DRAMA, DOGMATISM, AND IN PLATO’S PHAEDOancphil.lsa.umich.edu/-/downloads/osap/44-Lee.pdf ·...

DRAMA DOGMATISM ANDTHE lsquoEQUALSrsquo ARGUMENT

IN PLATOrsquoS PHAEDO

DAVID C LEE

Introduction

T Phaedo occupies a crucially important position in the attemptto build up a picture of Platorsquos philosophical views Its argumentshave been examined minutely numerous times perhaps more sothan those of any other Platonic work The result is as might beexpected a proliferation of alternative but equally sophisticated in-terpretative possibilities each placing a different construction onthe nature of Platorsquos commitments and offering a different accountof his philosophical developmentA clear division has emerged between two kinds of interpretation

Some take the Phaedo to include as a presupposition deployed asa premiss in arguments a worked-out and systematic metaphysicaltheory Others take the dialogue to be more ambitious both de-ducing consequences from the theory and seeking to argue for andjustify the theory itself by establishing it on the basis of rationalargument The interpretation with the longer history which takesthe Phaedo to be concerned essentially with exposition rather thanjustification can be named the lsquotraditionalrsquo reading The interpre-tation more recently developed which takes arguments for a me-taphysical theory to be a crucial part of the dialogue can be calledthe lsquotransitionalrsquo reading On this alternative interpretation Plato

copy David C Lee Traditional readers include R D Archer-Hind Platonos Phaidon [Phaidon]

(London ) J Burnet Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (Oxford ) H William-son The Phaedo of Plato (London ) W D Ross Platorsquos Theory of Ideas [PTI](Oxford ) R S Bluck Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (London ) R HackforthPlatorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (Cambridge ) J Brentlinger lsquoIncomplete Predicatesand the Two World Theory of the Phaedorsquo [lsquoIncompletersquo] Phronesis () ndash and D Gallop Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (Oxford ) The transitional read-ing was pioneered by G M A Grube Platorsquos Thought [PT] (London ) andis more comprehensively adopted by readers such as N P White Plato on Know-ledge and Reality [PKR] (Indianapolis ) D Bostock Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo](Oxford ) T Penner The Ascent from Nominalism [Nominalism] (Dordrecht) G Fine On Ideas Aristotlersquos Criticism of Platorsquos Theory of Forms (Oxford

Created on 23 February 2013 at 932 hours page 1

David C Lee

intended the Phaedo to set out and justify a change from an earlierlsquoSocraticrsquo style of philosophy which does not make any explicitlymetaphysical claims to a position in which various ontological com-mitments are to be adopted and their implications investigated Thetransitional reading unlike the traditional reading takes thePhaedoto include an explicit discussion of the details of these new com-mitments and to argue that they provide a response to some of theproblems raised by Socratesrsquo questions This interpretative divi-sion particularly takes shape around a disagreement over the correctreading of the lsquoequalsrsquo argument a passage in which the dramaticSocrates argues that our knowledge of equality must be recollectedfrom a previous lifeMy aim here is not to draw out the differences between these read-

ings and to support one over the other but rather to uncover someimportant common ground they share I intend to draw attentionto an alternative approach to the Phaedomdashand to the lsquoequalsrsquo argu-ment in particularmdashwhich does not share these assumptions As aresult I will propose a considerably different account of the philo-sophical structure of the dialogue from the interpretations currentlydebated According to this new account the particular metaphysi-cal theory which is given prominence in different ways by previousinterpretations is considerably less detailed and systematic than isgenerally supposed and plays a subordinate role in the PhaedoIn Section I examine the reasons typically given for taking a par-

ticular metaphysical theory to be a dominant theme of the dialogueand show that they rest on questionable methodological assump-tions about the context in which the Phaedo should be read I arguethat there is room for a rival approach to the dialogue provided itcan offer comparable advantages In Section I assess the accountsof the lsquoequalsrsquo argument offered by traditional and transitional in-terpretations show that neither is compelling and put forward analternative In Section I confront two objections to my readingand develop a distinction between dramatic and philosophical levelsof argument to answer them In Sections and I discuss the lsquofinalrsquoargument and make a case for a close connection between the con-ception of explanation developed there and the conclusion of thelsquoequalsrsquo argument I show in Section that the resulting reading

) C Rowe Plato Phaedo [Phaedo] (Cambridge ) P Dimas lsquoRe-collecting Forms in the Phaedorsquo [lsquoRecollectingrsquo] Phronesis () ndash andR M Dancy Platorsquos Introduction of Forms [PF] (Cambridge )


The lsquoEqualsrsquo Argument in Platorsquos Phaedo

gives new and plausible answers to some difficulties which causeproblems for the better-known interpretations In my conclusion Iwill argue that the apparent dogmatism and obscurity of thePhaedoarises from distorted expectations about the questions the dialogueis attempting to answer Onmy approach a different set of concernsemerges which have a much clearer correspondence with Platorsquosdiscussion and which also give rise to a distinctive position in thedebate about the nature of explanation which is of increasing in-terest to current philosophers

Metaphysics in the Phaedo

Before discussing the lsquoequalsrsquo argument in detail my first aim willbe to show that in spite of appearances there is considerable com-mon ground methodologically as well as substantively between thetwo readings of the Phaedo which I plan to challenge The tradi-tional reading takes the dialogue to presuppose a metaphysical the-ory familiar to Platorsquos readers using it as an unquestioned premisson which arguments for the immortality of the soul can be basedThe task of arguing for the theory itself is not attempted althoughin the course of the discussion some further aspects of the the-ory are revealed On the transitional reading on the other handthe dialogue does not merely presuppose but elaborates and arguesfor a metaphysical theory This theory is treated as a new develop-ment albeit one which has some continuity with what went beforeIt therefore attributes a dual purpose to the Phaedo together withits declared aim of defending the immortality of the soul the argu-ments also set out and defend ametaphysical theory which supportsthis conclusion

One important reason why the metaphysical focus of the Phaedois considered beyond question is that by the later stages of the dia-logue at least we seem to have strong evidence that Plato takes him-self to be in a position to invoke a theory of sense-transcendententities assuming that their nature is clearly understood by hisaudience One particularly strong example of this is a passage whichoccurs close to the end of thePhaedo in which Socrates takes up thediscussion with his companions on the immortality of the soul forthe last time

All translations throughout are my own unless I have explicitly credited themto others


David C Lee

lsquoButrsquo he said lsquothis is what I mean nothing new but those things I neverstop talking about both at other times and in the discussion just now Irsquomgoing to set about showing you the kind of explanation Irsquom concernedwiththat is Irsquom going back to those often chattered-about things and Irsquoll startfrom them by setting down that there is something fine by itself and goodand large and all the others If you grant me these and agree that they areI hope to show you the explanation from these and to discover that the soulis immortalrsquo

lsquoBut of coursersquo said Cebes lsquotake these as granted to you and hurry onyour wayrsquo (Phaedo ndash )

While the argument within which this passage is situated is the sub-ject of considerable debate it is none the less widely agreed that inthis passage the lsquooften chattered-about thingsrsquo are abstract meta-physical entities the Platonic forms If this is so then it is clearly atask for the interpreter to explain the status of these entities withinthe dialogue

Disregarding for amoment any prior expectations wemight haveon the basis of reading either the rest of the Phaedo or any otherPlatonic dialogue how clear is it that this passage must be read thisway Socrates does not explicitly say that the things he is settingdown (ὑποθέμενος) are forms nor does he say anything about theircharacteristics The word eidos is used in this passage but clearly ina non-technical sense as the lsquokindrsquo of explanation (τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος)he is looking for The claim that a particular metaphysical theoryis being introduced that of sense-transcendent eternally existingand immutable entities depends on a particular construal of theexpression lsquosomething fine by itself rsquo (τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ ᾿ αὑτό) men-tioned together with lsquogood large and all the othersrsquo at ndashThe same expression is picked up later in the argument as lsquothe fine

The interpreters who explicitly endorse this view include prominent representa-tives from both traditional and transitional readings such as Archer-Hind Phaidon Burnet Phaedo Grube PT ndash Ross PTI Bluck Phaedo Hackforth Phaedo Brentlinger lsquoIncompletersquo Gallop Phaedo A Ne-hamas lsquoPredication and Forms of Opposites in the Phaedorsquo [lsquoOppositesrsquo] Review ofMetaphysics () ndash at G Vlastos lsquoReasons and Causesrsquo [lsquoRea-sonsrsquo] repr in id Platonic Studies (Princeton ) ndash at ndash BostockPhaedo C Rowe lsquoExplanation in Phaedo ndash rsquo [lsquoExplanationrsquo] Ox-ford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash at and Phaedo DancyPF D Sedley lsquoEqual Sticks and Stonesrsquo [lsquoEqualrsquo] in D Scott (ed) MaieusisEssays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat (Oxford ) ndash at and R Sharma lsquoSocratesrsquo New Aitia Causal and Teleological Explanations inPlatorsquos Phaedorsquo [lsquoSocratesrsquo] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndashat



itself rsquo (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν ndash) lsquothat finersquo (ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ ndash )and subsequently lsquoby the finersquo (τῷ καλῷ ) These may beunderstood as terms of art indicating a special realm of metaphysi-cal objects the Platonic forms But is this metaphysical reading theonly possible one

Further grounds must be sought to determine whether lsquothe finersquolsquothat finersquo and lsquosomething fine by itself rsquo function as technical termsin the argument Yet within the Phaedo itself there is no strongreason to suppose that Plato employs a technical vocabulary witha fixed range of senses The word eidos most closely associatedwith Platorsquos form theory is a case in point Its putatively technicalinstances (eg ) are considerably outnumbered bythose in which it is plausibly translated in its ordinary senses of lsquoap-pearancersquo lsquoimagersquo ( ) lsquoconditionrsquo ( ) and lsquokindrsquoor lsquosortrsquo ( ) The words idea and morphē appear late in thePhaedo occurring only after the passage quoted above Even herethere is disagreement among commentators as to whether theseterms are also meant to refer to forms or to some other metaphy-sical entities which share some of the properties of forms but notothers The expression lsquoauto to rsquo which has the strongest claimto be taken as a technical expression for introducing a form (eg ndash ) is also found in other instances in which it appearsmerely to focus attention on a particular thing (eg )or event (eg ndash)

The inference from Platorsquos terminology to a belief in forms which exist inde-pendently of sense-perceptibles is critically examined by G Fine lsquoSeparationrsquo reprin ead Plato on Knowledge and Forms Selected Essays (Oxford ) ndash atndash The terminological evidence put forward for the commonly drawn contrastbetween forms and particulars in terms of generality and lack of spatial location iscriticized by V Harte lsquoPlatorsquos Metaphysicsrsquo in G Fine (ed) The Oxford Handbookof Plato (Oxford ) ndash

As Bluck points out (Phaedo n ) the consistent translation of ἰδέα as lsquoformrsquoappears to credit Plato with the view that each soul is itself a form at Thisand other problematic cases have created a dispute as to whether there are other sortsof entity besides forms involved in the argument lsquoImmanent charactersrsquo or lsquoform-copiesrsquo are attributed to Plato byHackforthPhaedo Vlastos lsquoReasonsrsquo andRowe lsquoExplanationrsquo The distinction is defended at length by D Devereux lsquoSe-paration and Immanence in Platorsquos Theory of Formsrsquo repr in G Fine (ed) Plato Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford ) ndash

