DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments...

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DRDOS Interna~ional Bar.'< for Rec3nstruction and LIevelopo;e4r: Development Research Center Discussion Papers No. 5 POLICY ISSTRUMENTS LUD PLA??TNlNGMODELS FOR INCOME DlSTRIBUTlON Montek S. Ahluwalia and Jorge Cauas KOTE : Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to st ir.1~1 'i LC discussi.~.~ and critical coment . References in publization to 1);s- cussion Papers should be cleared with the author(s) t~ protecr tt~t. tentative character of these papers. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Transcript of DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments...

Page 1: DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments follow this optimal time path. It is obvio~s that we are a long way from even formulating

DRDOS

I n t e r n a ~ i o n a l Bar.'< f o r R e c 3 n s t r u c t i o n and LIevelopo;e4r:

Development Research Cen te r

D i s c u s s i o n P a p e r s

No. 5

POLICY ISSTRUMENTS L U D PLA??TNlNG MODELS FOR

INCOME DlSTRIBUTlON

Montek S. Ahluwalia and J o r g e Cauas

KOTE : D i s c u s s i o n P a p e r s are p r e l i m i n a r y m a t e r i a l s c i r c u l a t e d t o s t i r . 1~1 'i L C

d i s c u s s i . ~ . ~ and c r i t i c a l c o m e n t . Refe rences i n p u b l i z a t i o n t o 1);s- c u s s i o n Pape r s s h o u l d b e c l e a r e d w i t h t h e a u t h o r ( s ) t~ p r o t e c r t t ~ t .

t e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r of t h e s e p a p e r s .

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December, 1973 raft Kot t o be quoted Comments welcomed

POLICY INSTdUMENTS AND PLANNING MODELS FOR

INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Montek S. Ahluwalia and Jorge Cauas*

I . 1ntroducti.on

11. Avai lable Ins t ruments of Po l icy

111. Broad S t r a t e g i c Choices

I V . Avai lable Planning Models

V . Conclusions

*This paper was presented a t a j o i n t I n s t i t u t e of ~ e v e l o ~ m e a S tud ies (Sussex) - Development Research Center (IBRD) Workshop convened a t t h e Rockefel ler Foundation Conference Centre i n Be l lag io , I t a l y , i n Apr i i 1973.

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P O L I C Y INSTRUME?STS All3 ?LPJI(?IJING MODELS FOR IXCGME D I S T R I B U T I O X

W e S e g b w i t h t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e p r o f e s s i o n a t l a r g e ha-

i n r e c e n t y e a r s d i s p l a y e d i n c r e a s i n g s c e p t i c i s m abou t t h e v a l u e ( o r Imre

s t r i c t l y " i l se fu lness") o f p l a n n i n g m d e l s i n g e n e r a l . The r e a s o n s f o r

t h i s s c e p t i c i s m a r e t o o w e l l known t o b e a r d e t a i l e d r ev i ew b u t i t i s

wor th n o t i n g t h a t t h e s c h i s m is n o t l i k e l y t o d i s a p p e a r i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e .

l'he s c e p t i c s b a s e t h e i r c a s e on two p r o p o s i t i o n s .

(i) m i s t i n g r e a l i t y e s p e c i a l l y a t economy-wide l e v e l s is f a r t o o

complex t o b e c a p t u r e d i n t h e s t y l i z e d a l g e b r a i c fonr,ula-

t i o n s o f economic models .

( i i ) The a v a i l a b l e s t a t i s t i c a l i n f o r m t i o n i n mst c a s e s is t o o

poor even f o r t h e d e m n d s o f e x i s t i n g " simple" models l e t

a l o n e a n y t h i n g more a n b i t i o u s .

, do - ; o p o s i t i o n s trikcr. t o p e t h e r ?;educe a n a t u r a l %zip-isse s i n c e any

a t t e m p t t o deve lop m r e g e n e r a l models must n e c e s s a r i l y p l a c e even g r e a t e r

s t r a i n on t h e s s a t i s t i c a l i n f ; a s t r u c t u r e . T h i s e s tab1. ishes an immediate

d i s t i n c t i o n between academic nctvances i n c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , b!~ich w i l l - - l r ~ c v i t a b l y bc.$n t h e d i r c c t . i o n o f mre s o p h i s t i c a t e d models o f t h e genera l

L

~ q c i l i b r i u m tDe and t h e o p e r a t i o n a l u s e f u l n e s s o f t l -~ese advances i n

e 11 p r o v i d i n g t o o l s f o r p r a c t i c a l p lanners .-

These p r o b l e m would be s e r i o u s enough i f w e were i n t e r e s t c z

o n l y in the t r a d i t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s of economic p o l i c y such a s o u t p u t g r o h y h ,

L / T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n is n o t of c o u r s e c l e a r c u t . P l a n ~ i n g o f 5 i c e s may b e L ; - . I 1 be i n t e r e s t e d i n v e r y g e n e r a l modeis t h a t s t y l i s e b road "growth stratcG;e:,

b u t what is l a c k i n g i n economic p l a n n i n g i s t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of o p e r a ~ i c n - a Lly u s e f u l models t o ac te rmir le s p e c i t i c p o l i c y c h o i c e s .

Page 4: DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments follow this optimal time path. It is obvio~s that we are a long way from even formulating

- 7 , - - --.---- CL--,aLilL.-~rt: i&;s~;z3e, C ; I - = - ~ ~ C ~~-;I<cLc.c~;, ~ L C . Tszy b e ~ ~ - = even m r e

,, c A H . r e ~ t ~ . . - ,-" w5en ue i n c l a c e ctj.=,siderLt:ozs of incoffie d i s t r i b u ~ i s n ~?teze

.LL-L -.+. - - -..- - - &..,a 125s i i g r e a a c on che zccc?ta'sil:ry of t h e ~ ~ d e r l y i n g

. ir is n s t s u r ? r i 5 L n j t:-,ersforc L T 5.e ~ t t z q r s o b;li.lL 2le:lnlng

. . :.sccls ;o teal ~ 5 t k ~2srr;-;>u;ic;? ~rcs ie-a Leads LO che obvious c r i t i c i s n

-.-L; i.:c &re r ry i -g t o KL- b e f o r e w e h ~ v e lczrned t o walk. Tne 2 o l n t of

- . r : ~ s c r l z i z i s z i is rist: t o ceny the i e s i r a 3 F l I q r or' c q e r 5 i r & n t i n & .zit5

rl..r;c;va;isre pzo to type m d e l s wTlic6 try tl; encogenize income 6-is t z i b c t i o n .

-?,;e'.-.er LC Is r o r e c s : g i z e t h a t t h e a p - , l ~ c a b i i i ~ y or' such izodels i n

* ~ - & c c i c a l p l ans in l j e>:&rcises In the ncs-: k t - u r e is bo-dnd t o be f a i r l y l7Ln;;ed.

;,lcrtrecl It ;s,y e-flex 542 a r z ~ e d t h a r i t is c c m ~ c r p r o d ; i c t i v e . T r y - x g r o m:

, e i o r e we :lave l e a r n e d co w a l k zry he c c t i r e i y cormendable i n the L.tceres;

of long tern s t f i le . t ic devclopnent , h l ~ t I n che i n t e r i m it i s probably nor.

the b 2 s t way o f gert:ng fron 11 r o 131

i i e -ryri.y; ;lui?o,.ie oE this p n p c r i s :o suggest a framework f o r

, - . r t . . , / . i : u n L i r l g 2hs ?OCL.:i ;:i;.:. IIPE LUI::C. '~S r l ;::e ;i\'3$1 : j b l ~ : and p r ~ s y f c t ? *,,:.

