In the aftermath of 21 August sarinattack in Damascus, a number ofphotographs and videos were posted

online, showing munitions localactivists claimed were linked to theattack. One was the M14 140mmartillery rocket, capable of carrying awarhead containing 2.2kg of sarin. Theother munition was more of a mystery.It resembled a barrel welded onto theend of a rocket, and the design appearedto be unique to the Syrian conflict.Using photographs and videos of theremains of these munitions from Syriait was possible to piece together whatthey were, and who was using them.

I first encountered these mysterymunitions in a video posted on YouTubeby activists in Daraya, a district in thesouthwest of Damascus, on 4 January2013. The video showed the tail of therocket, sticking out of a still-smokingcrater. The narrator of the videoprovided very little information beyondits location, and that the governmentforces had fired it. The unusual designof the tail fins didn't match anymunition I was aware of, even the DIYmunitions used by opposition groups. Itwas difficult to draw any conclusionsbased on the information presented, so Imerely noted it as one of the unusualunidentified objects that occasionallyturns up in the conflict.

Six months later, on 11 June, avideo was posted online by activists inAdra, northeast of Damascus, claimingto show the remains of a “chemicalrocket”. The video showed variousfragments of the rocket, including tailfins with the exact configuration of the4 January rocket. It wasn't until analleged chemical attack on 5 August inAdra that I came across the firstfootage of an almost complete exampleof the munition.

The video began with a dog,twitching and convulsing violently, andmoved on to other dead and dyinganimals in the area. Towards the end ofthe video the munition activists claimedwas used in the attack was shown. It

was clear this was the same type ofmunition shown in previous videos, andother videos posted online by activistsin Adra would show at least two moreexamples of the same munition theyclaimed were used in the 5 Augustattack. However, unlike the 21 Augustattack, the number of casualties wassmall, barely a couple of dozen killedand injured.

Videos and photographs from the 21August attacks show the remains of fiveto six of these munitions, someembedded in the ground, one even inthe entrance of someone's home aftercrashing through the roof. Thesephotographs and videos allowed myselfand others to build an increasinglydetailed picture of the munition, andled to even more discoveries about it.

Having gathered evidence linkingthese munitions to alleged chemicalattacks in Syria, I named andabbreviated the munition the“Unidentified Munition Linked toAlleged Chemical Attacks”, or UMLACA.I wrote a number of pieces about it, anda number of my readers forwarded mevideos showing two other examples ofthe munition. The first video, filmed inKhalidiya, Homs, on 2 August showed

the nearly complete remains of one ofthe munitions that had failed todetonate. The outer casing of thewarhead section was intact, apart fromthe nose section that appeared to havebroken apart on impact. Obviously,that's a problem if the warheadcontained sarin but, in this example,that didn't appear to be the case.Instead, yellow powder was visible and,in a second video, posted to YouTube on29 August by the Environs of the HolyHouse [Jerusalem] Battalions in CampSbeineh, Damascus, a similarly completeexample of UMLACA was shown with thesame yellow powder, which appeared tobe some sort of high explosive.

This obviously raised questionsabout what the UMLACA was, chemicalor explosive, but further investigationled me to believe there were at leasttwo types of UMLACA. In the twovideos of the complete UMLACA filledwith yellow high-explosive powder, itappeared the powder filled the entirewarhead. It appeared the warhead wasaround a metre long, and at least30cm wide, which would be a hugeamount of explosive powder. Thequestion was: why are there so manyexamples of the UMLACA with the

Drawing out the truth

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LD Eliot Higgins, also known as the blogger Brown Moses, provides his insight

into the delivery system, and munitions, used in the 21August attack

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Despite looking 'DIY' the munition seems to have been effective in the Aug 21 attacks ©E Higgins

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outer shell of the warhead missing,but with the central column of thewarhead intact, and no sign of yellowpowder? If the warhead was filled withhigh explosive then we certainlywouldn't be seeing the relativelyintact remains we were seeing at thesites of alleged chemical attacks.

From studying the videos it alsobecome apparent there were a coupleof other differences. In the base of thewarheads of the UMLACAs linked tochemical attacks in Syria two accessports were visible, while the high-explosive variant had only one port. Italso appeared that the explosive typehad black numbering on the body ofthe rocket, while the chemical typehad red lettering.

Further examination of theremains of the UMALCAs at the site ofalleged chemical attacks provided anincreasing body of evidence that therewere two versions of the munition.The pattern of damage to themunition was always very consistent,with the central column of thewarhead section always intact, butbent by the impact of the munitionwith the ground. Also frequentlypresent alongside the munition werethe remains of the warhead's outershell. These were consistently thesame size, and shape, alwaysrectangles of metal bent outwards.This seemed to strongly suggest theyhad been pre-weakened to break openwhen the dispersal charge detonated.

As for the position of the dispersalcharge, detailed images andmeasurement of the munition showedthe presence of a 6.5cm metal plug inthe end of the central column of thewarhead. It appeared the centralcolumn had extended past that metalplug, and that metal had been bentsideways, flush with the metal plug.This seemed to indicate the explosivedispersal charge had sat inside thecentral column, rather than beingseparate from the central column.