For Platorsquos use of the same expressions in a non-technical sense in the lsquoSocraticdialoguesrsquo see Vlastos lsquoReasonsrsquo ndash A striking example of this can be found atEuthph ndash in which Euthyphro agrees enthusiastically that there is a ταὐτὸν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ and a τὸ ἀνόσιον ἔχον μίαν ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιό-τητα although this is not generally taken to invoke a theory of forms or to indicate


David C Lee

Terminology alone then is not sufficient to settle the point On alsquoground-uprsquo approach which looks for evidence from the dialoguetaken by itself there are no clear indications as to Platorsquos intentionsat this point As a result a different strategy has proved popularwhich provides clearer support for the involvement of a particu-lar kind of metaphysical theory The alternative lsquotop-downrsquo ap-proach relies on locating the Phaedo within a wider framework ofa group of dialogues taken to be representative of a certain stagein Platorsquos development This broader approach draws on chrono-logical hypotheses about the likely order of composition of the dia-logues and a philosophical reconstruction of the development ofPlatorsquos thought Following the hypothesis which strikes many asthe most plausible it has been supposed that the Phaedo belongs toa lsquomiddle-periodrsquo group of dialogues in which the direct influenceof the historical Socrates was receding and Platorsquos own metaphysi-cal and mathematical interests were beginning to assert themselvesThis leads to an overall reading of the Phaedo in which Platorsquosdiscussions are expected to conform to the metaphysical emphasiswhich emerges from the lsquotop-downrsquo picture

None the less the attempt to impose a framework from whichlower-level interpretative questions should be tackled is clearly vul-nerable to a challenge about the assumed order of priority Thelsquotop-downrsquo approach holds that we can bemore confident about ourgrasp of the general outline of Platorsquos thought than our understand-ing of particular passages This is not something which should bestraightforwardly granted It is equally an open question whether

familiarity on Euthyphrorsquos part with Platonic metaphysics The terms εἶδος and ἰδέαalso appear in the Hippocratic corpus Taylorrsquos attempt to show that in this contextthey bore a technical sense stemming from the Pythagoreans (A E Taylor VariaSocratica (Oxford )) is criticized by C M Gillespie lsquoThe Use of εἶδος and ἰδέαin Hippocratesrsquo Classical Quarterly () ndash

This systematic approach is set out explicitly in Ross PTI Hackforth Phaedoand Bostock Phaedo who each devote a chapter to sketching out a chronology ofPlatorsquos works and give an outline theory of his philosophical development Thesame approach is implicit in the summaries of the development of Platorsquos form the-ory offered by Bluck Phaedo ndash ndash Gallop Phaedo ndash and Dancy PFndash The chronological and developmental assumptions made by top-down inter-preters are stridently challenged by Rowe lsquoExplanationrsquo ndash Phaedo vii and inlsquoInterpreting Platorsquo in H Benson (ed) A Companion to Plato (Oxford ) ndash However Rowersquos own approach is to modify rather than reject the top-downmethod and as a result his interpretation of the Phaedo yields interpretative optionsand conclusions which differ less than might be expected from the standard ones(lsquoInterpretingrsquo Phaedo )



the resources of the Phaedo are sufficient to provide any competinglsquoground-uprsquo interpretative possibilities taken by itself If so thiswould give us reason to pause before endorsing the metaphysicalreading of the lsquofinal argumentrsquo It would also give us reasons forthinking that the systematizing lsquotop-downrsquo project is not the onlypossible method to adopt as a way of approaching particular dia-logues

Moreover it may not even be the best approach If interpretativehypotheses are to be judged by their resultsmdashparticularly in termsof yielding interesting arguments which are plausibly grounded inthe textmdashit is possible that rival hypotheses will have advantagesover the metaphysical reading The emergence of a sophisticatedand interesting philosophical position in the Phaedo originatingfrom a ground-up approach would show that the top-down strategyis not forced on us by our apparently incomplete understanding ofcertain ideas involved in the discussion

The lsquoequal itself rsquo

I now turn to the lsquoequalsrsquo argument the part of the Phaedo whichis the main locus of disagreement between the traditional and thetransitional views Although they are both top-down readings andshare important similarities their conclusions about how this argu-ment should be read bring out the crucial differences between themIt is important to examine these readings to determine whethereither is persuasive and whether there is any further possibilityoverlooked by both sides

The lsquoequalsrsquo argument is part of a wider discussion about learn-ing and recollection at ndash In this exchange Socrates sets outhis reasons for thinking that lsquolearningrsquo is in fact the recovery ofknowledge we already possess He begins by claiming that an ex-perience of one thing can remind us of something else previouslyknown whether the two are similar or dissimilar He then getsagreement using the example of equality that what we come toknow is not the same as what is encountered by the senses the twobeing dissimilar From this he draws the conclusion that we haveknowledge regarding equality which is prior to sense-experienceand which must therefore come about through recollecting it froma time before we were born


David C Lee

Themost significant part of this contentious discussion from thepoint of view of the rival readings is Socratesrsquo initial move He askshis interlocutor Simmias whether he agrees that there is such athing as lsquothe equal itself rsquo

lsquoConsider thenrsquo he said lsquowhether this is the case we say I suppose thatthere is something equal I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stoneequal to a stone or anything else of that sort but something else besidesthese the equal itself [αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον] Do we say it is something or nothingrsquo

lsquoWe do say so by Zeusrsquo he said lsquomost definitelyrsquo (Phaedo ndash )

The careful distinction Socrates makes between lsquothe equal itself rsquoand the other equals he mentions and the enthusiastic agreementof Simmias most obviously suggest some previously drawn distinc-tion between two fundamentally different sorts of objects This im-pression is encouraged by the phrase lsquosomething else besides thesersquo(παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερόν τι) which seems to make it clear that two verydifferent sorts of things are involved there is no overlap betweenthe two Since there is no break in the discussion to clarify whatSocrates is proposing and no sign of hesitation on the part of his in-terlocutor this gives us some reason to suppose that Plato is puttinghis audience in mind of a distinction they are already familiar with

This initial impression accords well with the traditional readingwhich takes Platorsquos form theory to be an unargued premiss through-out the Phaedo This reading would be confirmed to some degreeif the remainder of the argument makes it plausible that a familiarPlatonic distinction between forms and sensibles is the one whichhas just been agreedHowever it has been pointed out that this con-strual does not make good sense of the way in which the discussioncontinues Socrates as we might expect contrasts lsquothe equal itself rsquowith the other equals he has mentioned making the point that theyare lsquonot the samersquo However he clearly does not regard this as some-

This is the interpretation adopted by among others Ross PTI ndash N Gul-ley lsquoPlatorsquos Theory of Recollectionrsquo Classical Quarterly () ndashBluck Phaedo Hackforth Phaedo K W Mills lsquoPlatorsquos Phaedo ndash rsquo [lsquoPart rsquo] Phronesis () ndash at D Tarrant lsquoPlato Phaedo ndashrsquo [lsquo ndashrsquo] Journal of Hellenic Studies () ndash at R P Haynes lsquoTheForm Equality as a Set of Equals Phaedo ndashrsquo [lsquoSetrsquo] Phronesis () ndash J M Rist lsquoEquals and Intermediates in Platorsquo Phronesis () ndash J LAckrill lsquoAnamnesis in the Phaedo Remarks on ndash rsquo in E N Lee A P DMourelatos and R Rorty (eds) Exegesis and Argument (Assen ) ndash at Gallop Phaedo A Nehamas lsquoPlato on the Imperfection of the SensibleWorldrsquo [lsquoImperfectionrsquo] repr in G Fine (ed) Plato Metaphysics and Epistemo-logy (Oxford ) ndash at and Sedley lsquoEqualrsquo ndash



thing that Simmias has yet conceded Instead he spends some timearguing that the two are in fact distinct and cannot coincide

lsquoAnd do we know what it isrsquolsquoAbsolutelyrsquo he saidlsquoFrom where did we grasp the knowledge of it Is it from what we were

just talking aboutmdashhaving seen either sticks or stones or other such equalswe understood it from these though it is different from them Or does itnot seem different to you Consider it this way donrsquot stones and sticks ap-pear sometimes equal for one [τῷ μὲν ἴσα] but not for another [τῷ δ ᾿ οὔ]though they are the same thingsrsquo

lsquoAbsolutelyrsquolsquoWhat then Have the equals themselves [αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα] ever appeared un-

equal to you or equality inequalityrsquolsquoNever SocratesrsquolsquoThey are therefore not the same [οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν]rsquo he said lsquothese

equal things [ταῦτά τὰ ἴσα] and the equal itself [αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον]rsquolsquoIn no way do they seem so to me Socratesrsquo (Phaedo ndash )

Leaving aside for the moment the question as to what precise argu-ment Socrates has in mind here this turn in the conversation pre-sents a problem for the traditional reading If our initial construalwas correct that equal things and the lsquoequal itself rsquo are meant to betwo fundamentally different kinds of objects Socratesrsquo question toSimmias about whether they seem different to him ( ndash) is anunexpected digression which calls for an explanation

Keeping to the traditional view two possible responses presentthemselves The first is that although Simmias has apparentlygrasped Socratesrsquo distinction Socrates is portrayed as taking spe-cial care to confirm that Simmias really does agree to it and isnot going along with his question without attending to it properlyThe second possibility is that the additional disambiguation is notintended for the characters of the drama but for the reader of thedialogue Anticipating the possibility that his audience might notimmediately make the connection with his form theory and notyet see that these two sorts of lsquoequalsrsquo really are different Platoincludes a brief digression to spell this out It is after all crucialfor Plato to forestall any misunderstanding if his readers are tofollow the argument correctly

Both suggestions fail however fully to explain a relevant featureof the passage The initial construal might lead us to expect a cla-rification but not an argument Socrates raises the possibility that


David C Lee

Simmias may suppose that lsquothe equal itself rsquo is no different from theequal stones and sticks He then gives a reason for thinking that theymust be different the latter have a characteristic that the formerdoes not have He presents their non-identity as a conclusion re-sulting from an inference they are therefore not the same (οὐ ταὐτὸνἄρα ἐστίν) This puts into question the assumption that lsquothe equalitself rsquo was understood at the outset to be a distinct object of a specialkind If we stand by our initial construal of the agreement betweenSimmias and Socrates no argument should be needed the infer-ence is a tautology and the attempt to persuade is redundant

Since Socrates is portrayed as giving an argument rather thandrawing out the consequences of a distinction a natural conclu-sion to draw is that Plato regards the conclusion of the argument assomething controversial which needs to be established This pointaccords better with a transitional reading If a metaphysical the-ory of forms is not a premiss but a conclusion of the argumentthen it seems clear that Platorsquos argument is intended to justify themove to this conclusion from amore intuitively acceptable positionFor this reason transitional readers often challenge a commonly ac-cepted claim that Socratesrsquo interlocutors Simmias and Cebes areportrayed as experienced philosophers who are thoroughly familiarwith the theory of forms and accept it as authoritative

However this rival view also regards the argument as involvingunstated but philosophically significant presuppositions It pro-poses a rival context from which the premisses of the lsquoequalsrsquo argu-ment are drawn the definition-seeking enquiries portrayed in theearlier lsquoSocraticrsquo dialogues Socratesrsquo search for definitions requiressome assumptions about the requirements for a successful defini-tion which may perhaps have metaphysical implications withoutexplicitly assuming them It can be argued that the premisses Soc-