. i~:~-;nir ,g ~ ~ ~ o d ~ l s i n p r o v i a i n g 2 0 i . i ~ ~ ~ ; c ~ L ' T . c ~ f o r p l a n n e r s c o n c e r ~ c d wi:'.7 Li

, , ' F ,r.i-i-l;:~. dLs ; r ; . c ~ t <icn sii? <?;:,;:?o~?~~~i.t_ nS j ec t ives . One way o r Lot.;.,;; tnis t s L O

~ . : . ~ i i ; . r i'?hzE t3t:: ";;lc.;:i. :i..:.rr:. 1,;. y,,it:i." s11oul.d b c a n d wjc :-:;i.; ns a - i

. . . o i 1 , J 1 ; . . . 2. :&ggcs t ing pr;.,: :.ical r ~ ~ ~ e n ' s i o : ; ; , L -

Page 5: DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments follow this optimal time path. It is obvio~s that we are a long way from even formulating

f o r ~ i v e x varces of the azozenoxs v a r i a b l e s acd 2 o l i c y v a r i z b l e s t o y i z l d

I I - x c o w d i s t r i j : r t i o n " AS a function of ci-.ese var ia 'c les . Xore & i t i o w

m d e l b c i l l e r s d g h t zver. hope cha t sucn a model caii be r e c z s r LT a 02-

r imis ing f r z e w o r k zs a c m t r o l 2:leory ?rabl'~-n a f Zezeni?icg o ? t h m t k e

par:- f o r t h e po l i cy i;l~~DLi!l!Zni~ ( con t ro l v a r i a b i e s ) given soiiie ob j ec t i ve

fuiiccio;?. Providiiig ye have cocp-cehensiveiy i d e n t l i i e d and i i lcluded a l i

a v a i l a b i e po l i cy i n s t r m n t s , p l an i x p l e i x n t a t i o n would simply b e a

n a t t e r of mking t h e se ins t ruments follow t h i s opt imal t i m e path.

It is o b v i o ~ s t h a t we a r e a long way from even formulat ing such

"5leal" m d e l s l e t a lone es t imaciag them succes s fu l l y f o r p r a c r i c a l appi5--

ca t ion . In p r a c t i c e we have only t h e f a x i l i a r cro;, of ecoAor- wide input-.

output models and l i r 'ear prograimixig models (both economy wide and s e c t o r a l )

10 work with . How f a r do t he se m d e l s ge t u s i n developing appropr ia te

p o l i c i e s f o r employment and incone d i s t r ibu t io r , ? It is e a s i l y seen t h a t

zhese models f a l l cors iderab ly s h o r t o f t h e "icieal" an two grounds.

(L) Kies i -rr.odels do r,ot Serxra' ie income d i s t r i b u t i o n i n the

sensc 02 A s r z e ~ i s z r i b c t i o n of income. k t b e s t they can

handle t h e problearof f c n c t i o n a l income d i s t r i b u t i o n and I r

then too on very rcs t r i c t i v e ass7m.pcions.

( i i ) I n general these rnodels l o not c x p l i c i t i y incorpora te Lhc!

' ? e-ffeczs c l the fc11 r;nl,e sf a v a i i a j i e o l i c y v ; r i~?fcs .

Page 6: DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments follow this optimal time path. It is obvio~s that we are a long way from even formulating

-- - i c ~ 1 ( i i ) relstes p r e i y LO inco-;rjo.-zci?g the e f f e c e s o f 2 0 i i c y

- , .ar iables g.Iven a theor, , r-; d i s r r i b i r r i o a t o d e t e d - , e f a c t o r p r l c e s 2nd

e q l o ~ p z n t levels. Ynis :r - , a r e n t i y t e c E ~ . i c i l problem is t o t however a

" s k p l e l ' p r s b l a g iven t h e wile v a r i e t y of p o l i c y i n s t r m e n t s ckzt 1s

7 -

LL. A v a i l a b l e I n s t r m e n t s o f P o l i c y

I n this s e c t i o n we w i l l L a t t enp t l t o c l a s s i f y t h e mar~y p o l l c y

v a r i a b l e s t h a t are s u g g e s t e d by c~nvcn:Lonal wkdom as p o t e n t i a l insti--&-

-z.ents of income d i s t r i b u t i o n . h r b a s i s c;f c l a s s i f L c a t i o n is t o group pol-icy

I n s c n z e n t s a c c o r d i i ~ g r o the pci r , t of d i r e c t i n p a c t o f rhesc p o l i c i e s wit?Ln

~2 i m p l i c i t framework of g e n e r a l e q u i l i b r i u m of the econoizy. Thus a l l

2 o l i c i e s a f f e c t i n g f s c t o r ?rites r.ac b e c l a s s e d t o g e t h e r a s the f e z s i b i e

set o f f a c t o r r a r k e t i n t e r ~ e n t i o n s . X i ~ E o u g h i n i t i a l l y d t r e c t e d a t f a c t o r

riirkets , such i n t e r v c n t i o r , ~ o b v i c u s l y a f f e c t e s n p i o p n t i e v e l s , p r o d u c t i o ; ~

;)clLrrclrr:s, o u t g u t p r i c e s , ecc., and i t is throu@. a l l t h e s e e f f e c t s : ; a t

:,aced. ~ b ~ i s ' c l s . . , s i i ; ica t iv sclienc enz5'3les IS t o f o c u s on ' *~arkets" o r

r c ~ , l t i o n s h i p s t h a t .;i-LG r z ) 6 2 L- . c S c , 2~ r a t h e r t'hafi tfie p r e c i s e ? o l l c y i;;:,tru-

, -, 1.q vkc;ea e f f ec t . . .- T i a ~ ; - ~ i . ~ ; , :-.<- ~.:i.ls .5re a e c c s s a r l l y . agg rega ted

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z-;rXst i s cezsrnined zke ? r e c i s e des lgn of ? o i i c y (choosing between

- ~ l c e r n a : i v e i -s t rcr .ea=s) ten b e worked our i n s o ~ e d 2 t a i l . rour a r e z s

o f i z t e r v e n t i o n ca;l b e d i s ~ i n g u i s i ~ e d c o r z e s p r d l n g t o t h e genera i e q u i i i b -

r lur . l i i ikage from (1) i iactor p r i c e s chro-~gh ( i i ) ~ e r s o i l a l i n c o ~ s d e r e r z i x r t i o n

~ t j - x t e l f o r ( i i i ) talc Lncidesce r o j iv) tezsnd ?atcer=,s arid o u ~ p i l t 2 r i c e s ,,:zich

a r e consis tezi t w i t h t 3 e f a c t o r 2 r i c e s . To rnese we add a f i f t h a r e a -- l u b i i c - . --A

a p e n a i r u r e ? t i t t e rns -- wnich com?letes rhe p iccure .

(i) D e t e n i n L n g P a c t o r Rewar&:

A w3-ole range of government p o l i c i e s i n f l u e n c i n g " ? r i c e c e t e r -

iriination" iii t h i s f i e l d can b e l i s t e a : v a r i o u s f o r n s of t a x e s on l a b o r

use; s u b s i d i e s t o c o p i t a l i n t h e foim cf " t a x ho l idays" , d e p r e c i a t i o n

allowances and i n v e s w n t al lowances ; government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n wage

po l icy bo th in t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r throcgh m i n i m wage l e g i s l a t i o n ant5

i n the ? & l i e s e c t o r f n r o u d ~ d i r e c t wage de temina t ion . Wage p o l i c i e s are.

f r e q u e n t l y implenented on " d i s t r i b u t l o n a l grounds" w i t h l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n

- - '.tLL r e l a t i v e p r i c e i q l i c a t i c n : ; Tcr eq,loynent l e v e l s 6.c the " C O S ~ pusi-i"

-..., i ~ ~ c ~ i o n s f o r i c L l ; ~ i o . ~ . T h e s e c,ues t i o n s csn ~ n l y be examined i n ?:&inis&

rnolels which i n c o r p o r a r e r e l a t i v e p r i c e d e t e n i n a t i o n and p e r n i t some scope I r

f o r f a c t o r substitution.

