quum

respublica non minus sit opus aliquod permanens atque sanitas humana, quam effici ab arte medica omnes

consentiunt’ [Moreover, if that is an art, which brings about a lasting achievement, then politics also can be

esteemed an art, since with a republic, the work is not any less lasting or healthy for man, than that which

all agree is brought about by the medical art] (H. Conring, De civili prudentia, in Opera omnia, vol. 3,

p. 334, n. 23).


Aristotelian principles of justice in an ideal republic of nobles. The perception thatamoral actions were unavoidabile in conditions of necessity did not hinder the rise ofreason of state doctrines: in its critique of the politica christiana (of all Christiandenominations), political Aristotelianism had never put the emphasis primarily onthe virtue of governors. In 1662, in his introduction to political science, Conring gavea long list of these ‘amoral’ actions demanded by necessity. And he added: ‘To sumup, I confess, no state can be founded and none preserved without such actions’. Onthe contrary, he continued: ‘It is not true, that they have to be regarded as unjust inevery context. Yes, it is my duty to emphasize that I judge it as a breach of the lawwhen they are not used as soon as the welfare of the public demands them.’35 Thedifference between Conring and Machiavelli was in their different conceptions ofwhat was conducive to the welfare of the people. Conring examined Machiavelli’sproposals in the light of this criterion, and concluded that many were false orinsufficient, while others were downright counterproductive.

Despite all this, the emergence of ‘reason of state’ as a major idiom of politicalthought contributed to the dissolution of political Aristotelianism in the last 30 yearsof the 17th century. The decay of Aristotelianism was caused by a number of factors.One was the growing importance of the natural sciences. A second reason was thetendency of Aristotelianism to hold on to late humanistic forms of teaching, whichthe nobility and the educated bourgeoisie, to whom the politica had been adressed,could not accept anymore. The third was the use of Greek texts and the reliance onthe writings of an authority from a quite distant historical epoch, whose ideas (aseven the Aristotelians themselves admitted) often contributed precious little to theunderstanding of important contemporary political problems.36

The Aristotelians could not deal adequately with the following three problems:(A) The Aristotelian politica failed to single out the problem of preserving the

ruler’s power for special analysis. It was capable of distinguishing analytically thesystem of political rule (the respublica) from the underlying stratum of societysupporting it (populus, civitas), but it persisted in putting a great emphasis on theirinterdependence. In spite of highlighting the functions of authority, it continued toemphasise the point that consensus was the most important device of politicalintegration. The ideas of Aristotelians on reason of state went way beyond seeing itas a technique for the preservation of power. They started from an analysis of thegeneral features of all political systems and the possible forms of government, and

35 De civili prudentia (Helmstedt, 1662), p. 19 (translation). For the clearest expression of Conring’s

views on Machiavelli see his Animadversiones politicae in Nicolai Machiavelli librum de principe (1661), in

Opera, vol. 2. pp. 973–1092. See also G. Proccaci, Studi sulla fortuna di Machiavelli (Rome, 1965);

M. Stolleis, ‘Machiavellismus und Staatsr.ason. Ein Beitrag zu Conrings politischem Denken’ in his Staat

und Staatsr .ason in der Neuzeit (Frankfurt a.M., 1990), pp. 73–105; H. Dreitzel, ‘H. Conring und die

politische Wissenschaft seiner Zeit’, in Stolleis (ed.), H. Conring (1606–1681). Beitr .age zu Leben und

Werk’, p. 165 ff.; for contemporary commentary see J. F. Buddeus, Compendium historiae philosophiae, ed.