For the claim see eg Burnet Phaedo ndash and Gallop Phaedo For criti-cisms see Grube PT ndash and Dancy PF Exactly what an acceptance of lsquoSocraticrsquo methodology commits its followers

to is a matter of disagreement among transitional readers The most conservativepositions which involve the fewest controversial assumptions are put forward byBostockPhaedo ndash and PennerNominalism More heavily committed posi-tions are adopted by Dimas lsquoRecollectingrsquo ndash and Dancy PF ndash both ofwhom hold that Socratesrsquo requirements for definitions implicitly involve a fairlystrong metaphysical commitment to a theory of non-sensible or paradigmatic en-tities to serve as the objects of definitional enquiries These implications are nothowever thought to emerge explicitly in earlier dialogues Rowe takes Plato to steera middle course or perhaps to equivocate between these two extremes Plato ex-



ratesrsquo companions agree to in the equals argument are explicableentirely by their acceptance of the method involved in this activityUnlike the traditional interpretation the transitional reading offersto give us an insight into the argumentative basis for Platonic meta-physics As a result it has great appeal for those who think Platowould be concerned to support his form theory with a justificationand so it potentially provides amore interesting exegetical approachto the argument if it can be confirmed persuasively

However before considering this reading in any further detailit is worth asking whether any other options are open In particu-lar it is pertinent to question whether the top-down approach isneeded and whether it is right to suppose that some specific setof presuppositions must be involved in the argument As I haveargued it is an interpretative hypothesis that our reading of par-ticular passages should be guided by a general picture of Platorsquosmetaphysical concerns not a principle on which all interpretationsmust be based The text itself does not give any indication that theargument ismeant to be understood on the basis of specific assump-tions or premisses provided in other Platonic works Consequentlywe should be wary of assuming that Plato must none the less haveintended his readers to supply such details It may be that all theinformation we need to make the subject of the discussion intelli-gible and philosophically serious can be found in the Phaedo itself

Any persuasive reading of the agreement between Socrates andSimmias that the equal itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον) lsquois somethingrsquo at will need to make Socratesrsquo argument to distinguish it from lsquosticksand stones or other such equalsrsquo dramatically and philosophicallyappropriate Transitional readers suggest that we should assimi-late this to a Socratic search for definitions raising difficulties forthe common-sense answers on the basis of elenctic principles fami-liar to Platorsquos audience from other dialogues But instead of expect-ing that the Phaedo will conform to a philosophical agenda sharedwith other dialogues we may instead look to the immediate con-text of the argument in the dialogue itself and the indications itprovides us with The discussion about learning and recollectionis concerned to show that our understanding of equalitymdashthe ex-ample Socrates choosesmdashis such that it could not come from sense-

plicitly presupposes only uncontroversial claims about the possibility of definitionaccording to Rowe (Phaedo ) but also hints strongly that these claims are moreconsequential than they appear (ibid )


David C Lee

experience The positions being compared by Socrates accordinglyhave a common starting-point they are attempts to specify what isinvolved in our understanding of equality Whatever else may beimplicated by the expression lsquothe equal itself rsquo one of its functionsis to mark out a place which may be filled in different ways by dif-ferent theories about what an understanding of equality involves

The starting-point for an alternative interpretation is to take Soc-ratesrsquo argument as a clue The argument is there because it is tempt-ing to identify the sense-perceptible equals and the lsquoequal itself rsquoand it is not obviously wrong to do so The conception of the lsquoequalitself rsquo shared by the protagonistsmust be schematic enough tomakeit possible for them to agree that there is such a thing while havingdifferent theories as to what it is This allows us to make some in-ferences The first is that the discussion of the lsquoequal itself rsquo shouldnot be thought of as directly picking out some specific object butrather marking out a place for whatever it is that plays the role ofaccounting for our grasp of equality This place could be filled byany number of different thingsmdashin the initial stage of the discus-sion at leastmdashincluding sense-perceptible equals A second infer-ence is that the expression lsquoequal itself rsquo if it is not a technical termintroduced by a theory could well invoke a notion which can beunderstood independently of any particular philosophical frame-work Since it is possible to have ideas about the basis of our know-ledge about equality without needing to know about Platonic formsor any rules governing a Socratic search for definitions we are notforced to take either as the tacitly presupposed context for the ar-gument

Dramatic and philosophical structure

The discussion so far has shown that in the initial stages of the dis-cussion of the lsquoequal itself rsquo there are strong dramatic indicationsagainst a particular metaphysical theory being a necessary presup-position of the argument This observation however leaves it openwhethermore subtle presuppositions are at work Thesemight con-sist of a framework of lsquonon-separated formsrsquo of the kind thought tobe presupposed by Socrates in the dialogues generally consideredto be early These could involve merely a set of methodological as-sumptions about unitary lsquoobjective propertiesrsquo or more strongly



some specific entities to serve as linguistic correlates in answers tothe Socratic lsquowhat is Frsquo question This suggestion needs to betaken seriously Yet in terms of supporting evidence in the dialogueitself there is little indication that the argument should be read inthis way Nothing in the text clearly points to assumptions of thissort being invoked as premisses in the argument Nor are there anyexplicit references to other Platonic dialogues in which the meta-physical or semantic presuppositions in Socratesrsquo practice are putunder scrutiny

The only clear external reference which Plato does make in thispart of the dialogue is to the Menorsquos discussion of teaching learn-ing and recollection The discussion is instigated by Cebes at who claims that Socratesrsquo frequently expressed opinion that lsquoforus learning is in fact nothing other than recollectionrsquo gives the basisfor an alternative demonstration that our souls exist prior to ourbirth In support of this opinion he observes that men will give cor-rect answers if questioned well which they could not do if they didnot have within themselves knowledge and a correct account (ἐπι-στήμη καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος ndash) Cebes adds that this is par-ticularly evident if the questioning is done by means of a diagramor something similar This can hardly fail to put Platorsquos audience inmind of the Meno and above all Socratesrsquo questioning of the slavewith the aid of a diagram to help him to discover the solution to ageometrical puzzle (Meno ndash )

While it is true that this passage focuses attention on Socratesrsquomethod of questioning his interlocutors the issue of tacit commit-ments to properties meanings or other philosophical presupposi-tions involved in this method is not raised Rather what is at stakein this part of the Meno is the effectiveness of enquirymdashand in par-ticular the Socratic elenchusmdashas means to knowledge The ques-tion is an urgent one because at this stageMeno has been persuadedthat the opinions imparted to him by others do not in fact constituteknowledge At the same time he does not see how knowledge couldcome about if not by this method The demonstration with theslave provides a response to this problem by showing that a person

For the former see Dimas lsquoRecollectingrsquo Fine lsquoSeparationrsquo T Ir-win Platorsquos Ethics [Ethics] (Oxford ) for the latter see Bostock Phaedondash

I am grateful to Brad Inwood for emphasizing the importance of this connec-tion and for prompting me to think about the significance of it in determining thecontext of the discussion of equality in the Phaedo


David C Lee

can come to apprehend something himself without being taughtthrough explicit instruction The point of contact then betweenthe Menorsquos discussion of recollection and the lsquoequalsrsquo argument ofthePhaedo is that there are instances of learning in which the gener-ally accepted sources of evidence seem insufficient to account forthe resulting cognitive achievement The difference between thetwo discussions is that the criticism in theMeno is directed at lsquoteach-ingrsquo in the traditional sense as a hypothetical source for our geomet-rical knowledge whereas in the lsquoequalsrsquo argument of the Phaedo thesource under scrutiny for our understanding of equality is sense-experience in general

I have argued that the text of the Phaedo provides no reason forthinking that the reader must supply a background of philosophicalassumptions in order to make sense of the argument The contextof learning and teaching gives the lsquoequal itself rsquo a perfectly intelli-gible status in the dialectical exchange which makes good sense ofthe way the discussion unfolds Socrates begins by asking Simmiasfor agreement on the intuitive question as to whether something isrequired to account for our grasp of equality This is something dis-tinguishable (παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερόν τι)mdashat least conceptuallymdashfrom theequal things which are the subjects of our judgements Identifyingequals as equal is not just to take account of the equal things them-selves but to take account of something about themTo agree to thisdoes not yet indicate an engagement with any particular philosophi-cal system The contrast between equal things and their equality isan intuitive non-technical idea which does not presuppose any me-taphysical conclusions as to what sorts of objects are involved or setup any sort of framework to constrain the kinds of answers whichmust be given Interlocutors of any philosophical persuasion couldup to this point follow the argument

On the reading considered so far Simmiasrsquo initial agreement tothere being such a thing as the lsquoequal itself rsquo does not rule out anyidentification of it with the objects of sense-perception We shouldtherefore expect an argument from Socrates to get to the conclu-sion he is after that the lsquoequal itself rsquo that figures in our judgementis different from the equals apprehended by the senses Socratesis indeed portrayed as deploying an argument asking Simmias at ndash whether he agrees to the premiss that the sense-perceptibleequals mentioned appear lsquoequal for one [τῷ μὲν ἴσα] but not for an-other [τῷ δ ᾿ οὔ]rsquo From this and from the further premiss at



ndash that lsquothe equals themselves never appeared to you to be un-equal nor equality inequality [αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνηἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης]rsquo it is inferred that the sense-perceptible equalscannot be the equal itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον) which is grasped by ourunderstanding

This creates considerable ambiguity In the first instance we donot know whether Plato meant lsquoappearingrsquo (φαίνεται ἐφάνη ) to be taken veridically or non-veridically This makes a differ-ence to the argument since on the former understanding he wouldassert that the sticks and stones are lsquoequal for one but not for an-otherrsquo because they really are so but on the latter he would assertonly that this is how they appear denying that they are in fact so orat least suspending judgement onwhether they areNor dowe knowwhether these pronouns are to be taken asmasculinemdashinwhich casewe would take the point to be the relativity of appearances to dif-ferent peoplemdashor whether to take them as neuter in which casethe relativity would arise from the sticks and stones being equal orunequal in relation to different objects in each case Relativity ofequality to different respects would perhaps have been more natur-ally expressed by feminine dative pronouns (ie τῇ μὲν ἴσα τῇ

Translated this way by Hackforth Phaedo Bluck Phaedo R Lori-aux Le Pheacutedon de Platon ndash [Pheacutedon] (Namur ) and defended againstcriticisms by Mills lsquoPart rsquo and in lsquoPlatorsquos Phaedo ndash Part rsquo [lsquoPart rsquo]Phronesis () ndash Penner Nominalism Fine On Ideas ndash n Irwin Ethics n and Dimas lsquoRecollectingrsquo ndash A point in favour of thisinterpretation is the parallel between the personal datives and the personal dative(σοι) for Simmias at The support it provides is however limited by the factthat the variability of equal sticks and stones to different people is contrasted withthe constancy of the equals themselves to the same person Simmias The invalidityin the argument introduced by this shift can be mitigated by supposing that Sim-mias is lsquoa representative of humanity in generalrsquo (Mills lsquoPart rsquo )

