Draft MCCLL December 2012 Newsletter · 2013. 9. 12. · in Afghanistan from the Civil-Military...

COVER STORY:Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC 2012

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MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED

M C C L L R E P O R T S :

F E AT U R E D A R T I C L E S A N D L E S S O N S :

R E G U L A R F E AT U R E S :

13 The Most Popular Downloads from the MCCLL WebsiteDocuments in the MCCLL repositories that have been accessed most often tend to highlight topics that Marines and other readers fi nd of particular interest.

14 Briefl yThree short articles are highlighted this month:

▪ An article on the Sustainability of Energy Supplies in Afghanistan from the Civil-Military Fusion Center (CFC), with a focus on the electricity sector,

▪ Two articles on instability in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, and Yemen that are included in the latest edition of Middle East Studies (MES) Insights from Marine Corps University, and

▪ The latest edition of the Asia-Pacifi c Irregular War-fare (IrW) Update from the U.S. Army Pacifi c (USAR-PAC) Asia-Pacifi c IrW Analysis Center.

16 Reading Lists and Book ReviewsTwo books on the Commandant's Professional Reading List are featured this month, along with a recent book on the "making" of the modern Marine Corps:

▪ Into the Tiger's Jaw by LtGen Frank E. Petersen (with Alfred Phelps),

▪ Command or Control by Martin Samuels, and ▪ Underdogs by Aaron B. O'Connell.

19 MCCLL Products "in the Pipeline" Several recent, ongoing and planned MCCLL collections are scheduled to result in the publication of MCCLL reports in coming months.

20 Contact Information for MCCLL Program Analysts This roster provides contact information for MCCLL representatives assigned at major commands.

3 Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC 2012This MCCLL report documents lessons and observations from participants in this year's RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC) exercise. This biannual exercise, held during even-numbered years in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, is billed as the world's largest international maritime exercise.

5 Employment of Expeditionary Energy Assets by the Marine Corps in AfghanistanThis MCCLL report is based on interviews with knowledgeable staff members from Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) and subordinate units who have been involved in the employment of alternative and renewable energy sources in Afghanistan.

7 Trends Identifi ed During Recent Command Element OperationsThis report identifi es trends associated with command element (CE) operations that have been captured in recent MCCLL reports and unit after action reports (AARs).

8 Guidance for the Evolution of Marine Corps Identity Operations CapabilitiesA new Marine Corps Order defi nes responsibilities and assigns tasks for institutionalizing identity operations capabilities within the Marine Corps.

9 Understanding Afghanistan Culture A Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) newsletter compiles previously published articles that identify best practices for facilitating improved relations with Afghan citizens and their leaders.

10 Providing Support to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons This CALL handbook is designed to provide commanders with an understanding of issues, planning factors, and security considerations that should be taken into account in planning humanitarian assistance for displaced persons.

11 Safety Guidance from the CMC Safety Division and the Naval Safety CenterRecent Safety Grams and Did You Know special safety reports can serve as valuable resources for unit safety stand-downs and other safety briefi ngs.

12 Available After Action Reports on the MCCLL SIPR WebsiteThis article highlights some of the recent AARs prepared following Afghanistan deployments that are available on the MCCLL SIPR website.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

Front Cover photo credit: SSgt Christopher Flurry

Marines from the Combat Assault Company, 3d Marine Regiment, storm the beach in their amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) during RIM OF THE PACIFIC 2012.


DECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 12 3

RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS

Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC 2012 (RIMPAC 12)LESSONS FROM THE MARINE CORPS PARTICIPATION IN THIS BIANNUAL MARITIME EXERCISE

M C C L L R E P O R T S :

RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC) is a biannual exercise, occurring during even-numbered years in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, that is billed as the world's largest international maritime exercise. Each iteration of RIMPAC is designed to provide a unique training opportunity for participants to forge and sustain the kind of cooperative relationships that are critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and the security of the world's oceans. The 2012 exercise was the twenty-third iteration of the event, taking place from the end of June to the beginning of August 2012 and involving 25,000 personnel from twenty-two nations and more than 40 ships and 200 aircraft.

Marine Corps' participation in the exercise was led by U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacifi c (MARFORPAC), with 3d Marine Regiment furnishing the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command element (CE), as well as the ground combat element (GCE) (represented by Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (BLT 1/3)). The amphibious task force consisted of two ships, the USS Essex (LHD-2) and a Mexican Navy vessel. The land component of the exercise was organized under Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 3 (SPMAGTF-3) and included coalition detachments from eight other nations. Within the SPMAGTF, the majority of coalition participants were assigned to the ground combat element (GCE). The logistics combat element (LCE) was formed from Combat Logistics Battalion 3 (CLB-3), providing landing support, transportation, maintenance, and communications capabilities. The aviation combat element (ACE) was comprised of detachments from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (All-Weather) 225 (VMFA (AW) 225), Marine Aerial Refueler Squadron 152 (VMGR-152), Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (HMLA-169), Marine Wing Support Squadron 171 (MWSS-171), and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463), together with other Marine aviation assets that participated from various locations.

Planning for the 2012 exercise took place during a series of conferences and meetings that spanned nearly two years prior to the exercise and focused on broad, exercise-level planning factors. Plans were further developed during the period that the 3d Marine Regiment staff was aboard the USS Essex, transiting from California to Hawaii. In addition, many productive working

relationships were established during this period with the staffs of Amphibious Squadron One (PHIBRON-1) and Combined Joint Task Force 176 (CTF-176)/Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).

In order to capture lessons and observations from the Marine Corps participation in the exercise, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) (at the request of the Commander, MARFORPAC) formed a collection team comprised of MCCLL program analysts, who interviewed key exercise participants during and immediately following the conclusion of the exercise. Among the interviewees were commanders and key staff members from MARFORPAC, PHIBRON-1, the USS Essex, 3d Marine Regiment, BLT 1/3, CLB-3, HMH-463, and other units. Comments from these interviews (along with the results of a number of completed questionnaires and review of relevant source documents) have been documented in a MCCLL Unclassifi ed/For Offi cial Use Only (FOUO) report, entitled Maritime Exercise RIM OF THE PACIFIC 2012. The report includes numerous comments and observations concerning the experiences of the exercise

Photo credit: Tyler Main

Australian Army soldiers from Alpha Company, 1st Royal Australian Regiment, are transported in amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs)

from Combat Assault Company, 3d Marine Regiment, during a training raid conducted as part of RIMPAC 2012.

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participants. Selected observations releasable in this newsletter are:

▪ Pre-Exercise Planning. The various challenges associated with identifying training objectives, scheduling events, planning logistical support, and integrating coalition forces into the exercise mandated the need for early, detailed planning. The commanders of coalition companies and platoons who are responsible for planning and scheduling their units should attend the main planning conference held six months prior to the start of the exercise.

▪ Communications planning by the USS Essex staff began

nearly a year prior to the exercise. This staff, along with

the SPMAGTF communications planners, emphasized

the critical nature of this early planning, as well as the

close coordination maintained throughout the exercise.

▪ Logistics and embarkation planning and coordination

also began early and were facilitated by weekly SPMAGTF

S-4 meetings hosted by the 3d Marine Regiment.

▪ Coalition participants (many of whom were eager to take

maximum advantage of the unique training opportunities

provided) developed their individual national objectives

during the pre-exercise planning period. ▪ Pre-Exercise Training. Pre-exercise training of the

SPMAGTF built upon the resident amphibious experience of participants and included a series of command post exercises (CPX) that began seven months prior to the exercise.

▪ Logistics training for the SPMAGTF and BLT including

convoy operations during these CPXs, as well as

the scheduling of several motor vehicle operations

courses.

▪ Among the major pre-exercise training events for BLT

1/3 were exercises LAVA VIPER and ISLAND VIPER. ▪ Operations. Since RIMPAC 12 was a maritime exercise, the

design of the exercise was dominated by events intended to exercise forces afl oat.