J. G. Walch (Halle, 1731) Ch. 31, and J. J. Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae, vol. 4.4,2 (Leipzig,1744),

pp. 784–793.36 See first of all H. Conrads, ‘Tradition und Modernit.at im adligen Bildungsprogramm der Fr .uhen

Neuzeit’, in W. Schulze (ed.), St .andische Gesellschaft und soziale Mobilit .at (Munich, 1988), p. 389.


this was frequently not connected to a practical theory of ruler behaviour. Thefavourite constitutional model of the Aristotelians was the mixed constitution, therespublica mixta, and not the absolute monarchy. The mixed constitution cameunder attack by both theorists of the divine right of kings and Pufendorf. As the lastpolitical Aristotelian, J.H. Hertius, confessed, in an age where absolute monarchybecame the de facto constitutional standard, the defence of mixed sovereignty wasnot sustainable. It was for this reason that political Aristotelianism appeared sodistinctly old-fashioned in comparison with ‘reason of state’.

(B) The Aristotelians did not see a wide gap between justum and utile: for themjustum equalled the utilitas of the common good. They actually shared this idea withthe theorists of ‘reason of state’. Their own objections against reason of state, whichthus had to come exclusively from the inner terrain of their politica, became subjectto an equally harsh critique as the one levelled against Machiavellianism. Alongsidethe criticism directed against ‘false’ reason of state stood the equally damningcritique of Aristoteles atheus. The difference between justum and utile that the Stoicrenaissance, and especially Lipsius, had emphasized, proved to be a better platformin the search for normative, lawlike, immutable and irresistible rights as a guide forpolitical action, than did sticking to conceptions of utilitas, for which both theAristotelians and the representatives of unbridled ‘reason of state’ were heavilycriticised. The rights-theory direction had also satisfied Christian moral demandsbetter. Aristotelians had continued to see natural law as nothing more than a set ofabstract ethical principles. In contrast, Hugo Grotius and especially SamuelPufendorf developed a set of natural laws that had a normative force for states aswell as for individuals. They started out of the Aristotelian principle of socialitas, butinterpreted it as a ‘socialitas inter aequales’, following not the spirit of Aristotle,but Cicero’s conception of societas. A later generation of Aristotelians, such asJ.J. M .uller (1650–1716), N.H. Hertius (1651–1710) and perhaps already J.H. Boecler(1611–1672) the most important political scientist besides Conring (1606–1681), inthe mid-17th century-tried to mix the new natural jurisprudence with Aristotelianpolitica (eclectic Aristotelianism), by replacing the pars architectonica of Aristotelianpolitics (the general theory of the state and the forms of government) with the jus

publicum universale of the natural lawyers. While the Aristotelians could not competewith the natural jurists in this area, they were not precisely strong in the pars

administrativa (the terrain of practical political prudence) either. It was therefore notsurprising that already Boecler had decided to follow Lipsius in this area andChristian Weise also turned towards reason of state in his doctrina statistica.37 Thepolitical theory of the Aristotelians was weaker as a guidance for practical actionthan for general structural considerations and for the empirical analysis of actualstates. In this latter area they could survive in various guises, such as statistics,Staatenkunde and later as a kind of ‘history of states’ (Staatengeschichte), and did soin fact up until the rise of historicism in the 19th century. It took centuries for

37 See also the comments in my, ‘Wann und warum endete der politische Aristotelismus?’ in Der

Aristotelismus in der politischen Philosophie Deutschlands, pp. 184–192.


‘reason of state’ and the concept of ‘interests’ to displace the Aristotelian category ofcausa finalis.

To sum up, ‘reason of state’ and Aristotelianism had both opposed the primacyaccorded to legal norms. If one disregards those quantitative and institutional fieldswhere the politica remained strong38, natural jurisprudence as ‘legalistic’ politicaltheory had two aspects which gave an advantage to it against Aristotelianism: thefirst was its quasi-geometrical epistemology, which enabled it to claim a much highercertainty for its ability to establish moral and political norms than the probabilisticmethods of civilis prudentia could ever aspire to. The second element was itssuccessful de-legitimation of despotism as a form of rule. The politica was henceforthdivided into a natural law theory of morality and into a utilitarian theory ofprudence, and in this divided terrain the discourse of political prudence (either asRegimentslehre or as reason of state) gained the upper hand over Aristotelianism.