This alternative construal was originally proposed by N R Murphy The In-terpretation of Platorsquos Republic (Oxford ) n and developed in detail byG E L Owen lsquoLogic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotlersquo in IDuumlring and G E L Owen (eds) Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century(Gothenburg ) ndash at It has been adopted and defended by NehamaslsquoImperfectionrsquo White PKR ndash Bostock Phaedo ndash and Rowe Phaedo This interpretation derives its force from Murphyrsquos point that the masculineconstrual of the pronouns does not provide a strong enough premiss from which toderive any conclusions about the deficiency of sensibles since the most that couldbe concluded is that at least one of the two observers had made a mistake If how-ever the premiss is to be taken as establishing that equal sticks and stones really doexhibit relativity or compresence of some kind the neuter reading of the pronounsappears more plausible (White PKR n ) An explicitly top-down argumentfor the same conclusion is given by Bostock Phaedo


David C Lee

δ ᾿ οὔ) but this has been defended as a possible reading of the pro-nouns if taken as datives of the indefinite article

Top-down interpreters may well object at this point that thelimited resources available on the ground-up approach are insuf-ficient to provide an interpretation of the argument as a wholeeffectively ruling it out Socratesrsquo allusion to the deficiency of sense-perceptible equals is made briefly and is given no further explana-tion While the argument called for at this point in the dialogueseems to require some very specific complaint to be made againstsense-perceptibles the brief and cryptic nature of Socratesrsquo remarksmakes it extremely difficult to see what this complaint is meant tobe As a result the inferential basis for the argument is left veryseriously underdetermined on the ground-up approach

To add to the difficulty there are also textual issues to reckonwith According to one manuscript family Socrates asks whethersticks and stones lsquoappear sometimes equal for one but not for an-other [τῷ μὲν ἴσα τῷ δ ᾿ οὔ]rsquo Alternatively two manuscriptfamilies have a different text lsquoequal at one time but not at another[τότε μὲν ἴσα τότε δ ᾿ οὔ]rsquo Lacking any contextual informationon which to determine the actual basis of the argument and hav-ing no criteria to arbitrate between the two alternative readings ofthe text the ground-up reading appears at a serious disadvantagein comparison with its top-down rivals

Before considering a possible response to this objection it is use-ful to consider a second point relevant to determining the best ap-proach to the dialogue I quote from ndash where Socrates is ask-ing Simmias about whether the separation of the soul from thebody is something to be feared or something that the philosopher

See Mills lsquoPart rsquo ndash This reading is defended by Haynes lsquoSetrsquo ndash Ithas not won wider support although commentators disagree on whether it is merelyunlikely or whether it is impermissible as a reading of the Greek as is asserted byGallop Phaedo

The former reading is to be found in the Clarke manuscript (B) in Oxford Itwas adopted in Burnetrsquos OCT edition and subsequently by a majority of commen-tators The latter reading is found in the Venice manuscript (T) and the Viennamanuscript (W) There is evidence that the existence of both of these alternativereadings was known in different manuscript traditions (Burnet Phaedo ad ndashLoriaux Pheacutedon E A Duke et al revised OCT ad loc) This suggests thatboth versions of the text were known at least by late antiquity making it practicallyimpossible to recover the original text or to trace a mechanism of corruption Thosewho follow the latter tradition for the text of this passage include Tarrant lsquo ndashrsquo W Verdenius lsquoNotes on Platorsquos Phaedorsquo Mnemosyne () ndash at ndash Dancy PF and Sedley lsquoEqualrsquo ndash



has already practised in pursuing the knowledge of certain kinds ofthings

lsquoWhat about these sorts of things Simmias Do we say that there issomething the just itself or not [τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτό]rsquo

lsquoWe do indeed by ZeusrsquolsquoAnd fine and good [καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν]rsquolsquoOf coursersquolsquoAnd did you ever see something of this sort with your eyesrsquolsquoNeverrsquo he saidlsquoBut then did you grasp them by some other bodily sense I speak of

all of them about largeness strength health and the others andmdashin awordmdashthe being of all such things what each one essentially is [περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν] Is the truest [aspect] of them studied viathe body or are matters thus whoever of us is prepared most of all and ascarefully as possible to fix his mind on each thing that he investigates thisman would come the closest to knowledge of eachrsquo

lsquoOf coursersquo (Phaedo ndash )

This concession on Simmiasrsquo part which anticipates the conclusionof the lsquoequalsrsquo argument apparently presents a further problem forthe neutral conception of the lsquoequal itself rsquo and for the ground-upapproach more generally Socrates explicitly introduces a philoso-phically significant claim that lsquothe being of all such thingsrsquo can beapprehended only in isolation from the senses The introductionof this point without any supporting argument in the immediatecontext seems to support the view that Plato assumes on the partof his audience an awareness of the reasoning behind this claimTaken in this way it provides a clear reason to think that the top-down approach is the correct one Moreover since this evidenceis drawn from within the dialogue itself it is not vulnerable to thecriticism about circularity made against top-down interpretationsin Section

Both of these objections are worth taking seriously and both areequally problematic for the ground-up projectrsquos attempt to work atthe level of the individual dialogue as far as possible However it isimportant to notice that these objections pull in different directionsThe first insists forcefully on the need to provide a philosophicallyweighty argument for an interpretation of the lsquoequalsrsquo argumentand criticizes the neutral approach for its inability to identify a basisfor the inference and its failure to provide a context to help resolvethe textual difficulties This focus is particularly important for tran-


David C Lee

sitional readers who see the Phaedo as playing the crucial role injustifying a move from Socratic enquiries to Platonic metaphysics

The second objection by contrast emphasizes the fact that Soc-rates and Simmias explicitly attribute a controversial characteristicto the entities they are discussingmdashthat of sense-transcendencemdashinadvance of any argument This seems to mark a sharp discontinuitybetween the Phaedo and the Socratic enquiries which might other-wise be taken as a plausible background against which to interpretthe dialogue Considered in this light this part of the Phaedo seemsto demonstrate that Platorsquos focus is on drawing out the implica-tions of a philosophical position which has already become a firmconviction rather than on discussing the nature and extent of hisnew ontological commitments and providing arguments to supportthem For this reason many traditional readers do not agree withtransitional readers that it is an urgent task to identify one specificbasis on which the lsquoequalsrsquo argument rests as Platorsquos justificationfor his theory Some have gone further stressing the openness ofthis passage to different interpretations hinting that Plato may nothave meant to single out any particular one of a cluster of deficien-cies connected to sense-perceptible things

The countervailing pressures exerted by these objections elicitresponses which open up further interpretative possibilities Whiletraditional readers give reasons to be wary about according a crucialturning-point status to the lsquoequalsrsquo argument transitional readersin turn argue the case for disputing the significance of Simmiasrsquoearlier agreement with Socrates They point out that Simmiasrsquo ac-ceptance of the claim about sense-transcendence without argumentat does not show that Plato expects his audience to react inthe same way It is perhaps conceivable that Plato is expecting hisreaders already to be familiar with a complex metaphysical theoryand to accept it without argument but this is not the only way tounderstand this part of the dialogue The point treated as a securepremiss at an earlier stage in the dialogue is very closely related toa conclusion which will be argued for later in the discussion about

Avery limited discussion of the lsquoequalsrsquo argument is the norm in older commen-taries eg Ross PTI ndash Bluck Phaedo and Hackforth Phaedo ndash as isthe opinion that the problems in the transmission of the text are not philosophicallysignificant eg Burnet Phaedo Loriaux Pheacutedon ndash For the suggestion thatit is not essential to the argument to identify any specific defect in sense-perceptiblessee Gallop Phaedo and for criticism see G Fine lsquoReview of Platorsquos PhaedoTranslated by David Galloprsquo Philosophical Review () ndash



equality This gives us reason to pause before drawing any conclu-sions fromSimmiasrsquo agreement The fact that Socratesrsquo point is un-supported at its first appearance does not show that it has the statusof a first principle Since it is possible for Plato to revisit an earlierclaim and back it up with an argument a decision of this kind oughtto be made on the basis of the dialogue as a whole

An alternative way to approach this passage then is to make adistinction between the dramatic presentation of key ideas in thedialogue and their philosophical exposition in terms of their jus-tificatory structure This needs to be further explored When in-terpreting a Platonic dialogue such as the Phaedo it is importantto decide whether the particular setting of the conversation and theidentity of the interlocutors have any significance for the philoso-phical content Plato is trying to convey One possibility is that thesedramatic details are simply a pretext for the presentation of argu-ments which could equally well be set out directly with no lossof content lsquoSocratesrsquo represents the philosophical position Platowishes to establish and his interlocutor personifies the responsesPlato expects from his audience or rather the responses and ob-jections which Plato wishes to bring up and address An alternativepossibility is to suppose that some purpose is served by dramatizingan interaction between two different standpoints which may differin terms of priorities and commitments and also in terms of philo-sophical sophistication and engagement

On this latter supposition the authorrsquos own standpoint need notbe wholly identifiable with any of those taken up by his charac-ters Dramatic differencesmight reflect important differences in thefeatures Plato wishes to emphasize in the particular philosophicalpositionmdashor positionsmdashhe is interested in The dramatic Socratesmight argue a claim in one way to an intelligent interlocutor whoshares his beliefs but switch to defending the claim in a very dif-ferent way when confronted with an opponent who is dogmaticsceptical or openly hostile The varying dynamics of each Socraticconversation can be used to develop different aspects of a philoso-phical position especially those aspects which are not easily con-veyed in abstract discourse This dramatic device allows certainpoints to be scrutinized in detail while others are left in the back-ground depending on the way in which the interlocutorsrsquo interestsare depicted

Accepting a distinction between the dramatic and the philosophi-


David C Lee

cal structure of the dialogue allows transitional readers to respondto the objection brought against them on the basis of ndash Butit also affords an opportunity for the ground-up view to respondto the challenge that it has no sufficiently detailed reconstructionto offer for the lsquoequalsrsquo argument at ndash If we are willing to ac-cept the suggestion that the philosophical agenda of the Phaedo ispursued in a more subtle manner than first appears we will also bereceptive to a general distinction between the dramatic structure ofthe dialogue on the one hand and the underlying philosophical en-gagement between Plato and his audience on the other This leadsus to formmore complex expectations about the discussion betweenSocrates and his interlocutors We should regard them as charac-ters with their own commitments and motivations whose reactionsmay deliberatelymdashas a matter of authorial intentionmdashdiverge fromthose of the audience in some respects

In particular our expectations about the equals argument maybe different from those transitional readers who take this to be astraightforward attempt to persuade the reader to accept a parti-cular metaphysical theory By supposing that the task of the in-terpreter is to reconstruct a specific argument at this point werisk mistaking an lsquointra-textualrsquo argument aimed at persuading thedramatic interlocutor Simmias for an lsquoextra-textualrsquo argumentdesigned to persuade his audience Plato might have reasons forpresenting only an outline of an argument at this stage pendinglater clarification Accordingly when Simmias is persuaded by anargument that strikes us as obscure and elliptical on the basis of thediscussion so far we should not automatically assume that we aremeant to refer to material elsewhere in Platorsquos dialogues to providethe missing explanation and justification Instead we can postpone