▪ For the land component participants (including those

of the eight coalition nations), the exercise was

largely tactical in nature with emphasis on security

cooperation, small unit and individual training,

coalition interoperability, and amphibious operations.

▪ Among the training areas emphasized during the "harbor

phase" were marksmanship, military operations in

urban terrain (MOUT), heliborne operations, amphibious

reconnaissance, and team building events such as

obstacle courses.

▪ The Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned (LCAC) employed

during the amphibious operations performed effectively.

The winds and sea states encountered in the vicinity

of the Hawaiian Islands had minimal impact on LCAC

operations, although these factors must be taken into

account during the planning phase. ▪ Amphibious operations during the exercise also tended to

be impacted by the number and size of available landing beaches on Oahu.

▪ Navy communications support was considered to be key to the establishment of effective networks, including radio nets, satellite communications, antennas, and telephone lines aboard the USS Essex.

▪ Logistics. The LCE support requirements for the SPMAGTF were considerable and highlighted the need for signifi cant numbers of landing support, transportation, maintenance, communications, and medical personnel.

▪ SPMAGTF and GCE logistics support for coalition units

was particularly complex and involved various funding

mechanisms. Such factors as unique ammunition,

non-standard requirements for ammunition storage,

and specialized meals added to the complexity of the

required logistics support.

Photo credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eric T. Crosby

Marines being transported in Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned (LCAC) 32, assigned to Assault Craft Unit 5 (ACU 5), prepare to enter the

well deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) during Exercise RIMPAC 12.





In March 2011, General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, issued the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan that established the "way forward" for reducing the critical dependency of the Marine Corps on the large amounts of fuel (as well as batteries) that are currently necessary for effective deployed combat operations. The objective outlined in this Strategy is to achieve the maximum employment of alternative and renewable energy sources for Marine Corps command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems (as well as life support systems), while relying on ground vehicles, as necessary, to power larger ground systems.

The use of renewable energy sources is considered to be particularly important during combat operations, since these energy assets can reduce the need for re-supply missions for fuel and batteries that can expose Marines in these convoys to increased dangers of enemy attack. Based on planned investments in energy effi ciency programs, it is expected that the effi ciency of future Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) will be improved by 9%, and they will be able to operate with 208 fewer fuel trucks. By 2025, the Strategy calls for the Marine Corps

to be able to organize a Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) that is capable of maneuvering from the sea while only requiring liquid fuel for mobility systems once ashore.

As a result of the documented need to reduce its energy requirements, the Marine Corps has invested in a number of innovative programs to integrate energy effi ciency and performance in the approaches being employed to man, train, and equip the force. Two of the programs that are currently being employed by the Marine Corps are the Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System (GREENS) and the Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System (SPACES). In addition, other power-saving devices, such as light-emitting diode (LED) light sets for shelters and radiant barriers that create additional thermal barriers for shelters, are being employed.

These systems have been used by Marine Corps units in

Afghanistan, as well as during recent exercises, including

JAVELIN THRUST 2012. Some of the capabilities furnished

by the systems are:

▪ GREENS is a solar power system, with a series

of solar panels that can maintain a charge of 300

watts continuously as long as a source of sunlight

is available. The system also provides the ability

to operate 300 watts of power for up to 16 hours

with four high-energy lithium battery packs that are

managed by a control box to determine the amount

of energy to be provided by each. GREENS allows

command and control systems and forward-deployed

bases to be operated on renewable energy.

▪ SPACES is a lightweight, man-portable system

that consists of several foldable solar panels, with

numerous output and input cables and adapters and

For Marines, the term "expeditionary" is a mindset that determines how we man, train and equip our force. We know that resource effi ciency aids in combat effectiveness and that our investments in reset and modernization will provide a force that operates lighter, faster and at reduced risk. Likewise, our force will be more energy effi cient to support the type of operations expected of us in the future. To do this, we are changing the way we think about and use energy. . .

General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps, in the 2012 Posture Statement to

the House Armed Services Committee

Employment of Expeditionary Energy Assets by the Marine CorpsLESSONS FROM REGIONAL COMMAND SOUTHWEST

Photo credit: Cpl Laura Bonano

Marines from the 5th Air Naval Gunfi re Liaison Company (ANGLICO) set up a Ground Expeditionary Energy Network System (GREENS) aboard a camp in Helmand Province in order to reduce the dependency on power sources, such as batteries, generators and natural fossil fuels, in their remote operating location.


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a control box. The system can charge batteries and

provide power for some radios.

▪ The LED light sets being employed by Marines

consume 25 to 60 percent less power than fl uorescent

bulbs and have high ratings for service life.

▪ Radiant barriers increase the insulation factors on

shelters and improve the environment control unit

(ECU) effectiveness in heating or cooling the shelters. In June and July 2012, a subject matter expert, sponsored by

the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), conducted interviews with relevant staff members from Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) and subordinate units to document their lessons and observations concerning the organization, training, and equipping associated with the fi elding of expeditionary energy equipment in theater. The results of these interviews, along with a review of relevant source documents, have been documented in a MCCLL Unclassifi ed/For Offi cial Use Only (FOUO) report, entitled Expeditionary Energy in Afghanistan, which includes numerous comments and observations concerning employment of the GREENS and SPACES systems. Among the observations releasable in this newsletter are: ▪ Training. Two of the infantry battalions interviewed had

employed prototype GREENS during home station training and/or during their Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) training exercise. This allowed the battalions to reduce their fuel consumption during training, as well as the need for resupply convoys, in addition to allowing them to become more familiar with the system. The units were able to practice setting up the equipment and learn about their proper employment.

▪ Training material and technical manuals proved to

be important resources in achieving the necessary

familiarity.

▪ Once in theater, sustainment training consisted

primarily of practical application classes.

▪ The simplicity and short-duration of the training

requirements for the equipment, allowed selected

Marines to become "GREENS experts" within their

units on the employment of the system and its

components. ▪ System Employment. Advisor teams that typically serve

in more austere or remote locations (in comparison to the large forward operating bases (FOBs)) benefi ted from the use of GREENS in conjunction with LED lights to reduce demand on the limited available power capacity. For example, employment of two systems at one advisor team location provided power for two radios and two laptop


computers, as well as refrigerators, a freezer, and lighting for the compound. As a result, fuel resupply requirements for this location were signifi cantly reduced. ▪ Advisor teams also employed GREENS to provide primary

power to critical systems as an uninterrupted power supply (UPS) in the event of loss of generator power. Units that employed the system as a UPS experienced almost continuous communications services when contracted generator power was interrupted.

▪ Expeditionary energy equipment also has the potential to reduce the administrative tasks associated with requesting external generator support.

▪ One unit experimented with the employment of SPACES in a man-portable Biometrics Automated Toolset (BAT) capability.

▪ Although the systems have generally performed well, their continued employment in Regional Command Southwest will obviously be impacted by the ongoing drawdown of U.S. forces, as well as the fact that Afghanistan is a mature theater with plentiful generators and a robust contracted logistical support system in place.

Video credit: Diane Durden

In preparation for Exercise JAVELIN THRUST 2012, Marines from Marine Corps Forces Reserve and 2d Tank Battalion, learn to

set up and operate the Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System (GREENS) and the Solar Portable Alternative

Communications Energy System (SPACES) during classes conducted by personnel from the Marine Corps Forces Pacifi c Experimentation

Center.