( i i ) D i s t r i S u t i o n of 'Inca ]Caning & s e t s aiid Fnctorr; over

P o p - ~ l n t i o c : - . - GLven fr.c:o; ? r i c e det~rr~i ; lzr ;o-n a;.d c;r;rsl.oy;ilci-L~ :eve-:, r o p e ~ c i - ,

I

- 7 - . . . - . :!c,e a; ;&cCjr ;EL ,:;e =-c;;;o; of eat-, a s e : i= ;:, -J,c L<sx--a i . . -> I . c--% 0 - _ - * L1.C.-.i > L

Page 8: DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments follow this optimal time path. It is obvio~s that we are a long way from even formulating

, ; l ~ c ~ ~ ~ . a r s s =o z?.e -&LEI d ~ ~ ? c - ? i ; l b oil L-,s tL=.it i csa l t h a r z c t e r i s t 5 c s and

G Z P L E ~ i ~ c t o r s . Ccnvestlozai w i z c o z scggkscs s e v e r a l ways i r L whL&

& o v e r a n t ~ a l i c y car, ar'fs:t c t e s e pzr^ie-r;ls by d i r e c t s c r i m . - % 7 ~ 0 ? r ~ . i ~ i ~ n

.- - -21 ~ i c > z r coliecci-;lzzt;on o r r e i l s t r i b u ~ i o r , U; a s s e t s Is --. L c . C ; i a ~

- - -- ;a;lcy a;te,-;la~"ivc. i t S a i a - z i l i a ~ reeczzx!ndation i n a g r i c u l t u r e ( l a s d

r e 2 o m ) but iz 2s a l s o v i a b l e ic i n l u s t r y z l ~ h o u g f i i n t he i a t t e r " r a d i s t ~ ; -

- - 2at lon" is i a r l i y i e + s ; j ~ e , ~ x d the choice is niorc l i i r e l y ro be

x a i i o n a i i z a ~ i o n OT " s o c . ~ ~ i i z a t i ~ n " ( t h e Yugosliiv p a t t e r n ) o f c a p i r a l .

Less r a a i c i l z a s u r e s with ;; ;cr,ger time p a t t e r n f o r e f f e c t i v e -

ness a r e p r o p e r t y ta:es and inher i t ?~ . - r t e t z x e s , b o t h of which a r e nlininalljr

e f f e c t i v e i n nost countzies . Even less T C Z ~ C ~ ; a r e measures designed t o

i,iri,rove t h e d i s t r i 3 u t i o n of skills (and consequeiltly earr,ing p a c e r ) i n the

7 o p l a i i o n by expanding educa t ion and t r a i n i n g progranls. ?his I s a far; i l$zr

corners tone of e q l o ~ p n t prot-otixg ;Jrograix, and one t h a t w e w i l l un-

cocbtediy h e a r about 511 any discussion cn f n c m d i s t r i b u t i o n .

(53%) D L s y r s h L C :;I! ~ 1 r . e 2 e 4 - -+-.! - r ~ ~ ~ . z t i o r . :

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sig. . if iczzce a t e c r l l i r r szzges -.,-Lere b.?ien%s;dtion p r o 3 i m a r e pz-rcL-

-- c u i a r i y i z q o r i a z t . a suz5 s;rcu=star.ces c a evzs iaz a o c g h i g h iilcozz

groups ;ley hzve t o 3e a c c q c e l zs an " i r L s t l t x t ~ c n e l c o n s c r a i n ~ " . Zie

=race-o,f - s u a l l y s s o c l a z e L wzti. -&ls p o l i c y - re la tes LO "' l n c e n t l v e s "

- I y 32 aclvsrsely ~ - f sc r , e6 by s u c c ~ s s ~ % i t a x p o l i c y Z F s u r e s . Scce

,:?at I 5 :he e c o n o q is c ~ c s e d f o r f a c t o r mvesents (an iixporced a s - ~ i i o n )

t h e i n c e n t i v e s q w s t i o n r e l a c e s e s s e n t i a l l y t o t h e work- leisure choice

and this m y n o r b e v e r y s e r ; o u i f t z x lceasures and i r ip lenen ta t i cn z b i l i r y

a r e u n i f o n f o r a l l c a t e g o r i e s o f econouiic a c t i v i t y .

Zi; p r a c t i c e i q l e n e n t a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y in d i f f e r e n t s e c t o r s is

widely d i f f e r e n t and this i n p l i e s t h a t i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on tax nieasures

i n e v i t a b l y in t roduces i n t e r s e c t o r a l d i s t o r t i o n s which nay be serio-iis. X?e

c i a s s i c example of t h i s probleui is t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e only ins tit.^-

t i o n a l l y f e a s i b l e tax n2zs-ares a m u n t co t z e s on e q o r t s o r iinporrs.

(CV) C ~ i x o L i i y ? r i c e r)eterizinclt5cii:

?-. :nc whoie razz oi c;o;r;cstic tsxes and su'3sidies oa ? r o l u c t l c \ r /

c m . s ~ ? : i o n and t a r i f f s on iz.,joztea g o ~ d s nsy b e c l a s s e i as p r i c ~ ; i ,~cr -

ven t ions in the c o m d i t y -;arkets t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e p r a l l e l s e t of L , t

q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n s wnich can be t r e a t e d as discont inuous ? r i c e

i n t e r v e a t i o n . Thcse taxes and q u a n t i t a t i v e restrictions h,ive bo th In - I I - mcone" e f f e c t ( r e d u c t i a n o r t n c r e a s e o>z:cai i i ; ~ u ; i ~ s j ~ s : rcla: LV\: ?:-cr-

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':x-,;rdc: xza-s" u;-.icr! are ?robably l e s s e f f l c i e r i t than di recr : i z c t o r p r i c e

?ub;rc z ~ ~ e r , c i r u z e is t h e c o l l e c t i v e 2 o t e n t i a l 5 g n s f i t r s s u l t i n g

. . : :,,3 d i r e c t a-lc L n c l r ~ c : i&:<ation aiid 9tk.er ;ovzrnzenC revsnces . T'r.3

k: s ~ r i b ~ ~ i o i - - a i i z p o r i z ~ - c e of ? ~ b l l c erc:>er-diiure s teas f r o s rwo c o n s i l e r ~ c i o ~ s :

(aj I t -is a very l a r g e znd i ~ s u s i l j r gwoking pro;,artion of G3P

coapared t o ti-.e snare o l 1me: income grox?s in t o t i i

i ncoze . T n c s , whereas p b l i c e w e n d i t u r e r a y accoua t f o r

1'1 t o 2 5 ; e rcen t of GD?, the sharz of income accrui:lg .io

t h e l o v . 2 r f 3 7ercc.n: i n GDI' i:.a;r =Inry 5ctwee:l 8 dnd i 5

-isprov,:ns::.: i:. i:h(i. -:clf.al-i: ie':ei of :his grou;, can 'je L! . I

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i r cp l ica t ions . In a si-cuatfon where publ ic resource mob i l i s a t i on i s zn

importsnt cons t r z in t , t h i s poses an obrious problem oi' choice betxeen

t h e two ca t ego r i e s aid a l s o o f course wi thin t h e two ca t ego r i e s .

Given this wide v a r i e t y o f a r ea s of i n t e rven t i on , t h e problem

f ac ing t h e p r a c t l c a l pl.anner i s t o devise a framework i n which t h e r,et

e f f e c t s and r e l a t i v e mer i t s ( i nc lud ing complementari t ies ma contrzc5ictlons)

of i n t e rven ing a t p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s can be evaluated. The p u r e l y " t ~ c h -

n i c a l response" to t h i s i s t o b u i l d b igger and b e t t e r models which a t tempt

t o endogenise a s far a s pos s ib l e a l l r e l evan t in ter-act , ions i n t h e ecozomjr. L/ 3 ~ c h a model would obvious1.y enable u s t o exper inen t xit.h t h e e f f e c t s of ELI-

t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y ins.yrwnents on income d i s t r i b u t i o n b u t a s we have

s t a t e d be fo r e t'kis " idea l " i s uqa t t a i n sb l e f o r some time t o cGme (certain1.y

f o r t he v a s t ma jo r i t y of unierdeveloped coun t r i e s ) . In p r a c t i c e we hsve

a r a g e or' l e s s powerL%l anal .y t ica1 t o o l s which he lp t o q u z n t i f y ~ s r t i c u l a r

choices b u t n o t i n any a l l i nc lu s ive frame-mrk. In such a wcr la a s t r ~ t e g y

f o r income d i s t r i b u t i o n invo lves two kin& od dec i s ions .

i Chocsing broad a reas 0;' i n t e rven t i on as a i scussed above izrgcl;.