(C) The Aristotelians had developed their political philosophy only in relation tocommunities; ‘politics’ was understood exclusively as a concern with the respublica

and they attacked any other interpretation of the purposes of political action.39

Aristotelianism had no answer to questions concerning the special moral code ofprudentia vivendi, since it understood private morality simply as a matter of virtue.Ratio status, with its focus on utility rather than virtue, successfully displacedAristotelianism and destroyed its significance for practical philosophy. Nobody caresabout the virtues any more, wrote Christian Thomasius, the interest of people is inpractical advice which can lead them towards a successful life.

There was another powerful argument against Aristotelian ethics: that it couldonly deal with the external behaviour of men, but not with the ‘vices and virtuesinternal to the soul’. This was of course a Christian critique, pressed in its radicalform by the pietists and soon transferred into the secular sphere. Aristotelianpolitical and social teleology, whose relative autonomy could only be maintained if it

38 See the judgment of the G .ottingen jurisprudence professor Johann Jacob Schmauß: ‘The chief reason

why the jurists, particularly the law professor at Protestant univepsities, had such a high esteem for

Pufendorf’s Jus naturae, was that it provided the whole of jurisprudentia humana, including both

jurisprudentia privata and publica, with an adequate foundation’ (Neues System des Rechts der Natur

(G .ottingen, 1754), p. 274.)39 See the comprehensive critique of the shortcomings of Aristotelian political theory by Johann

Nikolaus Hertius, Elementa prudentiae civilis (Frankfurt a.M., 1703), vol. 2, p. 5. This kind of critique had

become part of the commonplaces of Regimentslehre and was aimed against the unwordly and scholastic

learning of academics at least since the beginning of the 17th century. Chr. Weise, Politische Fragen

(Dresden, 1708) (the preface dated 1690), reported that the political prudence (‘Staatsklugheit’) failed to

appear in the most commonly used compendia. But referring to Jacob Thomasius (his own teacher in

Leipzig) Weise announced that ‘he overcame this defect by frequently lecturing on Septalium de Ratione

Status ... This made me reflect, when I started my teaching career in Weißenfels [an academy for nobles in

Thuringia], on this subject’, he wrote, and he indeed published his ‘own statistical ideas’ (Ideae Statisticae)

as an appendix to the German version of his Politica (p. 408 f.). Weise subdivided his Politica into three

parts: doctrines concerning the ‘Republique in general’ and the theory of state forms (in which he basically

followed Aristotelian political theory); political prudence (politische Staatsklugheit), ‘otherwise called

Raison d’Estat’, which discussed the issue of preserving the state in general and the various constitutional

forms; and finally the ‘politica specialis’, including ‘personal-politica’ and mainly the analysis of the

structure and the interests of actual states.


was kept separate from religious norms, was divided into a transcendental theory ofduties, an ethics of inner devotion and, finally, a wordly utilitarianism that becameidentified with ‘politics’40 and was developed into a subjectivised version of ratio

status. This disjunction was not sustained primarily either by a hierarchical orderingof the different norms (as in the Catholic-scholastic argument critique ofMachiavelli), or by a casuistry of bridging contradictory duties (like in JustusLipsius’ prudentia mixta), or through reducing everything to a master-principle (as inJ.Chr.Becmann’s political philosophy). Rather, it was sustained through developingfor each of this class of norms a relatively autonomous area of discourse, or ‘science’.

These developments led to a reorganisation of philosophy, which becameinstitutionalised in the curricula of the universities of Halle, Jena and Frankfurtan der Oder by the beginning of the 18th century under the name of ‘eclecticphilosophy’.41 The way Johann Franz Buddeus (1667–1729) restructured practicalphilosophy in his phenomenally successful textbook, the Elementa philosophiae

practicae (1695), faithfully reflected the aftermath of the demise of Aristotelianism.Buddeus divided practical philosophy into three parts: first ‘ethics’, dealing with thesummum bonum, i.e. with the peace of the soul and the duties to God; second ‘naturallaw’ as the study of lawlike norms for the individual, society and state alike; andthird ‘the doctrine of prudence’ which viewed human actions

‘prout ad nostram statusque nostri conservationem faciunt, et ita prudentiam status

seu civilem, sumpta in voce ampliori significatione, pertinent’ [just as they are donefor our preservation and that of our state, and thus they pertain to the prudenceof state—or civil prudence, understood in a more ample sense].