In April 2012, MCCLL began publication of a series of periodic reports to identify trends that have been documented during the process of capturing lessons from recent in-theater deployments, exercises and training evolutions. Each of these individual reports address one of the four Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements: command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), or logistics combat element (LCE). Following publication of the initial set of four reports in April and May 2012, MCCLL began preparing a second series of reports that compile common observations and recommendations from more recent unit after action reports (AARs) and MCCLL reports. The objective is to provide these observations for review by Marine Corps decision makers and leaders who are best positioned to address the issues. The fi rst of this second series, the LCE Trends Report for 1 January to 31 July 2012, was published in September 2012. The second in the series has now been fi nalized, Command Element Trends for 1 April to 30 September 2012. Among the topics addressed in this report are:

Amphibious Exercises. During the past eight months, MCCLL conducted lessons learned collections during three major amphibious exercises: BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012, SSANG YONG 2012, and RIM OF THE PACIFIC 2012. Among the common trends noted during these exercises were:

▪ Doctrinal Command Relationships, Roles and Functions. The roles, relationships and functions of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), and commander, landing force (CLF), are complex and variable (depending on exercise requirements).

▪ Availability of Amphibious Shipping. In order to optimize training and rigorously test doctrine, organization, command and control, and logistics, the availability of a suffi cient number of amphibious ships is required during exercises.

▪ Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). A number of challenges associated with C4 systems have been documented in these three MCCLL reports. Recommendations include the development of technological and procedural solutions that can be employed with the existing infrastructure aboard amphibious shipping.

▪ Exercise Design and Control. Exercise design should emphasize the provision of realistic training for all of the

Marine Corps participants.

Reserve-Sourced Forces. Two recent MCCLL reports

have addressed the deployment of reserve-sourced special-

purpose Marine air ground task forces (SPMAGTFs): the

Black Sea Rotational Force 2011 and SPMAGTF-12.1.

Among the trends identifi ed in these reports were:

▪ Activation Timeline for Command Element Staffs. The reports recommend that reserve-sourced command element (CE) staffs for large detachments and SPMAGTFs be activated thirty days prior to the general activation.

▪ Authorities of the Detachment Offi cer-in-Charge (OIC). OICs need to obtain several relevant command authorities in order to ensure good order and discipline and enable the performance of essential administrative and logistical activities.

Continuing Trends. Among the trends identifi ed in the

previous CE trends report that require continuing emphasis

is the need for ARG and MEU planners to anticipate and plan

for MEU disaggregated operations; these type operations

have become routine during recent MEU deployments. In

addition, the report points out that the effectiveness of

liaison offi cers deployed in support of amphibious, joint,

and coalition operations is often dependent on their early

identifi cation and training.


Trends Identified During Recent Command Element OperationsLESSONS FROM MCCLL REPORTS AND UNIT AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Photo credit: Diane Durden

Marines from the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (AABN), Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2), depart the well deck of the

USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) in their amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) during Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012.




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The MCCLL September 2012 Newsletter highlighted two related products that provide guidance (as well as lessons learned) on the topic of Marine Corps identity operations (IdOps). The fi rst was the recently-published U.S. Marine Corps Identity Operations Strategy 2020 Implementation Plan, while the second was a MCCLL report on the topic of Marine Corps Biometrics Efforts in Afghanistan. As defi ned in the Strategy, Marine Corps IdOps is an evolving capability that combines the historically separate, but mutually supporting capabilities of biometrics, forensics, and identity management and folds them under a single management and operations umbrella.

Emerging IdOps capabilities and requirements have been infl uenced greatly by U.S. and coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; these operations have validated the importance of IdOps in providing information, intelligence and battlespace awareness for the decision-making process of commanders and their operations at all levels. As a result, it is essential for the Marines Corps to examine the systems and capabilities procured for and deployed to these theaters and rigorously evaluate their potential applicability to other operating environments.

The overall objective of IdOps planning is to: (1) synchronize current and emerging operational IdOps capabilities to provide the tactical commander with near real-time information to establish the identity, affi liations, and authorizations of individuals, (2) link people places, and events, (3) deny anonymity and freedom of movement

Guidance for Evolving Marine Corps Identity Operations Capabilities MARINE CORPS ORDER 5530.17: MARINE CORPS IDENTIT Y OPERATIONS ( IDOPS)

F E AT U R E D A R T I C L E S A N D L E S S O N S :

to the enemy, (4) affect the enemy's operational environment, (5) infl uence the enemy's decision-making process, and (6) protect U.S. assets, facilities, and forces.

In November, the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations issued Marine Corps Order 5530.17, which defi nes the need for the Marine Corps to build on existing IdOps capabilities and assigns responsibilities and tasks for institutionalizing IdOps within the Marine Corps and integrating IdOps into Marine Corps operations and missions. The concept of operations for IdOps emphasizes the importance of "coordination and unity of effort through joint and interagency collaboration for all IdOps capabilities. Achieving unity of effort for the employment and governance of IdOps capabilities will encourage interaction and cooperation between the DoD and federal enterprises, reduce duplication of effort, avoid unnecessary resource expenditure, advance the Marine Corps vision, and enhance mission success."

The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations shall . . . Require commanders to provide an operational assessment [of IdOps] as part of the Marine Corps Planning Process in response to mission execution. Feedback on mission execution provided by commanders through after action reports, situational reports, or through the conduct of a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) fi eld collection will be incorporated into the analysis of the capabilities developed in order to ensure timely, accurate feedback from the operating forces. . .

From the tasks and responsibilities outlined in Marine Corps Order 5530.17


Photo credit: Petty Offi cer 2nd Class Matthew Snodgrass

Captured insurgent weapons hang inside a fi ngerprint recovery tank at the Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facility 7 (JEFF 7) at Camp Leatherneck. The JEFF exploits various enemy materials recovered

from the battlefi eld in Helmand Province for forensic, intelligence, and prosecutorial purposes.







Many Marines who have deployed to Afghanistan in recent years have "learned the hard way" about the diffi culties and challenges associated with communicating effectively with the local populace and establishing productive relationships with their leaders. These diffi culties often result from the challenges faced in appreciating the nuances of Afghan culture. As an aid for coalition forces who must interact regularly with Afghan citizens, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has prepared a newsletter, entitled Understanding Afghan Culture, that is designed to increase situational awareness concerning important aspects of Afghan culture and identify best practices that have proven effective in facilitating improved relationships. Although not all-inclusive, the newsletter compiles a number of thought-provoking articles that have been published in recent professional journals and designed to inform military service members and their leaders about relevant Afghan cultural issues. Among the topics covered in the newsletter is the impact

that decades of confl ict (especially the Taliban's murder and intimidation campaigns) have had on the attitudes of the local populace. In one interchange, in which a U.S. Army offi cer discussed providing villagers with weapons so that a village force of about 250 could help protect the village from an estimated ten to twenty Taliban, the offi cer states that the "Village elders had convinced themselves, despite facts to the contrary, that the insurgents possessed almost superhuman capabilities. While the elders' words and actions signifi ed broad, passive support for the insurgents, the shame and humiliation they felt at the hands of insurgent treatment was also evident. We were not seeing the fi ercely independent and aggressive Afghan. Could this really be the "Graveyard of Empires?" We were not seeing great men of honor. Could this really be the land of Pashtunwali - the unwritten code of conduct that places such an emphasis on honor?" The article highlights the fact that U.S. forces must understand the impact that decades of confl ict and rampant poverty have had on the local populace. This particular article makes the case that there are similarities between the attitudes of many Afghan citizens and that of "battered spouses" in terms of living in an environment of persistent fear and believing that the abuser is omnipotent, with the victim's behavior becoming one of "learned helplessness."

Understanding Afghanistan CultureA COMPILATION OF RECENT ARTICLES FROM THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

. . . The power of "refl ection" [after an event has occurred] as a learning strategy is evident in the following account of the fi rst meeting between a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and an Afghan battalion commander. . . Suddenly, one of the Afghans stood up, pointed at the lieutenant colonel, and said . . . "This man is a jerk."