Gn a non-formal cons ice ra t ions

b Using a v a i l a b l e p l a n i n g models t o i l l umina t e p a r t i c u l a r t r zde - 4

o f f s and p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s wi thin t he very broaa s t r a t e g y

Informal ly def ined

in t h e nex t two s ec t i ons we d i scuss b r i e ? l y soce of t he r rob l ens anc ~oss i ' r 11 i t~4 , z s

i n both f i e l d s .

1/ See f o r c x q l e t h e Faper Jn "Ir ,corporatin,; I 2 c i a i a n c Politics1- - V ~ r i a b l e s i n t o Zqui t :~ Grier.ted "uveelpment Plardning" , f o r sl oi sccss lx- . of such " a l l Inc ius lve" mocell ing.

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--"F - I.L. 3 r 3 t d S-,ratez.c Cho5 ccs

In L i s s ec t i on , ws w i l l 6 iscucuss S C Z ~ 0; the c c n s i d e r a t i c ~ s

sr,at a r e r e i e v m t I n c'r.ocsiag a "s7,rhtegy o f incoze c i s t r i bu t i on ' ! , i . e . ,

ckooslr?; m o n g the va r i oxs kreas or' i n t e rven i i on l i s t e c LDOVP,. In che

zbsence or' a f0'onr;il c o d e l t?.ese choices n u s t be made or, zn in;'omal 5 z s 5 z .

LY t k 3 s contw-r, iz i s use-'*; >G distinguish betk-een two p o l a r q p s i t e s k~-I

zem.s or' p o l i c y approach. The two approa&es follow from t h e two key cc:.;-

,,on.~r.=r -.,- o f t h e ae te rmina t icn o f "income d i s t r i b u t i o n " i n t n e ecor,o:mic s.,.ster.

Yne Yirst ol" chese i s t h e eeterminat ion 02 f a c t o r rexards ma emplo-ment

l e v e l s Tor f a c t o r s . Tq iz i s wnat economic theory c a l l s t h e ciistr i 'bution

c;" 1r.ccne ( i n t o i ; r ~ t o r s i ? x e s ) a d l n t h e neo- class ica l i r a n c w r k i t wcuia

kc: a f f ec t ed S;r the whoie r a g e of 2 o l i c i e s d i s c ~ s s e a i n ?I ( i ) a , l i i ( v )

aScve. Tne second l i n k i n t h e cnain i s ~ i ~ e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f ificcme e u n l n g

csset:; ar,d f a c t o r s over t h e ~ ~ : ; i a t i c n which de t e rn ine s t h e s i z e oi' 5 s -

t r i b u t i o n o f iricone. We szy c h a r ~ c t e r i s e income a i s t r ~ \ u t l o n strategies

a s aimel? e l t n e r a t a l t e r j n g tilt. ais t r i b u t i o n or' a s s e t s c r zf a f f e c t i n g

esAT.ln~s and emplojment l e v e l s .

(1) .;:;set &cii:,ri?il t l o 3 : Yr.e k ~ 1 c . d ~ Styate?.:

i sse t , r e d s t r i ' c x t l c r i i n t n e wiccst sense i nc ludes no t or,l:y ex- , f *

- . - . .;I-3 a t lcr , 2s.:: cc?:e,: r.'_-.-r: - r,S w- a;. r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , b u t a l s o the p:roirision . .

, . - I .: . ..,. ,, :;:ne:rcs i s XI cS-;;~,;c exr~rple . ) *

- L m rT lne g r e a t &ppe;l 0:' this ap?ror^cr! is thnt/seyz;.ztes tnk questior.

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narkec" . Given a s e t of e f f i c i e n c y p r i c e s i n t h e f a c t o r market , any

g i v e n p a t t e r n o f p e r s o n a l incone d i s t r i b u t i o n can b e ach ieved by a l t e r i n g

11 t h e p a t t e r n of d i s t r i b u t i o n of income e a r n i n g f a c t o r s and asse ts- . Obviously ti-.e change i n 'ncone d i s t r i b u t i o n s o induced w i l l f eed back

on e f f i c i e n c y p r i c e s i n a manner which may o r may n o t r e i n f o r c e t h e

e f f e c t s o f t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n b u t i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o suppose t h a t t h e s e

e f f e c t s w i l l b e e i t h e r r e i c f o r c i n g o r mere ly secondary2L. The prob1err.s

i nvo lved i n t h i s s t r a t e z y a r e mainly t h e " p o l i t i c a l " and" ins t i cu t iona1"

c o n s t r a i n t s on a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . W e w i l l n o t d i s c u s s t h e p l o l i t i c a l

c o n s t r a i n t s h e r e on t h e grounds t h a t a q u a n t i t a t i v e l y e q u i v a l e n t e f f e c t i v e

r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l f a c e t h e same p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s whether implemented

th rough a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o r o t h e r m2ans. The institutional! c o n s ~ r a i r i : ~ "

a r e more important because they a r e s u b j e c t t o p o l i c y a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e r ea lm

By " i n s t i t u : i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s " , w e mean c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e

e a r n i n g a b i l i t y of t h e r e d i s t r i b u t e d a s s e t . I t i s obvious t h a t r e d i s t r i -

~ u t i n g assczts is n o t enougll i f t h e e a r n i n g a b i l i t y of t h e a s s e t , i s S q a L r e d .

Thus l a n d reform may b e k e i f e c t i v e a s a n i n s t r u m e n t o'f income d i s t r i b u t i o n

if o t h e r d i s t o r t i o n s i n t h e s y s t e m prcvenL s m a l l h o l d e r from bc!ing p r o d u c t i v e . - - ' r

11 Note thrEf e d u c a t ~ o n a l p o l i c i e s aimed a t dynanrLc r e d i s t r i b u t : i o n of - s k i l l s a r e q t r e a l l y r a d i c a l i n t h i s s e n s e . The r e d i s t r i b u t i o n x i m d nc is e s s e n t i a l r y r e l a t i v e s i n c e t h e t o t a l supp ly o f s k i l l e d l & o r is e x p e c t e d t o expand. The "incot .e d i s t r i b u t i o n " e f f e c t depends t I ~ c r e f o r e on whether wages a r e ma in ta ined s u p p l y o f s k i l l e d l a b o u r s expands which is c s ~ ~ i ~ t l ~ l i l : ~ a problem of h n c t i o n a l incorrc d e t e r m i n a t i o n . These p r o b l e m are i ~ . ~ o r : u n t

however i n p r o v i d i n g s o c i a l m o b i l i t y i . e . e q u a l i s i n g acces s t o enployneat o f p a r t i c u l a r wage c a t e g o r i e s .

2 / A good d e a l of s p e c u l a t i o n and some e m p i r i c a l ev idence e x i s t on t5c g r e ~ - ~ e r - l a b o u r i n t e n s i t y o f l ower i n c o m consungt ion . ' Ihere i s a l s o evidence zlriat these feedbacks a r e r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l i n q u a n t i t a t i v e t e r n .