This point is not put in quite this way by transitional readers but it seems tocapture the thinking behind their reading of this earlier part of the SocratesndashSimmiasdiscussion Penner Nominalism comes close to making the distinction betweendramatic and argumentative structures in his rebuttal of the traditional view lsquoSoc-rates offers Simmias a chance to take back the thesis that there exist Forms andthen offers him an argument to show that Forms do indeed existrsquo Dimas lsquoRecol-lectingrsquo is perhaps closer still to making this distinction in his assertion thatthe lsquotheoretical commitments of the interlocutors cannot settle the question whetherSocrates and Simmias introduce the ἴσον as a Platonic form or in the innocuous sensewe have been used to from the shorter Socratic dialoguesrsquo A separation between thedramatic and the philosophical for this part of the Phaedo also seems to be assumedby White PKR Bostock Phaedo and Dancy PF



this move and continue the dialogue in the expectation that ourconcerns will be addressed there

The final argument

The top-down reading of the Phaedo involves the assumption thatPlato presupposes knowledge of either a theory or a method on thepart of his audience and expects them to apply it in their engage-ment with the dialogue The case for adopting such a reading isat best inconclusive according to the discussion so far Howeverthere is still work to be done before a ground-up reading can beconsidered a serious rival to this approach Specifically more posi-tive support is needed to sustain the thesis that the philosophicalcontent of the dialogue is independent of any collection of meta-physical doctrines introduced into the dialogue either by argumentor by presupposition Equally more needs to be said about the wayin which the lsquoequalsrsquo argument can be read in the anticipatory waydescribed presenting the audience with conclusions for which theargumentative basis is still to be set out

On these points it is helpful to turn to the later stages of thedialogue specifically to the final argument at ndash Both tra-ditional and transitional readers agree that a distinctively metaphy-sical position has been established at this stage in the dialogueAccordingly it is a crucial test for the ground-up reading to seehow far it can go independently of any such commitment takingthe argument as a free-standing philosophical discussion

The argument itself arises from an objection brought up byCebes that even if Socratesrsquo conclusions are accepted up to thisstage he has established only that the soul is longer-lasting thanthe body and that its existence prior to its association with thebody provides no guarantee that it will remain in existence when itis separated from the body again Socratesrsquo answer to Cebes centreson the passage I quoted at the start of Section in which Socratessays that he will set down that there is lsquosomething fine by itselfand good and large and all the othersrsquo (ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸναὐτὸ καθ ᾿ αὐτὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ndash) and hopes tolsquodiscover on this basis that the soul is immortalrsquo

Previously I noted that nothing in the passage itself necessitatesthe view that Socrates is dealingwith an established theory of sense-


David C Lee

transcendent Platonic forms Following the approach I have adop-ted we can consider the possibility that Socrates is portrayed asappealing to the more philosophically neutral claim that there issomething which is implicated in some way by our judgements thatthings are fine good large and so on On this view we do not con-front any questions about the sources we need to look to in order tofill out the details and argumentative basis of the theory whetherinternal to the Phaedo or external to it This is for the straightfor-ward reason that as yet no theory has been invoked Instead thereis an intuitive acceptance that our talk and thought about lsquofinersquolsquogoodrsquo lsquolargersquo involves something whose status is yet to be clari-fied

To see whether this reading can make good sense of the courseof the discussion in the final argument we are required to considerthe way in which it develops Socratesrsquo response to Cebesrsquo objec-tion calls for as he puts it lsquoa thorough handling of the explanationfor coming-to-be and perishingrsquo (περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίανδιαπραγματεύσασθαι ndash ) Prior to the passage underdiscussion in which Socrates announces his own approach to his to-pic he gives an account of his own previous enquiries into explana-tion Having become dissatisfied with the mechanical explanationsoffered by earlier enquirers into nature and similar common-senseexplanations of various properties and relations Socrates accusesthese earlier enquirers of a failure to draw the distinction between areal explanation (τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι) and a contributory factorlsquothat without which the explanation would not be an explanationrsquo(ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ ᾿ εἴη αἴτιον ndash)

Socrates goes on to say that having been unable to find anyexplanations of this kind either on his own or by learning fromothers he instead pursued an alternative course There is consider-able debate about the precise interpretation of the obscure nauticalmetaphor used by Socrates who describes this method as a lsquose-

There has been considerable discussion about whether the αἰτία of the final ar-gument should be taken as an lsquoexplanationrsquo regarding this as a broad metaphysi-cal notion potentially involving events processes states of affairs or linguistic cor-relates such as propositions or whether it should be taken as a lsquocausersquo more nar-rowly regarded as some entity responsible for something leaving out questions ofthe mechanism by which it operates Advocates for both can be found and for arange of intermediate positions As will become clear I do not think it is necessaryto settle this issue in order to understand this part of the dialogue and so I haveopted for the word lsquoexplanationrsquo as the more neutral of the two intending to closeoff as few interpretative options as possible



cond sailingrsquo (δεύτερον πλοῦν ) Whatever detailed accountshould be given of it there are strong indications that the approachin question is meant to be a cautious and commonsensical onerather than the bold course of metaphysical innovation typicallyimputed to him Socrates says that what he is about to discuss islsquonothing newrsquo (οὐδὲν καινόν ) but only those things he lsquoneverstops talking aboutrsquo (οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων ndash) The view isone which he holds lsquostraightforwardly untechnically and perhapsnaiumlvelyrsquo (ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ ᾿ ἐμαυτῷ ndash)giving what seems to him to be the lsquosafest reply to give myself andothersrsquo ( ndash) It is described as something which someone wouldhold through fear of facing opposed views ( ndash )through inexperience ( ) and by choosing onersquos words cautiously( ndash) He contrasts it with the lsquowise explanationsrsquo (τὰς αἰτίας τὰςσοφάς ) and lsquosubtletiesrsquo (κομψείας ) of others

It is just about possible to read some of these disclaimers as iro-nical Playful references to the lsquowisdomrsquo of his opponents is afterall a Socratic habit familiar from other dialogues However it ismore difficult to see the point of irony when it comes to describingan elaborate and controversial theory in such deflationary termsMoreover such a reading does nothing to explain the reaction ofEchecrates the hearer of Phaedorsquos narrative He interrupts at thispoint to say of Socrates that lsquoit seems that he said these things won-derfully clearly even to a man of limited intelligence [σμικρὸν νοῦνἔχοντι]rsquo ( ndash) If this is taken as the description of a sophisti-

Although it is agreed by commentators that the expression is a proverbial onethere remains a dispute about whether a lsquosecond sailingrsquo involved a change of des-tination or a different method for reaching the same destination Evidence for bothinterpretations is provided in Burnet Phaedo Discussion of the precise mean-ing of the expression is generally subordinated to the question as to how the meta-phor should be interpreted particularly with regard to Socratesrsquo disappointed hopeof finding satisfactory teleological explanations in Anaxagoras The long-standingview that Socrates is announcing his intention to pursue teleological explanation ina new way was criticized by Vlastos lsquoReasonsrsquo ndash and revived by D WigginslsquoTeleology and the Good in Platorsquos Phaedorsquo [lsquoTeleologyrsquo] Oxford Studies in AncientPhilosophy () ndash Both positions have attracted supporters while com-promise views are held by Gallop Phaedo and Rowe lsquoExplanationrsquo ndash

Grube PT ndash takes this to be a reference just to the foregoing discussionin the Phaedo but this seems unlikely given that it is closely paralleled by Socratesrsquoearlier description of lsquosomething fine and good and every such thingrsquo as lsquothe thingswe are always chattering aboutrsquo (εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί ndash) Grubersquos cri-ticism was directed against Burnetrsquos theory of a Pythagorean origin for the theory offorms and it seems likely that he embraced this implausible view as a way to avoidan even less plausible one


David C Lee

cated metaphysical theory we cannot help but find this dramaticreception rather perverse This provides strong motivation foran alternative reading which takes Socratesrsquo starting-point to bethe more modest one of eliciting agreement that somethingmdashas yetunspecifiedmdashis needed to explain the presence of fineness in things

The agreement between Socrates and Cebes that there is lsquosome-thing fine by itself and good and large and all the othersrsquo leads tothe following exchange

lsquoConsider thenrsquo he said lsquowhether you think the same as me on whatcomes next after this It seems to me that if something is fine other thanthe fine itself [αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν] it is not fine by anything other than by sharingin that fine and I say the same of everything Do you agree to an explana-tion of this kindrsquo

lsquoI agreersquo he said (Phaedo ndash)

On the metaphysical readings I have been challenging the Socratesof the Phaedo here is supposed to be ruling out all other theories ofexplanation including the view that fineness can be explained bythe materialistic factors proposed by his predecessors and declar-ing as the only sufficient alternative a metaphysical theory which iscarried over from an earlier discussion and unquestioningly accep-ted by his interlocutors This seems implausibly abrupt and whollyat odds with the dramatic indications which precede it

It ismuchmore plausible to look for a way for Socrates to take thisstep without needing to suppose that he is putting up any specificand controversial theory of explanation for acceptance at this pointThis creates a strong case for the ground-up view on which Soc-rates is merely formulating a platitude whatever it is that finenessconsists in is the explanation for somethingrsquos being fine This is ageneral schema to which any explanatory theory ought to conformlsquoThe fine itself rsquo is not some specific entity introduced as part of arival theory of explanation which supplants all others It is rathera general label for whatever it is that fits the description sketched

Nehamas lsquoOppositesrsquo takes the disclaimers as false modesty since thelsquotheory introduces a vast ontological apparatus which is necessary for its formula-tion and applicationrsquo But in response to such views Rowe (lsquoExplanationrsquo ) aptlycomments lsquowe have the odd situation that what readers and commentators currentlyregard as one of the obscurest parts of the dialogue (and perhaps even of Plato) isactually received by its fictional audiences as a plain statement of things which couldnot reasonably be disputed by anyonersquo None the less Rowersquos own reading of the fi-nal argument in my view is not notably more successful in addressing this problemthan those he criticizes



out by their search for an explanation for cases of fineness The realwork is still to be done Socrates and Cebes need to investigate whatthis lsquofine itself rsquo is At this point in the discussion their agreement isneutral as to the nature of whatever it is that ultimately providesthe explanation

The proposed interpretation also gives us a very different under-standing of Socratesrsquo description of this procedure at ndashthat of lsquosetting down on each occasion the logos I judge to be thestrongest [ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶ-ναι]rsquo On a metaphysical reading it is the strength of Socratesrsquo logoswhich is the key to its safety The theory of forms is unsurpassedin meeting explanatory criteria its rivals cannot

On my view however the strength and safety of a logos are incompetition with each other instead of going together What makesSocrates think he has lsquothe safest answer to give myself and othersrsquoand lsquoby holding to this I think I will never be thrownrsquo is thathe refuses to endorse the ambitious claims made by others Soc-rates sticks to the non-committal formula that there is somethingexplanatory connected with the things whose fineness needs to beexplained in some as yet undetermined way ( ndash) He con-fines himself to the lsquosafersquo formula that fine things get to be fine bythis lsquothe fine itself rsquo (ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά ndash)mdashwhatever it may turn out to be

Socratesrsquo conception of explanation

There are a number of advantages in taking Socratesrsquo and Cebesrsquostarting-point to be the agreement that there must be somethingin terms of which an explanation can be given which has yet to