The Marine remembered, "I'm leaving a family behind. I'm deployed, and part of me is thinking. . . 'Hey buckaroo, I'm here to help you guys; you're not doing anything for me here.' But I bit my tongue and swallowed it. I didn't know where he was going at the time. . . But, I understood that to be effective, I could never show that I had lost my temper. So I said, 'Clearly, you are a wise man, for my wife, too, thinks I'm a jerk.' And a cacophony of laughter broke out. . . The Afghan offi cer became my biggest advocate through the whole deployment. Later on, I was able to determine that he was trying to demonstrate in front of his peers that he was a man of importance and was using me as a way to demonstrate that fact. . ."

From the article, "Strategies for Developing and Practicing Cross-Cultural Expertise"


Photo credit: SSgt Andrew Miller

The Religious Cultural Affairs Offi cer with the Afghan National Army (ANA) 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, addresses the attendees

at a Religious Engagement Conference held in Helmand Province. The conference was sponsored by Regimental Combat Team

5 (RCT-5) to bring together religious leaders to discuss the importance of religious engagements with Afghan forces and the

citizens of southwestern Afghanistan.





As has been the case throughout human history, military confl icts are expected to continue to result in large numbers of dislocated civilians that may face extreme humanitarian hardships. The Marine Corps, along with the other U.S. military services, is often required to help relieve this human suffering and deal with the many issues associated with displaced persons. The diffi cult challenges anticipated in future confl icts (especially in the areas of law, logistics and security) will often be exacerbated when dealing with population groups that are displaced and suffering. In addition, the manner in which these displaced civilians are treated has the potential to refl ect U.S. values more so than do our stated policies. Issues associated with displaced persons during military operations are also likely to receive attention at the highest levels of government and to capture the attention of the media and the international community.

In an effort to provide increased awareness and understanding of the issues faced by refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the US. Army Command and General Staff College has developed an elective course on the topic. Students who have attended this course have written articles on many of the specifi c issues associated with displaced persons. Thirteen of these articles have now been compiled in a handbook published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), entitled Commander's Guide to Supporting Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. These articles are designed to provide commanders with an understanding of legal and funding issues, civil-military issues, and planning and security considerations associated with both refugees and IDPs.

Commanders who have responsibility for an area of operations with a signifi cant population of displaced persons must understand the importance of ensuring that this population group is not neglected. If neglect occurs, it can result in additional security and logistic problems and hinder the primary mission. For example, if the camps that have been established for the displaced persons do not have adequate supplies, individuals may leave the camps searching for additional provisions and thus interfere with operations. If the camp security situation is not acceptable, individuals could leave or band together and form their own insurgency. Commanders need to understand fully the impact that the displaced persons can have on the mission.

Commanders also need to be aware of the entities that


Providing Support to Refugees and Internally Displaced PersonsA HANDBOOK FOR COMMANDERS FROM THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

are working alongside them in their operational environment. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that specialize in refugee issues may already be working in the area. Prior to conducting operations, commanders should meet with these organizations; they can often provide additional expertise on the situation and the needs of the affected population. NGOs may also possess cultural knowledge of the local area and have gained the trust of key individuals in the camps.

. . . There may be hesitancy and sometimes distrust within the NGO community when it comes to working with the military. Civil-military meetings can help alleviate some of this mistrust. The NGOs will better understand the military mission, whereas the military will see how best to support the civil organizations and their operations. Each group can discuss their capabilities and goals and begin to build the trust necessary to work with each other. [The NGOs'] . . . knowledge of the people, language, and the different tribal groups is valuable information that can help a commander determine the best course of action. Additionally, the military has extensive lift capabilities and may be able to move needed humanitarian supplies, while the NGOs sometimes lack this capability . . . . . .

From the Commander's Guide to Refugees/IDPs

Photo credit: Cpl John Robbart III

Marines from the Engineer Detachment of Combat Logistics Battalion 15 (CLB-15), set up a tactical water purifi cation system

at Red Beach, Camp Pendleton, for an internally displaced persons camp as part of a humanitarian assistance exercise. During the exercise, the CLB-5 participated in interoperability

training with Amphibious Squadron 3 (PHIBRON 3)and 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in preparation for an upcoming

deployment.





All of the recent Safety Grams and Did You Know special safety reports from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Safety Division, as well as many other safety-related publications from the Naval Safety Center and deployed commands and units, are available on the MCCLL website for use by Marines during safety stand-downs and other safety briefi ngs. As shown below, many of these products can be accessed from the MCCLL homepage, which features the most recent fi ve CMC Safety Division reports and provides a link to other recent products. Among the topics addressed in these reports are: small arms and explosives safety, electrical safety, fatigue and late night driving, motorcycle safety, back problems that are often experienced by helicopter aircrew, and risks associated with fad diets.

The most recent safety product, the CMC Safety Division October 2012 Safety Gram provides a summary of mishaps reported in September that resulted in serious injury or death to Marines and/or damage to equipment. Four of these mishaps involved motorcycle accidents (all of which included fatalities), three were passenger vehicle accidents (also involving fatalities, with one being a Marine pedestrian), one was a swimming fatality, and one was an aircraft accident. Three of the motorcycle accidents, as well as one of the passenger vehicle incidents, involved Marines losing control of their vehicles and leaving the roadway or moving into oncoming traffi c. One of the other passenger vehicle accidents involved a Marine falling asleep at the wheel. Obviously, all of the mishaps could easily have been prevented by following safe driving practices.

Safety Guidance from the CMC Safety Division and the Naval Safety CenterOCTOBER 2012 SAFET Y GRAM WITH SAFET Y TIPS FOR INCLEMENT WEATHER DRIVING


The Safety Gram also includes a special article with driving tips for inclement weather conditions. Among the major points made in this article are: (1) plan ahead if you learn about bad weather conditions along your route (including the desirability of postponing your trip), (2) increasing the distance between your car and the car in front, (3) having your tires, brakes, windshield wipers, wiper fl uid, and headlights checked, (4) drive more slowly, (5) listen to radio reports concerning road conditions, (6) use your headlights (low beams) in fog, (7) pull over and rest if you feel yourself becoming tired, and (8) always buckle up (and ensure your passengers do the same). Of course the best advice for navigating inclement weather conditions is not to drive at all.

Photo credit: Sgt Rachael Moore

Rick C. Fedrizzi, President and Chief Operator of the "Richard Petty Driver Experience," teaches a course on safe driving to

Marines and sailors from 2d Marine Logistics Group (MLG) at Marine Corps Auxiliary Landing Field Bogue, NC. The course

focused on braking, reaction times, tailgating, and loss of control (particularly during inclement weather conditions).





In addition to the many after action reports (AARs) that have been highlighted in recent MCCLL monthly newsletters and are available on our NIPR website (https://mccll.usmc.mil), a signifi cant number of AARs prepared following OEF deployments are available only on the MCCLL SIPR website (https://mccll.usmc.smil.mil). Marines with SIPR access may be interested in the following AARs (all of which are based on OEF 12.1 deployments). Each of these can be accessed by clicking on the Marine Corps AARs link on the MCCLL SIPR home page:

▪ I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) OEF 12.1 First 100 Days AARs. In early 2012, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward) began its relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) with II MEF (Fwd) in preparation for assuming the role of the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) command element (CE) for all coalition forces operating in the Helmand and Nimruz Provinces of southwestern Afghanistan. Rather than preparing a fi rst 100 days AAR following it fi rst three months in theater, I MEF (Fwd) elected to prepare individual AARs that address specifi c time frames during its preparations for deployment and initial operations. These individual AARs highlight the development of staff capabilities over time and the command's efforts to address the main issues faced by a combined headquarters. The AARs address the following specifi c timeframes: (1) Pre-Deployment Training to TOA, (2) TOA to March 2012, (3) April 2012, and (4) May 2012.