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h whole r a n g e o i i n s t i t u t i c a a l c o n s t r a i n t s are r e l e v a n t i n t h i s contac t -

e d u c a t i o n and skill. level o f t e n a n t b e ~ e f i c i a r i e s and p r o v i s i o n o f

conplemer , i~ l>r i n p u t s such as s e e d s , f e r ~ i l i z e r , c r e d i t n a r k e t i n g f a c i l i - t i e s ,

e t c . . It 1; S ~ . ? o r t a n t t o r e a l i s e t!at t h e c o s t s i~ t e rms o f " output

t r a d e- o f f s" of p u r s u i n g an a s s e t d i s t r i b a t i o n o r i e n t e d s t r a t e g y depend

c r i t i c a l l y upon t h e ass--:ion of t h e " e a r n i n g a . b i l i ~ r ' l o f t h e r e d i s t i r i b u ~ e d

asset i n an o p t i m a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework. Undoubtedly, t h e c o s t o f

e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s ( 0.- r e f u r b i s h i n g t h e o l d ones) is a p a r t

o f t h e " t rade- off" b u t t h e ? r o b l a i n most c o u n t r i e s is t h a t t h e need f o r

t h e new o p t i m a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework is n o t always r e a l i s e d . Th i s

r c s l i s a t i on is growing i i ~ r u r a l- d e -elopmen'c p r o g r a m b u t i t is n o t a t

a l l e v i d e n t in p o l i c y f o n i l i a t i o n f o r t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r . Sa t iona1isa t : ion

of i n d u s t r y as we h a - e s e e n i s a " feas i31e1 ' a s s e t c a l l e . c t i v i s a t i o n po:licy

w i t h income d i s t r i b u t i o n b e n e f i t s b u t h a r d l y any a t t e m p t i s made t o e n s u r e

t h a t these c o l l e c t i v i s e d a s s e t s remain p r o d u c t i v e on any economic (noit

f i n a n c i a l ) cons idc ra t i c in s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e s e "non-essen t i a l " trade.* f f s

arc Ercquen t ly p e r p e t d a t e d owing t o a r e g r e t t a b l e s u s p i c i a n of "cf f icLency"

concep t s m o n g r a d i c a l r s fom:&rs a t l e a s t i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f r a t i ~ c a ,

'ti:ese. pr?!j'ic:.ti .:L . , IPS L. t.ilat a c r i t i c a l r o l e f o r p l ann ing mo~dels - i

. . I.1: e~AfsluizCirig asse'; <!is : r i > a r &c,:? r;rr~tt:&.les '& io i d e r r i f y rile i n : ; t i t . u t ionn l - - nee!-., ,: E ; J , ~ ~ r e d i s t r i b u t i ~ n . iSodels w;-,z.;,: P::i 1 t o i a c z t i i y key i n s t i t ~ ~ i n r ~ n l

I! * I

dcveloy,mcnts which z r e ~z r ; ? !en ' cn t~ ry to a s s e f T - c i i . 5 ~ :;3utlon and t o i z e i l t i f y

a l t e r n a t i v e "learnin; : p r o c e ~ s c s " 1.:: ciciiieving c f i l c i e n c y ir, he c e w s e t u p ,

fail fn an ir;por;ant s e n s e t3 i d e n t i f y t h e r e a l p r o b i c m w i t h such a h i l - ; l Z + p .

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- sua i ly p o h t t o observed r e s 3 A t s w i t h o ~ t a t t e q t i n g to &.fine sl::zr-

n a t i v e s which were r 'eas ible hut have been .Ip.ored. ?ro;lonents of asset

t t r e d i s t ~ i b c t i o n igrLore " i c a r n i ~ g c o s t s t h e need f o r c o q l e c e n t a r y

i npu t s . A ?~ograsa i r . g approach t o naticna2-&-kg iil-try f o r exarrple

a i g h t show a s t e e p l y r f s i i i ~ s 'na icw p r i c e . on skT i l ed s a l a r i e d ILacagaent

u w e noye fron t h e ?rivsra 20 t ke p u b l i c s ecco r with s m l o s s of

" p r i v a t e seczor mwagers". iri this m i ~ i r o m e n t Tigici wage p o l i c i e s which

l i m i t access t o managers mounts t o i ncu r r i ng unnecessary s o c i a l cos t s .

It should be emphasized t h a t the key problem i n the a r ea Is

n o t s o much techniques f o r h a ~ d l i n g t he se p r o b l e m b u t r a t h e r i n f o rna t ion

on what kin&- of i n s r i t u t i o n a l systems a r e needed, L.e., research on

t he production h ' c t i o n . Tnis conclusion is very s i m i l a r t o t h e genera l

agreement on t he need f o r r e s ea r ch on a v a i l a b i l i t y of " i n t e rned i a t e

technology" b e f o r e incorpora t ing c a p i t a l labour s & s t i t u t i o n i n t o planrling

C L L ~ S .

The neo- c l a s s i ca l a l t&rnar ive t o a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s

t o t r y and ope ra t e on the l e v e l s of r e a l rewards and employment l e v e l s .

The success of such p o l i c i e s depends c r i t i c a l l y upon the f ea s ib : i l i t y *

'i of altering x ~ r k e : cqui l ibr iurs s u f f i c i e n t i y t o ach i sve the desirl-a re-

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The l e a s i b i l i t y of L-,? L;iires: approach depznds cr r ~ i z l i y

. ,,on ,- the f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e eco?.~=y 2s d e r e m i n e d by b e n a v i o u r a i and

b a h a v i o ~ r a l c h a r a c c e r i s t i c s d e : e x 5 ~ r L c e ar-d incoze e l a s t l c S z l e s of

c o n s 7 a e r dezznd whi ie t e c h n o l o g i c a i c h : r a c t e r i s t i c s d e t e r n i n e f a c c o r

s c b s i i t u t i o n p o s s i b i i i t l e s . The scg?e f o r a i t e r i n g t h e f i n a l e q u i l i -

b r i m of t n e economy chrough p r i c e i a t e r v e n t i o n depends on t h e s e parameters .

This is e s s e n t i a l l y an e ~ p i r i c a l quescion and one f o r which no s i n p l ~ e

znswer can b e provided. F requen t ly w h i l e p o l i c y makers deuiand e v i j e n c e

economists c a do l i t t l e m r e tha7 ask f o r a c t s of f a i t h . We s5ouid

recogc ize however t h a t n e a t n e o- c l a s s i c a l r e s u l t s based on f a c t o r p r i c e

i n t e r v e n t i o n o r r e l a t i v e o u t p u t ? r i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l c o t c a r r y much

weight u n l e s s we can b e s u r e of t 5 z s i z e of t h e v a r i o u s e l a s t i c i t i e s

i i ~ v o l v e d . I t i s co ld comfort t o -know t h a t " t h e d i r e c t i o n of change"

w i l l be r i g h t i f w e cannot be very conf iden t about t h e zmounts involved.

S a t e t h a t t h i s problem h a s a l s o b e d e v i l l e d a n a l y t i c h l work on eaployment I

?ror,otion . w e p t t h a t l t i s nore s e r i o u s when t h e o b j e c t i v e i s income

cis t . r ibut ion thsn when i t A L e;;a>ia:-~ent. T h i s is because h i g h e l a s t . i c i t i c s

of s u b s t i t u ~ i o n b e w e e n c s p i t ~ l 2;- LaScar a r e a f t e r a l i on ly a mixed

- bLes.,~:-,< i f i nc reaJec rizplo;r;,en~ AS a-ly ~ L , - L I C Y ~ ~ ac t h e c o s t cf lcwer

w

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i n t h i s cor-:ex~, i: i s X O ~ L ? , c o t i n g cha t e x ~ e r i z e n c s wLc:;

? l a i - ~ i n ~ uio2rls incorporaz l i .g r ~ a s o n s b i e p s r e n e c e r s f o r de-iiicd ar-c Tro-

l u c t i o n f l e x l j i l i t y co c o t SuggeSK t h e r r e l a t i v e p r i c e i n t e r v e n c l o n o f f e r ;

a u c h hope f o r a l t e r l G g t h e c i s t r i b u c i o n of i n c o z e e i t h e r v i a d e ~ z n d

cnznges f e e d i n g back on p rocuc t ion o r even v i a d i r e c t substitution

52tween c a p i t a l and l a b o u r . Thus Chenery end Raducnel i n experrlzenring 1 / -, -

w i t h such a n o d e l cor.clude:

" In t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i n d i r e c t f a c t o r s u b s t i t u t i o n v i a dertand and t r a d e nay a o t be e x t e c s i v e enough t o accoinmodate v e r y wide v a r i a t i o n s i n f a c t o r p r o p o r t i o n s . Secondly, t h e f e a s i b l e r s n g e of v a r i a t i o n is made c o n s i d e r a b l y narrower when w e c o n s i d e r tfie i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e e q u i l i b r i w n f a c t o r p r i c e s f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of income between c a p i t a l and l abour ."