Reading with the majority of manuscripts εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃδὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη There is some uncertainty as to whether προσγενομένηcould have been part of the original text as it agrees grammatically with παρουσίαand κοινωνία rather than ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ as we might have expected on groundsof sense The correct reading could instead be προσγενομένου as Ueberweg conjec-tured or προσαγορευομένη a reading which was suggested by Wyttenbach endorsedby Burnet and which possibly has papyrus support (but see the revised OCT ad locfor doubts about this) Although the point is not significant for my interpretation Iagree with Bluck Phaedo in supposing that grammatical attraction adequatelyexplains Platorsquos writing προσγενομένη and that the text can be translated as lsquoeitherby presence or by communion or whatever way and manner [the fine itself] is at-tachedrsquo


David C Lee

be satisfactorily identified Firstly it gives a good reading of thetext There is a point to Socratesrsquo saying that he will set down oneach occasion the logos he judges the strongest since there are somesituationsmdashlike the present onemdashin which the best available logosis not very strong at all Secondly it also avoids resorting implaus-ibly to irony to explain Socratesrsquo claim to have adopted his posi-tion through inexperience and timidity Finally it allows us to takestraightforwardly Socratesrsquo description of his position as simple anduntechnical in contrast to the apparent sophistication of his rivals

It must be conceded though that this agreement by itself doesnot seem to be a promising basis on which to build any serious phi-losophical conclusions Moreover I have insisted in my reading ofthe lsquoequalsrsquo argument that no substantial claims about the lsquofine it-self rsquomdashthat it is identifiable with or reducible to sense-perceptiblefine things for examplemdashhave yet from the point of view of Platorsquosaudience been refuted Consequently such claims cannot properlybe presupposed in the final argument

This raises an important question However plausible a construalof the text the ground-up reading might provide it still remainsunclear how Socrates will go on to establish the more substan-tial conclusions which follow Most interpreters take these weightyclaims to require an equally weighty metaphysical position as a se-cure platform from which to argue There is still work to be donethen to show that my neutral understanding of the final argumentrsquosstarting-point can form any adequate basis for the distinction whichfollows

My suggestion is that Socrates takes himself and his adversariesto accept a common starting-pointmdashthat there must be somethingwhich accounts for the fineness of fine things The ground for theirdivergence has not yet become apparent but it is clear that thereis one Where his rivals push ahead and lay claim to have identi-fied the explanations by appealing to material or sense-perceptiblefactorsmdashlsquohaving a beautiful colour or shape or something else ofthat sortrsquo (χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ndash)mdashSocrates declares himself unpersuaded that they havefound the real explanation

This raises the issue as to the nature of Socratesrsquo dissatisfactionwith the explanations based on materialistic or sense-perceptiblefactors and Cebesrsquo reasons for sharing this dissatisfaction Socra-



tes had earlier described the sort of explanation he once accepted inthe following terms

lsquoI used to consider it sufficient that whenever some large man stands nextto a small one he appears larger because of a head [αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ] andalso a horse compared with a horse And even more clearly than these itseemed to me that ten are more than eight because two are added to themand that a double cubit is greater than a cubit because it exceeds it by half[of itself]rsquo (Phaedo ndash )

Socrates had also described other explanations he now says he canno longer accept that in cases of addition lsquothe one to which some-thing has been added has come to be tworsquo or that both togetherlsquocome to be two because of the adding of one to the otherrsquo ( ndash ) and that in cases of division that lsquoit the division is in turnthe explanation of onersquos becoming tworsquo ( ndash) Addressing thefirst example Socrates now gives his reasons he lsquowould not acceptit if anyone said that one man was larger than another by a headand that the smaller is smaller by the same thingrsquo ( ndash )He would be afraid of meeting an opposed account an ἐναντίος λό-γος that lsquofirstly it is by the very same thing that the larger is largerand the smaller smaller and then that it is by a head though it is asmall thing that the larger is largerrsquo ( ndash)

On the top-down approach adopted by most current interpre-tations Socrates has already determined that the correct answerto these explanatory questions is to invoke special metaphysicalentities Consequently the complaint he is making here is thathis opponents have invoked the wrong sorts of entitiesmdashordinarysense-perceptible onesmdashin their unsuccessful attempt to provideexplanations If this is indeed Socratesrsquo position his refutationneeds to be decisive and completely general in order to leave thefield clear for his own preferred alternative the form theory Wemust suppose that the specific examples chosen are not in them-selves significant they merely illustrate an overarching refutationone which rules out a priori all explanatory theories which do notinvolve forms By drawing their answers from the realm of sense-perceptible material factors Socratesrsquo predecessors are defeatedfrom the start

This immediately brings up a difficulty Since the text itself doesnot provide any systematic argumentative basis for Socratesrsquo con-clusions this reading forces us to supply one on his behalf Most


David C Lee

interpreters conclude that although he does not explicitly say soSocrates must be committed to the premiss that any entity put for-ward as an explanation must as a matter of stipulation have both anecessary and a sufficient link with the presence of the feature it ismeant to explain But this leaves the superiority of the form the-ory hostage to some controversially strong assumptions In parti-cular it is unclear why Socrates would expect his criticisms to haveany force against his opponents Since he is presupposing that allexplanatory theories must conform to these highly restrictive cri-teria the obvious focus for disagreement is on the appropriatenessof the criteria themselves It then seems surprising that somethingso crucially important to the argument is neither mentioned nor de-fended anywhere in the dialogue

It seems reasonable to take a second look at this passage to seeif there is a different way to understand Socratesrsquo position If Soc-rates is making the strong claim that he can refute the theories ofhis predecessors and establish his own theory as the correct onewe will need to go beyond the text in a significant way to providethe necessary support It is more plausible to take Socrates as mak-ing the weaker claim that the correct explanation has not yet beenidentified and that his opponents are likely to be wrong in suppos-ing they have already found what they were looking for On thisview the key fault with the rejected explanations has to do withtheir arbitrary and unenlightening character they leave room forpuzzlement which persists even if we are prepared to entertain thepossibility that the explanation might be correct Supposing it istrue that Simmias is larger than Socrates lsquoby a headrsquo why shouldit be a small thing and not a thing of some other sort which ex-

Thus many commentators are to be found talking of necessary and sufficientcauses or necessary and sufficient conditions for explanation in connection withthe final argument and making the claim that Socrates thinks he has identified whathe was searching for eg Bluck Phaedo ndash Gallop Phaedo ndash VlastoslsquoReasonsrsquo ndash n Bostock Phaedo ndash Wiggins lsquoTeleologyrsquo ndash RowelsquoExplanationrsquo n D Sedley lsquoPlatonic Causesrsquo Phronesis () ndashFine lsquoSeparationrsquo ndash and Sharma lsquoSocratesrsquo ndash

Socratesrsquo dissatisfaction with such explanations by opposites is anticipatedearlier in the dialogue in his discussion of the lsquoslavishrsquo explanation of courage at It is irrational (ἄλογον) he says to try to explain someonersquos courage in the faceof death as the result of fear of facing some greater evil A similar difficulty is notedin the case of apparent temperance at ndash The abstinence from some pleasuresoccurs because people are in the grip of others and to call this lsquotemperancersquo wouldlead to the paradoxical conclusion that it is in some sense because of indisciplinethat people are temperate Socrates does not rule out these accounts of the virtues a



plains largeness in this particular case And can it really be this andnothing else that makes Simmias taller than Socrates when in acomparison with Phaedo the very same factor can now be cited toexplain Simmiasrsquo shortness

These objections rest on a thought which is intuitively appealingand has considerable philosophical interest Plato makes Socra-tes put forward the view that real explanation leads to insightand understanding He seems to connect this with a concep-tion of explanation that modern philosophers would regard asa modal notion that the explanans must track the explanandumin relevant counterfactual situations Socrates thinks that thisrules out the tenuous and contingent connections of material orsense-perceptible factors as serious candidates We can imagineSimmias remaining exactly as he is and yet not being taller thanSocrates if Socrates had been slightly different in height It thenseems reasonable to say that Simmiasrsquo head is incidental to histallness relative to Socrates in the imaginary case the head re-mains unchanged but the situation it purportedly explains nolonger obtains This thought might have led Plato to concludereasonably that Simmiasrsquo head has little to do with explaining hisrelative tallness Its presence is compatible with both this state ofaffairs and its opposite

Defenders of such explanations may insist that Plato wronglyignores the possibility that an explanation can be a genuine onewithout the state of affairs it explains always obtaining explana-tions are subject to a ceteris paribus condition Simmiasrsquo head doesaccount for his tallness relative to Socrates provided everythingelse remains the same Yet it seems reasonable to reply on Platorsquos be-half that this would be to postpone the problem not to solve it Onthe modified view it is now the ceteris paribus stipulation not Sim-miasrsquo head which is fundamental to the explanation If wemake ourexplanation conditional on the stipulation that the situation mustremain the samemdashat least in this key respect that Simmias mustremain taller than Socratesmdashthe purported explanation seems re-dundant it is the stipulation not Simmiasrsquo head that is doing thereal work But if we dispense with the stipulation any of the factorsintroduced by Socratesrsquo opponents seem to be open to the objectionthat they are compatible with the absence of what they supposedly

priori his doubts about them are stated in a carefully nuanced way ( ndash ) andhis own account is presented as a personal view (κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν )


David C Lee

explain Hence Socrates in his current position thinks it is a mis-take to offer anything more informative by way of explanation thana platitude Simmias is taller by tallness whatever that may be

This also gives us a different way to interpret Socratesrsquo earlier dis-cussion of Anaxagoras at ndash which many have tried to see asthe vital key to unlock the mystery of Socratesrsquo new approach

lsquoBut once I heard someone reading as he said a book by Anaxagoras say-ing that understanding [νοῦς] is the agent of order and the explanation foreverything I was pleased by this explanation and it seemed to me that itwas in some way good for understanding to be the explanation for every-thing And I thought if this is how things are since understanding orderseverything it will order and place each thing in such a way as would bebestrsquo (Phaedo ndash )

Commentators have debated whether this discussion marks the ad-option or renunciation of a teleological criterion for explanationTeleology however is not the real issue The real significance ofAnaxagoras is that he promised to supply something vital in ourconcept of explanation in Socratesrsquo view He took the prospect ofAnaxagorean teleology seriously because as he says if explanationsof this kind were forthcoming he was lsquoprepared to yearn no longerfor any other kind of explanation [παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσό-μενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος]rsquo ( ndash) The point is not that any genuineexplanations must have this particular structure that of a teleologi-cal account but rather that they would put an end to Socratesrsquo feel-ing of dissatisfaction Explanations of this satisfying kind are con-trasted with the materialistic ones Anaxagoras actually providedwhich invite further investigation rather than foreclosing it

On my reading then the final argument stakes out a much moretentativemdashand more openmdashposition than the one typically readinto the Phaedo at this point Rather than rejecting explanationsby way of material or sense-based factors as mistaken in principleSocrates gives reasons for thinking that these factors do not in factfit a satisfactory conception of explanation From this point of viewsuch explanations are at best only part of a fuller andmore enlight-ening account Moreover this philosophical position is as far as Ican tell a defensible and interesting one It presents a thesis aboutthe connection between explanation and understanding which haspoints of contact with wider philosophical concerns



Explanation and equality

There is a great deal more to be said about the final argument butthe primary reason for considering it in such detail here is to provideillumination and support for the ground-up reading of the lsquoequalsrsquoargument I put forward earlier It remains to bring about a recon-ciliation between the dramatic and philosophical levels of the dia-logue and to show that this approach provides satisfying answersto some puzzles and difficulties which arise on more standard ap-proaches This final part of my case will bring to completion myaccount of the lsquoequalsrsquo argument and its place within a ground-upreading of the Phaedo