▪ Second Battalion, Fifth Marines (2/5) OEF 12.1 Post-Deployment AAR. This infantry battalion deployed unit elements into three of the northern Helmand districts during a time of rapid transition, with the surge recovery in "full swing." As a result of the reduction in the number of coalition fi xed sites and the retrograde of combat power, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were required to accept increased responsibilities and fi ll the security void.

▪ Second Battalion, Ninth Marines (2/9) OEF 12.1 Post-Deployment AAR. This battalion deployed to a central Helmand Province district for the second time, facing a far different operational situation than during its fi rst

deployment. The district had offi cially transitioned to ANSF lead security authority concurrent with the battalion's arrival. Battalion efforts concentrated on cutting off insurgent funding, identifying and targeting the insurgent leadership, and disrupting their ability to organize for the poppy harvest and spring offensive.

▪ Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 (HMH-466) OEF 12.1 Post-Deployment AAR. This squadron deployed to conduct heavy lift assault support missions in support of expeditionary operations in Helmand Province and surrounding areas. The squadron conducted both general support tasking and deliberate combat operations, including support of a number of named operations.

▪ Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 469 (HMLA-469) OEF 12.1 First 100 Days AAR. This squadron provided attack and utility support to RC (SW), with priority missions being the support of troops in contact (TIC), medical evacuation escort, and emergency supply. The squadron also performed a number of close air support (CAS) missions.

▪ First Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) OEF 12.1 First 100 Days AAR. This battalion deployed to provide the full gamut of mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability support to 1st Marine Division (Forward) in its capacity as Task Force Leatherneck in southwestern Afghanistan.

Available After Action Reports on the MCCLL SIPR WebsiteOPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 12.1 AFTER AC-TION REPORTS


Photo credit: Sgt Keonaona Paulo

A door gunner with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 469 (HMLA-469) provides close air support for International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) ground forces in Helmand Province.

https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/index.cfm



Many of the documents highlighted in MCCLL monthly newsletters and weekly new data rollups are downloaded every month from the MCCLL NIPR and SIPR websites. These include MCCLL reports, Marine Corps unit after action reports (AARs), recent doctrinal publications, briefi ngs on a wide range of topics, and many other source documents that articulate valuable lessons learned. In an effort to inform readers concerning the products that other Marines, civilian Marines, and contractors have found of interest, we include in each monthly newsletter a list of documents that have been accessed and downloaded most often during the previous month.

During November 2012, the docu-ments listed in the table to the right were

The Most Popular DownloadsFROM THE MCCLL WEBSITE

R E G U L A R F E AT U R E S :

Photo credit: Cpl Isaac Lamberth

After a ten-hour fl ight, a Harvest HAWK-modifi ed KC-130J aircraft equipped with Hellfi re and Griffi n missiles sits on the runway. The aircraft is staffed with offi cers who have experience conducting close air support in order to take advantage of this variant of the aircraft, which provides an expanded capability for close air support against enemy positions. The MCCLL report on this topic, KC-130J/Harvest HAWK Operations in OEF, was the most frequently downloaded document during November 2012.


most frequently accessed. This diverse collection of documents includes three MCCLL reports (including two of the latest Trends Reports), fi ve recent Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) AARs from Marine Corps commands and units, the latest Safety Gram from the CMC Safety Division, and an Exercise RIMPAC 2012 AAR from 3d Marine Regiment.

These documents were down-loaded most often by offi cers from 2ndLt/O-1 to LtCol/O-5, SNCOs from SSgt/E-6 to MSgt and 1stSgt/E-8, DoD civilians in grades GS-12 and GS-13, and DoD contractors.

There also continue to be signifi cant numbers of new registrations on the MCCLL website each month, with 688 new registrants signing up in November, compared with 614 in October.

T O P T E N D O W N L O A D S F R O M T H E M C C L L W E B S I T E , NOVEMBER 2012

1. KC-130J/Harvest HAWK Operations in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (MCCLL)

2. 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (1/8) OEF 12.1 After Action Report (AAR)

3. Command Element Trends, 1 April to 30 September 2012 (MCCLL)

4. Regimental Combat Team 5 OEF 11.2/12.1 AAR

5. 1st Combat Engineer Battalion OEF 12.1 Post-Deployment AAR

6. Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (VMU-2) First 100 Days OEF 12.1 AAR

7. October 2012 Safety Gram (CMC Safety Division)

8. Logistics Combat Element Trends (01 January - 31 July 2012 (MCCLL)

9. 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) Post-Deployment OEF 11.2/12.1 AAR

10. 3d Marine Regiment Exercise RIMPAC 2012 AAR



https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/middle/servefile.cfm?fileType=CDR&ID=24711&repositoryDirectory=AARs











of Energy Supplies in Afghanistan. In addition to examining the current state of this sector, the report seeks to identify obstacles that tend to undermine the sustainability of electricity supplies and impede opportunities for enhancing the energy sector.

Afghanistan has evolved from an energy exporter (providing the Soviet Union with natural gas in the 1970s and 80s) to a country that imports the majority of its energy needs. The overall domestic production from hydro and thermal plants has declined, whereas electricity imports from neighboring countries, particularly Uzbekistan, has increased greatly. While electricity imports were only about 33.5% of the total energy consumed in 2006, they now constitute almost 73% of Afghanistan's electricity supply.

As a result of international assistance, energy supplies in the major economic hubs of the country have increased signifi cantly, mainly as a result of connection to the North-East Power System (NEPS), which transmits power from Uzbekistan. This system now provides a 24-hour supply to Kabul, which, as recently as 2001, had electric access in only about six percent of the city. In Afghanistan's second largest city, Kandahar, power is provided primarily by a power plant that is powered by military-run diesel generators, with fuel procured and donated by USAID. The intent was for this to be a temporary solution until the city was connected to the NEPS and to the Kajaki hydropower plant in Helmand Province, which would provide domestically generated and more affordable electricity. However, insecurity in Kajaki has infl ated the cost of the rehabilitation of the plant, with the dam's main access road being vulnerable to Taliban attacks. Insecurity also prevents contractors from building new transmission lines.

Despite the current challenges, the CFC report highlights opportunities for enhancing the energy security of the country and points out the vast potential from renewable energy, particularly hydropower, solar and wind. However, harnessing this potential will require investment, which is often dependent on the ability to ensure security for transit routes.

Two articles in the November 2012 edition of MES Insightsfrom the Middle East Studies (MES) at the Marine Corps University address recent developments in the Gaza strip, Egypt and Yemen. The fi rst article, Egypt's Democratic Process Among the Victims of the Gaza Confl ict, by Amin Tarzi, highlights the results of Egypt becoming the main powerbroker between the Palestinians and the Israelis during the latest armed crisis in Gaza. Despite the

Briefly

Afghanistan currently resides in the bottom ten percent of nations worldwide in terms of electricity consumption per capita, primarily refl ecting the lack of access to reliable and affordable electric power supplies by a large segment of the country's population. It is estimated that only about a third of Afghan citizens have access to electricity, with a large differential existing in accessibility between urban and rural areas. In the latter (which includes much of the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) area of operations in southwestern Afghanistan), only about nine percent of the population has access to electricity. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimates that 28 million people in the country (mostly the rural poor) do not have access to reliable, modern forms of energy and instead rely on self-supplied energy sources, such as wood, dung and other biomass for fuel.