These r e s u l c s l e a d t o h i g h l y p e s s i m i s t i c c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e scope f o r

promoting income d i s t r i b u t i o n v i a market i n t e r v e n t i o n . I f w e a r e t o

b e l i m i t e d t o d i r e c t f a c t a r s u b s t i t u t i o n , l a b o u r s u b s i d i e s o r s i s i l a r

,--lea i f i t e r v e n t i o n w i l l have t o be conf incd t o those s e c t o r s wi th

e i a s E i c i t i e s of s u b s t i t u t i o n g r e a t e r t han one. Undoubtedly t h e e x p e r i -

nen t a l i x d r c i s e d e s c r i b e d above inay i o s e c o n s i d e r a b l e f l e x i b i l i t y through P .*

a g g r e g a t i o n b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e s u l t s a r e samewhat s o b e r i n g .

The above c h a r a c e e r i s a t i o n of a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n and x a r k e t

- - i 2 t e rv r i ; t i on p o l i c i e s as p c l ~ r o ? ? o s i t s s docs n o t of c o u r s e imply ;hat

* P - . . - LTL C C O . - I G ; ~ ~ w i d e c';,oicz ~ u s : 'se ;n;ie fa: one or t h e other a;>?roac;,. A X

f ~ c t we woiiic e x 2 e c t ;~I,I: c n e o r rhe o : u r r i p p ~ 3 a ~ ? , a i g ' f i ~ 5~ :;o:L: ~ ~ i . t i - 3 1 L -

1/ " S u b s t i c c t i o n i n . ? la r , r , ing ~ o d c l s " , X o l l i s 2 . Ci-,enery and '~'il;.; r:. 2. - ~ ; ~ d ~ ~ t ~ ~ l , L. L, + L ~ i a l e s . - . :Lr; :level::?zeac IJia::n.i?& e d . . r i . - 3. Ckenery, Ilar-br6-i?.

G n i v c r s i t y P r e s s , L 3 71 .

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f c r ,ar:icc;ar i r o c c c ~ i ~ n secLsr= d e p x d l n g u p m v z r i o u s c k a r z c t e r i s i i c s

- cne produci iox s c r c c r u r e of t h e s s c c o r and r h e degree

c r f a c t o r s u j s z % r c z a b i l i t y which d e i e m i n e s f l d x i b i l i t y

t h e t i s c z i j u i l v e = t z r a c t e r of r k e s e c r o r i n c i c d i n g e x i s t i n g

? z r t e r n s of a s s e t cor.centracioa ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i a p o r t a n r

in i h e casz of 1&?6 i n a g r i c u l t u r e o r n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s i n

s i n i n g a d e x t r a c z i v e resources )

r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s e c t o r r o t h e p rocuc t ion e q u i l i b r i u m

of t h e rest of t h e zconomy. Output l o s s e s fo l lowing from

d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p o l i c i e s may b e p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s f o r

"key s e c t o r s " where t h e ecoaony caanot a d j u s t e a s i l y i n

response t o such l o s s e s . (Exports a r e an example).

As these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s va ry s u b s t a n t i a l i y a c r o s s c o u n t r i e s we would expect

the aptimun s e t of d i s t r i b u t i o n p o l i c i e s t o vary accord ing ly and f ind ing

t h e optimum s e t i s a z a j o r ?l&i;,iag probiem. I n t h e absence of f o r m 1

z o d e l s t h e s e choices rill obviously b e made on t h e b a s i s of informai I t

e v a i u a t i o n s t r o n g l y co i ld i t lone l bjr socio-poi . i t ica1, h i s t o r i c a l , idco-

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fl A v a i l ~ b 1 e ?l&':-i:~ " O ~ Z ~ S

I n t h s ~ r e c s l i - g sec rLx . s de i-.zve o n t l i n e d che k i n d oC ~ o l i c y

~ 3 ~ o i c e s m G s c r a c e g i c a i c e r . ~ z t i v e s t n z z nsed LO b e i n c o r 2 o r a r e d i n z o

?;arming x o d e l s . 6 e hzva E S S ~ Z ~ t h r a a j h o u c c h ~ t C ~ C " i d e a l ? l & n n k g

nodel" I n c o i ? o r r t i n g a l l c k s s e c3o ices i s r,ot a t p r e s e n t a p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t y .

m. nexr a r e p i s LO c c c s i i a r how f a r zvaLlab le p l ann ing a o d e l s i i l m i n a ~ e

? a r t i c u l a r c k o i i e s r e l e v ~ c c t o Lacore J i s ~ r i b u t i o n o b j e c t i v e s . i n z h i s

s e c t i o n w e w i l l d e z l j r i e f l y wich two f d i i a r ty?es o f models--in?ut-output

n o d e l s and l i n e a r p r o g r a m i n g ~ o d c l s .

( i ) I n ~ u z - C u t p c c Hodels -, Usefu lnes s or' Cons i s t ency P lann ing

The l i n i c a c i o n s o f t h e s e u.odels a r c w e l l known. F o r on r purposes

they a r i s e from (a) exogenously gLven t e c h n i c a l c o e f f i c i e n t s which niake t h e

t r e a t m e n t of e n 2 l o p e n t g e n e r a t i o a h i g h i y d e t e r m i n i s t i c g i v e n p a t t e r n s o f

f i n a l demand and (b) t h e absence of a Lizk between f a c t o r p r i c e s and p e r s o n a l

i ncoae d i s t r i b u t i o n and t h e n c e L O incoze-wise d i s a g g r e g a t e d consumption

demand patterns. Var ious a t t e q t s have 3 e e n made t o ex tend t h e g e n e r a l i t y

of t h e s e a o d e l s on b o t h couacs b u ~ t h e s e have n o t s o f a r been r e f l e c t e d i n 1 / - - . .... - -

- .., ., --.... \ ; 5 ~ . g 2 . 111 i i i c ~ .,ock u x = z n s i o n s a r e q u i t e f e a s i b l e i n n,;ny

c o u n t r i e s and would e n a b l e t h e s e n o d e l s t o b e used f o r s e v e r a l t y p e s 0; * l ' c ~ n ~ i s t e n c y e x e r c i s e s 1' i n evaluating t i e imp!.ications o f a l t e r n a t i v e d i s -

t r i b u t i o n a l s t r a t e g i . e s . - - - 3

'2 ~ n e n o s t obvious i y ? e s o f q ~ 2 s : i o n s tharr can%e examined throug:.

I - - - in;wC-oiit?iit ~ o : ~ . s i . , ~ ~ ; . c y zcde i ; a r e ~ t e " r e s o u r c e - u s c " ~ a ? l i c a t i o n s of - m -

. . 1 / 1;or ;:2c ~~~~---,~--;,~i~~, ~f ~~~i;~~-i~~>-.~y s l < ~ ~ = i ~ ~ t L ~ i ~ = -y lrL - ,--...* -.. 0 - - . A - & L -.,yLiL-"LLr,uL. . . .

- 7 , 5 .. , , . - i.,,2a~-s se.2 .c:*?- ..cry ~ c : : i tzcxct.l ~ 3 . ~ i t . 3:. ..."

