Dr. Stefan Handke, ACQUIN...Dr. Stefan Handke, ACQUIN Literature cited Bach, T. (2015). 15 Years...
1
Introduction Quality assurance (QA) in higher education is mainly done in order to increase the quality of study programmes and governance at higher education institutions (HEIs). It is a key premise that (higher) education is crucial to the advancement of individuals and society at large. Students are main beneficiaries of QA, since they receive a sound education and can rely on quality standards being in place. Therefore, students are expected to participate in external peer reviews in their own interest. At the same time, the case of Germany shows a decreasing motivation of students to take part as reviewers in accreditation procedures. Under the assumption that higher education can be treated as a public good in Germany with its mainly public HEIs, rational choice theory explains the discrepancy between expectations and reality. Theory Higher education (with good quality) is conceived as a public good, “whose consumption does not diminish its availability to other consumers” (Samuel- son, 1954). To be qualified as a public good, the good must be both non- excludable and non- rivalrous (Musgrave 1969). A non-excludable good is one which a provider cannot charge consumers for; non-rivalry means that the use of additional consumers does not affect the consumption (in terms of quality and quantity) of others. The price for a public good is zero, as long as market mechanisms do not work. In social choice theory, the provision of public goods is often connected with the problem of free-riding. This is a situation where individuals are able to consume a good without paying. This creates a situation where there is little incentive to pay for the good – instead, people hope that others pay for it and they can get the good and save their money (Olson, 1965). Contact Dr. Stefan Handke, Managing Director Accreditation, Certification and Quality Assurance Institute (ACQUIN) Brandenburger Straße 2, 95448 Bayreuth, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] © Copyright Stefan Handke Results Students gain from well-structured, approved study programmes since they are stakeholders being most directly affected by higher education. Against this background, students are expected to have rational incentives to participate in accreditation procedures and to promote their specific interests. However, the example of the German “Studentischer Akkreditierungspool” – a kind of self- governing body of students – reveals shortcomings with students’ participation in procedures, which contribute to the provision of high quality education. The German Student Accreditation Pool In 2000, the German Student Accreditation Pool (GSAP) has been established as a central body for student participation in QA. The Pool recruits students from representative bodies at German HEIs and provides trainings for peer review procedures. This elaborate system, which is supported by accreditation agencies, enables students to act as well-informed reviewers within teams. At the same time it excludes those students who are not part of the organization and who did not pass any training workshop. Thus, being a student reviewer is associated with time and effort, which is nothing else than costs for the individual. For a couple of years, accreditation agencies in Germany notice significant problems of the GSAP to send enough (and eligible) students for peer reviews. Utility Functions of Students Reasons for the underlying problem of low self-recruitment rates are not only specific participation requirements of the GSAP, but it also reflects the general phenomenon of low motivation to contribute to any public goods. Thus, the decreasing student participation in peer review procedures is interpreted as a typical free rider problem. Even if students get the same remuneration as the other members of a review team, the expected profits (covering also immaterial aspects) of participating in accreditation procedures are not high enough to outweigh expected costs. Since the market price for a public good is zero, the willingness to pay – in terms of costs arising from trainings and other activities – is very low. In a system where higher education and QA are public services, students enjoy the provision of high quality education without any individual contributions – as long as others (cooperators) support the provision of this public good (Williams 2016). Conclusions Quality assurance and accreditation in Germany receive decreasing public attention. (as Google Trends shows, figure below). This could be interpreted as a positive finding, because it might express an overall satisfaction with the quality of higher education in Germany. This observation comes along with the finding that students treat decent higher education as a public good, which is provided by public institutions. Therefore, neither the provision of the good nor its enhancement by participating in accreditation procedures is appealing for rational actors. With the decreasing motivation of students to contribute in accreditation procedures, which cause individual costs, the free-riding problem in external QA becomes visible. In order to motivate students to participate in accreditation procedures in a system like the German one, incentives have to be created, which change the individual utility function. As long as higher education remains a public good, the individual profits of student experts have to be highlighted, e.g. intrinsic factors, pecuniary incentives or other benefits. Some HEIs already started to recognize activities in internal QA as social competences being part of study programmes. For external reviews, some accreditation agencies abroad consider to increase the compensation for student experts. Dr. Stefan Handke, ACQUIN Literature cited Bach, T. (2015). 15 Years Student Accreditation Pool in Germany: Achievements, Failures and Future Challenges. Paper presented at the 10th European Quality Assurance Forum. Musgrave, R.A. (1969). Provision for Social Goods. In Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Production and Consumption and their Relations to the Private Sector. Margolis and Guitton (eds.). London: Macmillan. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard Economic Studies 124. Samuelson, P.A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (4), 387- 389. Williams, G. (2016) Higher Education: Public good or private commodity. London Review of Education, 14 (1), 131-142. High Quality Education as a Public Good: Recruitment Problems of Student Experts in QA procedures due to Free Riding? Excludable Non- Excludable Rival Private Goods Common Goods Non- Rival Club Goods Public Goods Google queries for „Quality Assurance“ (red) and „Accreditation“ (blue) in Germany 2004 – 2018; Source: Google Trends
Transcript of Dr. Stefan Handke, ACQUIN...Dr. Stefan Handke, ACQUIN Literature cited Bach, T. (2015). 15 Years...