Access to more reliable, consistent forms of energy is widely recognized as a pre-requisite for the revitalization of the Afghan economy. In turn, economic growth is considered to be essential for increasing employment in the country, reducing the poverty rate, and improving overall social and political stability and security. In an effort to compile information on the current status and the sustainability of energy supplies in Afghanistan (with an emphasis on the electricity sector), the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) has prepared a report on the subject, entitled Sustainability


ACCESS TO RELIABLE, COST-EFFECTIVE ENERGY IN AFGHANISTAN

INSTABILITY IN EGYPT, THE GAZA STRIP, AND YEMEN

Photo credit: MGySgt Phil Mehringer

The supervisor of the Regional Command Southwest (RC (SW)) Economic Development section and an Afghan renewable energy engineer inspect the solar panels on the roof of a recently-completed fruit and vegetable packing facility in Marjeh. The solar panels provide a renewable energy source for the building.








unifi ed national command structure, there will continue to be the risk of further fractionalization and a possible, protracted civil war.

In response to the President's Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense, issued January 2012, the Marine Corps is adjusting its force lay-down in the Asia-Pacifi c region to respond to the shift of focus in this region. As evidence of the increasing importance of the Pacifi c theater, a bilateral agreement with Australia has resulted in the deployment of a Marine Corps rotational force to Darwin, Australia, to conduct exercises and train with the Australian Defence Forces. Among a number of resources available for maintaining situational awareness of this region is a monthly newsletter prepared by the U.S. Army Pacifi c (USARPAC) Asia-Pacifi c Irregular Warfare (IrW) Analysis Center, entitled Asia-Pacifi c IrW Update. Each edition of this newsletter is being made available in the MCCLL repositories. The 31 October 2012 edition of the newsletter includes a special assessment of IED cells located in Indonesia, along with regular features on the nations of India, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia.

The shift in focus to the Pacifi c is especially welcomed by the Marine Corps. As noted by General James F. Amos, Commandant, "As our nation is shifting its strategic focus to the Pacifi c, in many ways the Marine Corps is returning home to our historic backyard. We have a long history in the Pacifi c, replete with many hard-won victories, so this area of the world is in our institutional DNA."


symbolic recall of its ambassador from Israel and the dispatch of his prime minister to Gaza in a show of solidarity, the Egyptian President, Muhammad Mursi, genuinely tried to lessen the armed hostilities and broker a cease fi re. However, his sympathies are much more likely to be in line with the views of Hamas than with the security of the State of Israel (a pillar of which is the maintenance of peace with Egypt). He also must balance the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's popular mandate from the election, with a multitude of factors to achieve its short- to medium-term goals, which are primarily Egypt-centric. One of the key factors is the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Alafi s (whose party captured a signifi cant percentage of the vote in the parliamentary elections and who accuses the Brotherhood of not being true Muslims, in part due to Egypt's continued adherence to the Camp David Accords). After receiving international recognition for his handling of the crisis in Gaza and reestablishing Egypt's role as a partner of the U.S. and Israel in regional peacemaking, he announced a Constitutional Declaration, effectively providing himself with broad legislative, executive, constitutional and judicial authorities and immunity from judicial oversight. "It seems that in addition to those who died during the week-long confl ict between Israel and Hamas, the nascent democratic experience in Egypt has also received a near fatal blow."

The second article, Military Restructuring and Yemen's Stalled Transition, by Adam C. Seitz, addresses the continuing delays in the Yemen government's transition, which was called for in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and aimed to unify the deeply divided country and lay the foundation for the drafting of a new constitution. In particular, the Conference for National Dialogue continues to be pushed back from its scheduled date in April 2012. One of the main reasons for the delay is the restructuring of the armed forces, which is stipulated as a part of the fi rst phase of the GCC Initiative. This is especially important due to the continuing infl uence of the previous president (Ali Abdullah Saleh) on the military due to relatives maintaining several key posts. This raises the potential for armed confl ict in the event that the Dialogue fails.

During Saleh's reign, the military had become an indispensable tool of control by the regime, played an essential role in Yemen's patronage system, and had been used to marginalize potential rivals to Saleh and his dynastic aspirations. The use of the army in crackdowns on demonstrators and the fracturing of the Yemeni military during the 2011 uprisings further underscores the need for comprehensive reform of the armed forces. In August 2012, the fi rst stage of military restructuring took place, which attempted to re-balance forces controlled by competing factions rather than to move to a unifi ed armed forces. If such moves are not followed up with more comprehensive reforms aimed at establishing a

KEEPING ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Photo credit: LCpl Jacob D. Barber

Machine gunners from Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines (2/3), check an azimuth while creating a range card for an

M-240B medium machine gun at Kangaroo Flats Training Area in the Australian outback. The company was the fi rst to deploy to

Darwin under the bilateral agreement with Autstralia.





In July 2011, the Commandant’s Professional Reading List was revised by a review panel established by General James F. Amos to ensure that the list continues to be relevant and provides Marines with a variety of resources to broaden their perspectives and help ensure that they benefi t from the experiences of others. The list continues to highlight First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret), as the Commandant’s “choice book” to be read by all Marines. In May 2012, two additional books were added to the reading list, The Marines of Montford Point by Melton A. McLaurin and Into the Tiger's Jaw by LtGen Frank E. Petersen. Marines are tasked to read a minimum of one book from the list for their grade each year. The CMC list, as well as other reading lists (such as those prepared by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Director of Intelligence), are highlighted on the Marine Corps University (MCU) website, along with discussion guides and other resources.

This month we feature three books: ▪ Into the Tiger's Jaw by LGen Frank E. Petersen (with

Alfred Phelps), on the Commandant’s list for Captain and Chief Warrant Offi cer 4,

▪ Command or Control by Martin Samuels, on the Commandant’s list for First Lieutenant and Chief Warrant Offi cer 3, and

▪ Underdogs by Aaron B. O'Connell, a brand new book on the "making" of the modern Marine Corps.

With his retirement in 1988, Marine LtGen Frank E. Petersen concluded a military career of remarkable “fi rsts” that began 38 years before with his enlistment in the U.S. Navy. Among those fi rsts are those of being the fi rst black Marine aviator and general offi cer. In the intervening years, LtGen Petersen commanded at every level of command and stood as a trailblazer for all Marines. Indeed, his story is the story of the modern U.S. Marine Corps. Into the Tiger’s Jaw, LtGen Petersen’s autobiography . . . provides vital insights into both the history of Marine aviation and the racial integration of the Marine Corps.


INTO THE TIGER'S JAW: AMERICA'S FIRST BLACK MARINE AVIATOR LTGEN FRANK E. PETERSEN (WITH ALFRED PHELPS) (PRESIDIO PRESS, 1998)

Reading Lists and Book ReviewsA biographer of Gen Daniel “Chappie”

James, USAF, the fi rst African-American four-star general offi cer, as well as author of a collective biography of the fi rst black astronauts, J. Alfred Phelps lends a literary expertise to LtGen Peterson’s autobiography. Throughout LtGen Petersen’s story, Phelps includes the observations of the general’s family, friends, and contemporaries in “other voices” vignettes. These interludes

provide a context often absent from autobiographies and enrich the general’s story.

A Topeka, Kansas, native, LtGen Petersen earned his commission upon completing fl ight school in 1952 and saw combat in Korea the following year as a fi ghter pilot with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212 (VMFA–212) and a forward air controller with 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. A graduate of Amphibious Warfare School, he commanded VMFA–314 in Vietnam and graduated from the National War College in 1973. Afterward, LtGen Petersen commanded MAG–32 and became the fi rst black Marine general offi cer in 1979. The fi rst African-American three-star Marine general offi cer, he retired following his tenure as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. At the time of his retirement, LtGen Petersen held the distinction of being the senior naval aviator.

Throughout Into the Tiger’s Jaw, LtGen Petersen refl ects on those personal and professional episodes that defi ned his life. The father of four and fi rst black Marine to command a fi ghter squadron, a MAG, a Marine amphibious brigade, a MAW, and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, his is a life rich with memorable experiences. In refl ecting on his personal sacrifi ces and triumphs, whether the end of his fi rst marriage and joy of his second marriage or the loss of a parent, LtGen Petersen remains candid and forthright—admirable characteristics that defi ne him. Through the retelling of his professional life and the challenges he faced, whether in command or on a staff, the general provides valuable leadership lessons on which all Marines may draw.