A- d e s i n a S I C ; ~ c i e r c i.rc sc'i-rral

ac t e -apts a: cerivi:;;: i- I . ~ ~ . L . . L ----., c ~ s ; T ~ D L ~ ; ~ . - , . . . - . jjr ii:coae c i . 2 ~ 5 from VS;UL a a s ~ ~ : . . . S;:G - . w ~ g c - e ~ ~ ? i ~ y ~ e n : la.:;. S2c f o r exrizipie -3. !<elss;topf "A xci:i-Sec;or Si-::ul:-tion

. - x o d e l of Zi?loy-rr,enr, Srs-it;?, E;;G ,tlccz- ' J i s t r i b u t i o r . i n Puerco Xico" (Xiceo)

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- - , =--.ic--srrs ~ z ~ . , ~ e d a I a z . 1 ~ 2 ~ i s t r i 5 ~ c i c n a:.< growt;-, Ere g r e a t l y exa2geratdd

.. . k<ca.:sz incoas ~ L s r r l 2 u i ; o n w h l l e i t ~ A V O ~ V ~ S s o z e c o s t s a l s o p rov ides o f f -

s 2 t z l n g advanrages. The i o s t f a a - l i a r t r a d e- o f f s i.n t h i s con tex t i s t n e

- ? ?; res t on aggregacc s2vi;gs. Thus i t i s argued chz t z g g r e g a t e s ~ v i z g s w i l l

fall i: t h e ~ z r g i c a ; s ~ v i ~ ~ s r a t e s a r e h igher a t h igher incoze i e v e i s .

h g a i x s t t h i s i t i s u s u a i i y argued char i a c o a e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n enabies sub-

s i a n z i a l econony i n the u s e of s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s . T h i s is because incoiae

c l s t r i b u t i o n w i l l s h i f t consumption p a z t e r n s i n favour of goods which

f i g u r e c o r e p r o s i n e n t l y i n t h e consumption p a t t e r n a t lower incocs l e v e l s

and i t is argued t h a t t h e s e a r e s e c t o r s w i t h lower c a p i t a l o u t p u t r a t i o s

sad a l s o lower import i n t e n s i t y i n t e r n s of b o t h i n t e r m e d i a t e requirement

aad c a p i t a l goods r e q u i r e n e n t s . This speculation has l e d co a s e r i e s of

a c t e x p t s t o conpare out?u+ and resource u s e s o l u t i o n s f o r exogefiously

v a r i e d denand p a t t e r n changes. We n o t e i n p a s s i n g t h a t t h e quantitative

r e s u l t s of t h e s e e x e r c i s e s do n o t seen t o be s i g n i f i c a n t , b u t t:?is is

probably due t o t h e very h i g h degree of aggrega t ion invo lved on t h e pro-

duct-ion s i d e . ' Y y p i c ~ l l y whereas d e t a i l e d budget s t u d i e s a r e a v a i l - b l e

~ h e s e ;:ave t o b e aggregated i n t o very broad c a t e g o r i e s t o conform wi th a

the d e t a i l usua l ly a v a i l a b l e i n t h e input- output t a b l e .

S i m i l a r CccsiStci~Cy o x c r c i s e s can b e designed t o zxp lo re t h c - - . - A L L ~ C ~f s p e c i f i c ~ L C ~ O ~ J I . C O L - I ~ L T ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ' ~ ~ p c n income d i s t r i ~ u t i o n . Thus '5 L - ;C i; i i Z C c ; ~ . - , - - ly s - . . -

L I L I I . L L L C ~ ~ i l i i t t i i ~ b ~ ~ ; ? i y o r ~ - t ; i l ~ O U C S ( r n ~ i r . 1 ~ food and

L p . - I ':;.A(. '~-r;ic.e;lt ;% : s i . r l y obvious LA. - L -- cic:..cd dcOT~3z~y

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1/ - ~3 &n F q a r t a n ; c o ~ s t r a i n t . The c u r r z n t F i f t h P l a n e x e r c i s e i n i n Z i a

s x p l i c i z l y ccde rcakcs rhis t y p e of e x e r c i s e by s ? e c i f y i a g z a r g e t chmgea

i a eons.c;n?~ion l e v e l s f o r each 3: twenily s c ? a r a r e coasur;?zion e x 2 s n d i t u r e

c l a s s e s of r h e po?-a i . f ion . / The r e s u i i i a g s o l c t i o n f o r r h e s o d e l i s ex-

p z c t e d t o h i g h l i g h t t h e c u c ~ u t growt;? Lmpl i cz t ions f o r Lass c c n s l i z ? ~ i o n

goods s e c t o r s . S i n c e a z a j o r u s e of i x p a t - o u t p u t n o d e l s is t o i d e z t i f y

i n v e s tmenc L n p l i c a t i o n s ( o t a l t e r n a t l v z l a g a s s u n p t i o n s ) of ? a r t i c u l a r out-

p u t p a t t e r n s t h e s e e x e r c i s e s do p rov ide a v a l u a b l e g u i d e t o governnent p o i i c y

i n i nves tmen t r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n and t i n i n g (whether by p u b l i c s e c t o r

i nves tmen t o r c o n t r o i s c:im i n c e n t i v e s f o r t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r ) .

The c r i t i c a l weakness of t h e s e t y p e s of c o n s i s t e n c y e x e r c i s e s is

obvious on r e f l e c r i o n : t hey do n o t t e l l u s v e r y much abouz how t o a c h i e v e

t h e income d i s t r i b u t i o n a l changes whose p r o d u c t i o n i i n p l i c a t i o n s a r e be ing

examined. Th i s i s because inpu t- ou tpu t s o d e l s do n o t d e a l adequa te ly w i t h

t h e two key f a c t o r rewards and employment l e v e l s and t h e d i s t i r b u t i o n of

a s s e t s and l a b o u r s k i l l s o v e r t h e p o p u l a t i o n . Some a t t e n p t s have been lnade

+ - t i c k l e t h e second p r o b l c s by d i s t r i b u t i n g v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s of inco12e

,.,,AL zA7,d ,>refit i ncone ) by s e c t o z ove r ;he p o p u l a t i o n on t h e b a s i s of

. I survey d a t a on a s s e t an4 l a b o u r s k i l l d i s t i r b u t i o n . (This s t a t i s t i c a l y?-

l a t i o n s h i p nay b e assumed t o b e g iven i n t h e s h o r t p e r i o d . ) The b a s i c ;:roblem

I/ S e c t o r a l excess dsinands w i l l s p i l l o v e r i n t o t h e i3al:~nce of Payments -- w h i l e s e c f o r a l e x c e s s s u p p l i e s nay n o t b e e x p o r t a b l e . 7k.c absence of ?rites obviousby c e p r i v c s t h e model of any f l e x i j i l i t y :his r e s p e c t .

II 2 / The I ~ c i z n e x e ~ c i s e dces n o t c n d o 2 c n s - ~ s l y gene r t i l 6 iacoc.c dis;rib~t:o>. - hcwevcr s o t h a t cazge: cor,sm;,';ion chaages i;i.ply specific s o v l a ~ s r a z e s by ?ar : icu lar c l a s s ~ j . TP.e :L<;UL-C ;O i n c o r ? c r z c e i n c o ~ ~ e ge:.cra=is~~ cx;3i:<:lL1 L A Y c~:,viousiy r,xkes this e;cerc:sc n; . i n i t ~ d v<ii-ie f o r ? o l i c y s e n c c ~ c : ? i e v c 2er.t of s a v i n g s ta rge i l s & i ; ~ r c ; ~ c tl,is, i s critical.

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- - LaJocr l s a v e s t h e y a r z s r , of ou:?u= a s zhe oniy Ierernlna- i t of e a p l o p e a z

l e v e l s . Th i s r i g i d i t y l e z d s t o t r c e x l s u s =?:?asis be ing ? laced u?on t:he i

II - -&our i n r e n s i v e ,se!czors" s c c h as s e r v i c e s and constrr?ccion w i t n f requen t

r e f e r e n c e s t o r u r a l ce-;zlc?zsat &id s-dl1 s c a l e i n d u s t r y which a r e :ypi.cally

~ o c s e p a r a t e s e c t o r s b u t r e? resex= i n t r a - s e c t o r a l choices .

( i i ) L i n e a r T r o g r m i n g X c l e l s

.'l'hese node l s ex tecd t h e input- output models by adding technol.ogy

ckoica ( 'DUE w i t h i n a f i x e d c o e f f i c i e n t s framework) and an op t imis ing process .

Thc uses and 1imit ; l t ions of rhese a o d e l s have been e x t e n s i v e l y discussed

1 / e i s e w h e r ~ and our co-dents a r e c :~are fore l i n l t e d t o i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r

p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o icc0u.e d;: t r i b u r i o n ques t ioas . 'de n o t e t h a t u n l i k e

input- output models no l i n e a r programining model has been a c t u a l l y used a s

a ?'.anniag model a t t h e economy wide l e v e l a l though s e v e r a l such a o d e l s

hzve becn b u i l t a s resea rch e f f o r t s .

