Dr. Jonathan E. Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage [email protected]

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Experimental Economics: Short Course Universidad del Desarrollo Santiago, Chile December 15-17, 2009 Dr. Jonathan E. Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage [email protected]

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Experimental Economics: Short Course Universidad del Desarrollo Santiago, Chile December 15-17, 2009. Dr. Jonathan E. Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage [email protected]. Handbook of Experimental Economics: Table of Contents. Handbook 1995. New in 2010. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Dr. Jonathan E. Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage [email protected]

Page 1: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Experimental Economics: Short CourseUniversidad del Desarrollo

Santiago, ChileDecember 15-17, 2009

Dr. Jonathan E. AlevyDepartment of Economics

University of Alaska [email protected]

Page 2: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Handbook of Experimental Economics: Table of Contents

Handbook 1995

Public GoodsIndustrial OrganizationAuctionsCoordination ProblemsExperimental Asset MarketsBargaining ExperimentsIndividual Decision Making

New in 2010

Social preferencesNeuroeconomics Political economyGender, discrimination, and

culture LearningField ExperimentsMarket Design

Page 3: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Why Experiment?• Experimental economics has been the

protagonist of one of the most stunning methodological revolutions in the history of science.– Francesco Guala, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

• Core of the methodological advance– Making the unobservable (latent variables) observable

Page 4: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Example: Inducing Supply and Demand

• The study of…suitably motivated individuals in laboratory settings has important application to the … verification of theories of the economic system– Vernon Smith, 1976, AER

• Application of induced values to supply and demand Vernon Smith, Nobel prize 2002

• “Just do it” – Vernon Smith

Rasmuson Chair Emeritus University of Alaska Anchorage

Page 5: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Let’s do it

• Go to • http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login.htm• Join session apr1

Page 6: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Double Auction Results

• Contrast to textbook treatment– Competitive market assumptions not met• Small number of buyers & sellers• Price makers• Limited information

– Teaching and research tool

Page 7: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Course Outline1. Methods and Methodology– Controlling and/or measuring preferences – Treatment design & analysis– Lab & field experiments

2. Substantive areas– Individual choice– Auction & Asset Markets– Entrepreneurship

3. Purposes– Testing theory, looking for facts, policy

4. Resources for experimentalists– Research – Teaching

Page 8: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Methods and Methodology I: Fundamentals

• Treatment and Control– Comparison allows identification of causal effect• Comparison either to theory or baseline experiment

• What motivates behavior? – “homegrown values” subjects bring to experiment• May need to measure • Relevant in lab and field settings

– Induced values: created by researcher • For example, the value of a fictitious good. • Researcher knows the value for each subject.

Page 9: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Precepts for induced values1. Non-satiation • more of the reward is better

2. Salience • payoff depends on actions• difference between alternatives are significant

3. Dominance • rewards dominate any subjective costs of

participation4. Privacy • information only about own payoff

Page 10: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Conclusion on Induced values• Compensation can be a treatment variable– Real versus hypothetical payments

• However: Standard practice for publication– Pay your subjects!

• Payment differences must depend on behavior– Differences large enough to focus attention

• Amount must exceed opportunity cost of time – At least “in expectation”

• Economists view contrasts with some psychologists– More evidence on this below

Page 11: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Methods and Methodology II

• Randomization of subjects to treatment & role– Equalize distribution of observable &

unobservable characteristics across treatments• Fundamental to valid statistical inference

– All causes model

– Example: Let equal market efficiency, information condition

– Randomization and design choices held constant

nXXfY ,...,1

1XY

nXX ,...,2

Page 12: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Methods and Methodology III

• Replication– Support or dispute previous results– Extend previous results

• Knowledge accumulates– A strength of laboratory experiments

• Literatures we will examine– Risk elicitation – Asset markets

• Can be a challenge for field experiments– But extremely important contributions

» Especially in combination & contrast with lab results

Page 13: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Methods and Methodology IV:Experimental Design Choices

• Within vs. Between subject design– Within design has subjects participating in more than one

treatment. • Confound treatment effect with learning.

– Between subject design has subjects participating in only one treatment. • Clean comparison

• Other issues– No deception!!

• Loss of control.• Contamination of subject pool.• Unable to publish

Page 14: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Control: Elicitation of homegrown values

• Elicitation– What’s in there?• Risk attitudes, time preferences, belief, valuation (WTP

& WTA)

– Psychologists question preference stability and other aspects of economic rationality• Anchoring, preference reversals

Page 15: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Summary: Clean design

• What practices reduce (not eliminate), so that we can plausibly say we have controlled environment– Randomization to treatment – Clear instructions– Control for experience & order effects– Ceteris Paribus: Change one thing only

Page 16: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Risk Elicitation• “Risk attitudes are confounding unobservables that

have remained latent in a wide range of experiments.”– Cox and Harrison, 2008– E.g. auction theory for risk neutral bidders, but bidders risk

preferences are unknown.

• Risk Elicitation methods– Multiple Price List (MPL)

• Holt & Laury 2002 – BDM

• Becker DeGroot & Marschak 1963– Tradeoff method

• Wakker & Deneffe, 1996

Page 17: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Let’s do it

• Google veconlab & find participant login• http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login.htm• Group is split across two sessions, jev3 and

jev4– If your participant number is odd • join jev3

– If your particpant number is even• join jev4

Page 18: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Risk Elicitation• Risk Aversion & Incentive Effects– Holt Laury, AER, 2002

• Research Question– Impact of hypothetical vs. salient payments on risk

attitudes– Tversky & Kahneman: hypothetical payments are

ok.• People know how they would behave in actual situations• Have no reason to disguise their true preferences

Page 19: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Holt & Laury Elicitation Results

Hypothetical payments Real payments

Page 20: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Critique HL Treatment Design• Holt Laury protocol, within subjects• Treatment Elicitation Protocol

First Second Third

T1 Real 1 Hypo 20 Real 20

• Harrison et al. critique. Scale is correlated with order. – Requires between subjects design (T1 and T2)

• Treatment Elicitation Protocol First Second

T1 Real 1 Real 10T2 Real 10

Page 21: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Harrision et al. result: order matters

Page 22: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Importance

• Holt and Laury– Confound order & scale effect– Result: Overstate the importance of scale

• Stastical note: – Harrison et al. use ordered probit• Choices are naturally ordered (1-10)

– However, choices are not independent (within subjects)• Use error components model to control for repeated

choices.

Page 23: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

Alternative Elicitation

• BDM: See handout

Page 24: Dr. Jonathan E.  Alevy Department of Economics University of Alaska Anchorage afja@uaa.alaska

• Resources– Working paper listserv distributed by Dan Houser – Software cites– Teaching materials– Charlie Holt’s webpage to run experiments and

get impression of different instructions: http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.htm