While with VMFA–212 in Korea, LtGen Petersen fl ew 64 combat missions and earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for his combat leadership and bravery on 15 June 1953, which he describes with characteristic modesty. Likewise, LtGen Petersen fl ew over 250 combat missions in Vietnam, received the Purple Heart after enemy antiaircraft fi re brought down his F–4B over the demilitarized zone, and commanded VMFA–314 when the Marine Corps Aviation Association honored the squadron with the inaugural

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http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/lejeune_leadership/Pages/proprogbranch.aspx

http://www.google.com/url?q=http://leadingmarines.com/2011/07/31/almar-02711-cmc-revision-of-the-professional-reading-program-list.aspx&sa=U&ei=cE3CUMPOCYWM0QGy7IHADA&ved=0CCwQFjAJ&usg=AFQjCNFkm93j8DaYJUgH_KLIJWTCD-UYPg



leaving many feeling that the current U.S. Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual is out of date in regards to operations in Afghanistan. . .

At the beginning of the war in 1914, the German High Command realized that “the German Corps was too large for its components to be employed to best effect.” By the end of 1915 they had modifi ed their doctrine and organization to best fi t their strategic

goals. One year! The U.S. was involved in Afghanistan for over fi ve years and the U.S. military never updated FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Confl ict (at the time included COIN). It was not until more than three years into Iraq, with a failing strategy and tremendous pressure to get out of Iraq that the U.S. published at blinding speed (one year) the current FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Today this manual is over fi ve years old, and . . no modifi cations have been made to the document for Afghanistan. The Germans in WW I only waited one year to realize their doctrine was out of date and rushed to update it. The book continues to give examples of how many times the German forces changed doctrine based on new British, or failed German tactics and stratagems.

In Command or Control, Samuels provides a comparative analysis of the German and British Armies between 1888 and 1918, focusing primarily on the development of defensive strategies. He posits and tests three hypotheses. First, the difference between the combat effectiveness of the German and British armies owed as much to the failings in British performance as to German superiority. Second, these differences in effectiveness were, in large measure, because the two armies held quite different philosophies of combat. Finally, these different philosophies of combat would be expressed most clearly in the command systems employed by the two armies.

To validate and test his hypotheses, Samuels compares the German method of decentralized control to the British ridged method of restrictive control and how each of these methods fared in different campaigns during WWI. This also relates to today’s COIN Manual as it applies to efforts to move to decentralized operations. The COIN Manual states that “Small unit actions in a COIN environment often have more impact than similar actions during major combat operations.” However, history has shown that large scale operations continue, such as Operation Anaconda’s 2002 attempt to

Robert M. Hanson Award for best fi ghter attack squadron. Later LtGen Petersen commanded MAG–32 and 1st MAW. In refl ecting on his commands as well as staff assignments, LtGen Petersen chronicles the racial integration of the Marine Corps unequivocally.

In his career, LtGen Petersen confronted racism inside and outside the Marine Corps; nevertheless, as he refl ects, the Marine Corps ethos enabled Marines to triumph over racism ultimately. Indeed, his commands illustrate the Marine Corps’ triumph. In 1970, as deteriorating race relations threatened to rent asunder the Nation, LtGen Petersen became the Special Assistant for Minority Affairs to the Commandant. His guidance to the Commandant, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense served the Marine Corps and the country well during this challenging time. Although the issues that confronted the Marine Corps would be ones the Service would continue to face, LtGen Petersen’s actions, then and later, played a pivotal role.

Into the Tiger’s Jaw should fi nd a place on every Marine’s bookshelf, but it has regrettable editorial shortcomings. Chronological inconsistencies and confl ations will frustrate informed readers. Although the vignettes provide valuable insight, Phelps does not integrate them into LtGen Petersen’s remembrances effectively. Fortunately, the value of the general’s narrative makes it easy to overlook these weaknesses, such is the importance of LtGen Petersen’s story. Indeed, LtGen Petersen, with Phelps, has written a thought-provoking and compelling autobiography, as well as a personal history of the modern U.S. Marine Corps. As such, Into the Tiger’s Jaw is a welcome addition to the literature, and one that should fi nd a home in all Marines’ libraries.

READ THE COMPLETE REVIEW BY PAUL D. GELPI

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE ONLINE

Understanding that in military history “past is often prologue," it would seem odd to return to a book on World War I to compare and contrast U.S. military efforts at adapting doctrine while at war. However, Samuels’ book shares some enlightening facts about how German and British forces attempted to modify strategic methods while embroiled in a trench warfare stalemate. This can be a lesson to today’s fi ght as U.S. forces must continually update and modify doctrine,


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COMMAND OR CONTROL: COMMAND, TRAINING AND TACTICS IN THE BRITISH AND GERMAN ARMIES, 1888 - 1918 MARTIN SAMUELS (FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS, 2003)

https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/bookreview/tiger%E2%80%99s-jaw-america%E2%80%99s-first-black-marine-aviator%E2%80%94-autobiography-lt-gen-frank-e-pe



place during confl ict, in the vain hope that military successes can at least infl uence political success, even if looks quite different than the U.S. government’s defi nition. . .

The conclusion of the book is what could be called the “Cliff Note” of the entire book. It is a quote from Colonel G.F.R. Henderson: “The study of war has done more for Prussia than educating its soldiers and producing a sound system of organization. It had led to the establishment of a sound system of command; and this system proved a marvelous instrument in the hands of a great leader. It was based on the recognition of three facts; fi rst, that an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters; second that the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation; and that intelligent cooperation is of infi nitely more value than mechanical obedience”. . .

READ THE COMPLETE REVIEW BY REYES Z. COLE

SMALL WARS JOURNAL ONLINE

For the past decade, the public has ranked the Marines as

the most prestigious service by a wide margin. After serving one

tour of duty in the Corps, you are considered a Marine for life and

expected to conduct yourself accordingly. Why? Because the

Commandant of the Marine Corps says so, that’s why, and once

a Marine, always a Marine.

In his new book, Aaron B. O’Connell investigates how

an organization averaging 180,000 active members has

succeeded in attracting such intergenerational fealty and

admiration. Covering the period from 1940 to 1965, Underdogs

is a scholarly work based on a decade

of research. An assistant professor

at the U.S. Naval Academy, O’Connell

enlivens his academic framework

with sharp anecdotes and assertive

personalities. He reaches several

conclusions about the Marine Corps,

some old and some refreshingly new.

He begins by describing the old,

well-known essence of the Marine

defeat a major Taliban force and Operation Moshtarak in 2010, the huge Marine Corps effort to re-take Marjeh. . .

The Germans believed in war as chaos and accordingly as much latitude was given to the local commander on the ground as possible. This allowed for greater fl exibility in trying and testing new tactics and stratagems that the Germans were able to replicate throughout their army. The book indicates that the Germans changed their strategic method of defense over fi ve times and showed themselves to be masters at quick analysis of battlefi eld and enemy attributes. Most notable was the German manifestation of the elastic defense. This was a change in doctrine due to huge German losses during British bombardments of the forward trench line. The elastic defense, in essence, was to thinly hold the fi rst line of defense and then allow the defenders to fall back as they saw fi t, drawing in the British forces beyond the range of their artillery, and fully into the range of all the German artillery and massed reserve formations used to cut off and destroy the outgunned and exhausted British soldiers. The Germans learned from their mistakes and quickly incorporated new doctrines. . .