I t i s importanr t o recognise t h a t l i n c a r programming m d e l s t y p i c a l i y

do nor endogenously g e n e r a t e i n c o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n p a t t e r n s . They do y i e l d

shridm p r i c e s f o r a l l r e sources t h a t a r e f u l l y employed i n t h e opcirnal . t

s o l u t i o n but thesc s i ~ a d o w p r i c c r , cnnnot be i n t e r p r e t e d as market p r i c e s i n

'-.,-.:r s q s e . c f f c c t ~ b d s e m d 2 . s do sGmc a u s e f u l purFose i n i n c o r p o r a t i n g '9 .G . .

rilc ,i;lp?;.y s c t r c l z l e ; of Ic5ocr :;..-o t h e -c~;l , : if icatio;l of f e a s i j i e - - + . E - I

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11 choices- b u t they do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y s i n u l a t e market e q u i l i b r i m f o r

f a c t o r p r i c e de te rmina t ion .

Some a t t e m p t s have been made i n r ecen t s t u d i e s t o i n c o r p a r a t e

market e q u i l i b r i u m behaviour in some f a c t o r markets i n L. P. models of

i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s . Thus a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r m d e l s have been s p e c i f i e d

which i n c o r p o r a t e upward s l o p i n g supp ly curves f o r l abour . The a v a i l a b i l i t y

of l a b o u r is no l o n g e r expressed i n t e r n o + a n i n e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t bu t

a s a f u n c t i o n of wages which f i g u r e as a c o s t i n s i m u l a t i n g market

2 behaviour on f a d . Note t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e i u n c t i o n i n t h e s e models is

s p e c i f i e d t o s i m u l a t e compet i t ive e q u i l i b r i u m and does n o t have a soc : i a l

v a l u a t i o n a s p e c t . The model can then be solved t o y i e l d employmnt l e v e l s

and e q u i l i b r i u m wage r a t e s a long wi th shadow p r i c e s on those resources

t h a t e n t e r i n t r a d i t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t form. Such models a r e

e s s e n t i a l l y s imula t ion m d e l s when t h e op t i m i s i n g p rocess is d i r e c t e d s o l e i y

a t f i n d i n g t h e cclmpetitive equi l ibr ium. They can b e ext remely u s e f u l

s i n c e ~ n e y p e r n i t exper imenta t ion wi th a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s g i ~ r e n d i f f e r e n t

types of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l cons t r a i n ts o r o t h e r po l i cy i n t e r v e n t i o n s . Thus

C land a v a i l a b i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t s f o r d i f f e r e n t farm s i z e s can b e a l t e r e d in'

- 1/ Scc the paper on "Ernp loyr r~ t Planning Methodology" hy C . B l i t z e r imd - L . T a y l o r submit ted f o r t h e Wdrking p a r t y . -

C

2 1 T h i s approach was f o l l o w e d d n the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of CHAC, a s t a t i c programLng - model f o r t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e m o r i n Mexico.

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cjnsr r a l n t s . Si-Al;:r:)- p r i c e s f o r var lzb i e suppiy resources cai; 5 e

~ _ c c r z c ;-o yLel~ d:c=~rr;&civc s i ~ d a t 5 c r . s .

canslGe:a~lsr-s I n r a zke o t j e c c i v z 5cccr ioz . T t i s Is n o t ?.owever an cver-

u:~eirnin; l o s s . Inderc t ke sinuia:ion of a i t e r c a t i v s p o s s i b i l i t i e s described

above nay wel l be t h e Eas t u s e f u l ana ly t i c21 t o o l e s p e c i a l l y when d i f f e r -

CIZ dicznsions of the d i s t r i b u t i o a p rob lea nay be r e l e v a n t a t d i f f e r e n t

t i n e s -- p roduc t i v i t y on stall v s . l a r g e farms? e n p l o p e a t of h i r e d l a o c ~ r ?

.-ural-urban wage e q u a l i s a t i o n by Lixed ninimun wages?

( i i i ) Geileral Equilibri-im Mode l :~

Tne next s t e p i n m d e l 'bui lding is obviously i n the d i r e c t i o n

or' gene ra l e q u i l i b r i m models and sane of t h e f i r s z a t t eq r s i n t h i s

d i r e c t i o n have only r e c e n t l y been unveiled.l / kTe reseerve co-nts on these

m d e i s on he grounds t h a t t h e r a i n i n t e r e s t in t h i s f i e l d az t h i s s t age

is conceptual and a l g o r i t h d c . For some tire t o cone t h e s e models w i l l

Lave a p r i r a r i l y pedagogic (although n o t uni.mportalAt) r o l e and t h i s is C . e

v , l t s i i e c'nc :;co?e of t h i s pa7cr.

. . / S c r "A ?;<cro-~cor.cx-; ::oc:cl of Kom: : E'actcr.; . 2 f f c c t L s .- i'ne 3is trib.ccLon ~f i ; l c p i : i;; ti;^ S?.O;': ;i;ill'l, by I . A l e i : a r . h 2; lC.S. L c ~ ~ ~ I s Q ~ , J s n ~ a r y , 2373; :,<;>el- .~3rij--~d f a r L?.C 3iLlagi.s :<a~k<r,j ? z r ~ y . -

Page 25: DRDOS Public Disclosure Authorized Interna~ional Bar ... · natter of mking these instruments follow this optimal time path. It is obvio~s that we are a long way from even formulating

(V) Cznclcsc~ns

Oxr qe:leral cor,clus:o~s c L the r c l e of p i a n ~ i n g n o l e l s i n i 1 i u i n h z L n g

- . ?o,:cy :k-.oices r e l e v i n c f o r inccze c i s c r i b u r 5 o n 32y be s - a a r i s e d as f o i i o ~ ~ s :

( i ) The a v a i l a b l e a r e a s of in tervencior , a r e a m e r o u s and may b e

d iv ided broadly i n t o two approaches: a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u , t i o n

ecc a z r k r r i aze rvenr ion i n f u n c t i o c a l incoice de te rmina t ioa .

S x ; > e n d i r ~ r e ? o l i c y provides zn op?or tun i ty t o coiiibine Soch

approaci-es .znL a l s o u d e r t a k e "marginal consun?tion t r a a s f e r s ."

( i i ; Both a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n and ~ a r k e t i n t e r v e n t i o n have t h e i r

i i m i t a t i o n s and a s s o c i a t e d c o s t s . The s u i t a b i l i t y of one ~ p p r o a c h

o r t h e o t h e r w i l l depend upon o t h e r "stru. : tural fac tors ' '

( i i i ) So econoriy wide planning madel exists which w i l l s u f f i c i e n t l y

q u a n t i f y t h e e f f e c t s of a l l the v a r i o u s p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s .

C e r t a i n l y t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s cannot be c a s t i n t o an op t imis ing

framework f o r planning purposes.

( i v ) Some p a r t i a l o r "consistency" t y p e e x e r c i s e s csn be conducted--- -

using a v a i l a b l e planning. models of t h e input- output type and a l s o ". .. '

L.?. models. A major problem w i t h t h e s e e x e r c i s e s is t h a t :hey

do n o t focus on t h e key i s s u e of how t o change incone d i s t r i b u t i o n ,

except f o r some f a i r l y star ,dard *esc r ip t i o n s , e . g . , emphasising

" labour i n t e n s i v e s e c t o r s o r under taking l and reform. -

These conc lus ions &oulc not b e c lassed a s " p e s s i n i s t i c ." Thcy - .* L

~ l r e s i n p l y a r e f l e c t i o n of he e n t i r e l y p l a u s i b l e p r o p o s i ~ i o n t h z t we 'krAow - * *

r c l a ~ i v c l y l i t t l e &bout t h e 9 r u e long t e r n s t r x . : t u r a i f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e b e

ecoaon:gr i n g s n e r a c i n g a i c ~ r a a t i v c incoce d i s 2 r i b u t i o a p z t t e r n s .