The primary difficulty of the lsquoequalsrsquo argument according toprevious interpretations is to find the basis onwhich ametaphysicaltheorymdashthe existence of the Platonic formsmdashis established Tradi-tional and transitional readers give different answers to this ques-tion although both rely on the top-down assumption that the argu-mentmust be understood in the context of doctrines or assumptionsdrawn from other Platonic works and both take a metaphysical fo-cus to be a crucial theme of the Phaedo Yet such readings lead toserious problems in making sense of the lsquoequalsrsquo argument whichcan be avoided by the adoption of the alternative ground-up ap-proach I have argued for

Against the traditional reading I have argued that no explicitlymetaphysical claims need to be assumed at the outset of the discus-sion of equality and that there are strong dramatic indications thatPlato did not expect his audience to assume them Against the tran-sitional reading I have argued that a methodological framework ofSocratic assumptions which constrains the scope of an acceptabledefinition pieced together from other dialogues is not necessary tounderstand the basis of Simmiasrsquo agreement with Socrates On thereading I propose the discussion proceeds at a more intuitive leveland does not rely on any specific background drawn from other Pla-tonic works

This neutral approach which stresses the partial grasp Simmiasand Socrates have on their subject-matter is helpful in explainingsome features of their exchange which are difficult to account foron more mainstream readings The unusual expression lsquothe equalitself rsquo on this view is not used by Socrates and Simmias directly


David C Lee

to refer to an entity of a certain special sort nor to a meaning asso-ciated with a Socratic definition but rather to pick out somethingindirectly by means of an important role it has in a philosophicalaccount of equality This outline characterization although specificin one respect also leaves many details unspecified In particularit does not determine whether this lsquoequalrsquo is unitary or compositeor even what sort of ontological category it falls into

This indeterminacy provides a plausible way to account for thenotoriously problematic introduction of the plural expression lsquotheequals themselvesrsquo (αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα) at at a crucial point inthe argument The indirect way of identifying the subject of theconversation makes it possible to see how lsquothe equals themselvesrsquoarises quite naturally by attraction from the context This is nothowever an instance of grammatical attraction as some havesupposed If we move from discussing equal things as Socratesdoes to what it is about each of the things which makes them equalit is quite natural to consider the role in question as something dis-tinct and individual for each of the equal things in question

It also gives the expression lsquothe equals themselvesrsquo an intelligibleconnection with the lsquoequal itself rsquo which precedes it at andfollows it at ndash The variation from one expression to the othercounts against the idea that Socrates and Simmias are committedto a definite identification of an object with any specific featuresSince nothing has been agreed beyond the need for something tooccupy the role their terminology reflects the indeterminacy aboutwhether what they are considering is simple or compound

On previous interpretations which typically read the lsquoequalsrsquo ar-gument as concerned primarily with Platonic metaphysics the cru-cial question is assumed to be whether the lsquoequals themselvesrsquo aremeant to be identified with or contrasted with the Platonic formof equality Neither option however is particularly attractive Ifthe lsquoequals themselvesrsquo are just to be identified with the form ofequality why did Plato risk generating confusion by using differ-ent expressions in the course of a single argumentThis is a particu-larly pressing question given that the supposedly incidental shift ismade in the course of the attempt to draw a contrast between sense-

It might be that the plural has arisen by a copyistrsquos error or over-zealous correc-tion as Bostock conjectures (Phaedo ndash) but this is made unlikely by the parallelinstance in Parm of lsquothe likes themselvesrsquo (αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια)

eg Dancy PF



perceptible equals (ταῦτα τὰ ἴσα ) and the lsquoequal itself rsquo On theother hand if the lsquoequals themselvesrsquo are distinct from the form itis difficult to see what sort of objects Plato might have had in mindor why he introduced them If a contrast is being drawn between ametaphysical form and sense-perceptible equals the properties ofsome third kind of entity do not seem relevant to the argumentrsquosconclusion

Going further I have argued that the schematic nature of thelsquoequalsrsquo argument is not an accident but is an indication that thephilosophical basis for ruling out sense-perceptible equals as pos-sible candidates for lsquothe equal itself rsquo is not set out at this stage in thedialogue From the audiencersquos point of view no justification for thismove is apparent until the connection between the philosophicalaccount of equalitymdashor anything elsemdashand the notion of explana-tion is introduced As a result the agreement between Socrates andSimmias takes place at a dramatic levelmdashSimmias has his own rea-sons for ruling out certain kinds of options which are independentof those Plato will later present to his audience The metaphysicalreading which motivates the search for a detailed reconstruction ofthe lsquoequalsrsquo argument to justify the move from Socratic definitionsto Platonic metaphysics is in my view a distortion introduced bytop-down assumptions about the context

Later in the Phaedo Socrates defends the claim that the explana-tion of coming to be and ceasing to be in general (περὶ γενέσεως καὶφθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν ) cannot be done within the framework ofmaterial or sense-perceptible factors since they do not provide suf-ficient resources for genuine explanations The deficiency of suchfactors is not the result of one simple failing such as appearing dif-ferent to different observers manifesting relative rather than abso-lute properties having a property in one respect and not in othersor exhibiting different properties in different contexts The deli-berately vague formula in the lsquoequalsrsquo argumentmdashwhether it is thatthe sense-perceptibles are lsquoequal for one but not for anotherrsquo orwhether it is that the sense-perceptibles are lsquoequal at one time butnot at anotherrsquomdashboth foreshadows the problem and leaves it openfor the detailed discussion which comes later

One further problem which besets metaphysical readings of thelsquoequalsrsquo argument is to make sense of the summary of the argumentSocrates offers shortly after


David C Lee

lsquoThen thereforersquo he said lsquodo matters stand this way for us Simmias Ifindeed there are these things wersquore always chattering about something fineand good and every such thing and if we refer all our perceptions to thisrecovering the thing of ours that was there before and we compare these[perceptions] with it it is necessary that just as there are these things soour soul must be there before we are born But if there are no such things[εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα] this argument will be in vain Do matters stand thisway it is equally necessary that there are these things and that our soul isthere even before we are born and that if they are not there nor is [oursoul before we are born] therersquo (Phaedo ndash )

Read straightforwardly Socratesrsquo remarks suggest that the exis-tence of the lsquofine and good and every such thingrsquo is an assumptionup for debate on which the argument rests not something whichthe foregoing argument has demonstrated or something which canbe taken as self-evident

Moreover Socrates makes a similar concession at the conclusionof the final argument when he draws the conclusion that the soulis immortal and does not perish when death occurs Simmias com-ments that he necessarily lsquofeels some residual doubt as to what hasbeen saidrsquo and Socrates replies

lsquoNot only that Simmiasrsquo said Socrates lsquoyou are right about these thingsmdashbut even the primary suppositions although you accept them [τάς γε ὑπο-θέσεις τὰς πρώτας καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν] are to be examined more clearlyIf you go through them sufficiently it seems to me you will follow theargument to the greatest extent that a man can follow it And when thatbecomes clear you will seek nothing furtherrsquo (Phaedo ndash)

Dimas lsquoRecollectingrsquo ndash replies on behalf of metaphysical readers that theresponse of Simmias corrects the misleading summary of the position given by Soc-rates and in doing so confirms that the existence of forms has been established bythe argument He cites Grubersquos translation of the crucial remark lsquoit is opportunethat our argument comes to the conclusion that our soul existed before we are bornand equally so that reality of which you are now speakingrsquo (Phaedo ndash )However Grubersquos translation is misleadingly precise It takes lsquoequally sorsquo (τὸ ὁμοίωςεἶναι) to imply that the two claims are equally shown to be true not just that they areon an equal footing Yet this latter reading would confirm rather than correct whatSocrates has just said and it is taken by Hackforth Phaedo and Gallop Phaedo as the intended one It is true that Simmias goes on to say that he is convincedthat lsquoall such things are in the fullest possible way [εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα] fine andgood and all the others you were just talking aboutrsquo ( ndash) and it could be arguedthat it is this conviction that he describes as having been lsquoprovedrsquo (ἀποδέδεικται )But it seems more likely that Simmias is referring to the prenatal existence of thesoul since both he and Cebes go on to say that while they accept this part of theargument the counterpart claim the post-mortem existence of the soul has not yetbeen proved (οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ndash cf )



On themetaphysical reading Socrates can only be understood to bereferring to the special entities he has introduced in the dialogueBut then his attitude towards them in these comments is very puzz-ling Since somuch of the argument of thePhaedo has been based onthem he can hardly suppose that it is open to an opponent simplyto reject them nullifying the whole of the discussion If the formtheory is so vulnerable it is very strange that he says nothing intheir defence simply relying on his companionsrsquo uncritical belief inthem Yet at the other extreme if the existence of these entities hasbeen demonstrated by an argument taken by Plato to be valid it isdifficult to see why Socrates should be made to qualify his remarksin this way misleadingly suggesting that the question of their ex-istence is still open

As long as we make the assumption that the Phaedorsquos central pre-occupations are metaphysical these reservations must inevitablygenerate problems This makes it reasonable to look at an alterna-tive On the view I have advocated Platorsquos primary concern is notwith building a metaphysical theory but with looking for adequateexplanations If metaphysics is involved it is secondary to this aimmotivated by the inadequacy of more parsimonious resources andis crucially limited to the exigencies of his explanatory concernsAlthough the Socrates of the Phaedo does not venture to give anydetailed account of the items he deems necessary it is clear that theyrequire him to go beyond anything the senses reveal He ventures inthis direction reluctantly and in contrast to the enthusiasm of hiscompanions he stresses the difficulties at every step

In the final argument Socrates declares himself dissatisfied withthe stopgap lsquoexplanationsrsquo of his predecessors criticizing them fortheir arbitrary character and their failure to provide the enlight-enment that Socrates takes to be characteristic of genuine explana-tions He thinks it is insufficient to single out one particularmaterialfactor because this leaves us unable to say why it is this rather thananother one which does the explanatory work Moreover when wethink of relevant counterfactual situations in which the proposedexplanatory factor is still present the situation it is required to ex-plain may no longer obtain This shows on his view that the realexplanation is more likely to lie elsewhere

If Plato structures his argument in the way I have described itis notable that a great deal depends on the claim that there are ex-planations to be found and the claim that they have the features


David C Lee

Socrates attributes to them This suggests a different understand-ing of what Socrates has in mind when he encourages Simmias andCebes to examine the lsquoprimary suppositionsrsquo more clearly and whyhe makes the prenatal existence of the soul depend on there beinga lsquofine and good and every such thingrsquo It is much more difficult toimagine doing without the notion of explanation than it is to ima-gine doing without a metaphysical theory of forms And it is evenmore difficult to imagine that the things for which an explanation isbeing soughtmdashfineness and goodness among othersmdashdo not in facthave the kind of objective basis which gives rise to the explanatorydemand in the first place Plato however regards this as the onlyserious alternative to Socratesrsquo conclusions and he thinks it is worthdrawing his audiencersquos attention to it as an option If on the otherhand we continue to believe that there are such objective realitiesthe pressure of argument will drive us towards the Socratic kind ofexplanations which do not as others do rest on an arbitrary andunexplained basis And this in turn will expose the inadequacy oftraditional epistemological theories to account for our grasp of fine-ness or equality or anything else which cannot straightforwardlyarise from sense-experience