The British rejected decentralization and relied on a strong frontal line believing the purpose of defense was to break up an attack, making it possible for a counterattack. Many in the British Army felt the dogma of British “restrictive control” to be a poor method of control, when compared to the fl exible German forces. A veteran of the Boer war criticized the strategy saying, “it was mechanical discipline, absorbing all individuality, forbidding either offi cer or man to move or fi re without direct command and throwing no further responsibility to the subordinate leaders." The book indicates only one time that the British seem to have changed stratagems, and one of those times was to merely copy the German tactic of defense. This turned out to be a tragic failure for the British since the German tactic was based on how the British forces conducted an attack. Therefore, when the Germans conducted their attack by their own methods, the copied defense technique failed.

A key issue to consider, between COIN and this book, is whether changing military doctrine matters if political strategic goals are absent or misinformed. The book does not identify confl icts between military and civilian strategies. Some pundits say that the U.S. government’s desired end-states in Iraq and Afghanistan are unattainable. Regardless of whether this is true or not, the U.S. military must continue to strive to ensure the latest and most up-to-date doctrine is in

UNDERDOGS: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MARINE CORPS AARON B. O'CONNELL (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2012)


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image: heroism in combat. Every Marine is a rifl eman, and

you do only one thing with a rifl e. There are no doctors or

chaplains in the Corps, only shooters. They pay a cost for their

aggressiveness. In World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq

and Afghanistan, the Marines absorbed proportionately heavier

casualties than the U.S. Army and other units such as the Special

Operations Command. In response, Marines forged a powerful

self-identity that O’Connell calls a narrative of exceptionalism.

While Army draftees in World War II and Korea saw themselves

as citizens fi rst and soldiers by necessity, the Marines held

themselves apart from society. One advertising slogan summed

up that attitude: “We don’t promise you a rose garden.”

The Marine motto was the “fi rst to fi ght” — and mayhap to

die. To cope with that loss of life and limb, they embraced an

ethos that transcended any one life or any one time. O’Connell

refers to this tradition as “the Marine belief in a timeless

community of the living and the dead.” That community’s most

famous members — like Smedley Butler, John Basilone, Chesty

Puller and Jim Mattis — shared the trait of boldness in battle and

defi ance of death. Starting in boot camp, a Marine learned about

a heritage two centuries in the making.

The tradition persists today. Last year, for instance, when

a string of improvised explosive devices killed and maimed six

Marines in southern Afghanistan, the company commander

exhorted his men to remember the hardships borne by that

same company in Korea, 61 years earlier. The next day, the

Marines again attacked, some with waiting tourniquets strapped

to their legs so they could staunch the bleeding when the next

IED scythed through their ranks.

That Spartan code of the Marines is well-known; what

O’Connell adds is a new insight. He argues that for several

decades in the mid-20th century, the Marines were an

organizational underdog, fi ghting for survival against the U.S.

Army and the White House. The Marine Corps risked being

disbanded after World War II. In the view of Army generals,

there was no need for two land forces; the Marines should revert

to their 18th-century mission as guards on board Navy ships.

Both President Truman, who had proudly served in the U.S.

Army, and President (and former Army General) Eisenhower saw

merit in a small or nonexistent Marine Corps. In response, the

Marines sought allies in the public and in Congress. O’Connell

weaves a tale of intrigue, describing how the Corps survived the

bureaucratic wars in Washington by engaging in guerrilla politics.

. . Today's Marine Corps is no longer the underdog, scrapping

for its existence. Marines are now part of an integrated military

machine, where the four services perform all tasks jointly. .

. the Marine Corps, even as its size diminishes, will retain "an ideology of elitism, superiority, and paranoia . . . which shares some similarities with American exceptionalism [and keeps] the Marines forever on the attack.”

READ THE REVIEW BY BING WEST

THE WASHINGTON POST ONLINE


The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter provides "initial impressions" summaries that identify key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risks or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. In addition, some information in this newsletter has been compiled from publicly available sources and is not offi cial USMC policy. Although the information has been gathered from reliable sources, the currency and completeness of the information is subject to change and cannot be guaranteed.

The results of a number of recently completed, ongoing and planned collection efforts are scheduled to be documented in MCCLL reports within the next few months. “Stay tuned” for these MCCLL products:

▪ Results from the Regimental Combat Team 5 Lessons Learned Conference

▪ Air Operations in Support of Logistics

▪ Afghanistan Redeployment, Retrograde, Reset and Reconstitution (R4) Operations

▪ Security Force Assistance in OEF

▪ Marine Corps Forces, Pacifi c (MARFORPAC) Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Exercises

▪ Virtual Support to the Marine Air Ground Task Force: Intelligence Reach-Back to I Marine Expeditionary Force

▪ The Combat Logistics Regiment/Combat Logistics Battalion Transition in OEF

▪ Ground Combat Element (GCE) Unit Deployment Program (UDP) - 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

MCCLL Products “in the Pipeline”

http://www.google.com/url?q=http://thewashingtonpost.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx%3Fissue%3D10582012112500000000001001%26page%3D27%26article%3Df038181f-8089-48c2-83b2-80e01aac986a%26key%3DvmHSQ8wwkAwafT5PCuC9fQ%3D%3D%26feed%3Drss&sa=U&ei=Xk7CUMvuM6fs0QGhnIDwBQ&ved=0CBgQFjAB&usg=AFQjCNF3R0g58H_XeylWwY45uP2F-bOmjA


DECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 12 20DECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 8, ISSUE 12 20

Contact Information for MCCLL Program AnalystsContact information for Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives at major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. In many cases, both commercial telephone numbers and Defense Switched Network (DSN) numbers are provided.

Individuals from commands and organizations that do not have a MCCLL representative may contact the MCCLL Operations Offi cer at (703) 432-1284.

Questions or comments (or requests to be added to the MCCLL newsletter distribution list) can be directed to: Mr. Harry T. Johnson, Editor: (703) 432-1279 │ DSN: 378-1279.

Regional Command Southwest & Subordinate Commands, Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan DSN: (318) 357-2543

HQMC PP&O, Pentagon, Arlington, VA(703) 571-1068DSN: (312) 671-1068

MARCENT, MacDill AFB, FL(813) 827-4585DSN: (312) 651-4585

MAGTF TC, 29 Palms, CA(760) 830-8196DSN: (312) 230-8196

I MEF and 1st MLG Camp Pendleton, CA(760) 725-5931DSN: (312) 365-5931

1st MARDIV Camp Pendleton, CA(760) 763-4285DSN: (312) 361-4285

3d MAW, MCAS Miramar, CA(858) 577-5202│5163DSN: (312) 267-5202

II MEF, Camp Lejeune, NC(910) 451-3192DSN: (312) 751-3192

2d MARDIV, Camp Lejeune, NC(910) 451-8161DSN: (312) 751-8161

2d MAW, Cherry Point, NC(252) 466-3193DSN: (312) 582-3193

2d MLG, Camp Lejeune, NC(910) 451-6924DSN: (312) 751-6924

III MEF & 1st MAW Okinawa, JapanDSN: (315) 622-9218

3d MARDIV & 3d MLGOkinawa, JapanDSN: (315) 622-7358

Hawaii MarinesKaneohe Bay, Hawaii(808) 257-5939DSN: (315) 257-5939

MARFORRES, 4th MAW & 4th MLGNew Orleans, LA(504) 697-7322DSN: (312) 647-7322

4th MARDIVNew Orleans, LA(504) 697-7334DSN: (312) 647-7334

MARFORCOM & DD J7 JCOANorfolk, VA(757) 836-2797DSN: (312) 836-2797

MCCDCQuantico, VA(703) 784-2871DSN: (312) 278-2871

JCS J-7 Representative at MCCLLQuantico, VA(703) 432-1316DSN: (312) 378-1316

CALL Representative at MCCLLQuantico, VA(703) 432-1649DSN: (312) 378-1649


mailto:[email protected]

Draft MCCLL December 2012 Newsletter · 2013. 9. 12. · in Afghanistan from the Civil-Military...

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