Despite its initial rather crudeappearance, it became increasinglyclear the the UMLACA was moresophisticated than the munitionsproduced by the Syrian opposition. Thelargest DIY munitions being produced

by the opposition were rounds for the“Hell Cannon”, a type of mortar thatused empty cooking-gas cylinders filledwith homemade fertilizer basedexplosive as ammunition; certainly farsimpler than the munitions linked toalleged chemical attacks.

It was also possible to identify thelaunchers to fire the munitions fromphotographs and videos posted online.The first video showing what appearedto be this type of munition beinglaunched was posted online on 28August 2013, and showed whatappeared to be the same type ofmunition being loaded into a fairlybasic-looking tube launcher, mountedon the back of a large flatback truck.While the design of the munitionseemed to match what has been seenin other videos, one thing seemedsignificantly different. The rocketsection of the munition linked to the

21 August attack measured around135cm, while the munition shownbeing loaded in the video was at leastas long as the men stood next to it. Itseemed that this was in fact a largerversion of the same munition.

Further investigation uncovered sixvideos filmed by activists around thegovernment-held Mezzeh airbase,neighbouring Daraya, in southwestDamascus, filmed in December 2012and January 2013. In those videos awhite, flatbed truck is visible, carryinga large twin-barrelled launcher. Someof these videos show launches, butthere's only one video where the actualmunition being fired can be made out.By watching the video frame by frame,it's possible to see the distinct outlineof the UMLACA as it's leaving thelaunched tube. Other footage filmedoutside of Mezzeh airbase shows one ofthe UMALCA clearly flying through the

Many questions remain about this munition ©E Higgins

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air shortly before it hits the ground.The link between the launcher and theUMLACA is further supported byphotographs from Aleppo, taken inNovember 2012. It shows the sametype of flatbed truck, this time paintedblue, with the same twin-barrelledlauncher on the rear. One of thesephotographs shows the rear of theUMLACA protruding from the back ofone of the launcher's barrels.

While all this evidence points in thedirection of only government forceshaving and using these munitions,there have been attempts to link themunitions to the Syrian opposition. On15 September, the day after the UNreport into the 21August sarin attackswas published, three videos were postedon the video-sharing sites LiveLeak andYouTube by the same user. All threevideos were described as “September15. Kurdish Peshmerga killed threeSyrian terrorists on border. They foundcell phone in pocket. Night bombingvideo there. Terrorists on video weargas masks. Video was shot August 21.One terrorist name it Storm operation.”

The videos show what appears to bethe opposition group Liwa al-Islamlaunching UMLACAs, with thecameraman claiming it's 21 August,and they are targeting governmentforces in Jobar and Qaboun. All themen filmed in the videos are wearinggas masks, and Liwa al-Islam bannersare draped everywhere. It seems toimply that Liwa al-Islam wereattacking government forces withchemical weapons, and missed, gassingEastern Ghouta.

Ignoring the reports of thechemical attacks affecting two separateareas, there's a number of thingswrong with these videos. Liwa al-Islamis a well-established brigade, and knowa lot about making videos. They'veposted hundreds, if not thousands ofvideos, and their members are wellversed in making recordings of theiractivities. Why then does thecameraman use a low-qualitycameraphone, holding it the wrongway around, so the image is rotated 90degrees? They've gone to the trouble ofensuring their banner is draped overeverything in sight (itself very unusual

for their videos), they make sure thatall three videos start with them statingthe date, and the operation even has aspecial name, “Reeh Sarsar” or “ColdWind”. They've even ensured theirtruck is shining its lights on thelauncher, even though it would giveaway their position. So why go to allthe trouble of setting up flags,announcing the date and the name ofthe operation, if you aren't going tofilm it properly?

You could also questions why thecameraman is the only one notwearing a gas mask through all thevideos, or why the man stood closest tothe supposedly sarin-filled rockets hastaken the precaution of wearing a gasmask, while still electing to wear ashort-sleeved T-shirt, exposing hisnaked arms to any sarin that mighthappen to leak out of the munitions.Overall, the video is very fishy, andprobably does more to confirm thegovernment was responsible ratherthan Liwa al-Islam.

Thanks to evidence gatheredthrough social media and other opensources, we've been able to gain amuch greater understanding of amunition for which no datapreviously existed, and even build abody of evidence that points towardswho was responsible for the 21August event. Many questions still

remain: How many of theselaunchers exist? How are thewarheads filled with chemical agents?Are there more types of fills for thewarhead? Was the sarin used aunitary or binary type? Perhaps someof these questions will be answeredby the OPCW's work in Syria, but fornow they remain unanswered.

Link to all the videos mentioned inthe article http://bit.ly/16G1tlG

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38 CBRNe WORLD October 2013 www.cbrneworld.com

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The UMLACA launcher ©E Higgins

Evidence suggests there are twoversions of the UMLACA munition

©E Higgins