This ‘reason of state’ dealt with all life-strategies and with every social position; itbegan with a chapter entitled ‘the many status open for man’. The prudentio status

oeconomici42 constituted a very important part of it; it was not yet regarded as a

40 See this already in J. Chr. Becmann, Conspectus Doctrinae Politicae (Frankfurt a.O., 1691), Ch. 1 p. 1:

‘Politica est prudentia socialiter vivendi ... adeoque secundum ratiocinia necessitatum et commodorum

humanorum’ [Politics is prudence in living socially ... as far as reasoning about what is necessary and

advantageous for men]; ethics ensured, ‘ut homini intresicus bene sit’ [so that men may be well internally],

and the economics ( .Okonomie) ‘ut extrensicus bene sit’ [so that it may be well externally].-Andreas R .udiger,

Klugheit zu leben und zu herrschen (Leipzig-Coethen, 1733), p. 56: ‘Ethics is preoccupied with the inner

workings of man’s heart, and wants it to arrange in such a way that it lives in peace with itself in a repose

granted by God. The law of nature, however, also deals with the actions of man and wants to arrange them

in such a way that men follow their duties towards God and other men. Finally, the doctrine of prudence

or politique deals with the same actions, insofar as they concern the preservation of one’s reasonable

intentions; so that these actions enhance our own utility (Nutzen) or the utility of the whole of human

society ... The aim of Staatslehre is to teach man how he can ensure his utmost happiness’.41 See H. Dreitzel, ‘Zur Entwicklung und Eigenart der ‘‘eklektischen Philosophie’’’, Zeitschrift f .ur

Historische Forschung 18 (1991), 281–343. For an overview of their educational programme Grimm,

Literatur und Gelehrtentum, pp. 426–446. His interpretation of the so-called ‘politischen Gelehrtenideal’ has

to be corrected in light of the work of K. Forssmann, Baltasar Gracian und die deutsche Literatur (see

footnote 4): ‘The educational aim and with it the social ideal of Thomasius is not, as it has often been

claimed, the expression of a courtly polite or politically polite man ... but rather it belongs to a far more

comprehensive vision of worldly wisdom (Weltweise)’ (p. 153).42 The prudential doctrines of the first phase of the German Enlightenment are described in Forssmann,

ibid, pp. 190–233; Burkard Gotthelf Struve, Bibliotheca philosophica (G .ottingen, 1740), vol. 1, p. 307:


separate discipline. Reading the text makes it obvious that conservatio status wasidentified by Buddeus with felicitas or happiness, and naturally the appropriatedoctrine of looking at the utilitas of individuals in society and politics also figures inhis book prominently. In these passages he explicitly cited the literature of ‘reason ofstate’. The differentiation between prudentia publica and prudentia privata was set outquite clearly, although the identity of interests between ruler and people was alsoheavily emphasized, with the new model of princely rule as running an economicenterprise occupying a central area in the discourse.

Such typically German versions of ‘reason of state’ as the ‘security of the throne’or ‘the deliverance and welfare of the prince’ had been further developed by theAustrian cameralist Wilhelm von Schr .oder in his F .urstliche Schatz- und Rentkammer

(1686). Neither rapport with the nobility, nor the love of the ‘rabble’, he maintained,can ensure the security of the prince, and even less the use of those ‘Machiavellianmaxims that involve jealousy, mistrust and secret machinations to suppress thesubjects’. Princes can ensure their security and welfare by keeping a large army,running a successful economy and, in general, through the wealth of their people. Asvon Schr .oder contended:

A prince is like a patriarch (Hausvater). ...A father has to fertilize and plough thefield if he wants to harvest. The lakes must be filled with brood if he wants to fish.He must clear out his lifestock if he wants to slaughter it, he must feed the cows ifhe wants to take their milk. A good prince must therefore feed his people well if hewants to receive income from them. This can be accomplished without the peoplecomplaining; and nobody will be able to tell how much a prince received from hisland per annum.43

Schr .oder’s programmatic explication of a cameralist ‘reason of state’ became abestseller. It was a variation on the theme of the divine right of kings, reminding oneof Filmer’s patriarchalism. He prided himself on having developed a superioralternative to Machiavelli’s reason of state, with its rather crude devices forpreserving power, since his notion, at least partially, was predicated on a commoninterest between ruler and ruled in maximizing the country’s economic potential.


‘Nostro demum saeculo displinae huius (politica privatae s. prudentiae vivendi universalis) solidius atque

plenius excultae gloria relicta fuit’ [Finally, in our generation, the more secure and full glory of this refined

discipline (the universal politics of private or of prudential living) was abandoned].43 Wilhelm von Schr .oder, F .urstliche Schatz- und Rentkammer (Leipzig, 1686), 9th ed. (Leipzig, 1552);

Zitat: Vorrede, n. 11; c. 1 n. 8: ‘In a Monarchia it is permitted for a prince to prefer the preservation of his

own person to the welfare of his subjects. if nothing else can be done anymore ... while the publicum

personam regis oder principis in statu monarchico as personam primariam not at all excluded’. For his own

political theory see his Disquisitio politica vom allgemeinen F .urstenrecht (at first an appendix to the 1713

edition of the Schatz- und Rentkammer; later as a separate work with a critical commentary by Gottlieb

Samuel Treuer (Wolfenb .uttel, 1719)). For interpretation see: W. Roscher, Geschichte der National-

Oekonomik in Deutschland (Munich, 1874), pp. 294–300; H. v. Srbik, Wilhelm von Schr .oder. Ein Beitrag

zur Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften (Vienna, 1910); E. Dittrich, Die deutschen und .osterreichischen

Kameralisten (Darmstadt, 1974), p. 63 ff. (Lit.); on his political thought: H. Dreitzel, Absolutismus und

st .andische Verfassung, pp. 80–99.


Nonetheless his work was hardly more than a slightly veiled legitimization andpractical endorsement of the merits of despotic governance. Under the title of the‘princely art of power’ (f .urstliche Machtkunst) this genre enjoyed great popularity atthe end of the 18th century.44 As a consequence the phrase became synonymous with‘reason of state’ and it became normal to regard this kind of political rule as servingboth the interests of the prince (and his dynasty), and that of his subjects. The magicformula of ‘divitia populi thesaurus regis’ seemed sufficient to secure this goal. Thiswas not yet the blossoming of political economy, but rather its transformation intoan instrument of ‘reason of state’.45

5. Conclusion: reason of state and utilitarianism

In order to sum up this overview of the subject I would like to advance thefollowing thesis. In the German context the most important contribution of theconcept of ratio status was not to the formation of the ‘modern state’, although someof its problems acquired a much higher profile when looked at through the optics of‘reason of state’ than in other theoretical perspectives. Its real impact was on theevolution of a subjective and utility-orientated moral theory and in facilitating thefissure between justum and utile in practical philosophy. This latter development hadplayed an essential part in the defeat of political Aristotelianism. Compared withthis, the assistance of ‘reason of state’ to the birth of the modern concept of the statewas relatively trivial. After all, ‘sovereignty’ was Bodin’s idea; the categories of‘power’ and ‘power-state’ (Machtstaat) were introduced by Lipsius; the idea of aconstitutional state originates from the monarchomachs and the natural jurists; therelative autonomy of ‘politics’ and the specificity of the norms applicable to politicalprudence were understood pretty well at least since the rediscovery of Aristotle in the13th century, and were finely tuned in subsequent versions of political Aristotelian-ism.46 The Aristotelians had a sharper analysis of the sources of inner cohesion inpolitical systems than ‘reason of state’ writers, who often reduced it to the goal of