-
IntroductionQuality assurance (QA) in higher education is mainly donein order to increase the quality of study programmes andgovernance at higher education institutions (HEIs). It is akey premise that (higher) education is crucial to theadvancement of individuals and society at large. Studentsare main beneficiaries of QA, since they receive a soundeducation and can rely on quality standards being in place.Therefore, students are expected to participate inexternal peer reviews in their own interest.At the same time, the case of Germany shows adecreasing motivation of students to take part asreviewers in accreditation procedures. Under theassumption that higher education can be treated as apublic good in Germany with its mainly public HEIs,rational choice theory explains the discrepancy betweenexpectations and reality.
Theory
Higher education (withgood quality) is conceivedas a public good, “whoseconsumption does notdiminish its availability toother consumers” (Samuel-son, 1954). To be qualifiedas a public good, the goodmust be both non-excludable and non-rivalrous (Musgrave 1969).A non-excludable good isone which a providercannot charge consumersfor; non-rivalry means thatthe use of additionalconsumers does not affectthe consumption (in termsof quality and quantity) ofothers.
The price for a public goodis zero, as long as marketmechanisms do not work.In social choice theory, theprovision of public goods isoften connected with theproblem of free-riding.This is a situationwhere individuals are ableto consume a good withoutpaying. This creates asituation where there islittle incentive to pay forthe good – instead, peoplehope that others pay for itand they can get the goodand save their money(Olson, 1965).
ContactDr. Stefan Handke, Managing DirectorAccreditation, Certification and Quality Assurance Institute (ACQUIN)Brandenburger Straße 2, 95448 Bayreuth, GermanyE-Mail: [email protected]
© Copyright Stefan Handke
ResultsStudents gain from well-structured, approved studyprogrammes since they are stakeholders being most directlyaffected by higher education. Against this background,students are expected to have rational incentives toparticipate in accreditation procedures and to promote theirspecific interests. However, the example of the German“Studentischer Akkreditierungspool” – a kind of self-governing body of students – reveals shortcomings withstudents’ participation in procedures, which contribute tothe provision of high quality education.
The German Student Accreditation PoolIn 2000, the German Student Accreditation Pool (GSAP)has been established as a central body for studentparticipation in QA. The Pool recruits students fromrepresentative bodies at German HEIs and providestrainings for peer review procedures. This elaboratesystem, which is supported by accreditation agencies,enables students to act as well-informed reviewers withinteams. At the same time it excludes those students who arenot part of the organization and who did not pass anytraining workshop. Thus, being a student reviewer isassociated with time and effort, which is nothing else thancosts for the individual.For a couple of years, accreditation agencies in Germanynotice significant problems of the GSAP to send enough(and eligible) students for peer reviews.
Utility Functions of StudentsReasons for the underlying problem of low self-recruitmentrates are not only specific participation requirements of theGSAP, but it also reflects the general phenomenon of lowmotivation to contribute to any public goods. Thus, thedecreasing student participation in peer review procedures isinterpreted as a typical free rider problem.Even if students get the same remuneration as the othermembers of a review team, the expected profits (coveringalso immaterial aspects) of participating in accreditationprocedures are not high enough to outweigh expected costs.Since the market price for a public good is zero, thewillingness to pay – in terms of costs arising from trainingsand other activities – is very low.In a system where higher education and QA are publicservices, students enjoy the provision of high qualityeducation without any individual contributions – as long asothers (cooperators) supportthe provision of this publicgood (Williams 2016).
Conclusions
Quality assurance and accreditation in Germany receivedecreasing public attention. (as Google Trends shows, figurebelow). This could be interpreted as a positive finding,because it might express an overall satisfaction with thequality of higher education in Germany.This observation comes along with the finding that studentstreat decent higher education as a public good, which isprovided by public institutions. Therefore, neither theprovision of the good nor its enhancement by participatingin accreditation procedures is appealing for rational actors.
With the decreasing motivation of students to contribute inaccreditation procedures, which cause individual costs, thefree-riding problem in external QA becomes visible.In order to motivate students to participate in accreditationprocedures in a system like the German one, incentiveshave to be created, which change the individual utilityfunction.As long as higher education remains a public good, theindividual profits of student experts have to behighlighted, e.g. intrinsic factors, pecuniary incentives orother benefits.Some HEIs already started to recognize activities in internalQA as social competences being part of study programmes.For external reviews, some accreditation agencies abroadconsider to increase the compensation for student experts.
Dr. Stefan Handke, ACQUIN
Literature citedBach, T. (2015). 15 Years Student
Accreditation Pool in Germany:Achievements, Failures and FutureChallenges. Paper presented at the10th European Quality AssuranceForum.
Musgrave, R.A. (1969). Provision forSocial Goods. In Public Economics: AnAnalysis of Public Production andConsumption and their Relations to thePrivate Sector. Margolis and Guitton(eds.). London: Macmillan.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of CollectiveAction: Public Goods and the Theoryof Groups. Harvard Economic Studies124.
Samuelson, P.A. (1954). The Pure Theoryof Public Expenditure. The Review ofEconomics and Statistics, 36 (4), 387-389.
Williams, G. (2016) Higher Education:Public good or private commodity.London Review of Education, 14 (1),131-142.
High Quality Education as a Public Good: Recruitment Problems of Student Experts in QA
procedures due to Free Riding?
Excludable Non-Excludable
RivalPrivate Goods
Common Goods
Non-Rival
Club Goods
Public Goods
Google queries for „Quality Assurance“ (red) and „Accreditation“ (blue) in Germany 2004 – 2018; Source: Google Trends