Conclusion

I have tried to show that a plausible and philosophically interest-ing message emerges from the Phaedo when approached on its ownterms unburdened by assumptions involved in a general theory ofPlatorsquos development and interests In my view many of the pre-sent dissatisfactions with the dialogue arise from distorted expecta-tions about the kinds of questions Plato should be concerned withIt is no surprise then that Platorsquos limited engagement with thesequestions and his unwillingness to provide clear and precise an-swers to them leads to charges of dogmatism and obscurity Myalternative to this top-down approach yields a more positive viewof Platorsquos project in the Phaedo Starting from the questions thatthe dialogue does address a picture of Platorsquos philosophical con-cerns can be built up which is rather different from that of moremainstream approaches As a result the issues which the Phaedotreats as important are to be identified and assessed in their ownright



My reading of the Phaedo takes the argumentative structure andthe narrative structure of the dialogue as complementary Theseelements are integrated in Platorsquos writing but can be separated ininterpretation In this way the contribution made by both philoso-phical and dramatic structure can be seen as Platorsquos plan to buildup and defend an overall position According to the case I havemade the earlier stages of the dialogue bring up a series of claimswhich the dramatic characters receive sympathetically for reasonsof their own As the discussion progresses more and more of theargumentative justification is shared with the audience and in thefinal argument the crucial connection to the notion of explanationis made While the engagement between Socrates and his compa-nions dictates the structure of the discussion in the initial stages ofthe dialogue the argumentative engagement with the audience be-comes increasingly prominent as the discussion advances By theend of the dialogue the reader is in a position to appreciate the phi-losophical case in support of the claims that were introduced to theaudience at the beginning

On my reading of the Phaedo then the dialogue gives us bothmore and less than mainstream approaches suppose It offers lessin that it does not attempt the task of presenting a worked-out andsystematic metaphysical theory of the kind generally thought toset the agenda for a collection of Platorsquos dialogues typically groupedtogether by interpreters It offers more however in that it showshow a concern with explanation recognizably connected to thedefinition-seeking enquiries of the Socrates portrayed in otherdialogues can be developed into a powerful argument against theadequacy of generally accepted ways of accounting for knowledgeIt also offers serious reflections on the nature of explanation itselfand argues for some constraints on any theory which is to countas properly explanatory Read in this way the dialogue justifies adecisive step away from theories which deal primarily with sense-perceptibles and it points the way towards the development of atheory of a different kind Working out the precise details of thistheory was a task which would continue to preoccupy Plato for theremainder of his philosophical career

St Johnrsquos College Oxford


David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackrill J L lsquoAnamnesis in the Phaedo Remarks on ndash rsquo in E NLee A P D Mourelatos and R Rorty (eds) Exegesis and Argument(Assen ) ndash

Archer-Hind R D Platonos Phaidon [Phaidon] (London )Bluck R S Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (London )Bostock D Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (Oxford )Brentlinger J lsquoIncomplete Predicates and the Two World Theory of the

Phaedorsquo [lsquoIncompletersquo] Phronesis () ndashBurnet J Platonis opera vol i (Oxford )

Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (Oxford )Dancy R M Platorsquos Introduction of Forms [PF] (Cambridge )Devereux D lsquoSeparation and Immanence in Platorsquos Theory of Formsrsquo

repr in G Fine (ed) Plato Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford) ndash

Dimas P lsquoRecollecting Forms in the Phaedorsquo [lsquoRecollectingrsquo] Phronesis () ndash

Duke E A Hicken W F Nicoll W S M Robinson D M andStrachan J C G Platonis opera i tetralogias IndashII continens [revisedOCT] (Oxford )

Fine G On Ideas Aristotlersquos Criticism of Platorsquos Theory of Forms (Oxford)

lsquoReview of Platorsquos Phaedo Translated by David Galloprsquo Philosophi-cal Review () ndash

lsquoSeparationrsquo repr in ead Plato on Knowledge and Forms SelectedEssays (Oxford ) ndash

Gallop D Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (Oxford )Gillespie C M lsquoThe Use of εἶδος and ἰδέα in Hippocratesrsquo Classical

Quarterly () ndashGrube G M A Platorsquos Thought [PT] (London )Gulley N lsquoPlatorsquos Theory of Recollectionrsquo Classical Quarterly

() ndashHackforth R Platorsquos Phaedo [Phaedo] (Cambridge )Harte V lsquoPlatorsquos Metaphysicsrsquo in G Fine (ed) The Oxford Handbook of

Plato (Oxford ) ndashHaynes R P lsquoThe Form Equality as a Set of Equals Phaedo ndashrsquo

[lsquoSetrsquo] Phronesis () ndashIrwin T Platorsquos Ethics [Ethics] (Oxford )Loriaux R Le Pheacutedon de Platon ndash [Pheacutedon] (Namur )Mills K W lsquoPlatorsquos Phaedo ndash rsquo [lsquoPart rsquo] Phronesis ()

ndash



lsquoPlatorsquos Phaedo ndash Part rsquo [lsquoPart rsquo] Phronesis ()ndash

Murphy N R The Interpretation of Platorsquos Republic (Oxford )Nehamas A lsquoPlato on the Imperfection of the Sensible Worldrsquo [lsquoImper-

fectionrsquo] repr in G Fine (ed) Plato Metaphysics and Epistemology(Oxford ) ndash

lsquoPredication and Forms of Opposites in thePhaedorsquo [lsquoOppositesrsquo]Re-view of Metaphysics () ndash

Owen G E L lsquoLogic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aris-totlersquo in I Duumlring and G E L Owen (eds) Aristotle and Plato in theMid-Fourth Century (Gothenburg ) ndash

Penner T The Ascent from Nominalism [Nominalism] (Dordrecht )Rist J M lsquoEquals and Intermediates in Platorsquo Phronesis () ndashRoss W D Platorsquos Theory of Ideas [PTI] (Oxford )Rowe C lsquoExplanation in Phaedo ndash rsquo [lsquoExplanationrsquo] Oxford

Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndashlsquoInterpreting Platorsquo in H Benson (ed) A Companion to Plato (Ox-

ford ) ndashPlato Phaedo [Phaedo] (Cambridge )

Sedley D lsquoEqual Sticks and Stonesrsquo [lsquoEqualrsquo] in D Scott (ed) MaieusisEssays inAncient Philosophy inHonour ofMyles Burnyeat (Oxford )ndash

lsquoPlatonic Causesrsquo Phronesis () ndashSharma R lsquoSocratesrsquo New Aitia Causal and Teleological Explanations

in Platorsquos Phaedorsquo [lsquoSocratesrsquo] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash

Tarrant D lsquoPlato Phaedo ndashrsquo [lsquo ndashrsquo] Journal of Hellenic Studies () ndash

Taylor A E Varia Socratica (Oxford )Verdenius W lsquoNotes on Platorsquos Phaedorsquo Mnemosyne () ndashVlastos G lsquoReasons and Causesrsquo [lsquoReasonsrsquo] repr in id Platonic Studies

(Princeton ) ndashWhite N P Plato on Knowledge and Reality [PKR] (Indianapolis )Wiggins D lsquoTeleology and the Good in Platorsquos Phaedorsquo [lsquoTeleologyrsquo]

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndashWilliamson H The Phaedo of Plato (London )


OXFORD STUDIESIN ANCIENTPHILOSOPHY

EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3

Created on 23 February 2013 at 807 hours page iii

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David C Lee

intended the Phaedo to set out and justify a change from an earlierlsquoSocraticrsquo style of philosophy which does not make any explicitlymetaphysical claims to a position in which various ontological com-mitments are to be adopted and their implications investigated Thetransitional reading unlike the traditional reading takes thePhaedoto include an explicit discussion of the details of these new com-mitments and to argue that they provide a response to some of theproblems raised by Socratesrsquo questions This interpretative divi-sion particularly takes shape around a disagreement over the correctreading of the lsquoequalsrsquo argument a passage in which the dramaticSocrates argues that our knowledge of equality must be recollectedfrom a previous lifeMy aim here is not to draw out the differences between these read-

ings and to support one over the other but rather to uncover someimportant common ground they share I intend to draw attentionto an alternative approach to the Phaedomdashand to the lsquoequalsrsquo argu-ment in particularmdashwhich does not share these assumptions As aresult I will propose a considerably different account of the philo-sophical structure of the dialogue from the interpretations currentlydebated According to this new account the particular metaphysi-cal theory which is given prominence in different ways by previousinterpretations is considerably less detailed and systematic than isgenerally supposed and plays a subordinate role in the PhaedoIn Section I examine the reasons typically given for taking a par-

ticular metaphysical theory to be a dominant theme of the dialogueand show that they rest on questionable methodological assump-tions about the context in which the Phaedo should be read I arguethat there is room for a rival approach to the dialogue provided itcan offer comparable advantages In Section I assess the accountsof the lsquoequalsrsquo argument offered by traditional and transitional in-terpretations show that neither is compelling and put forward analternative In Section I confront two objections to my readingand develop a distinction between dramatic and philosophical levelsof argument to answer them In Sections and I discuss the lsquofinalrsquoargument and make a case for a close connection between the con-ception of explanation developed there and the conclusion of thelsquoequalsrsquo argument I show in Section that the resulting reading

) C Rowe Plato Phaedo [Phaedo] (Cambridge ) P Dimas lsquoRe-collecting Forms in the Phaedorsquo [lsquoRecollectingrsquo] Phronesis () ndash andR M Dancy Platorsquos Introduction of Forms [PF] (Cambridge )









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eg Dancy PF








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Conclusion








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BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

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The final argument






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Conclusion








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ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

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The final argument






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eg Dancy PF








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Conclusion








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ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3










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The final argument






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eg Dancy PF








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Conclusion








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ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3














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The final argument






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eg Dancy PF








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Conclusion








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ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3









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The final argument






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eg Dancy PF








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Conclusion








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BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3










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The final argument






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eg Dancy PF








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Conclusion








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ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3









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The final argument






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eg Dancy PF








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Conclusion








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BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3












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The final argument






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eg Dancy PF








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David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3









David C Lee







The final argument






David C Lee












David C Lee

















David C Lee














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David C Lee






eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3





The final argument






David C Lee












David C Lee

















David C Lee














David C Lee












David C Lee














David C Lee






eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3



David C Lee












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David C Lee














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eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3









David C Lee

















David C Lee














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David C Lee














David C Lee






eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3











David C Lee














David C Lee












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David C Lee






eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3










David C Lee












David C Lee














David C Lee






eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3









David C Lee














David C Lee






eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3










David C Lee






eg Dancy PF








David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3









David C Lee













David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3









David C Lee


Conclusion








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3








David C Lee

BIBLIOGRAPHY
















ndash




















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3





















EDITOR BRAD INWOOD

VOLUME XLIV

3



DRAMA, DOGMATISM, AND IN PLATO’S PHAEDOancphil.lsa.umich.edu/-/downloads/osap/44-Lee.pdf ·...

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Transcript of DRAMA, DOGMATISM, AND IN PLATO’S PHAEDOancphil.lsa.umich.edu/-/downloads/osap/44-Lee.pdf ·...