44 See Johann Georg F .orderer, Politischer Lust-Garten eines Regenten, darin ein mit klarem Wasser

springender Brunnen gezeigt wird, daraus er sich selbst Macht und seinen Unterthanen Reichtum sch .opfen

kann (Frankfurt a.M., 1709); [Asche Christoph von Mahrenholz], F .urstliche Machtkunst oder unersch-

.opfliche Gold-Grube, wodurch ein F .urst sich kan m .achtig und seine Unterthanen reich machen, ed. von

Heinrich Boden (Halle, 1702); Johann Georg Leib, Von Verbesserung, Land und Leuten, und wie ein Regent

seine Macht und Ansehen erheben k .onne (Leipzig and Frankfurt, 1708).45 See Axel Nielsen, Die Entstehung der deutschen Kameralwissenschaften (Jena, 1911; reprint Frankfurt

a.M., 1966).46 The common assumption that Machiavelli has established the ‘autonomy of politics’ in modern

thought—through the ‘realist’ separation of politics from ethics—completely misses, in my view, the

unavoidability of moral choice. These ideas often go hand in hand with the accusation that anti-

Machiavellian political theories which relativise reason of state are hypocritical and unwordly. Machiavelli

did not represent the sort of theory they usually attribute to him, but understood politics and the principles

of human social life in ethical terms. Whether he lived up more to the high expectations and possibilities

offered by such a discourse than, let us say, the Aristotelian doctrine, was generally doubted even from the

utilitarian and pragmatic perspective of the 17th century.


preserving a ruler’s power. Aristotelian political theory was also better at describingthe modus operandi of actual states. It is rather questionable whether ‘reason of state’had contributed importantly, even in political theory, to the rise of absolutism inGermany. Aristotelian authors regarded ‘limited monarchy’ a superior option forkeeping the state stable and happily contributed to the coining of the pejorative termof ‘Machiavellism’ in order to discredit the idea of absolute monarchy. Both ‘divineright of kings’ or ‘sovereignty’ were more effective intellectual devices forlegitimizing absolute monarchy. ‘Reason of state’ and the fascination with jus et

arcana dominationis had their heyday in the periods just before and after the ‘ThirtyYears’ War’. At that time the rulers of the various bits and pieces of the Empire weremost concerned with putting their newly acquired territorial quasi-sovereignty, aresult of the upheveals of the Reformation and the subsequent reorganisation of theEmpire, on a more secure footing. Despite all these changes they clung to a self-image of their states as dynastic and personal systems of rule, in which they sharedpower only with a privileged estate. While the economy was backsliding in to anagrarian-feudal direction, social climbing and the enhancement of status for most ofthe rural nobility and for the educated bougeoisie was possible only through offeringtheir service to the political ruling class.47 Natural law based public law seemed tosatisfy their craving for a depersonalization and institutionalisation of the politicalpower system. In natural jurisprudence the old controversy about ‘princely reason ofstate’ and ‘Machiavellianism’ was transformed into the Enlightenment debate over‘despotism’. Frederick the Great’s Anti-Machiavelli (1740) was a sign of thistransition. It was not a book about ‘reason of state’, as Friedrich Meinecke assumed.Its aim was, rather, to denounce ‘Machiavellianism’ in its most traditional sense, asthe legitimation of the despotism and tyranny associated with princely rule.

47 This was also the judgment of the 18th century. See Burkhard Gotthelf Struvius, Bibliotheca

philosophica, ed. L. M. Kahle (G .ottingen, 1740), vol. 1, p. 249: ‘sed haec potius est status ratio, ex quo

emolumenta capiunt summi imperantes, sive ex regulis politicis haec sunt petita sive ex arcano quodum

consilio’ [but rather this is reason of state, through which the greatest powers seize emoluments, and these

rewards are sought either according to poltical rules or through some arcane counsel].


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